Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia1
The four key elements of the 45 years long existence of Yugoslavia were:
a) the communist resistance movement during World War II along with carrying out an
authentic revolution (though under the Soviet influence);
b) the reconstruction of Yugoslavia as a federative republic (and not as the pre-war
centralised kingdom);
c) the introduction of an alternative form of socialism (socialist self-management) after the
break-up with the Informbiro in 1948;
d) the bipolar division of Europe and indeed, of the world in which Yugoslavia found the
so called "third" way (non-alignment) with the role of Josip Broz Tito as a charismatic
leader who - possessing absolute and undisputed authority - functioned within
Yugoslavia as a third "institution" (along with the Communist Party and the army).
Tito's Rise, Charisma, and the Personality Cult
Tito became a public figure as early as in the twenties when he was sentenced to several
years of imprisonment in a court trial in Zagreb. In the second part of the thirties he
became the organisational secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.2 The few
members of the leadership he had appointed (though he removed some of them, for
example Milovan Djilas and Aleksander Ranković in different periods) were then leading
the Communist Party, the liberation movement, as well as the state for several decades.
Nevertheless, it was the war, which helped Tito to transform from a secretary of a relatively
unimportant Communist Party into a legendary leader of the Yugoslav partisan movement
and a leader of Yugoslav state. With an extraordinary persistence he managed to bring
together parts of the broken Yugoslavia. At that time neither Britain nor America, nor the
Soviet Union believed Yugoslavia could ever be restored. With his motto about the
brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nations he tried to prevent the bloody fights
between the Serbs, the Croats and the Moslems and at the same time connect the
resistance with the revolution. Though maintaining a permanent contact to Moscow, he
exhibited a great deal of independence and autonomy even at that time. In the spring of
1943 when the pragmatic Britains realised who was really fighting in Yugoslavia, Tito was
given military missions, arms as well as international fame. Churchill didn't like him since
he was a communist but he valued his contribution to the war and even sent his son to
Tito's military headquarters. Even before the end of the war, when he got reconciled with
1
Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Repe, Božo
(not published): predavanje na konferenci Midnight Sun II, 26.-27. May 2000, Harstad College. Harstad,
2000.
2
Several tens of books in English and other languages were published about Tito, among others several
biographies which presented him from different angles. In Yugoslavia, the first major work about Tito was
published in 1953. Josip Broz -Tito. Contributions to the biography was written by Tito's official
biographer Vladimir Dedijer, who then fell out of favour and lectured for several years at foreign universities.
Numerous other books, presenting Tito as a revolutionary, statesman, hunter, etc. Towards the end of the
seventies, The Complete Works of Josip Broz Tito started to appear which included virtually all the
documents associated with his work. Over twenty volumes comprising the period from the mid-twenties till
the end of World War II were published. Due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the collection ceased to
appear. In 1981, after Titos's death Dedijer published New Contributions to the Biography of Josip Broz
Tito. Discussing unpleasant details from Tito's life and diverse backgrounds of his decisions, the book
provoked frantic reactions. With this book, Tito's myth gradually ceased to be seen as a taboo in Yugoslav
historiography. Later several other books, describing single elements of Tito's life (i.e. his romantic affairs,
memories of one of his personal doctors, etc.) were published. However, a critical biography by a
historiographer from former Yugoslavia remains yet to be written.
1
the political development in Yugoslavia he admitted to the British Parliament that Tito was
the undisputed ruler of Yugoslavia. Tito's charisma in the west during the war was rooted
in his resistance which was urgently needed by the allies, after the Royal Minister and
Draža Mihajlović had failed in this role, though the latter was persistently favoured by the
West and Tito's military achievements were attributed to him. Western statement were
much more reserved towards Tito on political level since they believed that he was under a
strong ideological influence of Moscow. Apart form that, Tito didn't show much interest for
the deals between the major powers. Without informing the allies, he convened the second
meeting of the anti-fascist council of the national liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ)3 and
proclaimed the new revolutionary government for the only legitimate government of
Yugoslavia.
Though Tito's popularity in the West was limited to his resistance, even during war, the
"normal" charisma of a leader grew into a proper personality cult in the home country. This
was not only due to a (though effective) systematic propaganda, it was also rooted in the
spontaneous reaction of the people who needed a kind of a saver in the circumstances
governed by the occupation of the country and religious massacres between the nations.
"Beloved leader comrade Tito dear, unite us, make us strong and fierce" and "here he
made an end to religious hate, instead he established the first proletarian brigade", were
among the first of the numerous folk songs which expressed the emotions of the people for
Tito, gradually creating a legend out of him. In the summer of 1942 when only burned
houses and the bodies of the killed were left behind after the Kozara offensive, the cult
song about "Tito's way" was created. Expressing devotion to Tito and his political ideas, its
different versions were frequently sung even after the war (particularly in the moments of
crisis). The song was written by the peasant woman Persa Ristić, from a village in the
vicinity of the Bosnian town Bosanska Dubica. During the offensive she lost over 30 of her
relatives and while collecting their bones, the following verses came to her spontaneously:
"The wheat fields strewn with graves / Kozara swears to Tito / Comrade Tito we shall
never depart from your course" 4 (free translation). Her surviving colleagues immediately
adopted the verses.
