What structural factors within each society favour or
impede democratisation?
Paper by Chishimba Brian Yumbe.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 2010.
I.
Introduction:
This paper examines the structural factors within societies that can either favour or
impede democratization. A quick look at the world today shows that, overall, most
societies have become more democratic over time, particularly over the past thirty
years. This trend is attested to by the two leading measures of democracy – the
Freedom House and the Polity IV indices. However, it is also clear that some societies
have achieved greater democratisation than others, and there has been significant
variation in the pace and ease of reforms. There are some societies that have literally
struggled, oscillating between relative democracy and relative autocracy, while some
societies have remained very autocratic. What could be the reasons?
The paper identifies common structural patterns across societies and rationalises
how these have helped or hindered the democratization process. The paper presents
findings and evidence from literature, explains correlations with democracy, and
concludes by summarising the key lessons and implications.
The paper does not directly explore non-structural aspects of societies that favour or
impede the democratic process. These are typically non-embeded or external
influences, and include political actors, industrialisation, modernisation, and
international factors. However, the effects of the external influences, as manifested
in the structure, are discussed. Thus structural characteristics, like economic income
distribution and educational attainment, are discussed but not the external
influences that could have caused them, for instance industrialisation or
international cooperation. The focus of the paper is on structural effects not causes.
Structural factors that favour or impede democracy
Page 1 of 7
II.
Summary of the core theoretical framework selected:
This paper reviews various studies that have been undertaken on structural factors
and their impact on democratisation. Prominent are: the level of economic
development and the rate of economic growth (Lipset 181; Przeworski 1992; Barro
1999), the distribution of power resources (Vanhanen 1989), long-term shifts in
societal power involving the bourgeoisie or working class (Moore 1967;
Rueschemeyer 1992), and cultural influences (Linder and Bachtiger 2005).
Other studies that complement the aforesaid have also been cited in relavant
sections of this paper.
III
Review of the literature and evidence:
A literal definition of democracy is “rule by the people”. Other more detailed
definitions go on to emphasize competitive elections, the rule of law, participation
and civil liberties. Key in all these is that the people have power in how they are
ruled.
Studies in democracy have advanced a firm hypothesis that the distribution of power
resources plays a big role in the prospects for attaining and sustaining democracy.
Since democracy is about people power, it flourishes in societies where there is
wider distribution of power resources among the people – where there is absence of
centralised control over power resources. This hypothesis is amply attested to by
both historical and contemporary contexts. When we look at the origins of
democracy, we trace it back to freeholder land systems. These emerged in places
where there was abundant or continuous rainfall such that there was no need for
centrally controlled irrigation systems (Midlarsky 1997). Freholder systems led to
nascent democracy in North-West Europe, North America and Australia/New
Zealand (Midlarsky 1997).
Apart from water resources, the absence of a need to maintain armory resources has
been found to be positively correlated to the occurrence of nascent democracy.
Where territories were on islands and therefore naturally shielded from potential
attackers, there was no need to maintain centralised standing armies and in turn
people power through democracy was more feasible (Midlarsky 1977). Examples are
Iceland, the UK and Scandinavia. Mountains played a similar shielding role such as
the Alps, resulting in Switzerland never needing a standing army and practising
nascent democracy.
Power resources can also be analysed in terms of revenue sources. Where you have
centralised revenue sources, there are lesser prospects for democracy. This is typical
Structural factors that favour or impede democracy
Page 2 of 7
in societies that have lucrative natural resources, such as oil or precious minerals,
and do not therefore rely much on the taxation of the masses. The principle of “no
taxation without representation” that has been instrumental in a lot of western
democratisation does not come to bear. Examples abound, from historical Spain with
its foreign colony revenue to modern day Saudi Arabia with oil. This phenomenon is
also referred to as the “resource curse” in macroeconomics in explaining why
naturally endowed countries do not seem to make much political, social and even
economic progress. Thus “oil hinders democracy” (Michael Ross 2011).
Another structural factor that has been long held as instrumental to successful
democratisation is the level of economic development and rate of economic growth
(Lipset 1981: Przeworski 1992). A number of empirical studies have been done that
show that a country’s prospects for democracy improve with economic
development. Robert Barro in 1999 studied 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 and
validated this hypothesis by monitoring democracy, as represented through electoral
rights, and economic development, as represented by the standard of living. Barro
observed a positive correlation of democracy to the standard of living – measured by
per capita GDP. Barro also observed positive correlations of democracy to (i)
education level – measured by primary school attainment and (ii) gender education
inclusiveness - measured by the gap between male and female primary schooling.
