Vol.53,No.21o
ThePhilosophical
Quarterly,
ISSN o3i-8o94
2003
January
LOWE'S DEFENCE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
By ERIC T. OLSON
at once.
Constitutionalism
canbemadeofthesamematter
objects
diferent
saysthatqualitatively
tobe qualitatively
claimthatweshould
suchobjects
Critics
E.J. Lowe
expect
indistinguishable.
isbasedonthe
that
inthewaythings
thinks
thiscomplaint
areata time
falseassumption
differences
inhowthings
areat thattime,
andthatwecananswer
itbypointing
out
must
begrounded
always
I argue
that
kinds
aresubject
todifferent
that
he
different
ofcoinciding
objects
composition
principles.
ismistaken
onboth
counts.
Constitutionalism
is the view that qualitativelydifferent
materialobjects can be
composedof the same particlesor matterat once. The atomsthatmake up a lump
of clay can at the same time compose a clay statue.The two objects are microphysicallyidentical.Yet the statueis not a lump,and the lump is not a statue;and
theyhave different
persistence-conditions.
Some philosopherswonderhow materially
coincidingobjects(thingsmade ofthe
same matterat once) could differ
in theseways.If thingsmade up entirely
of atoms
are composedof the same atoms,arrangedin the same way,in identicalsurrounddifferent?
ings,whatcould make themqualitatively
Why is the statue-shapedlump
nota statue,and thestatuenota lump?What enablesthelumpto surviveeventsthe
statue could not survive?This is especiallypressingwhen it comes to mental
properties.If clay statuescoincidemateriallywithlumpsof clay,thenpresumably
we human beings coincide materiallywith lumps of flesh.No constitutionalist
believes that those lumps of fleshthinkand experienceas we do. This radical
in mentalpropertiesis not due to any microphysicaldifference,
difference
since
thereis none. What is it,then,about the lump coincidingwithyou thatpreventsit
fromthinking?In my 'Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility
Problem' I
triedto articulatethisworryand to showthatconstitutionalists
cannotanswerit.I
Accordingto E.J. Lowe, the indiscernibility
problemrestson the mistakenview
thatany difference
in things'propertiesat a giventimemustconsistentirely
in facts
about how thingsare at thattime:the 'cinematographic
We
can
see
that
fallacy'.2
I E.T. Olson, 'Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility
Problem', The Philosophical
Quarterly,
51(2001), pp. 337-552 E.J. Lowe, 'Material Coincidence and the CinematographicFallacy: a Response to
Olson', ThePhilosophical
52 (2002), pp. 369-72.
Quarterly,
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LOWE'SDEFENCEOF CONSTITUTIONALISM
93
thisis a mistake,he says,by consideringthata thinghas a velocityat a momentin
partby virtueofwhereit is at othertimes.Velocityis at leastpartly'rootedoutside
Whether
the timesat whichit is had' (as Chisholmwould say),or temporally
extrinsic.
but
other
is
extrinsic
examples are not:
velocity temporally
may be contentious,
for
instance.
old,
being40 years
Lowe thinksthatthepropertiesin respectof whichmateriallycoincidingobjects
differare temporallyextrinsic.That is whycoincidingobjectslook the same, and
You cannot
different.
whysomeonemightdoubtwhethertheycould be qualitatively
tella clay statuefroma statue-shapedlump of clay by examiningthem,no matter
You cannot tella 4o-year-oldman
how carefully
you look. But thatis no mystery.
froma well preserved6o-year-oldor a newlycreatedduplicateby examiningthem
either.Yet even if theyare alike in everyotherrespect,a 4o-year-oldis different
froma 6o-year-old.
This does notyetexplainwhystatue-shaped
lumpsare not statues,or whymanshaped lumpsare nothumanbeingsand cannotthinkas humanbeingsdo. It tellsus
the differences
betweenmateriallycoincidingobjects.It says
whywe cannot detect
how
those
could exist. How does the idea that such
about
differences
nothing
are temporally
extrinsic
differences
helpwiththeindiscernibility
problem?
Lowe says that even if thereis now no difference
betweenthe lump and the
statue that could account for their currentdifferencein kind and persistencein termsof differences
in the
conditions,we can explainthose currentdifferences
a
are
at
other
times
much
as
the
difference
between
and a
way things
40o-year-old
in
is
and
in
of
their
It
these
earlier
is
terms
differences
6o-year-old explained
pasts.
laterdifferences
thatvictimsofthecinematographic
fallacyfailto notice.
But thisis no help either.All constitutionalists
agree thatlumpsand statuesmay
coincide, and thus share the same microstructure,
throughouttheircareers.Cocan
in
differ
now
their
and mental
kind, persistence-conditions
incidingobjects
in any otherway. So it is unclearhow freeingourpropertieswithouteverdiffering
selvesof the cinematographic
fallacywillturnup anythingto explainthe supposed
betweenthestatueand thelump.
qualitativedifferences
Why does Lowe thinkthat the indiscernibility
problemrestson the cinematofor lumps and for
graphic fallacy?Well, there are different
composition
principles
statues.What it takesforparticlesto composea lumpis one thing;whatit takesfor
themto compose a statueis another.This is evidentbecause particlescan compose
a lump withoutcomposinga statue.Apparentlythe cinematographic
fallacycomes
in because whatit takesforparticlesto compose a lump at a givenmomenthas to
do in partwithwhatis the case at othertimes.Particlescomposea lumpat t,Lowe
says(p. 370),ifand onlyifthey'have been unitedovera periodoftimeincludingt',
even though they may have been rearrangedduring that period. By contrast,
particlescompose a statueat t ifand onlyiftheyhave a statuesquespatialarrangementat t and thoseparticlesor replacementsforthemare arrangedin thatsame
way over a period of time includingt. It takes time,so to speak, forparticlesto
You get material
compose a lump or a statue:theycannot do it instantaneously.