The end of the war found Tito as an undisputed Yugoslav leader. Although a follower of
the Soviet Union (his unannounced visit to Moscow and his agreements with Stalin at the
end of September and the beginning of October 1944 particularly annoyed the western
allies), he understood to keep a certain distance to it. The Red Army didn't exceed its
activities on the Yugoslav territory over the extend that was demanded and accepted by
Tito, after that it had to withdraw. He was able to draw the maximum from the agreements
with the emigrant government: he became the Prime Minister of the temporary government
3
AVNOJ (the antifascist council of the national liberation of Yugoslavia) presented the central political and
representative body of the national liberation movement of Yugoslavia. As a political body it was set up in
November 1942 in Bihać (Bosnia). Its second assembly, which was held on 29 November 1943 and was
attended by elected delegates of all the Yugoslav nations, proclaimed itself for the supreme legislative,
executive and representative organ of the new Yugoslavia. The assembly concluded that the future
Yugoslavia would be a federal state and that King Peter would be forbidden to return to Yugoslavia. The
assembly further elected its government (The National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia) and appointed
Tito for the president. By request of the allies gathered at the Jalta conference, AVNOJ had to be extended
by the last pre-war members of the parliament and the representatives of political parties. A compromise was
made between the Prime Minister of the royal government Dr. Ivan Šubašić and Tito. In August 1945
AVNOJ was renamed into a temporary national assembly in which Tito kept the "revolutionary" majority
which made it possible to adopt the laws on agrarian reform, nationalisation and
elections. The elections were then carried out in November 1945 (without the participation of the opposition
which boycotted them) and were convincingly won by Tito and his People's Front of Yugoslavia.
4
Vladimir Dedijer: Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New Contributions to the Biography of Josip
Broz Tito), Liburnija, Rijeka, 1982, p. 928-930.
2
of the Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Further he was the commander-inchief of the Yugoslav Army, which arose from the former partisan army, and kept the
majority in AVNOJ and then later in the temporary National Assembly. The People's Front,
which he started to set up in the spring of 1944 as a beginning of the future people's front
democracy, was the most numerous political organisation within Yugoslavia. His young,
loyal political adherents who arose from the lowest working and farming classes were full
of energy and political power and willing to "storm the sky". It was easy for them to do
away with the fragmented opposition. In such circumstances it was possible for Tito to
bring the revolution to an end5 after the war, which can to a greater extend be attributed to
his intuition than to his modelling after the October revolution. The transitional phase
between capitalism and communism was a short one; it took only a few years for the
system of administrative socialism according to the soviet model to be fully functioning in
Yugoslavia. However, repression, shortages and absolute party control caused the
popularity of the new leadership and Tito to start fading (particularly in Serbia, where Tito
had never been as popular as in other parts of Yugoslavia - a fact on which the British
were counting unsuccessfully towards the end of the war.
Since the country was formally a federation, its centralism led to a certain disappointment,
though Tito maintained a national balance within the leadership. On the outside, this
unpopularity could not be noticed, since the politics encouraged mass mobilisation for the
reconstruction of the country, fast industrialisation and the building of socialism. In some
parts of the country, particularly in Slovenia and in Croatia, Tito was highly esteemed also
because of his determination to solve the questions of the frontier (although the allies
made him withdraw from Triest and Carinthia). After the war Tito displayed another
characteristics, which couldn't find expression during his leadership of the illegal party and
only to a limited, extend during the war: namely his good feeling for the masses. He could
easily establish contact with the masses, find the right words and fill his audience with
enthusiasm. Mass meetings with tens of thousands and even several hundred thousand
people became a part of the post-war political ritual, which was preserved until his late
years. However, he was only able to use his intuitive contact and the ability to speak freely
until the end of the sixties; later he lost them due to the burden of his age and the fact that
his speeches were written in advance. The silent decrease of his popularity, which he must
have noticed since he was always very well informed, was accompanied by the difficulties
with Moscow. They were increasingly suffocating him, since they prevented him from
spreading his ambitions, dating from the wartime, over the entire Balkan peninsula.6 On
the contrary, in setting up Balkan associations, Stalin saw an opportunity to place Tito in
the same line with other eastern European leaders who were mostly appointed by
Moscow. Tito was further unnerved by the Soviet interventions into Yugoslav internal
affairs. He attempted to preserve the autonomy without completely breaking up with
Moscow to which he remained ideologically loyal. However, during the conflict with
5
On the founding congress of the Serb Communist Party, which was held in May 1945 in Belgrade Tito said,
that there would be no "standard" second phase of the revolution according to the Russian model, because
the circumstances in Yugoslavia were different from those in the Soviet Union. According to him it was not
possible - due to the war - to develop clearly first the bourgeois and immediately afterwards the proletarian
revolution. In spite of that "we are already entering this second phase so smoothly that it can hardly be
noticed". (Hronologija ratne djelatnosti Josipa Broza Tita / Chronology of the war activities of Josip Broz
Tito/, Export-Press, Belgrade, 1978, p. 92)
6
In the middle of 1943 Tito tried to established a joint Balkan headquarters which were meant to co-ordinate
the liberation movements in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, however, his plan failed. At the end of the war
he attempted to establish a federation with Albania (which was completely under Yugoslav control) and
Bulgaria. Stalin first opposed the plan but then changed his mind and even demanded it to be carried out
since he counted on Bulgaria to take the role of the Trojan horse through which he could discipline or even
replace Tito. The Yugoslav side therefore gave up the plan.
