Predestination in Aquinas and Calvin
CHARLES PARTEE
Until mode rn times the most influe ntial systematic theo logians in the Roman
Ca tholic a nd Protes ta nt trad ition s re spectively were T homas Aquinas a nd John Ca lvin . Beca use eac h was syste matic, it is possib le to evalua te his thought in terms of
the co ntex t which he provides, a nd because eac h was influe ntial , it is worthwh ile not
o nly to examine hi s thou ght in its own context , but also in relation to the o the r.
Regarding the doctrine of predestinat ion the re lations hi p between Aquinas a nd
Calvin e vokes sharply diffe ring evalua tion s: On the one ha nd , Reginald GarrigouLagra nge sees a substa nti al dichotomy , 1 while J. B. Mozley recogni zes no real differe nce betwee n Thomas a nd Calvin. 2 A more extended a nd he lpful treatme nt of both
similarities and diffe re nces is found in Caspar Friethoffs, " Di e Pradestinationslehre
bei T homas von Aquin a nd Calvin". 3 Ac cording to F riethoff there is significant
agreement be twee n Thomas a nd Ca lvin concerning the sovereignty of God and therefore that God's foreknowl e dge of the good works of ma n is not the ca use of salvation ,
but rat her that sa lvation is t he ca use of good wo rk s. However , T homas believes God
to have a rra nged that th ose predestined to glory should receive salvation in connection with the good works attenda nt upon the pre destination to grace , thereby affi rming the merito ri ous nat ure of good works in a se nse to which Ca lvin is irreconcilably
opposed.
The purpose of this essay, then , is to consider the doctrine of predestination in
T ho mas a nd Ca lvin , not so. mu c h with the expectation of so lving the proble ms, but
with the hope of understa nding the issues better. T herefore we will ( I) o utline certain
esse ntia l differences between the intellectual posit io ns from which T homas and Calvin a pproach t he doct rine of pre destination in genera l, a nd (II), delineate in particu lar
the sign ificance of the differing contexts in which the doctrine is discussed in the
5 11111111<1 Theologica a nd the /11stit11tes of th e Christian R eligion. 4 Indeed, these
points may be regarde d as of more crucial and determinative importa nce tha n those
aspects of the ir doctrine of predestination which can be isolated a nd compared as
Friet hoff does.
I. Philosophy and Theology
While both Thomas a nd Calvin des ire to be , and are, Christian theologians, they
obv ious ly approach the doctrine of pre destination from differe nt perspect ives. Although not pola r opposites, Thomas and Ca lvin defend cons iderably different position s on philoso phy and theo logy, specifically in regard to (I) Aristotle and Plato, (2)
Reason a nd Reve lation, (3) Being and Know ing, and (4) Inte llect and Wi ll.
(I) -Thomas' carefu l synthe sis of philosophy and theo logy , nature and grace,
reason an d revelation , terme d by G ilson " the very essence of Thom ism ," 5 has no
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exact co unte rpa rt in Calvin 's tho ught. Thomas calls his work a " theologica l s ynopsis" a nd Ca lvin call s hi s "Chri stian philosophy ," but Thomas' e xposition is mo re
explicitly related to the philosophic t radition tha n Ca lvin 's. Thomas may be called a n
Ari stoteli a n in the se nse that he con side rs Arti stotle to be " th e Philoso phe r" a nd
con sta ntly uses Aristotle's thought as a n in strume nt of a naly sis and synthesis, while
Calvin refe rs to Aristotle o nly te n times in the /11stit11tes. On the othe r ha nd , Calvin
may be related to the Platonic tradition by way of opposition to the Ari stote lian , but
thi s di stincti on is scarcely helpful in the re lati o n of Calvin to Thomas since T homas
cites Plato by name in the Summa some one hundred times a nd Calvin in the ln s ti111/es only twe nty. Basically Calvin cites the philo sophe rs, not as a source of insight,
but as confirma tion that God was not without witness e ve n a mong the heathe n . 6
Calvin 's closest hi storical affinity is with theological, rathe r than philosophi ca l, Augustiniani s m.
(2) According to Thomas , " G race does not destroy na ture, but pe rfects it " (ST.
