ColonialApproachestoGovernanceinthePeriphery:
DirectandIndirectRuleinFrenchAlgeria
AdriaLawrence,AssociateProfessor
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
YaleUniversity
[email protected]
Preparedfor“ColonialEncountersandDivergentDevelopment
TrajectoriesintheMediterranean,”HarvardUniversity
December1,2016
Draft:Pleasedonotcirculatewithoutpermission
Abstract:WhentheBritishandFrenchexpandedintoAfrica,Asia,andtheAmericas,they
beganrulingdiversepopulationsthatdifferedfromthemalongethnic,linguistic,and
religiouslines.Tomanagethisdiversity,theyarticulatedtwodistinctideologies:direct
andindirectrule.Advocatesofdirectruleenvisionedacolonialprojectthatwould
modernizeandtransformcolonialterritories;proponentsofindirectrulefavored
preservingtraditionandworkingwithlocalauthorities.Recentscholarlyworkonthe
legaciesofcolonialrulehascodeddirectandindirectruleinformercolonies,arguingthat
thetypeofcolonialrulehasimportantlong-termconsequences.Thispaperexamineshow
theconceptsofdirectandindirectrulehavebeendefinedandmeasuredinthesocial
scienceliterature.Itarguesthatthedistinctionbetweenthetwohasbeenoverstated.
DrawingonthecaseofcolonialAlgeria,itpointstoagapbetweencolonialrhetoricand
actualcolonialgovernance.ThroughconsideringtheAlgeriancase,itsuggestsnewwaysof
understandingwhyandhowcolonialstrategiesvariedovertimeandplace.
“TheRomansaccomplishedlessinAfricain200yearsthantheFrenchhavesincethe
conquest”–GeneralDaumas,speakingtotheLegislativeCorpsinAlgeria,1861.1
In1830,KingCharlesXofFrance,hopingfortheprestigeofaswiftmilitaryvictory,
sentanarmyof37,000mentoAlgeria.ThearmytookAlgiers,buttoolateforthe
unpopularCharlesX,whoseregimecollapsedinthe1830JulyRevolution.Althoughthe
originalimpetusfortheconquestwasgone,FrancewouldremaininAlgeriaforthenext
130years.HowdidFrancegovernAlgeria?Specifically,whatkindsofstrategieswere
employedtogainthecomplianceoftheconqueredBerberandArabpopulationsofAlgeria?
The“nativequestion,”asMamdani(1996)calledit,affectednotjustAlgeriabut
nearlytheentireAfricancontinentastheEuropeanpowersdividedandseizedAfrican
territoryinthe19thandearly20thcentury.Europeanapproachestogoverningpopulations
thatdifferedfromthemalongracial,ethnic,religious,andlinguisticlineshavesincebeen
characterizedasfallingintooneoftwocontrastinglogics:directorindirectrule.Advocates
ofdirectruledefendedandjustifiedcolonialismasa“civilizing”projectthatwould
modernizeandtransformcolonialterritories.Theconqueringstateprovidedthemodelto
beemulated:Europeanbureaucracies,laws,andmodesofeconomicexchangewouldbe
transplantedtothecolonies.Above,GeneralDaumasspeaksofthetransformativenature
ofcolonialrule,just30yearsaftertheFrencharrivedinAlgeria.
Incontrast,proponentsofindirectruleframedthecolonialprojectin
preservationistterms.Theyfavoredworkingwithlocalauthoritiesandmaintaining
indigenoustraditions,notreplacingthemwithacentralizedauthority.Indirectrule
impliedlimitedcolonialintervention.
1L’AlgérieetleDécretdu24Novembre,1861.CentredesArchivesNationalesd’Outre-Mer.BIBB2374.
1
Asthe19thcenturygavewaytothe20th,indirectruleappearedtobecomethe
preferredapproach.SirFrederickLugard(1922)formallydescribedthesystemofindirect
ruleduringhistenureinnorthernNigeria,althoughindirectrulecharacterizedearlier
rulingarrangements,includingtheresidencysysteminIndia.EventheFrench,knownfor
theircentralizedapproachtoimperialrule,beganspeakingof“association”insteadof
“assimilation.”Indirectrulewaspromotedasacorrectiontotheperceivedproblemsof
directrule:itscosts,aswellasthedifficultyofabsorbingpopulationsthatcametoseemtoo
culturallydistanttobe“civilized.”AsSirDonaldCameron,governorofTanganyika,wrote
soonafterarrivingathispost,“Itisourdutytodoeverythinginourpowertodevelopthe
nativeonlineswhichwillnotWesternizehimandturnhimintoabadimitationofa
European”(quotedinMamdani1996,80).Indirectrulewasthuschampionedon
normativegrounds,defended“asadeferencetonativeagencyand,inmoreenlightened
self-descriptions,asaformofcosmopolitanpluralism,onethatrecognizedthespecificityof
nativesociety”(Mantena2010,6).Italsohadpracticaladvantages.JulesFerry,speaking
aboutthenewlyestablishedprotectorateinTunisiabeforetheFrenchChamberofDeputies
onApril1,1884,statedthatpreservingtheOttomanBey’ssovereignty“freesusfrom
installingaFrenchadministrationinthiscountry,whichistosayitfreesusfromimposing
significantburdensontheFrenchbudget.Itallowsustosupervisefromabove,togovern
fromabove,toavoidtakingon,inspiteofourselves,responsibilityforallthedetailsof
administration”(quotedinLewis2013,62).Governingfromabovehadtheaddedbenefit
ofdeterringrebellionsinceindigenouspopulationswereexpectedtobelesslikelytorebel
againsttheirownleadersthanoutsiders.
2
Thesetwostrategiesformanagingconqueredpopulationswerearticulatedand
defendedattheelitelevel,bycolonialofficersandgovernors,aswellasproponentsof
empireinEuropeancapitals.Buthowweretheycarriedoutinpractice?Evenasthe
overarchingaimsofandjustificationsforcolonialismshiftedfromatransformativelogicto
apreservationistone,empirically,imperialstrategiescontinuedtovaryacrossandwithin
territoriesthroughoutthecolonialperiod.2
Scholarsworkingindifferentdisciplineshaveaddressedthisvariationinopposing
ways.Politicalscientistsandsociologists,particularlythoseconcernedwiththelegaciesof
colonialrule,havetendedtotreatthecategoriesofindirectanddirectruleasempirical
realities,codingcolonialterritoriesbyusingmeasuresdesignedtocapturethedirectness
ofcolonialrue.3Incontrast,inrecentwork,historianshavequestionedthecorrespondence
betweenthesecategoriesandactualcolonialpractice,arguingthatindirectanddirect
strategieswereoftenlargelyrhetorical,capturingcolonialaspirationsandjustifications
ratherthanday-to-daycolonialgovernance.Inpractice,colonialofficersand
administratorsweretoobusyrespondingtoimmediatechallengesandconcernsto
implementaconsistentoverarchingstrategy,andthusmuchofcolonialruledepended
upontheman-on-the-spot.Inthisview,therewasfarmorevariationinrulingstrategies
thanthetermsdirectandindirectruleimply.4
2SeeHerbst(2000,81–89)ontheextenttowhichcolonialapproachesvariedacrossAfrica,regardless
ofwhichEuropeanstatewasincontrol.
3Forexamples,seeGerringetal(2011);Hariri(2012);Lange(2004);Wucherpfennigetal(2015).
