TransactionsoftheAmericanPhilologicalAssociation122 (1992) 1-15
The 1990 PresidentialAddress
San Francisco,California
Disauthorizing Prophecy:
The Ideological Mapping of Oedipus Tyrannus
JohnPeradotto
State University
ofNew Yorkat Buffalo
Yv@j 6' &p{strIAavxt;rtx' 5ovXfr.
Euripides,
Helen
Our startingpoint is the storyof how Themistoclestried,at firstwithout
thatvictoryagainstthePersianslay in
success,to convincehis fellowAthenians
sea power.In Plutarch'slife (10.1), we are told thathe lost hope of bringing
themover by rationalarguments(&AvOpcoivoitXoyiagoi?), and resortedto
c
signs from heaven and prophecies (arlgeixc 8ugo6vux wi
xpqtoFo),
as someonewouldin performing
a tragedy"(&$)airp ?V
"contriving
machinery
"
tpoycp&a Flxvi v pa). The statesman,frustrated
by the failure of
rationaldiscourse,findssuccess in theatrical
smokeand mirrors,
Themistocles
probablynotthefirstand certainly
notthelast.The storyillustrates
thepower
of non-rationalover rationalrepresentation
and uses theateras its mostapt
metaphor.I inviteyou to imagine,ifyou will,a sophist-someonelike Critias
or Gorgiasor even,perhaps,Protagorasor Socrates-sittingin thetheaterof
Dionysusduringa not altogetherdissimilarrepresentation:
the enactmentof
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus.Imaginehis sense of futility
in theface of this
powerfulanti-sophiststatement.
at lackingthechance
Imaginehis frustration
to respondin a social contextequally inclusive,equally compelling.I should
like to take thatfrustrated
sophist'sparttoday,respectfully
disregarding,
for
thewhile,themanyothervalid waystheremaybe to readOedipus Tyrannus.
I
shall, of course, be adding a particularcontemporary
perspective.That is
inevitable.But in thiscase it is also deliberate.Deliberate,fortwo reasons.
First,because whenI reflecton theparticularcontemporary
perspectiveI am
least uncomfortablewith, and look for somethinglike it in the age of
Sophocles, I findmyselfsittingwiththatfrustrated
sophistin the theaterof
Dionysus.And second,because thatplay is of course still read,stillheld in
highestesteem in the courtsof aestheticjudgment,still firmlyfixed in the
canon of thosetextswe wishthewell-schooledto have read,and that,not as
historicalmuseumpiece merely,butbecauseitstilldeliversa messagewe think
itvaluableto hear.
2
JohnPeradotto
This thenis, at least in part,a sophistreadingof Sophocles. Its most
textis a functionof
of a literary
assumptionis thattheintention
fundamental
its social use. It is promptedby the desire to distinguishnarrativesof
emancipationfromnarrativesof enslavementand therebyto promotethe
autonomyof readingsubjectsand theirsociety(Godzich 1989). If otherscall
thatis theirbusiness.I choose not to
whatI am about to do deconstruction,
misused,one so likely,
pigeonholeit witha name,especiallyone so drastically
in some quartersat least, to raise hackles and divertattentionfromthe
operational
substanceof the argument.If pressed,I would use a different
visible
to
make
intended
process
a prismatic
metaphorand call it "refraction,"
the invisible medium of our vision, withoutdestroyingeither vision or
medium.I do sharethegoals of thosewho,whatevername theygive to what
of theold romanticview thatart
theydo, wish to clear away thepretensions
formthrough
in monumental
universal
human
truths
and
expressespermanent
power of the imagination.Achievingthese
some prophetic,unscrutinizable
goals involvesmakingvisible the strategiesused by ideologyto createthe
appearance of abiding and universal truthin the interests,not always
overothers.WhatI wish
deliberate,of gainingpowerand exercisingauthority
in
of
Wittgensteinwhen he remarked:
to do is perpetrated the spirit
of our intellectby means of
"Philosophyis a battleagainstthebewitchment
no. 109).
language"(PhilosophicalInvestigations,
among the Azande, the ethnologistEdward
Speaking of bewitchment
arguedthat,whenit comesto whatsciencewould call causal
Evans-Pritchard
witchcraft
actually
farfromshowingany ignoranceor contempt,
determinism,
to
it
than
science
resort
more
uncompromising
insistsupona moreexhaustive,
revealsa genuinetheoryof
does. As a naturalphilosophy,he says,witchcraft
causation. When misfortuneoccurs, it can be attributedto witchcraft
cooperatingwithnaturalforces.If, forexample,a buffalogores someone,or
if the supportsof a granaryare underminedby termitesso thatit falls on
the
meningitis,
someone'shead, or if someoneis infectedwithcerebro-spinal
Azande say thatthe buffalo,the granary,and the disease are causes which
does not create the
to kill the victim.Witchcraft
combine with witchcraft
buffaloor the granaryor the disease; these indeed exist in theirown right.