I . I. 8.). T homas' vie w of the comple me ntary relation betwee n the natural and the
supernatu ral allows him to give a more pos itive e valua tion of human reas on that
Calvin 's does. Man , as created in the image of God , is a rational being (ST. I. 93. 6) .
The fa ll re moves the supe rnatu ra l gifts, but the natural gifts, while affected , are not
totally impaired . The refore, Thomas thinks that " ma n ma y progress in the kn o wledge.of Go d by beginning wi t h lo we r things and gradually asce nding" (SCG. IV. I.
I). T hu s grace restores the natural function of reason a nd will which the n co-operate
with grace.
Calvin is not so clear on thi s point . Reason a nd re velati on are not alwa ys cont radictory for him , and he can praise the huma n reason, but he also c riticizes "carnal
reason ." Still , T homas e mphasizes the continuity of reaso n a nd re vela ti o n; Calvin
e mphasizes the inadequac y of reaso n fo r knowing God . Ca lvi n, like Bo nave nture ,
see ms to thin k that a ny philosophy whic h is prese nted inde pe nde ntly of Christian
fa ith , whil e inte resting a nd perh aps helpful in so me partic ulars, is bound to be, not
me re ly inadeq uate as a whole, but viti ated in the pa rts . Calvin we lcomes philosop hi c
in sights because he, li ke T homas, regard s all truth as belo nging to G od , but he does
not beli eve that a philoso ph y can de velop a true, eve n tho ugh limited, syste m witho ut
the aid of God's revelatio n. Calvin occasio nally speaks of what can be natu rall y
kno wn , but hi s chief concern is t he re vealed Word of Go d . T hu s he comes close to a
kind of pos itivi sm of Chri stian re velation. Ca lvin ' s vie w is tha t " the Sc ript ures
should be read with th e aim of fi nding Chri st in t he m. Wh oe ver t urns aside fro m this
object , e ve n tho ugh he wears him self o ut a ll hi s li fe in learning, will ne ver reach the
kno wledge of the truth " (Comm. Jn . 5. 39).
(3) In ge neral Thomas' theo logy is more o ntological a nd Calvin ' s in contrast
more e pi stemologica l. T hat is 'to say, t hat while for Thomas "first philoso phy is
wholly o rde red to the kno wing of God , as its ultimate e nd " (SCG. III. 25. 9), he
begins with the being of God . Calvin begi ns with the kno ll'ledge of God as the fi rst
sente nce of the /n stit11tes indi cates: " Nearly all t he wisdom we possess, th at is to
say, true and sound wi sdom , co nsists of t wo parts: The kno wledge of God and of
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ourse lves" (Inst . I. I. I) . Thu s Thomas de votes a good dea l of atte ntio n to the
ex iste nce a nd nat ure of God a nd the n to the divine persons, while Calvin assumes the
doctrine of the T rinit y. witho ut muc h di sc ussio n a nd has co mparative ly little to say
abo ut the being a nd a ttributes of God. However, eve n within the framework of thi s
ge ne rali za tion , one find s more e pi ste mologica l co nsiderations (e.g., huma n knowle dge as de rive d from the senses, e tc. ) in Thom as tha n in Ca lvin .
Thomas ' ontological inte rest involves the vie w of the universe as a hierarchy of
be ings. The metaphy sical doctrine of grades of being is utilized by Thomas in the
ana logy of be ing and to ex pla in the be in g of a nge ls. Ca lvin 's a nge lo logy does not
focus on the be ing but the acti vity of the a nge ls. Another aspect of the scale of be ing ,
the princ iple of plenitude, allows Thomas to acco unt for evil as a reality , thou gh in a
privative se nse, while Ca lvin sees ev il in a direct re lation to the will of God . Perhaps
Ca lvin 's mo st ex plic it state me nt of God as the author of our affli cti ons (though he
de ni es that God is the author of ev il) is thi s:
All the se rvants of God in thi s world [are re prese nte d] as wrestle rs ...
