FIRST DRAFT
y
\
,
*
~
—
THE INTEGRATION OF AFRICA INTO THE WORLD CAPITALIST SYSTEM:
1800-1945
By Reginald Herbold Green
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means taking it away
from those who have a different complexion or slightly
fatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you
look at it too much. What redeems it is the idea only ...
and an unselfish belief in the idea ~ something you can set
up, and bow down before and o'ffer a sacrifice to ...
- Joseph Conrad, Heart of
Darkness
(1902)
The black man certainly has to pay dear for carrying the
white m a n ’s burden.
- George Padmore (1936)
The first raising of the metropolitan flags in the name
of civilisation and their last lowering in the name of
freedom were both attempts to make respec’
cs.d _l© "uh.e simpj.i
plan, That they should take who have the power. And they
should keep who can”.
- Douglas Brown, Sunday
Te 1egraph (19 75")
We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited
a great deal., we have been disregarded a great deal.
It is
our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited
and disregarded.
- Arusha Declaration (1 9 6 7 )
Three apparently methodological problems arise in treating
the colonial integration of Africa into the world capitalist system
These relate to coverage, timing and stance.
In fact they are mere
than methodological because the choices made do carry implications
as to what degrees of uniformity and homogeneity exist in substarw :
and importance (as well as appearance and artifactuality).
Over the period 1800-19*15 a strong case exists for including
Mediterranean Africa as well as sub-Saharan.1
In this period the
previous unities and interactions of the Mediterranean region were
I
*
ruptured and the colonial patterns introduced bear more than a
superficial resemblance on the two sides of the Sahara.
It is
perfectly true that colonial political economy required breaking
the earlier long distance trade links between North and. West Africa
and between East Africa and the rest of the Indian Ocean region
and the supercession of Egyptian and Zanzibari colonialism with
European.
However, it had the same pattern of destruction and
supplantation within sub-Saharan Africa at the long distance
intersociety, intercontinental, and even "short distance" levels
e.g. in Sahel/Savannah-Coast trade in West Africa and interregional
trade in East Africa; in the suppression of the Senegalese,
Ghanaian and Malagasy merchants' import export trade with Europe;
in the implantation of new retail networks both of European firms
like Unilever and CFAO and of new intermediate strata like the
Lebanese community in West Africa and the Indian in East.
Further,
where the same colonial power ruled territories in both North and
Subsaharan Africa (or on different shores of the Indian Ocean) new
trade patterns among these units (e.g. Mahgreb-AOF, AEF and IndiaEast Africa) were not inconsiderable.
From a political economic
perspective, tnerefore, a continental f r a m e s e e m s at least as
appropriate as a Subsaharan one.
The problem of timing is one common to all models using
analytical "stages" or categories and then applied to different
2
social and territorial units to examine the same time period.
First, the evolution of capitalism in the different colonial powers
was not uniform in time; therefore their demands on African
territories varied at any point in time.
Further, because their
domestic sub-class and production structures varied even over time
no 1:1 homogeneity of uses for colonies could emerge: e.g. Belgium
was never a major consumer goods exporter and this fact, reinforced
by the Congo Basin Treaty uniform tariff and market access
provisions,^ led to rather earlier attention to industrial production
there than in other non-settler colonies.
Second, at a second level
the precise nature of the colonial relationship (and especially the
number of expatriates) affected what type of production in colonies
was perceived as producing a surplus for particular capitalists and
the metropolitan power.
Third, the objective conditions - both
social and physical - of African territories influenced the timing,
nature and degree of their incorporation.
The problem of stance is a very real one.
To centre on
and from** the micro-level of an African society certainly puts
Africans at the centre but tends to lose an African and, much
more, a world perspective.
To centre on and from a continental
level has a danger of superficiality (or lack of portability)
and of treating Africa as either separate from or merely an
object of global dynamics.
To centre on global models of history
tends to lose Africans and reduce Africa to a minor case study both
because since the decline of the Islamic dominance of the
Mediterranean region global power centres have not been located in
Africa and because - with the exception of the period of the
slave trade - Africa has been far from being the most important
geographic region of the political economic periphery.
These problems are compounded by the racist element in the
colonial heritage.
The denigration of Africa in most pre-1960
historical writing available in the metropolis’ or in Africa has
led to a necessary countermovement to prove Africa, African
societies and Africans were not inferior nor radically different
from other continents, societies and people.
On the one hand
this can lead to rather over enthusiastic evaluations of a type
largely defunct in serious historiography elsewhere and to mis­
reading warped and basically dependent African states (e.g. the
Abcmey Kingdom) as a flowering of African genuis and on the other
to taking Africa quite out of world contexts except in the mechanica
sense of a victim to unexplained or facilely explained predatory
forces.
The historic fact that capitalism (at least industrial
capitalism) first emerged in and has subsequently been centred on
certain European and European settlement societies plus Japan" is
as relevant to ^he actual course of African history as the qqu a j. y
valid historic fact that African societies and polities not only
could but did undergo transformation and change prior to and during
the period of massive external intervention.
The difficulty lies in striking a balance and can be resolved
only in the context of a specific piece of analysis.^*
The title cf
this paper requires that a global model of capitalist metropolitan
expansion to the peripheral non-capitalist (or dependent capitalist’
societies serve as an underlying framework and that the main body
of material relates to metropolitan colonial (industrial) capitalist
penetration of Africa in terms of its effect on Africa and Africans.
'Portability and time both prevent detailed analysis of differences
among African societies and sub-regions.
II
By 1800 external penetration of Africa - basically European
7
capitalist or European capitalist dominated at one remove' - had
already created a combination of dependence, disintegration and/or
instability.
It Is true that because the mercantilist relationships
had not required large territorial bases (nor their African
articulation been seen as justifying conquest on the scale of the
"East Indian" chartered companies) the African physical presence
was scattered, tiny and apparently fragile.
That situation indeed
was to pertain except in parts of the Mahgreb and Southern Africa
g
until nearly the end of the 19th century.
However, the nature of
the penetration was much more pervasive and much stronger than it
appeared - a situation which in some of its variants is perhaps
usefully emphasised by the evocative term pre-colonial neo­
colonialism.
The penetration had several aspects:
a.
the slave trade had shattered some African societies,
strengthened and warped others and generally reduced the
level of productive forces;
b.
the aftermath of the decline (or post-1800 abolition) of the
slave trade had further altered African political and society
power and production patterns;
c.
the sale of
position of
arms had significantly improved the relative
the purchasers (whether in their own society or
vis a vis others);
d.
the coastal nature of European direct contact had in some
cases disintegrated coastal states (e.g. Kongo) and in others
been used by them to resist growing interior based states
(e.g. Farti-Ashanti conflict on Gold Coast);
e.
imports from Europe had both debilitated craft industries on
a local and an intraregional basis and weakened traditional
long distance links creating a degree of dependence on European
trade for the purchasers and seriously weakening groups
producing partly for,or involved in;the supplanted trade (e.g.
some Savannah societies in West Africa);
f.
European knowledge and technology had come to be seen as
superior at
least in many lines and there was a growing
demand for imported education, artifacts and production
methods as well as arms.
However, the imports tended to
be artifactual and partial, increasing dependence rather
than in a form readily incorporatable into the African
societies ;
g.