4SeeAgeron(1991,22);Porch(1982),addcites.Herbst(2000,82)alsoemphasizesthedifference
betweencolonialtheoryandpractice:“somuchof“colonialscience”wasmadeupinthefaceof
particularexigenciesandoftenbythemanonthespotratherthaninthecolonialcapital,muchlessin
Europe…Thehallmarkofcolonialtheorieswastheirextremeflexibilityattheexpenseoftheory.”
3
Oneoftheaimsofthisprojectistoadjudicatebetweenthesecompeting
understandingsofhowcolonialgovernanceoccurred,drawingoninsightsfromboththe
recenthistoricalandsocialscientificliteratures.Fromthehistorians,Itakethepointthat
characterizationsofdirectandindirectruledonotcorrespondwellwithcolonial
governance.Indirectanddirectcharacterizationsobscureavarietyofdifferent
arrangementsthatcolonialactorsreachedwithlocalpopulations.Itisinaccuratetoposit
thatvariationincolonialstrategycanbemeaningfullyplottedalongasingledimensionof
thedirectnessofcolonialintervention.Inthenextsection,Iexaminetheconceptsofdirect
andindirectruleandtheirusageinthesocialscienceliterature,andarguethatgreater
attentionneedstobepaidtothespecificandmultiplewaysthatcolonialstrategiesvaried.
Yetcolonialrulewasunlikelytobeashaphazardashistoriesofparticularcasesmay
suggest.Thenotionthatcolonialagentshadtorespondtolocalactorsandconditionson
thespot,withoutmuchguidancefromafar,isausefulcorrective,forpreferencesfor
indirectordirectrulehadtobeinterpretedandmodifiedtothesetting,andlocal
populations’responsesandreactionsdoubtlessshapedthewillandcapacityofcolonial
actorstoact.Theconstraintsandpressuresthatcolonialagentsfacedmay,however,have
beensimilarinmanysettings,makingitpossibletoformulategeneralclaimsabouthow
andwhycolonialapproachesvariedovertimeandplace.Thispaperthusdrawsfromwork
onthepoliticaleconomyofcolonialism;likethosepapersitproposestestableexplanations
forvariationincolonialstrategiesofrule.
Iarguethatunderstandingthisvariationrequiresinvestigatingthepoliticsofthe
period.Specifically,imperialstrategieswereoftenafunctionofcompetitionandconflict
amongdifferentactorswithincolonialstates.Colonialrulerswerenotaunifiedgroup,and
4
Iexaminehowdisagreementsbetweenmilitaryandcivilianofficers,betweenthoseinthe
coloniesandthoseinthemetropole,andamongthosewithdifferentpoliticalorientations,
ledtoparticularviewsabouthowcolonialruleshouldoperate.Inaddition,Isuggestthat
securityconcernsaffectedcolonialstrategy.Ilookathowcolonialviolenceandfearsof
rebellionaffectedthechoicesofcolonialactorsandtheirwillingnesstoempower
indigenousleaders.
Theseargumentsdifferfromtheexistingliterature,whichclaimsthatstrategiesof
indirectrulewereemployedwhereverfeasiblebecausetheywerecheaperandmore
acceptabletolocalpopulations,whiledirectruleoccurredwheretherewerenumerous
settlersandweakpre-existingstateinstitutions.Colonialpolitics,Iargue,weremore
importantinshapingthetypeofrulethantheattributesofthecolonialterritoryitself.
IdrawprimarilyonthecaseofAlgeriatoillustratetheplausibilityofmyarguments
andthelimitsofexistingexplanations.TheAlgeriancaseisusefulintworespects.First,the
Algeriancasedemonstratesthedifficultiesofcharacterizingasinglecolonyasgovernedby
eitherdirectorindirectrule.TheFrenchhaveoftenbeenassociatedwithdirectrule,in
contrasttotheBritish,whoaresaidtohaveruledmoreindirectly.AlgeriawasFrance’s
prizecolonyandthelevelofinterventionwasextremelyhigh.Itisoneoftheparadigmatic
casesofdirectrule.IfAlgeriacannotbeadequatelycategorizedasacaseofdirectrule,it
raisesthequestionofwhichcaseswouldcount.Second,theAlgeriancase,withitslengthy
andcomplexcolonialexperience,providesanopportunitytoconsiderthemeritsof
competingexplanationsfordifferentcolonialstrategies.ThediscussionofAlgeriais,
5
however,preliminaryandincomplete.5Thepurposeistoprovideaninitialexaminationof
empiricalevidenceatanearlystageofthisproject.
Thenextsectiondiscussesconcepts.Thesecondsectionlooksatsubnational
variationincolonialapproachesinAlgeria.Thethirdsectionlaysoutthetheoryand
hypotheses.
I.
Concepts:DirectandIndirectRule
Theliteraturesuggeststwowaystoconceptualizedirectandindirectrule.Thefirst
reflectsthetheoryofindirectruleaslaidoutbythecolonialiststhemselves.Itseesindirect
ruleaslessdisruptivethandirectrulebecauseitpreservedlocaltraditionsandpractices
byworkingwithalready-existingauthorities.Incontrast,directruleimposedEuropean
leaders,laws,andinstitutionsonindigenouspopulations.Indirectanddirectrulethushad
oppositeeffectsonpre-colonialstructuresofpower:indirectruleaimedtopreservethem,
whiledirectrulewasintendedtoeradicateandreplacethemwithanewcolonialorder.
Againstthisview,MahmoodMamdani(1996)arguesthatindirectruledidnot
preservepre-colonialauthoritybutwasinsteadjustasdisruptive,ifnotmoreso,than
directrule.“Inspiteofitsclaimstobeingamorebenignformofrule,onethattendedto
reproduce“nativecustom”inapermissivefashion,indirectrulewasthemorehegemonic
assertionofcolonialpower.Unlikedirectrule,itaimedatchangingthepreferencesofthe
massofthecolonized,notjustanarrowelite”(Mamdani1999,862).Indirectrule,
Mamdaniargues,didnotmaintainlocalauthorityasithadexistedbeforecolonialconquest,
5Atthisstage,IamworkingonanalyzingarchivaldatacollectedattheArchivesNationalesd’OutreMer
inAix-en-Provence,withfurtherdatacollectiontooccuroverthenextyear.Ilaidoutmyresearchplans
andinitialhypothesesinLawrence(2016).
6
butaltereditbyempoweringlocalleadersinspecificways;itmadetheirauthoritylike“a
clenchedfist”(ibid.,874).Mamdani(1996)thuscharacterizeddirectandindirectruleas
“centralizeddespotism”and“decentralizeddespotism.”
Mamdani’sclaimsraiseimportantquestionsforexistingcharacterizationsof
colonialrule:cantheexistenceandcontinuationofpre-colonialtraditionsandleadership
betakenasagiven,aspartofwhatdefinesindirectruleandsetsitapartfromdirectrule?
Ordidindirectrulealter,notpreserve,priorformsofpoliticalauthorityasMamdani
suggests?Ifso,howdiddirectandindirectrulediffer?
