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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations
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2010
The Soviet Influence on Turkish Foreign
Policy (1945-1960)
Murat Ulgul
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
THE SOVIET INFLUENCE ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY (1945-1960)
By
MURAT ULGUL
A Thesis submitted to the
Interdisciplinary Program in Russian and East European Studies
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester, 2010
The members of the committee approve the thesis of Murat Ulgul defended on March 16,
2010.
__________________________________
Jonathan Grant
Professor Directing Thesis
__________________________________
Michael H. Creswell
Committee Member
__________________________________
Dala L. Smith
Committee Member
Approved:
_____________________________________
Lee Metcalf, Chair, Interdisciplinary Program in Russian and East European Studies
_____________________________________
David W. Rasmussen, Dean, College of Social Sciences
The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.
ii
Dedicated to Mehmet and Hidayet Ulgul,
For the strong love and firm support they always give
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
................................................................................................
1. Introduction ............................................................................................
1.1 Turkey-Russian Relations before the Great War ..........................
1.2 The Beginning of Turkish-Soviet Relations .................................
1.3 Problems under the Guise of Friendship.......................................
1.3.1 Turkey’s Relations with Western States and Organizations
1.3.2 Communist Activities in Turkey........................................
1.3.3. Regime on the Straits ........................................................
2. The Second World War and Soviet Demands in 1945 ..........................
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
vi
1
3
7
12
14
15
16
21
Moscow Negotiations ...................................................................
Soviet Activities during the Nazi-Soviet Collaboration ...............
End of the Second World War and Soviet Demands ....................
Potsdam Conference .....................................................................
Evaluation of Soviet Demands......................................................
21
25
29
40
43
3. Turkey’s Security Seeking against the Soviet Union ............................
46
3.1 The Straits Question......................................................................
3.2 Turkey’s Struggle for Western Protection against the Soviet Union
3.2.1 Step 1: Economic Help ......................................................
3.2.1.1 The Truman Doctrine...........................................
3.2.1.2 The Marshall Plan ................................................
3.2.2 Step 2: Military Cooperation – NATO and Turkey ...........
3.2.2.1 Turkish Demand for Security Arrangement with US
3.2.2.2 The Korean War and its Effects on Turkey .........
3.2.2.3 Soviet Reaction to Turkish Entrance into NATO
3.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................
4. Turkey’s Bloc Policies against the Soviet Union ..................................
4.1 Stalin’s Death and Soviet Renunciation on its Demands..............
4.2 Turkey and the Containment Policy .............................................
4.2.1 The Balkan Pact .................................................................
4.3 Middle East in the New Turkish and Soviet Foreign Policies ......
4.3.1 Change in Turkish Middle East Policy and the Baghdad Pact
4.3.2 Change in Soviet Middle East Policy ................................
4.4 Soviet Russia and Turkey in the Middle Eastern Crises ...............
iv
47
52
53
53
57
60
60
64
67
69
73
75
76
77
79
80
85
89
4.4.1 Suez Crisis .........................................................................
4.4.2 Syria Crisis .........................................................................
4.5 On the Way to the Military Coup of 1960 ....................................
4.6 U-2 Crisis and Military Coup in Turkey .......................................
90
92
96
99
5. Conclusion .............................................................................................
102
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................
110
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .....................................................................
117
v
ABSTRACT
For the Turkish foreign policy, the years between 1945 and 1960 constitute a
period in which certain political policies that had long-term effects were followed and relations
with other countries underwent fundamental changes. In this time period, despite limited means
and hard conditions, Turkey joined the Western Bloc and became one of the active participants
of the Cold War because of its importance and the threat perception it felt from the Soviet Union
based on its geopolitical situation. In this study, the real affect of the Soviet threat as posed to
Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity during the 15-year period is analyzed. To this effect,
the research is divided into two periods. The first period consists of the years between 1945 and
1952, where Soviet effects on Turkish foreign policy were at their zenith, although official
Soviet-Turkish relations were rare in contrast to other periods explored in this study. The key
characteristics of this period are that Turkish foreign policy was extremely affected by the
phoniness of Soviet-Turkish relations in the interwar period and the Soviet threat that took place
between 1939 and 1947. Because of these conditions, in spite of the fact that the Soviet threat to
Turkey diminished after 1947, Turkish foreign policy diversified and the main objective of
Turkish policy-makers transitioned into a goal to join all economic, political and military
organizations founded by the Western Bloc. This endeavor swung a punch at the economic,
social and political evolution that had took place from the founding of the country and laid
substantial groundwork for Turkish foreign policy after 1952, in spite of American economic,
political and military provisions.
The second period lasts from the point of Turkey’s entrance into NATO and
Soviet renunciation of their demands on Turkish territory and Straits to the Turkish military coup
of 1960. These years represent the period in which official Turkish-Soviet relations intensified
while the Soviet effect on Turkish foreign policy was nadir. Characteristics of this period
include the shift to national interests of the Republic of Turkey as the top priority, replacing the
search for security against the Soviet threat that had been prevalent in the previous period. These
national interests amounted to the need to be a regional power in the Balkans and the Middle
East – which had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for centuries – as well as recognizing the
vi
economic development in Turkey. To reach these aims, Turkish politicians wanted to create in
the populace the notion that the Soviet threat had not disappeared for Turkey or the Middle East.
This planting of information heralded the second break in the Turkish evolution process through
the Turks alteration from their traditional behavior pattern which was returning to the balance of
power policy as soon as the threat vanished. However, the new Turkish policies did not result in
economic development and their goal to be a regional power and so, decision-makers
implemented policies inconsistent with the Turkish past and created more breaks in the evolution
process. Another argument presented in the study is that during this early post-war period
Turkish-Soviet relations were lived in the shadows of Turkish-American relations and more
importantly, American-Soviet relations; because of this, the Soviet effect on Turkish foreign
policy grew weaker with each passing year.
The subject of this study in not Soviet-Turkish relations but Soviet effects on
Turkish foreign policy between 1945 and 1960 because this study incorporated and benefited
largely from Turkish and American sources . To simply title this study Soviet-Turkish relations it
would lack Soviet point of view and its historical validity would by doubted. This is not to
discredit Turkish-American relations that are highly important in order to decipher the
underlying effects of the relations clearly.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The years between 1945 and 1960 constitute a period of transformation in Turkish
domestic and foreign policies. During this time, Turkey accepted and successfully applied a multi-party
system in the 1950 election, acknowledged liberal economic policies, became allies with the United
States- of whom Turkey had almost no relationship with prior to WWII- and as a result of this
relationship, were one of the most active participants in the Cold War, a policy contradictory to the
“peace-demanding” Turkey of the interwar period. A prevalent argument towards the reason for these
new Turkish policies was the Soviet threat to Turkish independence and territory. Because the Soviet
Union demanded land and bases from Turkey following their peaceful relations in the interwar period,
Turkey committed to the bloc policies as a small state with a common border to the leader of the Eastern
bloc. This study aims at revealing underlying Soviet influences on Turkish foreign policy. Was the
Soviet influence genuine or a mere excuse for Turkish politicians to benefit from the clash between the
rival blocs? Therefore, this study should not be regarded as Soviet-Turkish relations in the beginning of
the Cold War but as an effort to expose the extent of the influence of the Soviet Union; Turkish foreign
policy is scrutinized in correlation to the relationships between Turkey and the Soviet Union through the
contribution of other countries, such as Britain, the United States and the Middle Eastern States.
I have concluded that this period must be separated into two parts in which Turkey had
differing concerns, objectives and strategies. The first period consists of the events between the years
1945 and 1953 and the second period the years between 1953 and 1960. In the first period, Turkish
foreign policy suffered from high Soviet influence because of Turkey’s lack of security and Soviet
demands voiced in 1939 and 1945, in spite of limited mutual relations between parties during this
period. Conversely, in the second period, although relations were promoted thanks to the growing
importance of Turkey to the Americans-whose bases were established in Turkey- in regards to Soviet
security, Soviet influences diminished in Turkish foreign policy due to Turkey’s change in objectives: to
be a regional power and benefit from American economic aid, especially after the 1954 economic crisis
in Turkey. To decipher Soviet influence in the first period, two areas of time were established, the
interwar era and the Second World War. In each of these periods, Turkey had varying objectives and
1
security concerns, upon which the following table has been constructed. This paper is the study of this
table:
1920-1939
1939-1945
1945-1953
1953-1960
Soviet-Turkish
Soviet influence
Determinant
Objectives of
relations
on TFP
factors in relations
Turkey
high
medium
balance of power
to keep following
in international
balance of power
relations
policy
medium
low
high
high
Soviet demands in not to enter into
high
low
1939
the World War II
Soviet demands in
security
1945 and the Cold
arrangement with
War
US
Cold War and
being a regional
Turkish interests
power, economic
aids
In the first three periods, the determinant factor of Soviet influence was shaped by the
security concerns of Turkey. In the interwar period, Soviet influence remained limited because for the
small states, the attitude of hostile countries is more important than the attitude of the friendly ones.
Because Britain and then Italy were the foremost threats on Turkish security in the interwar period, the
Soviet influence remained limited. The relations were not “low” because of the Soviet Union’s position
as one side of Turkey’s traditional balance of power policy. This does mean that whenever Turkey
sensed a threat from the Western states, it approached the Soviet Union to balance threat perception
through establishment of friendship with a great power.
After the 1939 Moscow negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, Turkey’s
threat perception changed and until 1953, the Soviet Union became the main threat to Turkey’s security.
Therefore, as a hostile state to Turkey, Soviet influence was “high.” On the other hand, as shown by the
table, the Soviet influence on Turkey diminished drastically after 1953, even though Turkish politicians
named the Soviet Union as an enormous threat to Turkey. This situation contradicts the notion of hostile
states’ being the determinant factor on small states’ decisions. This study explains the reasons for this
2
change by looking at the motives and concerns of Turkey and its relations with other states. Turkish
foreign policy was not shaped by the attitude of hostile states as had been the case before 1953, but was
determined by Turkish interests and objectives.
In this study, the author benefits from both Turkish and English sources. Indeed, this is
one of the reasons why we could not regard this study as Soviet-Turkish relations. Without Soviet
sources, writing about on the latter topic would not be considered an objective study. However, it must
be accepted that English sources are limited on Turkish foreign policy. A few numbers of sources
generally choose American-Turkish relations as their topic and they are far from explaining TurkishSoviet relations. The books on Turkish foreign policy also explain a large period of time such as
William Hale’s Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000). Therefore, the author of this study believes that
this study contributes to the studies on political history. Another contribution of this study is its critical
approach on Turkish foreign policy after 1953. Especially after that year, Turkey’s difficult relations
with the Middle Eastern states and its critiques about the latter’s relations with the Soviet Union can be
viewed as far from an objective policy. Therefore, this study can be differentiated from many Turkish
sources on this period by its critical approach to this era.
1.1. Turkish-Russian Relations before the Great War
The Republic of Turkey is a country which can be respected even as a newborn state. In
spite of this, Turkish experience with governing states and keeping its independence is far older than
many nations in the world. On several occasions, after losing its independence, the Turkish nation
succeeded in maintaining itself under different names and flags. Because of this, when the Republic of
Turkey arose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the founders of the new-born country
benefited from this past experience and the commitment of the Turkish nation on the road towards
independence. During this time, Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish independence movement,
aimed not only at establishing a new state, but he was also determined to change the regime completely
and eliminate the defective sides of the Ottoman Empire. One of Kemal’s goals was to completely
rebuild of the foreign policy of Turkey’s predecessor. The first few years of the Republic witnessed
immense struggles to fix the ineffective aspects of the Ottoman foreign policy, such as capitulations,
concessions on Straits to the other states, the burden of being an empire, etc,.
3
Despite the faulty aspects of Ottoman policies, Turkey actually embraced other
characteristics of the Ottoman Empire foreign policy. These aspects include:
1) Following the “balance of Power” policy in international relations from which the Republic benefited
immensely.
2) Unless facing a threat of occupation, Turkey would not join wars of other states1.
Indeed, the first period of Turkish foreign policy up until the Second World War was
shaped under these conditions. It is also possible to add a third characteristic: traditional fear of Russia.
Throughout the interwar period, this fear did not become a decisive factor in Turkish foreign policy
because of its conflict with the “balance of power” policy. The Soviet Union was one of the two parts of
balance in Turkish foreign policy and the factor fear of Russia was hidden until Turkish officials sensed
“an occupation threat” from the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War. Turkish rulers
disregarded the balance of power policy and joined the “cold” war between the United States and the
Soviet Union, siding with the U.S.; this does not mean that Turkey dropped the “balance of power”
policy because whenever the Ottoman Empire felt threatened by Tsarist Russia, it would join the
Western states as a part of this policy. The vital difference in postwar Turkish foreign policy is that after
the “occupation threat” vanished, Turkey did not return to her traditional “balance of power” policy by
promoting a fear of Russia among the populace. Therefore, the post-war period represents a time in
which the Republic of Turkey cut links between Turkish foreign policy and Ottoman foreign policy as
well as Turkish pre-war foreign policy. The initiative for this change was fueled by Russian demands
made in 1939 and 1945.
Turkish lands had had a huge geostrategic importance for Russians since Tsarist Russia
had grown into a massive empire during the reign of Peter the Great and Catherine II in the eighteenth
century. In Peter’s era, Russia was adamant in its quest to acquire coastal land to reach warm seas and
after his time, both Russian and Soviet rulers tried to achieve this dream. Thus for hundreds of years,
Constantinople/Istanbul became the main target for Russian rulers. Although Peter disbursed his forces
over Sweden, it was rumored that he advised his successors to occupy the Straits, Black Sea and
Constantinople2. The first steps towards Peter’s legacy began in Catherine II era and with the Treaty of
Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774, Russia accomplished her goal by separating Crimea from the Ottoman lands.
In addition to this, Russia gained the rite of passage for her merchant ships through the Straits and right
1
Baskin Oran, Giris: Turk Dis Politikasinin Teori ve Pratigi in “Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular,
Belgeler, Yorumlar” Volume I (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002) p.19.
2
Haluk Gursel, Tarih Boyunca Turk-Rus Iliskileri. (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi) 1968. p.56.
4
of protection over the Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire. Now Russia was finally able to
interfere in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji was a milestone
in Turkish-Russian relations that marks the beginning of the Russian pressure on Turkey3.
Turkey’s application of the balance of power started after this point. Turks believed that
Russia would not stop until she conquered enough land to claim the coasts of the warm seas. Russia’s
mounting strength was the largest threat to the well-being of the empire and the greatest risk to Turkey’s
power. In order to stifle this threat, the Turks needed the protection of the European great powers, such
as Britain and France, which were ready to support Turkey for their own benefit. Because the Ottoman
Empire lacked the military strength to fight against Tsarist Russia, Great Britain and France faced with
Russian threats in order to prevent the Russian penetration into the strategically important regions such
as the Middle East and Far East throughout the nineteenth century. This challenge between the great
powers of Europe extended the life of the sick man, the Ottoman Empire, for a hundred years.
However, at the end of the 19th century, a new force, Germany, emerged in Europe and
at the beginning of the following century, Germans demanded their share of colonies. Because of
German threats to her colonies, Britain needed to cooperate with the “lesser evil,” Russia. This situation
freed Russia from her plans towards Ottoman territories and the Straits; so, Great Britain with France
ignored Ottoman requests for an alliance. The Ottoman Empire had no choice other than to ally with
Germany to maintain the balance of power policy in order to prevent the Russian threat.
The developments during the First World War proved the wisdom of the Turks
apprehension towards the intentions of Russia. On March 4, 1915, the Russian foreign minister
bargained for land with the Allied Powers: Constantinople, the western bank of the Bosporus, the sea of
Marmara and of the Dardanelles, southern Thrace to the Enez-Midye line, part of the Asiatic shore that
lies between the Bosporus, the Sakarya River and a point to be determined on the Gulf of Izmit, the
islands of Sea of Marmara, the Imbros Islands and the Tenedos Islands4. Unquestionably, Russia knew
the desperate situation of her allies and wanted to benefit from this situation by guaranteeing her own
security. In accordance with this and the other Central Powers’ demands, many secret agreements were
signed to share the Ottoman territory: the Constantinople Agreement, the Treaty of London, The SykesPicot Agreement and the St. Jean de Maurinne Agreement. Among these, the Constantinople Agreement
of March/April 1915 between Britain, Russia and France had acknowledged Russia’ demands to annex
3
Ibid, p.59.
Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan: the dynamics of influence. (Newyork, N.Y.:
Praeger, 1982) p. 3-4.
4
5
Constantinople and the Straits and the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 proposed the partition of the
Ottoman Empire among Britain, France and Russia5.
Despite Russian plans, the long war triggered two revolutions in Russia. After the first, in
February 1917, the Provisional Government decided to go on with the war but in October of the same
year, the Bolsheviks gained control of the government and withdrew from the war by signing the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers on March 3, 1918. In Article IV of this agreement, the
Bolshevik government agreed to cede Kars, Ardahan and Batum, which Tsarist Russia acquired in 1878.
Even before this article, the Bolshevik government attempted to restore relations with the Ottoman
Empire. On December 3, 1917, V.I. Lenin and Josef Stalin addressed the Working Moslems of Russia
and the East and in this speech they declared the annulling of secret treaties regarding the seizure of
Constantinople and the division of Turkey6.
Nevertheless, the situation between Bolshevik Russia and the Ottoman Empire remained
tense until the war concluded for the Ottoman Empire with the Armistice of Mudros on October 30,
1918. Both Bolshevik and Ottoman policies harmed their relations. The Soviets kept supporting the
Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. According to the decree issued by Bolshevik Government on January
11, 1918, the Armenia People’s Militia would replace the Russian Army which was withdrawing from
the region. The decree also anticipated the immigration of Russian and Turkish Armenians to Eastern
Anatolia. The decree emphasized that the Soviet government would have supported whether or not the
Armenians had decided their own future, even if it was independence7. It is evident that the Bolsheviks
did not respect towards the internal affairs of Turkey. It is also clear that Russians did not trust the Turks
and were trying to establish a buffer zone between the Ottoman Empire and Bolshevik Russia8.
The same degree of distrust also can be seen in Ottoman policies. The Ottoman interest in Turks
immigrating to Russia frustrated the new Russian government, which was busy with internal problems.
The exhilaration of the Turks at the independence of Ukraine and the right of self-determination granted
by the Bolshevik government to the other nations in Russia contributed to Russian anxiety about the
Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Ottoman armies were advancing into Caucasia. Because of Ottoman
military operations, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the German Consul on July
5
Bulent Gokay, Turkish settlement and the Caucasus, 1918-1920 (Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics) in “Middle Eastern
Studies,” Vol: 32(2), p. 45(32)
6
Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967. (Moscow, Progress Publishers) 1967. p. 34.
7
Kamuran Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991) p. 1.
8
Suat Bilge, Guc Komsuluk: Turkiye – Sovyetler Birligi Iliskileri 1920-1964. (Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari,
1992) p. 19.
6
4, 1918, and then to the Ottoman Foreign Minister on September 20 of the same year9. Obviously the
Turks would have preferred a weak Russia to a peaceful Russia. Finally, after the Ottoman signing of
the Armistice of Mudros, Russia declared the Brest-Litovsk agreement with the Ottoman Empire invalid
on September 20, 191810.
Although Turkish military operations in the final months of the Great War increased Russian
fears, after the signature of the Armistice of Mudros, Russia’s worry of Turkish threats disappeared.
Britain gained domination of the Straits, Constantinople and the Caucasus. Because of this new danger,
the end of tense Soviet-Ottoman relations evolved into close relations between the Soviet government
and Turkish nationalist movement.
1.2. The Beginning of Turkish-Soviet Relations
The years 1920 to 1939 represent an exceptional period in Turkish-Russian relations.
After a hundred years of animosity and war, two fresh states rising out of the First World War decided to
establish close relations with each other. However, one must remember that changing regimes and
systems does not mean that old aims or prejudices would be buried permanently. Close relations
between two states resulted from necessity rather than good faith. For the Turks, friendship with the
Soviet Union meant a source of aid during wars for independence. Turkish lands were occupied by the
most powerful countries in Europe, hence the leaders of the independence movements had only two
places to get help: the Soviet Union and the United States; common objectives made the former the
favorite of the Turks.
Firstly, the Bolshevik government was as knowledgeable of the British pressure as the
Turks. In the event of the fall of the Turkish movement, the Soviets would have felt this pressure more
than before because they would be surrounded. Another common element was both sides’ opposition to
a strong, independent Armenia in East Anatolia. Undoubtedly, Soviet opposition to an Armenian state
was not based on their reverence towards Turkish territory. Instead, the Bolsheviks were alarmed that
the British supported the Armenian state that abutted their border. On the other hand, the attitude of the
United States was not encouraging Turks to request aid from it. At this time, the United States was
9
For the details of these notes, Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1951) p. 83; 109-110.
10
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p. 4.
7
supporting an independent Armenia according to the Wilsonian principles and was reluctant to oppose
the Western countries because of the history of the Turks fighting with Germany during the war11.
Even the first contact between the sides proves the phoniness of the close relations
between the two states in the interwar period. In fact, even though the agreements signed in 1921 and
1925 formed the groundwork for the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union, under this
facade was an overwhelming consensus of distrust and ill-feelings. The first official contact materialized
in the form of Mustafa Kemal’s letter to Lenin on April 26, 192012. The letter consisted of three articles:
In the first article, Ataturk offered to operate together against imperialist powers. In the second, he said
that if Bolshevik forces organized military operation on Georgia and put them under the Bolshevik rule,
the Turks would undertake military operation on Armenia and Bolshevik regime in Azerbaijan. In the
last article, the Turks insisted on aid for their struggle against imperialist powers13. In short, the Turks
were offering an alliance and cooperation.
The reply to this letter was written on June 2, 1920 by Chicherin, People’s Commissar of
Foreign Affairs. It is interesting to note his expression on the Soviet Government’s noting the
fundamental principles of the foreign policy of the new Turkish government. As can be seen in Mustafa
Kemal’s letter, it is hard to talk about anything other than offers. In his reply, Chicherin turned 3-article
offers into 8-article principles. Article 4 and 6 are of considerable importance. In article 4, the so-called
principle was the decision to allow Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lusistan, the Batum Province, Eastern
Thrace and all territories with a mixed Turco-Arab population, to choose their own destiny. Article 6
raised the question of where the Straits belonged as territory and was to be submitted to a conference of
11
Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927, a study of Soviet policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. (London:
Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1966) p. 90-91...On the other hand, after the Sivas Congress on
September 4-11, 1919, in order to dissolve the negative atmosphere against Turks in the United States, the officials of the
national movement decided to invite an American Committee to Anatolia to research and see the truth.Also when Mustafa
Kemal met with General Harbord on September 22, he stated that national movement would accept help from a neutral great
power and his aim was to protect the empire with a neutral great power’s, preferably American mandate. However, this move
must be seen as a tactic to gain time during the wars with Allied Powers because of the strict opposition of Mustafa Kemal’s
to any option other than complete independence. Mehmet Gonlubol, Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1965). (Ankara:
Disisleri Bakanligi Matbaasi, 1968) p.12, 19.
12
According to Gurun, this letter was not written to send to Lenin. On these days, Karabekir Pasha advised to send a military
mission to Baku and he was corresponding with Mustafa Kemal about an instruction letter for the military mission. However,
Mustafa Kemal’s reply, letter of April 26, was sent to Moscow instead of Baku mistakenly and this letter was named Mustafa
Kemal’s letter to Lenin even though it did not include Lenin’s name in the letter. Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953).
p. 33-34.
13
For the letter, Turgut Ilkan, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). (Turkiye Disisleri Bakanligi) p.413.
8
the States bordering the Black Sea14. As a matter of fact, these principles were listed as terms in order
for the Turks to receive Bolshevik help and gain victory against imperialists.
On June 20, Ataturk wrote back to Chicherin and accepted the latter’s points in the
aforementioned letter as Turks sincere and serious principles and Russia’s mediation in determining
borders with Iran and Armenia. He also expressed the readiness for a friendship agreement with the
Soviets and asked for a halt to Armenian aggression15. Mustafa Kemal was in no position to express
outrage against the principles in Chicherin’s letter. Like in the Turkish proverb, until crossing the bridge,
he had to call the bear (ayı) uncle (dayı). However, this bridge was rough and boundless until the
beginning of the Second World War. The Turkish rulers continued with the same attitude towards the
USSR unless they were faced with an unacceptable demand and/or move. These objectionable demands
and/or moves were as follows:
1) any request violating the territorial integrity of Turkey determined in Misak-i Milli (National
Agreement – the document that enunciated the basic principles of Turkish independence movement as
well as Turkish territories);
2) any attempt to bring communist regime in Turkey;
3) any requests on the Straits against Turkish interests.
During the interwar period, Turkey and the Soviet Union occasionally clashed on these
points. For the Soviets, there was only one undesirable move: Turkey’s close relations with an enemy
state; these potential enemies were Britain, France and Germany. Russia’s panic about a satellite state
supported by an enemy in the southern borders led Turkish authorities to alleviate this fear through some
gestures and explanations to the Kremlin. Throughout the interwar period, both sides respected the other
one’s “red lines.” The Soviet Union rarely crossed the red line and when she did, after a short while
Moscow either withdrew her demands or chose to keep silent about her discontent and in turn, Turkey
ignored the problems.
The first time the Bolsheviks attempted to cross the “red line” happened during the first
negotiations. The Turkish delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey, arrived in Moscow
on July 19, 1920. From the outset, it was clear that this journey would not end with an agreement.
Nobody met the delegation in the train station and they waited impatiently for an hour until an official
came. After lingering three days to talk to Chicherin, instead of presenting the conditions of cooperation,
14
15
For the reply, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. p. 187-188.
For the letter, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 417.
9
the delegation was faced with Chicherin’s complaints about the Turkish-French negotiations. Chicherin
articulated his anxiety about these negotiations and his suspicion that the Turks would agree with
western countries16.
The Bolsheviks would show this kind of anxiety in every rapprochement between
Western states and Turkey throughout the interwar period. From the beginning the Bolsheviks
considered Turkey a state under their control. In the later days, when the Turkish delegation pressured
Russia about the opening of the Armenia way to get assistance without risk, Chicherin answered these
demands ambiguously by flashing an armistice agreement they had made with the Armenians on August
1017. Despite the negative connotations, an agreement was drafted. However, Chicherin requested the
cession of Van and Mus to Armenia; but as mentioned above, it was unacceptable for Turks to accept
any concession in light of their territorial integrity. After these demands, negotiations broke off and
Kazim Karabekir, the commander of Turkish Eastern Armies, launched an attack on Armenians.
In an assessment of the 1921 Friendship Agreement between the Soviet and the Ankara
Government, shortly afterwards, a contradiction arose in Soviet policies. If one takes a larger
perspective at the Turkish-Soviet relations from the dates between 1920 and 1960 as explained in this
study, the whole picture is much clearer. Between these dates, the primary determining factor in
Turkish-Soviet relations had not ever been mutual relations. Instead, it was Soviet policies towards the
other great powers that mainly influenced Turkish-Soviet relations. Therefore, during this period, one or
more – according to the conditions – of three conditions must have taken place for peaceful TurkishSoviet relations to occur:
1) the military and/or political strength of the Soviet Union must not be strong enough to challenge
another great power;
2) the Soviet Union must be in a political or military conflict with one or more great power;
3) the Soviet Union must benefit from the cooperation and/or friendship with Turkey.
The third element was crucial in this triangle. In the years 1939-1941 and 1943-1953, the
Soviet government did not perceive any benefit from friendship with Turkey. For the latter period,
Soviet perception was directly influenced by the disappearing validity of the first element. In the
following chapters, we return to this period formulating the main core subject of this study.
16
17
Bilge, Guc Komsuluk: Turkiye – Sovyetler Birligi Iliskileri 1920-1964. p. 43.
Ibid, p. 45.
10
The absence of this third element was the reason behind the failure of the first set of
negotiations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. While Chicherin and Bekir Sami Bey were
discussing their mutual relations, the Bolsheviks were gaining victories on the Western front and they
were about to sign a trade agreement with England18. Chicherin, especially, gave full weight to the
agreement with Britain and he would not want to risk the agreement with Britain by helping the Turks
fighting the Greek soldiers supported by the British Empire. Bolsheviks also hoped that communists
would take the power in Turkey, so they do not see the agreement with Mustafa Kemal as necessary19.
Finally, the Soviet Union knew that the Turks were desperately in need of aid20 and it thus felt free to
present huge demands to bail the Turks out of their abysmal situation.
“Conditions change, politics change.” This is summary of the Soviet attitude in her
relations with Turkey, and the story of March 1921 agreement is the first example of this attitude. After
the failure of the first negotiations, the conditions in Soviet and Turkish sides changed drastically. First
of all, Soviet successes on the Western front were short-lived. After a while no advancement was
realized and it was this situation that killed the Bolshevik dreams of spreading communism with active
propaganda throughout Europe, especially in Germany. Therefore, Chicherin avowed a “hiding-andwaiting policy” to spread communism in the West on February 25, 192121.
Second, Turkish operations in Armenia and then in Georgia and victories against Greeks
illustrated the miscalculation of the Bolsheviks in belittling the Turkish military. During this period,
communism had lost its impact in Turkey through the murder of Mustafa Suphi, the leader of the
Turkish Communist Party, the defeat of the socialist-Islamist group the Green Army led by Cerkes
Ethem and Ataturk’s declaration of the “official Turkish Communist Party”22.
Last but not least, Lenin and Stalin favored an agreement with the Turks more so than
Chicherin. At the beginning of the second series of conversations, which ended with the agreement, as
18
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p. 50.
William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000) (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000) p. 50.
20
After the Greek advance into the Turkish lands, some of the members of the Turkish Assembly offered to accept Russian
demands in return of aid, but Mustafa Kemal did not agree with that idea. Gonlubol, Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (19191965). p. 26.
21
In his speech, Chicherin did not accept their defeat openly, but admiited their policy of active propaganda on Munich and
Budapest as mistake. Donald Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: reports and papers from the Foreign
Office confidential print. Part II, From the First to the Second World War, Series A, the Soviet Union, 1917-1939.
(University Publications of America, 1984) p. 256.
22
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000). p. 50.
19
11
soon as Chicherin saw the Turkish delegation, he enumerated his complaints about the situation in
Armenia and Georgia and only after he spoke to Stalin was the agreement sealed23.
In March 1921, a friendship agreement was signed with the Bolshevik government. Even
though the Bolsheviks consented to an alliance- because they did not want to risk the trade agreement
with Britain- this accord would be consequential for Turkish foreign policy and later Soviet-Turkish
relations. This was the first time that the Turkish borders determined by Misak-i Milli were
acknowledged by a great power. In later Turkish-Soviet relations, we must not forget that Turkish northeastern front was drawn with this agreement: while Kars and Ardahan were counted as Turkish lands,
Turkey agreed to cede Batum to Georgia. In the first article, both parties agreed not to recognize any
peace treaty or international instrument relating to Turkey and that was not recognized by the Grand
National Assembly. Soviets also regarded capitulations as void by article VII. Additionally, both parties
decided to annul the agreements signed between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia24.
The camaraderie with the Bolsheviks and aid received from them was far-reaching and
substantial in the success of the Turkish national movement. However, these relations with the
Bolsheviks were established well above the base of necessity and not on mutual trust or good faith. The
foundation for their interactions was not built upon strong grounds and both the Turks and Soviets were
outraged at the strict moves that prevented a break in relations during the interwar period. Some of these
events and feelings stemmed from the animosity following the Second World War.
1.3. Problems under the Guise of Friendship
Karl Marx once said that, “The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, as long as
he knows that the other animals he has to deal with are capable of nothing.”25 Under the observation of
Soviet policies in the interwar period and post-war period, it would not be wrong to say that “old habits
die hard.” Unlike the Second World War, the Great War had little effect on the clout of Britain and
France. Russia was, therefore, in the same forest with other animals capable of doing “something”.
