Can there be genuine cooperation between Israel and
Palestine over security of The West Bank or will lack of
trust generated by political and ideological issues
prevent it?
Tim Baimbridge
Abstract
In 1993 Israel and Palestine signed the Oslo accords which set out the political and
security structures for the West Bank and Gaza strip. The following years saw a high
degree of security development and cooperation. More radical elements within both
societies however saw cooperation as collaboration and military confrontation as the
only answer. This culminated in 2000 with the outbreak of the second intifada which
lasted until a change in Palestinian leadership and the impact of attrition brought it to
an end in 2005. Whilst the late 1990s were seen as the halcyon days of security
cooperation, the political will of the Palestinian leadership, the extensive involvement in
Palestinian security sector reform by Western governments, and a majority public
desire for a negotiated peace are leading back to a more stable and secure West Bank.
The lasting concern however is how much control either side has over their religious
right wings.
Acknowledgements
Firstly I would like to thank Dr Alan Craig for helping narrow down my choice of subject
matter, enabling me to focus on an area of personal and professional interest. Professional
thanks to Neil Page, the USSC’s policing advisor for giving me a frank insight into their
operation. A former senior British police officer Neil gets stuck in on the front line of the
issue in places where the Americans are literally prevented from going. The two case studies
in section 3 detail incidents that demonstrate the apparently arbitrary nature of ISF/PSF
cooperation. I was directly involved in both incidents and was guided through these
particular political and tactical minefields by the Quartet’s police and military liaison officer,
Jack Parnell. Seconded from the UN, Jack along with Neil Page are two of the most
experienced officers on the ground and anyone seeking guidance in this complex area would
do well to seek them out – Neil, Jack, thanks for everything. Finally I want to thank my
family for putting up with my physical as well as mental absences during the past few
months. Fortunately my wife, with more degrees than a circle, understands the pressures of
academic study.
Introduction
This document will address the question as to whether there can be genuine cooperation
between Israel and Palestine over the security of The West Bank, or whether lack of trust
generated by political and ideological issues will prevent it. To fully understand the current
situation and how significant the need for cooperation is, it will be necessary to explore
recent historical background, particularly the Oslo Accords and the Second Intifada. The
timeframe chosen for the purpose of this review therefore will be 1993 to 2013. It will be
argued that the events occurring during these two decades have shaped the political and
security situation facing the current administrations as they resume their peace negotiations
sponsored by the current US Secretary of State John Kerry.
The document will be made up of a review of existing, publicly available literature, as
well as internal documents from the USSC’s office. For reference purposes these documents
will be attached in the Annex. Additionally it will draw on primary research via semistructured interviews, discussion and operational deployments with a number of individuals
directly involved in developing security capabilities and operations on the West Bank.
Through this format it will be seen that the security of the West Bank is a critical
factor in the ongoing peace process and that neither party is able to deliver the level of
security required on their own. Substantial efforts have been made, along with significant
progress, at various points over the past twenty years. However on each occasion the
process has collapsed and extreme levels of violence have followed. The physical damage to
individuals, property and infrastructure was only matched by the long term damage to the
capability of the Palestinian security services and the trust the two sides needed to make
the security cooperation work. Trust, its critical importance to security cooperation, and the
impact of its absence, will form a central theme throughout this discussion.
Section 1 will show that the last significant positive development on security
cooperation, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Governance Arrangements, also
known as the Oslo Accords, set in place a period of high expectation and no insignificant
amount of delivery towards a secure two state solution to the Israeli/Palestinian issue. This
was a period of hope bracketed by the two intifadas. The first, 1987 – 1993, had
demonstrated Israel’s inability to impose a purely military solution to their security problem
(Celso, 2003: 69). The level of both strategic and tactical cooperation demonstrated by the
two sides through to late 2000 were unprecedented in modern times. The Second Intifada
beginning in September 2000 was foreseen by the respective leaders however its extent and
consequences were far from anticipated.
Section 2 will show that the Second Intifada was a political as well as security
disaster for the Palestinians and a perceived vindication of the lack of trust on the behalf of
the Israelis. The post-Intifada years, 2005 to date, will also be discussed in this section and it
will be seen that they have been dominated by attempts to restart a process that had long
been frustrated by a mutual lack of political trust. This therefore became the focus of a
number of countries and organisations, building trust between the two sides. Key amongst
these were the efforts of the EU and US who continue to work to develop the capabilities of
the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) to a degree where they are capable of stabilising the
Palestinian controlled areas of the West Bank. These missions built on the security
cooperation structures generated by the Oslo Accords and effectively mothballed during the
Intifada. This developmental work will be discussed in detail in section 3.
Once stabilisation was achieved the parallel goal was to help create an effective
Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) who could continue the Security Sector Reform (SSR) by
engaging in consensual and democratic community based policing. A stable and effective
security apparatus, working in tandem with the Israeli Security Forces (ISF) to keep all
parties safe and secure, remains a cornerstone of successive peace negotiations.
As former Palestinian PM Fayyad identified, by building institutions of a modern
state, enhancing personal security and vigorously establishing a monopoly over the use of
force, Palestinians can regain the international community’s and Israel’s confidence,
neutralise a key Israeli argument against statehood and thus pave the way for independence
(International Crisis Group, 2010: 4). However others go further, believing that the success
of an independent Palestinian state – indeed its very survival – is inconceivable in the
absence of peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis alike (RAND, 2005: 4).
The overriding question going forward into the latest round of negotiations however
is not whether the respective governments are prepared to make the necessary
compromises to attain a lasting security - it will be shown here that they have the will for
that – more whether both sides can develop the trust to work together to prevent the more
extreme elements within their populations from derailing the peace process in favour of a
more drastic resolution.
The Oslo accords to the second intifada
The First Intifada ‘Shaking off’ ended in 1993 and whilst having been dominated with
violence and death on both sides, the Israelis in particular realised that they would not be
able to dominate the Palestinian territories simply through the use of overwhelming military
force (Celso, 2003: 69). As a securitized nation with a perception that they faced an
existential threat on all sides, it was hardly surprising that they had sought to resolve this
Palestinian issue through military means.
The Palestinian structure at this time was significantly fragmented, both politically
and geographically, and was also beginning to realise that armed resistance against Israel
would not, on its own, bring them the liberation they sought.
This then was the backdrop to the initially secret meetings in Oslo that eventually led
to the very public signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, which would become known collectively as the Oslo Accords. The accords
reflected the political and public mood of the age where considerable concessions and
compromises were demonstrated by both sides.
The agreement between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and President Yasser
Arafat, long-time antagonists and mortal enemies, was widely hailed in Western diplomatic
circles as a triumph of reason over destructive hatred, and the accord was seen as promising
a new era of peace (Celso, 2003: 68). However both sides were taking a gamble on the
outcome.
Rabin calculated that Arafat had made a sincere transformation from terrorist to
democratic statesman and that only the PLO could be trusted to quell Palestinian terrorism.
Arafat, accordingly, renounced terrorism and revoked PLO charter provisions calling for the
destruction of the Zionist state. The Palestinian leader’s conversion was, in essence, the
linchpin that would govern the success or failure of the accord (Celso, 2003: 69).
Certain key issues such as the future of East Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital and
the right of return for Palestinians were not addressed in detail. Combined with a likely
withdrawal from substantial areas of the West Bank, it should not have been a surprise that
the extreme elements within each society felt that the agreements were unacceptable and
that their respective leaders had ‘sold them out’. It would be these disaffected elements
within each society, whilst relatively small but prepared to use extreme acts of violence as
an effective force-multiplier, who would eventually lead to the collapse of the agreements
and the ushering in of the second intifada.