Numerousstudiestaketheviewthatcontinuityfromthepre-colonialerasets
indirectruleapartfromdirectrule.ScholarsofcolonialNigeriaoutlinedseven
characteristicsthatdefineindirectrule,thefirstofwhichisthecontinuityoftheprecolonialdynasty(inFisher1994,5).Herbst(2000,83)arguesexplicitlythatMamdani
overstatedtheextenttowhichBritishindirectruledisruptedpre-colonialarrangements,
writing:“Insomeways,theBritishmanagedtoduplicatemanyaspectsofpre-colonialrule,
includingtheincompletedominationofthesubjectpopulationthatwasinevitablewhen
foreignerstriedtorulethroughlocalstructures.”Recently,Gerringetal(2011)have
offeredathoroughanalysisofdirectandindirectrule.Theyarguethatindirectrulewas
morelikelytobeemployedwherestate-likestructuresofauthorityalreadyexisted.They
conceptualizeindirectanddirectruleasacontinuum,ratherthantwodistincttypes.This
continuumrepresentstheamountofpowerdelegatedtolocalintermediarieswhorulefor
apowerfulcentralactor.Theydefineindirectruleas“amoredecentralizedframeworkin
whichimportantdecision-makingpowersaredelegatedtotheweakerentity”(Gerringet
al.2011,377).
7
Notably,thesestudiescharacterizetheroleoflocalintermediariesdifferentlythan
Mamdanidoes.ForGerringetal,amongothers,indirectruleimpliespower-sharingwith
localelites,whileunderdirectrulepoweriscentralizedinthecolonialadministration.In
contrast,Mamdaniarguesthatthepowerofintermediariesstemsnotfromtheirpreexistingstatus,butfromtheirrelationshiptotheEuropeancolonialstate.Indirectruleis
notaconcessiontothepoweroflocalelites,butservestocreateandaugmenttheirpower.
Putotherwise,forGerringetal,thepoweroflocalelitescausesthemtobecome
intermediaries,whileforMamdani,itistheirroleasintermediariesthatcausesthemto
becomepowerful.
Thetensionbetweentheseaccountsliesintheirrespectivedefinitionsofindirect
anddirectrule.ForMamdani,independentauthoritywasnotthedefiningfeatureof
indirectrule.ForGerringetal,thepoweroflocalleadersvis-à-vistheconqueringpoweris
definitional:greaterindependentauthorityimpliesindirectrule,greaterdependenceon
theconquerorimpliesdirectrule.AlthoughGerring’setaldefinitionisintuitive,
parsimonious,andpermitsvariationalongacontinuum,Isuggestthatitisproblematicin
threeways.
First,atapracticallevel,itisdifficulttooperationalize.Thepoweroftheeliteswho
ruledonbehalfofcolonialpowersvariedtremendouslyinwaysthatarenotcapturedbya
singlecontinuum.6Forinstance,localrulerscouldhaveindependentauthority,yet
6Recognizingthetremendousempiricalvariationinindirectrulearrangements,Naseemullahand
Staniland(2014)offeratypologyofindirectruleinwhichthepoweroflocalintermediariesvaries.They
describeasuzerainsystem,inwhichlocalrulersmaintainahighdegreeofautonomy,adejuresystem,
inwhichthestatemonopolizesimportantfunctionsbutdelegatescoercivepowerstolocal
intermediaries,andahybridsystem,inwhichthestateandlocalintermediarieshaveoverlapping
spheresofcontrol.Theytakeanimportantsteptowarddisaggregatingdifferentindirectrule
arrangements,butcasesmaystillmovebetweenthesecategories,renderingcategorizationdifficult.
8
exerciseitondifferentscales.AsHerbst(2000,81)writes,“insomeBritishareas,indirect
rulemeanttheappointmentofacouncilofelderswhosewritdidnotextendmuchbeyond
avillage,whileinotherareas,itmeanttherecognitionofanalreadypowerfulrulerwho
hadauthorityoverhundredsofthousandsofpeople.”Rulerscouldalsoexercisea
significantamountofpowerbutthenfindthemselvesdismissedbythecolonial
administration,whichretainedtherighttoremoveleaders.Fittingcasesontoacontinuum
ofpowerisnotaneasytaskiftheabilityoflocalleaderstoactindependentlyfluctuated
overtimeandspace.Measuresofpowerarealsodifficulttoobtainsincelocalrulers
exercisedpowersindifferentdomains,suchaspolicing,taxcollection,andthe
administrationofjustice.Measurementsofoneofthesemaynotreflecttheirpowerin
otherdomains.
Second,therequirementthatlocalleadershaveindependentauthorityomitscases
inwhichconquerorsruledvialocalleaderswhowerenotpowerfulbeforethecolonialera.
Gerringetalexplicitlydiscountindirectruleviachiefswhoarelargelycolonialcreations
fromtheirdefinition.ThewarrantchiefsinAfricaare,theysuggest,aformofpseudoindirectrulebecausetheyhavelittleindependentauthority.7Thispracticeofinstalling
chiefsispuzzling,however.IfGerringetalarerightthatthisisfakeformofindirectrule,it
raisesthequestionofwhytheBritishdidnotsimplyruledirectly.Whatusewerelocal
intermediarieswhodidnothavetheirownpowerbases?Whatdifferencediditmakethat
Moreover,liketheGerringetaldefinition,theimplicationthatdirectruleequateswithmorepowerfor
thestate,whileindirectentailspower-sharing,requiresempiricalvalidation.
7Thewarrantchiefsarenottheonlyexamplesofthis;Wucherpfennigetal(2015)positthatFrench
indirectrulewasdifferentfromBritishindirectrulebecausechiefswhoworkedwiththeFrenchtended
tohavelessindependentpowerthanthechiefsinBritishcolonies.Ochono’s(2014)studyofMiddleBelt
NigeriaalsoshowsthattheBritishoutsourcedcolonialruletoHausa-Fulanioutsiders,ratherthanusing
localchiefsorrulingdirectly.
9
rulerswerelocalsratherthanEuropeansiftheiractionsweredictatedbythecolonial
power?ForGerringetal(2011,388),thiswasamisstep;anattempttoconstructindirect
rulewhereitcouldnotsucceed.InMamdani’sframework,thesechiefswereuseful,not
becauseofanypriorlegitimacyorpower,butbecausethecolonialpowers’delegationof
themaschiefswasitselfasourceofpower.Reconcilingtheseviewpointsrequires
consideringwhyEuropeanssometimesworkedthroughleaderswithminimalindependent
authority.
Third,andperhapsmostimportant,definingindirectruleasapower-sharing
arrangementeffectivelyassumesawaysomeofthemostinterestingandpressingquestions
aboutwhatitwasthatindirectanddirectrulewereintendedtoaccomplish.Ifwetake
Mamdani’spositionseriously,directrulemaynothavegiventhecolonialstatemorepower
overindigenouspopulationsthanindirectruledid.Indirectrulemayhavebeena
particularlyeffectivewaytoextendEuropeanpowerandachievecolonialobjectives,orit
mayhavebeenaconcessiontoexistingpower-holders,asGerringetalsuggest.Mediating
betweenthesepointsofviewrequiresaninvestigationintothereasonswhyparticular
colonialactorsadvocatedfordirectorindirectrule.Italsorequiresabetterunderstanding
ofthepowersofandconstraintsonthelocalintermediarieswhoruledonbehalfof
Europeanstates.
ItiseasytoseewhytherelativepowerofEuropeanandindigenousactorshasbeen
consideredanimportantdifferentiatingcharacteristicbetweendirectandindirectrule.
Continuitywithpre-colonialtraditionsandthepreservationoflocalauthoritywasthe
overarchingtheoreticalgoalarticulatedbythecolonialiststhemselves.Butitisamistake
totaketheirwordforit;inpractice,thiscontinuitywasvariable.Ratherthanaccepting
10
eitherthatcolonialrhetoricaccuratelydescribedarrangementsonthegroundorthat
indirectrulealteredandaugmentedthepoweroflocalelites,itmakessensetothinkof
theirpowerasavariable,notadefiningfeatureofonetypeofcolonialrule.Empirically,
bothGerringetalandMamdaniarecorrect;colonialrulersdidsometimessharepower
withlocalelites,butothertimes,theyempoweredlocalactorswhowereoutsidersorwho
hadlittlepriorauthority.
