REPRESSION,CIVILCONFLICT,ANDLEADERSHIPTENURE:CASESTUDY
OFTHEDEMOCRATICREPUBLICOFCONGO1
Thismaterialisbaseduponworkgenerouslysupportedby,orinpartby,theUSArmyResearch
LaboratoryandtheU.S.ArmyResearchOfficeundergrantnumberW911NF-14-1-0485.
1WearegratefultoKyleRenner,ValeriyaDenisova,MichaelGreco,andCaraParrellawhocopyeditedandcritiqued
thewriting.
2WerefertothecountryasCongoorDRCthroughout,exceptforthe1971through1997period,whenPresident
1
Table of contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 3
I. DRC OVERVIEW AND RECENT HISTORY ........................................................................... 5
A. KING LEOPOLD'S COLONY ............................................................................................................ 6
B. THE 1960 INDEPENDENCE AND THE RISE OF MOBUTU ........................................................... 7
C. DEMOCRATIZATION, CIVIL WAR, AND THE RISE OF LAURENT KABILA ................................. 8
D. "POST-CONFLICT" CONGO AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTEMPORARY CRISIS .............. 11
II. THE NATURE OF REPRESSION IN THE DRC .................................................................. 13
A. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPRESSION ............................................................................... 13
а. REPRESSION OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION ............................................................................ 13
b. INADEQUATE GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND IMPUNITY IN THE DRC ....................... 14
B. VIOLENT REPRESSION ................................................................................................................ 17
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL CONFLICT AND REPRESSION ........................ 18
IV. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESSION IN DRC ........ 18
A. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES .................................................................................................... 18
B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES .................................................................................. 20
C. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES ........................................................................ 21
V. THE CONGOLESE PUBLIC’S RESPONSE TO REPRESSION ......................................... 21
VI. CONGO REPRESSION, CIVIL CONFLICT AND LEADERSHIP TENURE: ANSWERS TO
OUR THREE QUESTIONS ...................................................................................................... 22
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS .............................................................................................. 22
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 24
2
ExecutiveSummary
TheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)providesaglimpseintoacountrywithanauthoritarianregime,
highlevelsofrepression,andlowsocio-economicdevelopment.Althoughleadershavelongbeen
repressiveintheDRC,wefoundtherelationshipbetweenrepressionandcivilconflictinthecountry
difficulttountangle.
Afteritbecameanindependentnation,MobutuSesoSeko,thefirstleaderoftheDRC,reliedonviolent
tacticstoeliminatethosewhochallengedhimonhisrisetopower.Hefavoredmembersofhisownethnic
groupintheeastofthecountry,andallowedthosewarlordstoreapeconomicbenefitsattheexpenseof
mostofthepeopleinthoseregions.Hefunneledfundsintohisprivateaccountsanddidnotallowpolitical
opposition.Resistanceeffortswerecrushed.However,overtime,pressurefordemocraticreformsledhim
tomakeconcessionsuntiltheFirstCongoWarerupted.
MobutuhadalreadyexploitedtensionsbetweenHutusandTutsisineasternCongo.WhentheRwandan
genocidespilledoverintoCongo,itignitedawarthatstillsparksskirmishestoday.The1994Rwandan
genocidefurtherinflamedtensionsintheDRC,threateningMobutu’sregime.Hesoughtreassuranceand
assistancefromseveralotherAfricannations,whiletheUgandangovernmentslookedforwaystoousthim
frompowertoaidtheirowninterestsintheCongo’svastnaturalresources.In1996,theUgandan
governmentsponsoredtheAlliancedesForcesDémocratiquespourlaLibérationdeCongo(AFDL)toenter
ZaireandoustMobutu.LaurentKabila,along-timecriticofMobutu,ledtheAFDL.ThoughKabilaseized
powerinacoupin1997,hisreigndidnotlast.Heinstitutedeconomicreformsthatangeredthosewhohad
benefitedfromMobutu’spatronageanditmeantRwandaandUgandadidnotreapthebenefitsofthe
Congo’smineralresources.Kabilawasoustedincoup,sponsoredbyRwandaandUganda,andupto40
distinctarmiesormilitiaswereactiveinthecountryasdifferentnationsandgroupsviedforpower.
Anuneasyceasefirewasbrokeredin2003,butviolencecontinuedtofesterineasternCongo,generally
alongethniclines.Duringthewar,childsoldierswereemployedandsexualviolencewasrampant.Under
thecontemporaryleadershipofJosephKabila,thegovernmenthasprosecutedsomewarcriminals,but
manyassailantshaveneverbeenbroughttojustice.JosephKabila’sreelectionbidwasfraughtwithseveral
accusationsofelectionfraudandirregularities.Protestsagainsthisregimearetypicallymetwithharsh
resistance.Thoughtheeconomyhasgrownunderhisleadership,therearefewopportunitiesformost
peopleintheDRC.NewconcernshavearisenineasternCongowithreportsofradicalIslamistsfrom
UgandaspillingovertheborderintotheDRC.Moreover,JosephKabilahasindicatedthathemaynotstep
downfrompowerinNovemberattheendofhisterminoffice.
TheDRCisacomplicatedcase;thecasestudymaynotsupportourgeneralizedfindingsfromour
quantitativeresearch.Thegovernment,particularlytheMobuturegime,usedallformsofrepression,often
preemptively,ratherthaninresponsetorebellionorconflict.Moreover,manyindividualsintheDRCare
sodeprivedthatorganizingpoliticalprotestsseemsunlikely.Theinternationalcommunitynowconsiders
theDRCapost-conflictsociety,butfailstorecognizetheongoingsporadicviolenceintheeasternpartof
thecountry.FromaWesternperspective,turningablindeyetotheinstabilityineasternCongobeing
dangerous,asradicalIslamiststhriveinplacesinwhichlawandorderbreakdown.Meanwhile,thisis
preciselythethreatthatJosephKabilamayusetohisadvantageinNovember.
3
Q1.Docitizensresponddifferentlywhenconfrontedwithpoliticalrepression,violentrepressionor
amixofrepressivetactics?
Thehistoricalevidenceismixed.Duringhisregime,Mobutuusedbothviolentandpoliticalrepressionto
maintaincontrolandfunnelwealthtohimselfandhiscronies.Inhisbidtoseizepower,heorganizedtwo
coupsshortlyafterCongoleseindependencefromBelgium.Aftergainingabsoluteauthority,Mobutukilled
manypoliticalopponents.Duringthe1980’sandearly1990’s,publicuprisingsforcedMobututoinitiate
somedemocraticreforms,buthemaintainedhisgriponpowerandrewardedmembersofhisownethnic
group,furtherinflamingethnictensionsintheDRC.WhenconflictspilledoverfromRwanda,individuals
begantorespondviolentlytotheeconomicandpoliticalrepressionperpetratedbytheMobuturegime.
WhenKabilatookpowerandinstitutedeconomicreforms,someoftheethnicgroupswhohadbenefited
fromMobutu’scorruptpractices,wereangry.TheRwandanandUgandangovernmentsbackedviolent
uprisingsaimedatremovingLaurentKabilafrompower.SincetheSecondCongoleseWar,thegovernment
hasoftenusedpoliticalrepression,includingpossibleelectionfraud,tomaintainpower.JosephKabilahas
oftengovernedwithimpunityandtherehavebeensporadicuprisingsinresponsetohisrule.Moreover,
inadequategovernancehascontributedtorebellioninrecentyears.TheeasternportionofCongo
experiencesviolentflair-upsonaregularbasis,usuallyalongethniclines,butnotnecessarilyinresponse
toanyparticularactsofrepression.
Q2.Doofficialsusedifferenttypesofrepressioninresponsetodifferenttypesofcivilconflict?
InCongo,officialsseemtouseviolentandpoliticalrepression.Whileviolentuprisingsarecertainlymet
withviolentformsofrepression,itisnotclearwhetherthereisasystematicuseofdifferentformsof
repression.PoliticalrepressionhasbeenalmostconstantsinceCongo’sindependencefromBelgium.Asa
result,politicalrepressionhasoftenprecededconflict,ratherthanbeingundertakeninresponsetoit.
Moreover,violentrepressionhasoftenbeenusedinresponsetopoliticalrebellionoroppositiongroups.
Therefore,wecannotdiscernapatternofrepressivetacticsinresponsetoconflict.
Q3.Doestheuse,andtypeofrepression(whetherpolitical,violentorsomecombination)increase
thelikelihoodthatrulersretainpower?
Forthefirst30yearsfollowingCongoleseindependence,repressivetacticshelpedPresidentMobutu
maintainpower.Heusedviolentrepressiontoeliminatehispoliticalopposition,andusedpoliticaland
economicrepressiontofavorsomegroupsoverotherstoformanetworkofcronieswhobenefitedfromhis
regime.Itcertainlyseems,inthiscase,thatbothformsofrepressioncontributedtothelong-lastingtenure
ofMobutu.Inrecentyears,thedemocraticallyelectedJosephKabilahasusedrepressivetactics.However,
theireffectremainstobeseen.Inrecentmonths,Kabilaandhisgovernmentofficialshaveindicatedthat
theywillbeunabletoorganizeelectionsintimefortheendofhisterminNovember.Thispolitical
maneuveringcouldhelphimhangontopowerforyearsafterhiselectedterminofficewastohaveended.