At the time however the central theme of the Oslo accords (I and II, signed in 1993
and 1995 respectively) was the establishment of a viable security apparatus that would
ensure the safety of both peoples. The PA security leadership was expected to devise a
Palestinian national security policy that would lay out a plan for tackling the intricate
Palestinian security situation (Hussein, 2007:46), with Oslo II detailing the complex security,
legal and political arrangements and coordination offices between the new PA and Israel
(Pacheco, 2001:182).
Whilst Israel were prepared to enter into a security partnership with the PA in order
to bring stability to both sides, the elements of the agreement were very much focused on
creating a structure which would primarily ensure the security of Israelis. Restraints on
Palestinian security responsibilities were repeatedly highlighted in the Accords. Israel would
maintain responsibility for border security, and for internal security and public order of
settlements and Israelis (Kristoff, 2012:3). The Palestinians on the other hand agreed to
establish a strong police force in order to guarantee public order and internal security for
the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Kerkkänen, Rantanen & Sundqvist,
2008:5).
This provided an early indication of the extent to how far security cooperation would
be allowed to go. Israeli military law would be applied to Palestinians in the West Bank,
however settlers living in the same location would be subject to Israeli civilian law, giving
rise to dual legal systems that suggested ‘discrimination based on origin or nationality’
(Duaibis, 2013:3).
The Oslo II agreement split the West Bank into three administrative areas, A, B and
C. Covering 5,700 square kilometres it has a population of approximately 2.4 million
Palestinians. Around 1.8 million are spread across villages or small towns. That leaves
approximately a quarter residing in the main urban centres. Due to the non-contiguous
nature of the administrative areas, cities exercise a disproportionate and indeed decisive
influence on national politics and society (International Crisis Group, 2004:7).
The PA was given full administrative control, including responsibility for security in
Area A. However geographically this only amounted to 17.7% of the West Bank. The PA
were to have administrative responsibility for Area B, which makes up 21.3% of the West
Bank and includes some 450 villages and cities, with Israel maintaining security control.
Israel would have full control in Area C which covers almost 61 % of the total area. In
addition to these three areas Hebron in the south was split into two security zones, H1 and
H2. The Palestinian police would control the smaller H1 area while Israel controlled the
larger area H2 (Bouris & Reigeluth, 2012:5). Local law and order in the various parts of Area
A would be enforced by a forty-thousand-man Palestinian security force (Celso, 2003:71).
The security problems generated by the Oslo accords begins to emerge when it is
identified that in total 43% of the West Bank is allocated to settlements and the number of
Jewish settlers living in this area is double that of Palestinians (Duaibis, 2013:3), none of
whom are therefore subject to any Palestinian laws.
It can be seen therefore that the PA were facing an uphill battle to garner public
support for the accords. The agreements allowed for the continuation of the Israeli
occupation of most of the West Bank and failed to put an end to the expansion of Israel
settlements (Lia, 1999:159). Worryingly a large majority of the Palestinian population
continued to support attacks against Israeli targets. The PSF began to be seen as
collaborators (ibid.).
Israel would not be prepared to reduce its security presence until it could be certain
not only that the Palestinian Authority itself no longer represented a physical threat to Israel
and its citizens, but, as importantly, the PA could ensure its own internal security by
maintaining control of and eventually eradicating militant and terrorist groups.
This need for reassurance and confidence would be seen running through all
elements of the negotiations that were to come and despite what were clearly extensive
efforts on both sides to build this trust alongside the PA’s capability, it would remain fragile
and with the coming of the second Intifada virtually impossible to maintain. However in the
immediate post signing period both sides were committed to developing the Palestinian
capability.
The accords created detailed structures for ensuring cooperation and as importantly
de-confliction between the two armed entities, the IDF and the fledgling PSF. These tiered
groups would oversee the strategic, tactical and operational deployment of the resources
from both sides.
The Joint Security Committee (JSC) sat at the strategic level. It was made up of
several command rank members from each side. The intention was for JSC decisions to be
reached by agreement between the two sides. Its role was to recommend security policy
guidelines for the approval of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee and
subsequently implement approved guidelines. Critical to the effectiveness of the JSC would
be the regular meetings held between the commander of the Israeli military forces and the
commander of the Palestinian Police in the West Bank. The JSC would ensure an open
channel for exchanging information and provide directives for the Joint Regional Security
Committees (RSCs) and for the Joint District Coordination Offices (DCOs) (Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2013).
The unpredictable nature of security operations required each side to operate an
RSC office 24 hours a day, with direct and constant communication links between the two
sides. These offices would coordinate the activities of the operational units under the locally
based DCOs. They also operated on a 24 hour basis with at least one duty officer from each
side, on duty at all times (ibid.).
In addition to ensuring de-confliction between the two sides, the DCOs directed the
joint patrols. These patrols would be the public face of security cooperation on the West
bank. Each one consisted of two vehicles, one Palestinian and one Israeli, each vehicle
containing an officer and three uniformed and armed guards. They patrolled 24 hours a day
as directed by the DCO. To further prevent friction and potential conflict with local groups, it
was directed that on roads under Israeli security responsibility, the Israeli vehicle would lead
and on roads under Palestinian security responsibility, the Palestinian vehicle would lead
(ibid.).
When the structure went live the RSCs and DCOs were supported by the Palestinian
Military Liaison (PML) officers. These were located in eight HQs in the West Bank and two in
Gaza (Joint Security Committee, 2012:3). In addition to the operational coordination they
supervised the redeployment and transfer of new territories to the PA and monitored
implementation of the Interim Agreement (ibid.).
The coordination and apportioning of security responsibilities was successful during
the early years, the IDF for example generally did not enter Area A, even in hot pursuit and
in some parts of Area C there was a formalised Palestinian presence. As much as the PA
would request Israeli permission to take action beyond its operational area, so too the
Israelis asked the PA for permission to enter Area ‘A’ (International Crisis Group, 2010:22). It
can be seen therefore that considerable effort and thought had gone into making
operational security cooperation an effective and viable reality on the West Bank.
The positive effects of this structured and mutually beneficial approach were seen
on the ground. The PA was credited with palpable improvements in personal security. To a
significant extent this was due to their mere existence and numbers of officers deployed,
however police and other security forces were generally considered effective in preventing,
prosecuting, and reducing crime (International Crisis Group, 2004:18).
These therefore were the halcyon days of security cooperation in the West Bank (N.
Page. Personal communication, July 30, 2013). The JSC and PML coordinated daily joint
patrols and the relationships between the soldiers and police on the ground was
professional and effective.
That said, whilst the coordination protocols made it look like a balanced partnership
the asymmetry showed through when it came to how the PSF were required to deal with
Israelis. In this matter the PML were required to apprehend, protect and hand over any
Israeli citizen or settler who gained access into the PA-controlled territory. This included any
Israeli military personnel. This extended to a requirement to hand over any Israeli who was
apprehended for having committed any irregularity or crime in the PA-controlled territory,
after examining their ID card and seizing any objects (Joint Security Committee, 2012:8).
Between January and July 2013 for example, 313 Israelis were detained for illegally
entering Area A. All were immediately handed over to the IDF unharmed. Of those 313, a
total of 67 were armed members of the IDF who had allegedly strayed into Area A by
mistake (N. Page. Personal communication, July 30, 2013).
Unfortunately it would in part be this close, public cooperation that began to cause
friction within the more militant elements on the West Bank. The PSF, with their roots in the
PLO and other resistance groups were beginning to be seen as agents of the occupying
force, the very people they should have been fighting to overthrow.