Ifwerejectaconceptualizationbasedonpower,andturnthedisruptivenessof
colonialruleintoaquestionratherthanadefiningfeature,howthenshoulddirectand
indirectrulebedefined?Definingthesetermsiscomplicatedbecausetherearemultiple
dimensionsalongwhichindirectanddirectrulearesaidtodiffer.Onecommon
understandingofthedifferencebetweenthemistheuseoflocalsincolonial
administration.Somehavesuggestedthatanyuseoflocalsqualifiesasindirectrule,8but
placescommonlyconsideredunderdirectrulealsoemployedlocalsasinterpreters,clerks,
andtaxcollectors;theyreporteddirectlytothecolonialadministrationbuttheyalso
sometimeshadconsiderableindependentauthorityandinfluence.9Useoflocalswas
ubiquitousinthecolonialperiod,sobythisdefinition,fewcaseswouldcountasdirectrule.
Itmaybemoreaccuratetosaythatitisnotthegeneraluseoflocals,butwhetheror
nottheyaregivennominalrecognitionasleaders.10Nominalrecognitiondoesnotimply
thatleaderswieldaparticularamountofpower,butitdoesacknowledgethemasofficial
8SeethediscussioninFisher(1994,5–6).Doyle(1986)suggeststhatunderdirectrule,onlythelowest
levelsoftheadministrationareentrustedtoindigenousactors.
9Onthis,seeDerrick(1983),whonotesthatclerkssometimesheadedcolonialofficesduringlong
absencesbyEuropeanstaff;theyalsohadconsiderableprestigeandaccesstoinformationthatthey
couldleverageoverbothcolonialadministratorsandthelocalpopulation.
10Fisher(1994,6–7)writesthattheexternalpowerrecognizes,atleasttosomedegree,thesovereignty
ofthelocalstate.
11
authoritiesdesignatedbythecolonialpower.Thiscriterionsetsaparttheemploymentof
localsfromtheirdesignationasleaders;underdirectrule,localsmaybeemployedand
delegatedspecifictasks,butthenominalrulersareEuropeans,eveniflocalssometimes
standinontheirbehalf.
`Anothercommoncriteriontodistinguishindirectfromdirectruleisthesystemoflaw.
Directrulesuggestsasinglesystemoflawsetbytheoccupyingpower.Thatsystemdoes
notimplyfairnessorrights;itoftenestablishedunjustlawsforindigenouspopulations,but
itwasacentralizedlegalstructure.Legalpluralismcharacterizesindirectrule.Areasof
indirectrulearegovernedbycustomarylaw,whichmaydifferfromregiontoregion,or
eventribetotribe;thelegalcodeoftheoccupyingpowerisreservedforEuropeansand
selectothers(Mamdani1996,17).
IfitwerethecasethatplacesclearlyfellundereithercustomaryorEuropeanlaw,
thiscriterionwouldbeusefulforcodingandclassification.Indeed,statisticalworkhas
oftenusedcustomarylawasanindictorofindirectrule,regardlessofhowitisdefined(see
Gerringetal.2011;Hariri2012;Lange2004).Yet,customarylawoftengovernedsome
domainswhileEuropean-basedlawgovernedothers,orcustomarylawwasalteredsuch
thatitwasnot,infactcustomary.Forexample,Lewis(2013)showshowthedecisionto
havedifferentlegalsystemsforTunisiansandFrenchcitizensinTunisiaunderthe
protectoratewasexceedinglydifficulttoimplement,andendeduprequiringasignificant
FrenchpresenceinthecourtsthatweresupposedtoberunbyTunisiansforTunisians,
renderingproblematictheideathatthisformofrulewasmeaningfully“indirect.”The
troublewasthatdiscerningwhocouldandcouldnotbeconsidered“French”or“Tunisian”
itselfrequiredadjudication,asclaimantsmanipulatedidentityclamsinordertoappearin
12
thejudicialsystemthattheypreferred.Inpractice,decidingwhetherandwhenthereisa
customarylegalsystem,versusaEuropeanlegalsystem,maybedifficulttodetermine,and
manycasesmayhavebothtypesofsystemsdependingontheregion,areaoflaw(criminal
versuscivilforexample),orconstituentstatus.
Otherinstitutionsmayalsobeimplicatedincommonunderstandingsofdirectand
indirectrule.TheextenttowhichthepoliceareEuropeanorindigenous,therationof
Europeanpersonneltoindigenouspersonnelinthecolonialadministration,thesystemof
education,andthepresenceofEuropeansettlercommunitieshavealsobeendescriptively
linkedtothetypeofcolonialrule(Hechter2013;Hechter2000).
Insum,theconceptsofindirectanddirectrulearenoteasilydifferentiablealonga
singleaxisofthe“directness”ofcolonialoversight.Itisnotjustthenamingofindigenous
actorstoleadershippositionsthatsetsareascommonlyconsideredunderindirectrule
apartfromareaslabeleddirectrule.Theinstitutions–legal,criminal,andadministrative–
mayalsodiffer,andtheremayormaynotbeasignificantEuropeanpopulation.
UnderstandingthecausesandeffectsofEuropeanstrategiesthusrequiresgreater
specificityaboutwhatpreciselydifferedacrosscolonialspace,sothattheconsequencesof
specificcolonialpoliciescanbeconsidered.Thenextsectionillustratessomeofthese
issuesthroughdiscussingcolonialAlgeria.
II.
MilitaryandCivilianRuleinColonialAlgeria
FrenchcolonialruleistypicallyconsideredmoredirectthanBritishcolonialrule.
TheFrenchcolonialmodelwasexplicitlyinterventionist.Francehadacivilizingmission:it
aimedtoassimilateitscolonies.Further,France’sJacobincentralizingpoliticaltradition
meantthatcolonialadministrationwouldbedirectedfromthecenter(Kudo2010,21).
13
Algeria,France’smostimportantcolonialterritory,wasnotjustacolony,butconsideredan
integralpartofFranceitself.In1848,thethreedivisionsofBone,Constantine,andAlgiers
weredesignatedFrenchdepartments,likedepartmentsinFrance.Algeriaisacasethatwe
mightexpecttobeeasilyclassifiableasdirectrule,butthissectionshowsthatcolonial
governancevariedovertimeandplaceinAlgeria,makinganassertionofthetypeof
colonialrulefortheentirecolonyinaccurate.LargeareasofAlgeriaweregovernedinways
thatwetypicallythinkofasindirect,andthetypeofrulevarieddependingonwhowasin
charge.Further,controlfromthecenterwasnotuniformandcolonialofficers,settlers,and
civilianleaderswereabletoactindependently,sometimesignoringdirectivesfromthe
centeroractingontheirowninitiative.
AlgeriaundertheJulyMonarchy,1830-1848
France’sfirstdecadeinAlgeriawascharacterizedbyuncertainty(Lorcin1995).
Proposedpoliciesintheearlyyearsincludedwithdrawal,alimitedoccupationofcoastal
citieswithnativechiefsgoverningtheinterior,exterminatingorexpellingindigenous
populations,andfullconquest.