4
I.DemocraticRepublicofCongoOverviewandRecentHistory
TheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(hereafterDRC,andformerlyZaire),whichsitsintheGreatLakes
regionofAfrica,isavolatilecountry,havingexperiencednumerousoutbreaksofcivilstrifeoverthepast
50years.2
TheDemocraticRepublicofCongoandthesurroundingcountries
Source:CIAFactbookonDemocraticRepublicofCongo.LastupdatedonMay5,2016
TheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoisborderedbyninecountries:Angola,Burundi,CentralAfrican
Republic,RepublicoftheCongo,Rwanda,SouthSudan,Tanzania,Uganda,andZambia(CIAFactbook).Itis
thesecondlargestcountryinAfrica(behindAlgeria),andisthelargestsub-Saharancountryonthe
continent(CIAFactbook).Ithasapopulationofmorethan69millionpeople;thecapitalcityofKinshasais
hometomorethan11millionoftheDRC’scitizens(UNData2016).
TheofficiallanguagespokenintheDRCisFrench,thoughotherdialectsofSwahiliandKiswahiliarealso
spoken(CIAFactbook).Therearemorethan200ethnicgroupsintheCongo,thoughtheMongo,Luba,
Kongo,andtheMangbetu-Azandegroupsmakeupalmost50percentofthecountry’spopulation(CIA
Factbook).ThesocialandeconomicconditionsintheDRCarepoor.Lifeexpectancyinthecountryisless
than57years,andtheinfantmortalityrateisamongtheworstintheworld,at71deathsper1,000births
(CIAFactbook).Thougheconomicconditionsarebleak,theDRChasexhibitedsomerecentgrowthafter
recoveringfromdecadesofdecline(CIAFactbook).Thecountryexperiencedsystematiccorruptionfor
decadesundertheMobuturegime,andthensufferedgraveinstabilitythroughoutthe1990s(CIA
Factbook).However,inrecentyears,mininghasagaintakenoff,spurringeconomicgrowth(CIA
Factbook).Thecountry’seconomyhasexperiencedpositiveeconomicgrowthsince2002,andin2013the
Congo’sGDPgrewby8.5percent(UNdata2016,CIAFactbook).
2WerefertothecountryasCongoorDRCthroughout,exceptforthe1971through1997period,whenPresident
MobuturenamedthecountryZaire.Fordiscussionsofthecountryinthattimeperiod,wewillrefertoitasZaire.
Moreover,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)isnottobeconfusedwiththeRepublicofCongo,sometimes
referredtoasCongo-Brazzaville,orFrenchCongoduringthecolonialperiod.
5
Despitethisrecenteconomicgrowth,theDRCisstillsomewhatunstable.Conflictinneighboringcountries
hasplayedapartinmuchoftheinternalstrifeinthecountry,particularlysincethefalloftheMobutu
regime(Braithwaite:2010;Stearns:2011;andCIAFactbook).ThewarintheDRCfrom1998-2000sawthe
involvementofsevenotherAfricancountries,andbecameknownasAfrica’sFirstWorldWar(Daley2006).
Thoughapeaceagreementwassignedandasettlementreachedin2003,intermittentviolencehasbeen
commonplaceinseveralregions(Autesserre:2009).Inrecentmonths,violencehasflaredagaininthe
easternpartofthecountry,andforeigngovernmentsfearthatJosephKabila,theDRC’spresident,maynot
stepdownwhenhistermendsinNovember(Wroughton:2016;Ross:2016;andAssociatedPress:2016).
Theremainderofthissectionbrieflytracesthehistoricalcontextthathasledtocontinuedinstabilityinthe
country.
A.KingLeopold’sColony
TheDRChasaverylonghistoryofoutsideinfluence,beginninginthe1880’sandcontinuingthroughtothe
presentday.LikeotherAfricannations,theDRC’scolonialhistoryisasourceofitscontemporaryconflicts
(Melvern:2000;Daley:2006;Nest:2006;Nzongola-Ntalaja:2002;Stearns:2011;andvanReybrouck:
2014).KingLeopoldIIofBelgiumannexedalargeswatheoflandinCentralAfrica,withtheostensible
purposeofopeningfreetraderoutesacrossthecontinent(Hochschild:1998andReybrouck:2014).With
supportfromtheGermangovernment,whichbelievedBelgiummightbeamorereliabletradingpartner
thanFranceorPortugal,KingLeopoldgothiswishinJune1885(Reybrouck:2014:54-7).From18851908,theterritorywasknownastheCongoFreeState,andwasruledbytheAssociationInternationaledu
Congo,ratherthandirectlybyBelgium,andonlyalimitednumberofBelgianofficialoversawtheregion
(StengersandVansina:1985andReybrouck:2014).However,LeopoldIIwasthemonarchicalheadofthat
state,andhewieldedhisauthoritytoseizelargeswatheslandforharvestingrubberandivory(NzongolaNtalaja:2002).Indoingthis,Leopoldignoredtriballandtenuresystemsandhadentirevillagesforcibly
removedtomakewayforhiseffortsataccumulatingnaturalresourcewealth(Maurel:1992;Reader:1997;
andNzongola-Ntalaja:2002).HisquestforCongoleserubberandivoryledhimtodemandnativefarmers
worktoharvestrubber.Anyvillagesthatdidnotcomplywerebrutallyattackedandpunished(Hochschild:
1998andNzongola-Ntalaja:2002).Thus,Leopold’slegacyintheCongowasoneofeconomicexploitation
andpoliticalrepression(Antesy:1966;Hochschild:1998;Moore:2001;andNzongola-Ntalaja:2002).
DuringBelgiancolonialrule,theCongolesepeoplerebellednumeroustimesforvaryingreasons.Mutineers
fromthecolonialarmyrebelledfrom1895-1908,whichisonereasontheBelgiangovernmentofficially
colonizedthecountry(deBoeck:1987andNzongola-Ntalaja:2002).Moreover,variousreligiousgroups
rebelledfromtimetotime,andworkersandpeasantsoftenprotestedagainsttheharshworking
environmentstheywereforcedintobytheircolonialoverlords(Nzongola-Ntalaja:2002).
In1908,dueinparttothetumultuousnatureofsocietyintheCongoFreeState,LeopoldgaveuptheCongo
ashispersonalfiefdom,andhandedoverreignoftheterritorytotheBelgiangovernment(Hochschild:
1998;Daley:2006;andvanReybrouck:2014).However,littlechangedfortheCongolesepeople,asthe
Belgianauthoritiescontinuedtoexploittheregion’snaturalresourcesandrepressthempoliticallyand
culturally(Anstey:1966;Hochschild:1998;andNzongola-Ntalaja:2002).From1908until1960,theCongo
wasanofficialcolonyofBelgium,anditsnamechangedfromthe“CongoFreeState”tothe“BelgianCongo”
(Nzongola-Ntalaja:2002).Duringthisperiod,theBelgiangovernmentbeganextractingvastquantitiesof
naturalresources(namelycopper,atthattime,andlaterdiamondsandcoltan)fromtheCongo(Daley:
2006andNest:2006).BelgiumexploitedtheCongo’snaturalresourcesandusedthewealthgleanedfrom
itforthewareffortduringWorldWarII(Rodney:1973andNzongola-Ntalaja:2002).
6
FollowingWorldWarII,indigenouspeopleintheBelgianCongodebatedthepossibilitiesforits
independence.AlthoughBelgiumhadmanagedtodevelopagooddealofinfrastructureinthecountry,
therewerefeweducatedelitestohelpleaddissatisfiedbutdisparategroupsinabidforindependence
(Moore:2001).Amerefiveyearsbeforeithappened,noonedreamedofanindependentCongo(van
Reybrouck2014).Indeed,whenAntoinevanBilsengaveaveiledsuggestion,in1956,thattheCongocould
gainindependenceinaslittleas30years,manyexpatriatesintheCongowereoutraged(Bilsen:1956and
Moore:2001).Likewise,nationalistleaderPatriceLumumbaexpressedconcernovertheabilityofthe
Congolesepeopletogovernthemselves,astherewereonly16indigenousuniversitygraduatesbythetime
ofindependencein1960(Moore:2001).TheBelgiangovernmenthaddoneverylittletopromotealocal
eliteinthecolony,andsotherewerefewpre-placedindividualstogovern(McNulty:1999).However,the
eventthatfueledthepushforrapidindependencefromBelgiumwasareferendumintheneighboring
FrenchCongo(Moore:2001).Inearly1959,peopleinthecapitalcity(thenLeopoldville)begantoriot,and
BelgianofficialsrushedtohandovermoreauthoritytotheCongolesepeople(Moore:2001andWrong:
2001).
B.The1960IndependenceandtheRiseofMobutu
InJune1960,duringthewaveofdecolonizationthroughoutAfrica,theBelgiancolonyofCongowas
grantedindependence(CIAFactbook;Moore:2001;Daley:2006;andNest:2006).However,theBelgian
governmenthadpreviouslyrefusedtogiveoverauthorityofthearmedforcesorofthecountry’smineral
resources,andasaresult,independence“broughtalmostimmediateviolenceasCongolesesoldiers
mutiniedandBelgianparatrooperslentaidtothesecessionistadministrationofmineral-richKatanga”
(Moore:2001,47).TheKatangasecessionistswereactivefrom1960-1963andreceivedsupportfrom
coppermininginterestsinthearea,theBelgiangovernment,andlocalpoliticalactors(Nest:2006).The
transitionwasfurthermarredbyColdWarinfluencesintheregion,asboththeUSAandUSSRwerewaryof
aleaderwhomayfavortheopposition(Moore:2001andDaley:2006).TheUnitedStatesfearedSoviet
influenceinAfrica,justasinAsia,andworkedtoundermineleaderswithstrongcommunistleanings
(McNulty:1999).Nevertheless,inMayof1960,thenewlyformedDRChelditsfirstelectionsfornational
office,andPatriceLumumbawaselectedasPrimeMinister(Daley:2006andvanReybrouck:2014).
