Explaining Major and Third Party Candidate Entry
in U.S. Gubernatorial Elections, 1980–2005
Conor M. Dowling, Yale University
Steve B. Lem, Kutztown University
abstract
While much scholarly research has focused on the quality of candidates in U.S. elections, the quantity of candidate participation has received much less attention. Consequently, there is little systematic evidence on what factors stimulate or dampen
candidate entry into electoral contests, especially at the state level. In this article, we
examine the effects of electoral laws, states’ social and political climates, and incumbency on gubernatorial candidacies. We test our claims using an event-count model
with the number of candidates contesting each gubernatorial election from 1980 to
2005 as the outcome of interest. We divide total candidate participation into major
and third party candidates to observe whether the factors affect neither, one, or both
types of candidacies. We find that electoral laws and incumbency play an important
role in determining the number of candidacies in these elections, but the effect of
these factors varies for the two types of candidates.
elections are the lifeblood of democracy. But for elections to accomplish their requisite function—connecting the preferences of the electorate
to governing officials—they must offer voters a choice. Without choices, the
expressive act of voting has no meaning. While much scholarly research has
focused on the quality of candidates in U.S. elections, the quantity of candidate participation—that is, the number of choices available in an election—
has received much less attention. As a result, there is little systematic evidence
concerning the factors that stimulate or dampen candidate entry into electoral contests, particularly in state and local elections (but, see Stratmann
2005 on the state legislative elections of 1998 and 2000; Bardwell 2002 and
Lazarus 2008 on gubernatorial elections).
The quantity of candidates entering the electoral arena is, of course, essential to understanding the dynamics of American democracy. As Duverger
State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2009): pp. 1–23
©2009 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
2 dowling and lem
(1951) noted more than five decades ago, the single-member-district, plurality
electoral system discourages third party candidate participation, while promoting competition between two major choices: Democrats and Republicans.
The existence of two major parties, however, does not always guarantee choices
on the electoral agenda. For example, the presence of a strong incumbent may
deter would-be challengers from the opposing party, leading to an uncontested
electoral race (see Squire 1989, 2000 on U.S. House and state legislative elections, respectively).
Despite these conditions, substantial variation in the number of both
major and third party candidates that enter electoral contests remains unexplained across the American states. In this article we ask: what accounts for
these observed differences? We approach this question by developing a model
based on three electoral characteristics. First, we focus on institutional differences with the expectation that electoral laws can significantly encourage
or dampen the number of candidacies. Second, we analyze the social and
political climates of the states because contextual differences can influence
electoral participation. Last, we include election-specific factors, such as
the presence of an incumbent. After deriving our hypotheses, we test our
model using data for state gubernatorial elections. We find that institutional
differences and election-specific factors affect gubernatorial candidacies in
important and systematic ways.
explaining candidate entry
in gubernatorial elections
The average number of major and third party candidates in gubernatorial
elections from 1980 to 2005 are presented by state in Table 1.1 There is a large
range in the number of both major and third party candidacies. Specifically,
the average number of major party candidacies ranges from 2.86 (Delaware
and North Dakota) to 12.33 (California2). Similarly, the average number of
third party candidacies ranges from 0.17 (Maryland and Nebraska) to as
many as 6.5 (Minnesota).
To explain this variation, we begin by developing a general model of
candidate emergence based on Black’s (1972) decision-making calculus for
a potential candidate, which is given by the following equation:
U(O) = (PB)—C
where, U(O) = the utility of the target office, O; P = the (potential) candidate’s
estimate of his probability of winning the target office; B = the benefit the
candidate receives in attaining the target office; and C = the cost required
Table 1. Candidate Participation in Gubernatorial Elections, 1980–2005
State
AL(6)
AK(6)
AZ(6)
AR(8)
CA(6)
CO(6)
CT(6)
DE(7)
FL(6)
GA(6)
HI(6)
ID(6)
IL(6)
IN(7)
IA(6)
KS(6)
KY(6)
LA(6)
ME(6)
MD(6)
MA(6)
MI(6)
MN(6)
MS(6)
MO(7)
MT(7)
NE(6)
NV(6)
NH(13)
NJ(7)
NM(6)
NY(6)
NC(7)
ND(7)
OH(6)
OK(6)
OR(6)
PA(6)
RI(10)
SC(6)
SD(6)
TN(6)
TX(6)
UT(7)
VT(13)
VA(7)
WA(7)
WV(7)
WI(6)
WY(6)
Average Number
of Major Party Standard
Candidates
Deviation
State
8.50
8.17
5.67
5.75
12.33
4.17
3.67
2.86
8.17
7.83
9.5
4.67
5.67
3.86
5.00
7.33
7.83
10.33
6.33
6.00
4.83
5.83
4.17
7.17
7.71
6.14
8.33
11.83
6.00
8.71
7.67
3.67
7.86
2.86
3.50
8.12
10.17
5.33
3.70
4.83
4.33
9.50
7.17
4.29
3.38
3.29
9.43
10.43
4.67
6.50
2.07
1.94
1.97
2.12
4.37
2.04
1.86
0.90
5.56
3.54
1.05
1.97
1.63
0.69
0.90
2.58
2.79
2.88
4.08
2.10
0.75
2.71
3.66
1.83
3.30
2.04
3.88
3.45
1.53
6.10
1.03
1.03
2.8
1.07
1.87
3.71
2.93
3.33
1.34
2.23
2.34
2.35
4.07
1.70
1.26
0.95
3.78
6.08
1.75
2.81
AL(6)
AK(6)
AZ(6)
AR(8)
CA(6)
CO(6)
CT(6)
DE(7)
FL(6)
GA(6)
HI(6)
ID(6)
IL(6)
IN(7)
IA(6)
KS(6)
KY(6)
LA(6)
ME(6)
MD(6)
MA(6)
MI(6)
MN(6)
MS(6)
MO(7)
MT(7)
NE(6)
NV(6)
NH(13)
NJ(7)
NM(6)
NY(6)
NC(7)
ND(7)
OH(6)
OK(6)
OR(6)
PA(6)
RI(10)
SC(6)
SD(6)
TN(6)
TX(6)
UT(7)
VT(13)
VA(7)
WA(7)
WV(7)
WI(6)
WY(6)
Note: Number of elections for each state reported in parentheses.