Moreover, it is not said that Satan, o r a ny morta l ma n, wrestled with
Jacob , but God himse lf; to teach us that our fa ith is tried by him ; a nd
whe ne ver we are te mpted , our business is truly with him , not only because we fi ght under hi s a uspi ces, but beca use he, as a n a ntago nist,
descends into the are na to try our stre ngth . This , tho ugh at first sight it
see ms a bsurd , experience and reaso n teaches us to be true. For as all
pro spe rity flow s from hi s goodness, so adve rsity is e ithe r the rod with
whic h he corrects our sins, or the test of our fa ith a nd patience. [God]
both fights again s t us a nd./(Jr us. In short , s uc h is hi s apportioning of this
co nflict , that, while he assail s us with one ha nd , he defe nd s us with the
other ... we ma y truly and prope rly say, that he fights again st us with hi s
le.Ii ha nd , a nd.f(1 r us with hi s rig hl (Comm. Gen. 32. 34).
T homas' theo logy is a n exp lication of the structure of be ing, of God as infinite being
a nd ma n as created being. Ca lvin 's theology revolves aro und the knowledge of God
as Creator-Sav ior and man as creat ure-sinner. T hu s Ca lvin uses personal and noetic
rathe r tha n ratio na l a nd o nto logica l categories.
(4) Co nce rning the primacy of the will or of the inte llect, T homas fo llowed
Aristotle ' s psyc ho logy whic h ho ld s that the reason is the best thing in ma n and aki n
to the gods. 7 T he will , accord ing to T ho mas, is determined by the knowledge of t he
good. T he refore wi ll fol lows ~nte ll ect (ST. I. 19. I ; ye t see Ia. II ae. I). God ' s wi ll ,
too, is de termined by good though not as a seco nd moveme nt since willing and being
are the same in God. T he di vine ideas a re not o nto logicall y d ist inct from t he divine
esse nce nor is the willing of t hem. In thi s sense Thomas can say t hat the will of God is
the ca use of things (ST. I. 19. 4). Sti ll , the la nguage T homas e mploys suggests a
distinct io n between inte llect a nd will, a nd T homas' basic position is that God is t he
ca use of th ings by his intellect (ST. I. 22. I). T hu s the divine will fo llows the divine
wisdom, a nd God will s t he good because it is good. The Occam ists, in affirming
d ivin e freedom and omnipotence a nd denying the onto logy of div ine ideas, see God's
will as constitue nt of the good , t hough Occam regards the divine will and inte llect, if
taken abso lute ly , as identical. T hi s que stion whether God wills the good beca use it is
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good o r whethe r the will of Go d creates the good is ra ise d as early as P lato's £ 111/iyphro. In a ny e ve nt , Ca lvin ' s edu cati on had bee n alo ng no min ali stic lines, a nd , while he
o bjec ts to the di stinc tion be twee n a bso lute a nd o rde re d powe r (In s ! . Ill. 23 . 2), hi s
re peated e mphas is is that nothing is greate r or more ultimate tha n the will of God .
T ho mas' view of the inte llect a lso in vo lves t he co nce pt of exe mpla ri s m whic h
was deve lo ped t hro ugh Neo pla toni s m. P lato's metap hysics may be conside red
dua li sti c in so fa r as he separa tes the e te rna l ideas fro m te mpora l things. T he res ulting
proble m of pa rtic ipa ti on co uld be met by P la to' s doctrine of soul as a n inte rmedi ary
betwee n ideas and things , but the po int is th at fo r P lato the god (or go ds) is cons ide re d more akin to soul s tha n to ideas, a nd the ideas a re co nside re d to be exp la nati ons
ll"ilh o 111 bein g c au ses (if the ideas we re ca uses the re wo uld be no prob le m of pa rti cipa tion). Ho we ve r, medi eva l thinke rs ide nti fy God with Pla to ' s idea of the Good
whic h is above the ideas rathe r tha n be lo w the ideas with so ul as P lato him self does.
T hus Plato's ete rnal ideas we re take n to be exe mplars in the mind of God and also in
some fas hi on as cau ses.
In summa ry, T ho mas, a zealous admire r of Ari stotle, a pproac hes the doctrine of
predestinati o n with the co nfi de nce that the inte llect is ca pa ble of reaso ning abo ut
be ing. Calvin , inde bted to Augustine, a pproac hes the doctrine of pre destin ati on in
the co nfide nce that the will of God can be known th ro ugh re ve la ti o n. T hu s e ve n a
brief co nsideratio n of the ge nera l inte llectua l fra mewo rk wit hin whi ch T ho mas a nd
Ca lvin mo ve shows t hat di ffe re nt e mphases ex ist a nd that essentia l e le me nt s of
Thomas' tho ught are quite absent from Calvin 's. If they were recogni zed as T homistic
a nd me re ly de ni ed by Calvin a nd othe rs substitute d fo r t he m, the re wo ul d be a bas is
fo r a mo re exac t co mpa ri so n betwee n t he two thinke rs, but sma ll paralle li sm ex ists.