Some commentators such as Said felt that the agreements gave official Palestinian
consent to continued occupation and that the PSF would effectively become Israel’s
enforcer (Said, 1996:147).
Consequently the Oslo Accords were denounced by both Jewish and Palestinian
extremist groups (Celso, 2003;70). The anger felt by the extreme right in Israel at the
‘collaboration’ between Rabin and Arafat quickly spilled on to the streets of Israel. In 1995
Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish extremist student caught up in a building right-wing
backlash against negotiations with the Palestinians (Peri, 2000:34). Rabin’s assassination is
seen by many commentators, even at this early stage, as the beginning of the end of the
Oslo accords.
Carmi Gillon, the Head of the Shin Bet or ‘Shabak’ at the time was under no illusion
of the impact the assassination of Rabin had on the Oslo Accords and the peace process in
general: ‘It showed very clearly that some punk of an assassin with a pistol that could barely
shoot could eliminate hope and an entire peace process’ (Moreh, 2012).
The key element, trust, needed to deliver joint security had gone. Even though
Rabin’s killer was a Jew, the shock that reverberated through the establishment, particularly
within the Shin Bet, was extreme. The problem post Rabin was not necessarily at the tactical
or operational level. It was the lack of faith at the political level. As another former head of
the Shin Bet Ami Ayalon puts it: ‘We wanted security and we got more terrorism. They (the
Palestinians) wanted a state and they got more settlements’ (Moreh, 2012).
The processes set out in the Oslo accords continued despite this cooling in the
Israeli/Palestinian relationship. PM Netanyahu continued the process however he was less
inclined towards Palestinian development. He had made his position on security
cooperation with the Palestinians clear three years earlier just after the Oslo accords were
signed when he wrote in his book, ‘Fighting Terrorism’ that: ‘The continued expansion of an
armed, independent Palestinian domain is merely a stepping-stone to the eventual
escalation of conflict and the continued march of Islamic militancy in the Middle East and
beyond’ (1995:120).
Despite this however he bowed under American pressure to sign the Wye River
agreement in 1998 that ended Israeli military occupation of portions of the West Bank and
expanded the jurisdiction of the PA (Celso, 2003:71).
Behind the scenes and at the tactical level, the Israeli security agencies continued to
work towards improving and expanding their relationship with the PSF. Ami Ayalon had
been a senior commander in the IDF when Rabin was assassinated. He took over the Shin
Bet shortly afterwards. He realised that being able to combat terrorism by use of force
wasn’t enough and had failed to prevent the assassination by an Israeli Jew of one of the
strongest exponents of peace. He identified that despite the Shin Bet preventing more
attacks each year, achieving greater security each year, the most significant achievement
was the cooperation they built with the Palestinians (Moreh, 2012).
Under his leadership he and the Shin Bet teams met with the Palestinian security
officials on a monthly basis to coordinate their intelligence efforts. During these meetings
the Palestinians were quick to remind him that they did not see themselves as agents of
Israel. They did not put Hamas members in prison for his benefit, they did it because the
Palestinian people believed that at the end of the day they would have a state alongside
Israel. If however the Palestinians ever stopped believing in that then the cooperation
would end (Moreh, 2012).
Despite the best efforts of the Israeli and Palestinian security apparatus, peace and
the Oslo accords began to fall apart as Hamas launched a campaign of suicide bombings in
Israel, specifically targeting civilians (Montefiore, 2011:611).
It has been postulated that increases in Palestinian and Jewish terrorism, however,
had paradoxical effects: empowering, rather than weakening the peace process, as both the
Israeli government and the PA sought to prove the critics wrong (Celso, 2003:71).
Even with the continued lack of security on the West Bank Netanyahu’s successor,
Ehud Barak pushed forward with the principles of the Oslo Accords and the security reforms
and partnerships at their core. In 1999 Barak was the first Israeli PM to endorse the concept
of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories (Barak, 2008:541).
The desperation of the West and in reality Israel and Palestine, led to the ‘make or
break’ summit at President Clinton’s retreat, Camp David in early 2000. It was arguable that
the Oslo accords were already dead by this stage and as such the Camp David summit was
the final attempt by an outgoing US President to rescue what had been seen as the most
promising chance at peace in the Middle East.
The 14 days spent behind closed doors led to no agreement between the two sides.
The storm clouds brewing over the West Bank and Gaza were not, it is generally believed,
ignored by Arafat and Barak. More likely was that they both believed that some limited
conflict would strengthen their respective negotiating position and remind the public on
both sides of the reality of a broken peace process. It is generally held that by the
conclusion of the summit Barak had made Arafat what was seen as the deal of a lifetime:
most of the West Bank, partial Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem including control
over Muslim shrines located on the Temple Mount, and substantial financial assistance for
the PA. Arafat, reportedly, was unwilling to negotiate over Palestinian claims of sovereignty
over East Jerusalem and refused to renounce an unlimited right of 4 million Palestinian
refugees to return to the historic homeland. When the talks broke down, Arafat was widely
perceived as the major obstacle to achieving a historic settlement (Celso, 2003:72). The Oslo
accords, which had always been predicated upon the sincerity of Arafat’s conversion from
terrorist to democratic statesman, had exhausted themselves (Celso, 2003:73).
Whether Arafat felt that a brief conflict would make Barak even more amenable, or
whether by that point he had lost so much control of the militant groups he knew that any
deal with Israel would not receive support at grass roots level, will remain unknown. What
is known is that within days of the collapse of the Camp David summit the second intifada
had broken out bringing with it a violent end to security cooperation and the subsequent
deaths of hundreds of Israeli and Palestinian civilians.
The decade had begun with the creation of a genuinely cooperative security
infrastructure that promised to deliver the building blocks for an independent Palestine
living safely alongside Israel. It would end with the IDF directly targeting the PSF
infrastructure they’d helped to create, crippling it and leaving the West Bank effectively
lawless.
The second intifada to date
The exact trigger for the second intifada remains debated and is to a greater degree
irrelevant for this discussion. What is significantly relevant is that the Israeli response to
escalating Palestinian violence was fierce (Catignani, 2009:107).
According to Amos Malka, Israel's director of military intelligence at the time, during
the first month of the intifada, the IDF fired 1.3 million 5.56 mm bullets, with 850,000 on the
West Bank alone (International Crisis Group, 2004:22).
The impact on the established security cooperation was equally dramatic. Within a
few days of the start of the intifada a PSF officer shot and killed the Israeli commander of
their joint patrol (N. Page. Personal communication, July 30, 2013). It was the immediate
end of joint patrolling and the start of a rapid collapse of their operational relationship. As a
result, Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation ceased and the US and other governments
curtailed or halted their security assistance to the PA (US Government Accountability Office,
2010:8).
The PML attempted hard to address field problems and alleviate friction. Military
liaison personnel faced physical risks while they were present under fire, leading to the
death of a number of liaison officers (Joint Security Committee, 2012:3).
Arafat may not have deliberately started the intifada but he appeared content for it
to run for a limited period at least. In the early weeks he opened the PA jails and freed
Hamas and PIJ activists, breathing new life into the organisations (Byman, 2012:828). Since
coming to power he had, through design, created a security structure that answered almost
directly to him. He was concerned for the stability of his own position, even before the
collapse of the Oslo Accords, and had deliberately designed the PSF to have conflicting and
overlapping agencies.
Unfortunately however whilst this made it harder for any group to threaten his
position it also meant that when isolated from him, as they became the more his
movements were restricted by the IDF, the agencies splintered and became individual
fiefdoms. Arafat, and the PA central command in general, quickly lost control of the PSF and
in turn the ability to restrain the violent militant groups he had at least tacitly supported.
