Accessing political arenas Interest group access to the administration, parliament and media Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz, Helene Helboe Pedersen and Peter Munk Christiansen Department of Political Science Aarhus University Correspondence address: [email protected] 1 Abstract Interest groups are active in the administrative, the parliamentary, and the media arena. It is essential to investigate whether group access is cumulative in the sense that access in one arena spills over to other arenas. We argue that group access depends on arena specific exchange relations and thus expect different group types to be relatively well‐represented in different arenas. Empirically, the paper draws on a large‐scale investigation of group presence in different political arenas in Denmark in 2009‐10. The data combines information about: 1) group membership of public boards and committees, 2) group access to parliament and 3) group presence in news papers. These different data are linked to survey responses from interest groups enabling an analysis of both the linkages between arenas and the explanatory power of group resources and the role of group types. The analyses support the exchange model of access, but also find group resources to affect the level of group access across arenas. 2 Introduction Interest groups are central to the political representation of societal interests. Groups voice the concerns of different groups in the media, they lobby politicians on behalf of their constituents and they seek to make bureaucrats aware of group interests and viewpoints. Although group influence is complicated to ascertain, there is no doubt that many interest groups have decisive political influence (Baumgartner et al. 2011; Dür 2007). For decades, scholars have debated the extent to which interest groups provide different groups with equal opportunities for representation (Dahæ, 1961; Olson 1971; Schattschneider 1975; Truman 1951). The underlying premise is that diversity in group representation is a democratic good, but many studies have found significant bias in the group system with overrepresentation of privileged groups such as business interests (Danielian & Page 1995; Schattschneider 1975: 34‐35; Schlozman 1984; Schlozman et al. 2012; Walker 1991: 3). While most studies have focused on the composition of the interest group population as such or the representation of groups in specific settings, there is evidence to suggest that group representation may vary between political arenas (Bouwen 2004; Halpin et al. 2012; Salisbury 1984: 74‐75). This issue is especially crucial in a context, where interest groups seek influence across different arenas including the news media, parliament and the administrative arena (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005; Kriesi et al. 2007). If these arenas provide opportunities for different groups to voice their concerns this may be seen as positive from a democratic perspective. If, on the other hand, cumulativity exists in group presence across different arenas, it is evidence of consistent bias in group representation. Our focus here is on interest group access in the administration, parliament and the media. The incorporation of different political arenas allows us to address the extent to which different arenas allow different groups and types of interests to be politically represented. We argue that group access is the effect of an exchange of resources between groups and gate keepers in different arenas (Bouwen 2004; Braun 2012: 7; Öberg et al. 2011). Crucially, relevant resources and assets differ across arenas. Some interests groups control insider resources such as expertise or the potential to affect societal production – resources that are particularly relevant for inclusion in decision making processes (Rokkan 1966). Groups lacking such resources may instead possess outsider resources for example by representing causes with broad public appeal thus 3 making them interesting for journalists to report on. Further, interest groups pursue diverse political goals which may affect the priority given to different arenas (Gais & Walker 1991: 105). For example, groups interested in affecting the political agenda will direct much attention to the media, while groups seeking influence on the preparation and implementation of policies are more likely to approach bureaucrats. Accordingly, we expect different patterns of group representation in different arenas. The empirical analysis of arena access draws on a study of Danish interest groups. Denmark has traditionally been regarded as among the most corporatist countries, but in recent decades corporatism has been in decline (Öberg et al. 2011). At the same time, parliament has gained in relevance as a target of interest groups, and – in tandem with the development in other liberal democracies – the media has become an increasingly important political arena (Binderkrantz 2005; Rommetvedt et al. 2013). Denmark therefore constitutes a relevant empirical setting to investigate interest group access across different political arenas. The analysis draws on a unique dataset combining measures of group access across three arenas with information from a survey of all national interest groups. This allows us to trace each individual group as it appears in the media, in the administration and in parliament – and to link this with survey data on group resources. In testing the argument about different patterns of group representation across arenas we investigate both the factors affecting (1) whether a group is present in each arena and (2) the number of times each group appears. After discussing how group diversity may be conceptualized, the paper proceeds to discuss the resource exchange model of group access in more detail. Subsequently, research design and data are presented and empirical analysis of arena access conducted. 