Hence, the competition between the European states and their economic superiority led the Bolsheviks
to establish friendly relations with her neighbors in order to maintain security. Regardless, right after the
Second World War, the Soviet Union broke off these friendly relations as soon as the “other animals”
23
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p. 68-70.
For details, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. p. 237-242.
25
Edward Latham (ed.), Crisis in the Middle East. (New York: Wilson, 1952) p.66.
24
12
lost their power and until another, the United States, came into the forest from the outside, the Soviets
kept their hostile policies in the zenith towards the states once she had established friendly relations. The
states that felt the hostile Soviet policies the most were Turkey and Iran.
The Turks harbored no historical ambitions on Soviet territory, but the reason that led
them to launch close relations with the Soviet Union were lack of full sincerity. Turkey had won its
independence at the conclusion of the war with the Lausanne Agreement and founded a republic.
However, problems with former enemies since 1920s and 1930s, because the Lausanne Agreement only
postponed the solution to these troubles instead of solving them. Sometimes these issues pushed Turkey
into the arms of the Soviet Union, as had happened in 1925. In Lausanne, no decision was made about
Mosul, a city in current northern Iraq, and according to the mutual agreement taken in Lausanne, both
sides accepted to discuss the status of Mosul. In case of no agreement, they would leave the problem in
the hands of the League of Nations. Britain did not want to leave this oil-rich city to the Turks and kept
an “intransigence policy” in order to ensure the choice would be made by the League of Nations, in
which Britain held utmost power. Throughout the antagonism, France supported Britain in accordance
with the San Remo Agreement between them. For this reason, she postponed ratification of Friendship
and Good Neighborliness with Turkey until the predicament was solved peacefully in July 192626. This
meant that in the event of war with Britain, France had no choice but to give London its unwavering
support. At the same time, there were rumors that in the case of war, Italy would have landed on the
west coasts of Anatolia. Under these conditions, Turkey had no choice other than creating a relationship
with her north neighbor and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with the Soviet Union on
December 17, 1925, one day after Mosul decision was given in the League of Nations in the favor of
Britain.
As mentioned above, in the interwar period there were some potential problems between
the Soviet Union and Turkey. Both parties were displaying some discontent with each other’s policies,
but the necessity of the close relations prevented them from admitting their displeasure. However,
immediately after the Second World War these potential problems would become real problems and
dominate the next twenty years. This observation proves the artificiality and affectedness of the interwar
relations. Throughout the interwar period, the principal potential problems were:
1) Turkey’s relations with Western states and organizations;
2) Communist activities in Turkey;
26
Fahir Armaoglu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi. (Istanbul: Alkin Yayinevi, 2007) p. 323-324.
13
3) and most importantly, the regime on the Straits.
1.3.1. Turkey’s relations with Western states and organizations:
The foremost importance of Turkey in Russian eyes had been its geopolitical position on
Russian security. Sharing borders on the south and control of the strategically supreme Straits, the
attitude of the Turkish governments had always been scrutinized closely by Russian rulers. This was
especially in hard times when Russia was not strong and tried to deter enemies from attacking Russian
lands. As a result, every time Turkey signed an agreement with a Western state, the Bolsheviks became
worried about the new relationship. Turks did not fret at Soviet skepticism; instead, many times they
worked towards alleviating the suspicions of their neighbor. Any chance of the Soviets’ taking umbrage
could not be risked, Mustafa Kemal did not hesitate even to use socialist language. For instance, after
French-Turkish agreement on October 20, 1921, Mustafa Kemal needed to ease Russian doubts and did
so by writing a letter to Lenin on January 4, 1922. In this letter, Mustafa Kemal stressed that the FrancoTurkish agreement was no different from the Anglo-Russian agreement and that entailed a conclusion of
some conditions. However, Turkey did not renounce her ideals. Kemal added that Turkey was closer to
the Russians because Turkey opposed the large capital owners’ class and capitulations, which were tools
of the imperialist states. In Turkey there is no division of powers like in Western states. According to
him, there were no limitlessly rich classes and everybody had to work, even landowners, because of
their diminishing profits27.
At the end of 1930, when Turkey started the policy of “building new friendships while
carrying on the old ones”28, Russian feelings of distrust towards Turkey increased and this situation
produced fresh protocols between the parties. For example, when a British fleet visited Istanbul, the
commander of the fleet and British ambassador to Turkey visited Ataturk in 1929. The Russian feared
that close links with Turkey were at risk. After this incident, Karakhan, the Deputy People’s Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara to add a new protocol to 1925 Agreement29. As per this agreement,
each contracting party undertook suspension of negotiation or the signing of political agreements with a
27
For the details, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 438-441.
Ibid, p. 22.
29
Gonlubol, Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1965). p. 72.
28
14
state that had common borders with the contracting side without the approval of the other contracting
side30. With this protocol, without a doubt, Russia tried to keep Turkey under her control.
Turkey followed the same “appeasement policy” when she entered and/or founded any
international organization or pact. One case, came two months before Turkish entry into the League of
Nations in 1932. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras was required to visit Russia to reassure the
Soviets about her intentions, which were that Turkey was only aiming at peaceful solutions to
international disputes. Therefore, while entering the organization, Turkey presented two letters to the
Soviet ambassador in Ankara. In these letters, Turkey stressed:
“Turkey’s entry into the League in no way affected her undertakings as given in the
Russo-Turkish Treaty signed at Paris on the 17th December, 1925, an completed by a
protocol of the 17th December, 1929. She had joined the League in the belief that it was
designed to further the peaceful settlement of international disputes, but should the
League manifest any contrary tendency or adopt aims hostile to the U.S.S.R., Turkey
would oppose such tendency or aims by all means in her power. Should any accusation of
initiating a war of aggression be brought against Russia, “Turkey would consider such an
accusation to be unjust,” and would therefore be under no obligation to take part in
coercive measures against her neighbor."31
In the same fashion, upon signing the founding agreement of the Balkan Pact with
Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934, Turkey entered a reservation in favor of Russia, and most
importantly, added the famous “protocol II” into the agreement, which called for an alliance with
England and France in the Second World War. This protocol stated that “Turkey’s obligations could not
compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed
conflict with the Soviet Union.”32 However, after the strained relations, this concession became the basis
that kept Turkey out of war.
1.3.2. Communist activities in Turkey
In the interwar period, communism and measures against it in Turkey were not,
surprisingly, at the top of the list of arguments between Turkey and the Soviet Union. At the beginning
30
For the protocol, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 274-275.
Robin Bidwell, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: reports and papers from the Foreign Office confidential print. Part
II, From the First to the Second World War, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918-1939. (University Publications
of America, 1985) p. 323.
32
Harry N. Howard, Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey During World War II in “Department of State Bulletin,” Vol: 19,
No: 472, p. 66.
31
15
of the national movement, the Soviets hoped for communist rule in Turkey; but nationalism outweighed
communism and the Soviets could not endanger themselves by inciting an aggressive government in the
south through bolstering communists in Turkey. Instead, supporting nationalists was more advantageous
for both ideological and strategic interests. Strategically, a friendly Turkish state would protect the
southern borders of Soviet Russia whereas ideologically, “that its support for a fight by “revolutionary
masses” of an Asian country against the Western powers was an important duty for the Soviet socialist
government.”33
The same policy was reissued after the nationalist movement and in the interwar period,
trials or arrests of communists in Turkey failed to spark any harsh reactions from the official Soviet
circle, even though Turkey was sometimes criticized in the Comintern. Soviet officials sometimes
deliberately avoided spreading news about the fate of Turkish communists. It was commonly agreed that
in order to prevent damage to the Soviet-Turkish Agreement in March 1921, the announcement of the
murder of Mustafa Suphi, which took place in January 21, would not be published for two months34. In
response to this policy, Turkish rulers abolished the communist threat from Turkish-Soviet relations,
which was a completely opposite the original Turkish policy towards the Soviets after 1945.
1.3.3. Regime on the Straits
The Straits policy of the Soviet Union in the interwar period can be defined as “ambitious
but not coercive.” This policy was not independent from Soviet foreign policy in general. Similar to
Soviet foreign policy, the Straits issue was shaped by international conditions, the strength of Soviet
Russia, as well as, the interests of the Soviet state. Under principle, Soviet rulers would not have been
eager to leave strategic areas in anyone’s hands but their own. This is the core element behind the
stubbornness portrayed in the attempt to acquire Batum from Turkey during negotiations in 1921 and
Chicherin’s strong request for joint protection of the Straits in the first letter he wrote to Mustafa Kemal.
Because of the aforementioned state of world politics, Soviet goals could not take precedence over
Turkish interests in two important conferences concerning the issue of Straits during the interwar period.
Moreover, the same conditions led Soviet Russia to adopt two opposing Straits policies at these
conferences.
33
Bulent Gokay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet foreign policy, Turkey and communism. (London,
New York: Routledge, 2006) p.15.
34
Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956) p.211.
16
The Soviet Straits policy was rightfully summarized by Fischer as “Russia desired closed
Straits when she was weak and at such periods sought the support of Turkey, but set her heart on open
Straits for herself and did not hesitate to antagonize Turkey when she felt more conscious her power.”35
Parallel to this argument, during the Lausanne Conference – which took place when the Constantinople
was under occupation – Russians proposed closure of the Straits to warships of outside powers,
fortification of the Straits by the Turks and exclusion of the outside powers from any future participation
in the discussion over the fate of the Straits36. Turkish officials knew that their armies could not afford to
go on with the war anymore. Turks managed to get almost all lands they aimed for in Misak-i Milli and
were ready to make concessions on the Straits by postponing the solution to later years.
The Soviets detested this solution. When Chicherin and Ismet Inonu, the foreign Minister
of Turkey, met and discussed this issue in Lausanne, Chicherin kept saying that “sacrificing Blacks Sea
means to follow policy against Russia.” When Inonu asked if the Russians were ready commence yet
another war when Turkey left the conference, Chicherin answered ambiguously37. Therefore, Turkey
could not risk the achievements they had worked for during extensive wars because of unreliable
Russian guaranties. For Russia, this result meant a defeat for Britain, which supported open Straits, more
than an argument with Turkey
As a result, the verdict on the Straits was fulfilled in accordance with British demands.
The straits would be open to the war vessels in both peace and war, in day and night. Even when Turkey
was belligerent, she had to provide free passage for neutral war vessels and her measures to stop the
enemy could not block this free passage. The Straits would become disarmed and the security of them
and Constantinople, was entrusted to the major players in the League of Nations; Great Britain, France,
Italy and Japan. A Straits Commission was formed and it became responsible in the administrative
duties of the Straits38.
Even though the Straits Convention at the Lausanne Conference was not settled in favor
of Soviet Russia, the situation did not cause a serious dispute between Turks and Bolsheviks. At the
Montreux Conference in 1936, the same arguments surfaced regarding the Straits. Because of the
increasing Italian threat on Turkey’s western shores, the chaotic international atmosphere and the quarrel
among the members of the joint protection system, Turkey stipulated another conference on the Straits.
35
Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs; a history of the relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world,
1917-1929. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960) p. 291.
36
George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941. (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1960) p. 52.
37
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p. 97-98.
38
For the Strait Convention, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 156-165.
17
Russia, unsatisfied with the Lausanne Conference, supported this offer. Britain could not put the dispute
between two countries into perspective while Germany was wreaking havoc, so Britain both accepted
the conference offer and yielded to Turkish demands.
In contrast to the Lausanne Conference, at the end of the conference, provisions towards
passing war vessels in the Straits and their stay in the Black Sea rearranged entirely and littoral states
gained the advantage. Article 18 proclaims, in a time of peace the maximum tonnage of total war vessels
of the non-littoral states should never exceed 30.000. In the Lausanne, there was no restriction on the
amount of war vessels presented by the non-littoral states and the possibility of the supremacy of nonlittoral states was open39. In general, when it came to war time, if Turkey was non-confrontational, war
vessels of warring sides were not permitted to pass through the Straits, and if Turkey was belligerent, the
passage of war vessels rested within Turkey’s decisions40. What is more, Article 21 issued that even
when Turkey felt the imminent danger of war, she had the right to decide admittance and passage of
warships. Turkey was also relieved of two conditions established in Lausanne. The Straits Commission
was abolished and Turkey assumed position of overseer of the Straits.
Clearly, the defense and control of the Straits was entrusted to Turkey as a direct
correlation with the result of the Montreux Conference. As previously mentioned, to Soviet Russia,
another country’s control of these areas was not desirable, even if this country was a friendly state.
When war was approaching, this judgment was more viable. From the very beginning of the conference,
Soviets were pressing to pass limitless forces through the Straits and put a complete restriction on the
non-littoral war vessels. To the Turks, these hassles meant converting Black Sea into the Soviet lake.
Another Russian demand was to refortify the Straits with Soviet arms. Turkey again rejected this offer
and agreed with Germans for refortification41.
Soviet Russia, most likely, saw this as crossing the “red line” that drawn and adhered to
in the interwar period. Indeed, now the potential problems of the interwar period were connected and
created a possible threat to Soviet security. Soviet’s irritation at German refortification to the Straits is
reasonable because of the fresh memories of the First World War. The visit of German battleship Emden
to Istanbul on November 1, 1936 and glowing demonstrations reminded Soviets of these memories42 and
39
Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi. (Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 1968) p.108.
In these provisions, there are some exceptions. For these exceptions, look at the Montreux Convention in Belgelerle TurkSovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 293-309, and for English version; Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO.
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972) p. 200-223.
41
Watt, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series A: The Soviet Union, Volume 17. p.226.
42
Armaoglu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi. p. 352.
40
18
next year, in 1937, in addition to the accusation of Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras of
favoring an agreement with Italy, the Soviet press charged Turkey through slipping into the Fascist orbit
from time to time43.
Turkey’s budding relations with Great Britain before the war were heightening Soviet
qualms on trustworthiness of their southern neighbor. One incident we see in British documents can be
viewed as the final straw that broke the camel's back that would obliterate the mutual respect of the
parties in not crossing the red line. British documents show that Turkish officials were not completely
lukewarm to giving some concessions to the Soviets for the Straits regime, even though it was not a joint
defense. After the conclusion of the Montreux Convention, Aras proposed that the Soviets “not to permit
the warships of an aggressor power to pass through the Straits to attack the Soviet Union in return for
Soviets’ willing to place their Black Sea Fleet and certain air forces at Turkey’s disposal in the event of
her being attacked in the Mediterranean.” It is hard to believe that this offer was sufficient for Soviets;
however, this is not the point. The dilemma is Turks’ withdrawal of this offer after consulting the Great
Britain. They convinced Turks that this sort of proposal may conflict with the Montreux Convention,
which serves the interests of Turks and by this offer, “Turkey would risk losing her political
independence, besides bringing the Soviet Union into Mediterranean politics and hence increasing the
very dangers which she wished to guard against.”44 Turks’ withdrawing their offer after consulting
another power was a serious blow to Turkey-Soviet relations. That was what the Soviets had feared
since the formation of relations with Turkey: A neighbor under the influence of another great power.
To understand the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the interwar period
is substantial for analyzing the problems in the post-war period. In the interwar period, Soviet-Turkish
relations were close and friendly, but the true reason behind this closeness was not based on good faith
and/or mutual trust. Conditions such as a common British threat and weak economical and political
situations forced both sides to adopt judicious policies towards each other. When these conditions
disappeared as the Second World War was approaching, the need for these policies disappeared. The
First World War brought the end of Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire; nevertheless, some the
principles, fears, ambitions etc. remained firm and guided the foreign policies of their successors. The
seeds of the problems in the post-war period were sown in the common history of Tsarist Russia and the
Ottoman Empire. In the interwar period these seeds were hidden but not eradicated and after the
43
44
Watt, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series A: The Soviet Union, Volume 17. p.296.
Ibid, p.226-227
19
Montreux they came to the surface. Finally, what would nourish these seeds in the future were the
Soviet demands made in 1939 and 1945, which will be explained next chapters.
20
CHAPTER 2
THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND SOVIET DEMANDS IN 1945
Generally, the foreign policy of any country is affected more so by the attitude of hostile
countries rather than friendly ones. Because of this, the policies of Soviet Russia did not direct the
political decisions of the Turkish Government in the interwar period. On the contrary, typically, British
polices in 1920s and Italian actions and ambitions in 1930s, shaped Turkish foreign policy. However,
Russian threats appeared in 1939 that for 25 years would become the pivotal determinant of policies, at
least in the first fourteen years.
2.1. Moscow Negotiations
Anomalous political events spanning the period from the Montreux Conference to the
beginning of the war presented a storm before the calm, serious conflict did not interrupt Soviet-Turkish
relations in this period. The main reason for this was that the centers for security measures and therefore,
the anxieties of both states, were located far from the common borders of the Soviet Union and Turkey.
Mussolini’s Italian policies towards the Mediterranean were released on March 18, 1934 and became a
source of danger and concern for the Turks. Mussolini declared that Italy’s future lay in Africa and Asia
and went on to say that “Italy’s position in the Mediterranean, the sea which has regained its historic
function of joining East and West, gives her the right and duty to accomplish this task.”45 From this date
to the Moscow negotiations of 1939, the Italian threat and Turkish fear of Italian policies fluctuated, but
there was one thing certain in the minds of Turkish officials: “Among big states, only Italy had
ambitions on Turkish lands.”46 At the time, a friendship and neutrality agreement between Turkey and
the Soviet Union had been established and they had a common aspiration, to protect the Black Sea from
becoming a war region. Since the key threat was concentrated in the Mediterranean rather than the Black
Sea, Turkey was compelled to weld firm connections with a country that also had the security of the
45
Dilek Barlas, Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities and Limits for Middle-Power
Activism in the 1930s in “Journal of Contemporary History”, Vol: 40(3), p. 450-451.
46
Rifki Salim Burcak, Moskova Gorusmeleri ve Dis Politikamiz Uzerindeki Tesirleri. (Ankara: Gazi Universitesi Yayinlari)
p. 29.
21
Mediterranean as their prime interest. This country was Great Britain, of which Turkey had already
launched friendly relations at the beginning of the 1930s. The Italian attack on Albania in April 1939
reinforced the necessity of this alliance on both sides and negotiations ended with Anglo-Turkish France
Pact in October of the same year.
The Soviet Union had planned to form an agreement with Great Britain against their
German menace. However, their ingrained mistrust and prejudice towards each other had not shrunk
over the years and Chamberlain’s “appeasement policy” towards Hitler did not help to improve these
relations, nor did the Munich Conference and leaving the Czech’s Sudetenland to Germany on
September 29, 1938; neglecting to invite the Soviet Union to the conference was the zenith of the
appeasement policy. This decision incited enough reason for the Soviets to suspect Britain. To them,
Hitler was a rabid dog inching closer and closer before the kill and Britain was the owner wielding the
leash. In fact, Chamberlain hoped that Hitler would enter an alliance with Britain against the Soviet
Union after his gains. He thought that Hitler would stop in order to protect his gains, like Bismarck47.
This policy did not only prove wrong; it was the reason behind the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939.
Therefore, on the eve of the world war, two “friendly” countries, Turkey and the Soviet
Union, parted their ways and became enemies. Even though these decisions were extraneous to each
other, it is impossible to assume that both parties were uninterested in the other one’s choice. Two
crucial meetings between the Turkish and Soviet officials before the war affected Turkish political
minds deeply. At the beginning of May 1939, Potemkin, the Soviet deputy Commissar of Foreign
Affairs, visited Turkey to inquire after the details of the British-Turkish negotiations. This was a
contractual obligation in accordance to the protocol added to the 1925 Friendship and Neutrality
Agreement in 1929. In the meetings, Turkish officials were well aware of the problems between
Western states and Soviet Russia and made efforts to reconcile the parties. In his notes to Moscow,
Potemkin pointed out that:
“According to Ismet, France and England are beginning to realize the very great danger
which this situation poses for themselves…England and France have decided to organize
opposition to the aggressors…They have entered into negotiations with Turkey and the
USSR. Ismet’s opinion, the USSR should not reject the offer of co-operation. Its selfisolation would do incalculable harm to the cause of peace…Incidentally, in his
conversations with General Weygand, Ismet had argued that without the USSR’s support
France could not defend herself against Germany. There was even more reason why the
47
M. Aydin, Yatistirma (Appeasement) Politikasi kutusu, in Baskin Oran (ed), “Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan
Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar”. Volume 1, p. 408.
22
USSR’s participation in the organization of defence against aggression in Eastern Europe
and in the Balkans should be a decisive factor.”48
It is vital to accentuate the components presented in the informational meeting between
Potemkin and Menemencioglu, Deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During this meeting the
elements within the British-Turkish negotiations were shared. As dictated by this, Turkey and Britain
undertook mutual assistance against Italy in any situation, anywhere; it was even possible to launch a
military attack against Italy without waiting for an attack. Turkey also agreed to take action against
Germany, if and only if, German attacks formed a direct threat to Turkey. Menemencioglu underlined
that Turkey was in dire need of financial aid and military supply and without receiving these requests
Turkey would not sign any agreement with Britain49.
This information provides us with a chance to evaluate the political stance of Turkey
prior to the war. First off, Turkey was knowledgeable of the possibility of the Soviet Union’s neutrality.
In spite of this, it appears that this would not have caused an obstacle in the formation of the BritishTurkish agreement. On the other hand, it is evident that Turkey was determined to join the war, even to
attack Italy, to protect her security. This, however, contradicts Turkish neutrality in the war. To resolve
this contradiction, we have to look at the second meeting between Turkey and Soviet Russia before the
war.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact can be seen as the starting point of the Second World War. As von
Papen, German Ambassador in Turkey during the war puts correctly, “Hitler would not have attacked
Poland if he had been faced by a war on two fronts.” 50 The war started and on September 17, Poland
was occupied by Germany from the west and USSR from east. On the same day, the USSR made public
a number of declarations and diplomatic notes concerning its foreign policy. One of them was the
invitation of Turkish Foreign Minister to Moscow for negotiations.
Moscow negotiations occurred between September 26 and October 16. Four meetings
were held in this process and at the end of the negotiations, the 20 year old friendship was irreparably
damaged as a result of differing ambitions and expectations on the part of the other. When Turkish
Foreign Minister Saracoglu arrived in Moscow he hoped to be a bridge between the Soviet Union and
the West while the Soviet Union was determined to shaft Turkey from an alliance with England and
48
S.S.C.B. Disisleri Bakanligi, Stalin, Roosevelt ve Churchill’in Gizli Yazismalarinda Turkiye (1941-1944) ve Ikinci Dunya
Savasi Oncesi Sovyet Baris Cabalari ve Turkiye 1938-1939 (Secmeler). (Istanbul: Havass Yayinlari, 1981) p. 38-41.
49
Ibid, p. 35-36.
50
Franz von Papen, Memoirs. (London: A. Deutsch, 1952) p, 446.
23
France by providing Turkey’s neutrality. England and France followed these negotiations with careful
eyes. Britain, especially, was very anxious about any shift in Turkish foreign policy51.
British fears did not come true. Rather, three days after the end of negotiations, the
Turkish Government ratified the Turkish-Britain-France Pact and indicated her permanent side. During
the negotiations, Saracoglu finally understood that 20 years friendship changed nothing a propos
Russian interests in the Straits. Since the beginning of the negotiations, Russian demands focused on
three topics: to make some changes to Turkish-Anglo-French pact; to put a reserve on the SovietTurkish pact in favor of Germany; and introduce some changes to the Montreux regime52. Turkey
rejected the last two. By placing the reserve in favor of Germany, the pact would be meaningless. If
Turkey had had to fight with Italy, the Soviets would not have come to their aid because Italy was
German’s ally. The third demand was completely intolerable for the Turks. At the end of the first
meeting, Molotov passed a piece of paper to Saracoglu. When Saracoglu asked what the paper was
about, Molotov replied that it contained changes to the Montreux regime. Saracoglu refused to even
touch the paper. In fact, the paper includes ten articles which would have given the Soviets control of the
Straits regime about the passage of non-littoral warships. According to the first article, Soviets and
Turks would come to a mutual decision about the passage of non-littoral warships both in peacetime and
wartime. The other articles were on organization of the passage of submarines, humanitarian warships of
third parties and in favor of Soviet Russia. Moreover, the new arrangement would forbid changing the
new Strait regime without a unilateral decision and/or entrance into negotiations with the third parties53.
Soviets tried to achieve their long-lasting desires towards the Straits through unilateral discussions with
Turks. The Soviets had assumed that the Turks would fear a joint German-Soviet threat and accept these
offers.
The Turkish government ratified her pact with Great Britain and France; however, it
would be unfair to say that the Moscow Conference was a total failure for the USSR, at least for the time
51
Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: an active neutrality. (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 78…Especially Germans made pressure on Soviets to convince Turkey to follow a
neutrality. On October 2, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop informed Schulenburg ,German Ambassador in Moscow, that
“…according to reports I have received the Turkish Government would hesitate to conclude an assistance pact with France
and England, if the Soviet Union emphatically opposed it. In my opinion, as already states several times, it would also be in
the Russian interest, on account of the question of the Straits, to forestall a tie-up of Turkey with England and France.” NaziSoviet Relations, 1939-1941: documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office. (Washington: Department of the
State, 1948) p. 110...For Germans, neutrality of Turkey and the closure of the Straits was important to prevent any aid
coming to Romania from the Western states according to the unilateral guarantee given to Romania by these states.
52
Burcak, Moskova Gorusmeleri ve Dis Politikamiz Uzerindeki Tesirleri. p.84.
53
Ibid, p.84-87.
24
being, Soviet Russia had a mutual understanding with Hitler’s Germany in that they wanted the Turks to
be a neutral state. The Moscow Conference changed all the plans of the Turkish Government during the
Second World War and became the first reason towards neutrality because it altered Turkey’s threat
perception. After the conference, the Soviet Union became one of the two countries that turned their
gaze towards Turkish lands, along with Italy, and because of her geographical location, as a neighbor of
Turkey, Soviet Russia was a far more viable danger than Italy. This situation changed the meaning of
“protocol II” in the Anglo-Turkish France Pact. As aforementioned, according to this protocol,
“Turkey’s obligations could not compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as
its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union.”54 Before the Moscow Conference,
this protocol was a sign of good faith of Turkish government to the Soviet Union. After the opposing
intentions of the Soviets were revealed, it turned into an excuse for Turkey and afterwards, when Great
Britain and France called on Turkey to join the war, in accordance with the Anglo-Turkish France Pact,
Turkish refusal was bolstered by this protocol that was made in the first two years of the war.
2.2. Soviet Activities during the Nazi-Soviet Collaboration
Some characteristics of Turkish-Soviet relations in the post-war period were fashioned
right after the failure of Moscow Conference. One of these characteristics was the “press war” and
Soviet efforts to sow the seed of communist movement in Turkey. Indeed, while Turkish press evoked
sympathy towards the Finns – who were in war with Soviets since November 1939 – the Soviet press
issued the argument that there was a distinction between the toiling masses of Turkey and Turkish
government. On December 7, the Comintern periodical Communist International wrote:
“…The Turkish people is unable to understand why Turkish Government circles, instead
of strengthening the friendship with the USSR, should have preferred to make a pact with
the old enemies of Turkey’s independence…Britain and France wished to extend the war
to the Balkans, to create there a military front against Germany. They wished to convert
Turkey into a strategic base for the execution of their plans…Everyone knows that the
present Turkish regime has little to do with a true democracy. Owing to the
rapprochement between the ruling Turkish classes and the Anglo-French imperialists,
Turkey’s independence…is now seriously threatened.”55
54
Howard, Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey During World War II. p. 66.
George Kirk, The Middle East in the War in “Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946.” (London, New York, Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1952) p. 445-446.
55
25
Soviet efforts also, as anticipated, centralized on the Straits problem as had been the case
since the beginning of the war. In the war years, Soviet rulers established dialog with almost all warring
sides regarding this issue. After the German occupation of France, the Soviet Union discussed the
Turkish issue with Italy, who entered the war on June 1940 as a result of the French downfall and fear
that the war would conclude before they took their booty56. In his meeting with Italian ambassador,
Molotov pointed out that Soviet Union was ready to recognize Italian hegemony on the Mediterranean
Sea if Italy would in turn recognize Soviet dominion of Black Sea57.
A month later, Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, was the addressee of
Soviet rulers. Surely, after losing France as an ally in the war, Britain’s main aim was to cause a rift
between Germany and Soviet Union and, in fact, Turkey was so suspicious of Cripps mission because
they were afraid of being a bargaining chip. This fear is evident in the British Foreign Office
memorandum which stated that “Turkey might be led to throw herself into the arms of Germany ‘by the
threat of her traditional enemy, the Soviet Union’.”58 Cripps reports to British Foreign Office show the
strained relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. In his report he remarked that “Soviets
has[have] no hostile intention neither on Straits nor Black Sea; but, the issue of control of Straits must
be solved with the participation of Black Sea countries. If this problem continues, Turk-Soviet relations
will not be as desired.” Moreover, when Cripps stated that this problem could be solved through
discussions with Turkey, Stalin affirmed that Soviets had wanted to agree with Turks when Saracoglu
had been in Moscow but Turks had rejected their “offers.” Stalin also remarked that “Turks can do
insomuch unexpected things, it is hard to find out which way she is going.”59
Another important meeting on the Straits and Turkey issue took place in November 1940
between Molotov and Hitler. Within Turkish sources, this meeting is generally the key event that
induced Turkish apprehensions about Soviet intentions. During these negotiations it would not be
inaccurate to say that Molotov acted on fears of the Balkans more than her traditional ambitions towards
the Straits. Instead, the records of this conversation show that the main anxiety of the Soviet Union in
the late 1940s was this situation with the Balkans and possible German superiority in the region. In the
meeting, Molotov stubbornly linked the Straits questions with the question of Russian guarantee on
Bulgaria. Many times Hitler tried to distract Molotov from the question of guarantee; Molotov was
56
Burcak, Moskova Gorusmeleri ve Dis Politikamiz Uzerindeki Tesirleri. p.123.
Fahir Armaoglu, Ikinci Dunya Harbinde Turkiye in “Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi", Vol: 13(2),
p.150.
58
Kirk, The Middle East in the War. p.448.
59
Ilkan, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 27-28.
57
26
obstinate to get an expression of Hitler’s opinion on the subject. Molotov stated that the Straits were
“England’s historic gateway for attack on the Soviet Union” and because England gained a foothold on
Greece, now the Soviets needed Bulgaria as “independent country located closest to the Straits.”60
However, when one looks at the general situation of German-Soviet relations in the late 1940s, it can be
claimed that Soviet Russia was not any less worried about Germany than about the British being in the
region.
This is not to suggest that the Hitler-Molotov negotiations were not against Turkey’s
rights to the Straits, as gained in the Montreux Conference, and her independency. After understanding
that the Germans were not ready to recognize the Balkans as an area of their interest, Soviets took
initiative on the Balkan states. Therefore, on November 25, Soviet Vice-Commissar Sobolov proposed
to the King of Bulgaria that, in the event of joint military action against Turkey, Eastern Thrace should
be awarded to Bulgaria.”61 The Soviet rulers would not have respected Turkish territorial integrity to
control the Balkans, however, viewing this as more or less important than the Soviet-Italian and/or
Stalin-Cripps negotiations would be fallacious and an exaggeration. In each one of these negotiations the
Soviet rulers tried to establish their superiority on the Straits. The crucial factor heading this
exaggeration was German propaganda during the war. After the German-Soviet difference increased and
then ended with the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, German propaganda doubled both
in Turkey and the Soviet Union. While they disseminated Molotov-Hitler negotiations and asserted that
“Turkey would be the next country to be confronted with Anglo-Soviet demands”62, after the occupation
of Iran by Anglo-Soviet forces, the Germans were supported the pan-Turanist trend in Turkey that
targeted the Turkish population in the Soviet Union.