situation
as responsiblefortheparticular
is ratherto be understood
Witchcraft
The
a
with
into
lethal
person.
particular
relationship
in whichtheyare brought
it
was
granarywouldhave fallenin anycase, butsince witchcraft present, fell
momenton a particular
person.Of thecauses involved,theonly
at a particular
emanatesfroma
forwitchcraft
is witchcraft,
one whichpermitsintervention
And
thedisease do notallow of intervention.
person.The buffalo,thegranary,
Disauthorizing
Prophecy
3
therefore,
thoughtheymay be recognizedas causes, theyare not considered
thesociallyrelevantones (Evans-Pritchard
1935: 418-19).
This can be expressedanotherway by sayingthatthe Azande do not
recognizethecategoryofaccidentor chance.Classical sciencecan neverreally
disprovetheAzande claim,forby theverynatureof itsexplanatory
procedure
classical sciencerulesout consideration
of thelethalrelationship
betweenthe
fall of the granaryand the presence of this particularvictim. Such a
relationship,
it insists,is accidental:an event,by definition,
thatneithersubmits
to causal analysisnoris relevantto it. But fortheAzande thisrelationship
is,
in fact,themostpressing,most"sociallyrelevant"elementin theevent,and
theirneed fortotal explanationrules out the accidental,or better,prevents
themfromevenunderstanding
whatitmeansforan eventto be accidental.
ErnstCassirer,in his monumental
analysisof mythicthought(1955: 4349), has shown how the philosopher Hume, in strivingto achieve a
psychologicalcritiqueof the causal judgmentof science, has in factrather
foundthe source of all mythicinterpretations
of experience.Accordingto
Hume,everyrepresentation
of causalityderivesfroma representation
of mere
coexistencein space or time.Humeheldthatin all causal representations,
not
simplythoseof myth,theprinciples
post hoc, ergopropterhoc and iuxtahoc,
ergo propterhoc apply.Even if one hesitatesto followHume thatfar,there
wouldappearto be no questionabouttheuniversality
of thesetwoprinciplesin
mythic thought.And since anythingcan stand in spatial or temporal
relationshipwith anythingelse, anythingcan come fromanything.Either
everything
makes sense,or nothingdoes. The distinction
thatAristotledraws
between events occurringafter one another(get'
ikkiXx) and those
occurringbecause of one another(&i' `CXX-Xcx)
is altogether
loston themythic
mentality.Accordingly,the concept of chance or accident is not only
incompatible
withthisnon-scientific
pointofview,itis a scandal.
JacquesMonod,Nobel Prize-winning
geneticist,
goes further
and argues
that the concept of chance, far frombeing the mere by-productof the
scientific
enterprise,
has in factbecomecentralto it.He says(1971: 113):
Thereis noscientific
inanyofthesciences,
concept,
moredestructive
of
anthropomorphism
thanthisone,andno otherso rousesan instinctive
protest
fromtheintensely
teleonomic
creatures
thatwe are.Forevery
vitalist
oranimist
ideology
itis therefore
theconcept
orrather
thespecter
tobeexorcised
atall costs.
The most articulatespokesmanfor this non-determinist
view of science is
anotherNobel laureate,Ilya Prigogine,who invitesus to reversethetendency,
4
JohnPeradotto
instilledin us by Westernphilosophyand classical science, to marginalize
chance. The perspectiveof thatclassical science is epitomizedin Laplace's
demon(who, by the way, sounds a lot like Sophocles'
famoushypothetical
Apollo), forits knowledgeof themass,position,and velocityof all bodies at
any giveninstantin theuniversewould allow it to inferall past and all future
states of the universe.In rejectingthatdemon and the classical science it
in what
Prigogine(1984: 304) offersus a moresalutarysubstitute
represents,
he calls a Lucretianscience."The point,"he says,
where[what
cease to be deterrnined,
wherethe[causal] trajectories
andmonotonous
theordered
thefoedera
fatigoverning
termed]
Lucretius
changebreakdown,[thatpoint]marksthe
worldof deterrninistic
of a newscience...In
of nature.It also marksthebeginning
beginning
Lucretianphysicswe thusagainfindthelinkwe havediscoveredin
modernknowledgebetweenthe choices underlyinga physical
to
relating
conception
anda philosophic,
orreligious
ethical,
description
is set
connections
in nature.The physicsof universal
man's situation
nolonger
sciencethatinthenameoflawanddomination
againstanother
ofrandomness.