Lumumba’stenurewasshort-lived.Justweeksafterhetookoffice,Katangaprovinceseceded,andshortly
thereafter,Joseph-DésiréMobutuoustedLumumbainacoup;Lumumbawaslatermurdered,alongwith
someofhispoliticalallies(Daley:2006;Nest:2006;Zellig:2008;andGerardandKuklick:2015).AsNest
(2006)notes,
ThedemiseoftheLumumbagovernmentwasrootedinitsperceivedthreattotheeconomic
interestsofWesterngovernmentsandcorporations.Belgianbanksandminingcorporationshada
largestakeintheformercolonyandfearedthatLumumba’santicolonialandpopulistsentiments
wereevidenceofhisintentiontonationalizetheeconomy—fearsthatwererootedintheirdesireto
maintaincontroloverCongoleseresources.TheUnitedStatesalsoviewedLumumba’squickening
tiestotheSovietUnionasevidenceofapendingalignmentwiththesocialistblocthatwouldextend
SovietandcommunistinfluenceintoAfrica,jeopardizingitsown(18).
Congowasbeingrippedapartafterithadonlyjustgaineditsindependence.Thecountryremainedin
crisisforfiveyears,withinvolvementfromtheUnitedNations,Belgianforces,corporateinterests,and
numerousrivalfactionswithinthecountry(Nugent:2004;Daley:2006;Zellig:2008;andvanReybrouck:
2014).
7
Afteryearsofinstability,andwithsupportfromtheUnitedStatesandBelgium,Mobutulaunchedhis
secondcoupd’etat,seizingabsoluteauthorityoftheCongoinNovember1965,andoustingthenPresident
Kasa-vubu(YoungandTurner:1985;McNulty:1999;Daley:2006;andNest:2006).Mobutuclaimedthat
theonlywaytorestoreorderinthevolatilecountrywastocentralizepowerinhisownhands(Youngand
Turner:1985;Young:1994;McNulty:1999;andNest:2006).Intheearlyyearsofhisrule,heproceededto
tortureandkilledmanypoliticalopponentsinanefforttoestablishabsolutepower(YoungandTurner:
1985andWrong:2001).Hisdesiretoexudeauthorityevenextendedtohisname,whichhechangedin
1972.Heeschewedhisbirthname,Joseph-DésiréMobutu,rebrandinghimself“MobutuSeseSekoKuku
NgbenduWaZaBanga,‘theall-powerfulwarriorwhogoesfromconquesttoconquest,leavingfireinhis
wake’”(Wrong:2001,4).Duringthatsametimeperiod,Mobutubeganaprocessof“authentication,”
wherebyheattemptedtoridtheCongooftheremnantsofcolonialinfluence(YoungandTurner:1985;
McNulty:1999;andWrong:2001).Hechangedthecountry’snametoZairein1971,renamedseveral
cities,includingKinshasa,whichhadbeencalledLeopoldvilleundercolonialrule,anddemandedchanges
indressforallCongolesecitizens(YoungandTurner:1985;Wrong:2001;andDaley:2006).
Inadditiontothesesymbolicchanges,Mobutualsoinstitutedvariouseconomicreforms.Togaingreater
wealthforthecountry,andtomakehimselfmoreindependentfromtheforeign-ownedmining
corporations,Mobutunationalizedcopperminingin1967anddiamondminingin1973(Nest:2006,18).
Healsonationalizedsomeplantationsandgrantedthemtohispoliticalallies(Nest:2006).Althoughthis
actionallowedMobututocollecttaxesandplacemoreCongoleseinemploymentwiththecompanies,it
alsomeantthatZairewasagreaterrisktofluctuationinmineralprices(Nest:2006).Thedownwardtrend
ofmineralpricesin1975meantsubsequentdecreasesinpayforstateemployeesandreducedstate
expenditureoninfrastructureandotherpublicservices(Nest:2006).Thoughthegeneralpublicwas
dissatisfied,Mobutumaintainedpowerbydirectingasmuchas20percentofthegovernment’sincome
directlytothepresident’soffice,andbyusingforcewhenhedeemeditnecessary(Bayart:1989;Leslie:
1993,36;McNulty:1999;andNest:2006).Usinghisvastaccumulatedwealth,Mobutuwasabletolinethe
pocketsofthosewhocouldhelpkeephiminpower(McNulty:1999).Hecontinuedtoconsolidatepowerin
hisownhandsandappointmembersofhisownethnicgrouptootherpositionsofauthority(Metz1996:8).
Somescholars,likeCrawfordYoung(1984)werepredictingthecollapseofZaireinthe1980s.Yet,Mobutu
managedtomaintainhisgriponpowerforanotherdecade.
C.Democratization,CivilWar,andtheRiseofLaurentKabila
In1991,withtheformationoftheSovereignNationalConference(SNC)Mobutufeltpressuretointroduce
democraticreformsinZaire(White:2005andNest:2006).However,MobuturesistedtheSNCandused
hisarmedforcestokeeptheconferencefrommeeting(Nest:2006).Publicservicesceasedtofunction,
publicsalariesstoppedtobepaid,andmanyunpaidsoldiersbeganlooting(Williame:1997andNest:
2006).Therewerewidespreadpublicuprisings,particularlyinKinshasa(White:2005).TheInternational
MonetaryFund(IMF)announcedin1991thatZairewasbehindonitspaymentsbymorethan$81million,
andtheorganizationceasedlendingmoneytothecountry(Metz:1996).In1994,Zairewasexpelledfrom
theIMF,andMobutuwasrunninglowontheresourcesneededtocontinueliningthepocketsofhis
politicalcronies(Metz:1996).Moreover,asMetz(1996,11)states,whentheColdWarended,“Mobutu's
strategicsignificancedeclinedandhiswesternbackerslosttheirtoleranceforhisfaults.”
Mobutu’sstatusasrulerwasprecarious.OnAugust4,1992,theCongoleseSNCvotedtoreverseMobutu’s
decisiontocallthecountryZaire,anddeclaredthatthenationshouldbecalledbyitsoriginalname:Congo
(Nzongola-Ntalaja:2002).ThoughtheConferencepermittedMobututocontinueasheadofstatefortwo
8
moreyears,theConferencestrippedhimofallexecutivepower(Nzongola-Ntalaja:2002).However,the
internationalcommunitydidnotrecognizethelegitimacyoftheConference—allowingMobututoremain
inpower(Nzongola-Ntalaja:2002).ThesituationwasfurthercomplicatedasMobutu’sholdonpower
deterioratedandheallowedlocalwarlordstocontroltheflowofcashandcommodities,aslongastheydid
notopposehisrule(McNulty:1999andNest:2006).Asthecountrybecamemorechaoticandviolent,
Mobutuusedhiscitizens’feartomakethepointthatonlyhisabsoluterulecouldprovidesecurity(Meditz
andMerrill:1994andMetz:1996).
Theextantpoliticalscienceliteraturehaspinpointedtheimportanceofcontagionconflicts;thatis,violence
inneighboringstatesgreatlyincreasesthelikelihoodofviolenceathome(SalehyanandGleditsch:2006;
BuhaugandGleditsch:2006;andBraithwaite:2010).Moreover,asBraithwaite(2010)demonstrated,
diminishedstatecapacityincreasesthelikelihoodofconflictcontagioninthatcountry.Congoisaperfect
exampleofthisdualeffectonviolentconflict.WithMobutu’sregimehangingbyathread,thegenocideand
warinRwandawasthestrawthatbrokethecamel’sbackandstartedaninternationalcivilwarinCongo.
ThecomplexityofthewarinCongocannotbeunderstated.Thewarwasfueledbypre-existingethnic
tensions,Mobutu’sdesiretoretainpower,economichardshipandtheconflictsinneighboringRwandaand
Burundi,amongotherfactors.Adetailedaccountwillnotbepresentedhere,butwewillexaminethemost
importantcauses,eventsandoutcomes.
TheFirstCongoWar,asitcametobecalled,haditsrootsinethnictensionsbetweentheHutuandTutsi,
whohademigratedfromRwandaformorethanacentury,andthenativeagrariantribes(vanReybrouck:
2014).ThoseimmigrantswhoenteredKivupriorto1960werecalledBanyamulenge,andthosewho
enteredafterweredubbedBanyarwanda(Nest:2006).BetweentheBanyamulengeandtheBanyarwanda
(alsocalledRwandaphonepeoples,astheyspokethelanguageofRwanda),individualsfurtheridentifiedas
HutuandTutsi(Williame:1997;Nest:2006;andAutesserre:2009).Tensionswereparticularlyheightened
inNorthandSouthKivuprovinces,whichborderRwanda(McNulty:1999andNest:2006).Mobutu’s
policyintheKivuswasalwaysprecarious.Thepolicieswouldhavedisastrousconsequences.