European direct long distance trade with the Far East and
the shift of the main global gold source to the Western
Hemisphere had similarly weakened the Mediterranean states
and partially reversed their evolution
in either productive
capacity or state structure terms.
By 1800 two eras in which
Africa had been of more central
concern to the European economy lay in the past.
Before 1500 Africa
(via North Africa) had been the source of the bulk of Europe’s
gold - a pattern relevant to the emergence of Italian mercantile
and financial capitalism.
Even after the opening of New World
sources, West Africa had been a significant secondary source for
a time but in 1800 that period was past and the South African
gold production centre was not yet established.
After 1500 the
slave trade had been critical to European mercantile capitalist
expansion and to the accumulation of capital for the industrial
and financial capitalist base.
Especially in the Caribbean and
Brazilian plantations and some Latin American mines/ production
depended on labour imports because the local population either
could flee the affected areas or died under the work regime.
The
triangular trade was one critical to Europe with West Africa and
the Caribbean very critical parts both of the periphery and of the
centre’s dynamic of growth.
By 1800 the slave trade was very
far from abolished (indeed the East African variant centring on
the Arab ruled Zanzibar state and that practiced by Mohammed Ali’s
Egyptian state against the Sudanic societies had not yet begun)
but it was no longer of central importance to European capitalism.
From the point of view of most elements in European capitalism
Africa had become a relatively minor part of the periphery.
Indeed
on balance the first half of the 1 9 th century was a period in which
European capitalist relations with the periphery were to centre on
existing settler colonies and ex-colonies and, to a lesser degree, on
Caribbean-Indian-East Indian plantation/mercantile colonies, rather
than on large scale opening up or acquisition of direct control over
new areas in Africa or Asia.
It would, however, be a mistake in
1800 or at any other point to treat world capitalist or even
- 0 ~
national capitalist interests in and attitudes toward Africa
as homogenous.
At the lowest level the "legitimate trade” houses
opposed the slave trade because it both damaged the labour
power and social organisation capacity for producing (e.g.) palm
oil and offered "unfair competition" by being more profitable to
African intermediary states or merchants.
More generally
capitalists directly involved in long distance trade with Africa
or with some particular market or supply connection there took a
*v
very different view of the costs of pre-colonial neo-colonial
support or colonial unit creation and maintenance than did others.
Until the latter quarter of the century the "African lobby" was
rarely composed of the dominant capitalist interests and what
state support it secured was both limited and probably more a
transfer payment to consolidate capitalist class solidarity than
a reflection of a real perceived interest in Africa by the
dominant capitalist groups.
Under these circumstances; many African societies and states
still retained a significant degree of autonomy and freedom to
manoeuvre in 1800.
The high point of the Ashanti state's advance
toward hegemony over the Gold Coast and Savannah zone areas
adjoining its forest base came in the 19th century as did the
attempted transformation of Egypt into an autonomous capitalist
economy with its own colonies under Mohammed Ali and the creation
of the Kwazulu empire in Southern Africa.
Even the more penetrated
and dependent states often adapted to "intermediary" roles rather
than collapsing or becoming abjectly dependent - the Fanti Con­
federacy and its member states' attempts to play off the European
powers and the Ashanti, the Merina monarchy's long sustained
attempt to use "modernisation" and an "open door" policy to keep
French colonialism at bay, and the new "Oil Rivers" trading states
of the Niger Delta are examples.
It is true that in retrospect the
first group of states and state building attempts were foredoomed
because they came too late to halt the globalisation of a Eurocentr:
capitalist system and too early to be fitted into it as inter­
mediaries and that the latter group of adaptations had set cut upon
a course of change in which the options open to them became steadil;
narrower but this was not evident to either the African takers or
European decision takers at the time.
- 7 *
<%»
h i
If o ne
accepts
t ha t m e r c a n t i l e
a growing
share
continued
to i n c r e a s e
1800-1850
a n d at
of A f r i c a ' s
t he
its
integration
capitalist
world
a.
system
there
time
and
takes
came
note
largely
three
a shift
into
form
colonialism
its
settler v a r i a n t ?
t his
shift
c.
Which metropolitan
benefitted from
extent
were
concentrated
capitalist
the
their
shift
gains
in
to its
variant
the p e r i o d
sub-classes
to c o l o n i a l
met
the i n d u s t r i a l
of E u r o p e a n p e n e t r a t i o n
its n e o - c o l o n i a l i s t
W hy was
t hat
a ri se :
and
b.
and
over
o f the f a c t
from dependency
and
1800
volume
subsequent
questions
in the
had dominated
trade by
absolute
of L a t i n A m e r i c a
independence
W hy was
capitalism
l o ng d i s t a n c e
share
same
the d i r e c t
political
..
to
1850-1910?
(or f o r m a t i o n s )
rule?
To w h a t
from increased exploitation
of A f r i c a n s
(absolute
or r e l a t i v e )
and
by internal
"transfer
payments" within
to w h a t
extent
the m e t r o p o l i t a n
economies ?
d.
What were
the
different
social
Three
to h a v e
a.)
main
reasons
results
s t r a ta ,
for
the
of
the
classes
shift
for A f r i c a n s
of
and f o r m a t io ns ?
transition
to c o l o n i a l
rule
appear
been d o m i n a n t :
the
imperialism
of f r e e
stronger
economic
into
territories
the
compatible
with
powers
However,
the
was
appropriate
more
less
France
in t h is
the
in
to the
context)
via client
by
who could establish
and
states
the
patterns
leading
was
and with
capitalist
relevant
period
Q
).
neo-mercantilism
of
the c a p i t a l i s t s
economies
be
(basically
so r e a d i l y
these w o ul d
capitalist
points
a n d f o rt s .
of
freely
of weaker)
could not
new contact
freedom
to e n t e r
interests
because
leading
trading posts
the
the
of e x c l u s i v e
advanced capitalist
be p e n e t r a t e d
existing
trade
of
the U K
imperialism
o f the
pursued
a nd s o c i e t i e s
interests
(primarily
(i.e.
and units
neo-colonial
the m e t r o p o l i t a n
economies
trade
Free
tend
to
s t a t e ’s t r a d e r s
to l e a p f r o g
trade
c o u l d be
- 8 -
imposed
on
and,
a degree,
one
to
(B ri t ai n,
weaker
to
really weak
F ra n c e
li nk s
trade
the
a combination
fanning
from
plus
its
enforcement
of
not
e.g.
against
under
a stronger
s om e
to m a i n t a i n
and
Belgium
therefore,
were
colonies
Br it a in was
out
powers
or G e r m a n y ) .
trade
over A f r i ca n
b ut
metropots
exclusive
their dependent
war
Portugal
capitalist
secure
colonial
short
pressure
or e x p a n d
of a E u r o p e a n
only countermove
of c o l o n i a l
client
access
states
the
f or
acquisition
and societies
to B e l g i a n
and P o r t u g u e s e
colonies;
b.)
the
client
states
neighbours
slave
had been
trade
in m a n y
and
cases
of st a b i l i t y
t rade.
l ed
and
very
its
no t
their
as
and order
a nd
T h e y were,
able
c.)