ForseveralyearsafterthecollapseofCharlesX’sregime,thegeneralsinAlgeria
werelargelylefttoformulatetheirownpolicies,althoughtheywerefrequentlyrecalled–
thereweretendifferentgovernor-generalsduringthefirstdecade.Theseearlygovernors
tookdifferentactionstowardtheindigenouspopulation.Thesecond,forexample,General
Clauzel,soughttoworkwithMuslimchiefswhohehopedwouldassisttheFrench;he
proposedinstallingTunisianbeystoruleatOranandConstantineandsignedasecret
treatywiththeTunisianrulingfamilybeforebeingrecalled(Ageron1991,11).General
Savary,thefourthgovernor,andaformerministerofpolice,usedmoreviolenttactics,
14
exterminatinganentiretribe,assassinatingseveralArabchiefs,andrulingbrutallyinthe
townofAlgiersbeforedyinginoffice(ibid).Subsequentgovernorsoscillatedbetween
brutalityagainstindigenousgroups,andformingallianceswithlocalleaders.Thistwinuse
ofviolenceontheonehand,anddelegationtolocalauthoritiesontheother,became
characteristicofmilitaryruleinAlgeria.
GeneralBugeaud(governorfrom1841-1847),initiatedasystematicapproachto
nativeadministrationwhenhere-establishedtheDirectionofArabAffairsin1841.
Bugeaudinitiallymeanttomodelthemanagementoftheindigenouspopulationafterthe
Ottomanmakhzansystem.ButDaumas,thedirectorofArabAffairs,studiedtheexisting
administrationofAlgerianleaderAbdel-Kader,andpersuadedBugeaudthatasystemof
indirectgovernmententrustedtoArabchiefsfromthemilitaryandreligiousnobilitywas
thebestexampletofollow:“Thearistocracystillhavegreatpowerandinfluenceoverthe
natives,andmustalwaysbegivengreatconsideration”(inAgeron1991,22).Themilitary
thusdidnotabolishtheprevioussystemofgovernment,buttookovertheorganizationit
hadfound(ibid.,23).
TheDirectionofArabAffairsoversawlocalbureauxarabes,whichwerecharged
withadministeringtheindigenousAlgerians.EachincludedFrenchandindigenous
personnel:FrenchmilitaryofficerswhospokeArabic,knewthearea,andcoordinatedwith
thecadi(localjudgeandnotary),khodja(arabsecretary),andFrenchandindigenous
soldiers.ThepurposeoftheArabaffairsbureauswas“abovealltoassuresecuritythrough
intelligencecollection,surveillance,andtiestonotables.”11
11CAOM,Gouvernementgénéraldel'Algérie.Bureauxarabesdel'Oranie-Registres(1841/1913),
histoireadministrative.
15
TheFrenchofficersofthebureauxarabesactedasintermediariesbetweenthe
Frenchmilitaryleadershipandthenativechiefs(Ageron1991,23).KnownasArabists,
theyspokeArabic,claimedknowledgeoflocalpeopleandcustoms,andtendedtohave
experienceinAlgeria.Theysawthemselvesasvastlymoreenlightenedwhenitcameto
indigenousadministrationthancivilianrulers.12
Civilianrulewastheexceptionduringthe1830-1848period;onlysmallurban
pocketswereunderciviliangovernment.Intheseareas,Frenchcivilservantsand
magistratesbehavedasiftheywereinFrance,applyingFrenchmetropolitanlaw.In1847,
civilianareasweredividedintocommunes,thebasicunitsoflocalgovernmentinFrance,
headedbymayorswhosesalarycamefromtaxescollectedfromthesubjectpopulation
(Ageron,26).BythetimeBugeaudleftin1847,therewere109,400settlersinAlgeria.Of
these,about15,000hadsettledinthemilitaryruledareasofthecountryside;therestlived
inthecitiesofthecoast(ibid.).Theseearlysettlershatedthemilitaryofficersofthe
bureauxarabes,whotheysawassidingwiththenatives(Ageron,24).
Themilitary’sapproachtonativeadministration,whichmorecloselyresembles
indirectthandirectrule,wasnottheonlystrategythemilitaryfollowedduringtheseyears.
Alongsidetheirclaimstounderstandandrepresenttheinterestsoftheindigenous
populationofAlgeria,themilitaryalsousedconsiderableforce.Bugeaudadvocated
conqueringAlgeria“byploughandbysword.”Accordinglyevenasadministrativeoffices
wereestablishedtoadministerlocalpopulations,theFrencharmyengagedinatrocious
actsofviolence.TheFrenchemployedatactictheycalled“razzia,”atermtakenfromthe
Algerianwordforraiding.Theyusedthetermtoimplythattheirattacksagainst
12OnthebureauxarabesandtheSaintSimonianideologythatguidedmanyofitsofficers,seeAbi-
Mershed(2010);Pilbeam(2013),add…
16
recalcitranttribeswereconsistentwithlocalnormsofviolence,butthelevelofbrutalityof
theFrenchpracticewentbeyondtheterm’soriginalusage(Gallois2013,2–4).In1845,
BugeaudcommentedontherecentasphyxiationofalocaltribebyFrenchsoldiers,“Itisa
cruelextremity,butahorrifyingexamplewasnecessarytostriketerroramongthese
turbulentandfanaticalmontagnards”(inBrower2009,22).
Themilitaryprincipleinplacewastheaggressiveuseofforcetooverwhelmthe
enemyandcrushresistance(ibid.,23).LieutenantColonelLucien-FrançoisdeMontagnac
described“howtomakewarontheArabs”inthefollowingway:Killallthemendownto
theageoffifteen,takeallthewomenandchildren,putthemonboatsandsendthemto
MarquesasIslands,orsomewhereelse;inaword,annihilateallwhowillnotgrovelatour
feetlikedogs”ibid.,22).DuringBugeaud’sterm,FranceexpandeditsreachintoAlgeria,
attackingtheresistanceleaderAbdel-Kader,towhomtheyhadearliercontemplated
delegatingpower(Ageron1991,18–19).
AlgeriaundertheSecondRepublic(1848-1851)andtheSecondEmpire(1852-1870)
Theperiodfrom1848to1870sawmultipleshiftsinauthorityinAlgeria,ascivilian
areasgrewandconsolidated,whilethemilitary’sauthoritywaxedandwaned.The1848
RevolutioninFrancebroughtinarepublicangovernmentthatsettlershopedwouldfavor
theirdesiretoexpandciviliancontrolofAlgeria.TheConstitutionof1848statedthat
AlgeriawasanintegralpartofFranceandpromisedtoextendthelawsofFrancetoAlgeria.
ItwasatthistimethatAlgiers,Bone,andConstantinebecamedepartments,thebasicunits
ofprovincialgovernmentinmetropolitanFrance.Ineachofthethreedepartments,there
wereareasundercivilianandmilitarycontrol.Inthecivilianareas,thedepartmentswere
dividedintoarrondissements(districts)andcommunes,justastheywereinmetropolitan
17
France(Ageron1991,29).Themilitaryzonesweredividedincerclesandcommunesand
thebureauxarabescontinuedtoshapepolicytowardtheindigenousAlgerians.
Withineachdepartment,therewerethreetypesofcommunes:communesdeplein
exercise,whichwerelargelypopulatedbysettlersandwereadministeredverysimilarlyto
communesinFrance,communesmixtes,wheretherewerebothsettlerandindigenous
populations,andcommunesindigènes,whichwerelargelyindigenous.Thisspatial
variationprovidesanopportunitytobetterunderstandthecausesandconsequencesof
differentcolonialapproaches.Sincethequestionhereconcernsthecolonialpolicies
towardindigenouspopulations,Iamparticularlyinterestedinthecomparisonbetween
mixedcommunesunderbothmilitaryandciviliancontrol.Iamstillintheprocessof
compilingsourcesonhowtheseareasweregoverned;belowIprovideapreliminary
discussionofthemotivationsofcivilianandmilitarycolonialagents.