Average Number
of Third Party
Candidates
Standard
Deviation
1.00
6.00
2.50
0.25
3.33
2.33
1.67
0.71
0.67
1.83
2.83
1.17
1.33
1.43
2.17
1.83
0.83
3.33
2.5
0.17
1.50
2.00
6.5
1.67
2.00
0.71
0.17
1.83
1.23
2.71
0.33
5.17
1.71
1.00
1.67
1.67
1.83
2.00
1.10
1.00
0.83
2.00
2.33
2.86
3.85
0.86
1.57
1.57
3.17
0.50
2.00
3.03
2.74
0.46
1.37
0.82
1.21
0.76
0.82
2.14
3.37
0.75
0.52
0.79
2.04
1.17
1.17
2.42
1.05
0.41
1.05
2.45
3.73
1.51
2.24
0.76
0.41
1.17
0.93
3.35
0.52
2.14
1.11
1.83
1.63
0.41
1.72
1.10
1.10
0.89
0.98
1.79
1.21
1.95
2.44
0.69
0.98
2.07
1.94
0.55
4 dowling and lem
to obtain the target office. When the value (B) of the target office (O) in
combination with the probability (P) of victory is greater than the cost (C)
of running for the target office, the utility (U) of running for office (O) is
positive and the potential candidate declares candidacy (also, see Jacobson
and Kernell 1981).
State differences and electoral characteristics encourage or suppress candidacies by the degree that they influence the probability of winning (P), the
benefit of office (B), and the cost of running for office (C). For example, ballot
access requirements directly affect the cost of running, which should directly
affect an individual’s willingness to declare a candidacy. Therefore, if one is willing to presume that the number of candidates in a particular election is simply
an aggregation of individuals utilizing the decision-making calculus, we should
be able to directly observe a correlation between our three types of electoral
characteristics and the number of candidates contesting an election.
Nevertheless, we need to make one important distinction before turning
to a discussion of electoral characteristics and the number of gubernatorial
candidates. Specifically, while the decision-making calculus provides a general
framework to connect state and electoral characteristics to candidate entry,
the factors we posit below might not have the same effect on the decisionmaking equation for every candidate. In this article, we distinguish between
major party candidates and third party candidates (minor party candidates
and independents), given that the resources needed to overcome some of
the barriers to entry are typically more easily attainable by members of one
of the two major parties.
Electoral Institutions and Candidate Entry
As several scholars have noted (e.g., Duverger 1951; Cox 1997), the rules
of the electoral game play a large role in shaping democratic participation.
Unsurprisingly, then, one should expect variation in state electoral institutions to have an effect on an individual’s opportunity and willingness to
contest public office.
Ballot Access Requirements. One of the most straightforward ways that candidate entry can be restricted is by manipulating the requirements that must
be met in order for a candidate to appear on the ballot.3 Specifically, state
laws regulating ballot access may influence the total number of candidates
that contest gubernatorial elections by affecting the costs of contestation (C).
While all states institute ballot access restrictions in some form, we highlight
two that are directly related to candidate entry: signature requirements and
major party candidate filing fees.
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 5
Both requirements are serious obstacles to major party candidate entry.
At least one of these requirements is present in all but four states (Colorado, Connecticut, North Dakota, and Wyoming). Of the 46 states that have
requirements, 25 require filing fees, 15 require petitioning with a list of signatures, and six require both. For third party candidates, signature requirements
are present in every state save three (Florida, Louisiana, and Oklahoma).
Therefore, as nearly every state has these requirements, the barrier to entry
is the level of the requirement needed to appear on the ballot.4 For instance,
some states require modest filing fees (e.g., $75 in Hawaii) for major party
candidates, while others require substantial amounts of money to appear on
the ballot (e.g., $4,000 in Texas).
Clearly, the cross-state variations in these requirements affect the utility
equations of the potential candidates for governor within each state. More
specifically, as signature requirements and filing fees increase, the costs of
running for office (C) increase, and consequently, the total number of (major
and third party) candidates should decrease.