It is impossible to argue that these propagandist activities did not work at all. Their
smallest effect was that they kept the suspicions of Turkey and the Soviet Union towards each other
alive and the relatively peaceful relations during the tough stages of German-Soviet war between June
1941 and the battle of Stalingrad at the end of 1942, could never affect future-relations in the positive
way. Instead, after the Battle of Stalingrad and increasing power of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s sole
unease became her northern neighbor.
60
For the report of this meeting, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: documents from the archives of the German Foreign
Office. p. 234-247.
61
Kirk, The Middle East in the War. p. 449.
62
Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: an active neutrality. p. 128.
27
The proof of this argument can be seen in Turkish moves after the Battle of Stalingrad.
Germany dwindled in power and Great Britain and the Soviet Union became allies British politicians
thought that it was time for Turkey to meet the requirements of Anglo-Turkish France Pact. However,
for Turkey, the reason behind her neutrality still existed. Turkish rulers maintained that even though
Germany was not as powerful as before, they could still hit Istanbul and the Straits. They also pointed
out the inadequacy of munitions; nevertheless, these were the ostensible reasons. The main concern of
Turkish rulers was the savior – the Soviet Union – more than the attacker – Germany. Turkey’s
communications with the British and Soviet officials and statements of Turkish politicians confirm this
fear. For instance, in the conversation between Cevat Acikalin, the General Secretary of Turkish Foreign
Ministry and Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador in Turkey, of November 1943, the latter asked for
Turkey’s help in Greece, as an ally of Great Britain, Acikalin asked, “What if Turkish capital were to be
occupied by the Germans as reprisal?” When Vinogradov answered that in the event of this situation
Russia would help Turkey, Acikalin stood up and said, “That, Sir, is exactly what we do not want.”63 In
April 1949, in his article published in Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, again demonstrated that the Soviet threat was the motive for Turkish neutrality after the Battle
of Stalingrad, verbalizing that:
“Indeed, one can readily believe that Russia’s greatest regret is that Turkey was not
occupied and then “liberated.” If Turkey had gone to war when she was without arms,
completely isolated and without any hope of aid, the German armies would have
occupied her territory within a few weeks. Later on, the Red Army would have come to
liberate her, as it liberated Poland, the Baltic countries, Rumania, Bulgaria…A lost
opportunity!”64
As can be seen above, neither Italy as the main threat of Turkish territorial integrity
before the war, Germany as starter of the war, nor Great Britain, as the ally of Turkey, affected Turkish
foreign policy as significantly as the Soviet Union did. Incipient communist propaganda and more
importantly, the demands on the Straits at the beginning of the war led Turkish rulers to review their
peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. In addition to this, Turkey had to revise her Western policy
because of the British efforts to bring Turkey into the war and British threats of leaving Turks alone
against the demands of the Soviet Union. This situation made Turkish politicians think of the United
63
Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: small state diplomacy and great power politics. (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1973) p. 189.
64
Necmettin Sadak, Turkey Faces the Soviets in “Foreign Affairs”, Vol: 27 (April 1949). p. 459.
28
States as their main ally; however, conditions in world affairs prevented close relations between the
United States and Turkey until the Truman Doctrine in 1947.
2.3. End of the Second World War and Soviet Demands
The Battle of Stalingrad changed the course of events in the Second World War and
launched the inevitable defeat of Hitler Germany. It also ended the period of comfort for Turkey.
Indeed, Nazi-Russian war had brought relief and joy in Turkey. Two main threats to Turkish security
were wiping each other out. One of the slogans that were used for this war in Turkey displayed Turkish
sentiments for both sides: “Germans to bed, Russians to grave.” The Battle of Stalingrad lead the way to
Russian victory in Europe and because of the war-weary situation of Great Britain and France, Turkish
rulers did not want to see a completely crushed Germany. To keep the traditional “balance of power
policy”65 Turkey needed a strong state against Russia in Europe. Therefore, they decided to support
peace before Germany lost all of its power.
The Casablanca Conference of 1943 confirmed to the Turks that their struggle would not
be easy. The conference ended with two negative decisions for Turkey. Firstly, the doctrine of
“unconditional surrender” was adopted by the Allies. To the Turks, this doctrine provided for nothing
other than Bolshevik control in Europe following the war and the termination of balance of power,
which had provided living space for little states such as Turkey. The second decision prevented Turkey
from drawing the USA into her foreign relation options. According to the verdict, Churchill would be
responsible for the issues concerning Turkey, while Roosevelt would be accountable for China.
This unfavorable situation pushed Turkish rulers to follow some policies that were a
contradiction to her alliance with Great Britain. To save their power for the pending struggle with the
USSR, Turks declined the Allied invitations to join the war – and also, rejected rescue by the Red Army
– and vowed to keep their economical and political ties with Germany for as long as possible66.This
65
By following this policy, a small state benefits from the rivalry between two or more big powers. Especially states which
lay on strategical lands and have rich minerals have more chance to follow this policy than other small states. The main
feature of this policy is its discouraging permanent alliances and/or hostilities with the great powers. In this way, it would be
easy to change sides for the small state and reward more from the rivalry. The Otooman foreign polcy in the nineteenth
century, Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period, and Egyptian foreign policy in the 1950s are the examples of “balance
of power policy.” For instance, even though the Ottoman Empire engaged war with the Tsarist Russia in three times in the
nineteenth century, she also cooperated with her nieghbour in 1805 and 1833 as Molotov quoted instances in the Potsdam
Conference.
66
After the Soviet demands on Turkish Straits and territory in 1945, Steinhardt, Ambassador of the United States in Turkey,
came out with the same judgment: “I have little doubt that the Turkish reaction to excessive demands put forth by the Soviets
29
policy was received with a harsh response from the Western states who needed to split the German
forces in the battlefront. Especially by British officials who blamed the Turks of being obsessed with the
idea of “Russian evil.” In British documents, Turkish fear of the Russians is described as “simply
idiotic”, “insane Russian complex”, “national psychosis”. One document even stressed that, “Turks visà-vis of Russia is rather like an Irishman vis-à-vis of England. He cannot forget and his suppressed
rancor blinds him to everything except his grievance.”67 In regard to these reports, one can come to the
conclusion that either the British politicians did not assess the real nature of Turkish-Soviet relations in
the interwar period and Moscow negotiations in 1939 accurately or that they thought that some
concessions on the Balkans and the Straits would be enough to satisfy Soviet Russia in the future. The
former was unlikely because of the experiences and asperity of British diplomacy. The latter was not
different from Chamberlain’s “appeasement policy” towards Hitler before the Second World War.
Therefore, this erroneous tactic in foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was one of the important
factors which opened the route towards forthcoming Soviet demands in 1945. During the Teheran
Conference at the end of 1943, Churchill stated that in the case of Turkish refusal to join the war,
Turkish territorial integrity on Straits might have been jeopardized and Turkey had to solve her
problems with the Soviet Union alone68. Unquestionably, this statement was a green light for rebirthing
Soviet policy towards Turkey. Another interesting point in the Teheran Conference is that Stalin was not
as eager as Churchill to bring the Turkey into the war. Stalin was bolstering Roosevelt, who did not want
to risk the Operation Overlord in Europe by sending equipments and troops to help Turkey. However, as
we have seen in Acikalin-Vinogradov meeting, not more than a month prior to this event, Soviet
officials had been pressuring the Turks to bring their soldiers to the battlefront. If Turkish troops had
been crucial in the effort to beat the Germans, the Soviet Union would not have changed her policy
towards Turks that fast. This reveals the true nature of Soviet intentions in bringing Turkey into the war.
In the Teheran Conference, Stalin was trying to reduce Allied aid to Turkey. His intentions were not
only to prevent the Turks from being strong, but more importantly he also aimed at obstructing the
would be pugnacious, their weakness toward Germany during the past 3 years having been intended to preserve their strength
for this purpose.” Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa.
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969) p. 1228.
67
Nicholas Tamkin, Diplomatic Sigint and the British Official Mind During the Second World War: Soviet Claims on Turkey,
1940-1945 in “Intelligence and National Security”, Vol: 23(6), p.756.
68
Erel Tellal, “SSCB’nin Turkiye’den Istekleri: Soguk Savas sonrasi bir degerlendirme” in “Cevat Geray’a Armagan”.
(Ankara: Mulkiyeliler Birligi, 2001) p. 755.
30
Turkish operation in the Balkans to keep the British armies away from the Balkans territory69. Turkey
was once again a pawn in the British-Russian struggle for strategically optimal regions of the world.
The status of her isolated situation after February 1944 and the diminishing power of
Germany, the Turkish government decided to join the war. However, at this time the Western leaders
did not want to see Turkey in the war so as to not to displease the USSR. In his letter to Roosevelt, in
order to decide the place of the next Allied conference (which would be Yalta, Crimea, in February
1945) on October 23, 1944, Churchill made this point clear:
“U. J. (Stalin)’s doctors do not like him flying and I suppose there would be the same
difficulties in Russian warships coming out of the Black Sea as of American and British
warships coming in. One way would be for Turkey to declare war, which I expect she
would be very willing to do. But I am not all sure that the Russians would welcome this
at the present juncture in view of what I told you about their wish for revision of the
Treaty of Montreux.”70
Not only did this letter demonstrate the Western states reluctance towards Turkey
entering the war, it also proves the oblivious nature of Western leaders towards the Soviet intentions on
the Straits, which would be clear in June 1945. Before the Yalta Conference, Anthony Eden, the British
Foreign Secretary, declared, “We had no clear indication of what they had in mind but it might be that
they would wish for a regime for the Straits similar to that of the Suez Canal which would enable their
warships to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean in time of war.”71 Great Britain would
approve changes on the Straits regime in favor of the Soviet Union as they had agreed upon in the
former conferences; however, they surely needed to see Soviet offers on paper as well.
Prior to the Yalta Conference, the position of the United States regarding the Straits
regime was not different than Great Britain. They would not object to the minor changes suggested by
the USSR; nevertheless, they did believe that “Turkey had been a good custodian of the Straits” and
because any major changes would affect Turkish sovereignty as well as the strategic and political
balance in the Balkans and the Near East, they wanted to protect the nature of the regime72.
During the Yalta Conference, the Russians position was not alarming for the Western
states and Turkey. Stalin objected that the Japanese Emperor played an even greater role than the Soviet
69
Gonlubol, Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1965). p. 162. For the record of the Teheran Conference, Robert Beitzell.
Tehran, Yalta, [and] Potsdam; the Soviet Protocols. (Academic International, 1970) p. 1-47.
70
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1955) p. 10-11.
71
Ibid, p. 501.
72
Ibid, p. 328-329.
31
Union in the treaty and Turks had the right to close the Straits even under the threat of war. He stated
that they could not accept Turkish hands on Russia’s throat. All he wanted was a revision on the Straits
regime that would not harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. Moreover, Stalin accepted assuring
Turkey that her independence and integrity would be guaranteed73.
Although Soviet demands in the Yalta Conference were understandable and not startling
at all, one detail was decisive in the Soviet demands that took place after four months. Indeed, this detail
may have been another mistake of Western states which would in turn, encourage the Soviet rulers, like
Churchill’s remarks at the Teheran Conference. As mentioned, during the meetings Stalin had accepted
to guarantee Turkish independence and territorial integrity. Therefore, in the draft protocol of the
conference, the article about the Straits was as follows:
“It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in
London, they should consider what changes should be made in the arrangements for the
Straits laid down in the Montreux Convention and report to the three Governments. The
Turkish Government should be informed that this matter is under consideration and
should be given an assurance that their independence and integrity is in no way
affected.”74
On the other hand, an important change can be seen in the official protocol of the Yalta
conference:
“It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in
London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government
would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention report to their Governments.
The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.”75
From the record, we cannot learn whether or not the Soviet politicians had role on the
change concerning the guarantee on Turkish independence and integrity; but, there is one fact, that by
this change, Western countries missed an important opportunity to forestall the excessive Russian
demands in June 1945. If the USSR had written their undertaking to respect the Turkish territorial
integrity, she might have not demanded the cities in the Eastern Anatolia. As we will see, territorial
demands increased the tension not less than demands regarding the bases on the Straits among the
Turkish populace.
73
Ibid, p. 903-904
Ibid, p. 940
75
Ibid, p. 982
74
32
When the Straits issue was being discussed among the victorious states, Turks were
watching the developments wearily. Their biggest fear was to be left alone against the mighty Soviet
Union regarding the Straits problem. Therefore, after the Yalta Conference, when Molotov told Selim
Sarper, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, that the Soviet Government would desire a discussion with the
Turkish Government for a revision of the Montreux Convention, Sarper replied by stressing the
international character of the Convention76. Accepting bilateral talks would not give chance to Turkey to
resist the Soviet demands and would be incompatible with the American and British policies, which
favored only minor changes on the Straits regime.
On the 19th of the same month, Molotov called for Sarper, who handed him a declaration.
In this declaration, the Soviet Government announced her request to denounce the 1925 Friendship and
Neutrality Agreement because of the changing conditions after the Second World War and its
inadequacy to meet the new conditions77. This was an expected move for Turkey and on 4th of April,
Turkey asked what the conditions of the new agreement were. After this date, the tactical moves of both
sides are revealed. Both Turkey and the Soviet Union were waiting for the first move from the opposing
side. In March 19, after receiving the declaration of annulment, Sarper asked for the full written lines of
the potential agreement, Molotov wanted him first to consult with Turkish Government. Then on April
4, Turkey asked for the new conditions and during the San Francisco Conference, while speaking with
Hasan Saka, Turkish Foreign Ministry, Molotov stated that they were not ready to offer conditions but
they could listen to suggestions from Turkey. In reply to this, Saka expressed that they would rather hear
Soviet views first. This chain of obstinacy broke in the meeting between Sarper and Vinogradov, Soviet
Ambassador in Turkey, on May 21st and in this meeting Sarper was hoodwinked by his colleague. While
Vinogradov focused on how two states were to provide the security of the Black Sea without touching
the Montreux Convention, Sarper asked if he was implying an alliance. Vinogradov answered this
question with a great interest and replied, “Yes, it may be.”
78
It may be seen as a simple question and
answer; but, events in the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 show us that the real intention of the Soviet
Union was not to enter into an alliance with the Turkish Government. In the conference, to legitimatize
his demands, Stalin signified that Turkey had demanded an alliance and the Soviet Government
presented their conditions. If Turks had not demanded an alliance, the Soviets would have not presented
their demands. By looking carefully at Vinogradov’s answer, he replied as if there was an offer more
76
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa. p. 1219.
For the declaration, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965).p. 459.
78
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p. 277-278.
77
33
than a question. All efforts were to end the ambiguity between Turkey and the Soviet Union as soon as
possible and because of this, Sarper made a diplomatic blunder.
On the other hand, by agreeing with the Soviet Union on the security of the Black Sea,
Turkey aimed at evading the main problem in her foreign relations. Despite the Soviet demands on the
Straits, demands presented in the 1939 Moscow negotiations and during the Hitler-Molotov meeting in
1940, Turkey wanted to return to its “balance of power” policy by establishing friendship with the
Soviet Union. The reason behind this attitude can be explained only with the isolated situation of Turkey
since February 1944 and her fear to be alone against the Soviet Union after the war. As a matter of fact,
Great Britain stopped their anti-Turkish attitude after a little while; however, she could not challenge the
Soviet Union openly because of her inferior situation in comparison to the Soviet Union. British
politicians were following the steps of their “new brother”, the United States, and to finish the war
against the Japanese armies, American rulers needed the friendship of the Soviet Union. As Toker
pointed out, the biggest wish of the Americans was to bring their boys back to the homeland79, and they
could not risk Soviet help by defending the issues of the small states. Moreover, as decided in the
Casablanca Conference in 1943, Turkey was under the responsibility of Great Britain. Therefore, other
than the American Ambassadors in Turkey, the problems of this country was eschewed by the American
politicians. American support that the Turks were seeking arrived in the spring of 1946 unofficially and
in the March of 1947 officially with the Truman Doctrine80.
The infamous meeting between Molotov and Sarper took place on June 7, 1945.
According to the instructions given to Sarper by the Foreign Ministry, Sarper could sign an alliance with
the Soviet Government and an article emphasized that “in the event of war, land and/or sea forces of the
enemies of the Soviet Union would not be passed through Turkey” could be put into the agreement of an
alliance. Other important instructions were to not discuss the Montreux Convention in a bilateral talk
with the Soviet Union and in the case of agreeing on alliance, a reserve in favor of Great Britain must
have been inserted81 – to follow the balance of power policy.
79
Metin Toker. Turkiye Uzerinde 1945 Kabusu. (Ankara: Akis Yayinlari, 1971) p. 15.
After the “Johnson Letter” which strictly urged Turkey not to use NATO equipments for any operation In Cyprus in 1964,
the years of 1945 and 1946 was reviewed by Turkish writers and it is stated that maximum dangers took place in these years
in which there was no connection between the United States and Turkey; therefore, the United States had not “saved“ Turkey
and she could not take credits for that. George Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical
perspective, 1945-1971. (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Pollicy Research, 1972) p. 9…Even though
candor can be find in these remarks, we should not ignore the efforts of American ambassadors in Turkey and the conditions
in the world affairs in those times. On the other hand it is important to note that, since the Johnson latter, no critics like this
seemed in the press.
81
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p. 282.283.
80
34
Soviet demands in the meeting went beyond the concessions Turkey was ready to make.
In order to overcome some difficulties between Turkey and the Soviet Union before “making an
alliance”, Molotov presented three requests to the Soviet Government: 1) the retrocession to Russia of
the Turkish districts of Kars, Artvin, Ardahan; 2) the granting of bases in the Straits to Russia; 3)
revision of the Montreux Convention82. These requests were crossing many red lines of the Turkish
Republic. First of all, as shown in the instruction given to Sarper, Turkey would not discuss Montreux in
bilateral talks. This point was also compatible with the Straits policy of Great Britain, that had urged
Turkey to remind the Soviets of the international nature of the Montreux Convention if they approached
that subject83, and the United States, that had opposed the major changes concerning the Straits.
Demands on Turkish lands were no different than the Italian ambitions on the western lands of Turkey
before the war and any move to recognize this demand would be casus belli for Turkey. Indeed, this
demand was in the mind of Sarper long before the meeting, but he did not believe that the Soviets would
make that request84. Similarly, request for bases was the red line for the Turkish Government. After the
annulment of the 1925 Agreement, in his conversation with Steinhardt, Sureyya Anderiman, Inonu’s
confidential secretary, stated that if no demands were made by the Soviet Government to infringe
Turkish sovereignty “such as a request for bases on Turkish territory,” the negotiation of a new treaty
would encounter no obstacles from the Turkish Government85. In conclusion, it can be said that the
Soviet Government hit three out of three Turkish fears by her demands.
After refusing all the demands of the Molotov, Sarper reported his impressions regarding
the meeting. The most important of these impressions is that his remarks about the possibility that
Molotov had had further demands which he had not mentioned in the meeting. According to Gurun, this
“fourth demand” was the one which claimed the sole attention of Great Britain and the United States.
This mysterious stipulation was never expressed; however, three different possibilities were mentioned
regarding this matter. In Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, the fourth demand was “certain unspecified
changes in Turkish Thrace in favor of Bulgaria and Greece”86 In the Survey of International Affairs,
George Kirk rests his information on the broadcast of Ankara Radio and stressed that “the Soviet
Government had also requested the formation of a more democratic and representative Turkish
Government, and held out as compensation for the retrocession of Kars and Ardahan that Turkey should
82
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. Edinburgh: Longman Group. February 16-23, 1946. p. 7737
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa. p. 1228-1229
84
Ibid, p. 1233
85
Ibid, p. 1224
86
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. February 16-23, 1946. p. 7737
83
35
recover from Syria the city and railway-junction of Aleppo.”87 This is more accurate than the
retrocession of lands in Turkish Thrace in favor of Greece and Bulgaria when one looks at the official
American documents and Turkish experiments in the war. During the war, rumors claimed that Stalin
had offered lands in Northern Syria to Turkey in return for “some benefits” were heard by Turkish
officials. These rumors were spread as German propaganda; but, they were not a matter of doubt for
Turkish rulers.
An American document paints a clearer picture about the “fourth demand”. Consistent
with the telegram sent by Winant, the British Ambassador in Turkey, this fourth demand might have
made the other three “unnecessary.” He indicates that the Turks believed this fourth demand might be
the rupture of the Anglo-Turkish alliance (which the Foreign Office considers highly unlikely) or a
modification of the political regime so that the Turkish Government might be reoriented, as had been the
governments of Romania and Bulgaria88.
In light of these two options, as Foreign Office correctly deduces, rupture of the AngloTurkish alliance could not be the fourth demand because it would not make the other demands
unnecessary and the Soviet Union would not declare open hostility against Great Britain in the middle of
1945.
By changing the political regime in Turkey, the Soviet Government, indubitably aimed at
establishing communist rule in Turkey. In this way, the Soviet Union would be able to control the
foreign and domestic policies in Turkey. Right after the war, the Soviet Union boosted democracy and
free elections in the Balkan countries and benefiting from the turbid atmosphere, communist parties
obtained the rules easily. Likewise, through the promotion of free elections in Turkey, the communist
parties could spread their ideology without restrictions and, indeed, economic conditions of the postwar
period and agrarian characteristic of Turkish workers would facilitate to reach their goals. Therefore,
after the war, the Turkish government was labeled as “reactionary” and “fascist” by the Soviet Union
and Balkan states89. After relations became strained further, through the diplomats of the Balkan
countries, Turks were “advised” to change their government. In January 1946, in his conversation with
Nurullah Esat Sumer, Acting Foreign Minister of Turkey, Bulgarian Minister Antonoff acknowledged
87
George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954)
p.21.
88
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa. p. 1236.
89
Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950. p. 21.
36
that “he believed cause of difficulties was Soviet lack of confidence in present Turkish Government and
if Saracoglu were replaced as head of Government there would be no further difficulties.”90
As Tellal purports, without explanation of their reasons, Soviet sources placed the blame
on Turkey for the failure of not signing an agreement with Turkey in 194591. It can be said without
hesitation that any state committed to its own independency and territorial integrity would not have
accepted the conditions above as requirements for a new agreement. Not only did the Soviet
Government disrespect independency and territorial integrity of her southern neighbor, she also broke all
the main pillars forming the Soviet-Turkish friendship during the interwar period. And all of these issues
took place before Turkey had completely committed herself as an ally of the Western states in the Cold
War. Certainly the Cold War was not officially started in the middle of 1945. Disagreements between
Great Britain and the Soviet Union were visible; however, at this stage, the Soviet Government could
still prevent Turkey from taking sides later through following sagacious policies towards her. By
demanding unacceptable conditions, the Soviet Government was the source that pushed Turkey into the
arms of Western states and made her forsake the traditional balance of power policy at the beginning of
the Cold War.
Among the Soviet demands, the one regarding the retrocession of the Turkish provinces
was of vital importance in the minds of Turkish rulers and especially Turkish populace. This provoked
the Turkish people to show their feelings through demonstrations. Most-widely-known among these
demonstrations took place on December 4, 1945. The meeting started with a small group of university
students that had metamorphosised into the biggest anti-communist demonstrators, with many followers
joining together in the streets of Istanbul. People were chanting slogans against communism and the
Soviet Union. During the demonstration, communist publishing and printing houses were razed and
demonstrators decked those buildings with the photos of Ataturk and Ismet Inonu. Moreover,
demonstrators were so angry that etiquettes on Russian salads in the grocery stores were replaced by
American salads92. Likewise, Soviet demands caused a reaction in the Turkish Parliament, Kazim
Karabekir expressed the determination of Turks against the Soviet demands by stating, “The Straits are
90
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VII, The Near East and Africa. p. 810-811.
Erel Tellal, Uluslararasi ve Bolgesel Gelismeler Cercevesinde Turkiye-SSCB Iliskileri (1953-1964). (Ankara: Mulkiyeliler
Birligi Vakfi Yayinlari, 2000) p. 23.
92
Turhan Feyizoglu, Bir Paylasma Planinin Perde Arkasi: Turkiye 1945. (Istanbul: Bizim Kitaplar, 2007) p. 124.
91
37
the neck of Turkish nation and the plateau of Kars is its backbone. If Turkey and Russia do not keep
being friends, this situation will engender pain and damage for both.”93
Conversely, Turkish diplomats in 1945 were considered the Soviet demand on Turkish
provinces as a factor that would increase Soviet bargaining power towards Turks94. The retrocession of
Turkish demands was of secondary importance to Soviet rulers in comparison to the base demands on
Turkish Straits; however, ignoring this demand completely would be fallacious. As previously
mentioned, even in 1921 Chicherin demanded that the Turkish provinces sign a friendship with Turkey.
After the World War, Stalin expressed his discontent to Molotov in reference to the Soviet borders in
South Caucasia95. These lands were important in the formation of the roads that were to go through the
oil-rich Middle East. Even though the Soviet rulers had given up territorial demands to discuss the
Straits issue, we could not say that territorial demands were a totally tactical move; however, it would be
logical to agree with Tellal, that it was a mistake for Soviet rulers because this demand drew a poignant
reaction maybe more so than the demand for base on the Straits.
The support that the Turks received from the West against Soviet demands had been
unsatisfactory until the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Both British politicians and
American Ambassadors in Turkey were fully aware of the threats towards Turkey and they were
pondering what would happen next if Turkey were to fall down. The British Foreign Minister Eden took
into account all the Soviet demands – but the revision on the Montreux Convention – as the first step
towards Russian control in Turkey and if they were to be generous towards the Soviet demands, then the
Soviets would raise more claims on Iran and other Middle Eastern States. In February 1946, his
successor, Ernest Bevin, showed his support of Turkey by affirming that he would not want to see
Turkey converted into a satellite state96. Edwin C. Wilson, American Ambassador in Turkey from 1945
to 1948, was also very helpful in Turkey’s struggle against Soviet demands and informed the American
Government, stubbornly, about Soviet danger by sending successive telegrams. According to Wilson,
the real objective of Soviet Russia was not a revision of the Straits regime, but domination of Turkey:
“In the vast security belt of the Soviet Union which extends from the Baltic to the Black
Sea, composed of vassal states, Turkey constitutes the sole gap. Turkey maintains an
independent foreign policy and in particular looks to the western democracies for
93
Ulus, December 21, 1945, p. 1.
Tellal, “SSCB’nin Turkiye’den Istekleri: Soguk Savas sonrasi bir degerlendirme”. p. 751.
95
Feliks Cuyev, Molotov Anlatiyor: Stalin’in sagkolu ile yapilan 140 gorusme. (Istanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2007) p. 23.
96
Aysegul Sever, Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu, 1945-1958. (Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1997)
p.27,35.
94
38
guidance and assistance. This is the Soviet Union is unwilling to tolerate. The Soviet
objective, therefore, is to break down this present independent Turkish Government and
to establish in its place a vassal or “friendly” regime in Turkey, which will complete the
security chain of subservient countries on Russia’s western and southern frontiers and put
an end completely to western influence in Turkey.”97
Like Wilson’s opinions, the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy of the United States
believed that the Soviet Union would not stop entreaties on the Straits and that if Turkey faltered, the
interests of Great Britain and United States in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean would be
affected98. All these efforts were ineffective without the determination from the decision-makers in
Washington and continued being reluctant to aid Turkey until the beginning of 1947.
What were the reasons behind this reluctance? First of all, the attitude of the United
States towards involvement in the relations between the European states was not decided in the first
post-war years. They saw the Straits issue as a problem between Great Britain and the Soviet Union and
the territory issue as a predicament between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Therefore, they did not want
to involve complex issues between the European states. Secondly, American officials did not see the
demands as an official request, to them, there were not any concrete threats. The Soviet Union did not
issue her demands officially so as to not to irritate the Western states and Turkish Government did not
announce it to the public so as to prevent worsening of the already difficult relations as well as to give a
chance to Soviet Russia to take her demands back99. For Turks, there was still a threat and in view of the
American attitude, the Turkish Ambassador in the United States could not help asking the State
Department of the United States, that if the Soviet Union had asked for San Francisco and Boston,
whether or not they would have accepted it as a worthy threat100. The third reason for American
reluctance to assist Turkey was their view towards this issue as “the first real test of the United Nations
Organization.”101 If this problem had been solved in the United Nations, the United States would have
complemented her victory against Hitler’s Germany in the battlefront with a diplomatic victory for
universal peace and in 1945 and 1946 the United States did not want to involve this problem or to risk
the functions of the United Nations. Even when the Truman Doctrine was announced, the American
Government was blamed for risking the functions of the organization by some sections of American
97
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VII, The Near East and Africa. p. 820-821.
Ibid, p. 857-858.
99
Ibid, 825-827.
100
Erol Mutercimler & Mim Kemal Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis politikasi. (Istanbul: Alfa
Basim, 2004) p. 26-27.
101
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VII, The Near East and Africa. p. 802.
98
39
Congress. Finally and more importantly, in the postwar years the United States needed to cooperate with
the Soviet Union to establish world peace for the greater benefit. Therefore, even in November 1946,
only four months from the Truman Doctrine, Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, tried to prevent
Turkish requests for arms and military equipment from the United States and aimed at directing them to
the British Government for these kinds of requests. He fought with his attitude with towards the “world
situation” rather than unwillingness to support Turkey102.
Turkey faced the Soviet demands alone and received help only from a couple of
perspicacious but ineffective diplomats. It is true that in 1945 and 1946 the United States did not save
Turkey; however, Turkey did not save herself either because there were no direct attacks from the Soviet
Union. There were rumors that the Soviet Union was ready to attack Turkey and was moving troops in
the Balkans and Caucasia but this information did not surpass rumors. If one can estimate that the Soviet
Union gave up attack somehow, the reason would have been the position of the United States, especially
their possession of atomic weapons weighed more on their decision than Turkish determination to fight
against. It was evident that even though the Soviet Union was worn in the long-lasting world war, the
military power of Turkey was not enough to stand fighting for a long period of time.
2.4. Potsdam Conference
Consequently, before Potsdam was held in July 1945, the Straits and Turkish policy of
the three big powers was evident enough to expect their attitude in the conference. The Soviet Union had
made their intentions clear in the Molotov-Sarper meeting. Great Britain gave passive support to Turkey
and taking a look at the steps that the United States might have taken, American officials were not as
interested in the issue as significantly as other two powers were. Therefore, in the conference the
argument concerning the Straits and Turkey occurred between the Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
The issue of the Straits and Turkey was discussed at first, in the sixth session of the
conference on July 22nd. As mentioned before, Stalin and Molotov legitimated their demands as
conditions to the Turkish offer for an alliance. In reference to the Turkish provinces in Eastern Anatolia,
Molotov claimed that these lands had been wrested from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia in 1921
and for the Straits issue, Molotov circulated a memorandum which called for the abrogation of the
Montreux regime, stated that the determination of the new regime should fall within the province of
102
Ibid, p. 916-917.
40
Turkey and requested the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Straits103. When Churchill argued
that these demands went beyond their agreement at Yalta and Turks would not accept these offers to
enter into alliance with the Soviet Union, Molotov expressed that Turkey and Russia had made an
alliance in the past, in the years of 1805 and 1833104.
These remarks absolutely deserve attention in order to understand the Soviet-Turkish
relations both in the interwar period and the post-war period. First of all, the agreements in 1805 and
1833 were signed between Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire more than a hundred years ago. By
exemplifying these agreements, Soviet Russia recognized the traditional Russian policy on Straits of
which the Russian delegation in the Lausanne Conference labeled as “policy of ambition.” These
agreements were signed in the weakest era of the Ottoman Empire and attempted to establish Russian
auspices on the empire and thereby, damaging the sovereignty of Turks105. After the Potsdam
Conference, a British minute called this Russian sampling “a piece of nonsense.106” Moreover, in article
VI of 1921 Friendship Agreement, both Turkey and Soviet Russia accepted that the agreements signed
between the Ottoman Empire and the Tsarist Russia had been against the mutual interests of the
signatories and invalid after that date. Now, the Soviet Union was instancing these agreements for her
demands on the Straits. This attitude was in accord with the demand on territorial change of which
objected the borders drew in 1921; but, at the same time, after the annulment of the 1925 Neutrality
Agreement, the Soviet Union discarded the other agreement that established the Soviet-Turkish
friendship in the interwar period.