In1852,NapoleonIIIcametopower,establishingtheSecondEmpireinFrance.
Withthereturnofmonarchy,themilitaryagaingainedtheupperhand.Inaletterwritten
in1863,NapoleonIIIstated“Algeriaisnot,strictlyspeaking,acolonybutanArab
kingdom.”Thisstatement,alongwiththeclaimthatthenativesofAlgeria,likethesettlers,
hadanequalrighttoNapoleonIII’sprotection,infuriatedthesettlers.13Thebureaux
arabesimplementedtheemperor’sprogram,establishingMuslimcourtsofjustice,
reopeningKoranicschoolsinmilitaryterritory,andintroducingArab-Frenchprimary
schoolsincertainurbanandtribalareas.Incivilianareas,settlerspushedbackagainst
policiesfavoringtheindigenouspopulation.Theymadestridestowardthepolicyof
13QuotedinAgeron(1991,38).
18
cantonnement,whichdelimitedpropertyrights.Inpracticethispolicyforcednative
Algerianstocedetheirlandstothestate.
Theinfluenceofthebureauxarabesbegandecliningafter1870,whenareasunder
militarycontrolbegantobetransferredtocivilianrule.In1875,therewere1,418,315
millionpeoplelivingundermilitaryrule,including7,055Frenchsettlers;while1,047,092
wereundercivilianrule,including136,826Frenchsettlers.By1902,numberofpeople
livingundermilitaryruleinthethreedepartmentshaddeclinedto588,691(andonly
3,245Frenchsettlers),whiletherewere4,134,534peopleunderciviliancontrol,including
354,884Frenchsettlers.14Thetransferofcommunesfrommilitarytocivilianruleprovides
anotheropportunitytoexplorethereasonsforandconsequencesofchangingcolonial
policies.
ThispreliminarydiscussionofthefirstfortyyearsofcolonialisminAlgeriashows
thattheFrenchapproachisnoteasilyclassifiableasdirectorindirect.TheFrench
implementeddifferentstrategiesindifferentplaces,andtheirapproachchangedovertime.
EventhoughAlgeriahasbeenconsideredaquintessentialcaseofdirectrule,theFrench
militaryempoweredlocalelites,retainedlawbasedonthesharia,andsupported
indigenouseducationinArabic.TheFrenchmilitaryalsoattackedsomelocalchiefs,rather
thanempoweringthem,engaginginhorrificviolenceastheconquestcontinuedintothe
Algerianinterior.Insomeareas,FrenchrulewasverysimilartoFrenchruleinFrance,with
metropolitanlawsandadministration,butthemajorityofthecountrywasundermilitary
rulethatdidnotincludemetropolitaninstitutions.Therewasnosingleoverarchinglogicof
colonialruleinAlgeria;themilitaryandcivilianshadapproachesthatwereatoddswith
14TableauGénéraldesCommunesd’Algérie,1875&1902.CAOM.
19
oneanother.Inthenextsection,Iconsiderwhyactors’approachestocolonialgovernance
differ.
III.Theory:Whofavoreddirectandindirectruleandwhy?
Competitionbetweenmilitaryandcivilianactorswascorefeatureofcolonialrulein
Algeria.Civilianadministratorsandsettlersinsistedthattheirapproachwassuperior,that
theultimategoalwastheadministrativeassimilationofAlgeriatothemotherland.15They
wantedtodestroythenativearistocracyandreplaceitwithaFrenchbureaucraticsystem.
Theyaccusedthemilitaryof“despotismbythesword,”pointingtothecontinuedreliance
onviolenceasaweaknessofthemilitary’sapproach.16Inresponse,proponentsofthe
military’sapproachdefendedtheuseofindigenouschiefsandthemaintenanceofnative
institutionsandpractices,decryingcivilianruleasineptandunjust.17GeneralHanoteau,an
officerofthebureauxarabes,criticizedthesettlersinthecivilianzones,stating,“Whatour
settlersdreamofisabourgeoisfeudalisminwhichtheywillbethelordsandthenatives
theserfs.”18BothsidespresentedthemselvesasbettersuitedtogoverningAlgeria;
defendingtheirownbureaucraticinterestsinthecolony.
15Theyfavoredadministrativeassimilationandtheimportofmetropolitanlawsforsettlers,notthe
assimilationofindigenousAlgerians;settlersvehementlyopposedcitizenshiprightsofAlgerians.On
theprospectsofassimilationforAlgerians,seeLawrence(2013).
16Forexamplesoftheseviews,see:Morsly,DocteurT.ConseillerMunicipaldeConstantine.
«ContributionàlaQuestionIndigèneenAlgerie.»Constantine:ImprimerieJéromeMarleetF.Biron,
1894CAOMB3932;«UnProgrammeAlgérien»DiscoursdeM.Marchal,vice-présidentduConseil
Générald’Alger,membreduConseilSupérieur.Alger:ImprimerieC.Zamith,1898.CAOMB7721;
Foucher,Vitor.LesBureauxArabsenAlgérie.Extraitdela«RevueContemporaine»t.XXXIV31
Octobre1857,pp.209-230CAOMB3931.
17See«Alger:SituationPolitique1860»GouvernementGénéralCivildeL’Algérie.BureauPolitiques.FR
ANOMGGA11H1;LeblancdePrébois,François(ex-représentantdel’Algérieen1848),«Bilandu
RégimeCivildel’Algérieàlafinde1871».Paris:E.Dentu,1872CAOMB7059.
18QuotedinAgeron(1991,39–40).
20
Twofactorshelpedshapewhetherthemilitaryorthecivilianleadershipdominated
atparticularpointsintime:thestanceofthegovernmentinParis,andthesecurity
situationinAlgeria.TheFrenchgovernmentchangedhandsoverthecourseoftheperiod;
withciviliansgenerallybettersupportedbyrepublicanactors,whilethemilitarywas
favoredbymonarchy.Butthisalonecouldnotgiveonepartytheupperhand.Akeyissue
wasalsotheongoingneedforsecurity,aconcernsharedbybothciviliansandthemilitary,
butwhichwastheprimaryjobofthemilitary.Rebellionsandthethreatoftherebellion
ensuredthatthemilitaryretainedanimportantroleingoverningAlgeria.
Butwhywasitthatthemilitaryfavoredastyleofrulethatmorecloselyresembles
indirectrule,whilethecivilianleadershipwantedtoimportFrenchinstitutions?This
sectiondevelopsageneralargumentfordifferentapproachestocolonialgovernance,
layingouttheimplicationsthatstillrequireempiricalinvestigation,bothinAlgeriaandin
additionalcases.
