Helaba Research
FX FOCUS
08 September 2014
British pound
AUTHOR
Christian Apelt, CFA
phone: +49 69/91 32-47 26
[email protected]


EDITOR:
Dr. Stefan Mitropoulos
PUBLISHER:
Dr. Gertrud R. Traud
Chief Economist/
Head of Research
Helaba
Landesbank
Hessen-Thüringen
MAIN TOWER
Neue Mainzer Str. 52-58
60311 Frankfurt am Main
phone: +49 69/91 32-20 24
fax: +49 69/91 32-22 44

Most recently the euro lost ground against all relevant currencies. The big winners, alongside the US dollar, were many non-European currencies.
The appreciation of the pound sterling has stalled, but the upcoming referendum on Scotland’s independence has presumably little to do with that. Till recently, according to the
polls the supporters of independence are in the minority. But if the change in sentiment is
confirmed, things will get interesting. Especially the question about the currency in Scotland
is unresolved and could cause for considerable uncertainty, which is temporarily weighing
on the pound sterling.
Helaba Currency Forecast
Euro performance on a month-over-month basis
% vs. euro compared to the previous month (from 08/07 to 09/05/14)
US dollar
3,2
Japanese yen
0,2
British pound
0,1
Swiss franc
0,7
Canadian dollar
3,6
Australian dollar
4,4
New Zealand dollar
1,4
Swedish krona
0,4
Norwegian krone
2,6
Czech koruna
0,6
Polish zloty
0,9
Hungarian forint
0,5
This publication was very
carefully researched and
prepared.
However,
it
contains
analyses
and
forecasts regarding current
and future market conditions
that are for informational
purposes only. The data is
based on sources that we
consider reliable, though we
cannot assume any responsibility for the sources being
accurate, complete, and upto-date. All statements in
this publication are for
informational purposes. They
must not be taken as an offer
or
recommendation
for
investment decisions.
Russian ruble
1,1
Turkish new lira
3,6
South Korean won
4,8
Chinese yuan
3,6
Indian rupee
4,7
South African rand
3,9
5,6
5,1
Brazilian real
Mexican peso
■ Core currencies ■ Rest of G10 ■ Currencies of emerging markets
Sources: Bloomberg, Helaba Research
HELABA R ESEARCH 8 SEPT EMBER 2014 · © HELABA
1
FX FOCUS BRITISH POUND
GBP: The Scottish question
Seven hundred years after the victory at the Battle of Bannockburn, the Scots are once again
seeking independence. On September 18, the residents of Scotland will vote in a referendum
about breaking away from the United Kingdom. This not only puts the Union of 1707 at issue, but
also raises the question about the currency. The “Act of Union” at that time created de facto a
common currency in the United Kingdom. Should the Scots indeed vote for separation, would there
be a currency union of two independent states? Or would Scotland introduce its own currency, use
the pound sterling unofficially, or even join the euro zone?
Scotland’s share of Britain’s economic output is about 9 %. While that order of magnitude is thus
not so significant, since the country’s oil and gas reserves are largely within Scotland’s sphere, the
economic consequences of a separation would not be negligible also for the rest of the UK. The
financial markets tend to ignore the issue of Scotland’s independence. The British pound has recently barely moved at least against the euro, and the euro-pound exchange rate was not far off its
low for the year of 0.79. Against the US dollar, however, the British currency has more than given
back its gains from this year. The reason behind the relaxed reactions of the market was surely
also the polling results, which consistently predicted a majority for the “no” votes till recently. In
newest poll, the “yes” camp prevailed for the first time, the euro-pound rate increased about 0.80.
Given the number of indecisive voters the race is open again that means there is certainly hope for
the proponents of independence.