The Intifada spiralled out of control and the authority and reach of the PA collapsed as
quickly. An unintended consequence of Israel’s attack on the PA leadership was the
Palestinians’ diminished capacity to fight terror even if they had chosen to do so (Byman,
2012:841).
The PSF, with no direct strategic control resumed their primary role of protecting the
Palestinian people. Unfortunately the IDF had once again re-emerged as the primary threat
and the PSF found themselves in direct armed conflict with the soldiers they had, until
recently, been patrolling partners with. The stronger the military action from the Israelis the
more the policing role of the PSF began to fracture. In many cases, Palestinian policemen
took off their uniforms, joined the demonstrators and opened fire on IDF troops (Luft,
2000:3).
Israel responded to this wave of violence through a series of measures including
targeted assassination of terrorist leaders, closing the border, imposing curfews, cutting off
financial aid to the PLA, and increasing security check points (Celso, 2003:73).
All pretence of ongoing cooperation ended as the IDF began to directly target PA
facilities. Initially, the attacks consisted of one or more missiles fired at facilities belonging to
the security forces, preceded by an informal warning (International Crisis Group, 2004:4).
However as the terrorism in Israel increased, particularly the suicide bombings targeted at
civilians, so in turn did Israel’s response, with the targeting of security headquarters,
vehicles and other infrastructure. In October 2001 for example, after Hamas gunmen
entered an Israeli settlement in Gaza and killed two Israelis, the IDF responded by
demolishing ten Palestinian police posts nearby (RAND, 2005:40). Palestinian security
personnel were detained and disarmed en masse, their facilities largely destroyed, and
many PA civil institutions ransacked (International Crisis Group, 2004:4). The Palestinian
administrative infrastructure was now to be a target in the resumption of absolute Israeli
control (Craig, 2011:185).
Police infrastructure suffered heavily due to Israeli attacks. Some 45 police buildings
and complexes across the West Bank and Gaza Strip were destroyed, including the Forensic
Laboratory at Police Headquarters in Gaza City and the police complex at Ramallah
(Kerkkänen, Rantanen & Sundqvist, 2008:10).
The rationale and legality for the targeting of the PSF under these circumstances is of
course debatable, as is the long term wisdom of destroying the security infrastructure of an
occupied territory. However, at the time the PA was dominated by the Fattah political party.
One of the primary militant groups targeting Israel during the initial stages of the intifada
was the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a military spin-off of Fattah. According to some estimates
as many as 80% of the Brigades were also members of the security forces (International
Crisis Group, 2004:26).
In the first two months of the Intifada the Palestinians counted 247 dead. UN
officials claimed that almost ten thousand Palestinians were injured in this period, almost
half of whom were children (Byman, 2012:827).
The Israeli government changed its approach after a suicide bomber struck in the
Park Hotel, Netanya. 30 Israelis were killed and 250 injured, the victims were mainly elderly
and children (Tyler, 2012:444). Israel responded in March and April 2002 by launching
Operation Defensive Shield, an operation to reoccupy much of Area A. It began with the
seizure of Arafat’s headquarters compound in Ramallah, and followed with IDF operations in
the other key Palestinian population centres in the West Bank (Byman, 2012:830). The
compound was assaulted by IDF armour and Arafat’s isolation from the PSF was almost
total.
Israel’s aggressive policy in response to the intifada was linked to their conviction
that they faced an existential threat. This was part of the motivation that took them to
strike first in the 1967 war. The problem however was that by targeting the Palestinian
security forces they damaged a potentially powerful ally in dealing with the militants. The
PA was equally motivated to restore order to retain control of the West Bank however they
needed resources to do so. As Byman identifies, the PSF could have been far more effective
in counterterrorism than the Israeli’s, as they knew their own community and could have
gained its support to neutralise radicals (ibid.).
Israel had clearly given up on cooperation as a realistic option. Neither negotiating
nor diplomatically forcing the Palestinians to police themselves was seen to have worked.
Now it was about imposing a settlement that it was hoped would eventually convince the
Palestinians that violence would not lead to victory. As Byman identifies, Israel was giving up
on its Palestinian partner (2012:830).
As a result of Operation Defensive Shield Israel decided to close down joint DCO
HQs, confiscated weapons and expelled Palestinian liaison officers (Joint Security
Committee, 2012:4). Cooperation, at tactical and now strategic level was over.
In 2001, Israel suffered 207 deaths, in 2002 the toll was 452, and in 2003 another
208—staggering figures for a country of seven million (Byman, 2012:825). The intifada was
now a war of attrition. Israel’s increased security restrictions and militaristic response to the
increasing civilian death toll within Israel proper began to show results. In 2004, Israel lost
117 citizens to terrorism, almost half that of the previous year and a quarter of the Intifada’s
height in 2002 (ibid.).
Israel’s tactics, whilst effective, not only destroyed Palestinian cooperation it drew
criticism from the international community and the UN. In September 2002, Terje RoedLarsen, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General said:
The past weeks also witnessed a number of IDF operations, including widespread
arrests and ongoing assassinations, as well as a tightened closure regime and curfews.
According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, these curfews
confine to their homes, on average, almost half a million Palestinians in more than 20
cities and towns, sometimes for days at a time. Yesterday, troops fired into a crowd of
schoolchildren protesting a curfew in the Amari refugee camp in Ramallah, killing a 9
year-old boy (UN, 2002).
Whilst the final trigger for the start of the intifada was unclear, the change of tempo and its
eventual end was less ambiguous. Israel simply destroyed, disrupted, and deterred
individual terrorist cells and eventually whole groups, rendering them unable to function
(Byman, 2012: 838).
The eventual reduction in attacks in Israel led to a softening of the IDF’s activities in
the West Bank. Whilst it was certainly not a return to full cooperation, and the Palestinian
Police were still in disarray, by mid-2003, they began to patrol most cities in uniform.
However they did not carry any weapons as the IDF had warned that any armed Palestinian
risked being shot on sight (International Crisis Group, 2004:6). While they were able to rise
to the occasion when confronted with a particularly severe case their commanders or
political leaders were determined to resolve, it was beyond their capability to do so
regularly (International Crisis Group, 2004:19).
However there would be no significant change in the Israeli/Palestinian relationship
until Arafat’s death in 2004. In February 2005, PA President Mahmud Abbas, who became
the leader of the Palestinians after Arafat died, declared that the PA agreed to stop all acts
of violence. Hamas-linked militants agreed to a ‘period of calm’, and then following Hamas’s
lead, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades also agreed to a ceasefire (Byman, 2012:833).
The election of President Abbas and his prime minister, Salam Fayyad, was seen as
an opportunity by both sides to begin to rebuild the trust and cooperation that had given
the region at least a degree of security in the late 1990s. There was a strong feeling in Israel
that they both genuinely sought peace. The problem however was that due to the IDF’s
targeting of the PSF during the intifada they inherited ruined institutions, a destroyed
infrastructure, and an increased military occupation of Palestinian areas (Byman, 2012:842).
The whole security sector was deeply dysfunctional and in severe disarray after years of
intifada violence and Israeli counter-measures (Sayigh, 2009:3).
‘Rebuilding capacity, rebuilding trust.’
On coming to power the Abbas government set out to rebuild and reform the PSF and legal
sector. In order to restart security cooperation it would be necessary to bring the PSF in line
with democratic governance. Abbas therefore ordered all PA security organisations to
merge into three branches – Internal Security Forces (Civil Police, Preventive Security, Civil
Defence), National Security Forces (National Security Forces, Military Intelligence, Naval
Police, Military Liaison, Presidential Security/Force 17), and General Intelligence (Hussein,
2007:58).