3
Informbiro7, Stalin who could never endure any competition, no matter how limited it was,
forced Tito to make a drastic decision: either submission or resistance. Tito was well
aware what resistance meant since he possessed several years of Moscow experiences.
Apart from that, Stalin was rather popular in Yugoslavia (particularly within Serbia and
Montenegro); his personality cult seemed to grow along with Tito's. The border disputes
with the west (which hadn't been solved until the mid-fifties) presented another burden.
However, his own rebellious nature and his ambition for power prevailed. The victories,
which were by no means achieved softly, but moreover by applying Stalinist methods,
brought him a new reputation in the west. For Yugoslavia they meant a specific form of
self-managed socialism which was given the name "titoism" by the western sociologists.
Titoism - a real or a fictitious difference?
In the first years after World War II there were no major differences in the social order
between Yugoslavia and eastern European countries (with Stalin's permission, eastern
European countries even imitated the Yugoslav system of "people's democracy" - the
transitional phase between the pluralistic and monistic political system.8 Hoping that the
relations between the two countries would be based on equality of both partners,
Yugoslavia was a most consequent ally of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia expected that the
Soviet Union would offer protection to the socialist Yugoslavia and assistance with the
industrialisation of the country. Some members of the Communist Party leadership even
considered the possibility of Yugoslavia joining the Soviet Union. The beginning (and the
core) of the quarrel with the Informbiro was the different comprehension of the equality of
both states and parties and Yugoslav (Tito's) resistance to the hegemonic Soviet (Stalin's)
policy. In Yugoslavia, the dispute provoked a critical analysis of the Soviet system which in
consequence led to the development of an alternative model of the social development
which was to be neither a capitalist nor a state-socialist one. It was given the name self management. This new model originated from the Marx thesis on the union of the free
producers and the Lenin thesis on self-management (which he elaborated in his book The
State and the Revolution). Based on the evaluation which regarded the state ownership as
a failure and the new bureaucratic class created by the party as dangerous, the decision
about the introduction of self-management was made. The factories were to be managed
(through workers' councils) by the workers themselves. The corresponding legislation was
adopted in June 1950. In the changed circumstances, more attention was to be paid to the
business independence and the mechanisms of the market, whereas the influence of the
state planning was to be reduced. The role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was to
be changed as well; it was to give up the immediate commanding and concentrate instead
on the ideological function at planning the social development. This change was also
demonstrated in renaming the Communist Party of Yugoslavia into the League of
7
Informbiro (Informational Bureau of Communist Parties) was established on 30 September 1947 in
Skljarska Polemba, Poland. The members were communist parties of the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, France, Italy and Yugoslavia. Informbiro was meant to replace
the international communist organisation Komintern, which was abolished during the war. It was expected to
serve the purpose of reinforcing the influence of the Soviet Union in eastern European countries as well as in
Yugoslavia and at the same time through the strongest western communist parties (the French and the
Italian) exert influence upon the turbulent, almost revolutionary conditions in those two countries. Such
orientation quickly led to a conflict with the orientation of the KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia).
Yugoslavia found itself on the verge of a war with the socialist countries. Yugoslavia was thus forced to come
closer to the west. In accordance with the motto "keeping Tito afloat," the USA provided limited assistance,
which helped Yugoslavia overcome the worst crisis.
8
Božo Repe: The System of People's Democracy in Slovenia and in Yugoslavia, Časopis za zgodovino in
narodopisje (The Magazine for History and Ethnography), Maribor, Volume 69, Issue 2, p. 303-315.
4
Communists of Yugoslavia (ZKJ). The change of the name was adopted on the 6th
congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (2 - 7 November 1952 in Zagreb)9.
Numerous members of the leadership opposed this decision and even Tito himself stated
on several subsequent internal meetings that the 6th congress had been a mistake.
The essential differences between Yugoslavia and the eastern European countries were
the independent national liberation war and the authentic revolution (the only one carried
out in Europe apart from the Soviet and the Albanian), as well as a relatively short postwar period of Stalinism (though its relapses continued to turn up until the mid-eighties).
Yugoslavia was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, which allowed it a more independent
search for alternatives. Since the sixties, other major differences had been in the
decentralisation, in the introduction of the market economy, the existence of mixed
ownership (though state ownership prevailed), orientation towards consumerism, certain
forms of pluralism in economy, culture and even ideology of national parties, in relative
openness of the information system and in free transition of people.
The limitations of Yugoslav model were rooted in the prevailing way of thinking of the
leading party cadres, which arose from the Comintern school as well as from the Leninist
type of party and had a crucial role at planning the social order. Other common points with
eastern European type of socialism further lie in the one-party system, the domination of
political elite over other centres of power (i. e. economic), bureaucratic type of
management, indivisibility of power, the dominating role of ideology in any kind of
arbitration. Titoism thus appealed to the Marxist ideology, the power was seized through a
revolution led by professional revolutionaries "in the name" of the working class, the
leading role of the party was never questioned, though it formally renounced power. Yet, in
terms of foreign policy, it insisted on the principles like respecting sovereignty,
independence, integrity and equality, acknowledgement and development of the peaceful
co-existence among the nations, regardless of their ideological differences - everything on
the principle of mutual help and non-intervention in internal affairs of each country. The
position of Yugoslavia in terms of international and inter-party relations was - due to
"Titoism"- completely different from the position of other eastern European countries,
which possessed only a limited sovereignty. Through the development of non-aligned
movement, Yugoslavia was able to strengthen its foreign policy influence, which by far
exceeded its territorial, economic and military power. In terms of internal policy it allowed
decentralisation as well as a gradual appeasement of repression since the fifties. Further it
introduced partial liberalisation of economy, approved increased production of consumer
goods, which resulted in constant growth of the standard of living, and allowed partial
democratisation. These processes were perceived as the reintroduction of the capitalist
system by a part of the leadership. Whenever the party monopoly seemed to be
questioned it was Tito himself who interrupted the process of democratisation. For the first
time it happened in the mid-fifties when he rudely refused the suggestions according to
which self-management should have been granted traditional middle-class rights, though
with a socialist label (at the beginning of the fifties Milan Djilas namely suggested the
introduction of a two-party socialist system). Further he retaliated the so-called "party
liberalism" which advocated in favour of market economy in the mid-sixties.