2. Explaining group access across political arenas 2.1 Bias and diversity in group representation The issue of diversity versus bias in the interest group system is classic. Ever since Schattschneider’s (1960/1975) challenge of the pluralist assumption of a relatively well balanced group system, scholars have been preoccupied with investigating the extent to which different groups have successfully mobilized and gained political influence (Baumgartner & Leech 1998: 4 100‐119; Jordan et al. 2012; Lowery & Gray 2004; Schlozman et al., 2012; Walker 1991; Wonka et al. 2010). A challenge in assessing the degree of diversity in group representation is that there is no way to know what unbiased group presence would look like. While some groups may be compared to relevant societal groups (see Schlozman 1984), for many group types it is not feasible to establish how their ‘natural’ presence in the group system might look (Baumgartner & Leech 1998: 93). It is, however, possible to compare the share of different groups in the politically mobilized interest group population to the level of political access obtained by different types of groups (Danielian & Page 2006) and – as we do here – to establish the relative success of groups across different political venues (Halpin et al. 2012). In addressing the issue of diversity in political voice it is essential to capture the nature of the interests being represented in political arenas (Schlozman 2012: 30). We define interest groups as membership organizations working to obtain political influence. Group members may be individuals, firms, governmental institutions or other interest groups. In contrast to some scholars our interest is thus restricted to membership groups and we do not include individual businesses or institutions (Jordan et al. 2004). Within the set of groups delimited by this definition we find groups representing very different types of members or causes – some organize well‐defined sectional groups for example related to the labor market, whereas others work for broader causes like animal protection or human rights. Although any categorization of groups entails grouping rather varied set of groups, a division into the following categories speaks to the main themes of the literature: 1) business groups, 2) trade unions, 3) institutional groups, 4) identity groups, 5) public interest groups and 6) other groups. Perhaps the most recurrent theme in the interest group literature has been the overrepresentation of business interests. From Schattschneider’s (1975: 34‐35) ascertainment that the ‘heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper‐class accent’ to more recent accounts of group representation, a main concern has been to determine the relative (over‐)weight of business interests in the pressure group system (Danielian & Page 1994; Schlozman et al. 2012; Woll 2007). In many respects, trade unions constitute the immediate counterpart to business and traditionally these group types are the quintessential participants in corporatist settings (Molina & Rhodes 2002; Schmitter 1974). Particularly in Scandinavia, institutional providers of public or semi‐public service – that is 5 associations of local authorities, schools, museums and other institutions – have also played a prominent role in corporatist arrangements. From a democratic perspective, these groups are of interest because they represent a set of interests particularly related to the production of public service. Even though the groups themselves are private actors they draw their members and finances from public sources (Rhodes 1986). Another crucial concern is the political representation of groups and causes not related to the market and/or vocations, professions or institutions. Berry (1999) argues that the voice of such citizen groups in US politics has been on the rise, while others are more skeptical about the role played by representatives of broad public interests as well as disadvantaged constituencies (Schlozman 2012: 34). The broad class of citizen groups, however, masks the important distinction between organizations that seek public goods and those seeking benefits for limited constituencies such as women or minority groups (Dunleavy 1991; Schlozman 2012: 31). Consequently the category of ‘identity groups’ includes sectional groups for patients, minorities, the elderly, students and other non‐labor market groups. On the other hand – consistent with the definition provided by Berry in his early work (1977: 7), ‘Public interest groups’ encompass groups seeking collective goods, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization. These latter groups have been argued to face particularly harsh obstacles in organizing for political influence and in effect to be underrepresented in political arenas (Olson 1971; Schlozman et al. 2012: 277). As any attempt to fit the diversity of empirical political phenomena into a limited number of categories much interesting variation may be masked by this categorization. Still, these categories of groups allow the analysis to address the major themes in the literature. Alongside the discussed categories we include a category of ‘other groups’ including hobby groups and other leisure related groups as well as occupational groups representing for example specific types of teachers and doctors. These groups are numerous but often their political participation is rather peripheral as their main purposes are of a non‐political nature (Jordan et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the inclusion of these groups in the study allows us to complete the picture of the type of interest groups represented in political arenas. 2.2 Political arenas: administration, parliament and media 6 Interest groups participate in various stages of political processes from the formation of the political agenda to the eventual implementation of policies (Bernhagen & Trani 2012: 50). In the course of this, they seek access to and interact with decision makers in the administration and in parliament and with reporters (Baumgartner & Leech 1998; Beyers 2004; Eising 2007a). While Congress has been in centre of much US research, European scholars have traditionally been more preoccupied with group interaction with bureaucrats (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Rhodes & Marsh 1992). In reaction to the increasing political importance of the media this arena has increasingly attracted the attention of group scholars (Bernhagen & Trani 2012; Binderkrantz 2012; Danielian & Page 1994; Kepplinger 2002; Kollman 1998). Ultimately interest groups are relevant because they channel interests into political influence. A crucial step in gaining influence is capturing the attention of relevant actors – that is accessing political arenas. Access signifies political importance and eventually higher likelihood of political influence (Eising 2007b: 387) and as argued by Hansen: ‘the policy views of advocates with access receive consistent, serious consideration’ (Hansen 1991: 11). In contrast, groups who do not take part in the policy process are less likely to defend their interests as acutely captured in the Washington adage: ‘If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu’ (Schlozman et al. 2012: 309). While access does not necessarily imply influence – or indeed capture all aspects of this complicated phenomenon – it constitutes a necessary step towards achieving influence on the political agenda or on specific decisions (Bouwen 2004; Eising 