withdisturbance
struggles
noranyone
theresurelyis no greaterscientistthanAristotle,
In antiquity
detailed
who submitstheconceptsof chanceand accidentto suchmeticulously
analysisas he does in the second book of the Physics. In this analysis,he
mentionsthe view of those who endow chance withthe statusof a genuine
cause, consideringit somethingdivine and mysterious(Oci6v z-r...i
dismisses.Yet, in the
himselfsummarily
5acxgovio'repov). This view Aristotle
effort
to correlatehis
be
a
concerted
indeed
seem
to
Poetics, wheretheredoes
and scientist,wherethebest
view of poetrywithhis views as metaphysician
or necessity(iCxtax
kindof plot is thatin whichthingshappenby probability
wherepoetryof thiskind is said to be a more
troeiic6oij ro &vcayKicxov),
whyin theface of all this
philosophicaland moreseriousactivitythanhistory,
a play so
does he makeOedipus Tyrannustheparadigmof tragiccomposition,
riddledwithchance,so crippledby coincidence,as to be ruledout of serious
and necessity?In so
of probability
consideration
by thescientist'stouchstones
againstall thathe holdsdearas a
turning
lionizingSophocles' play,is Aristotle
and scientist?Is it rightfora philosopherand a scientistto say
metaphysician
thatplausible impossibilitiesmake betterplots thanimplausiblepossibilities
(also called "successfulfalsifying"Wceo5i ?yclV60 5ei)? Readers of the
Poetics (1752a) will recognizea close kinshipbetweenEvans-Pritchard's
cursedAzande killedby thecollapsinggranaryand an exampleof Aristotle's,
the murdererof one Mitys,killed when,duringa festival,the statueof his
victimtoppledover on him. In thediscussionof thebest typeof tragicplots,
Disauthorizing
Prophecy
5
this incidentis offeredas an example of somethingwhich,even thoughit
happens by chance, has the appearance of design (C'irqt6e qaivetcat
yeyovevat),and so will arousewonder."Thingslike that,"Aristotleconcludes,
"do notseem (0oice) to happenwithoutpurpose(ejiqb),and plotsof thiskind
are necessarilybetter."
Better(KkXXiouS) in what way? Because theyarouse a sense of awe
(Oxi(x.u)in generaland in particular
thetragicemotionsin thoseirredeemably
teleonomicbeings who take such thingsnot foraccidents,as presumablya
philosopher
and scientistwould,butforeventswhichhave happenedby design,
accordingto necessityor probability.
A keytermhereis qaxivetal: theevents
merelyappear or seem to happenby design,notof courseto a philosopheror
scientistlike Aristotle,but to the mass of folks sittingin the theaterof
Dionysus.The allure of such tales,the seductionof the prophetic,of poetic
justice, of the curse fulfilled,even for the mind that disbelieves in such
things-thisAristotleunderstood-derivesfromour abidingdesireforunity,
oururgeto readin a unityeven wherenoneexists.
Anotherkey termhere is the one translatedas probability,to ?ic;K0:
likelihood,verisimilitude,
theview of tradition,
themajority,
currentopinion.
It bears no ironclad correspondenceto "facts," whetherof science or of
history,
butconforms
morecloselyto publicopinion,even wheresuchopinion
maydepartfromhistoricalactualityor scientific
possibility(Poetics ch. 25; cf.
also 9 and 15). Of course, we would say that "historicalactuality"and
"scientificpossibility"possess theirown particularbrandsof verisimilitude,
differingfrom "public opinion" only in degree of self-monitoring,
and consistency.
systematicity
But in Aristotle'sremarksherewe observethe
greaterkinshipof the Poetics withtheRhetoric thanwiththe Physics or
Metaphysics,despitehis protestations
about the philosophicalcharacterof
poetry.
It is here also thatwe mustobserve Aristotle'sfailureto answerthe
Platonic Socrates' charge against poets in the properlycomposed society.
ImaginePlato's reactionto thefollowingpassagein thePoetics(1461a):
Ifthe[poetic]representation
is neither
truetofactnoranidealization,
its
accordwithwhatpeoplesaymakesitacceptable.
Thisis thecase with
what[poets]sayaboutthegods;itmaybe perhaps
neither
thebetter
way
of speakingaboutthem,northetruth;
it maybe [as reprehensible]
as
Xenophanes
thought
itwas;still,itrepresents
whatpeoplebelievetobe
thecase.