In spite of that, "titoism" was quite different from the system of the state socialism in
eastern European countries, which was particularly the case in the sixties and in the
seventies. In two decades Tito managed - though forcefully - to set up basic modernisation
processes; something that the former political elite hadn't managed to achieve, namely:
9
The History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Komunist, Ljubljana, 1986.
5
the agrarian reform, industrialisation, the separation of the church from the state, and - at
least formally - the emancipation of women (in Yugoslavia women were given the right to
vote only after World War II). There was a major increase in the level of education; the
nations, which previously hadn't possessed its own educational system at all, were able to
introduce their own schools (including universities). However, there were still major
differences between individual republics and provinces - from different reasons they were
even getting bigger in the course of time. In terms of home style, clothing, arts (particularly
music, theatre, film) as well as organisation of leisure time, people were imitating the west;
in return they made use of the benefits of the socialist system like free education, good
health care, full employment)10.
For some time, the democratic processes in the east, particularly in Czechoslovakia, had
been exercising a stimulating effect on Yugoslavia. Some politicians (Edvard Kardelj) even
feared, that Czechoslovakia with its formula "socialism with a human face" could overcome
Yugoslavia and its reforms and thus take away the primacy of "titoism" as relatively most
democratic form of Leninist type socialism. The occupation of Czechoslovakia had a
certain influence on restraining democratic processes in Yugoslavia. For the purpose of
the state security, ZKJ (The League of Communists of Yugoslavia) started to curb the
democratic rights and suppress the media again. The Yugoslav leadership was again in
the position to determine by itself - without any competition from the other socialist states what level of democratisation it would allow. "Liberalisation" of Yugoslavian society
reached its peak in the end of the sixties but was defeated at the beginning of the
seventies. Due to its extreme nationalism, it was first destroyed in Croatia, then in
Slovenia, and finally in Serbia where the conflict was particularly serious so that Tito, using
informal ways, had to intervene personally. Serbia had offered the strongest opposition to
Tito. Some intellectuals had publicly opposed his lifelong presidency and demanded him to
give up the power due to his old age. Conflicts appeared in other republics too
(Macedonia). Along with the retaliation for the liberalism, the system of "self-managed
agreements and social consultation" was introduced in Yugoslavia. Officially founded in
the 1974 Constitution, the new system gave up the market economy and introduced the so
called "economy by agreement" instead, according to which the companies were not to
compete each other but negotiate about who would produce what and according to what
price. The so-called policy of realistic socialism with its huge industrial complexes,
unskilled working force, egalitarianism and emphasising the leading role of the party,
prevailed again. The system was not in a position to survive by itself, without substantial
financial support (cheap western loans in the seventies). Due to the blockades within the
delegate system (in which elected delegates were increasingly replaced by combined
delegations, which should have allowed maximal political involvement of the people), the
mandates were increasingly taken over by the executive and managerial organs. A kind of
"silent" centralisation carried out past the official system. The compensation for the
resumed complete ideological and personnel control by the ZKJ (League of Communists)
was a fictitious social peace. However, numerous achievements of "liberalism" were
preserved, a complete return to the old positions was simply not possible any more.
As long as it had existed, "titoism" had not renounced the leading role of the party and the
small group of leading people respectively. It had therefore never managed to overcome
the magic barrier between the attempts of "democratisation" and the real democracy. This
10
For more information on the issue see: Božo Repe, Das Besondere an "Titoismus" - seine
Gewaltherrschaft und sein Zerfall (The Special Characteristics of Titoism - its Tyranny and Decline), Aufrisse,
Wien, Nr. 3/1992 in Božo Repe: Confini aperti e stile di vita in Slovenia doppo la seconda guerra mondiale
(Open Borders and the Slovenian Style of Life after World War II) Qualostoria, Trieste, Anno XXVII, n)
Giugno 199, p. 215-229
6
was due to its strong ideological orientation, which didn't allow it to carry out the concept of
market economy (which was regarded as a restitution of capitalism by the leaders) and
introduce political pluralism, which would have resulted in the loss of party monopoly.