Furthermore, he was able to attest to a related economic hypothesis that democracy
increases with the middle class share of income. These findings reaffirmed earlier
hypothesis on the role of industrialisation in expanding the working middle class.
This resulted in long term shifts in societal power involving the bourgeoisie and
working class (Moore 1967; Rueschemeyer 1992). Barro’s work also showed that
economic variables outweighed potentially negative influences such as colonial
heritage or non-Christian religions, and that democracy has little relation to country
size and tends to fall with a greater reliance on natural resources.
The effects of the distribution of power resources – economic and intellectual – on
democracy was presented in a study by Vanhanen in his 1989 article entitled “The
Level of Democratisation Related to Socio-economic variables in 147 States in 198085”. Vanhannen noted that democracy is assumed to emerge in conditions in which
power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able
to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony. Empirical variables were
formulated to measure hypothetical concepts “democracy” and “power resources”.
The hypothesis was tested by empirical data covering 147 states of the period 198085. The results of correlation analysis showed that the principal explanatory factor,
the Index of Power Resources, statistically explained about 70% of the variation in
the Index of Demoratization. Regression analysis was used to disclose how well the
general relationship applied to single countries and which countries deviated from
the general pattern. High negative residuals were interpreted to mean that the level
Structural factors that favour or impede democracy
Page 3 of 7
of democratisation should be much higher than it actually was, and high positive
residuals can be interpreted to mean that the level of democratisation was much
higher than expected on the basis of the country’s social conditions.
Other structural factors pertaining to culture have been captured in the work of Wolf
Linder and Andre Bachtiger (2005), who took a cross national analysis of 62 African
and Asian countries between 1965 and 1995. Linder and Bachtiger adopted a social
anthrological view of culture by Muller (1999 and 2002) and analysed three of
Muller’s culture indicators: ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, male dominance, and
family and kinship systems. All three were expected to be negatively correlated to
democracy and these hypothesis were tested across the 62 countries. The results
showed weak correlations for the first two indicators but the third – family and
kinship- had a strong correlation. Linder and Bachtiger noted that “the more
extensive a family or kinship, the more a society can be considered “familistic” (i.e.
all basic needs are provided and regulated by the family). It also means that a society
has not developed (or resisted) more complex societal organisations like feudalism,
the extension of division of labour on the basis of a monetarised economy, or a
strong state providing for police, welfare or other public goods on the base of
surplus extraction through taxes”. Reference was also made to the work of
Fuyukama (1992) who coined the term “traditional sociability” – which refers to the
concentration of solidarity, loyalty and identity in family or kinship groups – and the
term “free sociability” – the capacity to build trans-familistic and civic networks.
Fuyukama’s argument is that it is difficult to build up reliable cooperation beyond
such kinship groups, and therefore civic networks – crucial for democratisation –are
difficult to establish. In a similar vein, Putnam (1993) claims that democratic stability
depends on a specific form of social organisation and citizen values: ”social capital”.
His argument is that denser networks and norms of reciprocity in a society make it
“more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit” (Putnam
1993:173). Less civic regions, in contrast, reflect a “Hobbesian equilibrium”
characterised by “mutual distrust and defection, vertical dependence and
exploitation, isolation and disorder, criminality and backwardness” (Putnam
1993:181).
Notwithstanding, the lack of empirical support in Linder and Bachtiger’s work on the
negative effects of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and male dominance on
democracy, these two factors are widely regarded as structural impediments to
democracy. As Pippa Norris (2008) notes “Multiethnic societies are widely assumed
to face particularly serious challenges in holding democratic elections, maintaining
political stability, and accommodating rival communities”.
Interestingly, Linder and Bachtiger found familism to be a stronger predictor of
democratisation than economic factors, which have often be viewed as the most
Structural factors that favour or impede democracy
Page 4 of 7
important factors for democratisation. Earlier studies on economic factors and
democratisation have yielded strong positive correlations and notable among them
are Lipset (1981), Przeworski (1992) and Barro (1999).