S u da n ,
the G o l d
some t i m e s
Coast).
conflicts
Thus
to i r r i t a t i n g u n c e r t a i n t i e s
in
of areas
the
case
European
(e.g.
settlement
mining
perceived
of
both
in
such
settlers
doubtfully
the
n e c e s s a r y f or
intermediary
( with
would
markets
stable
social
most
beyond
the
the
cure
scale
investments
rule was
temporary exceptions
an d M o h a m m e d A l i 's E g y p t )
s i m p l y not
loans
accept African
to v e n t u r e s
client
roles
their
to h a v e
t y p es
c a p a c it y over
to d o
so).
politics;
to t h e s e
state
situated
transformations
states
the M e r i n a K i n g d o m
sought
in U g a n d a
larger
metropolitan
(as e x e m p l i f i e d b y
which
for
l ar g e
and p o l i t i c a l
an d c o m p r a d o r e
penetration were
beyond
or p r e d i c t a b l e
African
(e.g.
ui Ltm
of m u c h e x p a n s i o n
suitable
direct
Republics
investment
and because
as
requiring
as e s s e n t i a l
because
r u l e / nor
or
operations)
the A f r i k a a n e r
incapable
seen
sometimes
the f i r s t n e o - c o l o n i a l
and
ra ids;
by
to .LnvojLvement m
to be
of p u n i t i v e
as
therefore,
’'helpful"
s y s t e m came
subject
seen
the
to p e n e t r a t i o n
them more
i ll u n d e r s t o o d 1 *^) i n t r a - A f r i c a n
the
by
to m a i n t a i n p a t t e r n s
conducive
to m a k e
to b r e a k d o w n s
r em oved client)
severely dislocated
ending.
seen
Attempts
(once
and
played
of
1850-1900
the E g y p t i a n
- 9 -
This p a t te rn was
paralleled
in
acquisition
not
Southeast
of the
unique
Asia
Spanish
to A f r i c a .
and,
It w a s
probably,
colonial
empire
in
the U S
(both
in
the
1 85 0- 19 1 0 period).
Given
this
set
of c o l o n i z a t i o n
It is p o s s i b l e
reasons
a.
given
French
of r e a s o n s
from
1850
the
the
well
as
t h is
a delayed
response
different
way
increasing
"comple t i on "
shift
in
East
by
t e r ms
of
the
to A f r i c a
Indochina)
i f it w a s
not
-
(as
and forced
the U n i t e d K i n g d o m
Portugal)
1910?
an d e c o n o m i c
directed
a nd
in
rapidity
itself:
- both political
1 8 5 0 's o n w a r d w a s
the M i d d l e
the
pattern
colonial
reassertion
from
to its
to e x p l a i n
fo r
why
(and
to be
in
a
shut
out;
b.
the
gradual
placed
did
decline/abolition
severe
rather
strains
on
so me
of
the
slave
dependent
trade
states
as
needlessly clumsy chartered company
a nd s m a l l e r
adventures
merchant
leading
hostilities
or
trading
either
leading
fort
to p o l i t y
to i n t e r v e n t i o n
commander
breakdowns
or
f o l l o w e d by
colonization;
c.
the
success
South
and
and/or
general
the
an
might
interest
to c h a s t e n
dependent
in c o l o n i a l
neo-colonial)
acquired
by
have
to 1 8 7 5 m a n y m i l i t a r y
partner
polity
(e.g.
t he m
a more
(as o p p o s e d
penetration.
i n a d v e r t e n c e ” model
to the n e e d s
or u n i f o r m l y d u b i o u s
would
and
deposits
to m a k e
created
clearly unsuited
an A f r i c a n
trading
the N o r t h
of m i n e r a l
capitalism
h a v e b e g u n b ut
Prior
in
technology
’’e m p i r e
been
capitalism
reversed.
seek
capitalist
colonies
European
pattern
and
to E u r o p e a n
is n ot
colonies
identification
simply mercantile
This
Had
the
settler
the m a r k e t s
relevant
to
of
of
investments
been h a l t e d
the
or
interventions
and make
it
d id
a useable
the Vv’o l s e y d a s h
to K u m a s i ,
the e x p e d i t i o n
It
is
to s a y
a situation
that
ruling
colonial
group
and
metropolitan
an u n s t a b l e
Su>ez C an al ;
its
a world
colonies
since
central
takers ,w e r e
or
it is n e c e s s a r y
a "vanishing"
exchange
gains
a kin
seems
and global
as m u c h
Lhe U K
in before
the
pawns
economic
" s o l d ” on
the b a s i s
as o f
and Germany
a major
of
actual
clash
p o l i c y w o u l d have
symbol
some
secondary
to s p e c i f y
of A f r i c a
costs
the
from
in
o f its
an d
b e e n );
nationhood,
However,
an o c c a s i o n
their
conquest
of
decision
impact
on w h a t
of c o l o n i e s
a l s o not
1950.
of merca nt i le
driving
deeper
carving
out
direct
additional
long
on
of
"mutual
The
routes
alternative
in
in a w a y
limited concession
the
pattern
socio-cultural
rather more
a nd
intensi­
gradually
interior
zones
of
1850
neo-colonialism
into
an
inequality"
a continuation
pre-colonial
Neither
nor
and d o m i na n t
in o r i g i n
However,
contact
trade
o b j e c t i v e l y open
institutional
subclasses
alternative.
distance
choice.
already European
of
to c a p i t a l i s t
assumed
a basis
a reasonable
Latin America's
to A f r i c a
fication
were
a Spanish province / "
always
and
p a r t i c i p a t i o n on
pattern was
colonies
the m e t r o p o l i t a n p o l i t i c a l
after
of L a t i n A m e r i c a w a s
because
the
B r i t a i n ’s
in A f r i c a .
In e x a m i n i n g
African
as
in E u r o p e
firm control
with
reign
being
probably fairly
hap>pened d u r i n g
the g r o u n d
seen
almost
to
to
one
securing
position
wars
by
responses.
relevant.
was
expansionist
f o r n ot
significance
near
easier
were
as pe ct s, w h i l e
empire
such
to c o l o n i a l
also
pre-
these
cases
evolution
Italian
leadership
a ny E u r o p e a n
raison d'etre
these
and
in w h i c h
in o t h e r
of E g y p t w a s
German
the p e r i p h e r y w e r e
Portugal's
are
with
within
to e x p l o i t
off cumu la ti v e
elements
(especially
than
situation
F r a n c e ’s c o l o n i a l
of re a ss er t in g
ensued
cases
ruling group geo-political
strategies;
economics
certain
of c a p i t a l i s t
in r e s p e c t
consistent
sub-elements
inadequate
set
in E t h i o p i a ) .
capitalism created
was m o r e
from neo-colonial
geo-political
in n a t i o n a l
on
shift
elements
interest
of the
of i n d u s t r i a l
- interests,
state wou ld
Broader
main
Teodoras
- and e sp e c i a l l y some
an i n i t i a l
a n d its
rise
n e o - c o l o n i a l i s m was
interests,
tha t
the
the E m p e r o r
in w h i c h p e n e t r a t i o n
ruling group
s om e
against
and
a nd
infra-
11 -
structure
home
and
routes
- Liberia
one w h i c h
formations
Liberal
l e as t
short
l is t
and
direct African
army
or
trade
in c o l o n i a l
under
(e.g.