The relations between the nations until Tito's death
The relations between the nations were re-established during World War II. The centralist
Kingdom of Yugoslavia only recognised the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes as the
"three tribes of the same nation". The Macedonians, the Montenegrins and the Moslems
were not acknowledged at all. The national minorities were being repressed and the
country was constantly threatened to fall apart because of the national conflicts
(particularly between the Croats and the Serbs). On the second meeting of AVNOJ (the
Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) which was held on 29 November
1943 (this day was later celebrated as the National Holiday of Yugoslavia), the
representatives of Yugoslav nations (resistance movements) reached an agreement
according to which Yugoslavia was to become a federative state, consisting of six
republics, one autonomous province (Vojvodina) and one autonomous region (Kosovo and
Metohija), both within Serbia. Many rejected this solution, but it had been preserved
throughout the existence of Yugoslavia although numerous questions remained
unsolved.11
Among others, the unsolved problems referred to the position of the Serbs in Croatia and
on the territory of Sanđak (the territory predominantly populated by the Moslems,
geographically situated in both Serbia and Montenegro). The communist leadership was of
the opinion that the revolution would also solve the national question, either within
Yugoslavia, or, as Tito hoped, within a Balkan federation or confederation respectively.
After the war, the Serbs opposed the communist vision for the solution of the national
question (federative regulation and acknowledgement by other Yugoslav nations) in the
Constitutional Assembly, but they were too weak to prevent it.12 Federative regulation was
declared by the 1946 Constitution, yet Yugoslavia was actually functioning as a centralist
state until the mid- sixties. This constitution (and all the others that followed)
acknowledged each Yugoslav nation the right of self-determination, including the right of
separation. The leadership was convinced that the revolution had solved the national
question forever. Towards the end of the fifties the unity of the Yugoslav leadership came
to an end. The dispute did start on the issue of social questions (the first major post-war
strikes of coal-miners in 1958 in Slovenia), yet it soon extended to the problems of
relations between the nations.13 Tito somehow managed to calm it down, yet it broke out
again at the beginning of the sixties, on the occasion of the discussions about the new
constitution.14 The dispute between the centralist and the federalist line had not been
solved until the mid-sixties. Edvard Kardelj, the Slovenian politician overtly said on
occasion of a meeting of Yugoslav leaders, that there were three options for the future
development of Yugoslavia, after the revolutionary generation ("the ten of us here") would
11
Especially the Serbs later opposed the decisions of AVNOJ. Due to specific circumstances (the prevailing
influence of Chetniks), the Serb delegation for AVNOJ was not elected but appointed from military units. The
Serbs therefore claimed that the new Yugoslavia was conceived without their participation and that the
decisions of AVNOJ were detrimental to them (they were particularly referring to the formation of both
autonomous provinces).
12
Slobodan Nešović: The Third Session of AVNOJ and the session of the temporary people's assembly of
the Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 7 - 26 August 1945, Komunist, Ljubljana, 1975.
13
Dušan Bilanžić: Hrvatska moderna povijest (The Contemporary History of Croatia), Golden Marketing,
Zagreb, 1999 p. 416 - 432).
14
Božo Repe: Some Thoughts about the year 1962, Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana, Volume XXVI, 1989, Issue
11/12 and Volume XXVII, 1990, Issue 1/2
7
be gone. The Slovenian and the Croatian would demand as much independence as
possible; the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia would favour the centralist option, since
they expected advantages for themselves from transferring the means from the developed
to the underdeveloped parts of the country, and finally, the hegemonstic Serb option.
Kardelj believed that the Serb option was the one most likely to succeed and therefore
wanted the individual republics to become rather independent actual states. According to
him, the federation was to have the role of some kind of a "round table" where the
republics could discuss common issues (the common economic and monetary policy,
common defence and foreign policy). Tito agreed to that concept, because Kardelj has
preserved the three main safety elements of "titoism" in it.15 The reform that followed led to
the so-called party liberalism, which emerged particularly in the more developed republics.
The republic leaders demanded a higher level of democracy (yet, within the socialist
system), market economy (within a welfare state) and more independence for individual
republics.16 Several national disturbances and conflicts with the federal centre started to
appear (the demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, the so-called mass movement in Croatia in
1971, Slovenian demands for a radical reform of the federation). Tito assessed that the
federation, the monopolistic position of the party, as well as his own position were
threatened and therefore annihilated them. However, he did abate about the national
question, which allowed individual republics to build up their own sovereignty within the
Yugoslav federation (i.e. introduction of republic presidencies, republic governments had
their own ministries for international collaboration and defence, as well as national banks).
Since there was no real democracy within the republics, the federalisation led to the
formation of republic oligarchies that were able to exercise unlimited power within the
competencies they had achieved. The new constitutional order had therefore never really
started to function and the decisions were mainly made outside the bodies of the republic
assemblies.
Yugoslavia after Tito's death - the Failure of the "After Tito - Tito" Policy
When Josip Broz - Tito got seriously ill in 1980 and could not leave the hospital any more,
the condition of the state he was the head of was hardly any better than his own, the only
difference being that the latter had been held secret. However, hardly anyone would have
approved with such assessment of the situation at that time. Yugoslavia gave the
impression of a peaceful, stable state with a decent standard of living, solved national
question and high level of international reputation which by far exceeded its economic
power. Even foreign analysts were surprised by the peaceful transition and other
statesmen gave Tito one of the most magnificent funerals of the 20th century. The great
powers, particularly the USA and the western countries were interested in the further
existence of Yugoslavia. In this terms democracy had a subordinate role. Upon his death
Tito hadn't said anything in the style like "preserve me Yugoslavia" (words ascribed to the
Yugoslav king Aleksander Karađorđević when he was dying upon his assassination in
Marseilles in 1934). Neither had Tito left behind any kind of a political will (nor a personal
one, for that matter, since he hardly had any personal possessions). Different statements
that he had - often resigned because of his poor health and suspecting that the end was
coming - made on several occasions for diverse delegations or individuals that had visited
him towards the end of 1979 were afterwards pronounced as his political will.17 A fierce
15
Dušan Bilanžić: Hrvatska moderna povijest (The Contemporary History of Croatia), Golden Marketing,
Zagreb, p. 482 - 489.