Referendum is an
open race
“No“ camp shrinking is losing the lead
British oil production on a downslope
%, share of undecided taken out
Mio. t oil equivalent
80
80
70
70
"No"
60
60
50
50
40
40
"Yes"
30
20
Jan 13
30
20
Apr 13
Jul 13
Okt 13
Jan 14
Apr 14
Sources: UK Polling Report, Helaba Research
Economic arguments
in the foreground
Jul 14
Sources: Macrobond, Helaba Research
The question about Scottish independence is being decided on both an emotional and a rational
level. It is one thing if the Scots feel oppressed within the United Kingdom and are therefore seeking greater autonomy. The very divergent voting results in Scotland and England alone suggest
certain differences. However, even the proponents of independence are arguing strongly on economic grounds. Thus, independence should make every Scot richer by an average of 1,000
pounds. These benefits will be financed primarily with the expected oil revenues, which would not
longer have to be shared with London.
The UK’s oil and gas reserves are largely in Scottish waters: 96 % of the offshore crude oil production and 52 % of the offshore gas production. Since oil is more expensive, Scotland’s share of
British tax revenues from oil amounts to more than 90 %. More than half of the oil within the EU is
being produced in Scottish waters. Thanks to the potential revenues, an independent Scotland is
already trying to compare itself to Norway. With its oil and gas reserves, Norway is the secondrichest country in Europe, measured in terms of GDP per capita. The oil revenues feed a gigantic
pension fund, which is far larger than the country’s debt. Moreover, Norway affords a comparatively generous welfare state. Scotland has a higher per-capita GDP than the rest of the UK, if one
includes the offshore income. However, British oil and gas production has shrunk by more than half
since the beginning of the millennium. However, thanks to the drastic rise in prices, the govern-
HELABA RESEARCH · 8 SEPT EMBER 2014 · © HELABA
2
FX FOCUS BRITISH POUND
ment’s income is still higher than it was in 1999. But here, too, the peak has been clear passed,
unless the price of oil rises dramatically. In principle, there should be enough North Sea oil for thirty
to forty years of production. Assuming rather constant prices, however, oil-based tax revenue will
slowly shrink. Solely on the basis of oil revenues, the call for Scottish independence comes in a
sense fifteen years too late.
Uncertain fiscal situation
The Scottish government is comparatively more spend-happy – 1,200 pounds per capita p.a. –
than the British central government. The country is governed by the social-democratic Scottish
National Party (SNP), the chief opposition is the Labour Party. In case of independence, the SNP
is promising new social benefits that would be financed with oil revenues – analogously to Norway.
However, the transfers from the British central government would cease, which means that the
financial advantages are already substantially reduced. Scotland already has its own administration, which would be further expanded in an independent state. The country would also need an
army of its own. The withdrawal of Britain’s nuclear fleet from Scotland is popular, in any case. In
recent years, the rather theoretical budget deficit of the Scots – that is, including oil revenues –
was lower than in the UK. Recently declining revenues from oil and gas production and the likelihood of rising expenditures should weigh on the budget situation of a Scottish government, with
the result that the deficit, at high single digits as measured against GDP, would be higher than in
the rest of the UK.
State revenues from oil and gas production
Volatile budget situation in Scotland
Mio. GBP
% of GDP
14.000
14.000
12.000
Total Revenues from
oil and gas
10.000
12.000
10.000
8.000
8.000
6.000
6.000
4.000
4.000
2.000
2.000
0
0
84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Sources: HM Revenue & Customs, Helaba Research
Double-edged financial
sector
12
12
Net Fiscal Deficit*
10
10
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
* Scottish share of oil and gas revenues included
Sources: Scottish Government, Helaba Research
In principle, it is advantageous to a region if it can control a fairly large portion of the state funds on
its own. But if the financial maneuvering room is actually smaller also because of additional costs,
the advantage of a state of one’s own declines. Scotland would receive a corresponding share of
the existing sovereign debt of the United Kingdom, whether calculated per capita or in terms of
economic performance. Scotland would then start with debt of between 70 and 90 % of GDP. A
special case would be the banks saved by the British state in the financial crisis, chiefly among
them the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). The name already indicates the Scottish background,
which is also where the bank is still headquartered. However, the majority of its business is transacted outside of Scotland. The takeover of this bank, as well as of the Halifax Bank of Scotland
(HBOS) by the Scottish government bears considerable risks for the latter, since their balance
sheet totals amount to several times Scotland’s GDP – Iceland sends its regards. The government’s bailout of RBS alone amounted to more than 200 % of Scotland’s GDP. But it is not unlikely
that the banks would shift their headquarters into the rest of the UK. In principle the financial sector
in Scotland is a very important segment of the economy. In addition to the by now somewhat ailing
banks, there are also some important wealth managers and insurance companies. Here is where
we return to the real question about the currency. The interest of the Scottish financial sector –
which pursues its business far beyond Scotland – in independence is rather muted, to say the
least.