6
JohnPeradotto
Aristotle'sfocushere,as in theRhetoric,is on technique.So faras thegoals of
tragictechniqueare concerned,his analysisends withthearousalof pityand
of thatmaybe, or whether
fear.Aboutwhatthesocial or politicalimplications
it is morallybeneficial,he is silent.In fact,in thisverypassage he insiststhat,
fromthe art of
the art of poetryis different
when it comes to correctness,
social conduct.However,if we choose to keep our eyes fixedon thosesocial
in theFrogs did,itis
as Platodid,and as Aristophanes
and moralimplications,
hardnot to see thePoetics, not as a separateand autonomoust%Xvibut as
virtuallyanotherchapterin theRhetoric,concernedas it is withwhatRoland
Barthes (1970: 179) calls a "deliberately degraded" logic ("logique
degradee"),one adaptedto the level of the generalpublic,of
volontairment
To
verisimilitude:
currentopinion,a commonaesthetic,thetaken-for-granted,
has been one thateffectively
iKc6, 60ta. The subsequenthistoryof rhetoric
disengaged it fromits immediatepragmaticaim in civic deliberationand
persuasionto concentrateon the productionof beautyin discourseand on
enumeratingand-cataloguingrhetoricalfigures(Ducrot and Todorov 1979:
betweenlanguageand itspragmaticeffect
74). This maskingof therelationship
was compoundedby the romantics,with theirconceptionof poetryas an
activityemanatingfroma solitarygenius.The effect
and mysterious
irrational
analysismighthave
of thisview was to neutralizewhateverpotentialrhetorical
had to deflatethe claims of the muse-inspiredbard. That historyhas forced
uponus a way of readingOedipus Tyrannusand of esteemingit thatis hardto
sophisticperspectiveor a contemporary
justifyfromeithera fifth-century
perspective.
semioticand hermeneutic
is
For in our timeit largelysemioticsand discourseanalysisthathave
tendency(on
reversedthis historyof rhetoricby exposingour unreflective
which Aristotelianrhetoricheavilyrelies) to confuselinguisticor narrative
realitywithso-called "natural"reality,or better,to confusewhat is being
forms
to withwhatreallyis, to confusethemutantand heterogeneous
referred
of cultureand history(verisimilitude)with enduringuniversalsof nature,
humannature.By exposingthe mechanicsat the secretcore of
particularly
discourse,semioticsmakesideologyexplicit;it unmaskstheprocess,
narrative
seem
to which language is ever open, of makingwhat is merelyarbitrary
natural,of tumingthemerelyaccidentalintothenecessary.Yet, so powerfulis
thisprocessand theresistanceto itsexposure,thatthereare manywho,even if
theyconcede the legitimacyand importanceof its exposure,still considerit
isolable fromtheact of readingpoetryand insiston its suspensionifthework
is to be enjoyed.They would arguethatto expose the rulesof thegame,the
process and devices of constructionthat ground and authenticatethe
Disauthorizing
Prophecy
7
representational
surfaceof the work,is to spoil thepleasurewe derivefrom
thatrepresentational
surface.But semioticsforcesus to questionhow farthis
suspensionof disbeliefcan reallygo, or should reallygo. Such "innocent"
readingof any texts,butespeciallyof thoseas overtlypersuasivein intentas
thisone,can be morallyalienatingand sociallydamaging.As GeorgesBataille
wrote(1957, foreword),"How can we lingerover books to whichobviously
In the same vein Borges,in his tale "Tlon,
the authorwas not constrained?"
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius"(1962: 13), createsa fictionalcountry,in realitythe
region of contemporary
literarydiscourse,where "a book which does not
containitscounterbook
is consideredincomplete."
In his readingof the Tyrannusthe sophist/scientist
insertsthe absent
counterbook,
thetextalong thelines
rereads,whichis perhapsto say rewrites,
suggestedby Valery(1957: 1467) whenhe speaksof an unconventional
literary
workwhich,he says,
would[openly]displayat each of itsjunctures
theplurality
whichis
availabletothemind,a plurality
inthemidstofwhichitmakesa choice
ofthatsinglesequencewhichwillbe giveninthetext.Thiswouldbe to
taketheillusionofa determinism
whichhasnooptionsandwhichcopies
reality,
andto substitute
forittheillusionofwhatis possible-at-eachan illusionwhichformeexhibits
moment,
moreverisimilitude.
Whatwouldemergefromsucha criticalrereading
of theOedipus Tyrannus?
1. Let us start,whereVoltairedoes, withthe arrivalof the Corinthian
messenger.Changetheplay to bringhim in twentyminutesearlieror twenty
minuteslaterand thetragedydissolves.His arrivalis timedto coincidewiththe
arrivalof Laius' herdsmansummonedby Oedipusforquestioning,
and occurs
immediately
afterJocasta'sprayerto Apollo fora clearresolution.
Thingslike
thatdo not appear to happenby accident.It is perceivedas happeningnot
simplyafter(get6), butbecause of(&6) Jocasta'sprayer.If suchan eventcan
be called a "universal,"it is like the Aristotelianuniversalsof politicsand
ethics,not of metaphysicsor even of logic. Such eventsare, in otherwords,
productsof verisimilitude,
culturalproducts,or contrivances
of a poet-what,
fromtheperspectivewe are assuming,we would call contingent.
The arrival
of themessengercan be said to happen5t' 6iXXT1Xcu
onlyif we posit-as the
poet or culturalconventionor belief may force us to do-a divine agent
causingwhatwe wouldotherwise
call a contingent,
coincidentaloccurrence.