Secondly, in Potsdam Soviet Russia did not offer revision of the Montreux Convention
instead she tried to annul it and in the event of signing new agreement, she aimed at excluding the other
powers, especially Great Britain.
Finally, Soviet claim that the provinces in Eastern Anatolia had been taken by force from
the Soviet Union was both nonsense and inconsistent with historical facts. Soviet rulers alleged that they
had been weak when the friendship agreement was signed in 1921; however, it is absolutely evident that
the Soviet rulers were not comparing their situation in 1921 to the Turks. It would be illogical to argue
that Soviet Russia was weaker then the nationalist movement in Turkey while the Bolsheviks were
sending economical and military aid to Turkey. Official Turkish sources even maintain that the
103
Harry Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) p. 226-227.
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p. 292-295.
105
Cemil Birsel, Sovyet Rusya-Turk Notalari Aydinliginda Turk Bogazlari .(Istanbul: Ismail Akgun Matbassi, 1948) p. 10-13.
106
A. L. MacFie, The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference:The British Position in “Middle Eastern Studies” Vol:
23(1), p. 79.
104
41
Bolsheviks were following an “expansive” policy by trying to enlarge Armenia into Turkish lands107.
Then it can be said, that the Soviet Union had been evaluating her position by comparing her power with
other great powers, especially with Great Britain. In this context, the “changing world conditions”, the
reason Molotov stated when he declared their annulment wish in regards to the 1925 Friendship and
Neutrality Agreement, represented the changed balance of power between the great powers of Europe.
Now that the Soviet Union was relatively stronger than Great Britain – at least the latter did not have
enough power to fight with the Soviet Union, relations with Turkey must have been recast according to
the new power relationship in Europe. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War
and/or policy on the topic of passage through Straits were not the key reason for Soviet demands in
1945. Regardless of whatever way that Turkey had acted in the war, the Soviet Union would have
brought up these demands following the war because of changed balance of power in Europe.
The discussions at the Potsdam Conference concerning the Straits issue came to a
deadlock after Truman’s proposal for free and unrestricted navigation in the European inland waterway,
including the Black Sea Straits. This meant the internalization of the Straits and even the Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs in the United States was surprised at this proposal because they had not
prepared it108 and Truman’s briefing paper prior to the conference had not included that aspect. This
offer was certainly against to the interests of both the Soviet Union and Turkey because it would
establish a system not much different from the Lausanne regime between 1922 and 1936. After this
detrimental offer, Stalin did not want to discuss the issue anymore stating that this offer had not been on
the agenda The cause of the Soviet attitude was the context of the offer. Turks were also complainant of
this offer and the American stance in the conference in general. According to Turks, by linking a
Turkish waterway with three Axis waterways109 during the conference, the United States had forgotten
the Turkish determination and contribution to save the Middle East. By regarding Russian demands for
Kars and Ardahan as a matter between Turkey and Russia, the United States followed the same
appeasement policy that Great Britain had followed towards Hitler before the war110. Only Churchill
encouraged Truman’s offer during the conference; this, however, can be seen as an attitude to leave the
Soviet delegation with only their offers. After the conference, the same British minute stressed that
107
Ilkan, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 40.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa. p. 1289-1293.
109
The other European waterways Truman had mentioned were the Danube, the Rhine and the Kiel Canal…Harry Howard,
Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits, 1945-1946 in “Department of State Bulletin” Vol:16
(January 26, 1947), p. 143.
110
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa. p. 1239-1241.
108
42
Truman’s proposal needed clarification. The document suggested that the possible guarantors of the
Straits under an international regime were not a “very promising team” and the new regime would be a
return to the regime which the Turks had objected loudly to before the Montreux Conference111. In
conclusion, the personal views of Truman concerning the Straits caused a standstill in the conference
and when the beginning of the Cold War approached, the context of the Straits took a different shape in
the eyes of American rulers.
2.5. Evaluation of Soviet Demands
Before closing this chapter some evaluations regarding the Soviet demands and its effects
on Turkish foreign policy should be made.
1) Soviet demands were the “first and main reason” for Turkish alliance with the Western states
in the Cold War. Some Turkish authors profess that Turkish politicians used the “Soviet
aggressiveness” as an excuse to approach the Western world112. There are two reasons for this argument:
firstly, the Soviet demands were short-lived and after note exchanges about the Straits regime between
Turkey and the Soviet Union in the second half of 1946, the Soviets did not establish the demands
publicly nor did they recede from their demands until 1953. The other reason is that after 1953, Turkish
officials did not change their policy towards the Soviet Union; moreover, they turned a deaf ear to
Soviet approaches for peaceful relations and even followed harsher policies against the Soviet Union to
get economical and political aid from the United States. Based on these two reasons, those authors found
Turkish demands for help against the Soviet Union as insincere and expedient. These arguments are not
wrong and indeed, after 1953 Turkey exaggerated the Soviet menace to get more economical aid for her
economical development. However, one cannot belittle the threat perception Turkey received from the
Soviet Union in 1945, especially when Turkey was alone in meeting these demands. Turkey’s intention
to enter an alliance with the Soviet Union shows that after the war, Turkish officials desired to follow
the “balance of power policy.” After facing the Soviet demands, Turkey left the basic principles of this
policy by engaging in a permanent alliance when she entered NATO in 1952 and displayed persistent
hostility against the Soviet Union after 1953. Also, it must not be forgotten that political and economical
111
112
MacFie, The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference: The British Position. p. 80.
Nevin Balta, Milliyet’ten Yansimalar: Turk Dis Politikasi, 1950-1980. (Ankara: Lazer Yayinlari, 2005) p. 27.
43
structure in Turkey was changed between 1945 and 1953 and it would be fallacious to assume that
Turkish Government in 1945 and the one in 1953 acted under the same conditions. Political and
economical aid from the United States might be a contributor to the hostile Turkish foreign policy
towards the Soviet Union; nevertheless, the event that started this policy was the Soviet demands of
1945.
2) Soviet policy towards Turkey in 1945 can be described as failure. The Soviet officials could not
have recognized their four direct or indirect demands/aims. These were the change in the Straits regime,
the base on the Straits, retrocession of Turkish provinces, and change the political regime of Turkey and
none of them were in favor of the Soviet Union in 1945 or later. One can however, suggest that the
Soviet demands in 1945 contributed to the strengthening of the leftists in Turkey in an indirect way.
Between 1945 and 1960, Turkish officials followed harsh policies against the leftists in Turkey;
sometimes, they did this in order to emphasize the “communist threat” in Turkey and as result of this, to
receive more political and economical aid from the United States. This unfair treatment increased the
discontent among the leftists and after the military coup in 1960 and adoption of a new constitution –
which allowed for more freedom to the political parties – clashes between the leftist and rightist groups
in Turkey occurred, which led to another military coup in 1980. Leftists, undeniably, were influenced by
their past discontent and experiences in 1945-1960. Indirectly, the Soviet Union managed to violate the
domestic order in Turkey by directing Turkish rulers to follow strict policies towards the leftists;
however, those events did not result with the formation of a communist regime in Turkey. Through their
demands, the Soviet Union pushed their neighbor state into the arms of the Western world and lost an
important pawn in her game with the United States during the Cold War.
3) The Soviet Union made tactical mistakes with her demands in 1945. By annulling the 1925 Treaty
of Friendship and Neutrality, the Soviet Union opened the Turkish way to the Western world. The
agreement had provided neutrality to Turkey; therefore, if it had been valid in the Cold War, Turkey
neither would have joined NATO nor would they have received the economical aid of the United States
by Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Moreover, the protocol adopted in 1929 would have given legal
basis to the Soviet Union to oppose the Turkish alliance with the United States. According to Gurun,
Turkey would not have joined NATO because of the necessity to gain Russian approval on the basis of
the Neutrality Agreement. Consequentially, Turkey would have fallen into the danger of being like
44
Finland, whose sole ally was the Soviet Union113. The other tactical reason was, as has been mentioned,
the territorial demands which drew more of a reaction than those made on the bases. As Bilge claims,
the respect to the territorial integrity of Turkey was one of the foremost conditions in being friends with
Turkey114 and by violating this condition the Soviet official did not only draw a negative reaction from
the Turkish politicians, but the Turkish public and press also showed their feelings through public anger
and discontent. When the United States insisted on bases from Turkey in later years it did not create a
public reaction and at the end of 1950s, Turkey even volunteered to give bases for American ballistic
missiles. These situations were accepted as natural outcomes of an alliance with the Western states, they
were not viewed as disrespect to the independency of Turkey.
113
114
Gurun, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). p.315.
Bilge, Guc Komsuluk: Turkiye – Sovyetler Birligi Iliskileri 1920-1964. p. 352.
45
CHAPTER 3
TURKEY’S SECURITY SEEKING AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION
Turkey was one of the most prominent small states whose foreign policy was
significantly affected by the relations established during the Cold War. Many events, whether they took
place near Turkey or far, more or less influenced Turkey during the more tense times of the Cold War. A
couple examples of these events are Korean War in 1950, the Middle Eastern Crisis in the second half of
1950s and the Cuba Crisis in 1962, etc. After the Cold War started to formulate in 1946, Turkish-Soviet
relations cannot be thought of without taking the United States into consideration. American-Soviet
relations became the most important and determining factor in these tripartite relations and when the
Cold War officially began, Turkish-American relations were promoted while Turkish-Soviet relations
became strained. Turkish-American relations were the second determining factor in these relations and
until the serious conflict between Turkey and the United States over Cyprus in 1964, Turkey did not
approach the Soviet Union, although the Soviets initiated peaceful approaches towards Turkey in 1953.
As a result, during the Cold War, Turkish-Soviet relations were not independent from
Turkish-American relations and more importantly, Soviet-American relations were instigators to the
situation, as a result of Soviet demands and the Western States deprivation of aid to meet these demands.
The price Turkey had to pay for leaving the traditional ‘balance of power policy’ was to be situated at
the center of the Cold War. If the Cold War had not started, sooner or later Turkey would have been
forced to come to an agreement with Russia because militia-wise, Turkey was no match for the Soviet
Union over a great span of time and would have reverted back to the balance of power policy. The Cold
War gave Turkey a chance to challenge Soviet demands without giving into concessions; however, the
Cold War would not have allowed Turkey to follow this policy because of its position as neighbor to the
Soviet Union, especially at the eruption of severe conflict.
Within the period of 1945 to 1952, Turkey’s struggle for the protection of the Western
states against the Soviet Union is epitomized. Even though Turkey’s geostrategic position was extremely
important to the Western States, Turkey displayed intensive efforts to form an alliance with the United
States up until the point that Turkey was accepted into NATO in 1952. This situation can be attributed to
46
Soviet-American rivalry and from 1946 to 1952, Turkey was eager to join all Western economical,
political and security organizations to balance the Soviet threat on Turkey and its security requirements.
3.1. The Straits Question
At the end of the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union, the United States and England,
agreed that the Straits question “would be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three
powers and Turkish Government.”115 In accordance with this decision, the United States sent notes to
Turkey and the British and Soviet governments about specific principles to be applied to the revision of
Montreux regime on November 2, 1945. The principles of the United States were as follows:
1) The Straits were to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times;
2) The Straits were to be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times;
3) Save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits was to be denied to
the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea
powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations;
4) Certain changes were to be made to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of
the United Nations system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a
signatory116.
The initial reaction of the Turkish officials to the American proposals was, in one word,
satisfaction. When the note was delivered, the Turkish Foreign Minister did not oppose anything in the
note, but only wished to know if the note was in synthesis of the views of three powers. It is clear that
the key anxiety of the Turks was Soviet demands on the bases; however, Wilson replied that they were
the suggestions of only the United States117. Although, Saka could keep his happiness to himself, Orhan
Eralp, the Second Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in the United States, was not as covert with his
feelings, stating that ‘Turkey could have hoped nothing better.”118 Indeed, this reaction to the American
suggestions- regardless that they diminished Turkish hegemony on the Straits, the Turkish rights gained
in this amendment to the Montreux Convention were greater that they had had with the aforesaid
hegemony- shows Turkey’s anticipation of an internalization on the Straits in conjunction with
115
Position on Question of the Turkish Straits in “Department of State Bulletin” Vol: 15. p. 420.
Concerning Revision of Montreux Convention in “Department of State Bulletin” Vol: 13. p. 766.
117
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa. p. 1269-1270.
118
Ibid, p. 1269.
116
47
Truman’s proposal in the Potsdam Conference or perhaps, in the worst case scenario, as an agreement
between the powers in favor of the Soviet Union.
The true Turkish thoughts on the American note were revealed only three days later when
Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Turkish Secretary General, called the British representative in his office and
stated the Turkish anxieties towards the Americans suggestions. Consistent with him, the Turks may
have found the whole Soviet and her satellite states’ navies in the territorial waters of Istanbul at a single
time and the proposals may have turned the Black Sea into Russian naval base from which the Soviets
could make hit-and-run expeditions in the Mediterranean without danger of pursuit. It is probable that
the Turks were aware that the British rulers must have been more interested in the regime of the Straits
than the Americans and that they aimed at converting the American proposals in Turkish favor by
having the British on their side. Nevertheless, in this meeting, a British representative stated that the
American proposals were more acceptable than the earlier ideas of demilitarization and
internationalization119 and within two weeks, after sending a note to Turkey, Great Britain agreed to the
United States proposal on a revision of the Straits regime; but also expressed that Great Britain did not
view the issue as particularly urgent120. Most likely, British politicians sensed a storm in international
relations and wanted to bide time. It is nearly impossible to believe that the British rulers did not have
the same anxieties as Turkey about the American proposals and their possible repercussions on one
areas of keen British interest.
The proposals dissatisfied the Soviet Union as well, but in the opposite way of the
concerns of the British and Turks. In his meeting with Wilson, following the arrival of the American
note, Vinogradov expressed the Soviet opinion on the American suggestions claiming that these changes
did not offer the necessary guarantee of Soviet security and reiterated their demands towards the
bases121. In later diplomatic meetings, Vinogradov kept the same stance and indicated that the Soviet
Union had presented these demands in the Potsdam Conference.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union did not present suggestions on the revision of the
Straits regime until August of the next year. By doing this, the Soviets maintained firm pressure on
Turkey and at the same time incited a psychological war against their neighbor. While rumors spread
about the troop movements of the Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Balkans, also news within the
Soviet Union displeased the Turkish officials. The chief news came right after the anti-communist
119
Ibid, p. 1273-1274.
Ibid, p. 1281.
121
Ibid, p. 1271-1273.
120
48
demonstration in Istanbul and on December 14, an article entitled “Our Lawful Demands to Turkey”
written by two Georgian professors was published in Kommunisti. In the article, the professors declared
rights to the Turkish districts of Ardahan, Artvin, Tirtun, Ispir, Bayburt, Gumushane and eastern
Lazistan. Parallel to the Soviet claims in announced in June, they expressed that these areas were
occupied during the hard times of Georgian people122. Similarly, the Soviet Union was playing
Armenian and Kurdish cards in addition to war rumors to keep the Turkey alarm and the Turkish army
in a state of emergency; in light of these economical and political burdens, the Turks would be weighed
down and become more susceptible to Soviet demands.
This tactic was another strategic mistake on the part of Soviet foreign policy after the
war. From the end of the Potsdam Conference in August to the Soviet proposals in August 1946, there
was critical deterioration in Soviet-Western relations. No headway was made regarding the important
issues of world peace and problems in Balkans, Iran, Germany etc. brought the parties to an inevitable
deadlock. At the beginning of 1946, there was substantial tension over Iran because of the Soviets’
reluctance to call their troops back and as a result, in March 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous
“Iron Curtain” speech regarding the uncompromising attitude of the Soviet Union and Soviet threat on
peaceful relations in the future. In Moscow, the speech was repelled and labeled as “extremely
aggressive” and “warmongering.” More aggressively, Stalin compared Churchill with Hitler “who also
unleashes a new war with a race theory.”123
Deteriorating Soviet-Western relations granted the Turks American support of which they
had sought since the Battle of Stalingrad. The foremost characteristic of Turkish-American relations in
the post-war period was that whenever relations between the United States and the Soviet Union went
through a crisis, the Americans approached Turkey thanks to its geographically vital location. Therefore,
the first indications of American support of Turkey against the Soviet Union came only a month after
the Churchill’s speech, when an American battleship visited the Istanbul harbor to bring the remains of
the late Turkish ambassador to his homeland. The United States also erased Turkish debt based on the
credits she received during the war in return for a small amount of money in May 1946.
Western support was also presented during the note exchanges between Turkey and the
Soviet Union during the second half of 1946, in reference to the Potsdam Conference. The first Soviet
note was sent on August 7, 1946. In this note, the Soviets offered some examples of Turkish
122
123
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. February 16-23, 1946. p. 7737.
Jeremy K. Ward, Winston Churchill and the “Iron Curtain” Speech in “The History Teacher” Vol: 1(2). p. 60.
49
misconducts in their control of the Straits regime during the war and then presented five suggestions for
revisions. The first three messages included the points all sides had agreed to in former conferences and
discussions, such as, the free passages of merchant ships of all countries, of warships of the Black Sea
powers and restraint to the passage of warships of the non-littoral powers, except in some special cases.
However, the fourth and fifth proposals would bring change to the Straits regime that Turkey and
Western states could not accept. In the fourth proposal, the Soviet Union demanded that the regime of
the Straits should be formed by the Black Sea powers, while in the fifth they offered the joint protection
of the Straits through Turkey and the Soviet Union “as the powers most interested and capable of
guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits.”124
Turkish reply came after two weeks in a note. The Turkish note was so detailed and long
enough to suggest that Turkey had carefully studied and diligently worked on the Straits issue. The note
began with reiteration of Soviet arguments sent two weeks ago followed by explanation of reasons for
the entire Axis passages one by one. To the Turks, the reason behind some of the Axis passages was not
in the misconduct of the Turks, but the provisions which separated the war ships and commercial vessels
and new kinds of small warships created in the war, led to a few problems and the solution of this
problem was the revision of those provisions and examination of proposed amendments in an
international conference. Indeed, during the war Turkey intentionally applied the Straits regime exactly
as the provisions were written in the Convention. The Turks thought that any unconventional application
would endanger the validity of the Montreux regime, damaging Turkish control on the regime; therefore,
Axis powers benefited from this fear during the war. Turkish stubbornness towards moving even led to
the resignation of Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, in 1944 after the appearance of
Axis fraud.
As for the Soviet proposals, Turkey accepted the American suggestions and first three
Soviet proposals as a basis for discussion; however, Turkey rejected the fourth proposal because it
ignored the interests of other powers who had an equal right to participate and implied a new regime that
could not be realized until the contractual end of the Montreux Convention in 1956. Turkey also
opposed to the fifth proposal since it was not compatible with the inalienable rights of Turkish
sovereignty and security125.
124
125
For the Soviet note, Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO. p. 246-249.
For the Turkish note, Ibid, p. 255-265.
50
A couple of interesting points are worth mentioning. At the end of the note, Turkey
expressed that “the acceptance of the Soviet thesis would result in…building the so-called security of
the Black Sea Powers upon the annihilation of the security of Turkey.”126 Turkey’s concerns about this
matter are understandable; this sensitivity was incompatible with Turkish security measures instituted
with the help of the Americans in later years. After Turkey became a major player in the United States’
security plans, military bases were established south of Turkey to subdue Soviet attacks without
forfeiting bases, as per the advice of the American military. This strategy would leave the majority of
Turkish territory vulnerable to possible Soviet attacks and no arguments against this matter were issued
until the Turkish-American relations dissolved in the mid-1960s. In the more intense years of the Cold
War, the security of the Western states was built upon the annihilation Turkey’s security and without
any opposition from Turkish political circles.
Another remarkable element within the messages was the subtle addresses to the Soviet
Union. Although the note was written in diplomatic language, by asserting that “history gives no
example of a war in which Turkey has been involved without the Turkish nation’s having accomplished
its duty to the country”127 Turkey aimed at demonstrating determination to fight in the event of Soviet
attack with extreme force. The Turkish note also frequently mentioned the United Nations and the
United States; therefore, Turkey wished to express the hidden addressees of the Soviet Union on the
matter.
Even though the Soviet Union reiterated her claims with another note on September 25, it
did not produce any benefit in favor of the Soviets and they did not bring the issue into the diplomatic
arena again. With her notes, the Soviet Union aimed at creating bases and excluding the non-littoral
powers on the control of the Straits regime; however strong Western opposition did not give them hope
for the realization of these aims. After the Soviet Union sent copies of the first note to the United States
and Great Britain, those states opposed the fourth and fifth points of the Soviet note before Turkish
reply. The Soviet Union did not inform the Western States about the second Soviet note; this time,
however, these states received the note through Turkey and again replied before Turkey through
indication of the end of the conversation process accepted in the Potsdam Conference. Turkish-Western
cooperation was anticipated even before the Western notes, encouragement of Turkey and growing
American interest towards Turkey began to annoy the Soviet officials. After the visit of Missouri,
126
Ibid.
Ibid.
127
51
Molotov blamed the United States for seeking bases in Turkey as well as Egypt and Persia128 and the
same critiques were seen during the note exchanges. In August, the Tass Agency insisted that the British
established a military supply base in the Straits and anti-submarine radar stations in Thrace and on the
Black Sea coast. On October 20, Western support to Turkey was scrutinized in Pravda: “The product of
Turkish diplomacy –second Turkish note – is only copy of an Anglo-American original.”129 During the
note exchanges, the Soviets continued to pursue the psychological war against Turkey. In autumn 1946,
Soviet military dispatchers were observed in Caucasia and Bulgaria and because of this, the Turkish
General Staff declared general mobilization under the name of “manevra – manoeuvre.”130 Even though
no attack was expected, Turks were taking all measures in the case of a surprise attack, especially one
that could take place at the absence of the Soviet ambassador in Turkey, taking the note exchanges into
consideration, the measures of a small state like Turkey can be understood.
3.2. Turkey’s Struggle for Western Protection against the Soviet Union
As previously mentioned, after the note exchanges the Soviets did not bring the matter
into the international arena and official Turkish-Soviet relations entered into a “frozen period” until
Turkey was preparing for entrance into NATO and trying to form Middle East organizations with the
Western states at the beginning of 1950s. The Turkish struggle to enter into alliance with the Western
states may be viewed as an offensive move because of the absence of the Soviet threat. Threat
perception was still felt and in the clouded atmosphere of the Cold War, as the neighbor of a mighty
state that had became the main threat to Turkish security and sovereignty since the beginning of the
Second World War, Turkey could not afford to take a chance and approached to the United States and
Great Britain. The Western states benefited from the desperate situation of Turkey in many different
ways as a result of the Cold War.
Turkey’s alliance with the Western states was affirmed by two steps that paralleled the
integration of the Western states. Firstly, economic cooperation was established through the Truman
Doctrine and Marshall Plan and secondly, political and security cooperation was reinforced through the
European Council and NATO. Economical aid from the Western countries was important both for
development of Turkey and in order to meet the requirements of the army, which was to be armed
128
Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950. p .28-29.
Ibid, p. 32-34.
130
Ilkan, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 45.
129
52
against any possible Soviet action. On the other hand, another important point on economical aid was its
effect on their alliance with the Western states. According to the Turks, if they were excluded from the
economical programs/plans of Europe, they may be excluded from the security organizations of
Europe131; Turkey became stubborn and insisted on joining all the economical initiatives of Europe. The
main aim was to provide the Western protection and this method differs from Turkish foreign policy
after 1953. After 1953, Turkey tried to get more economical aid from the United States by leading the
political/security organizations in Balkans and the Middle East through the creation of the Balkan and
Baghdad Pacts.
Some Turkish historians claim that Turkey entered into NATO to approach to the
Western states and get more economical aid because of the absence of the Soviet threat132. This
argument may have been based on the economical-political character of the Democratic Party that came
to power in 1950; Turkey’s effort to be a NATO member started long before the elections in 1950 and
this argument ignores the threat perception of Turkey at this time. After the war, Great Britain and
France approved enforcement of 1939 Pact; however, the British and French guarantee was not enough
for Turkey, especially when they needed help from the United States, therefore, the main Turkish
concentration in the postwar period was to gain guarantee of help from the Americans in case of Soviet
attack on Turkey.
3.2.1. Step 1: Economic help
3.2.1.1. The Truman Doctrine
Although the United States gave firm support to Turkey during the note exchanges, the
Americans still regarded Turkey as the responsibility of Great Britain as had been decided in the
Casablanca conference. The Turks’ extensive and in some cases, arguably outrageous credit demands,
were answered with insignificant amounts of money and the Turks were kindly asked to request military
aid from Great Britain so that they would not provoke the Soviet Union. Great Britain was unable to
resist the Soviet Union after the World War and on February 24, 1947, the British presented two notes to
131
Serap Tunc, II. Dunya Savasindan Sonra Turk Dis Politikasina Sovyet Etkisi (1945-1960). (Master thesis, Gazi University,
Ankara, 2005) p. 78.
132
Baskin Oran, Turkiye’nin Kuzeydeki Buyuk Komsu Sorunu Nedir? in “Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi
Dergisi” Vol: 25(1). p. 73.
53
the United States in which they stated that Great Britain “…feels itself unable, in view of the economic
situation in Great Britain, any longer to bear the major share of the burden of rendering assistance in the
form of money and military assistance which Greece and Turkey should have if they are to preserve
their territorial integrity and political independence.”133 Those notes embellishing the excitement present
in the official circles of the State Department placed the Americans in front of two options: either the
United States would undertake the burden of supplying both financial and military assistance to these
two states situated close to the Soviet border and risk inciting conflict with the Soviet Union or they
could leave these states to the Soviet Union either by doing nothing or through arrangement of the
Soviet Union through the set up of spheres of influence. The Americans believed that the second option
would have resulted in a third world war and although they doubted the authenticity of British anxieties,
they suspected that these notes were efforts of the British diplomacy to bring the United States into the
complex issues of the Near East134and so, they decided to help these states with the declaration of the
Truman Doctrine in March 1947. The Americans were right about the British intentions. As per the
Truman Doctrine, Great Britain established the United States in the role of “bodyguard” of the Middle
East. The British avoided positions as the target of Soviet diplomacy which they could not have faced
with and in turn acquired a stronger ally in Middle Eastern affairs. This did not mean that Great Britain
was willing to share control of the Middle East with the United States.
Truman declared his self-titled doctrine before a joint session of Congress on March 12.
After his speech on the threatening conditions in Greece, because of the terrorist activities in the state
and the need for expedient help to preserve the integrity and independence of Greece, Truman described
Turkey as “no less to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece.” Although
Turkey managed to avoid the disasters of the war and there were no internal conflicts, Turkey needed
American financial assistance. Truman targeted the Soviet Union by stressing that one of the primary
objectives of the U.S. foreign policy was to create conditions in which all nations could work towards a
way of life free from coercion and offering Poland, Romania and Bulgaria as examples of coercion and
intimidation. Therefore, he requested 400 million dollars from Congress to help Greece and Turkey135.
The Truman Doctrine played an important role in Turkish foreign policy by creating an
official link between the Western states and Turkey at the beginning of the Cold War. It also highlighted
the kindling of the United States’ interest in Turkey, of which Turkish officials had been waiting for for
133
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume V, The Near East and Africa. p. 42.
Ibid, p. 48-55.
135
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. February 15-22, 1947. p. 8491-8492.
134
54
a long time. This caused great appreciation and pleasure in Turkey but some were critical of this
decision in the United States. To the opposition in the United States, Turkey was governed by conceited
military-dictatorial regimes overlooking human rights and freedom. Turkey did not fight in the war like
Greece had and some had even helped the Germans. The same critics came from the Soviets and in
April, Gromyko, the Soviet representation in the United Nations, claimed that Turkey had no right to
receive American aid because of her attitude in the war and her provision of strategic minerals to
Germany 136. The necessity of United Nations’ move to assist Greece was a point that the Soviets and the
opponents in the United States had in common.
Separation from both Turkey and Greece was almost impossible for American policymakers. If one of them had fallen, the effect would have influenced the other and if they would have
worked with Greece and excluded Turkey, it would not have been beneficial in the prevention of Soviet
intentions and vice versa. The United States and Great Britain wanted to prevent Soviet penetration into
the Middle East and Turkey played a more important role than Greece for this aim. What made Greece
more important in the Truman Doctrine and in Congressional speeches were its urgent conditions but in
the long term Turkey was no less important than Greece in the plans of the American politicians.
Regarding the United Nations role in the distribution of aid, the State of Department claimed that this
may have taken long while in the hands of the United Nations. The chief reason must have been the
danger of Soviet veto in the decision progress.
The doctrine and also its inclusion of Turkey drew a strong reaction from the Soviet
Union. Izvestia blamed Britain for the disturbance in Greece and stated that the United States did not
wish to criticize Britain since they intended to follow its example. The newspaper went on saying that
since there was no threat to Turkish territorial integrity, the United States aimed at U.S. control in
Turkey and after that, it is impossible to speak of the independence of Turkish domestic and foreign
policy137. The Soviet and communist propaganda also attacked the Turkish government and compared it
to the “extensive, cruel and lawless Franco Spain.”138
Notwithstanding the Soviet critics regarding the independence of Turkish policies, the
documents show that the Turks were sensible about their sovereignty even when they were in need of
136
Melih Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. (Istanbul: Sema Yayinevi,
2006) p. 35-36.
137
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. February 15-22, 1947. p. 8492-8493.
138
Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950. p . 37.
55
American help. They stated that they could not accept the aid if any control is exercised139 and opposed
the word of “administrator” and persuaded the Americans to change it as “chief of any mission.”140 This
situation took attention when it is compared with the breaches in Turkish sovereignty after 1953.
However, the observation of the American press and radio on the utilization of assistance was accepted
by the Turkish Government in the agreement signed between the United States and Turkish Government
on July 12141.
Although Turkey was targeted by the Soviet Union and communist journals in the other
states, the Truman Doctrine and its application induced the Soviet officials to seek out the Turks for the
first time after the note exchanges. On November 7, Marshal Bulganin, Commissar of Armed Forces,
visited the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and declared that “he had admired Turkey in the past but
now Turkey had placed herself under American hegemony, was allowing US Army to create bases in
Turkey and serving as instrument of US in latter’s plans to prepare war against USSR.”142 This
statement can be seen as one of the first “peace attacks” on Turkey, like its counterparts seen after 1953;
however, because it was not continuous and the Soviet demands were still in the air, it did not produce
any effect on Turkish foreign policy.
The core importance of the Truman Doctrine to Turkey was the “aider state” more so
than the aid itself. In his speech to the American Congress, Truman pronounced the American interest
on the independence of Turkey and its territorial integrity. This additionally signaled a new period in
Turkish foreign policy in which Turks leaned their foreign policy towards the formation of close
relations with the Western states. As a result, after the Truman Doctrine Turkey aimed at joining almost
all Western financial, military and political organizations143. After this date, Turkey stressed her
European character in diplomatic arena by rejecting to join conferences of Asian states and followed
liberal policies in economy and politics to ingratiate with the Western states. Turkey withdrew support
from the Arab states on the Philistine issue and sided with the Western states in accordance with their
general policy144.
139
Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, Volume V, The Near East and Africa. p. 138.
Ibid, p. 144.
141
For the agreement, Agreement Between U.S. and Turkey to Govern Application of Turkish Aid Program in “Department of
State Bulletin” Vol: 17. p. 144-145.
142
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume V, The Near East and Africa. p. 417-418.
143
Oral Sander, Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri, 1947-1964. (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari,
1979) p. 36.