Rather than having the agencies report directly to him, as was the case under Arafat,
they would report to the Ministry of the Interior and National Security. The previous
approach had been deliberately divisive and had reflected Arafat’s autocratic leadership.
The new structure was intended to not only improve security but also restore the faith of
the Palestinian people and, in time, the Israelis as well.
However despite these efforts friction in Gaza and a lack of unity within the PA
prevented significant improvements in Palestinian relationships with Israel. The Israeli army
continued to encircle Palestinian population centres through checkpoints and roadblocks
and invaded them at will. Israel also relentlessly pursued its policy of assassinations,
triggering retaliation from militant groups and further destabilising the precarious security
situation in the Palestinian Territories (Hussein, 2007:62).
With neither an effective PSF nor a cooperative relationship with the IDF the
situation in the West Bank continued to deteriorate. The UN identified that in major cities
such as Nablus lawlessness and gang rule were common (International Crisis Group,
2010:24).
The election of Hamas in Gaza in 2006 and their subsequent internal conflict with
Fattah across the Gaza Strip in 2007 led to a political split between the two territories.
Whilst this would cause complications for the wider peace process in the long term it
actually made matters easier for Abbas in the West Bank. Abbas and Fayyad therefore
formed an emergency government in Ramallah in April 2007 (Sayigh, 2009:2).
With the creation of the new government the ceasefire with Israel grew stronger.
Fayyad focused on the public’s weariness of the lack of security across the West Bank and
their realisation that the violence of the intifada had not only failed to remove the
‘occupiers’ but had in fact made their situation and daily lives worse. Fayyad worked with
Israel to rebuild the faith and trust that had been such an important pre-intifada element.
He negotiated the removal of a number of Palestinian names from Israel’s wanted list and in
return the PA ensured that the men gave up their weapons. Politically this amnesty offered
the fighters an honourable way to resume a normal life and allowed the PA to focus on
those who were simply thugs masquerading as freedom fighters (Byman, 2012:834).
Abbas renounced violence against Israel then and has continued to do so since. In
2012 in a letter to PM Netanyahu he stated:
We know that violence and terror whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis is not
the way. I know that it erodes both of our public’s trust in peace. Therefore, I reiterate
our full commitment to a policy of zero tolerance against violence (2012:193).
With the IDF now backing away from directly targeting the PSF, Abbas made their
restructuring a priority. However even without interference from the IDF, this was going to
be a significant challenge. As Kerkkänen and his colleagues identified:
The establishment of a policing operation and a credible, accountable and functioning
police force in a non-state setting, amid territorial fragmentation, within an extremely
complicated and vulnerable political context and political transformation, presents a
huge challenge (Kerkkänen, Rantanen & Sundqvist, 2008:10).
Conscious of the issue the direct support for the IDF had created last time, combined with
the ongoing weakness of the PSF, more discrete cooperation was needed to remove the
threat from the militants. The JSC and to a lesser degree the PML still operated and had
their liaison lines if not liaison officers into the IDF. Intelligence began to be exchanged,
predominantly one way, PSF to IDF, about the location and activities of militants. The IDF
would carry out incursions into the PA controlled areas to make the arrests.
The IDF were less inclined to share detailed intelligence with the PSF as they were
concerned that they would use it as a means of rooting out informers. The cooperation was
returning but the trust would be slow to follow.
Speaking in 2008, Major-General Jibril Rajoub, former National Security Adviser to
the PA President, analysed the main challenges in providing security for the citizens:
The Palestinian context was unique in terms of security sector governance because the
PA was not a state: The occupation of the Palestinian Territories and the constant lack
of stability make up for a large part of the problems faced by the PA in enforcing
security. The occupier tends to exploit the Palestinian security agenda for its own
security needs’ (DCAF, 2008:2).
President Abbas, the PA and the international community all recognised that if the impact of
the damage caused to the PSF infrastructure and capability by the second intifada, and the
destabilising influence of the militant groups operating across the West Bank was to be
reversed then external assistance would be required.
The PA sought support from external donors for assistance through funding, training
and the provision of modern security equipment. The Oslo accords had stipulated the
number and type of weapons that the PSF could have and as a result of the intifada it was
highly unlikely that Israel were about to show much flexibility around that issue.
Prior to the Abbas emergency government the international Quartet had published
their Roadmap for peace. This offered a new framework for the post-Oslo era. Building on
the sentiment from the original accords the roadmap called on the PA to ‘undertake visible
efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and
planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere’ (Kerkkänen, Rantanen & Sundqvist, 2008:11).
If there was to be a realistic chance of returning Israeli and Palestinian security
forces to close working relationship then the PSF would need to change from being rebadged freedom fighters and ex-militants into a professional security force with clear
delineation of roles and responsibilities, command and control, and civilian oversight.
The PA now used this need as a way of leveraging practical and fiscal support from
the international community. It was within this framework that the European Coordination
Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) was conceived and delivered by the
bilateral DFID project and financed, to a large extent, by Denmark and Norway (ibid.).
The PA pushed hard for the involvement of the US who was seen as critical for
adding legitimacy and non-lethal aid to the PA efforts. They were however reluctant to
become involved, possibly fearing the impact it may have on their relationship with Israel.
However, in March 2005, the US sent Lieutenant-General William Ward, then Deputy
Commander of the US Army in Europe, with an adviser team to the region and informed the
PA that the Ward Mission would be regarded as the only channel for international aid in
security. Washington also pledged $3 million of assistance to the reform process (Hussein,
2007:54).
With the involvement of the US, the international effort began to gain pace and
focus. The international community realised that political and practical solutions needed to
be combined. While it remained the case that the two-state solution could only be
cemented by a negotiated agreement top-down, it was also vital that parallel bottom-up
initiatives underpinned the political track (Blair, 2013:17). In 2008, foreign ministers and
representatives of over forty countries and international organisations met in Berlin for a
conference in support of Palestinian civil security and the rule of law.
As a result of this conference the US and EU formally divided the responsibilities for
assisting the reform of the PSF. The US, with their pre-deployed military advisory team
under Gen Ward, took on the role of training the NSF so that they could act as the initial
stabilisation force on the West Bank. The EU, via the re-launched EUPOL COPPS took on the
Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), the Justice institutions such as the Ministry of Justice, Judges,
The Attorney General and the prosecutors and defence council (Bulut, 2009:288).
The two main training operations, USSC and EUPOL COPPS differed in their approach
as a result of both the styles of the two elements, the EU and US, but also the long term
goals of the agencies they were training. The USSC were involved in the full lifecycle of the
NSF officers, from selection through basic and specialist training. The EU on the other hand
only delivered training to substantive police officers. Their approach was one of building a
long term capacity to the PCP so that they could continue in their legacy training and
development once the EU’s three year rolling mission had concluded.
The initial goal for all parties however was to stabilise the West Bank. Israel was not
prepared to work with militant groups who presented an existential threat to them or at the
very least promoted armed resistance. The US and the PA therefore focused on building the
capability of the National Security Force (NSF).
The Palestinians were not permitted to have a military under their agreement with
Israel and so the NSF was badged as a ‘Gendarmerie’. The US administration’s choice of
military officers with no formal civilian, or military policing experience such as Gen Ward
and subsequently Gen’s Dayton and Moeller, and latterly Admiral Bushong, to train and
mentor the NSF demonstrated the realisation that bringing stability to the West Bank would
not be achieved through the use of community policing.