2. The same maybe said foranotheraspectof thisCorinthian
messenger.
He justhappensalso to be theherdsman
who receivedOedipusas an infantand
8
JohnPeradotto
gave him to king Polybus. Things like that do not appear to happen by
accident.
herdsman/messenger
3. Thereis stillmoreof the same. This Corinthian
whojusthappensalso
receivedthechildon Cithaeronfroma Thebanherdsman
to be the sole survivinghenchmanof Laius from the slaughterat the
crossroads.Thingslike thatdo notappearto happenby accident.It simplywill
have done,to writetheseoffas instancesof sonotdo, as some commentators
called "dramaticeconomy." That strikesme as an attemptto tame the
intellectualscandal of coincidenceby disguisinga problemof contentas a
virtueof technique.
4. Yet anotheritem:someonehas a littletoo muchto drinkat a partyand
?7E?atr 776-77) to call theking's son a bastard.
just happens(tixri tot/uS'
Vexationat thisremarkeventuallydrivesOedipusto Delphi,to heara horrible
timedfora fatalchancemeeting.
oracle,thewholeincidentperfectly
5. For Oedipusand Laius bothreacha spottoo narrowforbothto pass at
preciselythe same moment.They are broughtinto lethal relationwithone
another.Thingslikethatdo notappearto happenby accident.
6. Item:theplague in Thebes.At whatparticularmomentdoes it strike?
ImmediatelyfollowingLaius' death and beforeOedipus has fatheredfour
childrenon Jocasta?No. AfterOedipus and Jocastahave died of old age,
blissfullyignorantof theirfate?No. Rather,long afterthefatedpair have had
and preciselytimedto coincidewiththe
timeto breedfourincestuouschildren,
of his deathto
deathof Polybusin such a way as to bringtheannouncement
too
late.
minutes
Thingslike
or
twenty
too
minutes
early
not
twenty
Thebes
thatdo notappearto happenby accident.
thestoryof Laius' murder,a thing
7. Item:thecrossroads.In recounting
thatis motivated,mindyou, by Jocasta'sdesireto depreciateprophecy,she
mentionsan irrelevant,whollycoincidentaldetail, ?V tputXxi; aciroi;
(716), in an account otherwisebrutallyaustere in that kind of casual,
descriptivedetail. But forthatdetail,whichOedipus catcheson, the action
would notturnin its fataldirection.Thingslike thatdo notappearto happen
by accident.
This way of readingwill no longerpermitus to followthose who see
whathappensto Oedipus,butnotcausingit. All
Apollo as merelyprophesying
marksas accidents will be read as the
of the events the sophist/scientist
says of Azande witchcraft,
productsofpurposefulactivity.As Evans-Pritchard
But for
such aspectsof an eventare theonlyones whichpermitintervention.
the charactersof Oedipus, of Jocasta,of Laius, and of
such intervention,
and mythicmind,insufficient,
everyoneelse in thestoryare,to theunscientific
Disauthorizing
Prophecy
9
less relevantcauses of the outcome. From a semiotic and narratological
perspective-andthisis thecentralpointI wishto makehere-the actionsof
actionsof the author,while thoseof
Apollo are identicalto the constitutive
Oedipus,Jocasta,and the restare butproductsof thoseconstitutive
actions.
The textitself,if you will, ever so brieflyliftsthe veil on thissecretwhen
on all thathas happened,is made to say (1329-33):
Oedipus,in commenting
'Ao6XXowv
tab' ijv "This was Apollo. It was Apollo, friends,who broughtto
completionall theterriblethingsthathave happenedto me. But thehandthat
struck[myeyes] was noneotherthanmyown."
thehypothesis
Againstsucha background,
thatOedipusmighthavekilled
somebodyelse at the crossroads,aroundthesame time,is certainlyno more
preposterousa coincidenceto assume thanany of those I have enumerated,
especiallyin view of thequestionraisedby theplay itself,and neverresolved,
about the numberof Laius' assailants(Goodhart1978). Remove any one of
thesecoincidences,an easy thingto do giventhe infinitesimal
plausibilityof
theirall occurring,
and the Tyrannuscollapses like a house of cards.That is
not somethingthat can as readily be said of tragedies involving rival
allegiancesto incompatiblegoods such as theAntigoneor thePhiloctetes(at
least untilthelatter'sdisturbing
finale,whereprophecyand theatricalsmoke
and mirrors
do indeedintrudeto annultheharddecisionsreachedon a purely
humanplaneofmotivation).
What is more,all the suspicionraised by semioticsand hermeneutics
when it comes to literarytextsgoes a fortiorifor drama,for drama,even
more thanthe writtentext,masks an authoras source of the discourse.It
implicatesus emotionallyand intellectually
withso-called commonsense and
the ordinaryopinion (verisimilitude)of our social group by literally
surrounding
us withthem.It imposesits own pace upon the communicative
transaction.