144
Omer E. Kurkcuoglu, Turkiye’nin Arap Orta Dogusu’na Karsi Politikasi (1945-1970). (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1972) p. 25.
140
56
The Truman Doctrine presented marked disadvantages for Turkey. The aid Turkey
received from the Truman Doctrine was the military aid rather than economic aid. Therefore, 94 percent
of the aid was spent for military objects and the rest was used for road construction to carry military
supplies.145Maintenance and replacement parts for these supplies created new expenditures for Turkey
and became a burden on Turkish economy in later years. These military supplies also garnered a sour
reaction from the Soviet Union and turned Turkey into an active participant in the Cold War. As a
consequence, the Turks could not immobilize troops which may have relaxed the Turkish economy,
although the Truman Doctrine aimed at decreasing the number of Turkish troops.
3.2.1.2. The Marshall Plan
One of the repercussions of the Truman Doctrine was that it discouraged the last hope for
the continuance of the war-time American-Soviet relations. Three days before President’s speech, the
Moscow Conference was initiated with the participation of the foreign ministries of the four great
powers and the doctrine caused a tense atmosphere in the conference. During the conference, Marshall,
the Foreign Minister of the United States, both witnessed the destruction of Europe and began thinking
that Stalin wanted to collapse the European economy146. More likely, the attitude of the Soviet
delegation was based on the Truman Doctrine; but, the situation in Europe indeed was not promising. As
well as the growing power of the communist parties in Italy and France because of the war-weary
conditions of these states, there was also a dollar shortage in Europe and politicians in Washington
feared European collapse, which would have definitely resulted with Soviet expansion and brought a
disastrous atmosphere for American interests147. Therefore, on July 5, 1947, in his speech at Harvard
University, Marshall called for the European states to form a common economic plan. This initiative
must have come from the Europeans and the United States would be ready to assist. Marshall also
declared that this policy was not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation
and chaos. However, he did not refrain from stating that if any governments, political parties or groups
145
Between October 1947 and September 1948, Turkey received aid in the amount of 77,887,405 dollars.. Ibid, p. 31.
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 36.
147
C. C. S. Newton, The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan in “The Economic History
Review” Vol: 37(3). p. 394.
146
57
blocked this initiative, it would encounter the opposition of the United States148. The latter words were
targeted the Soviet Union and communist parties in Europe.
Although the Soviet Union was asked to take part in the initiative, the aims of the
Marshall Plan made it clear that giving economical aid to the Soviet Union was not one of the intentions
of the United States. The Marshall Plan had economic, political, and security objectives that were
interconnected with each other. First of all, after the war the United States helped many European
countries and the total amount reached 15 billion dollars in one and a half years. These economic
bailouts were given in very unbeneficial ways, mostly to meet budget deficits or to import149. Therefore,
no progress was made in the European economy and this situation was negatively affecting American
trade. In addition to this, communist and Soviet propaganda was finding a way to spread itself amongst
the Europeans. If the United States stopped economic depression in Europe, it also would stop the
advance of the Soviet Union and manage to contain it. On the other hand, if this aid was offered to the
European States as a part of containment policy, it may have been disapproved and even been rejected
by the small European states that did not want to provoke the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union rejected
the plan, the responsibility would be on the Soviets150. When one took the conditions of aid and the
ideology of the Soviet Union into consideration, rejection from the Soviets would be a more possible
estimation.
Another goal of the United States in adopting the Marshall Plan and calling the European
states for collaboration could have been to see if European integration was possible for future political
and security organizations. The Marshall Plan, in this case, served as an experiment for a future attempt
at NATO. This would give a greater meaning to the Marshall Plan rather than for strictly economical
purposes and Turkey saw this plan at a higher meaning.
On June 27, Molotov met with the foreign ministers of Britain and France in Paris, and
the meeting resulted in failure151. According to the Soviet argument, the plan was a tool for depriving
148
For the speech, European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery in “Department of State Bulletin” Vol: 16. p. 11591160.
149
Armaoglu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi. p. 443.
150
Aptulahat Aksin, Turkiye’nin 1945’den Sonraki Dis Politika Gelismeleri, Orta Dogu Meseleleri. (Istanbul, 1959) p.17.
151
Turkish sources blamed the Soviet Union of the failure of Paris Conference. According to Armaoglu, Molotov joined to
this conference to sabotage it Armaoglu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi. p. 444.; and to Erhan, he put forward some conditions
which was difficult to be accepted by the Great Britain and France. Cagri Erhan, ABD ve NATO’yla Iliskiler in “Turk Dis
Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar” Volume I. p. 539. On the other hand, Soviet sources
put the blame on the foreign ministries of the Great Britain and France who did not want to give any information about the
American plan. B. Ponomaryov, A.Gromyko & V. Khvostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1970. (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1974) p. 163.
58
the European countries of their economic independence and national sovereignty in the interest of strong
powers, dictating the direction of the development of the key branches of their economics, interfering in
their internal affairs and splitting Europe into two sides152. The Soviet Union claimed that this plan
would be an impediment to the industrial development of the Eastern Europe states153; therefore, the
Soviets did not let those states, especially Czechoslovakia, join the plan. When one takes the effects of
Marshall Plan on Turkish economy and sovereignty into consideration, they cannot claim that the Soviet
arguments lacked validity. The Soviet Union also proposed in the meeting, that the priority of aid should
be given to the countries that suffered in the war against Germany and contributed to the victory154. In
this way, the Soviet Union tried to prevent the United States from using the aids for its hostile policy
against the Soviet Union by helping states close to the Soviet border such as Turkey.
From the beginning of the discussion on Marshall Plan, the United States abstained from
causing any indication that could present the plan as anti-Soviet; therefore, when Turkey requested 615
million dollars in the meeting of foreign ministries held in July 1947, she received an answer that the
plan aimed at helping the states that had suffered in the war. According to the Americans, Turkey was
getting aid through the Truman Doctrine and even stated that if Turkey was keen to join the plan, she
could recognize it as a contributor by meeting the agricultural and mineral needs of the European states.
In reply to this, the Turkish antithesis stressed that the Truman Doctrine did not bring prompt solution to
the economical problems of Turkey and did not provide an effective downtrend on Turkish military
spending as the United States had suggested. The United States accepted the Turkish argument and
Turkey started benefiting from the Marshall Plan in March 1948155.
Because of the military characteristic, the aid received through the Truman Doctrine did
not contribute to the Turkish economy. Moreover, by bringing the American military equipment close to
the Soviet Union, Turkey put herself under threat perception more than before and could not decrease
the military spending. After the Truman Doctrine was declared, Turkey still expected repetition of
Soviet demands on the Straits and Turkish provinces and the Turkish Government took propaganda
news to heart, accepting that these demands were a matter of prestige for the Soviets and they would
never fully recede from them156. In this atmosphere, Turkey needed more economic help in defense
against the Soviet Union. However, like the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan did not let Turkey
152
Ponomaryov, Gromyko & Khvostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1970. p. 164-165.
Turkkaya Ataov, Amerika, NATO ve Turkiye. (Istanbul, Ileri yayinlari, 2006) p. 126.
154
Ponomaryov, Gromyko & Khvostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1970. p. 164-165.
155
Sever, Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu, 1945-1958. p. 54-55.
156
The Republic of Turkey Presidential Archives, Document No: 030.01-11.700.3
153
59
spend the aid in however they chose. Instead, the aid would be used for “general aims”; needless to say,
the United States would decide those “aims” during the Cold War. In the recovery of the Europe, the
Turkish role was to provide raw materials and agricultural products and aid was given to increase the
capacity of Turkey in the agricultural and mining industries. 60% of the aid was spent in the agricultural
sector and Turkey became one of the most prominent wheat producers in the world157. As a result,
Turkey gave up her industrial development plan that the Soviet Union had warned about for the Eastern
Bloc countries in the Paris Conference. In the long run, Turkey still suffered from this economic policy
which turned the country into an agricultural state.
Then why did Turkey follow this policy and allow herself to become dependent to the
United States? As Prof. Dr. Memduh Yasa asserted, “In those years, Turkey had no option other than
receiving that assistance.”158 Either the Turkish rulers would take the economical and political assistance
of the United States by letting her control the economic development of Turkey through aid or they
would reject the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, defend the full sovereignty of the country and face
with the possible Soviet threat alone. Even though the Soviet threat may be seen over in 1947, it is not
illogical to expect the repetition of Soviet threat when the western states called of their support on
Turkey. The United States expected the full support of small states against the Soviet Union in return for
their funding. This was an unwritten rule of the Cold War.
Another reason for Turkish insistence on taking part in Marshall Plan was their
evaluation of the program for its political implications. As attributed to the Turkish public opinion, if the
United States had left Turkey alone economically, it would have excluded the Turks from entry into
possible political organizations in the future159 and this prevision dismayed the Turks because it would
have left Turkey unprotected if the Soviet threat was renewed. As the Turks expected, attempts for the
political and security integration of the Western states appeared after a short while.
3.2.2. Step 2: Military Cooperation – NATO and Turkey
3.2.2.1. Turkish demand for security arrangement with U.S.
157
Erhan, ABD ve NATO’yla Iliskiler. p. 539-542.
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 36.
159
Erhan, ABD ve NATO’yla Iliskiler. p. 539-542.
158
60
The economic integration of the European states and the United States was an important
advancement in the struggle against the Soviet Union, but this cooperation had no deterrent effect on
Soviet foreign policy. The Czechoslovakia coup in 1948 and Communists’ government takeover proved
this fact160. This event led the economically and politically unstable European countries to insist on the
support of the Americans in order to reinforce security measures. The Americans wanted to see that
European countries were able to unite and function under both political and security measures, as per the
Marshall Plan, under the condition of receiving economic aid. As a result of this, five European
countries, England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg launched the Brussels Treaty
Organization (BTO) on March 17, 1948. According to the agreement, if one of the parties faced with an
armed attack, the other parties would help her with all means possible161. Nevertheless, the BTO was a
paper tiger. Without effective American support, the member states could not challenge the Soviet
Union. By creating the organization, the European states showed that they were more than capable of
uniting against the Soviet threat and this would impress members of American Congress and Senate,
who accepted the Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 1948. As a result of this resolution, U.S
memberships in regional security alliances were approved and the domestic obstacle in front of the
NATO was removed. Undoubtedly, the Czechoslovakia coup and Berlin crisis in 1948 also influenced
the decision of Congress and the Senate.
The security relations between the Western countries and the United States were
observed carefully since the beginning by the Turkish authorities and even before the Vandenberg
Resolution was accepted they demanded security guarantees from the United States. On 11 May 1948,
Huseyin Bagdur, the Turkish Ambassador, met with Loy Henderson, Director for Near Eastern and
African Affairs, and remonstrated that if the United States did not extend the security guarantees to
Turkey as the United States did to Western countries that this situation may give the Soviet Union the
impression that they might have comparative safety to commit aggression against Turkey. He added that
a minority group in Turkey that opposed hostility towards the Soviet Union may have benefited from the
indifference of the United States on Turkish security and Turkish resistance would be weakened. In
reply to these statements, Henderson stated that many countries demanded American security and no
decisions were made yet about this matter162.
160
According to Armaoglu, Czechoslovakia’s eagerness to join into the Marshall Plan played decisive role in the coup.
Armaoglu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi. p. 444.
161
Ibid, 445.
162
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume IV, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union. p. 83-84.
61
Turkey’s impatience for the American security guarantee even before the Senate of the
United States approved the Vandenberg Resolution is evidence of their fear to be left alone against the
Soviet Union. Indeed, until Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, the statements above would be
used every chance the Turks meet with American politicians. After the Vandenberg Resolution was
passed, Turkey kept demanding an alliance with the United States and in the same month with the
approval of Senate, Necmettin Sadak, the Turkish Foreign Minister, declared Turkish intention to
embody Turkish-American relations with an alliance in a more effective and official way. Marshall did
not accept this offer because that kind of alliance would necessitate revising almost all relations with
other states163. The first priority of the United States was Western Europe in 1948 and an alliance with
Turkey was worthless before NATO was formed.
When NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – sprang roots, the main aim of
Turkish foreign policy became to be member of this organization because NATO meant the American
security guarantee. However, when Turkey declared the intention to join NATO to the ambassadors of
the United States and United Kingdom in autumn 1948, those states informed Turkey that NATO would
be a regional security organization restricted geographically in scope to North Atlantic countries164. This
reply directed Turkey towards new plans in an effort to benefit from the security guarantee of the United
States. As a result, in February 1949, two months before NATO was formed, Hasak Saka offered a
Mediterranean Pact including Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and Greece. As Bagci affirmed, by
presenting this offer, Turkey hoped to reach NATO membership by different means165. Turkey already
had an alliance with France and Great Britain, and Greece and Italy would not provide an effective
security guarantee for Turkey. Therefore, after forming the Mediterranean Pact, Turkey tried to link the
NATO and this pact to have the security guarantee from the United States. Turkey asserted that the
security of the Atlantic region and Mediterranean were inseparable and if the Mediterranean was left
without guarantee, the security of Europe would not be secured.
When Italy and the territory in North Africa, the Algerian regions of France, were
accepted as a member of NATO, not only did it ruin the Turkish plan for Mediterranean Pact, it also
disproved the reason for Turkish exclusion from NATO. Therefore, this issue was discussed between
Dean Acheson and Necmettin Sadak in April 1949. In the meeting, Sadak uttered the confusion and
perturbation based on this decision and requested explanation from Acheson. After summarizing
163
Sander, Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri, 1947-1964. p. 67-68.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume VI, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. p. 1647-1648.
165
Huseyin Bagci, Turk Dis Politikasinda 1950’li Yillar. (Ankara: ODTU Yayincilik, 2007) p. 11.
164
62
Turkish-American relations since the end of the world war and American support of the Turkish
independency and sovereignty, Acheson reasoned the inclusion of Italy and North African territories as
their being the back door to France. He also implied that implication of American policy toward Europe
and Near East was not completed and further steps might be taken in the future.
It seems from the documents that these explanations did not satisfy the Turkish Foreign
Minister. What the Turks wanted to hear was a promise of a contractual security arrangement and Sadak
wanted to learn if the United States would fight in the event of a Russian attack on Turkey. Acheson
avoided giving a direct answer but indicated that further steps might be taken in a short time166.
The reason for the Turkish demand to be a NATO member was, undoubtedly, to receive a
security guarantee from the United States against a possible Soviet attack. The Turks also worried that
the American aid to Turkey may be dropped as a result of the American obligations and NATO.
Additionally, after the elections in 1950 and Democrat Party’s (DP) coming to power by defeating the
Republican People’s Party (RPP), which had governed the country since its foundation, the party leaders
saw NATO membership as a guarantee for the protection of the democracy in Turkey. Turkey would not
be able to join NATO until 1952, even though Acheson had stated in 1949 that further steps would be
taken in a year. In this period, every attempt of the Turkish Government was rejected by the Western
states for various reasons. These main reasons were as follows:
1) Until the Korean War, American foreign policy suffered from self-imposed budget constraints. As a
result of this, American politicians avoided following comprehensible Middle Eastern policies and
concentrated on the defense of the Atlantic region. After the Korean War, defense expenses rose from
13.5 billion to 48.2 billion dollars167; so, the United States brought herself into the position of forming
security arrangements in another regions;
2) Smaller members of the NATO opposed the admission of Turkey as well as Greece, for fear of
involvement in wars in the Middle East and Balkans, where they did not want to extend their
commitments and these states thought that membership of Turkey and Greece may provoke the Soviet
Union. The same states were also anxious to receive lesser aids by extending the organization;
166
167
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume VI, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. p. 1647-1653.
George McGhee, ABD-NATO-Turkiye-Ortadogu…(Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1992) p. 145.
63
3) As for the British plans, Turkey played a role in the possible Middle East organization more so than
in NATO. If the Arab states were attacked, NATO would not bring Turkey into the war168. Therefore,
Turkey’s place was under the Middle East organization rather than NATO;
4) The troublous situation in Greece and the difficulty of getting Congress approval for extension of the
security arrangement were amongst the reasons for Turkish exclusion from NATO169;
5) The United States did not want to give any indication that may show the Soviet Union that the
organization was not defensive170. Membership of a state far from the North Atlantic but close to Soviet
border would be inconsistent with the defensive character of the organization.
3.2.2.2. The Korean War and its effects on Turkey
The conditions that eliminated the barriers from Turkey’s path towards NATO cannot be
seen in the Turkish-American and/or Turkish-Soviet relations in general; instead, the reasons of
Turkey’s entry into NATO can be seen in American-Soviet relations. The successful nuclear tests of the
Soviet Union in 1949, earlier than expected, and fall of China caused panic in Washington. The main
problem was the budget constraints of the United States and this situation expressed in NSC-68,
prepared in early 1950, whose argument was that “when our military strength is related to the world
situation and balanced against the likely exigencies of such a situation, it is clear that our military
strength is becoming dangerously inadequate.”171
As mentioned, the budgetary constraints were a problem for Turkey that needed to be
countered in order to have a contractual security arrangement with the United States and the Korean War
was the golden opportunity for the two states in their objectives. The war started a month from the
elections in Turkey and for DP it was a chance for NATO membership which was not succeeded by
RPP. Therefore, after the United Nation’s call to the states to send troops for the United Nations Force,
Turkey became the second state that replied to the call positively after the United States. It must be
mentioned that sending troops to Korea was the first radical decision in the military history of the
168
In his article in Aksam newspaper on 16 August 1951, former foreign minister Sadak agreed this idea Aksin, Turkiye’nin
1945’den Sonraki Dis Politika Gelismeleri, Orta Dogu Meseleleri. p. 38. However, in 1951 Democrat Party did not believe
the future of Middle East organizations. On the other hand, as we will see in the next chapter, these reasons were totally
contradicting the Middle East initiatives of Turkye in mid-1950s.
169
Feridun Cemal Erkin, Disislerinde 34 Yil, Washington Buyukelciligi. II. Cilt, I Kisim. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu
Basimevi, 1992) p. 68.
170
For the Soviet thesis on NATO, Arthur Schlesinger, The Dynamics of World Power; a documentary history of United
States foreign policy, 1945-1973. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973) p. 403-406.
171
Robert Jervis, The Impact of Korean War on the Cold War in “The Journal of Conflict Resolution” Vol: 24(4). p. 577.
64
Republic of Turkey. Before that, one of the main principles of Turkish military history was not to
engage to the war unless there was a threat to Turkish security. However, now Turkish soldiers would be
fighting in a region far away from Turkish borders. This decision was made by a small group at the head
of party without consulting parliament and the government. Therefore, after the decision, opposition
presented critics to the form of decision instead of a decision itself.
During and after the Korean War, anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda flourished
among the Turkish public opinion similar to the ones seen in 1945 and 1946 and this situation
regenerated Soviet-Turkish relations, despite the negative nature. “Russian phobia” rose again and was
supported by the news coming from the Western press which maintained that Turkey was one of the first
targets of the “Red Muscovites.” The Turkish press also published news about the volunteers who
wanted to fight in Korea against the “communist aggressor.”172 According to the public opinion, by
fighting in the Korea, the Turks would be reducing the number of the enemies who would attack them.
Islam was also against communism. On August 25, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Director of Religious Affairs,
avowed, “The most mighty weapon against communism is the power of faith and spirit. There is no
possibility that a real Muslim get along well with communist ideas and actions.”173 By fighting against
communists, a Muslim would be serving to religion and community as well as his country.
Even though Celal Bayar, the Turkish President, stated that they did not send troops to
Korea in order to enter NATO and that they only wanted to prove their commitment to the United
Nations ideal174; the structure of the United Nations and Turkish actions right after the decision of
sending troops disproved his statement. The decision of the United Nations Force was passed when the
Soviet Union did not join to the Security Council because of her protest on the China issue and in the
event of Soviet attack on Turkey most likely this mistake would not have been made by Soviet Russia
again. Also, Koprulu’s, Turkish Foreign Minister, call of the ambassadors of the Western states to his
office a couple of days after the Turkish decision and reiteration of Turkey’s intention to be a member of
NATO, it is enough to see whether Turkey was committed to the United Nations or NATO.
With the Korean War, the United States was more interested in Turkey’s membership in
NATO; but Turkish participation in Korean War less influenced the decision of the American diplomats
than the conditions in the Cold War. It is even possible to claim that if RPP had won the elections and
172
Bagci, Turk Dis Politikasinda 1950’li Yillar. p. 21-25.
Mutercimler & Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis politikasi. p. 77.
174
Mehmet Saray, Sovyet Tehdidi Karsisinda Turkiye’nin NATO’ya Girisi: III. Cumhurbaskani Celal Bayar’in Hatiralari ve
Belgeler. (Ankara: AKDTYK Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi, 2000) p. 98.
173
65
Turkey had not taken such a radical decision in its history by joining to the Korean War, the United
States still would have changed its Middle Eastern policy and agreed on Turkish participation in NATO
because the Korean War proved that the Soviet Union may have engaged in local conflicts like was done
in Korea and since the Soviets succeeded in nuclear tests, the United States had no advantage to prevent
a Soviet move in regional areas such as the Balkans and the Middle East. If Turkey had fallen in the war
against the Soviet Union or yielded to Soviet pressure and communist rule had been established in
Turkey, it would have repercussions on American and Western interests in the Middle East. Also,
according to the new containment policy, the United States needed airbases in the countries close to the
Soviet Union and the American politicians were cognizant that unless the Turks were satisfied by
American security guarantee, they would not allow the United States to establish bases in their country.
Indeed, the United States discussed the question of seeking airbases in Turkey even in April 1949, but
they gave up this idea because exclusion of Turkey from NATO and not to serve the Soviet thesis that
the organization is not defensive175. However, after the Korean War both the conditions of the SovietAmerican and Turkish-American relations changed; therefore, Turkish membership in NATO was
essential for American foreign policy. Turkish participation in the Korean War and the brave fight of the
Turks served to erase the bad memories of the non-belligerency of Turkey in the Second World War and
facilitated the approval of American public opinion for extension of NATO to include Turkey.
Before Turkish entrance into NATO, Britain had to be satisfied as a responsible state in the
Middle East. What the British wanted was to have Turkey under her command in its Middle East plans
in the event of war; however, the Turks wanted their army to be under the command of General
Eisenhower, the commander of the NATO forces in Europe. According to Erkin, the British believed
that the traditional role of Turkey to be a guardian of British interests in the Near East176; however, the
Turks wanted to be a full NATO member without any provision like the other member states, it was a
“matter of honor” for Turkey after struggling for years177.
British insistence in this matter lasted even until the last meeting in Ottawa in which decision to
invite Turkey and Greece was taken and even though this insistence ended thanks to the determined
stance of the United States, it is important to see the surreptitious rivalry on the affairs of Near East
between the United States and Great Britain. Finally, after Turkey promised to play his role in the
defense of the Middle East, Britain ended its opposition and Turkey as well as Greece was invited to
175
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume VI, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. p. 1654-1655.
Erkin, Disislerinde 34 Yil, Washington Buyukelciligi. II. Cilt, I Kisim. p. 68.
177
Mutercimler & Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis politikasi. p. 107.
176
66
NATO membership in September 1951 and Turkey entered NATO in the next year. In regards to the
Middle East Command, on 13 October 1951 Turkey, the United States, Great Britain and France sent a
joint note to Egypt and presented the project of Middle East Organization; however, the offer was turned
down by Egypt. After 1952, Turkey followed a consistent Middle East policy as we will see in the next
chapter; but in 1951, all Turkey wanted was to be a NATO member and joining this offer was nothing
but a requirement to satisfy Great Britain for its consent on Turkish membership to NATO. However,
regardless of Turkish intention, by this move Turkey took the same side as the Western states seen as the
enemy of their independencies by the countries in the region and Turkey’s alliance with the Western
states, especially with Great Britain, would influence its relation with Arab states in later years.
3.2.2.3. Soviet reaction to Turkish entrance into NATO
Turkey’s entrance into NATO gave a boost to Turkish-Soviet relations and made Turkey
an important element in Soviet foreign policy again following the note exchanges of 1946. On
November 3, the Soviet Union sent a note to Ankara. In the note, at first the Soviets mentioned the
aggressive characteristics of the Atlantic bloc by its measures to set up a combined army, to remilitarize
Western Germany, intensifying armaments drive and establishing American military bases on the
territories of the other states. Then the Soviet note pointed out the information regarding the
establishment of air and naval bases in the Turkish territory and claimed that as a state with no relation
to the Atlantic, the invitation of Turkey to the Atlantic bloc means nothing but the imperialist states’
using Turkish territory for aggressive aims and warned Turkey that as a state neighboring on Turkey, the
Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to these facts and the responsibility of entering to NATO and
letting military bases on its territory lies on Turkish Government178.
In her reply to this, the Turkish Government delivered a note on November 13 and
rejected the aggressive character of the organization. The Turks indicated the commitment of Turkey to
the peace and world security and added that the same could not be said for the Soviet Union and the
states that are closely bound it because of their general policy and military preparations in their territory
under the direction of Soviet specialists. The note was continued by stating that military measures in
Turkey were not directed to any country and at the end of the note the Soviet Union was reminded that
Turkey had serious reasons for occupying itself for own security and at once Turkey found itself faced
178
For the note, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 487-488.
67
with demands which endangered its independence and territorial integrity; therefore, Turkey bears no
responsibility for the cooling off of Turkish-Soviet relations179.
The Soviet Union reiterated its claims by a note delivered on November 30 and stated
that Turkey’s reply had not presented any proof to deny the aggressive character of NATO and blamed
the Turkish Government of masking its actual nature by defaming the peaceful foreign policy of the
Soviet Union. The Soviets indicated that they did not find the Turkish reply satisfactory and threatened
the Turkish Government that the responsibility of the consequences of the Turkish foreign policy would
be on the Turks180. The Turkish Government did not give any official reply to this note and Koprulu
explained this attitude by stating that Turkish reply would not satisfy the Soviets unless Turkey
renounced its membership in NATO.
These notes reflected the main anxieties of the Soviet Union and Turkey. The Soviet
Union was not bothered by the close economic and political relations between the western states and
Turkey as much as Turkey’s permitting the establishment of military bases in its territories. Indeed, the
Soviet Union was worried about its own security not less than Turkey was concerned about the Soviet
threat, and the intention of the Western states to get airbases close to the Soviet Union by accepting the
membership of Turkey, indeed, justifies its anxieties. Therefore, these airbases would lead to serious
problems between the Soviet Union and Turkey in the U-2 and balloon incidents and Lebanon operation
in later years181. In the Soviet note, it is also possible to see the known tactic of the Soviet Union to
differentiate between the Turkish Government and public opinion when the Turkish Government was
accused of hiding its actual nature. Lastly, the Soviet threat at the end of the note became regular in its
later notes to Turkey; however, it must be seen as an understandable aspect of being a leading state in
the Cold War.
By the demands that endangered Turkish independence and territorial integrity, Turkey
implied that the Soviet demands in 1945 and 1946 revealed the real reason for membership in NATO.
Moreover, the Turkish Government uttered its discontent on Bulgarian foreign policy and SovietBulgarian relations by indicating the military preparations under the command of Soviet specialists. In
the same year, a refugee crisis took place between Turkey and Bulgaria as a result of Bulgaria’s
informing that 250.000 Turks wished to return to Turkey. Turkey accepted the refuges as well as it
could, but most of the people coming to Turkey were from the coastal area to the north-east and Turks
179
For the note, Ibid, p. 488-489.
For the note, Ibid, p. 489-491.
181
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 62-63.
180
68
suspected that this area of Bulgaria would return to a military zone if the Soviet army came to the
Balkans. Therefore, between the first Soviet and Turkish notes, Turkey closed the border182 and showed
its unease and suspicions in its note.
The Soviet Union sent one more note to Turkey as well as other three proponent states on
November 24 regarding the proposed Middle East organization and declared that they could not
overlook aggressive plans such as Middle East command. Two days prior, in the note to the Middle
Eastern states, the Soviet Union informed these states about the military intentions of the “aggressive”
states that may lead to loss of independence and sovereignty of the regional countries183. It is evident
that the last moves of the Western countries provoked the Soviet Union. As a result, after a few years,
the Soviet Union launched a new but familiar foreign policy which would be more effective to challenge
with the Western states in the Middle East.
3.3. Conclusion
Although Turkish-Soviet relations were quiescent in comparison to prior periods, the
period of 1945-1952 was also when the influence of the Soviet threat could be clearly seen in Turkish
foreign policy. Turkey had benefited from cooperation with the Western states economically but this
increase in aid was little in light of their central cause for worry, the threats that the Soviet Union
directed upon Turkey’s independence and territorial integrity. Turkey’s insistence and impatience to
gain membership to NATO was fueled by their perception of the Soviet threat, especially after the
Soviet Union’s demands made in 1945 and 1946.After the Korean War, there was reinforcement behind
Turkey’s fear of the Soviet Union. On 12 January 1950, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson excluded
South Korea from the United States “defense circle” and in the same year, a war erupted in the region184.
The Turkish Government was horrified of the possibility of Turkey’s exclusion from NATO because
they feared they would meet the same end as South Korea, at war with the Soviet Union. Within the
contingent atmosphere during the Cold War, the assumption that Turkey entered NATO largely for
economic reasons would not be felicitous.
Turkey’s benefiting from the Truman aid and Marshall Plan did not cause a heavy official
uproar from the Soviet Union. The reason of this attitude must be seen on the diminishing role of the
182
Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1951. (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 204-205.
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. November 24 – December 1, 1951. p. 11854.
184
Erkin, Disislerinde 34 Yil, Washington Buyukelciligi. II. Cilt, I Kisim. p. 144.
183
69
Straits and Turkey on Soviet security after the Second World War. Indeed, in the war air forces and after
the war nuclear weapons started representing the “real force” and this narrow waterway, and Turkey in
general, lost the importance for the Soviet leaders in the course of time. However, Turkish membership
in NATO brought American airbases and Turkey again became a factor that should not be overlooked in
Soviet foreign policy in the first time after the Nazi-Soviet war and by joining into NATO, TurkishSoviet relations revived.
One of the main consequences of the passive Soviet policy towards Turkey in this period
was the growing political and economical influence of the United States in Turkey and; as a result of this
fact, the Soviet Union lost its well-being as a determining factor on Turkish foreign policy. By
guaranteeing its security with establishing contractual security arrangement with the United States,
therefore, Turkey put an end to Soviet factor on its policy and after this date, as we will see, the Soviet
Union became a tool of Turkish Government to receive more economical aids and to become a regional
power in the global international relations.
It is important to stress that the American interest on Turkey was no different than the
British interest in the nineteenth century. As the Great Britain supported the Ottoman Empire against the
Tsarist Russia to prevent the latter to reach the warm seas and close the British roads to its colonies in
the Far East, the United States backed Turkey not to allow the Soviet Union entering the oil rich Middle
East by cooperation with the Great Britain. Because the Great Britain was not capable of protecting this
area alone, the United States undertook the protection of the region. In conclusion, the Cold War in the
Middle East was nothing but replacement of players in the Western side. If the United States had no
interest in the protection of Turkey, it would not have reached a security agreement with Turkey against
the Soviet threat towards the latter. However, it is evident that Turkey never looked at the United States
policies in that way. More likely, Turkish views were affected by the clean record of the American
history without imperialist aims. Therefore, as Oran pointed out, Turkey joined NATO without any
domestic objection and entered into an alliance with the United States as a state that had never been
allied with a big power that easy since the Ottoman Empire185. Indeed, this situation became one of the
statements of the Soviet Union against Turkey and they stressed that “while it had taken several decades
(in the nineteenth century) to make Turkey a semi-colony, the process of turning Turkey into a full
colony of Wall Street had been completed in only a few months.”186
185
Baskin Oran, 1945-1960: Bati Blogu Ekseninde Turkiye – 1, Donemin Bilancosu in “Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus
Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar” Volume I. p. 494.
186
Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1959) p. 143.