policing
wnrch
costs
(non-settler)
inefficient
moral
or
perceptions
of
on
participants
was
their
they
state
competitive
proportions
trade"
in
t h ei r
their
it w o u l d h a v e
lower
or
a nd
the m e t r o ­
settler
opportuiixta.es
manufacturers
based
t han
costs were
states w o u l d have
a "free
to the e x t e n t
traded with
Broader
sub-classes;
administration
colonial
or
export
includes:
higher
offload
the
companies
to r e m a i n
gaining
capitalist
could
out u n d e r
similar
British
landlord
trade
taxpayer),
trading
the
- dominantly drawn
clearly onerecl
frozen
to
alternative
officers
neo-colonial,
companies
politan
for
of t h e i r
- nearer
capitalist
backing
primarily
out
or
a possible
those
of f o r m a t i o n s
aristocratic
been
was
metropolitan
of
b ut
or H a i t i
interest.
bureaucrats
share
c.)
some
the b u l k
reasons
self
from
b.)
at
Party,, f a v o u r e d n o t
economic
a.)
and E t h i o p i a )
e.g.
isolationist
A
(as in T h a i l a n d
colonies
than c i r e n L
don e;
who would
regime
- not
countries
( C FA O a n d S C O A d i d
of F r e n c h g o o d s
have
been
least
b ut
n ot
by
wishing
stock
in S e n e g a l
and
the
G o l d C o a s t );
d.)
domestic
manufacturers
materials
at
them under
metals
under
lower cost
currency
conditions
secured
t ha n
other patterns
and s et tler
domestic
who
they could
or w h o
and pass
of n a t i o n a l
of
have
of p e n e t r a t i o n
produce)
sources
supplies
bought
(i.e.
could buy
on
external
raw
users
of
from
the h i g h e r
balance
costs
weakness
and high protection.
Prior
constituted
Kingdom.
c o u l d be
to
1945
the
Even
it
is d i f f i c u l t
leading
in
the
capitalist
ctvse o f
so c h a r a c t e r i z e d
influential
a nd m o r e
and
that
formations
France
although
numerous
to a r g u e
it
in
these
the U n i t e d
is d o u b t f u l
they were
gaine
that
th
c l e a r l y more
benefitted by their
class
linkages
with
Portugal
was
economy
other
domestic
a metropolis
so m u c h
as
with
colonial
t he d o m i n a n t
convincingly
t hi s
is n o t
capitalist
interests
had
to a r g u e
state
all
or
taking
Their
(as
one
of
French
Congo
the
game
At
both
state
is
somewhat
over
of C ongolese
polity
(in
the
are n o t
case
colonial
t h er e
integration
the
in
at
s eas
raw
f a ce
hardly
Bismark,
irrelevant
Even
if
Lincol
impact
a nd
thereby
altered.
and e v e n
in
the
from
the C o n g o l e s e ,
the h e r i t a g e
and
to the
surpluses
on
and
prance
capitalists
society
capitalism
back
than m a r g i n a l l y
cited p r o b a b l y was)
for m e t r o p o l i t a n
level
leaders
investible
the
to f a l l
capitalists
concessionary
1890-1930,
national
accepted
on A f r i c a .
French
its
colonies
to k e e p
Gladstone,
debate
a different
that
be
level,this
n et
the
sufficiency
as m o r e
the e v o l u t i o n
c o u l d be
no t
f or
any
lobbies
or
bases
and
-
directly
the
at h o m e
it
French"Congo
backing
of
accept
acquired negative
be m a d e
However,
(or A s i a )
"self"
capitalist
a group)French
independent
or
by its G D P ),
12
certainly,
did not
15
valid .
"symbolized"
as
some
naval
should
expansion
groups
them in e x p l i c a b l e
all m e m b e r s
(e.g.
of
co-terminus
totally from
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m e.g.
colonial
( t ak e n
l ess
of
case
rarely monolithic
came
t ra de ) ,
a nd C l e m e n c e a u
selectively
for
coalitions
analysis
less
colonies.
ca n w i n
almost
"realpolitik”
tainted with
impact
are
13
the g a i n s
- c e r t a i n l y major
At
support
capitalist
a clear
capitalist
c o l o n i a l i s m , the A f r i c a
non-colonial
materials.
value
the
decision
"gloire",
o p e n f or
s t at e
coalitions
t hat
a nd b e n e f i t t e d
on
or
coalition member
"sell"
political
being more
and,
14
c o a l i ti on members.
from other
To
gainers
of A f r i c a n
a n d f ir ms .
(’’r e l a y s t a t i o n " ? )
can
metropolitan
ruling
a central
in B e l g i u m
in r e s p e c t
from
hardly
sectors
Only
to m a k e
significant
bu t
an i n t e r m e d i a r y
the U n i t e d K i n g d o m .
the m a i n
capitalist
of
the
Colonialism
a negative
subject
is
some
relevance.
not
only
yielded
To
sum
peoples.
the e x t e n t
an e n h a n c e d
surplu
Ig
to the p e r i p h e r y
oriented capitalist
but
the g o v e r n m e n t a l
also covered
colonial
operations
capitalists
mercantilist
involved
part
of
colonies
could
- flow
of A f r i c a n s
of m o r e
(i.e.
or b e l o w
much
it m u s t
- and d id
driving
have
expansion
the
posthumous
an d
t hus
lay
polities
more
t h at
t h an
the
is d i f f i c u l t
from Arica.
While
standard
to
"respect"
living
"loss
as
an
exploitation
forces.
Since
of c o l o n i a l i s m
capita productive
as
of
subsistence
relative
on w h i c h A f r i c a n
to s t r i k e
settler
of p r o d u c t i v e
of
a
physically necessary)
increasing
p er
it
it n e c e s s a r i l y
absolute
of c o l o n i z a t i o n
of
done,
the
build/evidence
t ha n p r a i s e
a continued
and
level
of
to o t h e r
in E g y p t
c a s es ,
raise
costs
e.g.
from
claim
it d i d
a criticism
It
of
a foundation
could
instrument
come
costs
socially necessary
in c e r t a i n
involving
precisely
strata)
surplus
from reducing
t o w ar d ,
chief
labour
lower
n e o - c o l o n i a l i s m w o u l d have
extraction
t h is
of
s ome
and fo r m a t i o n s
infrastructure
and al l ow ed net
(and/or
units
enterprise".
three
reasons.
F ir st ,
h ow c o nt in ue d n e o - c o l o n i a l i s m w o u l d have
evolved
matter
o f conjecture.
c o u l d no t h a v e
provided
Katanga
settler
structures
adequate
colonies.
the
more
is n ot
the
of U g a n d a
it c o u l d
have
the G o l d
is
less
Coast,
clear.