T he e vi de nce suggests, so fa r as l can asce rtain , that Calvin was not greatl y interested in the T homistic sy nthes is; at least , Calvi n utili zed T homas ' tho ught
sca rcely at a ll . H is lo rica l/y , it wp uld be pointless to compa re Calvin a nd T ho mas as if
he did. Ho wever, o ne may profit abl y compare the ir tho ught sysl enw lic ally .
II. Providence and Predestination
T he doc trines of provide nce a nd pre dest inatio n a re c lose ly re lated in bo th
Aquinas a nd Ca lvin . However , the fo rm a nd conte nt of the ir t reatme nts indi cate that
T ho mas approac hes predestinati on fro m the doctrine of provide nce while Ca lvin
co mes to provide nce from pre destina ti on. T ho mas sees pre destina tio n as pa rt of
prov ide nce based on the divine decree. Ca lvin does not deny, indeed affi rms , the
ete rna l decree, but in most of his earl y wri tings Ca lvin treats pre destinat ion bef(1re
pro vide nce a nd sepa ral e.1· t hem in th e fi na l editio n of t he !n s tit111 es by dea ling with
pre destinatio n as an aspect of sote rio logy. To acco un t fo r this situati o n the suggesti on ma y be hazarde d t ha t T ho mas ' d octrine of prov ide nce a nd predest ination is
gro unded in a n ap pea l to reaso n a nd Calvi n's in an appea l to expe rie nce . That is ,
T ho mas ' view of prov ide nce a nd predesti natio n is a n expos itio n of t he rat io nal
un dersta ndi ng of God ' s ca usali ty a nd Ca lvin's is a n expos itio n of ma n's experie nce of
God's care. T hi s gene ra li zatio n he lps to expla in t he notab le d iffere nces be twee n
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Thomas and Calvin on (I) the textual locations of providence and predestination, (2)
the discussion of the relation of providence and predestination, and (3) the exposition
of predestination.
(I) The distinction in the Summa Th eologica between God's movement to man
(ST. I) and man's movement to God (ST. la. Ilae.) is not dissimilar to that between
Books I-II and III-IV of the Institutes. The traditional division of Calvin's work along
the line s of the Apostles' Creed; God the Father (Book I), God the Son (Book II),
God the Holy Spirit (Book Ill), a nd the Church (Book IV) cou ld be modified acco rding to Calvin's programmatic affir mation that the sum of wisdom consists in the
knowledge of God and man (Inst. I. I. I) . At the beginning of Book III, Calvin writes
that as long as Christ remains outside of us, all that he has done for us is use le ss. Thus
it is possible to view Books I-II as an expos ition of what God does.for us and Books
III-IV as what God does in and with us.
Thomas' basic discussion of both providence (ST. I. 22) and predestination (ST.
I. 23) is treated as part of the doctrine of God (yet see ST. III. 24). In sharp contra st
Calvin discusses predestination in his soterio logy as an implication of the response of
faith which is the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus in the S umma T/ieologica (though not
in the Summa Co ntra Gentiles) Thomas deals with providence, but also predestination , as part of the understanding of God, before cons idering creation. In this a
number of Reformed theologians, including T heodore Beza and Hieronymus Zanchius, follow Thomas. However, as Calvin's Institutes develop there were three
stages in the location of the doctrines of providence and predestination.
In the edition of 1536 providence is expounded as part of the belief in God the
Father Almighty , creator of heaven and earth. Predestination is treated in connect ion
with the doctrine of the church to which the elect belong. The second stage is found
in the edition of 1539. Here Calvin devotes a single and separate chapter to predestination and providence. In this edition providence, as the less polemical topi c, fo llows
the exposition of predestination. The third stage is reached in the final and definitive
edition of 1559. Now the main exposition of providence precedes the treatment of
predestination. Providence is placed in Book I as part of the doctrine of God the
Creator (returning to its location in the 1536 editi on) while the doctrine of predestination is placed in Book III (before the development of the doctrine of the Church in
Book IV) as part of the reception of the grace of Christ. It is in the light of the
differing contexts that the doctrines of Thomas and Ca lvin must be compared.