coincidencewhen the same particlessatisfytwo or more different
composition
fora kindof thing,Lowe says,follow
principlesat once. The persistence-conditions
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ERIC T. OLSON
94
fromits compositionprinciple.Since the compositionprinciplesfor lumps and
and
statuesdiffer,lumps and statuesmust have different
persistence-conditions,
therefore
differ
qualitatively.
But thisdoes not entailany qualitativedifference
betweenlumpsand statues,let
alone explainone. No persistence-conditions
followfromthecompositionprinciples
Lowe states.Suppose some atoms are unitedover a period of timeincludingthe
present.By Lowe's principle,thoseatomsnow composea lump. It does not follow,
as Lowe seems to think,that the lump theycompose persistsif and only if those
atomsremainunited.For all hisprinciplesays,a lumpmaybe unable to surviveany
atomsat different
times.
ofitsparticles,or be composedof different
rearrangement
Similarremarksgo forhis compositionprincipleforstatues.The factthattwokinds
are associatedwithdifferent
compositionconditionsdoes not implythatthingsof
in any way fromthingsof the other,or thatnothingcould
the one kindmustdiffer
belongto bothkinds.
Other cases make thisclear. The compositionprincipleforstudentsis different
fromthe one for human beings: particlescan compose a human being without
persistencecomposinga student.It hardlyfollowsthatstudentsmusthave different
conditionsfromhumanbeings,or thatnothingcould be both. For anypropertiesF
and G such thatsomethingcan have F withouthavingG,whatit takesforthingsto
fromwhatit
composesomethingwithF (thecompositionprincipleforFs) willdiffer
takesforthingsto compose somethingwithG (thecompositionprincipleforGs). It
does notfollowthatthingswithF mustbe qualitatively
fromthingswithG,
different
or thatF and G are incompatible.
So the claim that some particlessatisfytwo different
compositionprinciplesat
once - the one forlumpsand the one forstatues,say - entailsthatthoseparticles
composea lumpand thattheycomposea statue.But itdoes notentailthatthelump
is any more different
fromthe statue than a studentis fromthe human being
coincidingwithhim.
This is not merelya technicalproblem.If compositionprinciplesare to play
anythinglike the role Lowe has in mind for them,theymust be fundamentally
different
fromtheones he states.They willhave to look somethinglikethis:particles
compose a lump if and only if they are arrangedlumpwise(let this abbreviate
Lowe's conditionstatedearlier),and theycompose that lump because, and only
because,theyare arrangedlumpwise.Particlescomposea statueifand onlytheyare
arrangedstatuewise,and theycompose thatstatuebecause and onlybecause they
are arrangedstatuewise.We mightcall thesederecompositionprinciples,
in contrast
withtheoriginaldedicto
principles.
The de reprinciplesreallydo entail that lumps and statuesdifferqualitatively.
Suppose some particlesare arrangedbothlumpwiseand statuewise.The principles
implynot onlythatthoseparticlescompose a lump and a statue,but thatthe lump
exists because the particlesare arranged lumpwise and not because they are
whilethestatueexistsbecause theparticlesare arrangedstatuearrangedstatuewise,
wise and notbecause theyare arrangedlumpwise.Since beingarrangedlumpwiseis
not the same as being arrangedstatuewise,thatis a qualitativedifference
between
thestatueand thelump.
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2003
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LOWE'SDEFENCEOF CONSTITUTIONALISM
95
But this does not explain how coincidingobjects can differqualitatively.It
presupposesthattheydo. It beginswiththe assumptionthatone of the coinciding
objects,L, existsbecause theparticlesare arrangedlumpwise,and another,S, exists
because theyare arrangedstatuewise.This qualitativedifference
is theninvokedto
in thederecomposition
differences.
(Presumablythedifference
explaintheirfurther
principlesfor human beings and for lumps of fleshis supposed to explain their
Even ifthisis a good explanation,though,it does nothing
psychologicaldifference.)
to solve the indiscernibility
in
problem.The problemwas how L and S could differ
anyqualitativeway. L's particlesare arrangedstatuewiseas well as lumpwise.Why
does the latterratherthan the formeraccount forits existence?The difference
in
what it takesforL and S to existis no less mysterious
than the difference
in their
kindor persistence-conditions.
The accountmerelyexplainsone apparentmystery
in termsofanother.
Nor has thisanythingto do withthe cinematographic
fallacy.If therewere no
in
claim
L
that
and
S
different
and
the
mystery
obey
incompatiblederecomposition
the indiscernibility
principles,and if this could explain their other differences,
problemwould be solved.That would be so whetheror not any of thoseproperties
weretemporally
extrinsic.
I cannot see how the indiscernibility
problem restson the cinematographic
fallacy,or how avoidingthe fallacyhelps to explainhow materiallycoincidingobjects can differ
qualitatively.3
Churchill
College,
Cambridge
3I
thankEJ. Loweformanydiscussions
ofthistopic.
Quarterly,
2003
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