WhenHutushadfledviolenceinRwandaandBurundiinthe1970s,Mobututriedtodiffusetensionsinthe
Kivusbyissuingadecreein1971,grantingfullcitizenshiptoBanyamulengeandBanyarwandapeoples
(Nest:2006).Thedecreewasrevokedin1981andupheldbytheSNCin1991(Nest:2006andAutesserre:
2009).Thus,theRwandaphoneminoritiesintheKivusalreadyfeltagreatsenseofuneaseinthedecade
leadinguptotheturmoilinRwanda.However,itwasthegenocideinRwanda,andthesubsequentvictory
oftheTutsi-ledRwandanPatrioticFront(RPF)thatinflamedtensionsacrosstheborderinZaire(Nest:
2006andAutesserre:2009).TheindigenousCongolesepopulationfeltthreatened,andincreasingly
lumpedallRwandaphonepeoplesintotheTutsiethnicity(Nest:2006andAutesserre:2009).This
perceptionwasworsenedbytheparticipationofthousandsofBanyamulengeintheRPFmovementin
Rwanda,asitreinforcedbeliefsamongtheindigenousCongolesethattheBanyamulengewerereally
Rwandan(Stearns:2011,67).
Followingthe1994genocideinRwanda,thousandsofHutusbeganstreamingacrosstheborderintoZaire,
includingtheinterahamwemilitiawhoperpetratedmuchoftheviolenceinRwanda(Moore:2001;Nest:
2006;Stearns:2011;andvanReybrouck:2015).Sensingtheirvulnerability,Tutsi’sintheKivuswere
armedandtrainedbytheRPFtoprotectthemselvesfromongoingattacksintheUNcampsthathadbeen
setupinthewakeofthehumanitariancrisisfollowingthegenocideinneighboringRwanda(Nest:2006).
9
In1996,therebrandedRwandanPatrioticArmy(RPA)enteredZairetocaptureandkilltheformer
interahamweandanyotherperpetratorsofviolenceintherefugeecamps.Shortlythereafter,withthehelp
oftheRPAandtheUgandaPeople’sDefenseForce(UPDF)theUgandangovernmentsponsoredtheAlliance
desForcesDémocratiquespourlaLibérationdeCongo(AFDL)toenterZaireandoustMobutu(Daley:
2006andNest:2006).TheAFDLwascomposedofindividualsfromtheRwandaphonecommunitieswho
wantedtoendpersecutioninZaire,andotherdisgruntledgroupswhoopposedMobutu(McNulty1999and
Nest2006).ThemanchosentoleadtheAFDLwasLaurent-DésiréKabila,whohadlongbeenacriticof
Mobutu’s(Moore:2001;Daley:2006;andNest:2006).ThisFirstCongoWarsawthedeathof
approximately232,000HutusasKabilaledhisamalgamationofrebelstoKinshasa(Emizet:2000and
Moore:2001).
InMayof1997,Kabila’sforcesgainedcontrolofKinshasa,andKabiladeclaredhimselfpresident(White:
2005andNest:2006).OneofhisfirstactswastorenamethecountrytheDemocraticRepublicofCongo
(Nest:2006).Kabilabegantoenacteconomicreforms,sellingfuturemineralminingrightstoforeign
investors(Nest:2006).Thisobviouslyangeredsomeoftheoldguard,whohadbenefittedfromMobutu’s
patronage.ItalsodeniedRwandaandUgandaaccesstotheminerals,which,alongwithhisquestfor
greaterautonomyfromthosecountries,didnotsitwellwiththeleaderswhohadhelpedputhiminpower
(Nest:2006).Moreover,asNestwrites,Kabilarefusedto
arresttheInterahamweresponsibleforthe[Rwandan]genocideorindisarmingHutuPower
militiasthatcontinuedtolaunchattacksonRwanda.Thiswasanastonishingturnaroundgiven
thattheseforceshadsupportedMobutuandthatLarentKabila’sowntroopshadassistedtheRPA
inattackingHutugroupsfleeingtheAFDLin1997....TheAFDLregime’srelationswiththe
UgandangovernmentalsosouredwhenseniorCongoloeseofficialsaccusedUgandaofficialsof
profitseeking(2006:25).
Becausethesepoliciesalienatedsomany,Kabila’stenurewasshort-lived.Tofurthertheirowninterests,
RwandaandUganda(andperhapsBurundi)supportedagroupcalledtheRassemblementCongolaispour
laDémocratie(RCD)in1998toremoveKabilafrompower(Daley:2006andAutesserre:2009).Todefend
himself,KabilaenlistedthehelpofAngola,Namibia,andZimbabwebyofferingthemconcessionsfor
companiesfromthesecountries(Daley:2006).ChadandSudanwerealsomarginallyinvolvedin
supportingKabila(Autesserre:2009).Atthesametime,arebelgroupcomposedofformerMobutuallies
fromnorthernCongo,calledtheMouvementpourlaLibérationduCongo(MLC),advancedtoward
Kinshasa(Nest:2006).Relationsbetweenandwithinthesegroupswerefractious(Nest:2006and
Autesserre:2009),leadingStearnstonotethattherewere“atleastfortyorfiftydifferent,interlocking
wars”(2011,69).Duringthistime,RwandaandUgandaexploitedthesituation,suddenlyexportinglarge
quantitiesofdiamonds,eventhoughauthoritiesfrombothstateshavesaidtheyhavenodiamondsintheir
soil(Samset:2002,471andDaley:2006).
Throughout1999and2000,littleprogresswasmade,andinfightingamongthevariousgroupsand
countriesinvolvedintheDRCcontinued(Nest:2006).Therewasasortofstalemateinwhichprogovernmentarmieswereconcentratedinthesouthandwestofthecountry,andanti-governmentforces
wereinthenorthandeastoftheDRC(Nest:2006andAutesserre:2009).Mostofthefightingtookplace
alongthefrontlinebetweenthesetworegions.ThestalematecontinueduntilJanuary2001,whenLaurent
Kabilawasassassinated,andhissonJosephKabilatookoverforhisfather(Nest:2006;Dobbinsetal.:
2008;andKadimaetal.:2009).Apeaceagreementwasbrokeredin2002,owinginparttothemore
conciliatorytonetakenbyJosephKabila(Dobbinsetal.:2008).Kabilawasabletoreestablishlinkswith
10
InternationalFinancialInstitutions(IFIs)andwesterngovernments,andbeganpeacetalkswithUganda
andRwanda(Nest:2006).
D.“Postconflict”CongoandthePotentialforContemporaryCrisis
Duringtheconflict,upto14foreignarmiesweredeployedtotheDRC(Autesserre:2009),andsothepeace
processwaslongandprotracted.TheDRC,Uganda,andRwandawerethemajorpartiestothepeace
process,alongwiththeirsponsoredsatellitegroups.Anagreementwasreachedin2002,whichcalledfor
thedisbandingoftheCongolesearmyandrebelgroups,andsubsequentagreementsprovidedforthe
withdrawalofRwandanandUgandanfightersfromtheDRC(Dobbinsetal.:2008).Throughout2002and
2003,foreignarmiesandlocalmilitiaslaiddownarmsanddisbanded(Autesserre:2009).However,thisde
jurecessationofviolencedidnottranslateintoadefactopeaceinCongo.Scholarsandpolicy-makers
beganreferringtotheDRC,asapost-conflictsociety,whichAutesserre(2009)notes,“isaproblematic
misnomerforensuringalastingpeace”.
Inthispost-conflictenvironment,tensionsflaredalmostimmediatelyinIturiin2003,withseveralhundred
killed(Dobbinsetal.:2008).TheUNtookimmediateactiontosalvagethepeaceprocess.TheMissionde
l’OrganisationdesNationsUniesauCongo(MUNOC),whichhadbeenactiveintheCongosincethestartof
thewar,couldnotstabilizethearea(Dobbinsetal.:2008andAutesserre:2009).Assuch,theUN,in
conjunctionwiththeEuropeanUnion,senttroopstohelpquelltheinstability.TheRallyforCongolese
Democracy(RCD),ledbyLaurentNkundacontinuedtowagesmallbattlesintheKivuregions(Dobbinset
al.:2008).Yet,labelingtheDRCasa“post-conflict”societygavetheimpressionthatviolencehadended.In
fact,violencepersistedinseverallocalareasafterthepeaceaccordsweresigned(Autesserre:2009).
BecausetheCongohadbeenlabeledasapost-conflictcountry,fromtheperspectiveoftheinternational
community,thenaturalnextstepinrebuildingthepeacewastopushaheadwithdemocratizingpractices
suchaselections(Autesserre:2009).Thepost-conflictlabelhasalsohadtheeffectofmakingsome
“strategies(suchasworkonlocalconflicts)seeminappropriateandillegitimate”(Autesserre:2009,254).
Moreover,thepost-conflictlabelassumedthatsomeviolencewasjust‘normal’inacountrylikeCongo
(Dunn:2003andAutesserre:2009).However,suchanapproachhinderedbothpeacenegotiationsand
humanitarianefforts.Therefore,“theunderstandingofviolenceasnormalforapeacefulCongoprevented
internationalactorsfromconstructingcontinuedconflictintheeasternprovincesasaproblem”
(Autesserre:2009,254).
Bythetimethebulkofmilitaryandmilitiaactivityhadceasedin2004,thelossoflifewasincredible.The
deathtollasadirect,orindirect,resultofthe1998waristrulystaggering.TheInternationalRescue
Committee(IRC)estimates
that3.9millionexcessdeathshadoccurredbetween1998and2004,arguablymakingDRCongo
thedeadliesthumanitariancrisissinceWorldWarII.Lessthan10percentofdeathsweredirectly
attributabletoviolence.ThevastmajorityofCongolesediedfromtheindirectpublichealtheffects
ofconflict,includinghigherratesofinfectiousdiseases,increasedprevalenceofmalnutritionand
complicationsarisingfromneonatal-andpregnancy-relatedconditions(IRC2008).