70
Turkey had gains and losses by linking its foreign policy with the Western states. Truman
Doctrine, Marshall Plan and NATO gave Turkey aids which this state could not receive in any other way
as well as a security guarantee against the Soviet Union. Long lines of roads constructed and Turkey
became one of the main agricultural states in the region. Her economy gave positive signals in each year
and survived from the war and postwar periods without serious damages. Turkey also managed to be
seen as a European state by the big powers and joined almost all the Western organizations thanks to her
close relations with the United States. On the other hand, in the long term, Turkey suffered from her
policies in this period. By starting in 1954, Turkish economy deteriorated and to fix the economical
problems Turkey adopted policies of requesting more economical aids and, as will be mentioned, when
it could not convinced the United States, Turkish leaders followed risky policies in the region by
provoking the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Turkey also could not grow its
industrial capacity because of the directions of the western states and followed an economic policy lack
of diversification of production. Moreover, maintenance and replacement parts of the military and
agriculture equipments which bought from the United States would be additional burdens to the Turkish
economy in later years.
Turkey also lost the political flexibility by joining the NATO and accepted to be one of
the first targets in the event of Soviet-American war. Turkey noticed of the disadvantage of the onesided policy only a decade after when President Johnson urged Turkey not to use the NATO equipment
for possible Cyprus operation in 1964 in contrast to the United States’ using the NATO airbases,
sometimes without approval of Turkey, for observing the activities in the Soviet Union and operating
military actions in the Middle East in the second half of 1950s. Moreover, Turkish permanent link with
the NATO could not give any chance to Turkey for benefiting from the “peaceful coexistence” policy of
the Soviet Union started one year after the Turkish membership in NATO. As a matter of fact, Adnan
Menderes, the leader of DP, pointed the neutrality and expecting cooperation with both sides as
negligence and rejected to follow this kind policy even in 1948187, before coming to power and Turkish
membership in NATO; however, the same Menderes approached to the Soviet Union in 1959 as a result
of the economic crisis. Consequently, Turkey may have a chance to follow neutrality and returned to the
“balance of power policy”, at least in theory, if it had not entered the NATO in 1952.
Final words must be said for the effects of the Turkish connection with the Western states
towards Middle Eastern states. Turkey had no close relations with the Middle Eastern states in the
187
For this speech, Sukru Esmerci, Menderes Diyor ki. (Istanbul: Demokrasi Yayinlari, 1967) p. 158-161.
71
interwar period but the Turkish war for independence war was highly respected by the Muslim populace
living under the mandate of the Western states, especially the rule of Great Britain and France. This
respect was one of the reasons that Bolshevik Russia established closer relations with Mustafa Kemal’s
Government. However, after the Second World War, in order to be accepted as a European state, Turkey
rejected the conferences of the Asian states and worse than this, recognized Israel in 1949. Their aim
was to get British approval for NATO membership; Turkey also reluctantly joined to the offer for
Middle East Command. Even though these events were less effective than the later policies of the
Menderes Government in the Middle East and they were not the indications of Turkish interests on the
region, they were important to show the starting point of the discontent between Turkey and the Middle
Eastern countries, especially with Egypt.
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CHAPTER 4
TURKEY’S BLOC POLICIES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION
During the period between 1945 and 1952, official Soviet-Turkish relations were at an
all-time low while the Soviet Union’s effect on Turkish foreign policy was at its zenith. This same
formula was applied during the years between 1953 and 1960, where the exact opposite effect occurred;
Soviet-Turkish relations peaked while the Russian effect faltered. Soviet policies, demands, threats, etc.,
were frequently ignored at this time and the guiding force behind this must be searched for in Turkish
commitment to the Western bloc. Although the Turkish Government believed wholeheartedly that their
security could be protected only through acting in parallel to the Western states188, the promise of
economical benefits and their goal to be a regional power severely engendered this commitment.
Moreover, after the economic conditions in Turkey deteriorated after 1954, Turkey fomented the crises
in the Middle East to draw attention to themselves as well as warrant economic aid from and draw the
United States to the area by closing their ears to Soviet “peace attacks,” threats and sometimes even
leading crises until the very last minutes; such as the crisis of Syria in 1957. Because of this Turkey
maintained inflexible policies against the Soviet Union and her Middle Eastern allies, amongst who
were Syria and Egypt especially. Turkey also eagerly volunteered to take part in Western initiatives such
as the Balkan Pact and Baghdad Pact in correlation with the “containment policy” of the United States
and as a predecessor of the Ottoman Empire, which had ruled these areas for centuries. It would not be
farfetched to claim that the Turkish Government wished to reinstate her position as a regional power in
these areas. What can be seen clearly is that these policies were completely opposite of the defensive
mentality of the Turks that was established during the first period of the Cold War and indeed, Turkey
guaranteed its security through entrance to NATO in 1952. Although Turkey was weary of being
surrounded by the Soviet Union and its linked countries, such as Bulgaria and Syria, in the event of an
attack, the Western countries were legally obligated to help. After joining NATO Turkey’s chief
concerns shifted from the Soviet threat and the security of Turkish lands to reestablishment as regional
power, as can be seen in Turkey’s aggressive challenge with the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern
188
For this argument, look at the President Bayar’s speech in T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt:25 (1.11.1953). p. 16.
73
crises, which also serves to prove that Turks were convinced that the Soviets would not risk general war
by attacking Turkey unless, they breached the red line created many decades before.
During this period as well, the Turkish Government conflicted with many fundamental
principles and policies that it had defended since the founding of the republic. Namely, Turkish thoughts
on Egypt’s sovereignty regarding the Suez Channel and Egypt-Soviet relation contradicted Turkey’s
own Strait’s policy and their relations with the Bolshevik Government in the interwar period. In
criticizing Syria as a war arsenal to the Soviet Union this ran counter to Turkish status in NATO and its
agreements with the United States against the Soviet Union. Turkey also bolstered establishment of
Middle East organizations while the very reason Turkey rejected the same kind of organizations in 1951
still existed in the region.
Soviet foreign policy changed towards Turkey after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 and
the new Soviet rulers renounced claims in May 1953. Soviet policy towards Turkey evolved into a
mixture of “peace attacks,” détente, threats and aspersion towards Turkey in its foreign policy with the
Middle Eastern states. The Soviet Union formed a “peaceful coexistence” policy towards Western States
and had acquired great interest on the Middle Eastern states. In reality, these policies were
interconnected; the Soviets were trying to attack the Western States not with arms but through the
deterioration of Western relations with Middle Eastern countries of who the former was dependant on
the Middle East for their rich supply of minerals. Therefore, this policy was no different than the
Bolshevik policy towards Asian states proffered in order to undermine British power through divestment
of British hegemony and resources from that area during the interwar period. After 1955, the
Khrushchev Government followed a similar method in an effort to divest the United States and the
Western states from minerals and supplies in the area. The Bolshevik Government encouraged the
Turks’ fight for independence and their position on the Straits issue to procure the respect and support of
the Asian populace living under British hegemony. Post-1955 the Soviet Government supported Egypt
on the Suez Channel issue and granted economical aid to Egypt as a show of goodwill and to gain the
friendship and trust of the Middle Eastern states. The Soviet Union aimed at counterbalancing the
superiority of American-Turkish collaboration in the area by cooperating with the Nasser Government in
Egypt. The source of this pressure on the Soviet Government was a medley of domestic reasons, such as
Stalin’s death and the contest for leadership within the country, in addition to external reasons. The
external reasons amounted to Greece and Turkey’s membership in NATO and the American-supported
74
coup of Iran in 1953189. The Soviet Government had to change its foreign policy towards the Middle
East as a blockade against this siege. These new policies instigated struggle and crises in the Middle
East throughout the 1950s.
4.1. Stalin’s Death and Soviet Renunciation on its Demands
Stalin’s death, a turning point in Soviet foreign policy, was treated as good news in the
Turkish press. Their former leader was compared to Hitler and described as a “…barbarian, faithless
dictator ingrained with ambitions of blood, revenge and power.” Nevertheless, any change to Soviet
foreign policy was unexpected and a claim resonated that the Soviet foreign policy would continue to
decline and with this the possibility of a Third World War would increase190. On May 30, the Turkish
Government received a note from the Soviet Union indicating that after review of the issues between
them and with neighbor states, the Soviet Union announced that “Georgian and Armenian Soviet
Republics had renounced the territorial claims on Turkey they had made some years earlier” and “the
Soviet Union had no territorial claims whatsoever on Turkey.” The note stressed that the “Soviet
Government reconsidered its opinion on Straits question” and “deemed it possible to ensure the security
of the U.S.S.R. from the side of the Straits on conditions acceptable alike to the U.S.S.R. and
Turkey.”191
Although this note represented a pivotal step forward in the new Soviet approach after
Stalin’s death, the Soviet’s intentions were still suspect and questionable. Firstly, the note was received
only days after John Foster Dulles left Turkey, after discussing the possible formation of a Middle East
organization, and three months later Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece’s signing the Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation. Any détente with the Soviet Union would hinder the economical and political welfare
of Turkey because Dulles’ visit was the first step towards the Baghdad Pact of 1955 and the
aforementioned Treaty was the first step in establishment of the Balkan Pact of 1954. Turkey expected
economical and political benefits from these organizations would not have jeopardized these benefits by
forming good relations with the Soviet Union. Concerning the Straits issue, the Montreux Convention
189
In June 2009, President Obama became the first American President who accepts the role of his states on the coup.
1953’te Iran’daki Darbeyi Biz Yaptik. Hurriyet, 5 June 2009. p. 24.
190
Dilek Herkmen, Turk Basininda Stalin’in Olumu in “Stalin ve Turk Dunyasi” (edited by Gursoy-Naskali, Emine & Sahin,
Liaisan). (Istanbul: Kaknus Yayinlari, 2007) p. 320-347.
191
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. August, 22-29, 1953. p. 13101. For the full note, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde
48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 503.
75
had been signed and was valid for 20 years and according to Article 28 of the Convention, two years
before the conclusion of this period any signing party could give notice of termination. Therefore, in
1954 the Soviet Union would have a right to terminate the convention and for the Turks, the timing of
the note may not have been a coincidence.
The context of the Soviet note was cause for alarm. The issues of the Turkish provinces
the Soviet Government blamed on the Armenian and Georgian Soviet Republics. At the end of the note
the Soviets stated that their government had no territorial claims on Turkey, however, it was clear that
the Soviet Government did not completely take responsibility for the disintegrating relations within this
note. The Soviet Government requested “acceptable conditions” for the USSR in regards to the Straits
and this would have meant that the Soviet Union did not satisfy the guidelines specified in the Montreux
Convention.
Therefore, the Council of Ministers discussed the issue and adopted the view that the
Soviet initiative may be in separating Turkey from the Western states and that the Turks should look
carefully before falling into the Soviet trap. On July 18, Turkey sent a short note to the Soviet Union
suggesting Turkish pleasure at the renunciation of territorial claims and pointed out the regulation
outlined in the Montreux Convention towards the Straits regime. According to Aktas, the shortness of
the Turkish note was the manifestation of the rapprochement pattern of the Ministry of Councils
decision192. Two days after the Turkish note, the Soviet Government replied with a request for additional
information about the US and British naval squadron that would visit Turkey at the end of July193. Even
if the true Turkish intentions were not to approach the Soviet Union when the United States expressed
interest in the Balkans and Middle East, these sorts of requests, warnings and threats in later notes
presented the Turkish Government with a chance to keep the Russian fear alive in Turkish public
opinion.
4.2. Turkey and the Containment Policy
As mentioned in previous chapters, after the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear tests, the
fall of China and the Korean War, the United States changed its containment policy towards the Soviet
Union and became more open to the possibility of local conflicts in important regions. The Korean War
192
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p.77. For the Turkish note,
Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 503-504.
193
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. August, 22-29, 1953. p. 13101.
76
was evidence enough that protecting the Atlantic region only would not be efficient in preventing the
Soviet threat and that the Soviet’s could harm the Western states through the capture of strategic areas.
To deflect this possible danger the United States started a policy that would encircle the Soviet Union
with regional organizations. Accepting Turkish and Greek requests for membership to NATO was the
first of many steps in the induction of this policy. Offering the Turks membership to the Western side
was acutely significant because of its geographical location linking it to both the Balkans and the Middle
East. So, in the mid-1950s Turkey became one of the founders of two out of three regional organizations
boosted by the United States. These organizations were Balkan and Baghdad Pact.
The American containment policy was compatible with Menderes’ convictions on
Turkey’s place in the future of international relations. Menderes thought that Turkey’s geopolitical role
made it the natural leader of the Eastern Mediterranean194. Because of this, the Turkish Government
was glad to take part in these organizations and instilled a rigid bloc policy to establish and/or keep them
alive even if they had to ignore the wishes of member states and/or exaggerate the Americans’
expectations from these organizations.
4.2.1. The Balkan Pact
The Balkan Pact was the second initiative of the Turks for an organization in the region.
As mentioned before, in 1934 Turkey became one of the founders of the first Balkan Pact in the region;
but, the organization was still-born because of the concessions Greece gave to Italy and Turkey to the
Soviet Union. The organization was originally founded by the independent small states to protect
themselves against the revisionist states. Conversely, the second Balkan Pact in 1954 was the product of
the bloc policy and solely Yugoslavia had genuine security problems. In 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav relations
dwindled markedly and since then Yugoslavia had been under pressure from the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia
took aid from the United States but there was no contractual link between Yugoslavia and the Western
states.
To the Western bloc, Yugoslavia’s participation in a western organization was important
for two reasons. First of all, if Yugoslavia joined a western organization this would have served as a
precursor to a division in the Soviet bloc. Secondly, by accepting Yugoslavia on the Western side, the
194
Bagci, Turk Dis Politikasinda 1950’li Yillar. p. 51.
77
geographical gap between Italy-Greece and Turkey would be prevented195. Yugoslavia was still a
socialist state and did not want to pursue a bloc policy by joining NATO. Yugoslavia’s main anxiety
was the Soviet threat on its security and the Balkan Pact, the Yugoslavians assumed, would prevent this
threat.
The key problem within the Balkan Pact is visible in this aspect. On 28 February 1953,
the first step towards the Pact was taken with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and on 9 August
1954, this agreement morphed into an alliance with the Bled Agreement and the Balkan Pact was
founded. Only nine months later, the meaning of the Pact disappeared for the Yugoslavs when
Khrushchev began his détente policy towards Yugoslavia during his visit to the state. Moreover, the
emergence of the Non-Alignment Movement in the Bandung Conference, held just one month prior to
Khrushchev’s visit revealed another part of the policy towards Yugoslavia neither by linking with the
Western bloc nor accepting the dominance of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, seemingly overnight
became one of the leading states in this movement along with India and Egypt. The attitude of the
Turkish delegation in the Bandung Conference and the creation of the Baghdad Pact as an organization
concerning the containment policy disturbed Yugoslavia. Through the establishment of the Baghdad
Pact, the Yugoslavs indirectly perceived themselves as part of an “imperialistic bloc” and tried to steer
away from this perception196.
While Yugoslavia welcomed the Soviet Union’s détente policy, Turkey was adhering to
the bloc policy and was not open to dissolving this strict policy in the event of peace approaches from
the Soviet Union. Turkey tried to shape these bloc policies by advancing a proposal for Yugoslavia’s
acceptance to the NATO Council197 without Yugoslavia’s permission. Turkey did the same thing in the
founding of the Baghdad Pact by offering Iraq American aid without the approval of the United
States198. Turkey’s stance on this matter can be seen in all developments made in the Middle East until
the end of 1950s, however when it came to the Balkans, Turkey had to forfeit earlier than in the Middle
East.
195
Kamuran Gurun, Dis Iliskiler ve Turk Politikasi (1939’dan Gunumuze Kadar). (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal
Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1983) p. 353.
196
As known, Turkey was not joining the conferences of the Asian states; however, they took part in the Bandung
Conference after the request of the Western states and acted as advocate of the Western states in the conference. This
position of the Turkish delegate caused bitter feelings on the Egypt and India as opponents of the Turkey’s relations with Iraq
and Pakistan. In the conference, Turkey resisted on the “condemnation of all kind of imperialism” by claiming that the
imperialism was not only adopted by the Western states, it was also followed by the Eastern bloc. Tellal, Uluslararasi ve
Bolgesel Gelismeler Cercevesinde Turkiye-SSCB Iliskileri (1953-1964). p. 39,43.
197
Bagci, Turk Dis Politikasinda 1950’li Yillar. p. 52.
198
Mutercimler & Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis politikasi. p. 170.
78
The first disagreements between Yugoslavia and Turkey sprang up at the first meeting of
the Standing Council in March 1955. These arguments were on the importance of the pact in lessening
international tensions and whether or not there was more hope for the solution of disagreements between
the Soviet Union and the Western states. Yugoslavia was convinced that it was not necessary to place
importance on military issues under preexisting conditions. Turkey, on the other hand, was discreet in
their handling of the new Soviet policies and paid more attention to the military issues199. These
differing attitudes can be deciphered by considering each side towards the pact. To Yugoslavia, the
Soviet threat was their reason for the establishment of the pact and in 1955 this threat disappeared. The
reason for the Menderes Government was how the pact would contribute to leadership in the Eastern
Mediterranean. This goal prevailed and deteriorating economical conditions began in 1954, the necessity
for American aid could not be ignored in light of Turkish insistence of Soviet threats.
Finally, the Cyprus problem between Turkey and Greece and the violent demonstrations
that broke out against Greek heritage in Turks at Istanbul on 6-7 September 1955 was another reason
behind the inefficiency of the pact. Following the emergence of this problem, Greece approached the
Non-Alignment movement in order to benefit from the Asian and African states in the solution of the
problems within the United Nations and cooperated with Egypt. After the nationalization of the Suez
Channel corporations, the Greeks and Soviets replaced the British workers and when the United States
wanted to use the bases in Greece for missiles, the Greeks were not eager to supply. In retrospect,
Turkey’s bloc policy in 1950s damaged the national interests of Turkey and the repercussions of this
policy can still be felt today in regards to the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that
Turkey did not act with national interests at heart. The Menderes Government was as nationalist and
pragmatist as the other governments in Turkey and they had believed that the bloc policy would serve
the national interests of Turkey through American political and economical aid more than a passive
policy. The Balkan Pact lost its efficiency after 1955 and officially ended in 1960.
4.3. Middle East in the new Turkish and Soviet Foreign Policies
Unlike the Balkans, the Western initiatives in the Middle East throughout the 1950s
became one of the focal points in Cold War competition and played a more important role in
international relations during this period. The Soviet Union did not inveigh against the Turks about the
199
Gonlubol, Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1965). p. 217-218.
79
Balkan Pact because, most likely, the Soviet Union was aware of the worries that the Yugoslavians had
and expected the futility of the pact toward Western aims. However, in the Middle East the situation was
entirely different and many newly independent states in the region were open to Western influence and
may have played a more important role in the formation of the plans for the Western bloc. The change to
the Soviet Middle Eastern policy in the mid-1950s and the Baghdad Pact along with the Eisenhower
Doctrine drew attention to the region and in the second half of the decade the Middle East had not
lacked crises, incidents and competition.
4.3.1. Change in Turkish Middle East Policy and the Baghdad Pact
Until entering NATO, Turkey had intentionally ignored the Middle Eastern countries in
its foreign policy in an effort to invalidate the argument that Turkey was not a European country and that
because of this that it should not take place in European security organizations and/or economic plans.
Over the course of time, Turkey refused to participate in the same conferences with Asian States and
stepped back from its pro-Philistine stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and recognized Israel in 1949.
When the British wanted to use Turkey in their plans to secure their interests in the Middle East and
opposed the Turks entrance into NATO, this caused resentment and antipathy towards the British200. The
Turkish Government unwillingly took part in the offer for Middle East Command with the other
Western states but this is not to be taken to mean that Turkey expected the cooperation between the Arab
and Western states. This conclusion can be viewed in the Inonu Government’s reasons behind the
futility of possible the Eastern Mediterranean Defense Pact of 11 May 1950. It was of the Turks opinion
that this pact “…could not be achieved while the Arab states were still technically at war with Israel,
while the Arab League itself was so manifestly rent with discord, and while no acceptable replacement
had been found for the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.”201
All of these reasons were still in existence when Turkey pursued an insistent policy for
the establishment of a Middle East organization after 1952 and Baghdad Pact was founded in 1955. This
situation allows one to conclude that the Middle Eastern policy of DP was very different from RPP and
that the new government had altogether different aims than its predecessor for the region. The Menderes
200
201
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IX, The Near and Middle East. p.216.
Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950. p . 53.
80
Government’s policies regarding this oil-rich region after 1952 was compatible with the goal of
becoming a regional power.
The new lines drawn in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East were seen in
Menderes and Koprulu’s travel to Great Britain in October 1952. During this visit, Menderes “expressed
great appreciation for urgent need” to the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) and stated that
sponsors must go ahead on the establishment of this organization “even if Arabs will not play.”202 The
policy of the Menderes Government regarding MEDO was called “Setting up shop, wait for customers”
and this idea was attuned with British policies regarding the region203. Throughout the 1950s, Turkish
policies would parallel with the British thoughts on more than America’s policy on the Middle East;
especially after 1955 visible differences between Turkish and American foreign policies were evident.
This situation was related to the difference between the desired levels of tension in the region. While the
United States had wanted to keep the tension low during the Cold War to avoid general war- the same
can also be said for the Soviet policies in the Middle East- Turkey preferred to keep the United States
attention on the region through strict bloc policies because, according to Menderes, American aid to
Turkey was directly linked to Western calculations in the region204. A pact lead by Turkey would serve
both Turkish aims for regional leadership and American economical aid. Turkey’s ignorance towards the
Soviet renunciation in 1953 should be viewed from this perspective.
The goals of the Turkish Government lead to confrontation with Egypt who had the same
aims as Turkey, that of becoming a regional power and receiving American aid. Both parties followed
an “exclusion policy” towards each other throughout the decade. During Dulles’ trip to the Near and
Middle East in May 1953, this was especially true, the competition between Turkey and Egypt was
prevalent. Egyptian leaders insisted that there were important obstacles in front of MEDO; these were
the British troops and technicians within the Canal Zone and the conflicts between the Arabs and Israelis
and furthermore, the Western support for Israel. Nasser asserted that British influence in Egypt caused a
“psychological block to setting up an area defense arrangement.” He continued that MEDO was seen as
a “perpetuation of occupation” by the Egyptian populace and “it involves too many non-area countries,”
and that the armies of the Arab states should play role in the defense of the region205.
202
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IX, The Near and Middle East. p.296-297.
Fahir Armaoglu, (Amerikan Belgeleri ile) Orta Dogu Komutanligi’ndan Bagdat Pakti’na, 1951-1955 in “Belleten”
Sayi:224, Cilt: 59. p. 205.
204
Ara Sanjian, The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact in “Middle Eastern Studies, Vol: 33(2). p.228.
205
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IX, The Near and Middle East. p.10-21.
203
81
The main points of the Egyptian argument did not fit with Turkish plans on its role in the
Cold War. These anxieties of Egypt caused delays on the foundation of the organization; considering
this, Menderes invited Dulles to visit Turkey during his trip aiming at the Arab countries.
The
conversation between Dulles and Menderes shows that the Turkish Government could not understand
the plausible anxieties of Egypt. Menderes supported British position in the Canal Zone and stated that
“the stationing of foreign troops in a country is no longer considered to be an infringement as
sovereignty, as once was the case.” Menderes evaded contradiction with the Turkish struggle for
independence consciously but he was also destroying all respect of the Arab populace towards the
Turkish independence movement. Menderes claimed that Turkey must be the backbone on the defense
of the Middle East and that the importance of the Arab countries’ joining the defense should not be
exaggerated, “…the hope of having the Arab countries accept MEDO should be abandoned at this time.
Menderes also expressed his desire for the American economic aids “to help Turkey carry out her duty
as guardian of civilization.” 206
After the Soviet-Egyptian approach in the second half of the decade, Turkey increased
attacks on Egypt and Nasser was named “a dictator [that] fell into the net of Moscow,”207 and the United
States was criticized because of her inflexible policies toward Egypt during the Middle Eastern crises
and later on. When it is taken into consideration that Soviet-Egyptian relations started in 1955 and the
real essence of their friendship was far from a kind of bloc-satellite connection seen under the next
subheading, the core unease of the Turkish Government was not the Soviet influence on the Middle
Eastern countries but was the “Egyptian barrier” in front of Turkish leadership in the area and the
distribution of American economical aid to the country.
In addition to this, Turkish persistence to blind themselves to the problems of the Arab
states, such as British colonialism in the area and the Arab-Israeli conflict would do nothing but increase
the antipathy felt for Turkey and it was this feeling that was successfully sustained by the Soviet Union.
The Ottoman past was frequently a reminder to the Arab populace through Soviet propaganda and the as
a result of this, the fears of some Arab states were kept alive. For instance, in 1954 Soviet propaganda
stressed a Turkish threat to Syria and claimed that Turkey wished to occupy Aleppo and other regions in
206
207
Ibid, p.137-147.
Mutercimler & Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis politikasi. p. 199.
82
North Syria. In much of the same way, the Soviet propaganda portrayed Turkey as an “American
colony” in the Arab states, similar to Iraq208.
On June 1, the result obtained from Dulles’ visit to the Near and Middle East was
discussed at the National Security Council and it was concluded that because of Egypt’s reluctance, the
concept of MEDO was not realistic at that time and that the United States should concentrate on the
concept of the “Northern Tier” including Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Syria, the states that felt the
“Soviet threat” more than the Arab states209. Accordingly, Turkey and Pakistan signed an Agreement of
Friendly Cooperation on 2 April 1954 under the shadow of American encouragement and on 24
February 1955, Turkey signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation with Iraq and the last chain of the
containment policy was contemplated after the founding of Balkan Pact and SEATO (South East Asia
Treaty Organization) in 1954. The latter agreement became the founding of the Baghdad Pact and Great
Britain first joined the organization in April 1955 and in autumn of the same year Pakistan and Iran
joined as well. Egypt, who did not want separation of Arab unity, deprecated the organization and the
membership of Iraq and Syria. However, this could not prevent Iraq from entering the organization
because of its urgent need for American aid.
The Baghdad Pact would not be as short-lived as the initiative in the Balkans but it is
hardly possible to claim that this was effective in the relations of the area. Looking at the members of
the pact, failure was inevitable because four members of the organizations had serious problems with the
non-aligned states that occupied the majority in the area. The most critical of these memberships was
that of Great Britain and it proves that among the Arab states the concepts of MEDO and/or the
Northern Tier were the tools of Western imperialism210. Through its membership, the British
Government’s first aim was to protect and/or control its wellbeing both in Iraq and the other Arab states.
As a strong Arab state in the Arab Union, Iraq clearly challenged the leadership of Egypt on Arab
populace and Turkey was confronting with Turkey on the leadership of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Because of the Kashmir issue, India had substantial issues with Pakistan and their joining the group
resulted in India and Egypt strengthening their relationship in the non-alignment movement.
208
Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East. p. 198, 203…The same “Ottoman fear” was stated by Dulles in the
Meeting of National Security Council hold to discuss the results of his visit on June 1, 1953: “Turkey was still greatly feared
by the Arab countries which she had once controlled.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IX, The
Near and Middle East. p. 137-147.
209
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IX, The Near and Middle East. p. 386.
210
Armaoglu, (Amerikan Belgeleri ile) Orta Dogu Komutanligi’ndan Bagdat Pakti’na, 1951-1955. p .235.
83
The difference between the non-alignment movement and the members of the Baghdad
Pact gave a chance to the Soviet Union and successive note exchanged took place between the Soviet
Union and Turkey. In a note sent after the Turkish-Pakistani pact, the Soviets stated that because both
states were not threatened by attack, the pact could not be regarded as a defensive agreement, but it was
closely connected to the military plans of the Atlantic bloc and the purpose of these kinds of pacts was
to convert the region into a base for the armed forces of the Atlantic bloc. Once again the Soviet
Government warned the Turkish Government that the responsibility of the consequences would lie on
the Turkish Government211. Although this is stated in most Soviet notes, these statements did far from
change the Turkish attitude.
One of the vital Soviet documents mentioning the “military groupings” in the Near and
Middle East was from the statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 16 April 1955. The segment
concerning Turkey follows:
“Matters have gone so far that peremptory demands have recently been made of Syria to
join the Turkish-Iraqi alliance. These demands are accompanied by threats calculated to
intimidate the Government and people of Syria and to compel Syria to reconsider her
refusal to take part in aggressive military blocs. Such actions, and the role which the
Western Powers allocate to Turkey in the establishment of military blocs in the Near and
Middle East, arouse legitimate fears in the Arab countries that Turkey is once again
striving to dominate them, and that a direct threat to their national independence is being
created.”212
The last part of the paragraph was motivated by the need to keep the “Ottoman fear” alive
in the Arab populace and the use of the words “once again” reflected this objective. This is also essential
in understanding the usage of propagandist words in the official papers of the Soviet Union.
A couple words should be said about the effect of the Baghdad Pact on Soviet penetration
into the Middle East after 1955. Some Turkish authors maintain that the Soviet Union inserted itself
into Middle Eastern affairs and/or the Soviets increased their efficiency in the region because of the
effects of the Baghdad Pact on the Arab states213. This evaluation must be viewed as an exaggeration
regarding the role of the pact. The main reason for Soviet penetration in the area was Egyptian
211
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. April 10-17, 1954. p. 13519.
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. June 11-18, 1955. p. 14256.
213
Erel Tellal, SSCB’yle Iliskiler in “Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar” Volume
I. p. 315.
212
84
discontent with American policies towards her. Moreover, the members of the Baghdad Pact gathered
for different goals rather than the Soviet threat and the triumph of this pact was as unexpected as the
Balkan Pact. It must not be forgotten that the Soviet Union reshaped its foreign policy after 1953 but it
could not be activated until 1955 because of the domestic struggle in the country.
Therefore, the growing Soviet activities in the region and the establishment of the
Baghdad took place in the same year coincidentally. As Soysal pointed out, even if this pact had not
existed, the Soviet Union would have wanted to threaten the Western states through oil resources and by
strategic means that would become decisive for the Western states214.
4.3.2. Change in Soviet Middle East Policy
From the end of the Second World War to the summer of 1955, the Middle East was not
one of the areas the Soviet Union showed interest in. The factor that determined the Soviet approach to
the Middle Eastern states was the latter’s relationships with the native communists215 and because the
events in the Far East and Eastern Europe were a high priority on the Soviet agenda, the Middle East
was ignored until new rule in the Soviet Union was established and a new agenda for foreign policy was
adopted.
Like the United States, the Soviet rulers were aware of the high level of destruction that a
potential nuclear war would cause and they decided to beat the Western states through production in the
country and by depriving those states of raw materials, their more sensitive point. Therefore, in the
second half of the decade the Soviet rulers adopted the policy of “peaceful existence” and tried to
decrease tension with disarmament offers and they did not disregard the local conflicts in important
strategic areas, especially in the Middle East and backed the newly independent states against the
“imperialist” powers and their “colonies” such as the United States, Great Britain and Turkey. This
policy was a return to Lenin and Stalin’s policy in the interwar period. Those leaders had wanted to hit
Great Britain in their sore spot by supporting the war for independence in Turkey and to provoke the
oppressed populace living under British dominance, like the Indians, now Khrushchev supported the
Middle Eastern countries that were dissatisfied with the regional policies of the Western states. Because
of this, the Soviet rulers reshaped their regional policies in the area and removed the ideology from their
214
215
Ismail Soysal, 1955 Bagdat Pakti in “Belleten”, Cilt:55, Sayi:212. p. 221.
Yevgeni Primakov, Ruslarin Gozuyle Ortadogu. (Istanbul: Timas Yayinlari, 2009) p. 89.