Party Endorsement of Candidates. Another electoral law that is likely to play
a role in the candidate entry process is whether a state allows for preprimary
party endorsement. Bardwell (2002) found that gubernatorial incumbents are
less likely to be contested in their primary if they are from a party-endorsement
state. Similarly, we argue that states with preprimary party endorsement of
candidates decrease the probability (P) of winning for those potential candidates that do not receive the party’s endorsement, ultimately resulting in fewer
major party candidates.5
The Social and Political Climate of a State and Candidate Entry
While formal state institutions play an important role in shaping candidate
entry, a state’s social and political climate—the norms and patterns of behavior particular to each state—can also influence the number of individuals
that ultimately contest an election. Hence, if there is a way to generalize about
the social and political climate of states, rather than merely claim that each
state is different in its own right, these generalizations can be included in a
model of candidate entry. Accordingly, we consider two aspects of a state’s
social and political climate: political competition and social capital.
Competition. The degree to which the two major parties are competitive in a
state is likely to have an effect on candidate participation.6 However, major
party competition will influence major party and third party candidacies
in different ways.
6 dowling and lem
We begin with the relatively straightforward relationship between major
party competition and the number of third party candidates. As discussed
in recent work by Lem and Dowling (2006), major party competition is an
indicator to potential third party candidates that they can influence the outcome of an election or sway the policy of the major parties. In this regard,
major party competition signals a high probability of influence or even victory to these candidates (e.g., Jesse Ventura in Minnesota in 1998). Consequently, since higher levels of major party competition, on average, result in
more competitive elections, it makes sense for more third party candidates to
challenge for the governorship when the level of party competition is high.
Therefore, we expect that as party competition increases, the number of third
party candidates contesting any election will also increase.
The relationship between major party competition and major party candidate entry is more complex. In particular, we argue that the heterogeneity
of the major parties should be considered.
First, low levels of major party competition (i.e., when one of the two
major parties is dominant) are not a guarantee of only one major party candidate because the bulk of opposition and competition occurs in the primaries
(e.g., Canon 1978 on factionalism in the South). In these cases, we expect
fewer candidacies in the electorally weaker major party since there is a low
probability that one who declared candidacy within this party would win the
general election. However, we expect several candidacies within the dominant
major party since the likelihood of winning office after securing the party
primary is high. The number of candidacies in the major party will depend
on the level of partisan heterogeneity (i.e., the amount of policy diversity
within a party); the more heterogeneous the party, the greater the number of
candidates that emerge.
Similarly, while higher levels of major party competition will almost
certainly result in at least two major party candidates, one from each party,
we do not expect the count to necessarily continue to increase. Diverse parties will likely produce more candidates within each party, so we expect the
number of candidates to increase only under highly heterogeneous parties.
Therefore, ideally the impact of state political competition on the number
of major party candidates that contest an election is measured by the level
of major party competition and the heterogeneity of the two major parties
in each state. Presumably, a state with two heterogeneous parties will have
more candidates, holding two-party competition constant, than a state with
one (or no) heterogeneous party because more diversity in opinion results
in more candidate participation.
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 7
Social Capital. Another aspect of the social and political climate of a state is
its “social capital.” In Bowling Alone, Putnam conceptualizes social capital as
“connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (2000, 19). These “connections
among individuals,” which Putnam argues have been deteriorating for several
decades now, are crucially important for political participation because most
forms of political participation are group (i.e., “social”) endeavors.
While the decision to run for office is not inexorably a group decision,
running for office does require the aid of others. States with high levels of
social capital, therefore, may encourage candidate entry by decreasing the
perceived costs of entry or increasing the perceived benefit of attaining office.
More specifically, norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness can promote the
notion that the costs of campaigning are shared throughout the collective (i.e.,
an encompassing interest). Similarly, political awareness and efficacy could
highlight the benefits of obtaining office, thereby increasing its perceived value.
Thus, those states that foster more social capital, on average, should have a
greater number of both major and third party candidates entering the electoral
fray because more social connections translates into greater civic engagement
and political participation generally, and candidate entry specifically.7
Election-Specific Factors and Candidate Entry
State electoral institutions and aspects of a state’s social and political climate
are not the only factors likely to affect candidate entry. Election-specific factors, such as the status of the gubernatorial seat, might also affect the number
of individuals who choose to become candidates in gubernatorial elections
by influencing the probability (P) of electoral success.
The Status of the Gubernatorial Seat. The advantage incumbents enjoy when
seeking reelection is well-documented (Cox and Katz 2002; Erikson 1971;
Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1977; Jacobson 1987, 1990; Mayhew 1974). However,
not all incumbents are the same and not every incumbent enjoys the same
amount of incumbency advantage. In particular, the strength or weakness, or
vulnerability, of an incumbent has a substantial effect on his or her reelection
prospects. This vulnerability should have an effect on candidate participation
in an election because vulnerable governors indicate a greater probability of
electoral success to would-be challengers.