Second,
The
w o u l d have
been
French
Belgian negligible
balance
of gains
the e x p l o i t a t i v e
p r o ba bl y was
under
the
paucity
b as is .
more
an d
and
the
nature
of colon ia l
some
USA
negative
to
answer
by metropot
an d G e r m a n
the
shares
Italian
vanishing.
trade
have
free
on
comments
because
trade)
are
the
of
( w hi c h
been
a class
and
T hird,
pricing
than wo u ld
tentative
adapted
a
of Senegal,
to e s t i m a t e
accounts
Is
the cotton-c.offee
smaller,
of n e o - c o l o n i a l
of d e t a i l e d n a t i o n a l
However,
UK,
is h a r d
exploitative
imperialism
or
Portuguese
losses
and
the d i s t r i b u t i o n
been different.
the
the
economy
A flat
w o u ld have
l ar ger ,
or
been molded
groundnut
of
self evident.
it
Ran d,
slowly-the
cocoa economy
economy
to
Whether
build-albeit
Clearly
is
capitalist
"humanitarian
f or
levels
an d
colonies
an e f f e c t i v e
a balance
force
societies
making"
is
possible
and
the
and forma ti on
possible.
British
capitalist
Taken
system
own
to
the
o ut
to
capitalist
units
"colonial
not
benefitted
the
those
colonies
as
directly
overall
directly
French
s ta te .
subsidized
the b e n e f i t
services
goods
a n d of
but
adventurist
expanded
between
in the
costs
bourgoisie
surplus
gains
colonial
tr ade.
and M or o cc o ,
sub-Saharan
gains
t r ad e )
groups
French
a n et
cost
at
on
l e as t
and e s p e c i a l l y
budgets were
bureaucratic
heavily
and m i l i t a r y
French manufactured
of
of B e l g ia n
economy
net
n or
surplus
stimulate
govern
lacked
them
and re l i e d
and n e a r
After
1945
earning
policy
to the
flows
than
the
en de d .
and m e t r o p o l i t a n
in a n y o t h e r
cartelized
case
and i n t e r t w i n e d
in q u e s t i o n
metropolitan
an i n d u s t r i a l
capitalist
sector
This was
to e x p l o i t
as
- at
them
(or
Britain
concessionary-corvee
l e as t
and
Portugal
at
was
indeed
or B e l g i u m )
adventurism
to an e x c e p t i o n a l
in
all
of
partly because
Fr an c e,
colonization
changed
trade wit h
the p e r i o d
Portuguese
f ir ms ,
balance
over
to the
s am e d e g r e e
le ve l
- may have
on
d i d n ot
resources
on f o r e i g n
the
closer
in P o r t u g a l .
the
peasant
after
capitalism.
significance
Portugal
of s u r p l u s
one,especially
surpluses
very hig h ly
P o r t u g a l ’s c o l o n i e s
large
a source
of o p e n p i l l a g e 1p h a s e
colonial
the
merely
a critical
reproduction were
partly because
nature
probably
not
Leopoldian*' c o l o n y
linkages
real
service
industrial
imposed
inefficient
covered
a nd c a p i t a l i s t
T he
of the
yielded
exporters.
to B e l g i u m
g iv e
economy
colonial
The Be l g i a n Co ng o was
The
moderate
(excluding price
The
the m o r e
debt
Tunisia
by n e o - c o l o n i a l
on t he F r e n c h
to
extent
certainly
economy
completed.
settlers,
British
involved.
was
administrative
involved
French
almost
achievable
a nd
to the
for
the U K
colonial Africa
and p rovided
sources
for
conquest
and infrastructure
a lesser
a group
overall
logically
to
the
interests"
transfers
supply
Algeria,and
once
of B r i t i s h
administer),
and
the
r e st
s o me
on m a r k e t s
beyond
a whole
administration
(thus p r o v i d i n g
se nt
as
together,the
surpluses
its
Southern Africa paid handsomely
terms
times
of f o r e i g n
dsgree.
currency
the p r i c i n g
o f an e x c e p t i o n a l l y
surplus
(3
draining
t ype
The
German
German
Empire
growth policy
feature
f or M o z a m b i q u e
of
colonies d i d not
but
their
saw
e a r l y *loss
as m u c h
role, in w h i c h
them.
subsequent
B r i t i s h and French
and m e d i u m
term
especially
colonies
as
as o f the
Imperial
is
a
rather marginal
G e r m a n y ’s r u l i n g
efforts
an d T a n g a n y i k a
in b o t h
and ruthless
at
raising
exceeded
resources
devoted
results.
Italian
a self delusion
Cameroon
the
- that p r o b a b l y
Certainly German
in T og o,
benefit
a methodical
- excluding N a m i b i a
production
The
on b a l a n c e
economically despite
a nd g e o p o l i t i c a l
coalition
and A n g o l a .
colonial
- was
overtly
a starring
(on b o t h
empire
seen
point
counts
- to the
extent
it w a s
n ot
terms
and
in geopolitical
to m o r e
extensive
including
the
reversal
record
t h us n o t
a nd
of
lucrative
the
verdict
of A d a w a ) .
The
for
overall African
colonialism
whence
as
a tool
e s p e c i a l l y if
of c a p i t al is t
the
t wo m a i n
and South Africa)
are
about
as l i t t l e )
as m u c h
(or
excluded.
admittedly modernized
productive
very
forces
limited
However,
it
d id not
is n o t
have p r o d u c e d
efforts
major
natural
dependent
than for
barriers
growth
most
of
over
f or
A capsule
summary of
of
than
later
force
tributary
in
imperial
- Ethiopia
oriented
l ev el s.
M o h a m m e d Ali
was
fact
or
had
very
"naturally"
Certainly
more
economic
and even p r o b a b l y more
impact
on d i f f e r e n t
the
rapid
capitalists.
the
a
accumulation.
1930-1970
export
its
It h a d
rule w o u l d
1900-1940)
under
and e x p a n d e d
colonies.
on
it h a d
Ethiopia
a dominantly
the
Bri t i s h p e r i o d
European
as D a h o m e y .
emphasis
to e i t h e r
of E g y p t
lucrative
the f a c e
and
of p r o d u c t i v e
the
L i b e r i a on
than co lo n ia l
change
perhaps
raising
major
a n d p u r p o s i v e systemic
(Algeria
than most
presence
clear
growth
impressive
colonies
sense)
slowly
set
greater
( a l be i t
integrated
more
very
settler
growth
(in a n y
capitalist
system which
is
P
/ (o
formations
is
subject
the
specificity
was
most
of
damaging
to a r a t h e r
situations.
in settler
Certainly
colonies
positive
in n Q r r o w l y e c o n o m i s t i c ,
colonial
trade
forces
1910,
must
and
s a me
e.g.
enclaves
the G e z i r a f r o m
be
entered
coffee
with
the Gold Coast
the
e x t e n t fif
have
somewhat
ieveis
and
of
impact
(probably
in
the
of pr od u c t i v e
Buganda after-
cocoa^
say
-
the c a v e a t
Buganda
been produced
later
so
te rm s)
1 9 3 0 ' s albeit
that Gol d Coast
at
1890,
general
least
run
highest
after
exhibition
the
and
short
the
late
could probably
inadequate
to
dates,under
cotton
almost
the
a neo-colonial
pattern.