85
highest priority in their relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Smolansky cited in the Stalinist
motto, “He who is not with us is against us,” turned into “He who is not against us is with us, at least for
the time being” after 1955216. Principally in Soviet relations with Egypt, as the leader of the Arab states,
this played a huge role in Soviet insertion into the area.
Nevertheless, the greater share of the blossoming Soviet-Egypt relations belonged to
Western policies in the region similar to the reasons for the Soviet-Turkish approach in the interwar
period. The dual policy of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict, American cooperation with
Great Britain – the foremost enemy of the newly independent Arab states and of Egypt for years – in the
region and the United States’ withdrawal of its sponsorship of the reconstruction of the Aswan Dam
pushed Egypt into the arms of the Soviet Union. The brotherhood between Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union and the displeasure of India at Pakistan’s membership into the Baghdad Pact, as the other leaders
in the Non-Alignment Movement, were effective in booming Soviet-Egypt relations.
It is important to note that Soviet economical aid was more appropriate for the nationalist
and statist Arab states than American aid. The advantages of Soviet economic aid for the Arab states
were as follows:
1) The Soviet rulers stated that they would not give economical aid in return for military pacts and
bases;
2) Soviet credit had low interest-rates and allowed the debtor states to pay their debts with national
currency (Here, it must be remembered that Turkey had difficulty to find dollars for paying the
maintenance and replacement parts of the military munitions received according to the Truman
Doctrine);
3) Soviet rulers stressed the difference between Western and Soviet technical assistance. They claimed
that while the Western states created jobs for their citizens in the foreign states, they educated the native
staff and they would in turn leave that country;
4) While the Western aid aimed at laying the foundation for private enterprise, Soviet aid tried to lay the
foundation of statism.217
The effect of Western economic aids on Turkey is crucial. As a matter of fact, Turkey
suffered from all the negative characteristics of the Western aid mentioned in Soviet claims above.
216
Oles M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press,
1974) p. 25.
217
Guneri Akalin, A.B.D. ve S.S.C.B. Ekonomik Yardimlarinin Karsilastirmali Ozellikleri. in “Ankara Universitesi Siyasal
Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi”, Vol: 21(1). p. 59-76.
86
However, for Turkish Governments, especially for the Menderes Government, the quantity of the aid
was more important than the characteristics of aid.
The Turkish Government was also trying to
encourage privatization in the country and called for foreign enterprises to make investments in Turkey.
This situation caused a dilemma for the Turkish Government. To increase the amount of the American
aid, Turkey was provoking crises in the Middle East and aimed at drawing attention from the United
States. On the other hand, these crises were creating unstable conditions in the region in which it was not
mindful to make investments for the foreign enterprises. So, without successful economic structure,
Turkey kept demanding more economic aids and followed stricter foreign policy, which shows her as a
“warlike” and “irresponsible” country with a growing debts and budget deficit.
Even though political and economical reasons caused partnering between the Soviet
Union and Egypt, the latter was not ruled under the dominance of communism as the Turkish
Government claimed. Nasser’s approach to the Soviet Union and communism was reminiscent of
Mustafa Kemal’s methods in Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union. Even the two leaders’ statements
were alike. For instance, Nasser states, “Communism is one thing and cooperation with the Soviet state
is another.”218 These words are nearly identical to Mustafa Kemal’s statement of “Being a Bolshevik is
one thing, alliance with Bolsheviks is another,” which he expressed during the independence war against
opponents of Bolshevik help to the Turks. A couple of events in 1958 are enough to disprove
Communist dominance in Egypt: After the Iraq revolution, the Egyptian Government rejected the Soviet
demand on the publicity of all documents regarding the Baghdad Pact, which moved from Iraq to Cairo
by the Soviet representatives219; before his Soviet trip, Nasser restricted pro-Communist writers in Egypt
and banned Soviet propaganda pamphlets and books throughout the United Arab Republic220 which had
formed from the unification of Syria and Egypt was not to allow Syria to fall under the Communist rule
completely. However, even this unification was regarded as Communist work “to fight the Baghdad
Pact” by Adnan Menderes, although Fatih Rustu Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, articulated that
“…it would be happy if the union meant that Syria was going to get out of the Soviet orbit221.
These facts clearly show the “Cold War sickness” of the Turkish Government after
entering NATO and its reflection on her foreign policy brought nothing but hostility from the Middle
Eastern states and populace. Worse than following this policy, the Turkish Government frequently
218
Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East. p. 220.
Primakov, Ruslarin Gozuyle Ortadogu. p. 99.
220
Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev. p. 82.
221
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey. p. 737738.
219
87
assumed that domestic violations in the pro-Western Arab states were provoked by the governments that
were supported by the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union itself, like had happened in the Iraq Revolution
of 1958. The disgruntlement of the native populace towards their government was not estimated. Even
when Turkish ambassadors in the Arab countries gathered in Ankara for a conference in June 1956, the
majority of the ambassadors alleged that was hard to talk about a strong public opinion in Middle
Eastern countries222. The Arab countries went through what Turks had experienced in the 1920s. For the
Arabs, the Soviet threat was not more dangerous than the British and/or Israeli threat because while the
British and Israeli soldiers were in the immediate vicinity of Arab populace, the Soviet Union was
thousands miles away from their borders.
According to her new Middle Eastern policy, the Soviet Union displayed intensive efforts
to approach Turkey after her renunciation from previous demands. On 8 August 1953, Malenkov
repeated that they did not have any territorial claims on any country223; on 7 November, Bulganin stated
to the Iranian and Turkish Ambassadors in Moscow that some mistakes were made in their relations
with Turkey and Iran, Stalin had caused those mistakes and they would not be reiterated again. In the
same year, the Soviet Union offered to help in the return of remaining Turkish soldiers in Korea and sent
a celebration letter for the founding day of Turkish Republic for the first time since1941224. In December
1955, Khrushchev declared,
“When Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu held the reins of power in Turkey, our relations
with that country were very good, but those relations have subsequently become clouded.
We cannot say that this happened through Turkey’s fault alone. We too, made some
improper declarations which cast a cloud over those relations.”225
Although through this message Khrushchev hoped to heal relations, an important point
should be mentioned. In this message, Khrushchev spoke as if their relations were friendly during the
rule of Ismet Inonu. Only for less than a year, from November 1938 to 1939 at the Moscow Conference,
the Inonu Government had had friendly relations with the Moscow Government and after this, until the
end of his rule in 1950, fears and threats from the Soviet Union dominated these relations. By ignoring
this fact, Khrushchev indirectly cast the blame of deteriorating relations on the Menderes Government.
222
Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadogu’da Devrim Yillari (Bir Buyukelcinin Anilari). (Istanbul, 1977) p. 110.
Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1953. (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) p. 29.
224
Tellal, Uluslararasi ve Bolgesel Gelismeler Cercevesinde Turkiye-SSCB Iliskileri (1953-1964). p. 75-76.
225
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. January 21-28, 1956. p. 14655.
223
88
This methodology is clearly seen when Pravda wrote that “Menderes worsened the relations by putting
his country into NATO”226 after the military coup in Turkey in 1960.
Nonetheless, the interests of Turkey did not necessitate détente in its relationship with the
Soviet Union because the Soviet “peace attacks” came about at the same time as the economic
depression in Turkey. After the drought in 1954, the downtrend of exports and imports was seen
annually and the Turkish economy became one of the main problems between the United States and
Turkish Government. In his visit to Washington in June 1954, Menderes requested $800 million in
military aid and $300 million in economic aid over a period of four years; however, he was only able to
get one-fourth of the military aid and over $75 million in economic aid for 1954. The Menderes
Government could not recognize the economical advice given by the United States and at the beginning
of 1956, one of the questions asked about Turkey in the meeting of American diplomats in the Ankara
Embassy was “What good was a bankrupt ally?”227 In the same meeting, one of the evaluations was
correctly put,
“It seemed quite clear that United States should hold to a firm policy of extending only
the minimum amount of aid necessary to keep Turkey’s head above water unless and
until Turkey were to undertake policies of living within her means and so restoring
stability and solvency. Otherwise, Turkey could, and would be encouraged to, follow
policies which necessitated ever-increasing amounts of foreign help.”228
The validity of this estimation would be seen in Turkish attitude during the Middle
Eastern crises between 1956 and 1958, the same attitude that would depreciate Turkey’s relations with
the Soviet Union and Arab states, especially with Syria and Egypt.
4.4. Soviet Russia and Turkey in the Middle Eastern Crises
Between 1956 and 1958, the Middle East oscillated wildly as a result of the crises in the
Middle East. Soviet Russia as a leader of Eastern bloc and Turkey, as a small state between the Soviet
Union and the region and an ambitious member of the Western bloc, argued with each other over these
events. While the main objective of the former was to eject the military, economical and political assets
226
Saray, Sovyet Tehdidi Karsisinda Turkiye’nin NATO’ya Girisi: III. Cumhurbaskani Celal Bayar’in Hatiralari ve Belgeler.
p. 151.
227
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean. p. 659-661.
228
Ibid, p. 664.
89
of the Western states from the region rather than to genuinely to support the regional states, Turkey’s
aim was to draw the attention of the Western states for economical and military aid as well as to avert
the eyes of the Turkish public from domestic problems, even if it means forcing the limit of danger,
much like the Turkish Government did in Syria Crisis.
4.4.1. Suez Crisis
The Suez Problem started after Nasser nationalized the Canal in order to finance the
Aswan Dam on 26 July 1956 and turned into a crisis within a couple months. After the Egyptian
decision, two London Conferences were held in August and September and after getting nothing from
these conferences, Great Britain, France and Israel came to a secret agreement on 24 September.
According to his agreement, first Israel would begin occupation of Egypt and the next day Great Britain
and France called the two sides for armistice. When Nasser rejected this offer, these two states bombed
the Egyptian airports. Not only did this move irritate the Soviet Union, Eisenhower was also annoyed by
the “British and French tactic that belongs to nineteenth century,” 229 and on 2 November they put an oil
embargo on Great Britain and France and after that, the USSR threatened those two states by sending
volunteers to fight against them. Therefore, on November 7 the sides agreed to an armistice and the
crises ended.
The Suez Crisis concerned Turkey for several different reasons. First of all, Nasser’s
decision to nationalize the Canal affected the security of Turkey because in the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement, one of the conditions provided British use of the Canal in the event of an attack on Turkey.
However, it cannot be said that Turkey saw this problem as a security matter rather than a political issue.
As a signatory of the 1888 Istanbul Agreement, Turkey took part in the London Conferences and
supported the proposal of the United States, which anticipated an international agency for the
management of the Canal. Parallel to this offer, Turkish delegation at the conference stated that this kind
of agency would not violate the sovereignty of Egypt and to provide this proposed an amendment on the
United States’ offer. Conversely, the Soviet delegation regarded the Western proposal as “imperialist”
and “contrary to the conditions of twentieth century230. The Soviet press denounced the plan because “it
contradicted the principles of the United Nations and the basic tenets of the international law” and
229
230
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 110.
Kurkcuoglu, Turkiye’nin Arap Orta Dogusu’na Karsi Politikasi (1945-1970). p. 82-83, 92-93.
90
supported the views that the control of the Suez Canal was one of the Egypt’s sovereign rights231. When
the attitudes of both parties are compared with their view about the Montreux Convention, it is easy to
see how the political meanings of the issues overweighed the judiciary characters in their concepts of
foreign relations.
The military operation of Great Britain also affected the moves of Turkish Government
because of the former’s membership in Baghdad Pact. After the conflict erupted the members of the pact
– apart from Great Britain – gathered in Teheran and Turkey spent strenuous efforts to diminish the
reaction of other regional members and at the end of the meeting the members did not even condemn the
action of Great Britain and they only called out Great Britain and France for withdrawing from the
Egyptian lands. Moreover, on 10 November, Menderes told the British Ambassador that not inviting
Great Britain to the Teheran meeting was only “a temporary necessity”232. As a matter of fact, if the
United States had not reacted so harshly, Turkey may have supported Great Britain in the latter’s
operation, because the Turkish Government believed that Egypt only got what she deserved by not
entering into the Baghdad Pact. After the conflict, Zorlu professed that, “If the countries in the Middle
East had joined to the Baghdad Pact, the present situation would not occur.”233 Turkish press also
blamed Nasser for what happened. According to the press, “Nasser was only a shadow” and “the one
who closed the Canal was not Nasser, instead Bolsheviks did it.”234 After the Suez Problem, “hatred for
Nasser” would be a permanent item in Turkish minds and even at the end of 1959, he was regarded as
“ultimately as great a threat to the security of the area as Communist subversion on the assumption that
Nasser will eventually fall under Moscow direction.”235
Aktas said that the Arabs did not appreciate Eisenhower’s attitude; but that they agreed
with the view that the Soviet Union looked after their rights through its ultimatum on November 5236.
This argument is not completely true. The Arab populace may find the American attitude dishonest
because of the long-lasting Anglo-American alliance; however, the Soviet Union would not have come
to their aid if the event had gone to a critical phase and Nasser was fully aware of this fact, because
before the tripartite-attack Khrushchev himself told Nasser that he would not open a world war because
231
Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev. p. 41.
Kurkcuoglu, Turkiye’nin Arap Orta Dogusu’na Karsi Politikasi (1945-1970). p. 96-98.
233
Mutercimler & Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis politikasi. p. 202.
234
Ibid, p. 199.
235
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey. p. 825.
236
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 110.
232
91
of Suez237. Therefore, it is hard to claim that Soviet threats for supporting Egypt really changed Nasser’s
views regarding the real intentions of the Soviets. Soviet rulers waited until they were sure of the
American stance and thundered on the attackers. Even the difference between the Soviet and Egyptian
anxieties during the attacks unveiled the difference between benefits and/or interests of these states.
While Egypt’s primary concern was to realize the withdrawal of the Israel forces, the Soviet Union
frequently placed blame on the United States for the attacks, alleging that “influential circles in the
United States gave every possible encouragement to the Israeli military circles to attack Egypt.”238
4.4.2. Syria Crisis
During the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union and Turkey did not come up against each other
besides in anti-Soviet and anti-Communist articles found in the Turkish press; but, in the next year
Turkey came to the verge of war with Syria and by intervention of the “Big Brothers” the event turned
into one of the real tests in measuring the limits of the bloc leaders use of force after the declaration of
Eisenhower Doctrine on 5 January 1957.
The Syria Crisis headed international relations between August and September of 1957.
On 6 August, Syria signed an agreement for economical and technical aid with the Soviet Union, after a
week it lead to the deportment of three American diplomats on the accusation of efforts to throw out the
Syrian regime and 17 August, General Bizri known for Communist-leaning, became the Chief of Staff
in the army. In view of these developments in the south, Turkey moved her troops to the Syrian border
and the Soviet Union gave a swift reaction to the Turkish actions. The United States did not leave alone
Turkey against Soviet accusations and the event turned into a crisis between two bloc leaders and two
small states dependent on them. These problems were discussed in the United Nations but the solution
came about in an unexpected way and at an unexpected moment, when the Soviet leaders joined in the
reception of Turkish Ambassador for the celebration of founding day of Turkish Republic and broke the
ice239. The crisis ended as suddenly as it started.
Distrust of Syria in Turkey actually started after the former declined to enter the Baghdad
Pact and decided to sign an agreement with Egypt for an alternative pact. In view of this situation,
237
Primakov, Ruslarin Gozuyle Ortadogu. p. 64.
Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev. p. 54-55.
239
Melek Firat & Omer Kurkcuoglu, Ortadogu’yla Iliskiler in “Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular,
Belgeler, Yorumlar” Volume I. p. 630-631.
238
92
Turkey sent a strong and Soviet-like message to the Syrian Government in March 1955 and warned her
that “if Syria adopts [a] hostile attitude, Turkey cannot remain indifferent or tolerant.”240 Indeed, what
bothered Turkey was the Egyptian-Syrian approach, which could have jeopardized the Baghdad Pact.
Right after the end of Suez Crisis, Turkey’s fear of Soviet-Syrian cooperation increased
and Turkish officials warned the United States about the Soviet over flights in the direction of Syria on
Turkish territory and stated that this situation was cause for NATO air defense over Turkey. However,
the Americans did not join in the Turkish view and concluded that the situation must be accepted as a
violation of air space rather than a situation that necessitated the application Article 5 of NATO and did
not regard the problem as casus belli241. However, four days later at the meeting of American officials,
Menderes visited the American Embassy in Ankara and stated that “further violations by Soviet planes
will be met [with] resistance.” Moreover, the Embassy concluded that “Turks would like [to] enlist US
support in taking positive measures in Syria.”242
Turkish keenness to fight against Syria and the Soviet Union and its unhappiness with the
former came before the Syrian activities in August. The situation in Summer 1957 can be attributed to
economic depression and domestic restlessness toward the ruling party in Turkey. According to Turkish
Government, American needs from Turkey were parallel to economical and military aid and a crisis
would bring the help that Turkey urgently needed. In these years, the United States expected economical
stabilization and a realistic rate of exchanges, but Menderes could not head the advice of the United
States because this advice would hinder the developmental plans of Turkey. The United States was very
persistent in its warnings and even Eisenhower acknowledged in National Security Council in March
1957 that “if Turks still refuse to take some of these steps” he was not sure that “they could be
described…as “staunch allies” of the United States243. The United States’ economical disagreement
grew over time and Turkey, rightfully, believed that the security concerns of Americans could outweigh
the disagreements only in crisis. Therefore, in the climax of the Syrian crisis, the Turkish Ambassador
visited the Department of State and asserted that “although anti-Russian feelings are very strong among
the people [Turks], the situation cannot be taken [for] granted” because of the economical situation in
Turkey and “heavy defense expenditures,” and the question was “how long these offers [Soviet
240
Ayegul [Aysegul] Sever, The Compliant Ally? Turkey and the West in the Middle East 1954-1958 in “Middle Eastern
Studies”, Vol:34(2). p. 76.
241
Article 5 stipulates that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern
Mediterranean. p. 692-694.
242
Ibid, p. 695-696.
243
Ibid, p. 707-710.
93
economic offers] can be resisted.”244 Even this “indirect threat” is enough to show the desperate need
Turkey had for economic aid. Since becoming a NATO member, Turkey had been a passionate advocate
of the bloc policies. However, because of the economical and political agreements of Turkey with the
United States and the quantity of the Soviet aid, Turkey would hardly change her political and
economical direction, and by this “threat” Turkey only wanted to remind the United States of her
importance.
Although Turkey was interested in the tension boiling in the area, blaming only her for
the Syria Crisis would be unfair. The Soviet Union was increasing her effects on Syria and even, as
Laqueur points out, the latter tended to move too fast (in the direction of the Soviet Union) to make the
other countries reconsider their attitude towards the Soviet Union245. Because of this dangerously high
Soviet effect, Nasser decided to unite with Syria in 1958, even though he believed that this unification
occurred far earlier than it should have. Therefore, the Soviet Union did not leave Syria alone and
expressed her attitude towards Turkey in the staunchest way of the 1950s.
On September 10, Bulganin wrote a letter to Menderes. Bulganin’s letter had three
important characteristics. Firstly, it reminded Turkey of the similarities between the Soviet-Middle
Eastern relations and Soviet-Kemalist Government relations. Then it indicated that the United States was
the one behind the actions of Turkey proclaiming that the American Envoy Henderson’s visit to Turkey
was proof of a “task to organize a plot against Syria” to overthrow the Syrian Government. The Soviet
Union made it clear that she regarded the United States as a correspondent in this matter. And finally,
the letter served as a warning to Turkey through suggesting that, “Once started, military action in such
an area [the Middle East] could easily become a broad conflict. It would then be difficult to confine its
consequences with an area.” Bulganin stressed that in the event of Turkish attack it would turn into
general war and Turkey would be the one mostly injured246.
Menderes replied to this letter on September 30 and started with a reminder to the Soviets
that good relations with Turkey in the interwar period also served the Soviet Union, who had completely
isolated and showed the Soviet threats and demands after the world war as responsible factors in
deteriorating relations. Then Menderes stated that, “positive results in matters concerning the
244
Ibid, p. 736-737.
Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East. p. 254-255.
246
For the letter, Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 233-237.;
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. October 19-26, 1957. p. 15811.
245
94
independence of nations are not possible by words alone but by de facto and de jure actions.”247 Indeed,
this statement was a set phrase when Turkey replied to the “peace attacks” of the Soviet Union.
Regarding the Syria issue, Menderes expressed that Syria was “hastily arming beyond the
limit of any reasonable defense needs” and she became “an arms depot which will probably be used by
others in case of need.” It is interesting to note that if the same statement had been used in a Soviet note
in switching the name of Syria with Turkey, no one would have seen anything strange. However,
Menderes, who made a severe blunder with this statement, stated that he did not receive any letter from
Syria regarding this issue. Therefore, Menderes indirectly stressed the Soviets’ link to the developments
in Syria. Menderes also stated that Henderson visited the area for observation and his discussions with
Turks did not suggest aggressive plans. In review of Turkey’s actions on the Syrian border, Menderes
cited them as defensive measures248.
Some time after Menderes’ letter, Syria sent a note to Turkey. At the same time Soviet
Union as well as Egypt, had increased their support for Syria. While Egypt sent troops to Syria, the
Soviet rulers appointed Marshal Rokossovski, Deputy Minister of Defense and a hero in World War II,
as the Commander of the Transcaucasia Military District249. Nevertheless, like the Suez Crisis, the
Soviet Union targeted the United States, as can be seen in Bulganin’s letter and on October 9, the same
day of the Syrian note to Turkey, in the interview with the New York Times, Khrushchev blamed Dulles
for “inciting Turkey to attack Syria.” Moreover, he threatened Turkey and declared that, “If the rifles
fire, the rockets will start flying” and until the United States came to help, Turkey could “not last one
day.”250 One day later, the State Department answered Soviet accusations and threats by saying,
“Despite distances, he [the Soviet Union] should be under no illusion that the United States…takes
lightly its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty,” or was not determined to carry out the
guarantees given these countries through the Eisenhower doctrine. One week later, Dulles likened the
situation with Korean War251; however, their reaction to the Soviet Union would not be like it had in the
Korean War.
The Syrian Crisis can be summarized as follows: the Soviet Union increased her
influences in Syria and they grew more than the former expected. Turkey did not miss this chance to
247
For the letter, Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 239-243.;
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. October 19-26, 1957. p. 15811-15812.
248
Ibid.
249
Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev. p. 69.
250
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. October 19-26, 1957. p.15812.; Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961. (New
York: Doubleday& Company, Inc., 1965) p. 204.
251
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. October 19-26, 1957. p.15812.
95
draw American attention to the area and to detract the attention of Turkish public opinion from domestic
consents and more importantly from general elections on October 27. In comparison to Turkey, the
Soviet Union did not skip this chance to take some indications about the American commitment to the
regional states and in this incident with Turkey and challenged the United States. When the Soviet rulers
saw the determined stance of the United States and that Menderes had reached his aims by gaining the
support of the United States and winning the elections, they did not see any necessity to drag on the
issue. On October 29 Khrushchev and Bulganin visited the Turkish reception and proposed a toast, “To
Peace! To Peace! Let him be damned who wants war! Let him fight alone! But why talk about war
anyway – there will be no war.”252 Like the Suez issue, for the Soviet Union, the matter was not to help
to the Middle Eastern states and Syria Crisis was another tactical war without arms against the United
States.
4.5. On the Way to the Military Coup of 1960
Turkey got her long-standing credit wish in the summer of 1958 and received $359
million in credit from the United States. The determining factor for this credit was, as usual, corrosion in
USA-USSR relations. In July 1958, the monarchy in Iraq was overthrown and this event was important
because it was not started by Western powers as the Suez Crisis had been or by a small state in Western
bloc like Syria Crisis. The Iraq Crisis was not started even by the Soviet Union or Egypt. As Primakov
suggested, when the demonstrators occupied with the coup killed the Iraqi leader Nuri al-Said and gave
his cut-off finger as a gift to Nasser, the latter was shocked at the destiny of the late leader even though
he did not like al-Said253. The coup was homegrown and based on the despondency of the Iraqi people at
the Western policies of late leader. Nonetheless, the Western bloc lost one of the rare strongholds in the
Middle East and decided that Lebanon and Jordan would fall like dominos. Bases in Turkey were
critical in these operations and the Americans needed to satisfy Turkey. The Americans were concerned
about the successive rejections of Turkish demands for help. Even before the Syria Crisis, Ambassador
Warren expressed that, “Turks have accepted negative replies in the past and will continue to do so,
but…these turndowns will lead to a deterioration in U.S.-Turk relations to the point where the US will
not be able to obtain what it wants from Turkey when it wants it.”254
252
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. December 21 – 28, 1957. p. 15920.
Primakov, Ruslarin Gozuyle Ortadogu. p. 21.
254
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean. p. 717.
253
96
The United States demands were not limited to the usage of bases for the Middle Eastern
operation. In June 1959, the United States came up with another offer: To establish IRBMs
(Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles). Since December 1957, the United States had been looking for
possible areas to establish these missiles such as France, Italy, Greece, West Germany and Turkey.
Turkey was at the end of this list because North European members of NATO believed that putting
missiles in Turkey may provoke the Soviet Union and Turks would “irresponsible” and “warlike” with
them255. Unquestionably, this view was the result of the Middle Eastern policies on Turkey in former
years; however, Turks had one unique advantage which put her at the beginning of the list in 1959. The
protest of public opinion against the missiles was not in existence in Turkey and strong anti-Soviet
feelings did not bring about any protest to feelings against the missiles. Turkish leaders were so
impatient to sign the agreement regarding the missiles that they did not need to question the
disadvantages of those missiles. Regardless of the fact that they would need a long preparation time,
invite attacks because they were immobile and they were also politically provocative256. Despite these
negatives, Turkish eagerness for IRBMs and the inert public reaction shows the strength of anti-Soviet
feelings both in the Turkish Government and Turkish public opinion.
Although DP completely participated in bloc policies, the United States tried to avoid
close relations with the party at this time. The reason for this attitude was the despair within Turkish
public opinion towards the party and the close relationship of the American Government with the
Menderes Government that was directing a part of this content to the alliance with the United States.
Opponents of Adnan Menderes believed that American help lengthened the life of his party and
protected the party from its leaders’ mistakes. A slogan against American help to the party was, "If
Allah does not provide, America will."257 Especially after the 1957 elections, Turkish-American
cooperation became a matter of discussion in domestic policies; however, the aim was not to change the
direction of Turkish foreign policy from the alliance with Western bloc but instead, the opponents were
trying to prevent American support to DP. Therefore, whenever RPP criticized the bloc policies of
Menderes Government, the officials of the party visited the American officials in Turkey and stated that
their opposition was not against an alliance with the United States, and Americans showed tact towards
these critics. For instance, when RPP criticized the American's use of bases in Turkey during the
255
Philip Nash. The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963. (Chapel Hill, N.C.:
University of California Press, 1997) p. 45.
256
Ibid, p. 66, 75, 81-82.
257
Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971.. p. 80-81.
97
Lebanon operation and American credits given in 1958, American Ambassado,r Warren informed his
department that if RPP was in power, they would cooperate with the United States in regards to use of
the bases like that of DP258.
The sovereignty of Turkey in this period was sometimes seriously damaged by the
policies of Democratic Party and sometimes by the United States. For example, when Adnan Menderes
began to form his new cabinet after the 1957 elections, he asked for the view of the Americans regarding
the appointment of his new Foreign Minister Fatih Rustu Zorlu. Turkey's participation in regional
organizations after the encouragement of the United States and/or American control on how Turks used
economic and military aid may not be seen as a breach of sovereignty because they can be viewed as
inevitable conditions of being in the Western bloc; however, asking the view of the Americans regarding
the appointment of ministers conflicted with the concept of sovereignty. The United States did not see
this question as out of the ordinary and stated that "the United States had high regard for Zorlu."259
Another infringement case against Turkey’s sovereignty came from American flights
from the bases in Turkey because Turkish officials were unaware of the exact objectives of these flights.
Worse than that, sometimes Turkey learned that these objectives not from the American officials but
through Soviet notes, such as the "Balloon Crisis" between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1956. On
February 4, the Turkish Government received a note from the Soviet Union claiming that many balloons
equipped with cameras, radios and transmitters that had originated from the United States entered the
Soviet air space from Turkish territory and the Soviet Government requested that Turkey take measures
against these infringements of air space. In the reply to this note, Turkey ignored Soviet points regarding
the characteristics of the balloons and stated that these balloons were meteorological devices. On
February 20, the Soviet Government sent one more note to Turkey and offered to stage an exhibition in
European countries in order to show those devices and if Turkey wanted she could send a commission of
experts to examine the devices. In reply, Turkey rejected this offer and demanded the return of the
balloons if the Soviet wanted Turkey to examine that the devices were sent from Turkey. Because
Turkey was unaware of the characteristics of the balloons, Turkey was trapped by the Soviet notes and
more importantly, the Soviet Union learned who was truly behind the flights260.
Neither these incidents nor American neutrality between the Turkish parties caused any
258
Faruk Cakir, Amerikan Bakis Acisindan Turkiye’de 1957-1960 Donemi Siyasal Gelismeleri ve Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri in
“Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi” Vol: 59(1), p. 68.
259
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean. p. 745-746.
260
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 129-132.
98
decline in the Democrat Party’s bloc policy and Turkish-Soviet rapprochement at the end of 1959 started
after Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. This situation once more proves that Turkish-Soviet
relations after 1945 were strictly connected to the American-Soviet relations. On 9 December 1959,
Lutfi Kirdar, the Turkish Minister of Health, became the first diplomat to visit the Soviet Union since
1939. Although Turkey took a step towards the Soviet Union through this visit, a couple of days prior
Zorlu did not fail to mention his suspicions about the Soviet Union’s policies during Eisenhower’s visit
in Turkey. According to Zorlu, the Soviets wanted detente, in optimistic approach, because they had
accomplished economic gains and now wanted to protect their superiority by cutting defense
expenditures to challenge the Western states economically: “The Soviet goal is still domination of the
world and the free world must be able to maintain its solidarity. Any dissonance among allies
encourages the USSR.”261
4.6. U-2 Crisis and Military Coup in Turkey
One of the main discussions in Turkish political history is whether or not the United
States placed a role in the military coup in Turkey because of the growing Turkish-Soviet relations in
1960. After Kirdar’s visit, Turkish and Soviet politicians did not settle for this and the Turkish and
Soviet Governments announced the decision of the mutual visits of Menderes and Khrushchev to each
other’s countries on 12 April. According to this decision, Menderes would pay a visit to Moscow on 12
July. The main objectives of the Turkish Government might have been to create an alternative – but not
rival – way to American economic aid and diminish opposition regarding the strict bloc policy of DP.
However, this visit should not be thought of as “gunboat diplomacy” against the United States. As a
matter of fact, the visit was, as Ilkan claimed, a great success for the Soviet Union because Turkey was
known as the most intractable member of NATO.262 And finally, the Soviet government managed to
break the stubbornness of Turkish Government. However, Turkey informed the United States on every
phase of their decision and the talk about the visit with the Soviet officials were made under a peaceful
atmosphere in West-East relations. In May 1960, the victorious states of the Second World War were to
meet in Paris to discuss the future of Germany; this was the best atmosphere for Turkey to approach to
the Soviet Union.
261
262
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey. p. 821.
Ilkan, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). p. 59.