But while we expect that a strong incumbent is likely to deter potential
challengers from entering the electoral fray, it is important to distinguish
between three other scenarios: (1) the presence of a weak incumbent; (2) an
8 dowling and lem
open seat resulting from an incumbent choosing not to seek reelection (e.g.,
retirement, death, running for president, etc.); and (3) an open seat resulting
from the incumbent being legally prohibited from seeking reelection (i.e.,
term limits).
With respect to a weak incumbent governor, we expect, on average, there
to be more major party candidates contesting the election than when a strong
incumbent seeks reelection, given the other major party will run a candidate
and the incumbent will be likely to encounter opposition in his or her primary. An important caveat to note, however, is that while it is plausible to
assume that the same logic would hold true for third party candidates, it is
not clear that they should be strategic in the same manner about where and
when they run, given that third party candidates have a low probability of
winning an election compared to the two major parties to begin with. That
is to say, the difference between a strong and weak incumbent probably does
not mean as much to a third party challenger as it does to a major party
challenger. As a result, we do not expect strong incumbents to necessarily
limit the field of third party candidates.
A clear determination of what the difference in open seat types entails
for candidate entry is difficult to ascertain. On the one hand, in the case of
term limits, prospective candidates know well in advance that the seat will
be “up for grabs.” Given this knowledge, it is plausible that more candidates
enter the electoral contest when an incumbent is term-limited out of office
because of more time to prepare a campaign. On the other hand, term limits
can result in lower numbers of candidates than when an incumbent chooses
not to run because there is less certainty concerning the vulnerability of the
incumbent party. That is, choosing not to run gives prospective candidates
more information about the status of the gubernatorial seat in terms of why
it is open, whereas term limits only inform prospective candidates when the
seat will be open. Given its intricate nature, we attempt to more fully ascertain
the role the status of the gubernatorial seat plays when it comes to candidate
entry empirically.
data
In order to test the proposed effects of the systemic factors outlined above on
candidate entry in gubernatorial elections, we made use of a variety of data
sources. Our dependent variable—the number of candidates participating
in a gubernatorial election—is coded from Beyle and Jensen’s Gubernatorial
Campaign Expenditures Database (2005), which contains data on all gubernatorial candidates from 1977 to 2006 (see also Jensen and Beyle 2003).8 To
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 9
generate the dependent variables—the total number (or count) of major
and third party candidates at any point in time during a state gubernatorial
election-year—we simply counted each individual that is included in the
dataset, every individual that spent money on a campaign.9
While the decision to become a candidate is ultimately an individual’s
decision, an individual-level study similar to those done for House elections10
is beyond the scope of this article and is not feasible given our retrospective
time frame (1980–2005). We contend, however, that the count of candidates
provides a nice way of aggregating and analyzing individual decisions. Further, by analyzing the count, we can build a model that accounts for our
systemic factors and look at how they draw out or suppress major and third
party candidates. Consequently, by analyzing the number of major and third
party candidates, we can get a better handle on what conditions account for
there being any candidate as well as the number of such candidates when
there is at least one.11
Independent Variables
Table 2 recapitulates our independent variables of interest with respect to the
three electoral characteristics outlined above and how each relates to Black’s
(1972) decision-making calculus of potential candidates. The measurement
of each of these concepts is discussed below.
Electoral Institutions. As previously noted, ballot access restrictions come in
many forms. This article utilizes the number of signatures required by electoral law for major and third party candidates to get on the ballot and the
filing fee requirement (in dollars) for major party candidates.12 The signature
requirement variable was tabulated by first calculating the actual number of
signatures required by electoral law using the election code references and
election results as reported by The Book of the States (various years). To make
Table 2. Independent Variables of Interest for Explaining Candidate Entry in Gubernatorial
Elections, 1980–2005
P
B
C
Electoral Institutions
Preprimary Party Ballot Access
Endorsement States (–) Requirements (–)
Social and Political Two-Party Competition (+)
Social Capital (+)
Social Capital (+)
Climate of a State
Party Heterogeneity (+)
Election-Specific Factors
Open Seats from Term Limits (?)
Presence of Incumbent (–)
Incumbent Strength (–)
Note: Hypothesized direction of coefficient in parentheses.
10 dowling and lem
this variable comparable across states, the number of signatures was divided
by the total population. This new measure reflects the percentage of people
needed to sign the petition in order to be placed on the ballot, thereby making
the measure comparable across states as it controls for state size. The various
legal requirements and election code references were obtained from Richard
Winger (personal correspondence), editor of Ballot Access News13 and The
Encyclopedia of Third Parties in America (Winger 2000, 72–95). As discussed
above, we expect that as the signature and filing fee requirements increase,
the total number of (major and third party) candidates will decrease because
the process of becoming a candidate becomes increasingly difficult.
Our other electoral law of interest—preprimary party endorsement
states—is measured by a dichotomous variable. States that allow for preprimary party endorsements are scored 1 and states that do not are 0.14
Accordingly, a negative coefficient is expected.