Broad formation economic
a.)
traditional
status
by
(or e v e n
British
a nd
b.)
created)
with
"modern"
than
share
colonies)
appreciably
artisanal
were
on
the
in
above
supply
states
after
have
pattern
sector
roles
to the
1 94 5
as
the
areas
by
b ut
were
employment
In the
"land c l e ar a nc e
both
a
their
sharing;
limited
(except
the
almost
pf
the
an e v o l v i n g
gain
and
to
in
labour
certainly
force
n ot
agricultural
settler
scheme"
and e v e n m o r e
in
and p r o b a b l y
largely
domestic
case
a higher
i l l u st r at ed by
bureaucracy
pre-colonial
side
than
o c c u p i e d in
a small p r o p o r t i o n of
incomes.
to
achieve
renewed neo-colonial
lo w w a g e
dominantly
until
did
absolutely
neo-colonial
o ne
parallel
in u n s k i l l e d ,
and
they w o u ld
modern productive
settler
colonial
in r e s p e c t
education
relatively
low absolute
a handful
in b o t h
phase;
neo-colonial/dependent
c.)
Savannah
as c o m p r a d o r e s ,
pre-colonial
significant
(e.g.
t he p o s t -
status
o ne
restored
u se
neo-colonial
a lower
in e c o n o m i c
partially
rule
b e e n:
both
colonial
quite
indirect
to h a v e
of U g a n d a ) , a n d f a t a l l y w e a k e n e d ,
and
actual
reduced
sometimes
under
conquest
economic
were
French West A f r i c a n
in p a r t s
bureaucrats
seems
aristocracies
the c o n q u e s t ^
an d
impact
or
colonies
tax
or
they
"induced"
disadvantageously placed
economically;
d. )
medium
scale A f r i c a n
at
least
of
the
businessmen
in m a n y p a r t s
19th ce nt u ry
of West
- were
- who were
A f r i c a until
systematically
significant
near
the e n d
squeezed
into
bankruptcy
did not
Small
as
or b a c k
occur until
which
firms
compradore
adequate
dominant
locally
economic
of
immigrants
to
and
to d e p e n d e n t
trade
the p r o t o - k u l a h s
adequate
hold constant)
zones
land
evidently
(to E u r o p e a n s )
a case
perhaps
Namibia,
tell
politicians
prominent
until
and
a re
after
in
Senegal).
They were
public
until
service
productive,
formations.
the
t h ey
pattern;
(but
rule
per
a b le
growth
o nes
se)
to
in
(or
farmers
were
l i v e d in n o n - e x p o r t
Settler
total
partial
and
colony peasants
loss
of de s ir ab l e
enforced proletarianism,
starkly exemplified
Bortustan
relevant
Egypt
and,on
to b e c o m e
class
in
1945 were
and m o d er n
small
the
than w o u l d
gains
Food
a class which
Liberia,
(and b e n e f i c i a r y )
but
the
later,
in
the
south
in
and
in t h e n o r t h .
exceptions
phase
if
totally
and
to e r o d e
them were
gains.
and
the
to p r o d u c e
colonial
from near
land
most
Botswana
the M a h g r e b i n
modern
placed
and forced to par levies .
s uf fe r e d most
in
extent
to s u s t a i n
usually weakened especially
crop
tended
absolute
among
these
non-
a forti'arl c r a f t
not
surpluses
often
in
so the i n c r e a s e d
greater
achieved
l ong
operate
a lesser degree
advantageously
related
generate
- or m o r e
a continued neo-colonial
often
so
of h i e r a r c h i e s
interstices
to
a significantly
who were
only
and,
tolerated
rungs
Even
reversal
co l o n i a l period);
- could not
filled
of traders
crops"
even
late
produced manufacturers
"export
but
or
(a p a r t i a l
blancs
structure.
characterized
peasants
bottom
and petit
imports
status
producers
the
returns
system's
penetration
have
trading
t he p o s t - 1 9 4 5
filled
European
European
of
petty
scale A f r i c a n b u s i n e s s m e n wer e
they either
with
i nto
business
the
still
period
become
(wi th p a r t i a l
a very
the m a i n
limited
scale,
intermediary
subsequent
neo-colonial
inchoate within
educated
and
did not
elements
traditional
of
the
the m o d e r n
aristocratic
It m a y be
one
can
explain
onward.
The
improved
tr ade,
penetration
African
(for
as A f r i c a )
to a p a t t e r n
deaths
by
Further
elements
with
part.
lies
for
in
frame
to it,
of conquest,
of reference
of r e l a t i v e
the
migration,
le d to h i g h e r
birth
spacing
the d e s t r u c t i o n
of
the
of
e n d of
out
order
of
social
the
capitalists
phase
which
as
did
lead
reduced
dislocation.
patterns
in
(whether
s i t u ) s e em s
because African
family
s o ci a l
of
the b r u t a l ,
following
rates
of intra-
completion
or e v i s c e r a t i o n
and
the
that
adventurist
of A f r i c a n
nor
v a st m a j o r i t y
a n d its
and
1 9 00
services
the h a l t i n g
a nd b y f a m i n e
the b r e a k - u p
of b i r t h
l aw
from
c a u s e d by e a r l i e r
phasing
concessionary
violence
the
dislocations
a n d the
health
the f a c t
the m e t r o p o l i s
by u r b a n i z a t i o n ,
to h a v e
it
an d r e a c t i o n s
conquest,
uneconomic
c an h a r d l y be
of living
the
state wars
colonial
well
answer
Rather
slave
this
rising African populations
standards
Africans.
the
a s k e d h ow w i t h i n
societies’
spacing disintegrated
order
of w h i c h
they were
IV
The colonial variant of the peripheral capitalist mode
of production has not been homogenous in Africa.
sub-variants can be identified.
At least six
However, it is not, on the
whole, analytically useful to use these to '’classify’' regions or
even in many cases whole territories and, indeed, sub-variants
could and did coexist in the same territory albeit usually with
18
one dominant. L
a.
subordinated African producer based trade (Amin's colonial
trade economy) utilised penetrative "equal", unequal (in
Amin's sense)^ and oligopolistic trade to extract local produce
at prices allowing the merchant to achieve a. surplus and to
inject relatively over-priced (in world market terms) manufactures
In its commonest form the African producers were a mix of small
peasants and proto kulaks but larger non-capitalist (e.g. the
Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal, parts of Ethiopia), protocapitalist (e.g. the Sudan plantation ancestors to the present
private pump schemes), state capitalist (e.g. Mohammed Ali's
\
~ A ■<--3.
i_'g,y
;
C A J L O b c u ,
concessionary company allocation whether to chartered companies
during the transition to colonialism or to purely commercial
adventurers within a titular colonial framework wase a
transitional phase.
The chartered companies usually found
the costs of administration too high to be offset by even
a trade monopoly, the adventurers - with the notorious exception
of King Leopold of the Congo - on balance failed to extract
much surplus and - most assuredly including Leopold - operated
a system of pillage which was quite incompatible with stable,
sustained exploitation;
foreign plantation based production tended to be dominant as a
replacement of concessions and of mercantilist slave colonial
structure-s pre-dating 1800 (e.g. the Cape Verdi Islands,
Fernando ?o, Reunion, Mauritius) but was common for specific
crops (e.g. sisal and sugar and at one period bananas and
tobacco) and as a favoured (but usually non-competitive) parallel
to subordinated African producers (e.g. in AOF, Nigeria,
Uganda) in countries in which it was either secondary or ec-eq.a. '
with other production patterns;
foreign non-agricultural enclave production was dominant in minir
and in secondary industry (local market or export processing).