Thelossofhumanlifeasaresultofthisconflictcontinuestomount,asperiodicresurgencesinviolence
continuetoday,particularlyineasternCongo(Autesserre:2009).
Inanefforttopushaheadwiththepeaceprocess,despitecontinuedviolenceintheeasternpartofthe
country,democraticelectionswereheldin2006atbothnationalandprovinciallevel(Kadimaetal.:2009).
11
TheywerethefirstelectionsintheCongosince1965(Kadimaetal.:2009).Kadimaetal.notethat“the
mostimportantnationalcompetitorofJosephKabila’sAlliancedelaMajoritéPrésidentielle(AMP)[was]
Jean-PierreBemba’sUnionpourlaNation(UN)alliance,whichwasbuiltoutofhisUganda-backedrebel
movementinthenorth-east”(2009,21).Thoughtheelectionssufferedfromsomeproblems,theywere
generallyconsideredfair,andKabilawonamajorityofthevotetobebecomepresident(Kadimaetal.:
2006).Hischallenger,Jean-PierreBembaisnowbeingheldinTheHagueonchargesofcrimesagainst
humanity(CarterCenter:2011).
In2007and2008,NorthKivuwasagainembroiledinconflictbetweentheindigenousCongoleseandthe
Rwandophones,whileSouthKivusawlargelynon-ethnicallymotivatedfightingoverleadershipofdifferent
militias(Autesserre:2009).InNorthKatanga,militiasfoughtamongstthemselvesforsimilarreasonsto
thoseinSouthKivu,andinIturiskirmishescontinuedoverlandandminingsites,sometimesalongethnic
lines,butoftentimesnot(Autesserre:2009).Autesserre’s(2009)primarypointisthatintheseregionsof
theCongo,conflictdoesnotalwaysoccuralongtheneatethniccleavagesvisibleatthenationallevel.
In2011,anotherroundofdemocraticelectionswasheld,aftersomedelays(CarterCenter:2011a).Joseph
Kabilaranforasecondtermaspresident,andwaschallengedbyoppositionleaderEtienneTshisekedi(Al
Jazeera:2011).Turnoutwasapproximately58percent,thoughtherewassomeconfusionamongvoters
andsomeindividualssupportiveoftheoppositionprotestedduringtheelection(CarterCenter:2011aand
FreedomHouse:2012).Moreover,accordingtoobserversfromtheCarterCenter(2011b)upto2000
pollingstationsinKinshasalosttheirresults.MeanwhileinKatangaprovince,turnoutwasnearly100
percentandalmostallthevoteswereforKabila,despitetherebeing11candidatesontheballot(Al
Jazeera:2011).Tshisekedicontestedtheresult,declaringhimselftherightfulpresidentoftheDRC(Smith:
2011).Violentprotestseruptedasaresultoftheelection,butKabilareassumedthepresidency(Freedom
House:2012).
In2013,asconflicteruptedagainineasternCongo,theUNdeployedits“ForceInterventionBrigade,partof
itsMONUSCOpeacekeepingmission”(HeritageFoundation:2016).Inthewinterandearlyspringof2016,
concernbegantogrowagainoveraloomingpoliticalcrisisintheDRC.AsTomPerriello,theUnitedStates
SpecialEnvoytotheGreatLakesRegion,noted,theCongolesepeoplewereconcernedthatJosephKabila
mightnotstepdownattheendofhissecondtermaspresident(Wroughton:2016).Inadditiontothis
buildingpoliticalcrisis,violencehaseruptedagainintheeasternDRC,withdozenskilledinresponsetoa
previousassaultbytheRwandanHutumilitiaoperatingintheCongo(FDLR)againstindigenousCongolese
(Ross:2016).
AnotherdevelopmentintheDRCcomeswiththeinfluxofIslamistsintoCentralAfrica,particularlyUganda,
whichisnowspillingoverintotheDRC(AP:2016).TwoUNPeacekeeperswerekilledbyCongolesetroops
inFebruary,“afterciviliansaccusedtheTanzanianU.N.troopsofprovidingsuppliestoIslamistUgandan
rebelsinEastCongo(Nichols:2016).WhileIslamistsareknowntooperateinUganda,untilrecentlythey
hadnotposedamajorthreatintheCongo.Theresponseoftheinternationalcommunitywilllikely
determinewhat,ifany,affectthisinfluxofUgandanIslamistshasonstabilityintheDRC.
II.TheNatureofRepressionintheDRC
Whenweproposedthisproject,weselected9casesforanin-depthexamination.TheDemocraticRepublic
ofCongoconstitutedahighlyrepressiveunderdevelopedauthoritarianstate.Despiteitsnewname(since
12
1997)ofademocraticrepublic,mostoftheDRC’shistoryhasbeenoneofintenselyrepressivebehavioron
thepartofitsleaders.Asoutlinedabove,thisrepressionbeganduringLeopold’stenureasheadofthe
CongoFreeState,andithascontinueduntilthepresentday.DuringtheMobuturegime,repressioncame
inallforms(political,economic,andviolent),andwhilewenoticedemocraticandeconomicreformsunder
JosephKabila’sleadership,therecent2011election,andallegationsofpoliticaldisappearancesandviolent
repressionbymilitiainsomeprovincesareworrying(AmnestyInternational:2012andInterParliamentaryUnion:2012).Moreover,itremainstobeseenwhateffecttheinfluxofUgandanIslamists
willhave,thoughtwoCongolesemilitarypersonalhavealreadybeenkilledbecauseofsuspicionsovertheir
involvementwithradicalIslam(Nichols:2016).
A.PoliticalandEconomicRepression
Formostofitshistory,centralauthoritieshaverepressedthepeopleoftheDRC.First,theBelgian
colonizersseizedalleconomicbenefitsfromtheCongo’svastnaturalresourcesforthemselves.When
Mobuturosetopower,hekilledanddisappearedallpoliticalopposition,andboughttheallegianceof
croniesandallies(YoungandTurner:1985;Young:1994;andWrong:2001).LaurentKabilausedviolent
andpoliticalrepressiontoattainpowerin1997,andhisson,JosephKabilahasbeenaccusedofpolitical
repressionasrecentlyashislastelection(CarterCenter:2011).
WenotedthatsomeformsofrepressioncommoninthedevelopedworldarenotprevalentintheDRC
becauseofitslowlevelofdevelopment.Forexample,thegovernmentdoesnotusetheInternettomonitor
orsurveilitspublicbecause,only3percentofthepopulationhasInternetaccess(InternetWorldStats:
2016).
Politicalrepression,asmanifestedindisenfranchisementandelectionfraud,tendstobethemostcommon
andobviousmodeofrepressionintheDRC.However,“thelackofanindependentandeffective”judiciary
hasbeenhighlightedbytheUnitedStatesStateDepartmentasanareaofconcern(StateDepartment:
2011).
a.RepressionofPoliticalOpposition
AsdiscussedaboveinthehistoricalaccountoftheDRC,political(tendingtowardviolent)repressionwas
Mobutu’smodusoperandi(YoungandTurner:1985;Young:1994;Wrong:2001;andNest:2006).During
hisrule,politicaloppositionwascrushed,andpoliticalallieswererewarded.From2011-2015,theState
DepartmentreportedthattheDRCheldhundredsofpoliticalprisonersincaptivity,andthatthosebrought
totrialweregenerallypresumedguiltybeforethetrialcommenced(StateDepartment:2011,2012,2013,
2014,and2015).Duringthisperiod,judgeswerefrequentlycoercedorpaidtomakedecisionsfavorable
tothegovernment(StateDepartment:2012).The2011electionswerewidelyregardedbyinternational
observerstobeflawed,withgraveirregularitiesoccurringthroughouttheCongo(CarterCenter:2011a,b
andFreedomHouse:2012).
Mostrecently,asJosephKabilaseemstobemaneuveringtoremaininpowerbeyondtheendofhis
presidentialterm,bothpoliticalandviolentrepressionhavebeenontherise(HumanRightsWatch:2016).