16
Božo Repe: "Liberalism in Slovenia", Borec, Ljubljana, 1992.
17
The last delegation he had seen shortly before he was admitted to the hospital on 24 December 1979 was
a Slovenian one. On that occasion he criticised excessive consumerism and expressed his preference for
short, only one year long political mandates, which the Slovenians opposed on the grounds that they were
8
struggle for the change of the relations within the federation - yet from different angles started immediately after Tito's death. Centralist oriented politicians, army leaders, as well
as Serb intellectuals perceived the federalisation of Yugoslavia in the seventies as
Slovenian construct. In the policy of Slovenian leadership they saw national pragmatism
and a tactics of gradual, yet persistent realisation of its national objective: attaining of
independent Slovenian state. According to the Serb author Dobrica Čosić, the Slovenians
were applying methods that he called "intelligent machiavelism". As long as Tito was alive,
the Serbs were reluctant to utter that publicly, although a silent agreement between some
Serb politicians and the army was made in the seventies, according to which the 1974
Constitution was to be abolished.18 The Slovenians, and after them the Croats were also
beginning to see the federation - though from different motifs - with mixed feelings. Their
attitude was based on economic crisis, gradual dwindling of fear from former enemies
(Germans and Italians) and the growing concern about the aggressive Serb politics. In the
first phase, however, Slovenians restricted themselves to the protection of the constitution
and thus Tito's heritage regarding the relations between the nations. Due to the political
turmoil and the struggle for power within individual republics (i. e. in Serbia between
Slobodan Milošević and Ivan Stambolić, the then head of the Serb presidency) there were
hardly any major changes in the functioning of Yugoslav federation until the mid-eighties.
The people who came to power after the so-called "party liberalism" had been destroyed in
the seventies were rotating on the top state and party positions since then. Mostly these
were the experienced, old revolutionary cadres whose biological strength was definitely in
decline (in the first part of the eighties a joke about a politician was making rounds, who
upon arriving to the airport, allegedly asked his companion: are we leaving somewhere or
have we arrived?), and politicians of younger generation who had sensed in time who the
winner would be.19 After Tito, there had been no other politicians with a Yugoslav
charisma. This was also due to the system which didn't have any "exclusively" federal
functions left, which would be occupied by people, not delegated by the republics.
Obviously, the political and economical premises of "titoism" were officially not questioned
in the first half of the eighties. The self-managed socialist system was described as being
good; however it required consequent implementation. The controversy between the
officially proclaimed socialist patriotism, brotherhood and unity (expressed through the
motto "after Tito - Tito"), which remained a stable part of political programmes, party
declarations, textbooks and celebrations, and the way Yugoslavia was actually perceived
was enormous. Cultural and economic differences (7:1 between Slovenia and Kosovo),
poor knowledge and stereotype ideas about each other seemed to have become even
bigger in the eighties, in spite of several decades of life together. Informational systems
were only functioning within individual republics; and economic agony became worse.
The Rise of Nationalism
irrational. (The discussion between president Tito and the Slovenian delegation on 24 December 1979,
Slovenian Archives)
18
Veljko Kadijević, the last Defence Minister of Yugoslavia explicitly admitted that in his memoirs with the
title Moje viđenje raspada (How I See the Disintegration), Politika, Belgrade 1993.
19
Tito had to a large extend removed the "middle-aged technocratic" generation who did take part in the war
and revolution, yet was not as burdened with ideological patterns as not to be able to see what major
changes were going on in the world (the change of social structure of the society, gradual disappearance of
the traditional working class and the growth of middle classes, emergence of "welfare state" in Scandinavian
and western European countries, the transition to the post-industrial society). The members of the middle
generation didn't manage to assert themselves against a too strong pre-war generation of revolutionaries
and therefore perceived themselves as being "lost". In the seventies it was gradually replaced by the
youngest generation of upstarts from the party and the state structures who on the one hand did appeal to
the "revolutionary traditions", but had neither any emotional attachment to them nor did they want to change
them in any way. They simply adapted to the situation, made a career for themselves and led a comfortable
middle class life.
9
After Tito's death, the balance between the nations as well as political balance within the
federation became very fragile. The previously suppressed national (as well as
nationalistic) demands were beginning to arise. In 1981 there was an uprising of the
Kosovo Albanians which seemed to be quite irrational, since the autonomous province
possessed virtually the same rights as the republics (towards the end of the eighties
another, this time justified rebellion took place, since the new Serb constitution abolished
autonomous provinces). On the other hand, the centralist pressure increased. The 1974
constitution, which represented the culmination of Yugoslav federalism, was something
between a federation and a confederation. The federal constitution didn't hold any superior
position; it was more or less placed on an equal level with the constitutions of individual
republics. Yet on the other hand - though acknowledging a high level of rights to individual
republics - the federal constitution didn't fully observe the principle of authentic sovereignty
of individual republics; Yugoslavia was not defined as a federation of states
(confederation), but as a federal state (federation). As all the other post-war constitutions,
it did recognise the right of self-determination, including the right of separation. However,
there were no regulations about how the nations and republics respectively were to realise
that right. Legal interpretations of that issue differed a great deal: some jurists thought that
this particular right was exhausted with the foundation of the socialist Yugoslavia, whereas
the others thought that this right was permanent and inalienable. The system based on the
1974 constitution could only function as long as all the three previously mentioned security
mechanism continued to exist: the unified League of Communists was based on the
principle of democratic centralism which spread its leading role to the other segments of
society; unified army with Tito as the highest authority, Commander in Chief, the president
of the state and the president of the League of Communists.