Two other structural factors in societies seem correlated with democracy. These are
colonial legacies and religion. It is amply clear that Aglophone Africa has been more
successful at democratisation than Francophone Africa. We could infer from the
work of Linder and Bachtiger, that the characteristics of familism and male
dominance might explain why Protestantism could be a stronger influence for
democracy than Islam. Similarly, French colonialism had a more autocratic style of
governing, a culture that seems to have persisted in post-independence francophone
countries, thereby possibly impeding democracy. However, we can take note of
Barro’s findings above that economic variables outweighed potentially negative
influences such as colonial heritage or religion.
IV
Conclusions and Implications:
The paper has reviewed the role structural factors play in aiding or impeding
democracy. A wealth of literature has been referred to, and in particular recent
studies that evaluate earlier hypothesis against world developments.
Earlier studies of the determinants of democracy had focussed on structural factors.
The level of economic development, favourable geopolitical conditions, the
distribution of power resources, and shifts in societal power involving the
bourgeoisie or middle class. Subsequent studies, however, turned away from
structural analysis and emphasised the role of actor-related factors. While not
discounting structural factors, proponents argued that they leave a lot of room for
political actors to make choices about the regime – that a country’s chances for
successfully democratising depended primarily on the political intentions and actions
of its political elites.
However, in light of the manu unsuccessful transition processes to full democracy in
the 1990s – despite the intentions of political elites – the question of aiding or
impending structural factors has again been brought into sharper focus. According to
Freedom House’s latest evaluations, many states are still stuck in the middle ground
between liberal democracies and absolute autocracies.
This paper has reviewed the more recent studies that again emphasise the role of
structural factors in aiding or impeding democracy. The centralised control of power
resources continues to be a major impeding structural factor as can be seen in some
of the major oil producing states or some persisting absolute monarchies.
Furthermore, recent empirical evidence has shown that culture, in the form of
Structural factors that favour or impede democracy
Page 5 of 7
familism, can be a stronger impeding factor than low economic development and
standards of living (conversely the absence of familism was fould to have a stronger
correlation to democracy than economic development). In turn, high economic
development and standard of living have been shown to outweigh potentially
negative influences such as colonial heritage or non-Christian religions. Democracy
has been shown to increase with middle-class share of income. Other structural
factors that have been deemed capable of playing positive roles are ethnic/linguistic
homogeneity and the absence of male dominance.
While the various research highlighted in this paper have presented empirical results
on the interplay of various structural factors and political actors, actual results may
vary by country. The central message here is really that structural factors appear to
be more dominant than political actors in the attainability of democracy. How the
factors interplay, could vary by country and according to time.
Structural factors that favour or impede democracy
Page 6 of 7
V. Endnotes: Comprehensive list of literature and references used in this paper.
Barro, Robert J. 1999. “Determinants of democracy”. Journal of Political Economy 107(62):158-183
Haerpfer, C.W., Bernhagen, P., Inglehart, R., Welzer, C.,(2009). Democratization.
Fukuyama, F.(1992). The end of history and the last man. New York: Free Press.
Linder, Wolf and Andre’ Bachtiger. 2005. “What drives democratisation in Asia and Africa?”
European Journal of Political Research 44:861-880
Lipset, M. (1981). Democracy in developing countries, 2nd edn. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Lipset, S.M. (1981). Political man: The social basis of politics. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins
University Press.
Midlarsky, M.I. (1977) (ed.), Inequality, Democracy and Economic Development: Cambridge
University Press
Moore, B. (1967). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Müller, H.-P. (2002). Input paper for Monte Verita Conference. Paper presented at the
conference on Culture, Democracy and Development Monte Verita, Switzerland, 6-11
October.
Müller, H.-P. et al. (1999). Atlas of pre-colonial societies: Cultural heritage and social
structures of African, Asian and Melanesian countries. Berlin: Reimer.
Przeworski, A. (1992). The games of transition. In S. Mainwaring et al. (eds), Issues in
democratic consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative
perspective.
Norris, P. (2008). Driving Democracy: Cambridge University Press.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 105-152.
Przeworski, A. et al. (1996). What makes democracies endure? Journal of Democracy 7(1).
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ross, M.L. (2001), “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, 53:325-61
Rueschemeyer, D. (1992). Capitalist development and democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Vanhanen, T. (1989). The level of democratization related to socio-economic variables in
147 countries.
Welzel, C., Inglehart, R. & Klingemann, H.-D. (2003). The theory of human development: A
cross-cultural analysis. European Journal of Political Research 42(3): 341-379.
Structural factors that favour or impede democracy
Page 7 of 7