The former did dominate some territorial economies, the latter while not uniformly negligible by 19^5
even outside the settler
economies - was very much secondary and concentrated in a few
cities;
e.
European settler based production on a broad front was dominant
only at the Northern.iand Southern ends of the continent (includin
Zimbabwe) but pockets of settler agriculture were scattered
throughout British East and Central Africa and the larger
Portuguese colonial territories (where it became dominant
supplanting plantations and a primitive cross between sub­
ordinated African production and state ran concessions after
f.
1945);
labour reserve areas appeared to remain "traditional”
"subsistence" economies to the casual (and in many cases the
not so casual) observer.
In fact whether they had been created
by settler expropriation (e.g. Lesotho, the non-settler rural
areas of Algeria, the Kikuyu reserves) or by the destruction of
earlier economic relations with areas more intensively directly
exploited under colonial rule (e.g. Upper Volta, Mali, large
areas of Southern Tanganyika;they were very far from being
unaffected or irrelevant to the colonial system of production.
Their impoverishment - augmented where necessary by taxation made them labour supply depots and their remaining agricultural
potential allowed their migrant workers to be paid at less than
family physical subsistence wages because the family, perforce,
remained in the reserve.
While usually described in relation
to labour supply depots for settler, enclave or foreign
plantation agriculture the labour reserves have also been critica
to some subordinated African producer based economies (e.g.
Voltaic labour in the Gold Coast and - admittedly after 19^-5 far more centrally in the Ivory Coast).
To a minor extent the
t Mahgrebin labour reserve areas were serving European labour
market unskilled labour requirements by 19^5 but their major
role in the "exporting" "guest workers" began significantly laser
as did the significant (albeit numerically and as a percentage
of territorial labour force lower) flows from some AGE regions
(e.g. the Middle Senegal basin).
To apply this analytical frame to one country is not always easy,
to apply it regionally or continentally leads to a danger of a less
of portability and of salient parallels and divergences.
Coastal
- 21 •
' West Africa through the Cameroon was dominantly a series of
subordinated African producer territorial units with secondary
foreign non-agricultural enclaves and diminishing foreign
plantation elements.
French conquered West African savannah
(through.'1Chad territories and parts of the Gold Coast and Nigerian
Savannah cones were basically labour reserves.
Ciabon and the
Middle Congo (now CAR) were dominantly foreign forestry enclave
plus plantation economies while in the French Congo limited
foreign plantation, logging and non-agricultural enclave urits
were perhaps about co-equal.
The Western Belgian was dominated
by foreign plantation and the Eastern by mining enclave production
with internal labour reserve areas surrounding them and two
relatively large industrial enclaves at Leopoldville and in Katanga.
Angola and Mozambique had a shifting balance of plantations,
settlers, labour reserves (for export to South Africa as well as
domestic use) and subordinated African producers.
In South Africa
the settler dominance-linked to African labour reserves - was so
great that it would perhaps be inappropriate to treat the plantations,
mines and non-agricultural sector separately except for the fact
that they were largely owned by external and settler groups who had
distinct secondary contradictions with the Afrikaaner dominant
settler group.
South Africa.
Southern Rhodesia was a smaller and somewhat diluted
Northern Rhodesia was dominantly a raining enclave
economy with a significant settler sector and labour reserves while
Nyasaland was perhaps balanced between labour reserve and plantation
roles.
Madagascar and Uganda were basically African subordinated
producer in their territorial economic pattern as were the Sudan
and Ethiopia (albeit the pattern of subordination was more complex
in the last case).
Rwanda and Eurundi combined subordinated
African production with a labour reserve (for both the Congo and
East Africa) role.
Kenya was co-dominated by a settler enclave in
the "white highlands", a plantation enclave on the coast and
industrial enclaves in Mombasa and Nairobi plus labour reserve
areas to serve them, and to a lesser degree Tanganyika and Uganda.
Tanganyika had a large plantation and small settler enclaves balanced
by subordinated African production and a peripheral labour reserve
role in respect to Southern Africa despite being a heavy net labour
imp crier.
Egypt probably had a dominantly subordinated If: '
'. 1
producer based territorial economy in 19^5 albeit,if one lumps the
Suez Canal with the other external non-agricultural enclaves,that
sector was more important from the Metropolitan optic.
Algeria
" was a settler colony with labour reserves in which separating
settler-plantation-non-agriculturai foreign elements probably
would be pointless for 19^5 (though not after the rise of the
oil sector).
Morocco and Tunisia while settler and enclave
dominated had much more significant subordinated African producer
components than Algeria.
The older ex-slave plantation colonies
(Cape Verdi, Fernando Po, Sao Thome and Principe, Reunion and
Mauritius) became foreign plantation dominated and the former
Arab slave plantation based states (Comoros, Zanzibar) subordinated
African producer centred economies with an Arab intermediary layer
over the share cropping (de jure or de facto) tenants.
Spanish
Sahara, Eritrea, Libya, British and Italian Somaliland, mainland
Equatorial Guinea and Portuguese Guinea were economically almost
non-existent from a capitalist point of view - subordinated African
production, foreign plantations (with the exception of the
Italian Somaliland banana enclave) and settler implantation were
all unsuccessful.
French Somaliland was - economically - a foreign
enclave in the Ethiopian territorial economy.
The impact of these elements on the growth of productive forccthe structure of production and the distribution of output was
critical.
The most disastrous role from all points of view was
that of labour reserve since in that case net transfers had to be
earned by temporary outmigration with serious territorial economic
well as social, corrosive effects.
Intensive settler colonisaticn
had the most positive effect on territorial average levels of
productive forces and on the balance of production (as the territcr
accounts of South Africa and Algeria demonstrate).
Its economic
impact on Africans - at least so long as the territory remained a
colony - was, however<destructive.
Plantations where dominant term:
to raise the average levels of productive forces but not to improve
the structure of production nor African incomes.
Mon-agricultural
enclaves were rarely dominant but did tend to raise average output
per capita, create a small above average income African "proletaria
and in the domestic market oriented cases (but net mineral or feres
extraction nor export processing) create a slightly less imbalanced
structure of production and use.
During the colonial period
subordinated African production gave the highest incomes to African
(and probably also the greatest broadly based inequalities among
them) but in most cases relatively low average levels of productive
forces and radically imbalanced structures of production and use.
V
The economic roles of penetration were not basically altered
by the transition to colonialism .nor during the colonial period.
They remained:
a.
to secure at costs allowing a surplus to the acquiring
commercial house (whether a producer or not) on their
export
and sale in a capitalist metropot or another colony;
b.
to provide opportunities for commercial units to sell imports
at
c.
prices which yielded a surplus;
to open outlets at surplus yielding prices for metropolitan
producers;
d.
to make available opportunities for profitable investment
of capital in production for metropolitan or colonial
e.
to provide a vent for settlers and temporary migrants
markets;
from
the metropolis.
The first of these was dominant in respect of Africa as a whole
and
for metropolitan capitalist powers as a group.