(2) In Thomas' theology predestination is the particular aspect of divine providence concerned with each person individually. Thus predestination is a part of
God's universal providence. Calvin also affirms God's universal providence, but the
distinction , if any, between God's particular providence toward man and predestination is blurred . One might conclude that Calvin's doctrine of predest ination is simply
a fuller exposition of his view of particular providence, but it seems more Likely that
his view of predestination explains his emphasis on particular providence.
According to Thomas, since God is the creator, " the causality of God extends to
all beings which are therefore su bject to providence" (ST. I. 22. 2) . In explaining this
doctrine Thomas emphasizes the causality of the intellect of God. Quoting Boethius,
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Thomas defines" 'Providence [as] the divine reason itself which, seated in the Supreme Ru ler, di sposes all things'; which disposition may refer e ither to the exemplar of
the order of things toward an end, or to the exemplar of order of parts in the whole "
(ST. I. 22). Since Thomas holds that the doctrine of government belongs to providence (ST. I. 103. 4), he distinguishes between providence as the eternal exemplar
of order towards a n e nd and government as the temporal execution of order. Within
the operation of God Thomas attempts to make room for the co-operation of man by
adding di stinctions between immediate and intermediate, universal and particular ,
primary and secondary, and necessary and contingent ca usa lity . Thus predestination
is said to achieve its effect certainly and infa llibly but not necessarily since divine
provide nce has ordained some things to happen conti ngently (ST. I. 23 . 6). It is
surely a perplexity, if not a contradiction, to think that events certain ly a nd infallibly
but not necessarily occur . How an omnipotent and omniscient God co uld know
future cont ingent events without being respon sible fo r them is unexplainable.
Ca lvin , on the other hand , emphasizes the will of God, rather tha n the int e llect of
God in providence and predestination. He writes, "God's will is so much the hi ghest
rule of righteousness that whatever he wills , by the very fact that he wills it, must be
considered righteou s. When , therefore, one asks why God has so done, we must
reply; because he has willed it. But if you proceed further to ask why he so wi lled ,
yo u are seeking something greater a nd higher than God's will, which cannot be
found " (Inst . Ill. 23 . 2). Similarly, Thomas, citing Augustine, concludes, ·' Why
[God] chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason exce pt the divine
will" (ST. I. 23. 5). Neverthe less Ca lvin asserts that man is free , but he does not
attempt to gro und this assertion in an ontology. Calvin vigorously objects to those
(including Aquinas) who think concerning universa l provide nce "that nothing hinders all creatures from being co ntingently moved , or man from turning himself hither
and thither by the free choice of his will. And they so apportion things between God
and man that God by His power inspires in ma n a movement by which he can act in
accordance with the nat ure implanted in him " (Inst. I. 16. 4) .
It should also be noted that Calvin 's view of government and providence are not
clearly differentiated. Further , while Ca lvin see ms to give greater place to secondary
and inte rmediate causality tha n Zwingli , he really does not have a logi ca ll y coherent
theory of contingency as evidenced in the assertion that God's providence " is the
determinative principle of all things in such a way that sometimes it works through an
intermediary , sometimes without a n intermediary, sometimes contrary to every intermedia ry" (Inst. I. 17. l ).
In summary, Thomas' doctrine of predestination mu st be understood in terms of
hi s doctrine of providence . In contrast, Calvin's doctrine of providence must be
approached from the standpoint of his doctrine of predestination. The major problem
with Thomas ' view is the limitation of God's action . T he major problem with Ca lvin 's
view is the limitation of man' s responsibility. This beco mes cleare r.in their respective
expositions of predestination.
(3) Thomas believes that God ' s providence includes predestination and allows
reprobation. Calvin sees predestination as a se parate topic involving bot h election
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and reprobation. "We call predestination God's eternal decree, by which he determined with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in
equal condition; rather, eternal li fe is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for
others. Therefore as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we
speak of him as predestined to li fe or to death" (Inst. III. 21. 5).