The NSF therefore became a lightly armed and equipped force charged with
supporting the civil police; delivering law and order; and combating terrorism, but short of
acting as a true military force (US Government Accountability Office, 2010:13).
The semantics between ‘gendarmerie’ and ‘para-military’ were necessary as the
fledgling Israeli/Palestinian security cooperation began to re-emerge. The US mission was
to ensure that the NSF were formidable enough to enforce stability across the West Bank
but not enough to threaten the dominance of Israel as the hegemon. This was not only a
political but also physical challenge considering the abilities and weaponry available to the
dissident militants the NSF were charged with pacifying.
The balancing act was not always successful. The Palestinian public increasingly
blamed General Dayton’s NSF for the human rights abuses and growing atmosphere of
political intimidation generated by the intelligence agencies (Sayigh, 2009:5).
Additionally, in May 2009 General Dayton made a speech in Washington during
which he commented on Israel’s satisfaction with the way the NSF were dealing with
militant groups. Many Palestinians interpreted this as evidence that the NSF were being
rebuilt as a subcontractor of the Israeli occupation. The PA’s response was to end USSC
access to PSF area commanders, and to require the USSC to channel all contacts through the
Ministry of Interior (Sayigh, 2009:6).
The stabilisation of the West Bank was always going to be a difficult time for the
Abbas government. It could be argued of course that conversely it helped the relationship
with Israel as the NSF acted against those who were still intent on launching attacks on
Israel.
Dr. Ahmad Musleh, Professor in Law at Birzeit University believes however that the
security forces involvement in the struggle against elements of the Palestinian resistance
contributed to the dramatic loss of trust and credibility in the eyes of the Palestinian people
(DCAF, 2008:4). Whilst this may be a slightly generalised position there were certainly
public displays of anger about security cooperation. These were particularly vociferous after
incidents such as the IDF killing of three militants during a night-time incursion into Nablus
using information allegedly provided by the PSF (International Crisis Group, 2010:36).
Human Rights Watch believed that the PA was extremely lax in prosecuting security
officials for torture and ill-treatment of detainees. Between 2007 and 2010 for example, the
period when the NSF were carrying out their stabilisation operations, the PSF had allegedly
been responsible for the deaths in custody of eight detainees in the West Bank. Palestinian
detainees registered 106 complaints of torture with the human rights commission from
January through to September 2010 (Human Rights Watch, 2011:208).
The public began to resent the presence and actions of the NSF. The intelligence and
security services were seen as functioning outside the scope of the law. NGOs pointed to
increased use of torture and illegal detentions (Bouris & Reigeluth, 2012:5). This was not
lost on those sent to train the NSF. Neil Page, policing advisor to the USSC, observed that
when talking to Palestinian civilians they often told him that ‘When I see a green uniform
(the NSF) it might as well be an Israeli, we’re swapping one occupation for another’ (N.
Page. Personal communication, July 30, 2013).
As a result of their research, the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) suggested that the PSF promoted force instead of gradual institution building and
reform. Those in charge of the security forces, DCAF believe, needed to make a mental shift
in order to address the changing nature of the challenge (2008:2).
At the same time as the US was training the NSF, the EUPOL COPPS set out to rapidly
professionalise the civilian police in the West Bank. The mission’s objective was to assist the
PA in building the institutions of a future State in the areas of policing and criminal justice
under Palestinian ownership and in accordance with the best international standards (Bulut,
2009:288). Accordingly the training focused on community crime fighting and maintaining
public order. These therefore would be the police officers who would, it was hoped, resume
the day to day liaison and partnership with the ISF.
The role of EUPOL COPPS was to provide support to the PCP for both immediate
operational priorities and longer-term transformational change. In order to do this they
adopted a more holistic approach to their task. They advised the senior leaders of the PCP,
and ensured liaison with Palestinian and international stakeholders and coordinated and
monitored donor assistance (Kristoff, 2012:5). This civilianisation of the Palestinian police
was linked directly into the PA’s strategic thinking. The Ministry of Interior believed that a
professionally trained and self-sufficient Palestinian Civil Police was the cornerstone of law
and order which would eventually lead to a secure and independent Palestinian state
(Bouris & Reigeluth, 2012:8).
The EU operation delivered a breadth of courses including inter alia, human rights,
proportionate response to force, community service, communication skills, crowd control,
crisis management, manoeuvring skills, defensive techniques and first aid. The ethics of the
course are based on the idea that the police should serve the citizens (ibid.).
As a result of the EU training the PCP now numbers approximately 7,300 officers.
They are responsible for daily policing, including arresting criminals, controlling traffic, and
keeping general order. A relatively small, special rapid deployment unit handles complex
situations such as riots or counterterrorism activities (US Government Accountability Office,
2010, p13). This public order unit within the PCP, the Special Police Unit (SPU) is 1350
officers strong, trained by the French CRS and operates at a standard equally comparable,
and probably better than most European agencies (N. Page. Personal communication, July
30, 2013). The capability of this unit means that the need for the NSF to be deployed on the
streets has significantly reduced.
The EU and US however were not the only countries providing training to the PSF. In
2011 for example PSF officers undertook training courses in Jordan as well as seminars in
the West Bank (Faayad, 2011:19). Other countries such as Russia and China have trained
and supported the PG in advanced tactics whilst Turkey has delivered extensive traffic police
training for the PCP (N. Page. Personal communication, July 30, 2013).
The training was seen as not only a chance to build the capability of the Palestinians
but also as a way of reintroducing the security cooperation between the two sides. Prior to
the second intifada face to face interaction between the ISF and PSF had been a positive
daily occurrence. Meetings at both strategic and tactical levels had been routine. The EUPOL
COPPS and USSC programmes included the opportunity for joint training courses and
seminars. As with the political level, trust and faith in the intentions and capability of both
sides were seen as critical for rebuilding cooperative security protocols.
Whilst the international community was focused on building competence and
capacity within the PSF, the Palestinians and Israelis were rebuilding the liaison structures
that had, to a degree, lain dormant during the intifada. Initially the Israeli coordination with
the PA was limited to prior notification when incursions occurred into Area A, during which
the Palestinians were required to withdraw in order to avoid friction between the two
forces (International Crisis Group, 2010:22).
However as the confidence and trust began to return so did the extent of
cooperation. In 2009 for example there were over a thousand coordinated activities
(Byman, 2012:842).
At both strategic and tactical levels the Israelis and Palestinians resumed their
regular rounds of information sharing and coordination meetings. These ranged from the
IDF and PSF commanders meeting on a monthly basis, through joint workshops on counter-
narcotics and vehicle crime, to exchange visits (N. Page. Personal communication, July 30,
2013). In 2011 the JSC structure held 440 meetings and in the first six months of 2012 (the
most recent figures available) they held 300 meetings (ibid.).
By 2012 the PML was once again an effective coordination unit. However the legacy
of the loss of trust between the two sides at operational level as well as strategic/political
caused by the early stages of the Intifada in 2000, clearly remained. The PML’s tasks
therefore focused now more on de-confliction rather than active cooperation (Joint Security
Committee, 2012:3).
It would be naïve to think that the liaison structure, particularly at the operational
level, proceeded without occasional negative frictions. However, by 2013 the PML had
resumed all tasks of coordinating movement of military convoys and patrols from Area A to
all other areas within the West bank. Its role includes the coordination of police operations,
including armed escort of dangerous criminals and detained persons, distribution of judicial
warrants, arraignment of wanted culprits, regulation of the flow of traffic, dealing with
mines, suspicious objects and Israeli unexploded ordnance, and coordination for persons
detained by Palestinian General Intelligence, Preventative Security, and Military Intelligence
(Joint Security Committee, 2012:5).
