March 2014
CONTENTS
Substantive Issues…………2
Delegation Negotiating
Positions and Interests ........ 2
Lessons Learned…………..4
ABOUT PILPG
The Public International
Law & Policy Group
(PILPG) is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, which
operates as a global pro
bono law firm providing
free legal assistance to
developing states and states
in transition involved in
conflicts. To facilitate the
utilization of this legal
assistance, PILPG also
provides policy formulation
advice and training on
matters related to conflict
resolution. To date, PILPG
has advised over two dozen
countries on the legal
aspects of peace
negotiations and
constitution drafting, and
over twenty states and
groups in Europe, Asia and
Africa concerning the
protection of human rights,
self-determination, and the
prosecution of war crimes.
Water Security in the Euphrates-Tigris
Basin: Exploring Options for Cooperation
A Review of Lessons Learned From a Negotiation
Simulation
Water Security in the
Euphrates-Tigris River
Basin represents one of
the greatest challenges to
peace and security in the
region. Turkey, Iraq,
Syria, and Iran all
depend on the waters of
the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers for consumption,
agriculture, irrigation,
hydroelectric power and
other uses. Facilitating multilateral water management and cooperation
initiatives between the states is crucial to ensure peace and stability in the
basin. On March 19, 2014, the Public International Law and Policy Group
(PILPG) hosted a simulated negotiation designed to stimulate debate on
water security issues in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin and to identify
potential solutions and points of contention likely to arise in future
negotiations. PILPG designed the negotiation simulation according to the
methodology used by the United States Department of State’s National
Foreign Affairs Training Center. DLA Piper and New Perimeter generously
co-hosted the simulation at their Washington, D.C. office.
The negotiation simulation brought together various experts, practitioners,
and policymakers from the U.S. Government, U.S. military, NGOs,
academic institutions, and law firms to discuss the issue of water security in
the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. Participants played the roles of delegates
from Turkey, the Syrian Transitional Government, Iraq, the Kurdish
Regional Government, Iran, United States, the United Nations (UN) and the
Arab League. As members of these delegations, participants addressed and
negotiated several critical issues, including potential conflict resolution and
knowledge-sharing mechanisms, potential parties to participate in such
mechanisms, and water data transparency.
In order to facilitate the exercise and to remove
certain unknown variables, the negotiation
simulation made a number of strategic assumptions.
First, the simulation assumed that the negotiations
took place in March 2015, the conflict in Syria had
stabilized, and an internationally recognized Syrian
Transitional Government (STG) had been
established. The simulation did not specify the
composition of the STG. Furthermore, the
negotiation simulation assumed that a portion of
Northern Syria between the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers was under the semi-autonomous control of
the Kurdish Regional Authority (KRA). For the
purposes of the simulation, the KRA was not
formally recognized by any government, and had no
formal ties to the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) in Iraq. Additionally, the simulation assumed
that the security situation in Iraq had improved and
the central government was more stable, although
the issue of Kurdish autonomy remained.
mitigate the potential threat of conflict over
water in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin.
The negotiation simulation generated a number of
important lessons learned that may inform any future
international negotiations or proposals to help
mitigate water security risks in the Euphrates-Tigris
River Basin. The lessons learned from this
simulation are presented in this report and are solely
those of PILPG. Moreover, the views in this report
do not reflect those of DLA Piper or New Perimeter.
Parties to the Process: The delegations
negotiated the issue of which states or entities
would participate in the potential conflict
prevention mechanism. Additionally, the
delegations negotiated the capacity and
involvement of mechanism participants.
•
Transparency of Information: The
delegations negotiated the issue of greater
transparency and cooperation with regard to
technical information, including water
quality, water quantity, pollution, and
salinity.
D ELEGATION N EGOTIATING P OSITIONS
AND I NTERESTS
S UBSTANTIVE I SSUES D ISCUSSED
Each delegation’s overarching objectives and
strategies for addressing the potential conflict in the
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin shaped each
delegation’s negotiation strategy in the simulation.
The negotiation simulation centered around three
key questions. First, what could parties do to reduce
the risk of conflict? Second, who should participate
in a water security mechanism and in what capacity?
Third, how could modern technology and science
contribute to a possible solution? The U.S., United
Nations, and Arab League were assembled into one
negotiating delegation to serve as international
observers. There was no formal mediator throughout
the simulation.
Turkey
The Turkish delegation based its negotiating strategy
on the premise that Turkey has primary control of
the water resources in the basin as the upper riparian
state for both the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers.