Thomas defines predestination as " a kind of exemplar of the ordering of some
persons towards eternal salvation , existing in the divine mind " (ST. I. 23. 3). The
rational creature, while capable of eternal Life, must be Jed towards it by God. To
providence belongs the permission of certain defects in things, and the permission of
certain men to fall away from eternal life is the negative side of providence. God's
love wishes some good for all men but not every good. Therefore eternal Li fe is not for
all. Those who are predestined are divinely ordained to eternal salvation; those who
are reprobated and deserted by grace freely choose to sin. For the elect God wills the
end necessarily, but the means conditionally thus guaranteeing their freedom of
choice. The elect are given grace in order to earn glory . "God pre-ordained to give
glory because of merit, and ... he pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory" (ST. I.
23 . 5). The doctrine of reprobation is not symmetrical with election. The reprobate
cannot acquire grace, not because it is absolutely impossible, but because it is conditionally impossible, i. e., because he chooses to sin.
To explain predestination Thomas uses the distinction between universal and
particular causality, but whether a dual causality which includes God as one cause
allows freedom to man is a moot point. One might adopt the panentheistic position
that God is a whole with self-determining parts, but presumably the resulting denial
of God's perfection and omniscience would have made this view unacceptable to
Thomas. In any case, Thomas holds that while the particular cause excludes all
defects, the universal cause permits some defects for the good of the whole . Thomas
seems to believe that God as universal cause could not logically prevent all evil
without destroying some good. That is, without tyrannical persecution, there would
be no patient martyrs. This point has been challenged in the contemporary discussion
of God and evil. 8 However, Thomas' identification of God's providence and universal causality is in sharp contrast to Calvin's emphasis on God's particular providence. Thomas' doctrine places God directly before and after the life of man but
only vaguely with the events of earthly life, thus endangering the concept of the
constant care of God. Calvin places God so directly with the life of man that the
assertion of the freedom of man is unsupported .
For Thomas, God' s providence includes the positive permission of evil, and
predestination includes the just reprobation of the evildoer. Though God does not
positively will evil and reprobation, he positively permits both as a way of justifying
the freedom and destiny of man. On the other hand, Calvin understands Augustine's
statement that "the will of God is the necessity of things" as a denial of the distinction between God's will and his permission (Inst. III. 23. 8). Calvin's emphasis on
particular providence and predestination as the work of God leaves the freedom and
destiny of man in the hands of God.
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The resulting situation is something Like this. God has made a wonderful house
with a heavenly attic and a hellish cellar. Man is placed in the living room . According
to Thomas , some men are given a floor plan and these, with the plan and through
their own efforts, ascend the stairs. Jhose without the plan can only , but through
their own efforts, descend the other stairs . According to Calvin , God is the real estate
agent who leads some upward and others downward . The proper attitude for those on
the upward way is praise and gratitude to God and hope for the others. In both
Thomas and Calvin, God is ultimately responsible for all men, but in different ways.
For Thomas, God is directly involved in giving or withholding the floor plan which
man is said to be free to follow if he has it, and yet bound to get lost if he does not.
For Calvin, God directs the entire tour. Thus it seems that in terms of salvation the
freedom of man in Thomas is basically illusory and in Calvin essentially non-existent.
Towards a Conclusion
The conclusions reached in this essay is that there are critical differences between
Thomas and Calvin in the general intellectual frame-work from which they approach
the doctrine of predestination and in the form and content of their discussion of it.
More than that, one must conclude that serious intellectual problems remain. The
most evident examples are Thomas' distinction between predestination to grace and
predestination to glory, which seems to be a logomachy, and Calvin's distinction
between the will of God and evil, which seems to be an antinomy.
However, this essay should not be construed as an attack on the doctrine of
predestination in general nor on that of Aquinas and Calvin in particular. That intention presupposes that the author has answers rather than questions. The Socratic
stance toward the possession of ultimate knowledge still has much to commend it.