Case study 1 – Murder of Palestinian male
Ramallah can be accessed from Israel proper by a number of Israeli checkpoints, one of
which is at El-Jeeb. Due to the geographical boundaries of Area A around Ramallah the
PSF are not allowed to approach the crossing without significant coordination. The
reality is that their area of routine operation falls several kilometres short of the
crossing. On the 20th of August 2013 a Palestinian male was murdered and his body
abandoned on the main road to Ramallah from the El-Jeeb crossing approximately 2 km
outside the PSF’s normal area.
The IDF responded to the scene and after an initial investigation formed the theory that
this was a Palestinian inter-family matter best dealt with by the PCP. With hostile and
emotional families gathering in the heat of the day authority was sought for the PCP to
travel the 2 km from Ramallah to take over the investigation.
In line with protocols the coordination was managed through the IDF’s Civil
Administration Office (a partner office to the DCO) for Judea and Samaria, a department
based in Beit-El within Israel’s military command known as COGAT (Coordinator Of
Government Activities in the Territories).
The authorisation took six hours to arrange.
By this time rival families had turned up, roads were blocked, the crossing was closed
and rumours circulated that the victim had been shot by the IDF. The PCP resources
required to manage the scene and the developing incident were increased therefore by
their delay in arriving. More units were called for and the authorisation cycle continued.
In the years leading to the second intifada this incident would have been dealt with
immediately by a joint patrol. It would seem that the legacy of the intifada is such that
the lack of trust remains and as a result these types of incidents will continue to be
unnecessarily complex (J. Parnell, personal communication, August 20, 2013).
Whilst joint patrols have not returned the exchange of tactical information has. The Shin Bet
provides lists of wanted militants who are then arrested by the PSF. As far as the IDF and
Israeli intelligence officials are concerned the cooperation has never been as extensive with
‘coordination better in all respects’ (International Crisis Group, 2010:21). Furthermore,
extensive International Crisis Group interviews with IDF personnel reveal that the IDF
believe that whilst in the recent past the PSF were divided and internally ill-coordinated,
leading Israel to work with only some of them, their current more centralised Palestinian
apparatus, enables Israel to coordinate across the entire PA region (2010:21).
Case study 2 – PG VIP movement
Only two days after the murder at El-Jeeb a UK protected VIP movement took place
from Jerusalem across the border at Hizma near Ramallah, travelling north to Nablus
and then back out through Jal Joulia into Israel proper. This would involve starting and
finishing in Area C whilst crossing through a number of zones within Areas A and B.
A request was made for support from the Palestinian Presidential Guard (PG) for the
sections within their authorised operational zone, Area A.
The request was routed through the UN, to the Civil Administration in COGAT, the DCO,
the PML and then the PG. The process took three days however the result was
unexpected. The PG were authorised to undertake the full movement from Hizma to Jal
Joulia. They were permitted to be armed and unescorted by IDF. The only restrictions
placed on the PG were that they covered up the blue lights on their vehicles and
travelled in plain clothes.
This not only demonstrated significant faith by the IDF in the capabilities and
professional restraint of the PG it also represented a significant risk of compromise
considering the proximity the convoy would have to sensitive areas within the West
bank.
This was not a decision the IDF would have taken lightly and was an unprecedented
authorisation. Although the IDF did not deploy on the ground with them, so there was
no actual joint working, it demonstrated a level of trust that would not have taken place
a few years ago.
The training and capability of units such as the PG are, it can be argued, beginning to
influence the relationship they have with the ISF (J. Parnell, personal communication,
August 20, 2013).
‘One step forward, two steps back.’
The history of the Middle East peace process is littered with incredulity around the actions
of both sides. The ability to literally snatch defeat from the jaws of victory is a trait seen
time and again. The Rabin assassination and Arafat’s refusal at Camp David have already
been discussed, however as the 2013 Kerry sponsored negotiations begin, three perennial
hurdles to a negotiated peace and generator of friction between the ISF and PSF again
emerge – the disparity of the two legal systems, IDF incursions and roadblocks, and the
settler issue.
Currently half-a-million Israelis now live in illegal settlements in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem. More than 1700 military orders have been issued by the military
commander who has legislative, executive and judicial powers over two and a half million
Palestinians and at least 730,000 Palestinian men, women and children have been
prosecuted in military courts and imprisoned (Duaibis, 2013:3).
Whilst Israeli settlements on the West Bank dominate the political debate they also
have a significant impact on the relationship between the Palestinian and Israeli security
forces.
The IDF’s formal, primary mission in the West Bank is to protect Jews from Arabs,
not Arabs from Jews. This has led to a situation where assaults upon Arabs and their
property by settlers are not viewed by the IDF as its responsibility (Aronson, 2012:209).
However, with no joint patrolling with the PSF, and restrictions placed on how close the PCP
can get to settlements the Palestinian response to these incidents is limited. The Oslo
requirement to hand over Israelis detained and the fact that Palestinian law does not apply
to Israelis on the West Bank, further frustrates the population and damages any attempts to
create an impression of joint security responsibility.
Settler attacks on Palestinian residents tripled between 2009 and 2011. Extremist
settlers launched almost 300 attacks on Palestinian property in 2011 alone, which resulted
in over 100 Palestinian casualties and caused extensive property damage for Palestinian
farmers, who lost approximately 10,000 trees (Madsen, 2013:20).
The settlers however do not reserve their aggression solely for the Palestinians. In
2011, 100 Israelis protesting the impending court-ordered evacuation of a settlement
outpost travelled from Jerusalem to assault a military base in the West Bank. A crowd of 50
entered the camp, threw rocks, burned tires and otherwise vandalized military vehicles
before retreating. There were no arrests. The IDF, which defends its people, found itself
defending itself against its people (Aronson, 2012:209).
However as Byman identifies, if Palestinian security forces try to increase the scope
of their activities, they would run afoul of Israel’s settlers in the West Bank, inevitably
bringing confrontations. A decline or even collapse of security cooperation remains a
constant risk (2012:843). Former Palestinian PM Faayad is in agreement but adds the stark
warning that; ‘the window of opportunity to secure a viable two-state solution is now
mortally threatened by Israel’s settlement policy, the continuation of which will undermine
the remaining opportunity of building an independent Palestinian State’ (2011:5).
The cooperation that developed between the PSF and IDF in the initial post-Oslo
years led to concerns and claims of collaboration. The inability to undertake joint patrols
and operations now generates a situation where the IDF carry out their incursions into PA
controlled areas on their own. This has in turn generated a paradoxical situation with the
IDF now accused of making the PSF look weak as they are perceived as not being able to
protect the Palestinians from these military incursions. As one West Bank governor
observed, ‘It is a question of respect. Nothing undermines Palestinian civilians’ respect for
their security services more than Israeli incursions into the heart of our cities’ (International
Crisis Group, 2010:19). It is suggested therefore that the security forces are losing their
legitimacy because they cannot protect the people against Israeli military actions and
incursions (DCAF, 2008:6).
According to USSC figures for the period 1st to 15th of December 2012 there were
425 incursions and raids into PA controlled areas by IDF troops, 15 assaults on PSF staff and
25 assaults by settlers (N. Page. Personal communication, July 30, 2013).
The lack of public security coordination would seem to be as damaging if not more
so than the previous accusations of collaboration. Byman believes that Israel must enhance
the status and capabilities of Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. As Palestinian
forces stand up, Israeli security can stand down, creating a benign circle: Palestinian
credibility will grow, and their ability to fight terrorism will increase (2012:844). Israeli
counterterrorism therefore must change, he states, with measures including working with,
as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank (2012:827).