HELABA RESEARCH · 8 SEPT EMBER 2014 · © HELABA
3
FX FOCUS BRITISH POUND
Scots in favour of retaining
the pound sterling
– “EMU“
Introduction of its
own currency
– „St. Helena“
Informal retention of the
Pound Sterling
– „Panama“
The independence movement is clearly in favour of retaining the British pound, which the financial
sector would surely prefer. Incidentally, at the beginning of 2009 Scotland’s First Minister Salmond
was still advocating the introduction of the euro in an independent state. Also because of the difficult experiences of the European currency union, the British government has unequivocally rejected such a union with Scotland. Without a coordinated financial policy, a currency union bears some
risks. Still, the “Yes” campaign insists on retaining the British pound. The currency question, in
particular, is one of the most sensitive issues in the debate, one that is raised especially by the
opponents of independence. According to polls, the vast majority of the Scots would also like to
keep the pound. But without a formal currency union, Scotland would have the following options:
introducing its own currency, introducing the euro, or informally retaining the British pound.
Since the British government cannot be forced into a currency union Scotland is left only with the
other two options. Technically the introduction of a separate currency should not pose a problem,
since Scottish banks already issue their own notes in the pound sterling. However, the conversion
would be economically risky if the new currency did not enjoy nearly the confidence of the British
pound among the population. In that case, account holders might withdraw their funds from Scottish banks and either use them as pound cash or transfer them directly to pound accounts in British
banks. Various financial institutions could run into great difficulties as a result, something that
would also affect the rest of the United Kingdom. A new Scottish government would therefore have
to quickly introduce clarity on the currency question. For example, the “Scottish pound” could be
tied directly to the British pound at a rate of 1:1. This would introduce a so-called “Currency Board.”
Classic examples of this are the linkage of the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar, of the Danish
krone to the euro, or, to stick with the pound, of the St. Helena pound (St. Helena is a British overseas territory in the Atlantic) to the British pound. If this is done in a clear and credible manner –
and underpinned also with currency reserves – the introduction of a new currency should be unproblematic. However, Scotland would then largely forego an independent monetary policy and
would have to take its guidance from the Bank of England. Whether the British central bank pays
much attention to Scottish interests these days is also a good question. Generally speaking, a
“Scottish pound” could also keep the exchange rate with the British currency flexible so the government could pursue its own monetary policy. However, in that case the problems indicated
above could occur during the conversion.
Should Scotland decide to keep the pound sterling, the UK could not really prevent it. Scottish
commercial banks would then have to procure pound liquidity in the UK. Examples for the informal
usage of another currency include Montenegro (euro) and Panama (US dollar). In this case, too,
Scotland would forego an independent monetary policy and possibly also its own central bank.