Further, it does not follow from critical objections that the doctrine itself should be
dismissed as an abortive conception of a bygone era. As long as men believe in a God
who ~ares for them directly and individually , some attention will be devoted to the
doctrine of predestination. Moreover, none of the major schools of contemporary
thought provides an entirely satisfactory basis for dealing with these issues . For
example, theistic existentialism offers an agonized description of the brokennes s of
human life and thought, but a description is not a solution. Process theology is able to
explain the purpose of God and the freedom of man, but only by denying the traditional theistic views of God's perfection and omniscience, an expedience which
many will be unwilling to grant. The analytical tradition, as represented by John
Hick, sees the Christian's religious interpretation of his experience of dependence on
God's providence related to his scientific understanding of the sufficiency of the
world as "two-fold and indeed paradoxical. " 9 According to Hick, the two-fold
paradigm of Christ as completely human and completely divine parallels the Christian's view of the spheres of science and religion. Thus the "paradox" of the crucifixion as the greatest crime of man and the greatest blessing for man is regarded as the
pattern for viewing the responsibility of man and the purpose of God.
This appeal to mystery and paradox is not unlike the appeal of Thomas and
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Calvin to re velation and reason, nor indeed of Kant to the noumenal and phenomena l
realms, but it is open to many of the same objections. How is one to determine the
difference between true and fal se in mystery and paradox or the relation of one realm
to the other in a dual-adequacy truth theory ? Perhaps the logical objections to the
doctrine of predestination are unresolvable, at least on the basis of discussions to
date . However , thi s situation may point to a psychological solution. That is to say,
while experience is corrigib le, and likewise the interpretation of experie nce, for some
(though not for a ll) God's care is an experienced fact. Thus the only evidence for the
care of God is the experience of it. Hick consciously adopts this stance and Ca lvin
suggests it. 10 Thus, without having arrived at an explanation of all the logical iss ues in
the doctrine , fa ith continues to seek understanding .
FOOTNOTES
Regina ld Garrigou- Lagrange, La Pr~desti11atio11 des Saints et la Grace (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1935).
p. 136.
2 J .B. Mozley, A Treatise 011 th e Augustinian Doctrine vf Predestination (2nd e d.; New York : E. P. Dutton,
1878), p. 267 and note 2 1, pp. 393ff.
'Caspar Friet hoff, "Die Pradestination slehre bei Thomas von Aquin und Calvin ," Di\>//s Thomas , III , 4
( 1926) , 71 -91 . 195-206, 280-302, 445-466 .
4
The S11111111a Th eolog ica (ST) of T homas Aquinas is c ite d in th e translation of the Fathers o f the Englis h
Dominican Province , rev . by Danie l J. Sul li van (Chicago: Willia m Ben ton , 1952) ; the Summa Contra
Gen tiles (SCG) with variou s tran slators (Garden City , N . Y.: Image Books , 1955). T he c itation s from
Calvin are found in the In s titut es of th e C hris tian R elg io11 .1· (Inst .. ), ed. by John T. McNe ill , tran s. by Ford
Lewi s Battles (Phi ladelphi a: T he Westmin ster Press , 1960) . Ca lvi n's O ld Testament citations are from the
Co 111111 e11taries <!( John Ca li•in, various translators (Edinburgh: The Ca lvin Translation Soc ie ty , 1843-55).
The New Testament cit ations are from Ca ll'in' s Ne11 · Testam ent Co111111 e11 taries. ed. by David W. Torrance
and Thomas F . To rran ce , variou s translators (Grand Ra pid s: William B. Eerdman s, 1959- 1972).
' Et ie nn e G il so n , The S t>irit of Thomis m (N ew York: P. J. Kenedy , 1964) , p. 73.
6
C f. C harles Parlee, Cali •in and Classical Philosophy. (Leiden: E. J. Brill , 1977), pp. 95 ff.
7
Ethica Nico111achea. X, 8. 11 79 a 25.
'For exa mple, J. L . Mackie in Mind. LXIY ( 1955), 200-21 2.
''Jo hn Hick , Faith and K1101rledJie (Ithaca: Co rnell Unive rs ity Press. 1957) , pp . 209- 17.
1
Cf. my essay, ··calvin and Ex peri ence," Scottish Journal 4 Theology , 26, 2 (May , 1973), 169-8 1. See also
John E. Smith , Experience and God (London : Oxford University Press, 1968) a nd his The Analogy of
Experimce (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
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