It constrains,
by fixinggesture,toneand scenery,our receptionof
otherwiseambiguousor multivalent
textualelements.Whatis mostimportant,
it preventsrereading.We mighteven speak of thiseffect,by contrastto what
happensin a reader,as theunwillingsuspensionof disbelief.This is, in Charles
Bernstein'swords,"notimagination
(theact of forming
a mentalimageout of
something
notpresentto thesenses)butim-positionof theimageon themind"
(1986: 90). Put anotherway,the superficialdeletionof theauthor'svoice in
drama actually gives him greaterdominionover the discourse (especially
where,as in Sophocles'case,he is also thedirector)
and disableshis audience's
powerto producemeaning.This sortof linguisticactivityis tyrannical,
forit
turnsthearbitrary
intoa constraint.
It was thisperception
thatled Rousseau(in
a letterto D'Alembert) to advocate the banningof theaterbecause, as he
10
JohnPeradotto
remarks,"it bringsa public togetherto reinforcetheprevailingmoresrather
of bothour formsof life and
as constitutors
thanto exerciseits constituency
aestheticsof thiskind of
traditional
the
short,
In
principlesof government."
tragedymay put us in danger of revivifyingghosts, of maintainingor
values whichhistory,which is to say othertexts,has otherwise
reinstating
criminal
taughtus to abandonto our advantage,values such as involuntary
prophecy.
unresponsive
authority,
unquestioned
contamination,
In this context,let me returnto the relationbetweenApollo and the
author.I have urged thatApollo not only predictsOedipus' "crimes,"and
punisheshimforthem,butcauses themtohappen.Whichis to say thatthepoet
quitedistinct
causes themto happen,and thison a level of poeticconstruction
fromthaton which he fabricatesverisimilarmotivationand action in his
reducestheusefulnessof theplay
Whatresultssignificantly
humancharacters.
of prophecyover sophistic
merits
relative
evaluating
the
as a model for
science, as a model fora theoryof action,as a model for anythingexcept
persuasiveideologicalmessage.
of a powerfully
perhapstheproduction
What Apollo "does" in the OT is somethingthepoet is doingdirectly;
what Oedipus "does" is somethingthe poet does indirectly.When we ask
ourselveswhat"Oedipus" in thiskindof storycan or mightbe expectedto do,
shaped by prevailing
we make explicita whole set of rules (verisimilitude),
to do in certain
can
or
are
likely
what
human
beings
views about
by such rules,and
is controlled
Audience-and reader-response
circumstances.
poets are constrainedby them;in composing,theymustworkthroughthese
But whenwe ask ourselveswhat"Apollo" in a storylike this
rulesindirectly.
be
can or might expectedto do withrespectto humanbeings,we realizethatit
is verynearlyidenticalto whata poet,composingthiskindof story,can do
withrespectto his characters.That is whynothingthat"Apollo" does in the
play is motivated the way human actions in the play have to be and are
motivated.But thisdirectoperationof thepoet on theplot,specificallyin the
creationof the coincidences,is construed,by the unscientificmentality,as
divineactivity.The powerof theplay as a modelof beliefand conductlies in
and so
is to demystify
To revealthedistinction
theopacityof thisdistinction.
to neutralizethatpower.For ourknowledgeof how theeffectis achievedcan
actuallydestroytheillusion,and,I am arguing,shoulddo so.
Prophecy is not conceivable apart fromnarrative.It derives from
in time.It is, I believe,
of causal continuity
fromtherepresentation
narrative,
less accurateto say thata narrativerepresentsa prophecythanto say that
and does so bypre-presenting
it,theframe
thatnarrative,
prophecyrepresents
paradoxically embedded in what it frames. Prophecy derives from the
Disauthorizing
Prophecy
11
narrator'sforeknowledge
(in reality,his afterknowledge)
of his own products,
froma processof retrogressive
composition-fromend to beginning(theend
coming firstand justifyingthe means), disguised in performanceas a
progressionfrombeginningto end. It is a processresidingin thesecretplace
betweenconstruction
and production,in whicheffectprecedescause in the
realityof relativelyunconstrained
composition,
the
producingin performance
illusionof a necessaryprocessionof cause and effect.Now in thelife of real
moralagents,"the subject,"in Ricoeur's words"precedesthe action,in the
orderof ethicalqualities;in poetics,thecompositionof theactionby thepoet
govemstheethicalqualityof thecharacters"
(1984: 37). Once thisdiscrepancy
is understood, once the camouflaged relation between prophecy and
compositionis laid bare,itspersuasivepowerto bindis broken,and a playlike
theOT ceases tomakesense.