However, in that case the commercial banks would lack access to the funds of the central bank
(“lender of last resort”) in times of crisis, something international investors do not like to see. On
the other hand, after the experiences with the global financial crisis, one might well ask whether the
absence of a central bank would really pose a big problem. In Panama, the financial sector manages well without such a bank. But it is probably rather doubtful whether the Scots have much of
an appetite for “Panamanian” adventures. Especially since the failed Scottish attempt at colonizath
tion in today’s Panama at the end of the 17 century (“Darién Disaster”) with its catastrophic economic consequences played an important role in the loss of Scottish independence in 1707. The
absence of a central bank bears uncertainties that could irritate businesses, investors, and Scottish
savers.
HELABA RESEARCH · 8 SEPT EMBER 2014 · © HELABA
4
FX FOCUS BRITISH POUND
Unlike in 2009 (see above), the introduction of the euro is no longer being discussed as an option.
Another important issue, however, is membership in the EU. An independent Scotland would like
to be a member, while the sentiment in England is less clear in this regard. The UK would likely not
oppose Scottish EU membership. But it is unclear whether Scotland, as a de facto member, would
be given an accelerated procedure or would have to submit a new application, which would delay
accession to the EU by several years. Other EU countries could also block Scottish membership,
since they are themselves affected by separatist efforts – like Spain with Catalonia. The at least
temporary departure from the EU internal market would undoubtedly burden Scotland’s export
economy.
Euro introduction
no topic
When it comes to the question about the currency system, one must bear in mind that the structure
of the Scottish economy differs from that of the British economy. The once dominant heavy industry has largely disappeared, though the textile industry is still in existence. Newer sectors are
pharmaceuticals, high tech, machine building, and defence. Alongside the already mentioned financial industry, the production of foodstuffs – above all whisky – has greater importance. But
most of all, the economy is dominated by the production of oil and gas. At the same time, though,
this also makes Scotland vulnerable, should energy prices move in an unfavourable direction. In
principle, the country could balance out the negative consequences of a declining oil price by devaluing its currency, something that would rather favour a flexible exchange rate. On the other
hand, the already mentioned consequences argue at least initially for a fixed linkage to the pound
sterling.
England is Scotland’s main export destination
British oil sector already with trade deficit
% of export
% of GDP
70
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
0
Rest of UK
Europe
North
America
Asia
Sources: Macrobond, Helaba Research
Speedy resolution of the
currency question needed
Other
Sources: Macrobond, Helaba Research
Should the Scots in fact vote for independence, the government would have to quickly produce
clarity on the currency question to avoid negative repercussions. If the UK does not change its
negative stance on a currency union after the referendum, the surest method is the introduction of
a Scottish currency that is tied to the British pound. Public finances would bear certain risks. Over
the medium to longer term, certain cutbacks in the government’s spending patterns would be hardly avoidable. Fundamentally, Scotland – EU membership would be an advantage here – would be
economically viable also as a smaller state. However, there are still a few stumbling blocks that the
“Yes” camp largely ignores or keeps quiet about. Whether independence is advantageous in purely
economic terms is doubtful at least in the longer term.
Needless to say, Scottish independence would have consequences also for the rest of the UK. For
one, the country would be smaller not only geographically, but also economically. This will be felt in
general importance, but also in certain relationships with voting power etc. Still, this would not be a
serious change. Until 2003, the UK was actually running a surplus in its internal oil trade. Without
Scottish oil, the current deficit of around 1 % of GDP when it comes to energy products would rise
substantially. Nevertheless, the rest of Britain has a substantial surplus over Scotland when it
comes to other goods and services which means that the total effect on the current account would
probably not be all that pronounced. The uncertainty over the Scottish currency question can affect
HELABA RESEARCH · 8 SEPT EMBER 2014 · © HELABA
5
FX FOCUS BRITISH POUND
also the banking sector in the rest of the UK, especially since that is where the large Scottish
banks are mostly active. But the shift of financial institutions to England could even have economic
advantages. Scotland’s accession to the EU is in the interest of the British economy. But since the
EU membership of the UK is itself up for question in a possible referendum, this issue is quite
tricky. The public finances could even get some relief, whereas possible new military bases could
cost money. However, if the currency question is speedily resolved, the negative consequences for
the UK would be contained. However, political repercusions on the Cameron government of a
“Yes” vote cannot be ruled out.