Inthelastyear,StateSecurityForces(SSF)usedviolentrepressiontoquellpoliticaldemonstrations
againstPresidentKabila(StateDepartment:2015andHumanRightsWatch:2016).Policeandintelligence
serviceshavebeenarrestingpoliticalgroups,partyleaders,andactivistsoverthepastyear,andpriorto
13
large-scaledemonstrationsinJanuaryoflastyear,thegovernmentshutdowntwonewsagencies,
presumablytokeepthemfrombroadcastingcoverageofthepoliticalprotests(HumanRightsWatch:
2016).
b.InadequateGovernance,Corruption,andImpunityintheDRC
EconomiccorruptionunderMobutuSeseSekowaslinkedtohisdishonestpractices.Mobutusystematically
syphonedmoneyfromthegovernmentcofferstomaintainhisluxuriouslifestyleandtolinethepocketsof
hispoliticalcroniesandallies.Inparticular,henationalizedtheminingindustriesandredistributedtheir
managementamong“localelite,mostlyfriendsandfamily.Hesquander[ed]andembezzle[d]billionsof
dollarsthroughtradeincopper,cobalt,diamondsandcoffee”(HumanRightsWatch:2009).Hissystemof
patrimonylastedfor30years,andleftmostcitizensinpoverty.Moreover,in1981,Mobutuusedhis
absolutepowertoengageineconomicrepressionofethnicminorities,whenhestrippedtheRwandophone
peoplesofcitizenshipandseizedtheirland(Nest:2006andAutesserre:2009).Bycomparison,his
successors,LaurentKabilaandJosephKabila,havevastlyimprovedthecountry’seconomicsituation,both
intermsofattractingrenewedforeigninvestment,negotiatingwithIFIsandprovidingbetteropportunity
andinfrastructure(Nest:2006).Unlikesomeoftheothercaseswehaveexamined(Mali,Thailand,andSri
Lanka),theDRCdoesnotseemtodemonstratealonghistoryofsystematiceconomicrepressionof
minorityethnicgroups.Theexceptionhasbeentheoccasionaluseofeconomicallyrepressivetactics
againsttheBanyamulengeandBanyarwandapeoplesintheKivuregion.Thougheconomiccorruption
occurredduringthecolonialperiodandduringtheMobuturegime,thatcorruptionwasnottypically
directedsolelyatminoritygroups.
Currently,intheDRC,economicopportunitiesarerareforthebulkofpeople.Economicmonitors,suchas
theAfricanDevelopmentBankGroup(citingtheAfricanEconomicOutlookreport)suggestthatthough
thereissomeinvestmentinthecountry,theprivatesectorisstillsmallandthatopportunitiesforyoung
jobseekersarelimited(theAfricanDevelopmentBankGroup:2014).Thoughproductionfromextractive
industrieshasgrown,revenuefrommininghasnot.Thegovernmenthastriedtoreformtheminingcode
toincreasegovernmentrevenuesthroughroyaltiestothetreasury,butminersopposethesechanges
becausetheybelievethereformswillscareawaypotentialinvestors(Cisse:2015).So,ultimately,though
therehasbeensomeeconomicgrowth,theDRC’seconomyremainsunstable,andeffortstomaximizethe
state’srevenuemaynothelpworkers.
FromthetimeoftheBelgiancolonialism,governanceintheCongohasbeenachallenge,inlargepart
becauseofthesheersizeofthecountry(vanReybrouck:2014).In2009,HumanRightsWatch(HRW)
reportedthatcorruptionintheDRCconsistedofrewardingfriendsandfamilywithmanagementrolesin
hisnewlynationalizedminingenterprises,andwithpayingoffthoseopposedtohisrule(HumanRights
Watch:2009).Today,theDRCexperiences“widespreadimpunityandcorruptionthroughoutthe
government”(StateDepartment:2015).JosephKabilawonhisreelectionbidin2011,buttheelection
processwasregardedasirregular(FreedomHouse2012).Duringthatelection,theSSFintimidatedsome
votersandpollingstationswereburnedinprotestamidallegationsoffraud(FreedomHouse2012and
TransparencyInternational:2013).ThoughJosephKabila,likehisfatherbeforehim,promisedtotackle
corruption,theDRCstillranks154thoutofthe177countriesassessedbyTransparencyInternationalin
their2013TransparencyReview.Moreover,Kabila“increasedhiseconomicandpoliticalpatronage
systembyreplacingtheheadsof37stateenterpriseswithhisown“clients”,tighteninghisgripson
economicandpoliticalpower”(Matti:2010andTransparencyInternational:2013).TheInternational
14
CrisisGrouphasaccusedtheDRCoflegislativefraud,aswell,inwhichlegislatorsarepaidtovoteforor
againstspecificbillsbeforethem(InternationalCrisisGroup:2010).
Similarly,theworldwidegovernanceindicators,whichtrackcorruption,ruleoflaw,andstability,among
otherthings,indicatethatwhilethesituationintheDRCisslowlyimproving,thesituationisstilldire
(Kaufmannetal.:2010).Indeed,theDRCranksbelowthe20thpercentileinallcategoriesandyears
surveyed.Theseabysmalgovernanceandcorruptionindicatorsdonotgivemuchhopeforanyimminent
improvementofconditionsintheCongo.
Worldwide Governance Indicators
Table1:WorldGovernanceIndicators(2004,2009,2014)
Indicator
Country
Year
Voice and Accountability
Congo, Dem. Rep.
2004
Indicator(﴾s)﴿
Percentile Rank
Percentile Rank
(﴾0 to 100)﴿
Voice and Account
Political Stability an
Government Effect
2009
Regulatory Quality
2014
Political Stability and
Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Government Effectiveness
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Rule of Law
2004
Control of Corrupti
2009
2014
2004
Year(﴾s)﴿
2009
Multiple Values
2014
Regulatory Quality
Congo, Dem. Rep.
2004
2009
In order:
(﴾' )﴿ Income Group A
(﴾* )﴿ Regional Averag
individual Countries
2014
Rule of Law
Congo, Dem. Rep.
2004
2009
Control of Corruption
Congo, Dem. Rep.
2014
s
' High income: non
2004
' High income: OE
2009
' Low income
2014
' Lower middle inc
' Upper middle inc
0
20
40
60
80
100
Source:KaufmannD.,A.Kraay,andM.Mastruzzi(2010),TheWorldwideGovernanceIndicators:Methodologyand
AnalyticalIssues.3
* East Asia & Paci
* Europe & Centra
* Latin America & * Middle East & No
* North America
* South Asia
* Sub-­Saharan Afr
Likewise,overtime,theseindicatorshaveremainedpoor.Infact,the“RuleofLaw”and“Controlof
Afghanistan
Corruption”indicatorshavedisplayedaslightdownwardtrendsince2013.Thisfitswiththeincreased Albania
climateofcorruptionanddistrustfollowingthe2011election,andtheincreasedviolenceandinstabilityin
Algeria
American Samoa
theeasternborderregions.
Andorra
Angola
Anguilla
Antigua and Barbu
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba
Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.govindicators.org
Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large numbe
survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-­governmental orga
3Graphscreatedonlineat:http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports
tions, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WG
Group to allocate resources.
15
Worldwide Governance Indicators
Table2:WorldGovernanceIndicators
Congo, Dem. Rep.
(1996-2014;blueline–DRC’spercentileoneachindicator;orangelines–errormargins)
Income Group, Region, or Country:
Voice and Accountability
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
100
Year
All
100
50
Listed in order:
(﴾' )﴿ Income Group
(﴾* )﴿ Regional Ave
individual Countr
50
s
' High income: n
' High income: O
Government Effectiveness
' Low income
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2000
1998
1996
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2000
1998
0
1996
0
' Lower middle
' Upper middle
Regulatory Quality
100
* East Asia & Pa
* Europe & Cen
100
* Latin America
* Middle East &
* North America
50
* South Asia
50
* Sub-‐Saharan A
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Rule of Law
American Samo
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2000
1998
1996
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2000
1998
0
1996
0
Andorra
Angola
Control of Corruption
100
Anguilla
Antigua and Ba
100
Argentina
Armenia
50
Aruba
50
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The
The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators.
The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.
Source:KaufmannD.,A.Kraay,andM.Mastruzzi(2010),TheWorldwideGovernanceIndicators:Methodologyand
Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
4
AnalyticalIssues.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.govindicators.org
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2000
1998
1996
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2000
1998
0
1996
0
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen
survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-­governmental organizations, internation
tions, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the ThoughTransparencyInternationalhasidentifiedsomeanti-corruptionmeasuresintheDRC,theynote
Group to allocate resources.
thatweakgovernanceissuesplagueanyattemptstoquashcorruptioninthecountry.Thelackoflegaland
institutionalmechanismsnecessaryforaccountabilityisparticularlycounterproductive(Transparency
International:2013).Forexample,nolegalprovisionsexisttoprotectwhistleblowers,andsoveryfew
individualsarewillingtocomeforwardwithallegationsofcorruption(FreedomHouse:2012and
TransparencyInernational:.2013).
Corruptionstemsfrominadequategovernance.Thepeopleareunabletoholdtheirleadersaccountable,
andleadersoftengetawaywithmurderingtheirowncitizens.BecausetheDRChasinadequate
governanceandimpunity,thestatehasusuallyviolenceagainstmanyofitsowncitizens.From1998-2003,
unarmedcivilianshavebeenkilled,oftenalongethniclines,individualhavebeenforciblydisappearedor
4Graphscreatedonlineat:http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports
16
unlawfullydetained,andsexualviolencehasbeenperpetratedagainstwomenandgirls.Someestimates
suggestasmanyas10,000girlsandcombatantswithvariousallegiancesrapedwomen.“TheUnited
NationsJointHumanRightsOffice(UNJHRO)inCongorecorded187convictionsbymilitarycourtsfor
sexualviolencebetweenJuly2011andDecember2013.Fourofthoseconvictedweremembersofarmed
groups;theothersweresoldiers,police,orotherstateagents”(HumanRightsWatch:2014).However,
manyperpetratorsremainunpunished,andsometrialsarestillongoing(HumanRightsWatch:2014).
Moreover,theuseofchildsoldierswaswidespreadamongallmilitiasandmilitarygroups(HumanRights
Watch:2004and2014).Yet,almostimmediatelyafterthepeaceagreementsin2003,manyindividuals
appointedtogovernmentpositionshavebeenaccusedofwarcrimesorcrimesagainsthumanity.Many
wereneverprosecuted.Moreover,thereislittleconfidenceinthejusticesystem,duetoitslackof
independenceandadearthoftrainedandqualifiedpersonnel(HumanRightsWatch:2004).