It is not simply the IDF’s incursions damaging the PSF’s reputation that impacts on
their ability to effectively police the West Bank communities, particularly the more remote
ones. There are numerous official and unofficial road closures, as well as the non-contiguous
nature of the West Bank Areas which prevent the PSF responding to the public they serve.
The IDF however move across the West Bank unimpeded. As one US analyst put it ‘Israel
recognises the divisions between Areas A, B and C when it comes to defining Palestinian
zones of operation but tends to ignore them when it comes to defining its own’
(International Crisis Group, 2010:20).
In June 2009 for example there were road 613 closures within the West Bank, 68 of
which were permanently staffed checkpoints (Byman, 2012:833). It can be seen then that
whilst large numbers of Israeli checkpoints and road closures enhance Israel’s security they
in turn frustrate the development of the PSF’s capability (Kurtzer & Lasensky, 2008:44).
Furthermore PSF officers claim that they are regularly treated disrespectfully by their
Israeli counterparts, even in public. When PSF vehicles pass through IDF checkpoints, they
are often searched and occasionally IDF soldiers order Palestinian officers to dismount their
cars during inspections occasionally in front of Palestinian civilians (International Crisis
Group, 2010:23).
As is often the way with practical police officers, the PCP have tried to find a way of
working around these closures and restrictions. If the circumstances warrant it for example,
the PCP will get into plain clothes, leave their weapons behind and drive in unmarked cars
to get to their destination. They have also, on occasions, arrested an individual and then
crossed back through the checkpoint with the prisoner in the boot of their car (N. Page.
Personal communication, July 30, 2013).
Frustrated by their inability to reach those in need some PCP officers have resorted
to handing out the telephone number of the local IDF commander in response to requests
by villagers for protection against marauding settlers (Aronson, 2012:208). Former
Palestinian PM Fayaad is unambiguous about the impact of IDF activities, he believes that
military incursions and other activities undermine the PA’s national security efforts, and
impacts on their ability to meet the safety and security needs of Palestinians outside Area A
(Faayad, 2011:17).
Conclusion
Security cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian forces has existed on the West Bank,
was effective and improved the security of both sides, for a limited period. However as has
been shown the perceived line between cooperation and collaboration is a thin one, which
poses a virtually insurmountable challenge for the PSF’s efforts to win Palestinian hearts and
minds (International Crisis Group, 2010:36).
The military are an entwined aspect of Israeli society at all levels, most importantly
within the political sphere. For this reason the key decision makers within the Israeli
government will understand the need to empower the Palestinian security forces. The twostate solution cannot progress without a secure and stable West Bank. The West Bank
cannot be secure without an effective and capable PSF. The PSF in turn cannot be effective
without the support and committed cooperation of the IDF at both strategic and tactical
levels. As most conceivable variations on a Palestinian-Israeli final status accord will leave
one or other rejectionist group unsatisfied and prepared to continue to fight against Israel
(RAND, 2005:41), the challenges are convincing firstly a nervous population on both sides of
the Security Wall that cooperation is not the same as collaboration, and secondly the
political right from both sides of the Western Wall that a compromised peace is better than
a third intifada
The settler issue and its impact on a cohesive security process has dogged the
process since the signing of the Oslo accords. In September 1995, only two months before
Rabin’s assassination, a group of rabbis from various settlements called for religious soldiers
within the IDF to refuse orders involved in the implementation of the accords (Pedahzur &
Perliger, 2011:100). As one Israeli commentator explained; ‘Today it seems that the biggest
threat to the quiet in the territories comes not from the Palestinians, but from irresponsible
provocations of the zealous, insane margins of the Israeli right wing’ (Aronson, 2012:208).
The problem however is not simply, if that is the right word, about the internal
extreme politics of both sides. The PSF on the West Bank has to contend with a zone of
operations that is both fragmented and far-flung. They cannot move personnel, vehicles, or
arms between different PA autonomous areas without prior Israeli permission. They are
compelled to scatter or duplicate human and material resources, making centralised
administration difficult (Sayigh, 2011:8).
Due to this fragmentation and the legacy of the intifada, it is Israel that largely
decides the scope and content of the cooperation, and the PSF has to comply. The result is
that Palestinian officials often claim that the IDF treats them as subcontractors, which
furthers the image of coordination as a form of collaboration (International Crisis Group,
2010:23).
There will always be those who see cooperation as collaboration. However it could
be argued that the more covert the cooperation the more suspicious it looks.
Commentators such as the Christisons believe that the fact that the PCP patrol Nabulus (in
Area A) during the day but pull out at night to enable the IDF to conduct raids signifies that
the PA are simply a tool of the occupation (2009:121). If this position becomes the dominant
public view then it is unlikely that there will ever be a truly cooperative approach to security
on the West Bank.
The evidence however does not all point towards a negative outcome. As the
Quartet maintain, the ability of the PA to conduct effective law enforcement has improved
and that this shift is reflected in an enhanced public sense of security and stability (Blair,
2011:14). Maintaining that public confidence and trust is the critical challenge.
Therefore the work that continues to be put in to rebuild the trust and cooperation
between the Israeli and Palestinian security forces will be wasted unless the public on both
sides, and the Palestinians in particular, come to embrace the new concept of security as
cooperation over collaboration as the only way to secure a Palestinian state. The future
should not be dominated by the past. Daniel Taub, the Israeli Ambassador to the UK was a
negotiator during previous rounds of Palestinian talks. His view on this is clear:
When negotiating with the Palestinians you have competing voices from your own side.
Particularly significant are those of the grandparents calling for revenge and the
grandchildren calling for a peaceful future. Your responsibility as a negotiator is to
ensure that the voices of the grandchildren are at least as loud as those of the
grandparents’ (D. Taub, personal communication, February 15, 2013).
Finally, Ami Ayalon, who admits that on retiring from the Shin Bet all officers become a bit
leftist, has a warning for his successors that is equally valid for the Palestinians; ‘Victory is
creating a better political reality. The tragedy of Israel’s public security debate is that we
don’t realise that we face a frustrating situation in which we win every battle but lose the
war’ (Moreh, 2012).
Glossary
al-Aqsa
Terrorist organisation associated with Fattah formed during the second intifada.
Martyrs
Brigade
DCO
District Coordinating Office – Sits below and reports to the RSC tasking and
monitoring joint operational deployments.
DFID
Department For International Development – UK government Ministry
EUCOPPS
European Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support,
EUPOL
European Police Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support – Successor
COPPS
to the EUCOPPS,
Fattah
Primary political group within the PA.
Gendarmerie
Civilian police officers with military leadership.
Hamas
Current De facto government of Gaza however still recognised by most
governments, including the UK and USA, as a terrorist organisation.
IDF
Israeli Defence Force – Unified branches of the Israeli military.
ISF
Israeli Security Forces – Generic grouping for military, police and intelligence
agencies.
JSC
Joint Security Committee – Coordination unit created by the Oslo Accords.
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
PA
Palestinian Authority
PCP
Palestinian Civil Police
PG
Presidential Guard – Palestinian security force reporting to the President.
PIJ
Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Terrorist organisation predominantly operating within
Gaza.
PLO
Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PML
Palestinian Military Liaison – Palestinian link into the JSC
PSF
Palestinian Security Forces – Generic grouping for military, police and
intelligence agencies.
Quartet, The
Joint Middle East Peace initiative formed by America, Russia, the UN and EU
RSC
Regional Security Committee – Sits below and reports to the JSC.
Shin Bet /
Israeli internal security and intelligence agency.
Shabak
SSR
Security Sector Reform
USSC
United States’ Security Coordinator.
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