If we are to makesense of theOT, we may(in fact,we must)assumethe
realityof Sophocles' Apollo. Froma scientificpointof view, the temporary
suspensionof our disbeliefhere is indeedsalutary,forit is indispensiblein
realizing an experimentbased on hypothesis.For literarytransactionsdo
involvehypothesisnot altogether
unlikescientificones. Theypresentus with
modelsof actionand consequenceswhichwe use in theconstruction
of moral
systems.We are oftenled to believe thatit is moralprinciplesderivedfrom
such systemsthatofferactual groundsforconduct,whenin facttheyare but
abstractionswhose significanceremains dependenton original narrative
contexts(Burell and Hauerwas 1976: 90). As models,theseoriginalnarrative
contextsmustbe judged by criteriaof the usefuland the good, and ranged
againstothermodels. It is out of the currentconsensualcompilationof such
models that we derive our view of what we call the "real world."
(Parenthetically
and obviously,problemsassociatedwiththecanonicity
of texts
are largelyreducibleto thisrealizationand to arguments
over whose use and
whosegood is to be served.)
In the long run,the OT is designed to induce us to disauthorizeour
scientificand rationalao(p{at because of and in favorof an authority
disbelief
in whichwe have suspendedin orderto realize theliterarytransaction.
I am
suggestingthatnothingaccomplishedby the play should dissuade us from
reinstating
thatdisbelief.In fact,thesemioticreadingof theplayonlyservesto
confirmthatdisbelief.When the existentialrealityof spectators/readers
is
modelledon theOT, if whateverthecharacter
Oedipusrepresents
in theorder
of experienceis somethingwhichgroundsdecisionsaboutthatworldand the
actionswe can take in it, whatthendoes the characterApollo represent?
Or
Tiresias? This realization,I believe, argues not for the removalof the OT
12
JohnPeradotto
fromour canon, but ratherfor an even securerplace for it there-as a
in need of exposure.
and propheticrhetoric
powerfulparadigmof theocratic
be construed
prophecyshouldnotnecessarily
to disauthorize
My attempts
thetragicviewthisplayis allegedto embody.We may
to demystify
as attempts
all well agree thatself-knowledge-completeand clear-is an illusion.We
may even thengo on to agree thatthisillusionis tragic.But I would submit
thatthisinsightis based on or embodiedin othersources,othertexts.I am no
be based on thisone. We can indeed
longerpersuadedthatit can legitimately
act in massive ignoranceof forcesthathave shaped us, and by such actions
precipitatemajor misfortunefor ourselves. But in the life of "real" (vs.
are to a
perspective,
fictional)agents,thoseforces,fromthesophist/scientist's
large extent random. They are not orchestratedtoward the goal of our
nordo theygeneratepropheticsignswhoseeffectis to keep us on
destruction,
a fataltrackwe mightotherwisedivergefrom.
The view I am expressing here is sure to incur the charge of
a philosophical,scientificand rational
to reinstate
of attempting
"rationalism,"
point of view long afterits defectshave been exposed. But for all those
defects-defectswe know well how to demystify-Iwould insistit is once
the discourseof the
again timeto emphasizethevirtuesof rationalthought,
scientistand sophist.We have muchmoreto fearfromthe otherside, from
I do notwish,hereof all places,to
whatsophismcame intobeingto demystify.
a complexissue. Indeed,whatgoes by
give theappearanceof oversimplifying
it
thenameof reasonor therationalthesedays is notnegotiatedcomfortably;
powerthanothers,
hardlyever occurswithoutsome havingmorenegotiating
But we
altogether.
or worse,thepowerto excludeothersfromthenegotiations
the
that
it.
The
onlyproof
of reasonby abandoning
do notescape thetyranny
sophisticenterpriseis bankruptwill be one executedby sophismitself.Any
other will be the unresponsivedogma of the prophet. I, for one, am
overtheimage,at theend of theTyrannus,of powertransferred
apprehensive
who will makeno
intothehandsof a self-confessedshirkerof responsibility
moves untilclearingthemwithDelphi. The standtakenhere is based upon a
and absolutist,
prophetic,
mountinganxietyoveragendathatare unresponsive,
inside academia or
whetherreligious or secular, national or international,
it masksits
outsideof it,insideourprofession'sranksor outsideof it; whether
institutional
loyaltyor "political
partisanshipas centralityor marginality,
As Fred Weinsteinhas pointed
dignityor righteousindignation.
correctness,"
continueto occupy
out, politicaland otherformsof unresponsiveauthority
more so thanadvocatesof the
elevatedand veneratedpositionseverywhere,
of authority,"
democratization
processwouldhave expected."The ritualization
Disauthorizing
Prophecy
13
he says, "cuts across all lines and existsin all cultures,to different
degrees,
certainly, but to significant degrees, no matter how rationalized,
bureaucratized,
or even democratized
theymaybe" (1990: 146). By social and
culturalcommitment,
ourprofession,
like otherscholarlyprofessions,
and the
colleges and universitieswhere we do our work,are the only institutions
If we
formallydedicatedto whatI have been callingthesophisticenterprise.
let it fail, no one else will take it up. In short,if we believe thatthereare
answers to the kinds of questions we ask, howeverprovisional,however
makeshift,
thenin orderto tolerateour differences,
theremustbe a shared
language-call it a rhetoricif you must,butshared-in whichthesesortsof
1986: 246). If thereare values derivingfrom
thingscan be done (Prendergast
whatI have been callingthepropheticviewpoint,and I do not discountthat
possibility,I believe it is our greatersocial obligationto forcethemintoan
Othersmayfind,perhapswithgood
open and responsivearenaofjustification.
reason,thattheyhave to yield to the despairof Themistoclesor Aristotle's
resignedconcessionto publicopinion.We cannotaffordto.