The Social and Political Climate of a State. Existing measures of electoral
competition, such as the Ranney index or Holbrook and Van Dunk’s (1993)
measure of competition, might be useful for gathering a basic sense of different levels of competition from state to state, but we consider them less
appealing for our purposes. In particular, these indexes are based upon state
legislative elections, whereas gubernatorial elections have different patterns
of competition.15
Therefore, we operationalize electoral competition as the margin of victory of the winning candidate in each election. The margin of victory is
calculated as the difference between the winning candidate’s vote percentage
and the second-place candidate’s vote percentage. It is preferable over potential alternative measures—such as the winning candidate’s vote percentage
or the difference between the winning candidate’s vote percentages and 50
percent—because it directly captures the closeness of the race between the
two top candidates and is applicable to candidates winning with both a plurality and a majority of the vote. We should note, however, that measuring
competition as the margin of victory could be vulnerable to election-specific
idiosyncratic factors. Therefore, to approximate the overall level of major
party competition in a state, we construct a three-election moving average
of the margin of victory centered on the current election.
To measure the heterogeneity of the two major parties, we use Poole
and Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-NOMINATE scores. These scores are calculated
using U.S. House legislators’ roll-call votes to calculate each legislator’s ideal
position in policy-space. To calculate party heterogeneity, the amount of
diversity in the state’s two major parties, we use the standard error of the
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 11
first dimension coordinate (labeled “se_1” in the DW-Nominate data sets).
Specifically, we calculate the average of these standard errors for all the House
members in a state for each session of Congress. We then match these scores
with the corresponding state gubernatorial election years. This calculation
gives us an estimate of the average variation in a House delegation’s voting
behavior (for states with only one House member, the average variation is
simply that one member’s variation) for each state election year, which we
use to proxy party heterogeneity.16
Social capital is measured with the index Putnam (2000, 290–3) devised
for the states based upon 14 indicators of social capital.17 It ranges from low
to high social capital, so we expect the higher a state is on the index the greater
the number of major and third party candidates will be in an election.
Election-Specific Factors. To test for the effects of incumbency and open seat
types, we begin by coding two dichotomous indicators: one for incumbency
(coded 1 for the presence of an incumbent, 0 otherwise) and one for open
seats via term limits (coded 1 if the seat was open because the incumbent
was legally prohibited from seeking reelection, 0 otherwise). As a result, the
reference (omitted) category is an open seat resulting from any reason other
than term limits. We also include a measure to capture the dissatisfaction of
the electorate with the incumbent government because constituents often
hold governors accountable for the success or failure of their state’s internal
affairs (Carsey and Wright 1998; Svoboda 1995; Atkeson and Partin 1995;
Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995); the more vulnerable a governor, the more
challengers he or she will face.
Therefore, we utilize the incumbent’s previous vote share (of the total
vote) to gauge the vulnerability of the incumbent governor. We then include
the interaction of the incumbent’s previous vote share and whether he or
she ran for reelection. By including these variables in the model, we are
able to assess the effects of incumbency and different types of open seats.
When the dichotomous indicators for open seats resulting from term limits
and incumbency (and consequently incumbency’s interaction term with
the incumbent’s previous vote share) are zero, the intercept indicates the
expected number of candidates from open seats via the incumbent not
seeking reelection (even though they are not legally prohibited from doing
so). The coefficient on open seats via term limits reflects the change in the
expected number of candidacies vis-à-vis open seats via the incumbent
not seeking reelection. Similarly, the coefficient on incumbency reflects the
change in the expected number of candidates when an incumbent runs in
the election. The coefficient on incumbent’s previous vote share captures
the effect of incumbent strength when she does not seek reelection. Last,
12 dowling and lem
the coefficient on the interaction term indicates the degree to which the
strength of an incumbent, when she does run, deters or encourages wouldbe challengers.
Controls. While our argument focuses on several factors influencing an individual’s decision-making calculus, there are two important caveats to note,
given that our dependent variable is aggregated at the state level. First, other
idiosyncratic factors—such as age, education, and career status—are likely to
play an important role in whether one contests elected office in a specific election (i.e., these factors will influence P, B, or C). These idiosyncrasies, however,
are automatically omitted since they cannot be included in an aggregate-level
model. Although we recognize their importance in the decision-making calculus, we do not believe their omission will significantly affect the results of our
model. Theoretically, these characteristics are likely to exhibit the largest effect
between those who declared candidacy and those who did not. Because our
analysis focuses on only the candidates that did emerge, we suspect the effect
of these variables would be marginal. Additionally, there is no a priori reason
to expect that the state-level variables we identify above would be strongly
correlated with idiosyncratic factors such as to produce biased estimates.
Second, because our analysis focuses on the count of the number of
candidates in a state, we must include several state-level control variables
that might influence the dependent variable but may or may not be directly
tied to an individual’s decision-making calculus per se. For example, we
should attempt to control for the pool of potential gubernatorial candidates
in a state.
We include two such measures as proxies for the pool of potential candidates: the number of statewide elected executive branch offices (other than
the governor) and the size of the state legislature (lower and upper house).
Both of these variables are coded from the Council of State Governments’
The Book of the States (various years). Presumably, as each of these variables
increase, we should observe a greater number of both major and third party
candidates.