B.ViolentRepression
ViolentrepressioninCongogoesbackatleastasfarasKingLeopold’srule.ThebrutalForcePublique—an
armyofnativesoldiersoverseenbyregionalgovernors—wasknowntokill,rape,andstealinorderto
maintainabsolutecontrolandtocollecttaxes(Hochschild:1998andvanReybrouck:2014,88-94).In
moderntimes,violentrepressionissometimesmoredifficulttountangle,thoughitundoubtedlyoccurs.
OurresearchindicatesthatviolentrepressionintheDRCoverlapssomewhatwithpoliticalrepression.
MobutuSeseSekointimidatedpoliticalrivalsanddevelopedasystemofpatrimonytokeeppeopleloyal
(YoungandTurner:1985;Young:1994;Wrong:2001;andNest:2006).Sincedemocraticelectionswere
firstheldatthenationallevelin2006,thegovernmenthas,ostensibly,beenopentochallengersfromother
parties.However,itistellingthatJosephKabila’sfirstopponentiscurrentlybeingheldinTheHaguefor
crimesagainsthumanity(CarterCenter2011).Moreover,AmnestyInternationalissuedanappealin
August2012forthereturnofadisappearedpoliticalopponentofKabila’s,DiomiNdongola(Amnesty
International:2012).Ndongolawaseventuallyreleasedfromcaptivityfourmonthslater.Heclaimedthat
Congolesemilitaryforcesabductedhimontheday“hewastoattendasigningceremonyforthecharterof
anewoppositionpartyplatform”(Inter-ParliamentaryUnion:2012).Thedaypriortohisarrest,hisparty
headquartersweresearchedwithoutawarrant,andhewaseventuallyaccusedofrape,aclaimhesaysis
completelyfalse(Inter-ParliamentaryUnion:2012).Hewasthendetainedandinterrogatedaboutthe
opposition’smilitaryintentions,beforebeingreleasedmuchlaterinneedofmedicalattention(InterParliamentaryUnion:2012).Thisincidencefallsunderourdefinitionofviolentrepression,asitisacaseof
forceddisappearance.Inourestimation,theviolentlyrepressiveactappearstohavestemmedfrom
motivationstohinderpoliticalopposition,thusshowingalinkbetweenmuchoftheviolentrepressionin
theDRCtopoliticallyrepressiveaims.Similarly,thequestionssurroundingthefreedomandfairnessofthe
2011presidentialelectionwereexacerbatedbythesometimes-violentactsoftheSSFwhoactedoutsideof
anycivilianormilitarycontrol(StateDepartment:2011).
ThemostobviousexamplesofviolentlyrepressivetacticshaveoccurredduringtheriseoftheMobutu
regime,andduringtwoCongoWarsofthe1990s.However,violentrepressionmaybeontheriseagain,
particularlyineasternCongowhereweakgovernancepermitsfrequentencroachmentbyUgandan
paramilitary,andleavestheregionopentosquabblesbetweendifferentmilitiasandwarlords.According
totheStateDepartment(2014),“Themostimportanthumanrightsproblemsincludedarmedconflictin
partsofthecountrythatexacerbatedanalreadyprecarioushumanrightssituation,suchasunlawful
killings,sexualviolenceincludingrapes,disappearances,torture,andarbitraryarrestsanddetention.”In
particular,thescaleofsexualviolenceintheDRCsincethestartofcivilconflicttherein1996isstaggering.
TheUNDPreports,“TheHealAfricaHospitalbasedinGomareportsthatanestimated5,000womenwere
17
rapedinoneprovincein2013.Forcingwomenandchildrenintosexwork,forcedpregnancy,andeventhe
deliberatespreadofsexuallytransmittedinfectionsarecarriedoutbyallsidesintheconflict”(UNDPno
date).
III.TheRelationshipbetweenCivilConflictandRepression
TherelationshipbetweencivilconflictandrepressionintheDRCiscomplexanddifficulttountangle.Our
researchindicatesthattheinitialrelationshipstemsfromthefirstrepressiveactsbytheBelgiancolonial
rulerswhentheyusedeconomicexploitation,politicaldisenfranchisement,andviolentlyrepressivetactics
throughtheForcePublique(venReybrouck:2014).Civilunresthasoccurredalmostconstantlyinsome
partsofthevastcountrysincethen.Autesserre(2009)doesanexcellentjobcallingintoquestionthe
notionthatsomepeople,countries,orcontinentsarejustmorehostileandmoreviolentthanothers.
ScholarsandgovernmentofficialsoftentendtoviewtheCongointhatlight.However,violentuprisings
canalmostalwaysbetracedbacktosomeformofrepressioninthecolonialperiod,orduringMobutu’s
rule,orincontemporaryDRC,inwhichJosephKabilaseemspoisedtokeepholdofpower.Althoughwe
canseethereactionofcitizensandyouthgroupstoperceivedgovernmentrepression,thesituationin
easternCongoismuchmorecomplicated,withvariousmilitialeadersrepressingrivaltribesinaneffortto
maintainpower(Autesserre:2009).Inthesesituations,itisalmostimpossibletodiscernwhether
repressionbegetsconflictorconflictbegetsrepression.However,atleastinitially,civilconflictintheDRC
wasbornofthepolitically,economically,andviolentlyrepressivetacticsoftheBelgians,andlaterMobutu.
OncetheCongowarbeganin1998,aviciouscycleofrepressionandconflicthadstarted,andcontinues
today.
Inouropinion,therecentviolentconflictistheresultoftwoprimaryfactors.First,theexternal
involvementfromRwandaandUgandahascontinuedtofuelethnictensionsintheKivuregion.This
problemwasexacerbatedyearsagowhenMobutustrippedallethnicRwandansoftheircitizenshipand
land.Toalargeextent,thatareaoftheCongostillfunctionsundertheghostsofMobutuandtheRwandan
genocide.Second,inotherregionswhereethnictensionsflair,thesecanalsobetracedbacktothe
patronagesystemunderMobutu,andcontinuedtodaybyJosephKabila.Thepittingofdifferentwarlords
againstoneanotherhaskepttheeasternregionsinturmoil.
IV.TheEconomicandPoliticalConsequencesofRepressioninDRC
A.EconomicConsequences
TheeconomicsituationintheDRChasimprovedsomewhatinthepastfewyears(seeTable3).The
economycollapsedin1997,afterthefalloftheMobuturegime,andin1999,duringtheSecondCongoWar.
However,from2000and2001,whenJosephKabilatookoffice,theDRChasseenreasonablyrobust
economicgrowth,thoughsuchstatisticsdonotalwaysaccuratelyportraythelivesoftheaverageperson,
andtheDRCranksasoneofthemostunderdevelopedcountriesintheworld(UNDP:2015).
18
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
-2.00
-4.00
-6.00
-8.00
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Table3:ChangeinGDP%Growth,1995-2015
CreatedfromtheWorldBankDatapage:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data//reports.aspx?source=2&country=MLI&series=&period=
However,asTable4indicates,growthisforecasttostagnateintheDRCinthecomingyears.Presumably
muchwilldependuponmineralprices,andwhetherJosephKabilachoosestostepdownattheendofhis
terminoffice.Italsoremainstobeseenwhethertheupcominggovernmentcansuccessfullyconvert
economicgrowthintosocialandeconomicbenefitsfortheaverageCongolesecitizen.
Table4:TheDRC’SRealGDPGrowthComparedtoDevelopingCountriesandSub-SaharanAfrica
(annual%,2013-2018)
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
SSA excluding South
Africa
6.0
5.0
4.0
Developing
Countries
3.0
DRC
2.0
1.0
0.0
2013 2014 2015e 2016f 2017f 2018f
FromtheWorldBank’sEconomyandRegionSpecificforecastsanddatapage:
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/data?region=SST
19
B.DomesticPoliticalConsequences
Domestically,politicsseemstocarryonmuchasitalwayshasintheDRC.RepressionintheDRChasbeen
aconstantfacetofsocietyfor150years,sinceBelgiancolonization.AsAutesserre(2009)indicates,outside
observerstendtoviewtheDRCasaplaceofperpetualconflict.Becauseofthefrequentuseofrepression,
bothpoliticalandviolent,andbecauseofconstantcorruption,itisn’tsurprisingthatpeopleprotestand
rebelintheDRC.Thebiggestcurrentquestionmarkrevolvesaroundtwopoints.First,willtherebea
peacefultransitionofpowerwhen,orevenif,thenextpresidenttakesofficein2016?Second,willdecades
ofinstabilityinviteadditionaloutsidegroups,suchasradicalIslamists,intotheDRC,andwilltheybecome
thenewrepressorsastheydidinMali?Withregardtothesecondquestion,itseemslikelythatUgandan
IslamistsarealreadyoperatinginsidethebordersoftheDRC.Itisnotyetcleartowhatendtheyare
operating,butnewsreports(citedabove)andlocalaccountshavealreadyconfirmedtheirpresencein
easternCongo.
ThepossibleemergenceofradicalIslamintheDRCmayalsoservetostrengthenJosephKabila’salready
firmgriponpower.IntheMobutuera,oneoftheprimarymeansofclingingtopowerwasinconvincing
thepeopleoftheirneedforstabilityandsecurityinthefaceofconflictanduprisings.Wesuspectthatany
instabilityintheeasternCongowouldonlybeheightenedbythepresenceofradicalIslamists.Thismay
strengthenKabila’sargumentformaintainthepresidency.However,thepresenceofradicalIslammay
alsodrawcloserinternationalscrutiny,aswellasforeigngovernments,seekingtorootoutanynew
terroristhotbeds.