Indirectruleandthemilitary
Iarguethatindirectrulewasusefulforthemilitaryinpartbecausetheprimarytask
ofamilitaryengagedinconquestistoestablishorder.Securityistheforemostconcernfor
ageneralengagedinoperationsoverseas.Indirectrulehelpedsolvethisproblem:it
allowedcolonialmilitariestodelegatetheuseofforcetoindigenousleaderschargedwith
maintainingstabilityandpreventingdisorder.Disordercouldtaketheformofoutright
revolt,butitcouldalsoinvolvelessovertformsofresistance,suchastherefusaltoprovide
laborforcolonialprojectsortaxevasion.Bydelegatingauthoritytolocalrulers,the
actionstheserulerstookcouldbejustifiedasconsistentwithindigenouscultureand
traditions.Theabilitytopassoffthecoercionexercisedbylocalintermediariesasa
21
manifestationoftraditionconvenientlydistancedcolonialactorsfromthebrutalityof
colonialrule;itprovidedawaytodeflectdirectresponsibilityforcoercionthatwasuseful,
orinsomeinstancesessential,tothesuccessofthecolonialproject.
Byportrayingthecoerciveactsoflocalintermediariesasalamentableby-productof
indirectrule,colonialactorscouldaccountforviolencetodomesticaudiencesinthe
metropolewhooversawcolonialrulefromafar.Proponentsofindirectrulewerethus
carefultonottopubliclycondonetheuseofbruteforce,andEuropeansretainedthe
prerogativetoinvestigatesuch“abuses”whentheyoccurred.Inpractice,however,
brutalitywasexpectedtoaccompanyindirectrule.AsC.L.Temple,thelieutenantgovernor
innorthernNigeriafrom1914-1917explainedinNativeRacesandtheirRulers,“Toputthis
policyintoeffectmeansfirstofallthatyoumustshutyoureyes,uptoacertainpoint,toa
greatmanypracticeswhich,thoughnotabsolutelyrepugnanttohumanityarenevertheless
reprehensibletoourideas…youhavetomakeupyourmindthatmenarenotallequal
beforethelawandcannotbesotreated”(quotedinSmith1970,16).Inthisview,indirect
rule,withitsrelianceonmultiplesystemsoflawostensiblybasedontradition,requireda
degreeoftoleranceforunrestrainedleadership,uptoanunspecifiedpoint.
Theneedforcolonialofficialsto“shuttheireyes”tobrutalpracticescouldbetaken
toimplyanecessaryabsenceofaccountabilitythataccompaniedthedelegationofruleto
localleaders.Indeed,Gerringetal(2011,414)suggestthatindirectruleentailsatrade-off
betweenaccountabilityandtheeffectivenessoflocalrulers,writingthatinterferencemay
threatenthelegitimacyofthedesignatedrulers.Yetpracticesthatwerejustifiedas
unwelcomeaccompanimentstoindirectrulemay,infact,havehadutilityforcolonial
actors.Insteadofconceptualizingtheuseofforceasaproblemofaccountability,the
22
absenceofaccountabilityanddirectoversightcouldbeadvantageous,notonlybecauseit
distancedthecolonialpowerfromviolencecarriedoutbyintermediariesandallowedthem
toavoiddirectresponsibility,butalsobecausecoercionitselfwasusefulfordeterringand
dealingwithactsofrebellionandforjustifyingthecontinuedneedformilitaryoversight.
MartinThomas(2012,2)hasdirectedourattentiontotheutilityofpolicingforthe
economicaimsofcolonizingpowers,pointingtotheuseofrepressionagainstworkersin
industriesandplantations.Thisrepressionisnotaby-productofcolonialrule,butpartof
“whatcolonialpolicewerecalledupontodo.”Totakeanexample,incolonialGambia,the
Britishnotonlytoleratedcoercionbychiefs,theyexpectedchiefstowield“strongpowers”
inordertofullycontroltheirdistricts(Ceesay2014,29).
Militaryactors,byhabitus,arelikelytoprioritizeorderandtofavormethodsthat
reducerestrictionsontheuseofforce.Inareasofindirectrule,forcecouldbedelegatedto
localactors,butadditionally,indirectrulegavethemilitaryitselfsignificantfreedomof
action.InAlgeria,themilitarycarriedoutnumerousattacksonunconqueredareas,and
alsobrutallyputdownrebellionswhentheyoccurred.Theviolenceofthemilitaryin
Algeriastandsincontrasttotheirroleasthe“defender”oftheindigenouspeopleandthe
civilianclaimthatthemilitaryofficersinAlgeriaputthenativeaheadofthesettler.Itis
indeedremarkablethatFrenchmilitaryofficersbothbrutallyattackedandvehemently
defendedindigenouspopulations,andthisapparentcontradictionmakesmoresenseifw
positthattheabilitytowieldviolencewasamorefundamentalpartoftheappealof
indirectapproachesthanrespectforindigenousnormsandinstitutions.19
19OnekeyproblemthatconfrontedcolonialofficersinAlgeriawasthatalthoughtheywishedtorelyon
localchiefs,theirnotesandcorrespondencesuggestthattheyoftenhadtroublebelievingtheycould
trustlocalchiefsbecauseofthehistoryofFrenchviolenceinthecolonies.Thearchivessuggesta
23
Severalempiricalimplicationsfollowfromhypothesizingindirectruleasan
authoritarianprojectaimedatestablishingorder.First,theargumenthasimplicationsfor
thekindsoftraditionsthatmightbetoleratedunderindirectrule.AsSuzanneRudolph
(2005,9)writes,“traditionisnotanunbreakablepackage.”Customarylawcodifiedsome
practicesandomittedothers;colonialrulerslikewisetoleratedsomecustoms,but
outlawedothers,astheeventualabolitionofslaverysuggests.Theargumentheresuggests
thatindirectrulewouldtendtopermitelementsoftraditionthatwereusefulfor
maintainingautocraticcontrol.Therazzia,forexample,mentionedabove,was
appropriatedbytheFrenchandusedagainstrecalcitranttribes.Bugeaudstatedexplicitly
in1841thattherazziawas“systematizedbecauseofitsusefulness”(quotedinGallois,p.
3),suggestingthattheFrenchwereselectiveaboutwhichelementsof“traditional”culture
theyused.
Asecondimplicationisthatweshouldobservevariationinthekindsofcoercion
employed.Specifically,inareasthatwereruledmoreindirectly,colonialofficersandlocal
leadersshouldhavehadafreerhandtoengageinpracticessuchascollectivepunishment,
imprisonmentwithoutdueprocess,confiscationofproperty,andviolentpunishmentof
offendersthaninareasofdirectrule.Totakeadifferentexample,inGambiain1919,when
“theUpperSaloumChiefburntdowntheentirevillageatBantantoforcingitsinhabitantsto
seekrefugeinnearbyNianijadistrict,asubsequentinquiryexoneratedthechief.Itstated
thus:“Thecrimeswereverycommon,andwerenotcrimesintheeyesofhispeople…In
fact,theywerecommittedtoshow‘power’”(Ceesay2014,34).Inareasofdirectrule,the
lingeringsuspicionthatleadersmightdefectatanypointbecausetheconquesthadbeensobrutalthatit
wouldbedifficulttoforgiveandforget.
24
legalcodeinplace,includingtheNativeCodesthatestablishedpunishmentsspecificto
indigenouspeoples,shouldprovideamoreuniformsetofpenaltiesandrestrictions.
Athirdimplicationisthatindigenousleaderswhowerenotsignificantpowerholdersduringthepre-colonialeracouldstillperformaneffectiveintermediaryrole.The
opportunitytousecoercionundertheguiseoftraditionallowedleaderswhowere
appointedbythecolonialpowertoconsolidatecontrolevenwhentheylackedalegitimate
pre-colonialleadershiprole.Wemightexpectthattheseleaderswouldneedtorelyon
forcemoreheavilythanleaderswhoalreadyhadestablishedrolesbeforethecolonial
period,atleastinitially.Themovetoappointleaderswholackedtheirownindependent
powerispuzzlingforexistingaccountsofdirectandindirectrule,butifthepowersthat
theyweregrantedhelpedtoestablishtheircontrol,theycouldstillfulfillausefulrolefor
colonialactors.