Other state-level factors that we control for include state population size
and population density. Both of these variables are available from the State
Politics and Policy Quarterly Data Resource18 and were updated with data
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstracts. Population size is used to
control for the possibility that more populous states might be more attractive to candidates for reasons of prestige or larger budgets and, therefore,
result in a greater number of major and third party candidates. Whereas,
population density controls for the possibility that less densely populated
states may have lower costs of campaigning (e.g., potentially, fewer media
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 13
markets) and, therefore, result in a greater number of major and third party
candidates.
We also control for the salary of the governors, which is coded from
The Book of the States (various years) and serves as a proxy for the value
of the office. Additionally, for third party candidacies, we include the vote
share for third party candidates from the previous presidential election to
control for a general propensity of the voters of a state to support third
party candidates.
Last, we control for the ideology, the general “liberalness” of the citizens
(e.g., Berry, et al. 1998; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1985), of a state. We use
Berry et al.’s (1998) measure of a state’s citizen ideology19 as their measure
is annual (i.e., dynamic), as opposed to other static measures (e.g., Wright,
Erikson, and McIver 1985), and is observed for the entire period of our study
(1980–2005). If there is any relationship between a state’s ideology and candidate entry, we expect it to be positive as the citizen ideology variable runs
from conservative to liberal (0 to 100); presumably liberal states are more
congenial to more candidates.
results and discussion
The results from negative binomial regressions estimating candidate entry
into gubernatorial elections from 1980 to 2005 for major party candidates and
third party candidates are reported in Table 3. Negative binomial regression
is specifically designed to model count processes and, additionally, relaxes the
mean-variance equality assumption that the Poisson distribution places on the
data. That is, while the Poisson assumes that all events within the period are
independent, the negative binomial allows for positive contagion, or the ability
for the occurrence of one event (i.e., one candidate entering the electoral fray)
to increase the probability of another event (i.e., another candidate entering
within the same time period) (Long 1997). The negative binomial reduces to
the Poisson if the mean-variance equality assumption is met (i.e., if Alpha is
found not to be statistically different from zero). We begin by noting that in
both equations alpha is significant. This suggests that when one major (third)
party candidate enters an election we are more likely to observe another major
(third) party candidate entering the same election, in the same time period,
for reasons not explained by the model.
Major Party Candidate Entry
With respect to the major party candidate equation, we generally find support
for the electoral laws and election-specific hypotheses. Signature require-
14 dowling and lem
ments and the preprimary party endorsement system both tend to limit
the field of major party candidates, but filing fees do not appear to deter
these candidates from entering the electoral fray. Although there does not
appear to be a significant difference in open seat types (i.e., open seats via
term limits vs. the incumbent not seeking reelection), the presence of a weak
incumbent encourages more major party candidates to contest the office as
indicated by the coefficient on the interaction term. Thus, as the strength of
the incumbent increases and the incumbent runs for reelection, the number
of candidacies decreases.
While the electoral laws and status of the gubernatorial seat have an effect
on the number of major party candidacies, the social and political climate
does not. Two-party competition and party heterogeneity are both statistically indistinguishable from zero, and while social capital attains significance,
it is not in the expected direction. Furthermore, none of the control variables
have a significant impact on major party gubernatorial contestation, except
for the size of the state legislature, and this is not in the direction one would
expect.
Third Party Candidate Entry
Turning to third party candidate entry, the signature requirement variable is,
as expected, significant and negative, which suggests that signature requirements are significant barriers to entry for these candidates in gubernatorial
elections. The status of the gubernatorial seat, however, does not appear to
be important. This finding could suggest that incumbency does not affect
third party candidacies as much as major party candidacies since third party
candidates are likely less concerned with winning the election.
While social capital and party heterogeneity do not have an impact on
third party candidacies, two-party competition is correctly signed and statistically significant.20 This finding is not surprising given that high two-party
competition increases electoral uncertainty and gives third party candidates
a chance to significantly alter the direction of the election or even capture
elected office. Last, most of the control variables are significant in the third
party model.
Comparing the two models of candidate entry, we observe some interesting differences between major and third party candidacies. First, the twoparty competition variable was significant in the third party model but not in
the major party model. We interpret this finding to be consistent with recent
work (Lem and Dowling 2006) that demonstrates third party candidates
are motivated to contest elections for reasons other than solely the chance
to win the election, such as policy concerns or gaining recognition for their
Table 3. Explaining Candidate Entry in Gubernatorial Elections, 1980–2005
Independent Variables
Major Party Candidates
Electoral Laws
Signature requirement (% population)
Filing fee requirement (in hundred dollars)
Party endorsement states
Social and Political Climate
Social capital
Two-party competition
Party heterogeneity
Election-Specific
Open seat via term limit
Presence of incumbent Incumbent strength
Presence of incumbent × Incumbent strength
Pool of Potential Candidates
Size of state legislature
Number of offices elected statewide
(0.0114)
Controls
Citizen ideology
Population (in millions)
Population density
Governor salary (in thousand dollars)
Previous third party vote
Constant
Alpha
N
Wald statistic, χ2
Pseudo log-likelihood
Third Party Candidates
-0.0031
(0.0006)***
0.0004
(0.0025)
–0.4131
(0.0813)***
–0.0008
(0.0002)***
—
–0.1162
(0.0436)**
0.0003
(0.0022)
0.1365
(1.9613)
–0.0024
(0.0932)
0.0115
(0.0047)**
–0.8034
(3.8753)
–0.0613
(0.0825)
0.1485
(0.3299)
0.7234
(0.4574)
–0.9550
(0.5834)*
–0.2512
(0.1659)
0.1105
(0.8026)
–1.0203
(1.0290)
–0.7294
(1.4417)
–0.0015
(0.0004)***
–0.0001
(0.0265)*
–0.0010
(0.0007)
–0.0592
0.0025
(0.0024)
0.0076
(0.0053)
–0.0001
(0.0002)
–0.0008
(0.0012)
—
(0.6958)**
1.9203
(0.2664)***
0.0309
(0.0142)
298
192.19
–699.26
0.0071
(0.0046)
0.0087
(0.0072)
-0.0008
(0.0003)**
0.0104
(0.0020)***
1.8532
*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001; all significant tests are one-tailed
Note: Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.