99
The U-2 incident on May 1st upset this calm atmosphere in international relations. On that
day a U-2 plane was brought down by Soviets under the accusation that the plane was flying for
espionage activities. This situation brought the United States and the Soviet Union into a crisis right
before the Paris Conference and the matter concerned Turkey because the plane was landed from
Turkey. Because of the U-2 incident, Turkey suddenly found itself between two powers. While the
Soviet Union sent note to Turkey on May 13 reminding her of her responsibility for the incident because
the plane was aired in Turkey, the New York Times criticized Menderes’ visit to Moscow and warned
Turkey in writing that, “If Menderes does not change his policy, it is hard to guess what would happen
next.”263 This indirect threat created proof for those who supported the American role in the military
coup, but it must not be forgotten that this article was published during the rough atmosphere fashioned
by U-2 incidents. Turkey gave full support to the United States in the incident and rejected her
responsibility with a note on May 26, one day before the military coup, by stating that the responsibility
of Turkey is applicable on Turkish air space; in the air spaces of other countries Turkey is responsible if
the matter of discussion is a Turkish plane; and the U-2 plane had not entered the Soviet territory
through Turkish-Soviet border264 – the U-2 plane entered the Soviet Union through Pakistan. The
support of the Turkish Government was satisfying and inspired the Turkish Ambassador to the United
States say, “I have never known a better ally” in his telegram regarding his conversations with Adnan
Menderes only a week before the coup265. If the United States had wanted a coup in Turkey, one of the
people who would have needed to know this would have been the US Ambassador. Also, under these
conditions it is hard to see any reason to make the United States suspect of the commitment of Turkey to
the Western bloc.
The military coup that occurred on May 27 is really an interesting model in the history of
military coups. Everything recognized, a small number of middle-rank officers and the coup resulted in
the retirement of many high-rank officers. This result reminded a researcher of of the NATO demand for
the personnel reform in the army. Even this does not provide clear proof of American involvement in the
coup because this reform may have been realized to decrease the reaction of Western states. Therefore,
without any evidence it is unfair to claim that the United States wanted and/or was involved in the
Turkish military coup because of its grief over the growing Turkish-Soviet relations and/or its demands
263
Saray, Sovyet Tehdidi Karsisinda Turkiye’nin NATO’ya Girisi: III. Cumhurbaskani Celal Bayar’in Hatiralari ve Belgeler.
p. 150.
264
Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru. p. 149-150.
265
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey. p. 842.
100
on Turkish army.
An appropriate evaluation may be that the United States did not want to get involved in
the domestic issues of Turkey so as to not to be damaged from the inevitable public reaction to the
Democrat Party. Therefore, the United States would establish good relations with the new Turkish
Government – most likely it would be RPP – from the beginning. The thoughts of the United States on
RPP were clear even during the 1957 elections and they thought that if Inonu came to the power again,
he would continue the pro-Western line of Turkey but may “display the high degree of
independence.”266 What the American officials were afraid of was the long-lasting rule of the
Provisional Government and renewed Soviet “peace attacks” on rule in Turkey. After the coup, the
Soviet Union blamed Menderes for the weakened relations and offered $500 million with the %3 rate of
interest. It is extremely questionable that the Soviet Union would ever give that much economical aid –
it was almost the half of the total American aid made up until that date – however, even hearing that
number would be attractive both for the new Turkish Government and Turkish public opinion and the
American officials believed that if Turkey accepted this aid, “the bars will be down” and “the United
States and Western World will have suffered a major and tragic defeat.”267 Again these anxieties can be
seen as proof to the opposition of American involvement into the military coup of Turkey. Why would
the United States prefer to deal with these kinds of questions when they could benefit from the full
cooperation of the Menderes Government?
In September 1960, during his conversation with the Secretary of State at the United
Nations General Assembly, Selim Sarper, the Turkish Foreign Minister, reaffirmed the Turkish
Government’s commitment to its NATO, CENTO and bilateral obligations while they intended to have
“better neighborly relations” with the Soviet Union268. Turkey continued its pro-Western stance until
1964, although it was not in the same degree with that of the Democrat Party; with the events of the
Cyprus Crisis and the disreputable “Johnson Letter,” Turkey began questioning the nature of her alliance
with the United States.
266
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean. p. 744.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey. p. 875.
268
Ibid, p. 882.
267
101
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In Turkey the years between 1945 and 1960 were comprised of significant developments
in both Turkish domestic and foreign policies. If scrutinized closely, the roots of many problems
infecting Turkey today were sown in this period, consisting of but not limited to economic problems, the
problems with establishment of democracy and the Cyprus issue. Even the transportation disorder
resonating today was a product of this era. The $5 million gifted in Truman aid was distributed to the
construction of the roads to carry the military equipments without difficulty and Turkey became a
country covered with new transportation routes and domestic roads, nevertheless, railway transportation
remained undeveloped because of these policies. The urgent issues felt during later years can be directly
attributed to the three problems listed above.
Turkey drastically changed their economic and political structure during the postwar
period. As a result of the malevolent promise of a Soviet threat the Turkish Government shattered their
evolutional progress. After the war ended Turkey was still a young country of 22-years but the
fundamental alterations in economic, social and political structure revealed the characteristics of a state
much older. It was no easy feat for Mustafa Kemal to modify a regionalist and conservative 600 year old
empire into a modern, secular, democratic state in such a short time. As often as Kemal motioned
towards advancement to a multiparty system, fundamentalist opposition parried the moves of his
Republican People’s Party and so, for a while he was forced to revert back to the one-party system.
Turkey needed to keep its statist and holistic development because of the long-standing economical
system of the Ottoman Empire. When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk passed away in 1938 the evolution was
cut short and the eruption of World War II froze the process altogether. By following a faultless war
policy during the Second World War – thanks to the Moscow negotiations between Saracoglu and
Molotov in 1939 – Turkey survived the war with minimal loss. However, when faced with the pressure
of increasing Soviet demands in the post-war period and deserted by the Western countries, the Inonu
Government adopted liberal economic and political systems. This situation was not only outrageous by
almost impossible, it was similar to expecting a 10-year old child to age 15 years over the course of a
day. This lapse in judgment by the Inonu Government placed the Turkish economy in a downward
102
spiral. The Soviet propagandist “war of nerves” policy worsened the situation and even before the
drought and economic recession of 1954, Turkey paid attention to American criticism that maintained
the problem with the Turkish economy lied in the fact that the Turks failed to comply with the American
economical concept269. Blame should not be placed when the Turks main concern was to save the
country from the Soviet Union rather than focusing on economic transformation.
The breach in Turkey’s evolution was triggered by two key aims: the Soviet threat and
the Western wish to use Turkish lands as a buffer zone to prevent Soviet penetration into strategic areas.
If the Soviet Union had respected the 1925 Neutrality Agreement and the Turkish offer for an alliance
regarding the security of the Black Sea, Turkey would have most likely stuck to a balance of power
policy and continued fruition. Soviet demands on the Straits and Turkish provinces as well as the Soviet
Union’s ultimate goal-to ascertain a “friendly government” in Turkey pushed the latter towards founding
a relationship with the Western states. Three basic problematic areas – communist rule in Turkey,
recognition of Soviet demands and concerns on the regime in the Straits and retrocession of the
provinces in Eastern Anatolia – became the core controversial issues presented during the interwar
period between the two states, but because the Soviet Union also wanted Turkish lands as a buffer zone
against the British threat, the Soviet Union did not come to a deadlock on these issues. Similarly, during
the Ottoman era Turkey served as a buffer zone of the British Empire to blockade Tsarist Russia from
using the trade routes of the Empire between its homeland and colonies. Therefore, from the beginning
of the nineteenth century up until the end of the World War II, Turkey functioned as barrier in the
competition between Great Britain and Tsarist Russia/Soviet Union.
The friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey during the interwar period
can only be explained by the relatively weak position of the Soviet Union in international relations.
After the Second World War bombarded the big European powers, the Soviet Union’s position in the
international hierarchy reversed and the Soviet Union dismissed good relations with Turkey through
termination of the Neutrality Agreement, commanding retrocession of Turkish provinces, bases on the
Straits and the dissolve of the Montreux Convention. From the end of WWI to Turkey’s guarantee of
security through entrance in NATO in 1952, factors in Turkish-Soviet relations correlated with the
position of the Soviet Union in comparison to the other great powers in international relations.
In the postwar period, Turkish-Soviet relations were determined by two factors:
American-Soviet relations and the objectives of the Democrat Party after 1950. After February 1946, the
269
Erkin, Disislerinde 34 Yil, Washington Buyukelciligi. II. Cilt, I Kisim. p. 110.
103
United States expressed keen interest in the territorial integrity and independence of Turkey, although
the true motive behind this kindle in interest is highly suspect. As per the American point of view,
Turkey’s importance was no different than the British view on the Ottoman Empire and Soviet view
during the interwar period. Once again Turkey played the role of a buffer zone in the prevention of
Soviet penetration into the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. This fact is made perfectly clear
when military units were erected in Southern Turkey. It is impossible to claim that the purpose of this
was the protection of Turkey because through paving a security line through the southern part of the
country, the other parts were excluded from security measures. As Bozdaglioglu addressed, what
influenced the American approach to Turkey was not security but rather the security of the areas
neighboring Turkey, such as the Middle East, Western Europe270 and the Balkans.
The question must be posed of whether or not Turkey needed to implement liberal
economic and political ways in order to benefit from Western support? And in turn, was it absolutely
necessary for Turkey to hinder progress to gain the aid of the Western states against the Soviet Union?
Even in retrospect it is difficult to answer these questions. The Western states would have had to protect
Turkey at all costs as a neighbor to both the Soviet Union and the Middle East and therefore, would have
helped Turkey even without Turkey’s official request. Turkey lost all benefits and accumulations
acquired from abstaining from WWII after a short period of time because Turkey had to maintain its
large army in alarm stance against the Soviet Union. The Turkish Government would not dare risk
exclusion from the Marshall Plan, which brought American control to the Turkish economy indirectly
because Turkey was compelled to use the money granted as the European Development Plan dictated. In
an effort to battle harsh critiques from both the American Senate and public opinion in relation to aid
given to Turkey, a working multi-party system was formed.
In spite of Turkey’s announcement of the recognition of a multi-party system during the
San Francisco Conference in April 1945, to say that it was implemented in the election of the next year
would be false. After the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the more Turkey became dependent on
the Western states, the less the Republican People’s Party could obstruct the working multi-party
system.
What would have happened had Turkey not insisted on participating in the Marshall Plan
and kept a single-party system? Turkey’s geographical importance would have almost guaranteed
270
Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Turkiye-ABD Iliskileri in “Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-2008), edited by Haydar Cakmak.” (Ankara:
Baris Platin Yayincilik, 2008) p. 465.
104
Western support, at least as much to keep Turkey’s head above water. Taking into consideration the
budgetary constraints of the American Government and that the government’s priority was the security
of Western Europe, this would have been a risk for the Turkish Government. Turkey’s economic
problems reinforced by the “war of nerves” may have increased and communism might have gained
supporters and Turkey would have had to take on the role of Korea in the Cold War or yield peacefully
to Soviet orders. The main factor that significantly influenced decision of the Turkish Government in the
postwar period, broke its evolutional progress and caused Turkey to throw away the “balance of power
policy” was the possibility of a Soviet threat. The verdicts of the Soviet Government were
incomprehensible and assuming that Turkey could not feel the overwhelming danger of the Soviet
Union would be wrong. The Korean War of 1950 is evidence that supports this; the war occurred after
Acheson excluded areas from the United States’ sphere of security and after MacArthur reported that
attacks on Korea were not expected271. Because of these conditions, why would not Turkey expect an
attack from Bulgaria and/or Georgian/Armenian Soviet Republics?
Even in the 1950 election, the result was not a change of Government in Turkey and/or
Turkey did not enter the security plans of the Western countries. As a result of the war, however, Turkey
would be included in the security plans of the Western states because of the growing budgets of the
United States, the fact that the Korean War proved that local conflicts were in existence and the new
American strategy to circle the Soviet Union with regional organizations.
The last of these was
monumental to Turkey because of its stance as a regional state that shared a common religion and
cultural characteristics with Middle Eastern states.
The American interest in Turkey was not limited to participation in regional organization
for their containment policy but Turkey would also provide bases and be the first soldiers in the event of
a Soviet attack to penetrate the Middle East. This role for Turkey served as effective availability to
financial aid. American General W.H. Arnold stated, “A dollar spent on Turkey was providing a security
valued three dollars for the United States.”272 Therefore, after getting membership into NATO, the
amount of aid to Turkey increased. Between 1949 and 1961 Turkey received over a billion dollars in aid
from the United States273.
271
Mutercimler & Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis politikasi. p. 57.
In an statement in the Congress of the United States, it was pointed out that while an annual cost of an American soldier
was estimated $3511, an annual cost to train a Turkish soldier cost $105. Sander, Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri, 1947-1964.
p.95.
273
Akalin, A.B.D. ve S.S.C.B. Ekonomik Yardimlarinin Karsilastirmali Ozellikleri. p. 80.
272
105
This amount of money was not in line with the Soviet threat, especially after 1953. This
is reminiscent of the warning of Turkish Ambassador Wilson, who recognized this potential threat even
better than the Turks. On 7 March 1947, only 5 days before the declaration of the Truman Doctrine,
Wilson talked to the Turkish Foreign Minister Saka regarding a request for credit from the International
Bank and warned him to “consider matter from angle not saddling Turkey heavy financial burden by
purchasing lot unnecessary material but from long term view obtaining only what necessary gradually
bring Turkish armed forces up to strength.”274 It was not unlike the Turks to knock on the United States’
door for exaggerated amounts of aid after the economic recession of 1954 and it was these exact
problems that lead the American leaders to evaluate Turkey’s place as an ally. Although the Turkish
Government did not receive the staggering amounts requested, even a billion dollars can be considered a
“heavy financial burden” for a transforming economy. The effects of these economic burdens would
become more of a threat than the Soviet Union.
It was expected that the lack of Soviet pressure in 1953 would have allowed Turkey to
return to its traditional “balance of power policy” but new Soviet policies towards Turkey did not
change anything and Turkey continued to follow pro-Western policies against the Soviet Union. This
could be explained by Turkey’s obligations to NATO and the Cold War’s anticipation of tense relations
between members of opposing blocs. However, Turkey was eager to follow strict bloc policies more so
than obligated, which correlated with the Turkish objective to be a regional economic and political
power in the Balkans and more acutely, in the Middle East.
This was a huge strategic blunder for Turkey because to be a regional power necessitated
having a strong political and economic structure, one of which Turkey definitely did not have. Addition
to this, in the atmosphere of the Cold War, the leader of an opposing bloc would never remain inactive
to the actions of a small state situated in a very strategic area. Consequentially, the Soviet Union
established close relations with Egypt to halt Western influence in the Middle East and Egypt did not
follow the directions of the Soviet Union and acted out of their own interest; in Turkey, Nasser was
regarded as a Soviet satellite in the competition for leadership in the area. In light of these
circumstances, Turkey ignored the anxieties of Egypt and the true nature of the Soviet-Egyptian
relations. Soviet-Egyptian-British relations were nearly identical to Soviet-Turkish-British relations in
the interwar period; Turkey’s ignorance of this fact can be attributed to Turkey’s growing need in the
Cold War rather than simply forgetting their recent history. The Turkish Government termed this
274
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume V, The Near East and Africa. p. 101.
106
neutrality policy “political blackmail.”275 The Turkish argument was because of the change in conditions
during the Cold War. The similarities between Ataturk’s and Nasser’s policies as well as Turkey’s
interwar policies and Egypt’s Cold War policies proves that the conditions of the Cold War were not as
different as Turkish leaders claimed.
At the same time, Turkey suffered some difficulties from the United States on efforts to
become a regional power. The reason behind this was the Cold War structure which placed the last word
in the hands of the leaders of the bloc. Nevertheless, Turkey challenged the United States’ plans in many
instances. Turkey wanted to be a country whose opinion mattered in establishment and change to
regional areas but did not glean the full support of the United States. The attitude of the others states
towards Egypt was different and the Turkish Government supported stricter policies towards the neutral
states. When the United States had flexible policies towards the Middle Eastern states, the Turkish
Government did not understand their attitude and claimed of lack of solidarity in the West. Indeed, many
events in which the United States and Great Britain conflicted proved the Turkish claim such as Suez
Crisis and Turkey’s membership in NATO. Moreover, a shady competition was initiated between Great
Britain and France and France opposed the Baghdad Pact because the organization would have increased
British power in the region. While these complex competitions between the blocs and within the
Western bloc took place, Turkey could not have established influence in the region.
Over the period of a few years the need for more economic aid forestalled Turkey’s
ambition to be a regional power without causing any major difference in the bloc parties. Turkey
provoked certain Cold War relations not to gain position as regional power but to acquire additional aid
from the United States. The last ruling period of the Democrat Party was met with several economic
crises. In the statements of this period, Turkey could not import even “a nail for horseshoe.” Like the
last Ottoman period, Turkey started borrowing money not for economic development but to pay debts or
meet the deficits276; therefore, the government met the missile request with pleasure.
The more the economical situation deteriorated in Turkey, the country became less
independent on policies and all of this started when Turkey lost control of economic development
through the Marshall plan. Interestingly enough, in the period between 1945 and 1960 the deficient
nature of Turkey’s alliance with the Western bloc did not cause an uproar in the public and the majority
of critics believe this period began after the Turkish-American disagreement over the Cyprus issue. In
275
Bagci, Turk Dis Politikasinda 1950’li Yillar. p. 58.
Baskin Oran, Bati Bloku Ekseninde Turkiye-1 in “Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler,
Yorumlar” Volume I. p. 490-491.
276
107
the early Cold War period Turkish foreign policy became a matter of discussion and was supported by
the populace. This situation can be seen both as a result of Soviet threats until 1953 and Democrat
Party’s creation of the “evil Reds.”
Could Turkey have acted differently and followed neutral policies after 1953? The
answer to this question is both yes and no. First of all, by entering into a contractual security
arrangement with the Western States, Turkey undertook many obligations. Turkey was expected to play
a role in the regional organizations after all, Turkey’s membership was accepted because of the
geostrategic importance of her location, the same reason that put Turkey under Soviet threats in the first
place and period, in the containment plans of the United States. Turkey had to join the Balkan and
Baghdad Pacts and support the Western policies whenever needed. If the situation had been reversed,
Turkey might have faced pressure from the Unites States; a Western-supported coup took place in Iran
in 1953 and may have in turn showed up in Turkey. In addition to this, even though an invasion would
not occur, Turkey might have been subjected to Soviet threats and pressure without Western help.
Despite the Soviet renunciation of demands, the new Soviet policy towards Turkey should not be
misinterpreted as a complete change; instead it must be viewed as an altered version of Lenin and
Stalin’s interwar Turkish policy. If the Soviet Union in the future declared superiority against the
Western bloc, Turkey would be exposed to renewed Soviet demands on its territory and regime.
It must not be forgotten that Turkey did not follow bloc policies unwillingly but
complained of clemency in the policies and measures of the Western bloc. Turkey was able to follow
détente policies toward the Soviet Union to some extent. Moreover, Turkey could stop hostile policies
towards the neutral states, especially the ones in the Middle East. In this way, Turkey could manage to
draw private enterprises into Turkey without being under the “war-like” appearance and with their
investments the Turkish economy could be somewhat relieved. Regarding the Middle Eastern states,
Turkey would not remind them of Turkish dominance in the Ottoman era and would provide their
neutrality on the Cyprus issue in later years. After the Cyprus issue came to the United Nations, the
newly independent Arab states supported the Greek thesis on the future of the island and because of the
high population of the neutral states in the United Nations, Greece gained superiority in the issue. After
the “6-7 September incidents” in Istanbul, Greece approach Egypt and followed its national interests by
displaying a frosty attitude towards Western bloc policies. As a neighbor state to the Soviet Union,
Turkey could not act as freely as Greece but all the events of this situation prove the far-sightedness of
the Greek politicians in comparison to the Menderes Government.
108
The early period of the Cold War can be separated into two parts of Turkish foreign
policy. The first part forms the years between 1945 and 1952 in which Turkey felt the Soviet threat
and/or threat perception ultimately. In this period, the security concerns were on the top of Turkish
agenda regarding its foreign policy and joining the Western political, economical and security
organizations was the main aim, not only to protect itself from the northern neighbor but also in
preventing the latter from assuming that the Western states excluded Turkey from their protection. Also
the problems in this era prove the phoniness of the Soviet-Turkish friendly relations in the interwar
period because the same problems had been faced more or less in the interwar period and in usual
conditions, Turkey’s ignorance to the Soviet approach after 1953 would be justified by taking this
phoniness into consideration. Therefore, even though this era can be described as a period of
disconnection because the official links almost disappeared, it is the time period in which Turkey felt the
Soviet influence on her more than any period before.
On the contrary, between 1953 and 1960 Turkey put its national interests on the top of its
foreign policy objectives and assumed that being under the Soviet threat was the best way to reach its
goals. Undoubtedly, Khrushchev’s détente policy constituted an obstacle for this method but Turkey
ignored the change in the Soviet Union’s policies. In this period, we can say that the Soviet policies did
not influence Turkish foreign policy and even before the Turkish military coup Turkish Government did
not stop supporting the Western states against the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is logical to claim that the
Cold War between Turkey and Soviet Union was started by the Soviet Union but it was perpetuated by
Turkish Government. The more Turkey become politically, militarily and economically dependent on
the Western states, less possibility for détente was seen in Soviet-Turkish relations and until realizing
that its national interests were jeopardized by the United States- regarding the Cyprus issue- Turkish
Governments shared the same idea. However, these twenty years shaped the future of the country and
broke the evolution process of Turkey to a conservable degree.
109
LIST OF REFERENCES
ENGLISH SOURCES
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A.L. MacFie, The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference: The British Position in “Middle
Eastern Studies” Vol: 23(1), p. 75-82.
•
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“Department of State Bulletin”, Vol: 17. p. 144-145.
•
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influence. (Newyork, N.Y.: Praeger, 1982)
•
Ara Sanjian, The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact in “Middle Eastern Studies”, Vol: 33(2).
p.226-266.
•
Arthur Schlesinger, The Dynamics of World Power; a documentary history of United States
foreign policy, 1945-1973. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973)
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•
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(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974)
•
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__________, Part II, From the First to the Second World War, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the
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•
Bulent Gokay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet foreign policy, Turkey and
communism. (London, New York: Routledge, 2006)
__________, Turkish settlement and the Caucasus, 1918-1920 (Turkey: Identity, Democracy,
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•
C. C. S. Newton, The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan in
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•
Concerning Revision of Montreux Convention in “Department of State Bulletin”, Vol: 13. p. 766.
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•
Dilek Barlas, Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities and
Limits for Middle-Power Activism in the 1930s in “Journal of Contemporary History”, Vol:
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•
Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961. (New York: Doubleday& Company, Inc., 1965)
•
Edward Latham (ed.), Crisis in the Middle East. (New York: Wilson, 1952)
•
Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: small state diplomacy and great power
politics. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973)
•
European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery in “Department of State Bulletin”, Vol: 16.
p. 1159-1160.
•
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and Africa. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969)
__________, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VII, The Near East and
Africa
__________, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1947, Volume V, The
Near East and Africa
__________ Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, Volume IV,
Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union
__________, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1949, Volume VI, The
Near East, South Asia, and Africa
__________, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1952-1954, Volume IX,
The Near and Middle East
__________, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1955-1957, Volume
XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean
__________, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1958-1960, Volume X,
Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey
•
Franz von Papen, Memoirs. (London: A.Deutsch, 1952)
•
Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO. (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1972)
•
George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941. (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1960)
111
•
George Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 19451971. (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Pollicy Research, 1972)
•
George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1954)
__________, The Middle East in the War in “Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946”.
(London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1952)
•
Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927, a study of Soviet policy towards Turkey, Iran
and Afghanistan. (London: Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1966)
•
Harry N. Howard, Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey During World War II in “Department
of State Bulletin,” Vol: 19, No: 472, p. 63-78.
__________, Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits, 1945-1946 in
“Department of State Bulletin” Vol:16, No: 395, p. 143-151.
__________, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1974)
•
Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1951)
•
Jeremy K. Ward, Winston Churchill and the “Iron Curtain” Speech in “The History Teacher”,
vol: 1(2). p. 5-13 + 57-63.
•
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. (Edinburgh: Longman Group)
•
Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs; a history of the relations between the Soviet Union
and the rest of the world, 1917-1929. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960)
•
Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967. (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1967)
•
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office.
(Washington: Department of the State, 1948)
•
Necmettin Sadak, Turkey Faces the Soviets in “Foreign Affairs”, Vol: 27 (April 1949), p. 449461.
•
Nicholas Tamkin, Diplomatic Sigint and the British Official Mind During the Second World
War: Soviet Claims on Turkey, 1940-1945 in “Intelligence and National Security”, Vol: 23(6).
p.749-766.
•
Oles M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev. (Lewisburg:
Bucknell University Press, 1974)
112
•
Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1951. (London: Oxford University Press,
1954)
__________, Survey of International Affairs, 1953. (London: Oxford University Press, 1956)
•
Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963.
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of California Press, 1997)
•
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•
Robert Beitzell, Tehran, Yalta, [and] Potsdam; the Soviet Protocols. (Hattiesburg, Miss.:
Academic International, 1970)
•
Robert Jervis, The Impact of Korean War on the Cold War in “The Journal of Conflict
Resolution”, Vol: 24(4). p. 563-592.
•
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(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
•
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1955)
•
Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1956)
__________, The Soviet Union and the Middle East. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1959)
•
William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000) (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000)
TURKISH SOURCES
•
Aptulahat Aksin, Turkiye’nin 1945’den Sonraki Dis Politika Gelismeleri, Orta Dogu Meseleleri.
(Istanbul, 1959)
•
Aysegul Sever, Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu, 1945-1958. (Istanbul:
Boyut Kitaplari, 1997)
•
Baskin Oran (ed.), Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler,
Yorumlar. Volume I. (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002)
113
__________, Turkiye’nin Kuzeydeki Buyuk Komsu Sorunu Nedir? in “Ankara Universitesi
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi”, Vol:25(1). p. 41-93.
•
Cemil Birsel, Sovyet Rusya-Turk Notalari Aydinliginda Turk Bogazlari. (Istanbul: Ismail Akgun
Matbassi, 1948)
•
Dilek Herkmen, Turk Basininda Stalin’in Olumu in “Stalin ve Turk Dunyasi” (edited by GursoyNaskali, Emine & Sahin, Liaisan). (Istanbul: Kaknus Yayinlari, 2007)
•
Erel Tellal, “SSCB’nin Turkiye’den Istekleri: Soguk Savas sonrasi bir degerlendirme” in “Cevat
Geray’a Armagan”. (Ankara: Mulkiyeliler Birligi, 2001)
__________, Uluslararasi ve Bolgesel Gelismeler Cercevesinde Turkiye-SSCB Iliskileri (19531964). (Ankara: Mulkiyeliler Birligi Vakfi Yayinlari, 2000)
•
Erol Mutercimler & Mim Kemal Oke, Dusler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti donemi Turk dis
politikasi. (Istanbul: Alfa Basim, 2004)
•
Fahir Armaoglu, (Amerikan Belgeleri ile) Orta Dogu Komutanligi’ndan Bagdat Pakti’na, 19511955 in “Belleten” Sayi:224, Cilt: 59. p. 189-236.
__________, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi. (Istanbul: Alkin Yayinevi, 2007)
__________, Ikinci Dunya Harbinde Turkiye in “Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi
Dergisi”, Vol: 13(2). p. 139-179.
•
Faruk Cakir, Amerikan Bakis Acisindan Turkiye’de 1957-1960 Donemi Siyasal Gelismeleri ve
Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri in “Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi”, Vol: 59(1).
p.59-88.
•
Feliks Cuyev, Molotov Anlatiyor: Stalin’in sagkolu ile yapilan 140 gorusme. (Istanbul: Yordam
Kitap, 2007)
•
Feridun Cemal Erkin, Disislerinde 34 Yil, Washington Buyukelciligi. II. Cilt, I Kisim. (Ankara:
Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1992)
__________, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi. (Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 1968)
•
George McGhee, ABD-NATO-Turkiye-Ortadogu. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1992)
•
Guneri Akalin, A.B.D. ve S.S.C.B. Ekonomik Yardimlarinin Karsilastirmali Ozellikleri. in
“Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi”, Vol: 21(1). p. 47-88.
•
Haluk Gursel, Tarih Boyunca Turk-Rus Iliskileri. (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1968)
•
Haydar Cakmak (ed.), Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-2008). (Ankara: Baris Platin Yayincilik, 2008)
114
•
Hurriyet (newspaper), 5 June 2009
•
Huseyin Bagci, Turk Dis Politikasinda 1950’li Yillar. (Ankara: ODTU Yayincilik, 2007)
•
Ismail Soysal, 1955 Bagdat Pakti in “Belleten”, Cilt:55, Sayi:212. p. 179-236.
•
Kamuran Gurun, Dis Iliskiler ve Turk Politikasi (1939’dan Gunumuze Kadar). (Ankara: Ankara
Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1983)
__________, Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri (1920-1953). (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991)
•
Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadogu’da Devrim Yillari (Bir Buyukelcinin Anilari). (Istanbul, 1977)
•
Mehmet Gonlubol, Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1965). (Ankara: Disisleri Bakanligi
Matbaasi, 1968)
•
Mehmet Saray, Sovyet Tehdidi Karsisinda Turkiye’nin NATO’ya Girisi: III. Cumhurbaskani
Celal Bayar’in Hatiralari ve Belgeler. (Ankara: AKDTYK Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi, 2000)
•
Melih Aktas, 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Donemi Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde Amerikan Faktoru.
(Istanbul: Sema Yayinevi, 2006)
•
Metin Toker, Turkiye Uzerinde 1945 Kabusu. (Ankara: Akis Yayinlari, 1971)
•
Nevin Balta, Milliyet’ten Yansimalar: Turk Dis Politikasi, 1950-1980. (Ankara: Lazer Yayinlari,
2005)
•
Omer E. Kurkcuoglu, Turkiye’nin Arap Orta Dogusu’na Karsi Politikasi (1945-1970). (Ankara:
Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1972)
•
Oral Sander, Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri, 1947-1964. (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler
Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1979)
•
Rifki Salim Burcak, Moskova Gorusmeleri ve Dis Politikamiz Uzerindeki Tesirleri. (Ankara:
Gazi Universitesi Yayinlari, 1983)
•
S.S.C.B. Disisleri Bakanligi, Stalin, Roosevelt ve Churchill’in Gizli Yazismalarinda Turkiye
(1941-1944) ve Ikinci Dunya Savasi Oncesi Sovyet Baris Cabalari ve Turkiye 1938-1939
(Secmeler). (Istanbul: Havass Yayinlari, 1981)
•
Serap Tunc, II. Dunya Savasindan Sonra Turk Dis Politikasina Sovyet Etkisi (1945-1960).
Master thesis, Gazi University, Ankara, 2005
115
•
Suat Bilge, Guc Komsuluk: Turkiye – Sovyetler Birligi Iliskileri 1920-1964. (Ankara: Turkiye Is
Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari, 1992)
•
Sukru Esmerci, Menderes Diyor ki. (Istanbul: Demokrasi Yayinlari, 1967)
•
T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt:25 (1.11.1953)
•
The Republic of Turkey Presidential Archives, Document No: 030.01-11.700.3
•
Turgut Ilkan, Belgelerle Turk-Sovyet Iliskilerinde 48 Yil (1917-1965). (Turkiye Disisleri
Bakanligi)
•
Turhan Feyizoglu, Bir Paylasma Planinin Perde Arkasi: Turkiye 1945. (Istanbul: Bizim Kitaplar,
2007)
•
Turkkaya Ataov, Amerika, NATO ve Turkiye. (Istanbul, Ileri yayinlari, 2006)
•
Ulus (newspaper), December 21, 1945
•
Yevgeni Primakov, Ruslarin Gozuyle Ortadogu. (Istanbul: Timas Yayinlari, 2009)
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Murat Ulgul was born in Manisa, Turkey on 20 February 1982. He completed primary
and high school in the same city and earned a B.A. degree in International Relations in May of 2006 at
Gazi University in Ankara, Turkey. After graduation, he applied for the scholarship of the Ministry of
National Education in Turkey and started English education at Boston University in May 2007. After a
year, he was accepted by Florida State University towards continuing his education for a M.A. in the
Interdisciplinary Program in Russian and East European Studies.
117