2007b). Being in contact with members of parliament, having access to relevant bureaucrats and being present in the media are therefore relevant measures of interest group positions in these arenas. While this study is the first to systematically compare group access across arenas and test the role of group type and resources, there is some evidence to suggest that different arenas provide different types of groups with political opportunities. First, several studies have analyzed the strategies employed by interest groups and demonstrated variation in the extent to which different types of groups target political arenas (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005; Kriesi et al. 2007). Second, in a classic article Salisbury (1984: 74‐75) found different patterns of representation depending on the arena in question. A recent study of Scottish interest groups in different arenas supported this finding (Halpin et al. 2012: 133). A common theme in these studies is that publicly visible arenas 7 are more attractive to groups pursuing broad political goals, whereas business interests are for example more likely to be found in less visible arenas. In the proceeding section we seek to link this argument to an exchange model of arena access. 2.3 An exchange model of arena access Arena access can be seen as the result of an exchange of resources between interest groups on the one hand and arena gate keepers – politicians, bureaucrats and reporters – on the other. Resource dependencies matter because neither state institutions nor interest groups can autonomously pursue and achieve their political goals. The interaction of groups and gatekeepers can thus be seen as a series of interorganizational exchanges based on interdependent relationships (Beyers & Kerremans 2007; Bouwen 2004: 339; Braun 2012; Pfeffer & Salancik 1987). This line of reasoning is consistent with prominent perspectives in the US as well as the European literature arguing that group access may be explained as the result of group ability to supply decision makers with relevant resources. In return groups gain access and eventually political influence (Bouwen 2004; Eising 2007b; Jordan & Maloney 1997; Hall & Deardorff; Hansen 1991; Woll, 2007; Öberg et al. 2011). Similarly, in the media literature the relationship between reporters and their sources has been described as an exchange of resources, where newsworthiness is continuously negotiated (Cook 2005). Crucially we argue that the resource exchange varies depending on the arena in question and in effect expect different patterns of group access in the media, parliamentary and administrative arena (Halpin et al. 2012; Salisbury 1984). There are two elements to this argument. First, different types of groups possess resources of different composition. Some groups control insider resources particularly relevant for inclusion in decision making processes, while other groups score higher on outsider resources that matter more in public arenas. Second, interest groups pursue diverse political goals which affect the priority given to different arenas. Groups emphasizing agenda setting influence are for example expected to be more attracted to the media arena, while groups interested in affecting concrete policy decisions are more likely to approach bureaucrats. In explaining group access to decision makers, many different resources have been cited as important. An influential strand of US scholarship simply emphasizes financial resources as the 8 key to buying either votes or the time and attention of legislators (Austen‐Smith & Wright 1996; Hall & Wayman 1990). Later contributions have addressed intangible resources such as the provision of expertise, political intelligence and propaganda (Hansen 1991: 3‐5; Hall & Deardorff 2006: 72‐74). Similarly, European contributions have pointed to the dependence of government institutions on groups for information, consent and active co‐operation (Eising 2007b: 385). Scholars in the corporatist and network tradition have described group access as an effect of the ability of groups to control their membership and contribute to the policy process by moderating the public opinion (Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Rokkan 1966; Öberg et al. 2011: 367‐368). In sum, interest groups may possess insider resources consisting of information and expertise of relevance to the policy process on the one hand and external control – for example of members – of relevance to the political fate of policies on the other. These resources are likely to affect the relative access of groups to decision making processes. Insider resources can be contrasted to outsider resources of particular relevance to the access of groups to public arenas. In a study of outside lobbying, Kollman (1998) emphasized the ability of groups to mobilize citizens in collective action efforts. Groups also differ in the extent to which their causes have broad public appeal. Groups pursuing issues of relevance only to very narrow societal sectors have fewer outsider resources – in the form of ability to make claims of broad appeal – than groups focusing on issues of broad societal relevance (Binderkrantz & Krøyer 2012). Groups also differ in the extent to which their causes confirm with news values. Studies of the news media have identified specific news values that are instrumental in determining the kind of stories and sources reported upon. Wolfsfeld (2011: 72) argues that the media are dedicated more than anything else to telling a good story implying for example that stories involving drama and conflict are more likely to appear in the news. News value theory also emphasizes personalization as a factor affecting the likelihood that stories are reported upon (Galtung & Ruge 1973). Groups with good abilities to provide reporters with personalized case stories therefore have a competitive advantage. Accordingly, interest groups in possession of outsider resources due to their representation of causes with broad public appeal or their ability to provide reporters with stories of news value are likely to have relatively more access to public arenas. 