C.InternationalPoliticalConsequences
IntheearlyyearsoftheMobuturegime,boththeUSSRandtheUSAwereveryfriendlywiththedictator.
TheUnitedStatessawtheCongoasapossibleavenueintoAfricafortheUSSR,andsotheUSsoughtto
wielditsinfluencefirst(Moore:2001;Daley:2006;andNest:2006).WhentheColdWarendedand
MobutulostfavorwithboththeUSandtheUSSR,thedoorwasopenforadditionalexternalinfluence,
particularlyfromneighboringstates.Asdetailedabove,Rwanda,Uganda,Namibia,Zimbabwe,Angola,
Chad,andSudanallplayedaroleintheCongolesecivilwars.ThewesthadlargelyleftMobutualone,
exceptforastreamofUNpeacekeepers.Itwasnotuntilthepossibilityofaspreadinggenociderearedits
headinthelate1990sthatWesternpowersbecameinvolvedagain.JosephKabila’srisetopowersawhim
negotiatebetterwithWesternpowers,andbrokernewdealswithIFIs.ThoughtheCongo’srelationship
withEuropeandAmericahasalmostalwaysbeenonebasedonCongo’srichnaturalresources.Freer
economictradingonthebasisoftheseresourcesshouldopendialoguesfurther.However,thepotentialfor
JosephKabilatooverstayhistenurelooms,andhisretentionofthepresidencycouldbeharmfultothe
economicandsocialinterestsofhiscitizens,aswellasstrainingtheDRC’srelationshipwithWestern
nations.
V.TheCongolesePublic’sResponsetoRepression
Historically,theCongolesepublichasrespondedbothviolently,andthroughpoliticalmeans,tocounter
repressiveactionsintheircountry.TheMobuturegimeusedbothpoliticalandviolentrepressiontoretain
powerfordecades.Duringhisreign,thewarlordswhoformedhissupportingcoalitionalsorepressed
individualsintheirlocalareathrougheconomic,political,andviolentmeans.However,thestoryofCongo
20
hasalwaysbeenoneofoutsideinfluence,firstfromcolonizers,thenfromethnicconflictinneighboring
Rwanda.ManyindividualsintheEasternpartofthecountryhaverespondedbyformingtheirownbands
ofrebels.ThoughtheDRCcurrentlyisexperiencingrelativecalm,thepossibilityofrenewedconflict
alwayslurksbeneaththesurface.
Inrecentyears,theresponseoftheCongolesepublictorepressionhascomeinafewforms.First,there
havebeenoccasionalorganizedprotestsfromactivistsandyouthprotestors,suchastheprotestsinthe
wakeofthe2011election,andthosethatarecurrentlyhappeningintheDRCinpreparationforthe
possibilitythatKabilawillrefusetostepdown(HumanRightsWatch:2016).Sofar,theseprotestshave
beenmetwithviolentresistance(HumanRightsWatch:2016).Sadly,mostofthepublicissodeprived
andpovertystricken,thattheyarenotabletomountseriouspoliticalprotests.Outsideafewmajorcities
suchasKinshasaandGoma,thepossibilitiesforpoliticalprotestsareslim.However,intheruralregions,
especiallyintheeast,thereisaconstantthreatfrommilitias,whichmayleadtopublicuprisingsinthe
future.
VI.CongoRepression,CivilConflictandLeadershipTenure:AnswerstoourThree
Questions
Q1.Docitizensresponddifferentlywhenconfrontedwithpoliticalrepression,violentrepressionor
amixofrepressivetactics?
Thehistoricalevidenceismixed.Duringhisregime,Mobutuusedbothviolentandpoliticalrepressionto
maintaincontrolandfunnelwealthtohimselfandhiscronies.Inhisbidtoseizepower,heorganizedtwo
coupsshortlyafterCongoleseindependencefromBelgium.Aftergainingabsoluteauthority,Mobutukilled
manypoliticalopponents.Duringthe198’sandearly1990s,publicuprisingsforcedMobututoinitiatesome
democraticreforms,buthemaintainedhisgriponpower,andrewardedmembersofhisownethnicgroup,
furtherinflamingethnictensionsintheDRC.WhenconflictspilledoverfromRwanda,individualsbeganto
respondviolentlytotheeconomicandpoliticalrepressionperpetratedbytheMobuturegime.WhenKabila
tookpowerandinstitutedeconomicreforms,someoftheethnicgroupswhohadbenefitedfromMobutu’s
corruptpractices,wereangry.TheRwandanandUgandangovernmentsbackedviolentuprisingsaimedat
removingLaurentKabilafrompower.SincetheSecondCongoleseWar,thegovernmenthasoftenused
politicalrepression,includingpossibleelectionfraud,tomaintainpower.JosephKabilahasoftengoverned
withimpunityandtherehavebeensporadicuprisingsinresponsetohisrule.Moreover,inadequate
governancehascontributedtorebellioninrecentyears.TheeasternportionofCongoexperiencesviolent
flair-upsonaregularbasis,usuallyalongethniclines,butnotnecessarilyinresponsetoanyparticularactsof
repression.
Q2.Doofficialsusedifferenttypesofrepressioninresponsetodifferenttypesofcivilconflict?
InCongo,officialsseemtouseviolentandpoliticalrepressionasandwhentheyseefit.Whileviolentuprisings
arecertainlymetwithviolentformsofrepression,itisnotclearwhetherthereisasystematicuseofdifferent
formsofrepression.PoliticalrepressionhasbeenalmostconstantsinceCongo’sindependencefromBelgium.
Thatpoliticalrepressionhasoftenprecededconflict,ratherthanbeingundertakeninresponsetoit.
Moreover,violentrepressionhasoftenbeenusedinresponsetopoliticalrebellionoroppositiongroups.
Therefore,wecannotdiscernapatternofrepressivetacticsinresponsetoconflict.
21
Q3.Doestheuse,andtypeofrepression(whetherpolitical,violentorsomecombination)increase
thelikelihoodthatrulersretainpower?
Forthefirst30yearsfollowingCongoleseindependence,repressivetacticshelpedPresidentMobutumaintain
power.Heusedviolentrepressiontoeliminatehispoliticalopposition,andusedpoliticalandeconomic
repressiontofavorsomegroupsoverotherstoformanetworkofcronieswhobenefitedfromhisregime.It
certainlyseems,inthiscase,thatbothformsofrepressioncontributedtothelong-lastingtenureofMobutu.In
recentyears,thedemocraticallyelectedJosephKabilahasusedrepressivetactics.However,theireffect
remainstobeseen.Inrecentmonths,Kabilaandhisgovernmentofficialshaveindicatedthattheywillbe
unabletoorganizeelectionsintimefortheendofhisterminNovember.Thispoliticalmaneuveringcouldhelp
himhangontopowerforyearsafterhiselectedterminofficewastohaveended.
VII.ConcludingThoughts
OurstudyoftheDemocraticRepublicofCongodemonstratesthedangerofcontagionconflict,particularly
inacountrywithalonghistoryofethnictensions.Whenleadersexploitthoseethnictensionsfortheir
ownpoliticalbenefit,asMobutudidintheCongo,thepossibilitiesforviolentconflictincrease.Then,when
conflictsarisenearbyduetosimilarethniccleavages,thesituationcanbecomeprecarious.The
involvementofsomanyothercountriesintheconflictsintheCongohasmadepeacefulresolutionof
grievancesmoredifficult.Moreover,whentherootcausesofconflictarenotproperlyaddressed,asisthe
caseintheeastoftheDRC,tensionscanoftenleadtoviolentclashesbetweenethnicgroups.AsAutesserre
(2009)notes,therearedangersinviewingtheDRCasapost-conflictcountry,whenconflictscontinueto
eruptonaregularbasisinsomepartsofthecountry.
Fromourresearch,webelievethattherearetwoverypressingissuesonthehorizonfortheDemocratic
RepublicofCongo:radicalIslamintheeastandthepossibilitythatJosephKabilawilltrytoretainpower.
Thetwoproblemsarerelated.IfreportsfromjournalistsaretrueandradicalIslamistfightershave
crossedintotheDRC,thealreadycomplicatedsituationintheeastofthecountrywillbecomeevenmore
delicate.Withitshistoryofinstability,radicalIslamists,lookingtoestablishageographicfootholdin
CentralAfrica,muchastheyhaveinMaliinNorthAfrica,couldeasilyexploittheDRC.JosephKabilahas
alreadyindicatedthathemayhavetoremaininpowerbeyondtheendofhisterminNovember,because
thegovernmentcannotorganizetheelectionsintime.Ifthesituationintheeasternpartofthecountry
becomesincreasinglyunstableandreportsofjihadistsareconfirmed,Kabilacouldusethesecuritythreat
tokeepaholdonpower.HisretentionofthepresidencywoulddamagethestridestheDRChasmadeto
createafunctionaldemocracyandagrowingeconomy.Moreover,Westernpowershaveaninterestin
pursuingdiplomaticavenueswithKabilatoensurehestepsdownattheendofhisterm.Ifhedoesn’t,
uprisingsmayoccur,generatingfurtherinstabilityforradicalIslamiststoexploit.
22
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