–0.0970
(0.1392)
0.5704
(0.6737)
0.2078
(0.0580)
298
118.20
–496.53
16 dowling and lem
party or themselves. Under low two-party competition, it is unlikely that a
third party challenger would win the election or influence policy especially
vis-à-vis a major party challenger. Conversely, when major party competition is high, third party candidates may be able to barter potential votes (i.e.,
the ones they would steal from the major parties) or draw more attention
to their issues.
Second, the strength of the incumbent is negative and significant for
major party candidates, as expected, but is insignificant for third party candidates. The inference to be drawn then is that where major party candidates
shy away from strong gubernatorial incumbents running for reelection, their
third party counterparts do not necessarily act in the same fashion, which
is probably due, at least in part, to differences in motivation for contesting
elected office.
While the direction and statistical significance of coefficients from the
negative binomial regression are directly interpretable, gauging the substantive effects of our key variables is not straightforward. First, unlike OLS,
negative binomial coefficients are not independently additive, meaning that
a coefficient cannot be interpreted as the change in Y given a one unit change
in X. Rather, the coefficients are inherently interactive, meaning their substantive effects may only be interpreted when considering estimates in the
entire model. Second, the substantive effects of variables are not constant
across their range. For example, the difference in the expected number of
third party candidates when signature requirements shift from .01 to .02
percent of the population, ceteris paribus, is .29, while the difference between
.02 and .03 percent is .19.
To deal with these issues, we provide substantive interpretations of the
results concerning incumbent strength and signature requirements using
CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).21 In general, CLARIFY derives
quantities of interest—in our case, the expected number of candidates—
using simulations to derive the model’s key parameters. Through this process,
the program allows us to generate the expected number of major and third
party candidates at a priori defined levels of key independent variables while
holding all of the other variables in the model constant at their means or
modes. We can then combine the expected number of candidates over the
range of a variable of interest in a single graph, which helps us discern the
impact our variable has on the dependent variable. Therefore, the figures
show the expected values (with 95 percent confidence intervals) given the
values of each independent variable holding all else constant at their means
(continuous variables) or modes (discrete variables).
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 17
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the strength of the incumbent
when an incumbent runs for reelection, with all other variables at their means
or modes, and the expected number of major and third party candidates
with 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure confirms what the direction
of the coefficients told us: the impact of incumbent strength is different for
major and third party candidacies. More specifically, major party candidates
decrease as we move from a weak incumbent to a strong incumbent, from
about seven major party candidates with a very weak incumbent to around
four major party candidates with a very strong incumbent. However, the
count of third party candidacies stays about the same (at two) as we move
from a weak to a strong incumbent.
Finally, there is one important similarity between the two models: the
signature requirement variable performs as expected for both major and
third party candidates.
Again, we used CLARIFY to generate graphs of the expected number of
candidates and their 95 percent confidence intervals, but this time across the
range of the signature requirement variable. As shown in Figure 2, moving
across the full range (0–0.02 percent) for major party candidates results
in a significant decrease, about eight candidates to four or five candidates,
on average (see Figure 2a). Moving across the full range (0–0.2 percent) of
signature requirements also decreases the expected number of third party
candidates from about 2.5 to 0.5, suggesting these requirements do limit third
party candidacies (see Figure 2b). Thus, we see the effectiveness of signature
requirements in limiting the field of candidates in gubernatorial elections. In
other words, ballot access requirements, at least signature requirements, do
restrain the amount of candidate participation and choice offered to voters
in (gubernatorial) elections.
Figure 1. Expected Number
of Candidates by Incumbent Strength
18 dowling and lem
Figure 2A. Expected
Number of Major Party
Candidates by Signature
Requirement
Figure 2B. Expected
Number of Third Party
Candidates by Signature
Requirement
conclusion
The results presented in this article offer important insights into how systemic factors affect candidate entry in gubernatorial elections. By providing
a general framework for studying the quantity of candidates, our model
helps shed light on how state-level forces (electoral laws and the social and
political climate) and election-specific forces structure individuals’ choices
to pursue elected office. The results illustrate the importance of ballot access
restrictions and the incumbency advantage in determining who enters the
electoral arena.