9 The second factor included in our model of resource exchange is the political goals of groups. In previous accounts of resource exchange the assumption has simply been that interest groups interact with decision makers in order to gain influence (Bouwen 2002; Hall & Deardorff 2006; Hansen 1991; Öberg et al. 2011). While this may be an appropriate assumption when studying interactions with public institutions, a more nuanced view of group goals include attempts at agenda setting alongside specific policy decisions (Bernhagen & Trani 2012: 50). All interest groups can be expected to include these different political goals in their portfolio, but the balance between goals is likely to vary. Groups focusing relatively more on agenda setting are therefore expected to seek access to public arenas to a higher degree than groups focusing relatively more on affecting decision making. These latter groups are on the other hand more likely to seek access to decision making processes. In relating these speculations to group types, we expect sectional groups – for example trade unions, business groups and groups of patients – to be relatively more concerned with affecting specific policy decisions of immediate interest to their membership. Public interest groups are likely to give relatively higher priority to agenda setting. These groups generally work for broad causes and have an interest in communicating to rather diffuse sets of members and potential members. Here, the crucial goal of group maintenance therefore affects the political work of groups (Gais & Walker 1991: 105; Dunleavy 1991; Lowery 2007). Public interest groups are also expected to be relatively well equipped with outsider resources. Again, these groups work for broad causes and can therefore raise issues likely to have public appeal. Many identity groups also have an advantage in terms of outsider resources due to their representation of groups such as the elderly or patients where personalized angles are easily found. Insider resources are on the other hand predominantly found among the groups representing sectional interests related to the private or public sector – that is business groups, trade unions and institutional groups. Such groups possess important information and expertise and represent constituencies of importance to societal production (Rokkan 1966). A clear contrast between the administrative and the media arena stands out as the result of the above speculations. The administration is the predominant insider arena making for a clear match with business groups, trade unions and institutional groups. These groups possess relevant resources and pursue goals related to affecting the preparation or implementation of specific 10 decisions that lead them towards bureaucrats. A similar match is found for public interest groups and the media. Public interest groups are – on balance – expected to be more in pursuance of agenda setting and their causes appeal broadly. Thus they make a good match for reporters in search of good news stories. Many identity groups also possess resources – in the form of deliverability of personalized stories – relevant for public arenas. Further, some citizen groups represent groups such as sick children that tend to attract widespread sympathy and therefore also media attention (Ingram & Schneider 1993). Identity groups are, however, expected to be more interested in affecting specific decisions of relevance for their membership than public agendas, which draw them towards decision making arenas. Here, they are, however at a disadvantage due to their lack of insider resources. Parliament is a more ambiguous arena as it plays an important role both in decision making and as a more open forum for agenda setting (Andeweg & Nijzink 1995). Legislators may also value both insider and outsider resources. For MPs concerned with devising policy proposals relevant for solving the problems at hand (Eising 2007b: 385) the expertise of insider groups may be highly valued. Their colleagues seeking to draw public attention to themselves and their political goals may be more interested in providing access to groups with outsider resources. Moreover, the role of parliament varies between presidential and parliamentary systems as well as within either of these system types. While the Danish parliament is involved in agenda setting as well as specific decision making it is – compared to other parliaments – relatively powerful in terms of agenda control and less so when it comes to the drafting of legislation. In fact, the government has an almost monopoly in introducing bills (Binderkrantz 2003; Mattson & Strøm 1995: 298‐300). In effect, we expect public interest groups and identity groups to be relatively well‐represented here, while groups with insider resources are likely to prioritize contacts to the administration. 2.4 A competing perspective: cumulativity in arena access The exchange model posits that the specifics of the resource exchange between groups and gate keepers vary according to the arena in question. Competing theoretical perspectives emphasize factors that may lead to cumulativity in group access across the media, parliament and the administration. Importantly, resource differentials may matter for access to all arenas. We know from previous research that group resources such as finances and staff dedicated to monitoring 11 and lobbying affect the political role of interest groups (Binderkrantz 2005; Eising 2007b). These resources may very well be relevant across arenas as they affect the ability of groups to engage professionally with gate keepers. A further factor drawing towards cumulativity in arena access is that access in one arena may spill‐over to other arenas. For example, Bennett (1990) argues that reporters ’index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in the news according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate. Also, Cook (1998) discusses how officials are generally seen as more reliable sources than other actors. The effect is a systematic bias in the pattern of actor appearance favoring public officials (Bennett 1990: 106; Thrall 2006: 408). By the same reasoning, interest groups enjoying privileged access to decision making processes possess an inherent news value similar to that of public officials because of their insider access to public decision making. According to this reasoning, the very groups that dominate the inside game of politics can thus be expected to be predominant in the outsider arena of the media (Thrall 2006: 408). Similar spill‐over effects may be present for example from media to parliament where media attention may be instrumental in attracting the attention of politicians and from parliament to the administration, where bureaucrats may anticipate the reactions of legislators and thus provide access to groups enjoying legislative attention. The empirical analysis juxtaposes the two overall theoretical perspectives discussed. On the one hand, we have argued that different patterns of group access can be expected in different arenas. Interest groups and arena gate keepers exchange resources and relevant resources and assets vary between closed circles of decision making to public arenas such as the media. Thus we expect business groups, trade unions and institutional groups to be relatively well‐represented in the administrative arena and public interest groups and identity groups to fare relatively better in the media and parliament. We contrast this with the cumulativity perspective arguing that general financial and personnel resources are relevant in all arenas and that spill‐over effects lead to further convergence in arena access. 