CivilianAdministrationandDirectApproaches
AreaswherecivilianswereinpowerinAlgeriawerehardlymorebenevolentand
justthanareascontrolledbythemilitary.Thecivilianzoneswerenotviolence-free,butthe
formsofviolenceandtheytypesofpenaltiesthatAlgeriansfaceddiffered.
Myargumentisthatcolonialbureaucratsandsettlersconceptualizedorder
differentlythanthemilitarydid.Forthem,ordermeantruleoflaw.20Themissionof
colonialbureaucratsdifferedfromtheirmilitarycounterparts;forthem,thekeygoalwas
toinstallanadministrationcapableofgoverningnewlyconqueredareas.Thisimplied
20AsThomas(2012,7)arguedforcolonialpoliceofficersacrossEuropeancolonies,differentactorsmay
havetheirownstandardsforhowtheworldoughttobe.
25
implementingabureaucraticstructurethatwouldroutinizeandregulaterelationsbetween
Europeansandthecolonializepopulation.21
Thisunderstandingoforderdidnotimplyrightsforthecolonizedpopulation.Often,
itcarriedwithitasetoflegalpenaltiesandrestrictionstargetedspecificallyatthenative
population.ItprovidedrightstoEuropeansinthecolony,butestablishedaninferiorlegal
statusforthewiderpopulation.Settlersthushaveoftenbeenassociatedwiththe
establishmentofdirectrule;theywereeagertomaintaintheircitizenshiprightsand
preventtheconqueredpopulationfromgainingsimilarrightsinordertopreservetheir
privileges.Bothsettlersandadministratorscanbeexpectedtofavortheinstallationofa
legalcodethatwouldofferuniformityandclearlydelineatethelawsgoverningbehavior.
Theestablishmentofaunifiedlegalcode,withrightsforEuropeansandselected
groupsamongthecolonized,affectedtheformofcollectiveactionthatoccurredin
responsetocolonialrule.AsIhavearguedelsewhere,theinitialresponseofindigenous
activistsintheFrenchcolonieswastousethelegalcodetomakedemandsupontheFrench
administration.RebellionagainstcolonialismintheFrenchEmpirewasguidedbythelaws
andrightsinplace,asactivistspointedtothehypocrisyofasystemwhoseaimwasto
“civilize”nativepopulationsbutwhichrefusedtoextendtothemthesamerightsthat
Europeancitizensenjoyed.Activiststhussoughttoextendtherightsthatwereprovidedto
EuropeansettlerstothelocalpopulationandworkedtodismantletheNativeCodesthat
setthemapartfromEuropeans(Lawrence2013).Directrulewasthusnotalways
illegitimatebecauseoftheidentityofthecolonialrulers,butbecauseofthelawsandrules
thataccompaniedit.
21OnEuropeanwaysofseeingandbringingordertoacolony,seeMitchell(1991).
26
CompetitionandColonialGovernance
ThehypothesesIhaveoutlinedfocusontheinterestsofparticularcolonialactors.
Theyreflectinsightsfromhistoriansabouttheimportanceofstudyingtheinteractionsthat
occurredduringthecolonialperiod.Colonialpolicywasnotdecideduponinimperial
centersandthenimplementedsurgicallyfromabove.Colonialactorshadopposingideas
andintereststhatledtodivergentviewsabouthowcolonialgovernanceshouldbe
approached.Competitionbetweendifferentcolonialagentsledtoshiftsinstrategyover
timeandplace.Andtheactionsoftheindigenouspopulationalsomatteredbecausethe
prospectofrebellionempoweredsomecolonialactorsoverothers.
Theseargumentsdifferfromexistingexplanationsfordirectandindirectrulein
waysthatrequiregreaterelucidation.Theprimaryalternativesfocusontwofactors:the
costsofdirectversusindirectrule,andthesuitabilityofeachtypeofruleforparticular
locations.Indirectruleissaidtobelesscostlyandthereforemoreattractivetocolonial
powerslookingtoreducethecostofempire.Yetindirectrulecannotbeimplementedinall
settings;Gerringetal(2011),forexample,arguethatitisonlypossiblewherethereare
pre-existingleaderscapableofrulingfortheimperialpower.Forlackoftimeandspace,I
donotdiscussthesealternativeargumentshere.Itisworthwhiletoadd,however,thatIdo
notintendtosuggestthatthesefactorswerenotimportant,butthatthepoliticsofthe
periodmaybeequallycrucial,ifnotmoreso,forexplainingwhycolonialstrategieswere
adoptedandwhytheychangedovertime.
27
Conclusion&Implications
Thispaperhasofferedapreliminarylookatvariationincolonialgovernance,witha
focusoncolonialAlgeria.Itispartofanongoingprojectthatseekstoinvestigatedifferent
colonialstrategies,demonstratesubnationalvariationthatisoftenignoredinmacro
characterizationsofcolonialrule,andconsiderwhycolonialapproachesvaried.
Studyingindirectanddirectruleduringthelatecolonialperiodisimportantfor
understandinghowEuropeansruledoverdiversepopulationsatgreatdistancesfrom
imperialcenters.Recentscholarshiphasshownhowimperialiststhoughtaboutand
defendedbothformsofcolonialrule.22Myaimistocomparedifferentmodesofruleand
describehowtheyworkedontheground.
Thistopichasimplicationsforunderstandingtheeffectsofthecolonialperiod.The
ideathatcolonialrulehadlong-termconsequencesmakessense,giventhatcolonialrulers
oftenclaimedtobeinthebusinessoftransformation.Evenwherecolonialinterventions
weresupposedtobeindirectandlimited,rulersactedinwaysthatchangedlocal
economiesandpatternsofauthority.Agrowingbodyofworkhasfoundpersistentlegacies
ofthecolonialera.Directandindirectruleinparticularhavebeenlinkedtonationalist
resistance,theempowermentofprivilegedgroups,economicunderdevelopment,and
autocracy,23yetthemechanismsremainunclearbecauseknowledgeofanddataoncolonial
practicesislacking.Abetterunderstandingofhowimperialgovernancevariedcanpoint
topotentialproblemswithcurrentwaysofmeasuringandinterpretingcolonialera
variables.
22SeetherecentstudiesbyMantena(2010)andPitts(2009).
23Forrecentexamples,seeAcemogluetal(2014);Hariri(2012);Hechter(2000;2013);Kohli(2004);
Lange(2004);Wucherpfennigetal(2015).
28
Further,strategiessuchasindirectrule,ordivide-and-rule,continuetobeinvoked
incontemporarycasesofoccupationandstateexpansion.24Thisprojectsuggeststhatthese
approachesareunlikelytobeimplementedinthewaysthatproponentsenvision.Indirect
rulemaynotbeeffectivebecauseofitsuseofindigenousleaders,asissooftenassumed,
butbecauseoftheviolencethataccompanieditsapplication.Acloserlookatthecolonial
periodmaythushaveimportantlessonsforthestudyofcounter-insurgencyandconquest
morebroadly;bylookingatthegapbetweenwhatcolonialrulerssaidaboutwhatthey
weredoingandwhattheyactuallydid,itispossibletoidentifystructurallimitationsthat
thwartpolicyimplementation.
24SeeFisher(1994,3–4)andNaseemullahandStaniland(2014).
29
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