The Turkish delegation sought to remain the primary
authority in the region through its historical water
management. Throughout the negotiation
simulation, Turkey argued that water security in the
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin was a bilateral issue
between Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iraq, respectively,
rather than a multilateral issue for the whole basin in
order to mitigate Syria-Iraq bargaining power. The
The working group negotiations addressed three
areas:
•
•
Conflict Prevention Mechanism: The
delegations negotiated the types of
mechanisms that could be established to
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Turkish delegation also attempted to keep
international involvement to a minimum. Turkey,
however, was motivated to allow some international
role because of the potential to achieve Arab League
observer status and European Union membership.
Additionally Turkey attempted to prevent the KRG
from participating in any official capacity in the
negotiations because the KRG is not a recognized
state, and because of historical tensions between the
Kurds and Turkey.
technical capacity to monitor and measure the
quality, quantity, and salinity of the Euphrates River.
This deficit of technical capacity caused the STG
delegation to try to cooperate with either Turkey or
the International Community for assistance and build
better relations.
Iraq and Kurdish Regional Government
The Iraqi delegation sought to address the issue of
Kurdish involvement in the negotiation process
before moving to a discussion of any substantive
issues related to water security. The Iraqi and KRG
delegations recognized that this particular
negotiation was not the appropriate forum for
discussing issues related to Kurdish autonomy, and
that their division would be used to the advantage of
other parties. Both entities agreed to participate as
one Iraqi delegation, but with the caveat that the
Kurdish contingent could separate from the Iraqi
delegation if its interests were not being adequately
represented. The KRG and the Iraqi government
agreed to future bilateral negotiations with Iraq
regarding autonomy and water resources,
particularly with regard to developing an agricultural
center in Kurdistan.
Syria Transitional Government
The STG delegation had two main objectives
entering the negotiations: (1) establish a conflict
prevention mechanism similar to the Nile Basin
Initiative, and (2) incorporate technical and
knowledge sharing capacity in the mechanism but
limit its decision-making power. Under the Nile
Basin Initiative model, the riparian states of the
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin would establish an
umbrella organization, under which separate
management organizations would focus on the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers. This model would allow
Turkey and the STG to work together on the issues
facing the Euphrates River, and Turkey, Iraq, the
Kurdish Regional Government, and Iran to work
together on issues facing the Tigris River. By
separating the rivers, and their respective
management issues, the STG delegation felt it would
have a stronger voice in matters on the Euphrates
River.
The Iraqi delegation aimed to create a multilateral
commission between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, but
would only negotiate with Iran on a bilateral basis.
The Iraqi delegation further emphasized the need for
technical assistance and an information-sharing
initiative among the three riparian states in the
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. In order to facilitate
Turkish support for this initiative, the Iraqi
delegation considered potential incentives it could
provide to Turkey, including oil and other petroleum
products.
Iran
The Iranian delegation aimed to pursue bilateral
negotiations with Iraq and not participate in any
potential multilateral venture based on skepticism of
international involvement in the region, its upper
riparian status in the Tigris tributaries, and its shared
border with Iraq. The Iranian delegation chose to let
the discussions unfold with minimal participation on
their part, and then approach Iraq after negotiation
sessions through backchannels on the possibility of a
bilateral arrangement. The Iranian delegation
Next, the STG delegation wanted to grant the
potential mechanism technical and knowledgesharing capacity, without any binding decisionmaking powers. The delegation recognized that
Syria, in its post-conflict phase, does not have the
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offered Iraq technical assistance and information
about the Tigris, as well as counter-insurgency
assistance. The Iranian delegation was hesitant of
any involvement by the International Community,
particularly on the part of the U.S. The delegation
therefore aimed to limit the participation of the U.S.
in the negotiations and in any future conflict
prevention mechanism. In addition to its mistrust of
Western interests, the Iranian delegation was keen to
stress its position as the regional economic and
military power, especially in relation to Iraq.
Offering strong incentives to Turkey, the upper
riparian, could be key to gaining leverage and
persuading Turkey to make a meaningful
contribution to the negotiations.
From the outset of the negotiation simulation, the
Turkish delegation took a firm stance that it had little
incentive to negotiate a multilateral agreement. The
Turkish delegation emphasized that it was in a
position of power due to its upstream position in the
Basin, as well as its economic, technological, and
military capacity. Without a delegation from the
European Union, there were few incentives that the
International Community or any of the participating
states could offer Turkey. The only potential carrot
that enticed members of the Turkish delegation was
the possibility of obtaining observer status with the
Arab League. However, some delegates expressed
doubts as to the real benefit of observer status and
the effectiveness of the Arab League as an entity.