3. Research design 12 A main challenge in investigating group access to different political arenas is establishing suitable indicators of access. Crucially, the concept of access implies that groups have successfully entered the political arena and gained the attention of bureaucrats, politicians or the media. Previous studies of access have utilized a wide range of methods such as survey responses from groups, interviews with decision makers and counts of appearances in the media or public boards (Bouwen 2004; Braun 2012; Christiansen et al. 2010; Danielian & Page 1994). Rather than relying on self‐reported access for example in surveys it is preferable to establish indicators of actual group access. Reflecting our interest in reaching general conclusions about the involvement of groups in different arenas, measures allowing for large‐scale analysis of access are prioritized over more labor‐intensive indicators. Therefore we have established measures of: 1) group representation in public boards and committees, 2) group meetings with parliamentarians/parliamentary committees and parliamentary responses to group approaches and 3) group appearances in news papers. Regarding the administrative arena, group representation in public boards and committees constitute a main mechanism of incorporating interest groups in decision making (Christiansen et al. 2010). We have therefore established a data base of all committees and boards active on December 31th 2010. All committee members have been registered and those representing national interest groups constitute the units of administrative access. The unit of analysis here is appearance in a public board or committee. 2,467 administrative appearances by groups were registered. For parliament, a particular challenge has been the lack of any formalized integration of groups into parliamentary decision making. A main data sources in previous studies of contacts to parliament has been letters sent to parliamentary committees (Binderkrantz 2003), but this measure is not suitable in the present context because it does not indicate passing a threshold of access. It is, however, suitable to rely on parliamentary responses to interest group approaches as an indicator of group access. Here, a parliamentary committee or an individual member of parliament has decided to react to a group letter for example by asking the relevant minister for a comment. We have recorded all letters sent to parliamentary standing committees and traced whether or not they led to: 1) a committee question to the minister, 2) a question in the general 13 session of parliament, and/or 3) an interrogation of the minister. In addition we have obtained access to calendars of a selection of members of parliament1. These calendars have been checked for all meetings with national interest groups and meetings are regarded as an additional indicator of parliamentary access. These different measures have been combined in a database with a total of 930 parliamentary appearances for the parliamentary year 2009/10. Media access is operationalized as appearance in a news story. Two large national newspapers with opposite political leanings have been selected for analysis (Jyllands‐Posten and Politiken). For these papers the first section and the business section has been searched for articles with interest group appearance. Front pages have been registered for a full year (From July 1st 2009 to June 30th 2010), while the remaining pages are recorded for half a year (specifically we coded two calendar weeks, skipped two calendar weeks, coded two calendar weeks and so forth). In the analyses we have omitted appearances where the group was framed negatively as these cannot meaningfully be seen as constituting group access to the media arena. We registered a total of 3,672 relevant media appearances. A crucial step in evaluating arena access is establishing a list of the Danish interest group population. A large number of groups were identified in the establishment of indicators of arena access, but other groups may seek influence without obtaining access – or at least not access through the channels identified here. Therefore we have constructed a population list relying on an existing list of previously identified groups (see Christiansen 2012). This list has been updated through internet based searches on group names identifying name changes, mergers and shut downs of groups. All groups identified in either of the indicators of access to political arenas have been added to the list as well as groups found by consulting a number of internet based group directories. The resulting list included 2,541 groups. To obtain information about group resources, a survey was administered to the group population. Here, a crucial step was to identify whether groups were in fact politically active. Therefore, the first set of survey questions was designed to distinguish between politically active groups and other groups. 1,645 groups – corresponding to 65 1
These data were very difficult to obtain. We contacted 44 individual MPs and four party secretaries. This means that we either directly or via the party contacted 87 of the 179 MPs in the Danish parliament. Two parties did not want to participate. In total we obtained access to the calendars of 33 MPs. These data are not perfect representative and therefore we have conducted the multivariate analyses excluding these observation but we arrive at similar results. 