In the second half of the eighties, the three options, announced by Kardelj as early as in
the mid-sixties, became clearly crystallised: the demand for confederation (Slovenia, later
followed by Croatia), a federal Yugoslavia with a strong centre which was to keep
transferring money from the developed to the underdeveloped parts of the country
(Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and as the third option, the centralised Yugoslavia
under Serb dominion, the so-called Srboslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Serb intellectuals
were the first in Yugoslavia to write a national programme - the so-called Programme of
the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAZU). The programme became public in 1986
when one of the newspapers (Večernje novosti - Evening News) published parts of the
text. A complete memorandum was first published by the Serb Diaspora in the USA. A
committee of 16 members of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences defined the situation
of the Serb nation as catastrophic. According to the members of the Academy, the Serbs
outside Serbia, particularly those in Kosovo, were undergoing a process of assimilation; in
terms of economy they were completely subordinated to Slovenia and Croatia, they had no
state of their own and they were losing their cultural identity because of communism. For
the authors of memorandum, the solution was in the change of the 1974 constitution and
in the introduction of the "democratic federalism", which basically meant abolishment of
sovereignty of individual republics. They demanded a "total unity of the Serb nation"20,
irrespective of the division of Yugoslavia into republics and provinces. This actually meant
a unified Serbia (without autonomous provinces), the final consequence being the
implementation of the "Great Serb" programme, according to which all Serbs should be
living within the same state. In case Yugoslavia continued to exist, this would lead close to
the concept of the three ban's dominions (provinces), i. e. administrative units that had
already existed in the Kingdom Yugoslavia in the late thirties. This was not a realistic
20
Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umjetnosti (The Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Arts and
Sciences), Belgrade, September 1986, Serbian Literary Association, New York.
10
option, since the Slovenes and the Croats, as well as the Macedonians and the Moslems
had already achieved much more than that. After the faction of Slobodan Milošević
emerged victorious from the 8th meeting of the Central Committee of the League of
Communists of Serbia in September 1987 the members of the Serb Academy supported
the new Serb leadership (May 1988) which then started to implement the programme of
the Academy, the first measure being the subordination of the Albanians in Kosovo, and of
the autonomously oriented politicians in the second autonomous province of Vojvodina.
The project was continued by replacing Montenegrin leadership and destabilisation of the
conditions on the territories, populated by the Serbs (the Knin region in Croatia, Slavonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina). To achieve this, Serb nationalists made use of the pressure
from the street: they organised mass meetings, which forced politicians in certain areas to
resign. The consequence was, that other republics started to protect their national
interests as well (Slovenian intellectuals published their national programme in February
1987). The first conflict thus emerged between Slovenia and Serbia. More than a conflict
between the two nations, it was a conflict between two different visions of the future
development of Yugoslavia: the Slovenian, which was oriented towards market economy,
scientific and technological development, European and global integration; and the Serb,
patriarchal, inwards oriented, centralist society based on pre-modern patterns of the
existing society. Whereas the Slovenians wanted to negotiate with the European
Economic Community and adopt European criteria, the Serbs were convinced that the
question of democracy was a Yugoslav internal affair and that Milošević would join the
European Community with "beat of drum and flourish of trumpets". With energetic
economical and political measures, Slovenians managed to defend themselves from the
pressures of the Serbs, yet the conflict between the Croats and the Serbs was intensified.
This was the first real conflict between the nations; the media and the political war
gradually grew into a real war. Slovenia and Croatia carried out national referendums
which resulted in their declaration of independence and consequently, in the war.
Why Tito could hold Yugoslavia together and why it fell apart after his death
After the war, Yugoslavia was going through periods of crises which - in the final
consequence - could have led to the break up of the state: i. e. during the dispute with
Stalin in 1948, further in the early sixties when the first serious national conflicts emerged
which led to a deep crises within the leadership, and finally during the seventies when the
liberally oriented communists in Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia were
suppressed. There were also several occasions in which a foreign intervention seemed
quite close, the first one emerging even before the end of the war (the question of Triest).
Afterwards there was a risk of an attack from the Soviet Union on several occasions; at
least twice Yugoslavia was immediately threatened: in 1948 and in 1968, after the
suppression of the Prague spring.