The ability to offer Turkey incentives, particularly
incentives that would strengthen the path to
membership in the European Union, could help to
persuade Turkey to participate in meaningful
negotiations on water security.
International Community
The International Community was composed of
delegations from the Arab League, United Nations,
and U.S. The International Community agreed that
the best course of action was to create a UNsponsored knowledge sharing initiative based in
Turkey that would include Turkey, Syria, and Iraq as
full members and receive technical support from the
International Community. The International
Community stressed that the Initiative would not
have binding decision-making authority over
members and would be managed by a board of codirectors, composed of an equal number of officials
from each state. The U.S. delegation also voiced
support for the KRG playing a limited role in the
initiative. The International Community delegation
pushed this plan during backchannel discussions
with the STG, who then discussed the plan with the
Iraqi delegation.
Incremental information-sharing initiatives may be
a way to gradually build trust among the basin
states.
During the negotiations on water data transparency
and technology, the parties broke a deadlock by
expressing the sources of their distrust. The lower
basin states expressed a general distrust for Turkey
due to its lack of water data transparency throughout
history. Turkey expressed distrust with Syria
regarding its stability. Turkey was particularly
concerned that its information might be used for
illegal and even violent means by Syrian leadership
or other political parties. Turkey was also concerned
about U.S. involvement given its unauthorized data
collection on Turkey’s glaciers. After expressing
these concerns, the parties agreed that a phased
approach to data sharing would make sense. The
parties agreed that the details on the quantity and
quality of data sharing would be left to the technical
representatives. The parties also agreed to locate the
data collection center in Turkey.
The International Community proposed to have the
knowledge sharing initiative’s headquarters located
within Turkey, thereby granting Turkey a greater
position of prestige and influence as an incentive to
cooperate. The International Community also
stressed the importance of Turkey’s compliance with
European Union water management standards based
on Turkey’s interest in potential EU membership.
The Arab League delegation also offered to consider
Turkey’s potential observer status within the Arab
League as an incentive to participate in the
mechanism and share information.
LESSONS LEARNED
This simulation identified several issues that parties
seeking to establish a water management mechanism
in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin may consider:
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Considerations of historical relationships and roles
in water management could assist in developing a
coordinated regional effort in the Euphrates-Tigris
Basin.
The water security mechanism’s structure and
authority would dictate which parties will
participate and the extent of their authority and
involvement in the mechanism.
The Turkish delegation’s key argument throughout
negotiations was based on its historical management
of water in the basin. The Turkish delegation argued
that it has responsibly managed its water for
thousands of years, while Iraq, Syria, and Iran had
all been severely affected by political instability.
The Turkish delegation argued that its historical role
and relative stability made it best placed to make
water management decisions going forward. Iraq
and Syria needed to overcome recent instability and
build trust with Turkey to gain more influence in
water management.
One of the most challenging negotiation sessions
centered on which parties would participate in the
potential mechanism. In addition to the positions
and interests of the parties, negotiators also had to
overcome the added variable of not knowing the
specific structure or function of the mechanism.
Membership was further complicated by the
presence of the Iranian delegation and the Kurdish
Regional Government delegation. The Iranian
delegation opposed any involvement by the U.S., but
it offered few incentives to the other negotiating
parties for its own involvement. The Turkish
delegation similarly opposed any formal
involvement by the Kurdish Regional Government.
Thus the parties may consider which mechanisms
draw the most support and involvement from basin
states and which mechanisms would be less
favorable.
International technical and financial assistance is
an important component of regional informationsharing initiatives.
The international community and basin states set
forth proposals for how the international community
could facilitate the establishment and operation of a
regional data-sharing initiative, including through
technical assistance and financial support. The
international community could assist the states by
providing technology, training, independent experts,
and other resources. Syria, Turkey, and Iraq
acknowledged that some form of international
technical assistance would benefit regional efforts.
The PILPG Knowledge Management Initiative
PILPG’s Knowledge Management Initiative connects the community of peacebuilding practitioners with the resources
and training necessary to accomplish PILPG’s vision and strategic objectives related to peace negotiations and postconflict transition processes.
The Knowledge Management Initiative is designed to enable PILPG and the peacebuilding community to develop and
share best practices and lessons learned, enhance the capacity of strategic partnerships, and provide effective legal
assistance and policy planning through training programs, roundtables, negotiation simulations, and the distribution of
toolkits and handbooks.
To learn more about PILPG, please visit
www.pilpg.org
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