14 per cent – responded to the survey and of these 1,109 reported to be politically active. These groups are used as the reference population of interest groups. Measures of group resources were obtained from the survey including annual group income and number of employees working with politics broadly (contacts to bureaucrats, politicians or reporters as well as conducting analyses and monitoring the political process). The full questionnaire as well as the frequency distributions of group answers may be found at: http://interarena.dk. All data were linked through providing each group with a unique identification number. For each group we can therefore combine information obtained from the survey with access data for the three arenas. Here, groups were given first a score of 0 or 1 depending on whether they had accessed the arena at least once and second an appearance score for each arena counting how many times the group appeared in our data. The maximum number of appearances was 144 for the administrative arena, 22 for the parliamentary arena and 254 for the media arena. Finally, all groups were coded into different group categories based on the group categorization discussed above (a more detailed coding schema can be found at http://interarena.dk). This was done by the authors with a reliability test of 100 groups resulting in a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.906. Summing up, we have collected data on all group access across three political arenas in a full year with a total of 7,069 observations. In combination with the population wide survey we have a unique opportunity to study diversity in interest group access using a representative sample of Danish interest groups as a baseline for comparison in evaluating this diversity. 4. Analyzing arena access: bias or diversity? 4.1 Overlap and distribution of arena access The combination of data on group appearances across three different arenas allows us to investigate differences as well as similarities in group access. Do we find different groups and group types to be represented in the media, parliament and the administration or do we find similar patterns of representation between the arenas? Table 1 presents an overview of the 871 unique interest groups identified in at least one arena and their appearance in the administration, parliament and the media. It is thus possible to see how many groups appear in all three arenas, in any combination of two arenas or in one arena only. 15 [Table 1 about here] It is evident that most groups are found in one arena only sources. In fact, 65 per cent of groups have been identified in only one of the three arenas and all arenas have a rather high number of uniquely active groups. On the other hand, a significant number of groups – corresponding to 15 per cent – occur in all three arenas, while the remaining groups appear in any combination of two arenas. These patterns correspond well to previous findings of relatively little overlap between interest groups identified in different data sources (Berkhout & Lowery 2008; Halpin et al. 2012). It may be that more overlap would have been found if further sources had been use to uncover group access in different arenas, but given the relative extensive coding of group access across all policy areas in a full year it is likely that the general pattern with many groups appearing in one arena only would have been sustained. An important part of the picture is, however, that the 15 per cent of groups occurring in all three arenas account for a full 67 per cent of all appearances. This is first evidence that a combination of factors drawing towards cumulativity and arena specific dynamics is needed to account for group access to different arenas. Table 2 displays the distribution of the groups appearing in different arenas on group types. For each arena, the first column shows the distribution of unique interest groups appearing, while the second column reports the distribution of all appearances in the arena. As a standard of comparison the table includes the distribution of the population of politically active interest groups as identified in the group survey. [Table 2 about here] The pattern of group access in different arenas reveals a number of interesting points. First, the contrast between business representation in the administration and the two other arenas is clear. Those who view business groups as particularly dominant political players will find the patterns of access in the administration to provide overwhelming support to this view. In fact, 43 per cent of all seats in public boards and committees are occupied by a business representative and about 40 per cent of groups appearing in this arena are business groups. In the media and parliament, the share of business groups is closer to (or even a little lower than) their share in the general group 16 population, but no matter which indicator used they stand out as the best represented type of group. Trade unions and institutional groups were also argued to be well‐equipped for interacting with bureaucrats. Here, the evidence is less supporting. Both group types are better represented – in terms of number of appearances – in the administrative arena than their presence in the population would suggest, but their representation across the three arenas do not support the expectation that they are particularly well‐represented in the administration. Regarding institutional groups, it should also be noted that their high share of total access is mainly driven by two encompassing groups representing local and regional authorities – Local Government Denmark and Danish Regions. A main contrast to business groups is found among identity groups and public interest groups. These were speculated to constitute a better fit with the logic of the more public arenas and agenda oriented arenas than that of the administration. Corresponding to this line of reasoning neither of these group types has much success with accessing the administrative forums. Even though identity groups constitute 15 percent of the group population their share of seats in public boards and committees is only 4. Public interest groups do better, but still their administrative representation is below their share in the general population. Also, these positions are mainly accounted for by two major public interest groups – the Danish Consumer Council with 144 seats and the Danish Society for the Preservation of Nature with 59 seats. In parliament and the media, the representation of identity groups and public interest groups is much better. The share of unique groups appearing here is higher than the population shares and especially in parliament these groups also account for a high share of total appearances. For identity groups this could be a result of the ambition to affect decisions of relevance for their membership. Given the lack of insider resources parliament may be the most relevant arena given its more public nature than the administration. More generally, the pattern of group appearance in parliament is rather similar to the pattern in the media. Finally, ‘other interest groups’ are not very present in either arena. With a share of 21 per cent in the population their levels of respectively 6.4, 6.1 and 3.1 of arena appearances are not impressive. 