The political and the national structure within the socialist Yugoslavia could be preserved
for over four decades. Firstly that was due to its international position which suited both
blocks, secondly, due to the three internal pillars: the unified state Communist Party, the
strong, centralised army which exercised a strong political influence and thirdly, due to Tito
as the highest authority. Tito who held the three highest posts (the party, the state and the
military) even enjoyed the support of Moscow after the reconciliation with the Soviet Union
(1955 and 1956), with the exception of 1968 when Yugoslavia defended the "Prague
spring" and thus jeopardised its own position. In spite of his independence, Tito seemed to
be more acceptable for Moscow than any of the possible successors who could have
brought Yugoslavia even closer to the west. Through occasional internal purges, Tito
managed to preserve and control the process of democratisation and keep the republics
11
under control, though the latter were governed by their own communist oligarchies. He
never allowed the national demands to go beyond the limit, which could have jeopardised
the very existence of Yugoslavia. With a mixture of his political and statesmanly skills,
personal charisma and personality cult, demagogy, as well as with the provision of a
relatively good standard of living he managed to preserve affection of the people. The
good standard of living in the last period of Tito's reign was not a result of economic
effectiveness of the country it was rather a result of its specific median position, which
provided the country with strong financial injections and cheap loans, while preserving an
advantageous position within eastern markets.
The internal and external conditions, which consequently led to the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, became synchronised for the first time when towards the end of the eighties
socialism and along with it the Soviet Union with the entire socialist block fell apart. From
the three "protective" mechanisms, Tito was the first to go; then the League of Communist
fell apart (at the beginning of 1990) and finally, (after an unsuccessful intervention in
Slovenia), the Yugoslav Army.
The key question is, whether Tito and his actions had impeded a more successful course
of development in terms of relations between the nations in Yugoslavia, or was it the other
way around: had he "frozen" an inevitable catastrophe through his authority? At least
theoretically, it would have been possible for the Yugoslav nations to regulate their
relations on the grounds of common interests, instead of on insisting (on Tito's demand) on
the - in the meantime empty - ideological motto about the "brotherhood and unity", dating
from the wartime. As an optimal solution, this could have been a federation, based on the
market economy and the welfare state. However, this wouldn't have been a socialist state
any more; the revolution carried out during the war would have lost its sense and Tito his
integrative function. There was no universal recipe according to the motto "after Tito - Tito"
which could have prolonged the existence of Yugoslavia. Apart from that, there is a
justified doubt whether a confederation could have existed over a longer period of time
because of the huge cultural and economic differences. Political pluralism would have
caused emergence of national parties, which would have - as it indeed happened in the
early nineties - had a disintegrative role. "Titoism" could only emerge due to specific
historic circumstances (both internal and external) after World War II and was a unique
phenomenon. There was no universal recipe according to the motto "after Tito - Tito"
which could have preserved Yugoslavia. Yugoslav nations should have found a different
recipe for the post-communist period after the end of bipolarity in Europe, which they had
failed to do.
SUMMARY
In his contribution the author reflects upon the reasons which made it possible for
Yugoslavia to exist under Tito's leadership for over four decades and a half. He concludes
that this was possible because of the international position Yugoslavia managed to obtain
and which obviously suited both blocks, and because of the three internal columns:
the unified communist party, the strong, centralised army with a major political influence
and Tito as the highest authority. Tito who held the three highest positions within the state
(the presidencies of the state and of the party respectively, as well as the command over
the army) enjoyed the support of Moscow after his reconciliation with the Soviet Union
(1955 and 1956). The exception was the year 1968 when Yugoslavia defended the
"Prague Spring" and consequently jeopardised its own position. The Yugoslav system
based on the same political premises as the state socialism in the east European countries
(a single party system, predominance of ideological criteria within the society), yet it
12
possessed a kind of semi-market economy and was open to the world. Through a mixture
of his statemanly and political skills, personal charisma and personality cult, as well as
through demagogy and a relative good standard of living, Tito managed to sustain the
affection and the support of the people.
The key question to raise is, whether Tito had impeded a more successful course of
development in terms of relations between the nations in Yugoslavia, or was it the other
way around: had he "frozen" an inevitable catastrophe through his authority? Theoretically
it would have been possible for the Yugoslav nations to regulate their relations on the
grounds of their common interests instead of on insisting (on Tito's demand) on the
ideological wartime motto of the "brotherhood and unity" which had lost its meaning in the
course of time. As an optimal solution, this could have become a federation, based on
market economy. However, this wouldn't have been a socialist state any more; the
revolution carried out during the war would have lost its sense and Tito his integrative
function. Apart from that, there is a justified doubt about whether - due to the huge
economic and cultural differences - a confederation could have existed over a longer
period of time. Political pluralism would have led to the emergence of national parties
which would have played - as it indeed happened in the early nineties - a disintegrative
role. Titoism could thus emerge as a consequence of specific historical circumstances
(both internal and external) after World War II. As such it was a unique phenomenon.
There had been no universal recipe according to which the motto - "After Tito - Tito" could
have been prolonged and thus preserved the existence of Yugoslavia. For the time after
the end of communism and bipolarity in Europe, Yugoslav nations should have found a
different solution from "titoism", which they had failed to accomplish.
ABSTRACT
In his contribution, the author reflects upon the reasons which have made it possible for
Yugoslavia to have existed under Tito's leadership for over four decades and a half. He
concludes this was firstly due to the fact that the international position Yugoslavia
managed to obtain suited both blocks and secondly, to the three internal pillars: the unified
Communist Party, the strong, centralised army which also possessed major political
influence, and finally due to Tito who held the three highest positions within the country
(presidencies of the party and of the state respectively and the command over the army).
"Titoism" offered no universal recipe, which could have prolonged the existence of
Yugoslavia after Tito's death. Yugoslav nations should have found another solution for the
time after the end of bipolarity and communism in Europe, yet they have failed to achieve
that.
13