To say thattheTyrannusis an anti-sophist
tractis to say thatit yieldsto
thatdespair.Whatshouldbe emphasized,however,is thatthesophistOedipus
who is demolishedis buta half-bakedsophist,one stillimmersedin an archaic
notionof criminalcontamination
thateven Aristotlewould have discounted.
And in theconflictof social skillsor txvcti of whichOedipushimselfspeaks
(380), in thecompetition
of "wisdoms"or ao(pitxmentioned
by an ambivalent
chorus (501), he is made finallyto abandon not only the problemof the
numberof Laius' assailants,but even the evidence of his own senses in
recollecting
thathe killedall thosehe encountered
at thecrossroads.Not only
has one been made equal to many,butzero has been made equal to one. And
thenotso evidentironyis thatto makesenseof theTyrannus,
even in a pious,
unscientific
reading,in whathas been called the"natural"readingof theplay,
requires fairlyheavy applicationof the very skill for which Oedipus as
enlightenedsophistis noted,namelyinference:to reconstruct,
among other
things,by whatmotivationthesurvivorfromthecrossroadsshouldlie about
thenumberof assailantsbut,underexamination
by theking,notaboutwhose
child the infantOedipus was. In the same way we must reconstruct
how
Oedipus could have missedthissurvivor,thinkinginsteadthathe had killed
everyonein Laius' party,and how theCorinthian
drunkshouldcome to know
the secretsurrounding
King Polybus' son, and why Laius wished to go to
Delphi. In the same way we must reconstruct-thisone is harder!-how
Oedipus could have missed the survivor'sstory,one which,as Jocastasays
14
JohnPeradotto
(850), the whole cityheard,not she alone. To do all this,to make all these
is to readtheplayas OedipusreadsTiresias.
inferences,
disclosure,Oedipus is made to consider
Shortlybeforethe terrifying
himselfa maxs tilt TvlklT (1080), a child of Tyche, a consequence of
That is trueof himand of theplay,of
coincidence,an effectof thearbitrary.
coursein a sensehe does notmean,norSophoclesintend.He is theeffectof the
by
is frustrated
arbitrary
made to appearnecessary.And ifthesophist/scientist
thepowerof theplay to maskthisfromtheteleonomiccreaturesthatwe are,
and by Aristotle'sapparentconcessionto thisperhapsinevitableillusionin
mass culture,he can at leastfindpoeticjusticeand perhapsperversedelightin
Intotheurn,
theway prizeswereawardedon theoccasion of itsperformance.
thejudges cast tenballots,perhaps,one may speculate,as manyas seven for
way,fivewereshakenout,butno morethantwo
Sophocles.In thecustomary
beyond
forSophocles. Submittedto thetruelotteryof chance,and altogether
took
second
the
Tyrannus
intervention
and
purpose,
the reach of personal
place. Like it or not,that'sjust thekindof thingthatdoes happenby chance.
formy purposes-I shall not
irony,perhapsdisconcerting
Yet, by a further
hide it!-that versionof what happenedmakes a good storyfor the same
reason as the storyof Mitys' statue: the same poetic justice is at work,
Sophocles undoneby chance forwritinga play discountingchance. Not the
kindofthingthathappensby chance!
historymay be, I would preferto
As provocativeas thathypothetical
thatconsortsmoreaptlywiththeview I have taken:
concludewitha narrative
a talmudictext thatoffersan elaborationof, if not an alternativeto, the
canonicalpictureof creationin Genesis. In thisversion(citedin Neher1975:
at thetask,each of themdoomedto
attempts
179), thecreatormadetwenty-six
failure,beforegettingthingstheway theyare. The worldwe inhabitis made
out of thedebrisof provisionaland failingcreations.Made in theimageof its
maker,thehumancreaturefaces the same riskof failure.In thetale, as God
looks upon his latestcreation,he says not "This is good," but "Let's hope it
works"(Halway Sheyaamod),thusbrandingthehumanstory,rightfromits
in the
outset,withthemarkof radicalchancinessand risk,its end not written
leftto concludeitforthemselves.
and itsmaincharacters
beginning,
Disauthorizing
Prophecy
15
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