17 It is, however, noticeable that many of these groups – for example sports associations – do not primarily work to pursue political goals and are rather sporadic political participants (Jordan et al. 2004). Generally, we find clearly diverging patterns of access in different arenas. This corroborates the conclusion of Halpin and colleagues that the choice of lens through which to view the mobilization of groups is crucial to what one finds (Halpin et al. 2012: 133). Particularly, the administrative arena stands out as being relatively dominated by business groups, while the other arenas exhibit a much higher share of identity groups and public interest groups. It is also interesting that the patterns differ according to whether we look at mere presence – appearing at least once in an arena – or level of access. This corresponds with previous findings that a few very dominant groups are able to attract much attention, while many other groups appear infrequently (Danielian & Page 1994: 1,067‐1,068). In fact, while there is generally little overlap in group presence across arenas the pattern is very different for the most dominant groups. Out of the ten most dominant groups in each arena (numbers not shown) five – The Danish Consumers Council, The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, The Confederation of Danish Industry, Danish Regions and The Danish Chamber of Commerce – are also among the ten most dominant in the two other arenas. Alongside the large number of groups accessing only one arena we thus find an elite of groups with very high levels of access across the board. This is an indication that factors leading towards cumulativity are also at play. 4.2 Group types or resources? Explaining access In this section we contrast the two competing perspectives on arena access. On the one hand, we test the effect of group type on access to the three different arenas. On the other, we include resource variables to test the argument that general resources such as a professional secretariat are important for accessing all arenas. Table 3 presents the result of multivariate analyses of arena access. For each arena it includes first, a model with a dichotomous variable registering whether a group has accessed the arena at least once and second, a model counting the number of appearances for groups present in the arena. This allows us to address both the unique 18 characteristics of all groups found in each arena and the factors affecting the level of access once a group has entered the arena in question. [Table 3 about here] Comparing first the three types of groups argued to possess insider resources – that is business groups, trade unions and institutional groups – their patterns of arena access are in most instances not significantly different. Trade unions have lower levels of total access than business groups (the reference category in the models), whereas institutional groups are generally less likely to have accessed the administrative arena. This may reflect that the incumbent government at the time of the study was right‐wing perhaps leading to a preference for giving access to business representatives. Identity groups and public interest groups were, on the other hand, speculated to be more visible in relatively open, public arenas than in closed circles of decision making. The results lend some support to this view. In particular, the representation of identity groups clearly differs from that of business groups as they are less present in the administration and more in parliament and the media (although the difference in general access to the media is not significant). Public interest groups are also less likely than business groups to have accessed the administrative arena and more likely to appear in parliament, but there is no significant effects when it comes to level of access or to the media arena. The role of resources is more unequivocal across different arenas. The number of political employees affects both sets of dependent variables across all arenas. Group income is also of importance in most models, but it does not affect level of access in the administration or parliament – or more correctly it does so only through the effect of income on number of political employees2. The effect of resources supports the argument that the same factors are important for accessing different arenas and thus that cumulativity in arena access is present. A more direct test is whether access to one arena tends to spill‐over to other arenas. As argued above, a core argument in the media literature is the overrepresentation of actors and views expressed in official The Pearson correlation between the transformed variables for group income and number of political employees is 0.573 and significant at the 0.001 level. 2
19 decision making circles (Bennet 1990; Cook 1998). Similarly, it may be speculated that officials may pay attention to media appearances by groups and be more likely to give access to groups regularly appearing in the media. We are therefore faced with a problem of endogeneity in testing the presence of these spill‐over effects. Rather than including access to other arenas in the multivariate models we have therefore tested the partial correlations between the measures of arena access controlling for the other independent variables included in the models above. All measures of access turn out to be significantly correlated (at the 0.001 level). Even when controlling for resources and group type there is evidence that access to one arena affect access to the others. There is, however, a marked difference between the correlations between the dichotomous access measures (ranging from 0.159‐0.237) and between the measures of level of access (ranging from 0.401 to 0.628). This further supports the emerging picture of relative diversity in the population of groups entering arenas and more cumulativity at play when taking into account the large differentials in the number of times groups access arenas. The highest correlation is found between level of access to the administration and the media, which lends support to the argument that the media tends to give more attention to insider actors. Still, as discussed the opposite effect could also be present with bureaucrats incorporating actors with high media presence in decision making. In sum, there is much evidence to support the logic of cumulativity. Access to one arena is correlated to accessing other arenas and general group resources such as professional secretariats are important determinants both of whether groups access arenas at all and of the number of time they appear across all three arenas. On the other hand, we also find support for the alternative view – that different logics of resource exchange are present in different arenas. 