Scottish “Yes” presumably
not a lasting burden
for the pound
The pound sterling could receive a damper in case of a “Yes” vote. A sustained weakness,
grounded in capital flight from the British pound, could be expected only if the decision about the
currency in Scotland and the question of whether the major banks will stay or leave drags on for a
while. As it is, our basic scenario is despite the new poll that Scottish independence will be rejected
in the referendum.
Interest expectations for the pound already priced in
Pound losing interest rate advantage over US dollar
GBP
GBP
% points
Sources: Macrobond, Helaba Research
Euro-pound exchange rate
initially sideways
% points
* Difference 1-Year-OIS-Forward in 2 years
Sources: Macrobond, Bloomberg, Helaba Research
Beyond the Scottish question, the British pound has shown itself to be very robust against the euro
in 2014. Since July that has no longer been the case against the US dollar. After a few members of
the Bank of England were still pushing the theme of a turnaround on interest rates, most recently
more cautious tones have predominated, even though there were two votes for an interest rate
hike at the August meeting. Thus the low wage growth was highlighted, and inflation in July was
also at a moderate level at 1.6 %. The fast-paced economic growth from the first half of the year is
losing some steam. For example, a few sentiment indicators from the manufacturing sector cooled
off. With that, the British central bank can take a somewhat slower approach, even if the price
increases for residential real estate continue to rise. The Bank of England could in fact react at the
beginning of 2015 and raise its key interest rate. Only then should the pound gain ground again on
the euro. After all, the markets have largely already priced in the change of course on interest
rates. The pound weakness will persist against the US dollar. In other words, even apart from
Scottish independence, the British pound is not shining for the time being.
HELABA RESEARCH · 8 SEPT EMBER 2014 · © HELABA
6
FX FOCUS BRITISH POUND
Helaba Currency Forecasts
Performance
year to date 1 month
vs. Euro
current*
Forecast horizon at end ...
Q3/2014
Q4/2014
Q1/2015
Q2/2015
(vs. Euro, %)
US dollar
6,1
3,2
1,30
1,30
1,25
1,20
1,20
Japanese yen
6,3
0,2
136
133
131
126
128
British pound
4,7
0,1
0,79
0,80
0,79
0,78
0,78
Swiss franc
1,8
0,7
1,21
1,25
1,25
1,25
1,25
Canadian dollar
3,6
3,6
1,41
1,42
1,38
1,33
1,32
Australian dollar
11,6
4,4
1,38
1,44
1,42
1,36
1,36
New Zealand dollar
7,6
1,4
1,56
1,55
1,52
1,50
1,54
Swedish krona
-3,7
0,4
9,19
9,20
9,00
8,80
8,70
Norwegian krone
2,6
2,6
8,13
8,10
7,90
7,80
7,70
vs. US-Dollar
(vs. USD, %)
Japanese yen
0,2
-2,8
105
102
105
105
107
Swiss franc
-4,1
-2,4
0,93
0,96
1,00
1,04
1,04
Canadian dollar
-2,4
0,4
1,09
1,09
1,10
1,11
1,10
Swedish krona
-9,3
-2,7
7,10
7,08
7,20
7,33
7,25
Norwegian krone
-3,3
-0,6
6,28 1,57
6,23
6,32
6,50
6,42
-3,0
1,63
1,63
1,58
1,54
1,54
US-Dollar vs. …
(vs. USD, %)
British pound
-1,4
Australian dollar
5,2
1,2
0,94
0,90
0,88
0,88
0,88
New Zealand dollar
1,4
-1,8
0,83
0,84
0,82
0,80
0,78
*05.09.2014
Sources: Bloomberg, Helaba Research 
HELABA RESEARCH · 8 SEPT EMBER 2014 · © HELABA
7
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