It is essential to point out, however, that the effect of these factors varies for individuals who choose to run under a major party label from those
that campaign under minor party banners or as independents. While ballot
access restrictions tend to constrain the number of both types of challengers, incumbency has significantly different effects for each type of candidate.
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 19
Would-be third party challengers tend not to be concerned with the status
of the gubernatorial seat or the strength of the incumbent holding it. On the
other hand, strong incumbents seeking reelection deter major party challengers; weak incumbents encourage more contestation on the part of major
party candidates.
We conclude by noting that the factors that influence candidate entry,
the sheer quantity of candidates—i.e., the number of choices available in
an election—especially, for major and third party candidates merits further
theoretical and empirical consideration. Work such as this will allow us
to better understand why some elections offer voters more choices than
others.
endnotes
A previous version of this article was presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. We thank Jennifer Jensen, David H. Clark, and three
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts. We also thank Robin E. Best
for generously sharing data with us. We are responsible for any errors that remain.
1. In this article, we choose to focus on gubernatorial elections for two related reasons.
First, most cross-sectional office-specific differences (e.g., salary and professionalism of
the office), which several scholars (see McCormick and Tollison 1978; Fiorina 1994; Hibbing 1999) often point to as increasing the propensity of individuals running for a given
office, tend to be relatively small when comparing governorships. Therefore, the number
of candidates in each state may be more directly comparable prima facie. Second, given
the homogeneous nature of governorships, one could expect to see a lower amount of
variation in the number of candidates seeking office across the states. We do, however,
control for gubernatorial salary and find that it does contribute to the number of third
party candidacies.
2. This figure does not include the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election.
3. Previous research concerning ballot access requirements has found them to be effective at limiting the field of candidates. For example, Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996)
examine the effects of filing fees and petition requirements on congressional elections and
find that more stringent ballot access requirements increase the frequency of uncontested
seats and decrease the frequency of retirements. Additionally, Stratmann (2005) analyzes
state legislative elections and finds that, in general, higher ballot access requirements
decrease the number of both major and third party candidates.
4. We should note that most of these requirements are relatively constant over the time
period under study in this article, especially for major party candidates. For a discussion
of changes in third party ballot access requirements since the 1970s, see Winger (2000).
5. There is no prima facie reason the presence of preprimary party endorsements should
affect the decision-making calculus of potential third party candidate entrants.
6. Depicting the amount of two-party competition in a state as an aspect of the state’s
social and political climate might strike some as odd. We believe, however, that the amount
20 dowling and lem
of two-party competition can straightforwardly be thought of in terms of an orientation toward political action, i.e., as a part of a state’s social and political climate. As an
illustration, where one party dominates a state, the view toward politics of the citizens of
that state is no doubt different from one in which two parties struggle for superiority.
7. In a sense, then, this is a direct extension of Putnam’s work in that we wish to see
if social capital is related to candidate entry, a form of political participation Putnam
(2000) does not consider.
8. The Beyle and Jensen data can be found at www.unc.edu/~beyle/guber.html.
9. Please note that we are not concerned with only those candidates that appear on the
general election ballot. Rather, we seek to explain candidate participation more broadly.
In other words, we seek to explain the total number of individuals that are candidates, for
both major and third parties, at some point in time during a given election-year.
10. Most notably, the Candidate Emergence Study (CES) surveys “politically informed
individuals” in order to identify the pool of “potential candidates” in recent House elections (see Maestas, et al. 2006; Maisel and Stone 1997; Stone and Maisel 2003; Stone,
Maisel, and Maestas 2004).
11. Analyzing the total number of major and third party candidates does, however,
suffer from some limitations. Namely, individual idiosyncratic factors that may be important for major and third party participation (e.g., personal wealth, age, etc.) cannot be
accounted for. We discuss the ramifications of such omissions below.
12. In some states, the parties set the filing fee. Consequently, the fees may be different
for the two parties. When this occurs we use the less stringent requirement in the model,
so that potential candidates only have to jump over the lowest bar.
13. Ballot Access News can be found at www.ballot-access.org/.
14. Seven states have legal preprimary party endorsements: Colorado, Connecticut,
North Dakota, New York, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Utah (Jewell and Morehouse
1996).
15. We thank an anonymous referee for pushing us on this point.
16. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of NOMINATE scores to
measure party heterogeneity.
17. The data can be found on Putnam’s website at www.bowlingalone.com/data
.php3.
18. The SPPQ Data Resource can be found at www.unl.edu/SPPQ/sppq.html.
19. Their data can be found at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR), www.icpsr.umich.edu/; study no. 1208. For a complete description
of their measurement see the article and/or the accompanying appendices available
thru ICPSR. The data is also available at www.uky.edu/%7Erford/Home_files/page0005
.htm.
20. One reason for the comparatively poor performance of the social and political
climate indicators in both models could be that these underlying norms have an indirect
effect on the number of candidates participating in elections through some of the other
variables in the model, such as the ballot access requirements or incumbency indicators.
Modeling this multi-stage process is one potential fruitful avenue for future research.
21. Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, 2003. CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1. Stanford University, University of
Wisconsin, and Harvard University. January 5. Available at http://gking.harvard.edu/.
spring 2009 / state politics and policy quarterly 21
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