5. Conclusion Interest groups are active in multiple venues. It is consequently of interest to study whether these venues provide different groups with opportunities of being heard or on the contrary serve as multiple arenas for the same groups to draw attention to their interests. The data reported in this article provides a mixed answer to this normatively important question. On the one hand, many groups are found to be present in one arena only. The existence of multiple arenas thus provides 20 more groups with the option to appear in a politically relevant context. Also, including several arenas gives us a much broader picture of the politically mobilized group population than focusing on one arena only (Halpin et al. 2012). On the other hand, a relatively small number of groups get the lion’s share of access across all arenas. There are therefore also clear elements of bringing in the usual suspects when interest groups are provided access to political arenas. The administration is home to a particularly high number of business groups. An impressive 43 percent of all seats in public boards and committees are occupied by business representatives and most other group types are found to be less represented than business when controlling for group resources. In contrast, the media provides the best approximation of the interest group population. The composition of the subpopulation of groups appearing in the media is very close to the pattern in the overall population of groups and almost no significant effects of group type on media access are found in the multivariate analysis. This runs counter to our expectation that public interest groups and identity groups would fare better here. As indicated by the high correlation between administrative access and media access it may be that two opposite effects are at play: on the one hand – and as emphasized by media theory (Bennett 1990; Cook 1998) – groups with insider representation are good media sources and on the other hand public interest groups and identity groups possess outsider resources making them worth reporting on. The exchange logic here thus seems to combine different elements. Parliament is the main contrast to the business dominated administration. Here, groups representing broad public interest groups and different types of non‐vocational constituents are more likely to appear. As discussed above, the Danish parliament has a key role in agenda setting, while the preparation of legislation is almost uniformly situated with government and the administration. This squares well with the representation of groups in possession of resources that matter for politicians interested in putting broadly appealing politics on the agenda. The contrast between these two arenas thus supports the idea that different resource exchange logics lie behind the involvement of groups in different arenas. While we expect the general theory of arena specific resource exchanges to be generalizable above the Danish case, the specific content of the exchange is likely to depend on the balance between different arenas in a specific political system. For example, parliaments with more say in decision 21 making are likely to attract more groups with insider resources. Also, the Danish corporatist heritage may serve to increase the overlap between the administrative and the media arena. The conclusion that more diversity is present in the composition of groups covered than in the composition of all attention is also likely to be mirrored in other systems (Danielian & Page 1,067‐
1,068). The fact that the presence of different political arenas provides access to different types of groups may be seen as a pluralist trait. As Dahl (1961) argued, different resources are politically relevant and many groups therefore have a chance to affect politics. On the other hand, an elite of groups has a particularly privileged position across political arenas. The best description of the system of group representation described her may thus be that of privileged pluralism. Different arenas do provide options for different groups – and types of groups – to access politics, but when it comes to the major players the pattern is one of cumulativity. Above all resources count. Resources are, however, found not only among the major business groups or unions, but also among institutional groups and public interest groups with a few large groups being allowed to speak on behalf of the general interest. 22 6. References Adeweg, R.B. & L. 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Thesen (2011). “Disrupted Exchange and Declining Corporatism: Government Authority and Interest Group Capability in Scandinavia“, Government and Opposition, 46(3): 365‐391. 28 Table 1: Overlap in arena access, numbers and column percentages Unique groups Arena Numbers Percentages Only in the media 214 25 Only in parliament 149 17 Only in administration 199 23 In media and parliament 67 8 In media and administration 71 8 In parliament and administration 41 5 In all arenas 130 15 All groups 871 100 Table 2: Patterns of arena access: unique groups and access, column percentages Administrative arena Survey population Unique groups Total access Unique groups Total access Unique groups Total access Business groups 25.3 39.9 43.0 22.1 26.3 26.8 31.4 Trade unions 14.2 23.8 24.3 20.7 23.7 17.6 29.8 Institutional groups 6.3 6.3 11.4 7.8 7.1 5.8 12.0 Identity groups 17.2 9.3 4.0 19.9 18.9 18.4 10.0 Public interest groups 15.6 7.0 10.9 19.4 17.8 18.5 13.7 Other groups 21.4 13.6 6.4 10.3 6.1 12.9 3.1 N 1,109 441 2,467 387 930 482 3,672 29 Parliamentary arena Media arena Table 3: Explaining group access Constant Parliamentary arena Media arena Access Total access Access Total access Access Total access ‐4.431*** 0.176 ‐3.286*** ‐2.762*** ‐0.650* Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Trade unions 0.100 ‐0.387** 0.416 ‐0.081 0.066 0.243 Institutional groups ‐0.687* ‐0.354 0.598 ‐0.132 ‐0.322 0.208 Identity groups ‐0.757** ‐0.429* 1.024*** 0.288** 0.256 0.341* Public interest groups ‐1.321*** 0.224 0.782** 0.145 0.433 0.208 Other groups ‐0.572* 0.318 ‐0.419 0.079 ‐0.353 ‐0.265 Political employees 4.419*** 4.966*** 5.437*** 2.849*** 6.503*** 4.126*** Group income 4.673*** 0.006 1.566 ‐0.790 1.359* 1.566*** Group type Business groups Resources Administrative arena Nagelkerke R2/Pseudo R2 0.344 0.191 0.280 0.115 0.296 0.171 N 1,025 276 1,025 267 1,025 299 Note: Access to political arenas is a dichotomous variable and logistic regressions have therefore been performed. Negative binomial regressions have been performed for level of access because the dependent variable is count‐data. The variables measuring income and political employees have been logarithmically transformed to obtain linearity. Levels of significance: *= 0.05; **=0.01, ***=0.001. 30