It did not
mean "cheap" produce in terms of world market prices.
alway
If the
metropolitan decision takers placed (for whatever reason) a premium
on own currency sources and de facto or de jure protected their
suppliers (not if they were African their producers) then the
products might well be quite "dear" e.g. Somaliland bananas, AEF
cotton in the interwar period, German East African rubber.
Even
the United Kingdom in the late Second World War and 19^5-50 period
provided support for, and indeed massive state investment in,,
production seen as "cheap" in foreign exchange shadow pricing
terms not those of the world market.
A related variant involved
subsidies to sellers to buy from colonies and sell to earn other
metropolitan currencies.
For most major trading units,the second goal was linked to
the first.
A balanced trading operation required a two way flow
of sales and purchases.
was irrelevant.
For this purpose the sources of the goods
However, metropolitan producer micro and macro
concerns were fairly central to the metropolitan coalitions
perceptions of colonial gains throughout the period except in the
case of the United King.:':::, up to the mid 1920s.
Froi then throt
19*15 the UK did practice imperial protection with Japan the chief
competitor to be kept out.
’
♦
*
By and large investment opportunities
\
a mil
colonialism in Africa - the most significant : rofitafcle directly
productive investment was in mining and in that case the production
was critical to securing the export product.
Plantations were seen
in similar terms as a fortiori was infrastructural investment which
was, indeed, usually both metropolitan state financed and not
directly surplus generating.
Secondary industry colonial market
oriented investment (in the colony or the metropolis) was quite
minor both relative to the metropolis and to the total "colonial
interest" group with the partial exceptions of Algeria and: South
Africa.
Vent for settlers and
temporary migrants (administrators,
<»
merchants, managers) was perhaps central to Italian colonial economic
strategy but was a secondary element in the case of other metropolises.
The evolution of penetration over 1800-19^5 falls into three
periods: 1800-1850 was characterised by the decline of the mercantile
neo-colonialism of the slave trade and its partial replacement by that of legitimate commerce; 1850-191^ was marked by the establishment
and initial organisation of the colonial system; 19^-15^5 saw a
slackening of general momentum because the global capitalist
system and especially its periphery were almost continuously
jnvolved in crises.
Over 191^-1918 the First World War partly isolated the colonies
from the metropolises and involved campaigns against the German
colonies which used a considerable portion of what attention and
resources were available in Subsaharan Africa while drafts of men
(especially in the French case) and resources (e.g. on Egypt for
the British Middle Eastern campaign) affected Mediterranean Africa
3.S W 6 1 1 .
1918-1930 was.marked at the broad periphery level first by the
short lived commodity boom and then by a longer period of commodity
price depression and the strengthening (as e.g. at the Ottawa
Conference in the British case) of the drive for partially closed
trading systems to strengthen metropolitan external balance positions.
In Africa the boom led to a burst of public investment - e.g.
Governor Guggisb erg'S Seven Year Plan in the Gold Coast,‘the
. .
completion of the basic East African railway network, the’ buildup
of Dakar and the Dakar-Bamako link in AOF.
Most o.. this ^p.ctftujl'ly.**
came after the boom had passed and colonial territorial -revefrues
0 once again shaky.
The increased operating and debt' service'
costs of this wave of investment contributed to the wave of
late 1920s and 1930s retrenchments which pulled colonial governments
back to a much more limited law and order role than had characterised
their consolidation and initial developmental phases.
It was not
any general objection to interventionism nor devotion to Smith's
invisible hand which held colonial governments back - neo-mercantilist
intervention by policy and precept was, on the whole, enhanced and
multiplied so long as it cost little to promulgate and administer.
The constraint was finance.
The commodity slump on the periphery (and the special British
crisis related to its over-valued currency) were exacerbated in
Africa as well as in the metropolises over most of the 1930s by
generalised industrial economy unemployment.
Metropolitan budgets
were strained3 metropolitan investors were in retreat, metropolitan
firms hardly needed rapidly rising imports.
Indeed the intensification
of the "cutthroat competition" - "price ring" cycle in Anglophonic
West Africa bears witness to the colonial firms' group need to
enhance the surplus on a given volume of business by lowering
costs and raising the import/export price ratio in the colonies and,
at the same time, their contradictory individual drive to increase
surplus through expanding volume via competitive bidding away of
each other's business.
Under these circumstances the periphery's least central
region was certainly not the object of any general development
drive.
a)
Three classes of exceptions can be identified:
the gold sector boomed - costs fell and the terms of exchange
for gold against currency rose - with special territorial
significance for South Afri*ca;
b)
protectionism against foreign currency sources to protect
the franc led to major attempts to raise commodity production
in francophone Africa but to do so without putting in new
investment or public services - an approach which had distinct
limits (e.g. the opening up of the Ivory Coast or Guineavas
not possible under it because major infrastructure could not
be financed) and special characteristics (e.g. a greater
•
emphasis on subordinated African production to lessen calls on
colonial state and metropolitan money market resources).
A
settler variant of this "strategy" operated in the Mahgreb with
somewhat more real resources devoted to its implementation;
c)
import substitution in Algeria, South Africa and the Belgian
Congo to preserve local consumption capacity in the face of
disappointing export earnings.
This variant of the Latin
American first round defensive import substitution was limited at least on any significant -scale - to a few territories
because
colonial structure was, by definition, not one in
which colonial state initiatives for closing markets against
the metropolis were likely to be begun much less allowed to
go very far.
state.
South Africa, however, was de facto an independent
The Belgian capitalist group was able to find investment
opportunities in the Congo by substituting against non-Belgian
imports thus melding metrpolitan macro-monopolist micro- and
colonial territorial macro interests into a less self evidently
contradictory temporary working synthesis than was possible
in other sub-Saharan colonies.
Algeria was seen as a French
province and thus in terms of regional policy.
The partial metropolitan economy and global commodity market
recoveries of the late 1930s probably would have led to more activist
colonial development of productive forces policies backed by more
infrastructural investment and a more substantial capitalist firm
concern in trade and selected production enhancement with and in
African colonies in the early 19^0s had they not been followed so
closely by the Second World War - e.g. British Colonial Development
Planning thinking and legislation shows an upsurging from 1938
onward.
The direct impact of fighting in Africa was extreme in the
North and Northeast but the resource calls (especially in terms of
both African and colonial administrator/manager manpower) were much
more widely spread.
The economic impact was,outside battle zones, on balance
stagnationist (or worse) but highly unequal.
Import starvation
was uniform because of shipping constraints.
Exports were affected
in the same way unless they were raw materials critical to military
production, e. g. the Belgian Congo's copper, cobalt ar.d uranium,in
which case they boomed.
Mercantilist intervention by the colonial
states did seek to raise local market oriented production in both
food and light manufactures.
While more widely spread than the
1930s manufacturing sector growth that of the war years was relativel;
limited in coverage and depth both because market size was limited
and because adequate equipment and intermediate goods imports' were
not available.
At the end of the Second World War the majority of African
colonies probably had lower real per capita levels of productive
forces than in 191^*
Colonialism centred on crisis wracked
metropolitan capitalism had not proven a dynamic means to development
of production.
The major exceptions were Algeria (seen as a
province of France), the Belgian Congo ("benefiting" from the
rather special metropolitan production and corporate structure)
and South Africa (with a state independent enough to follow its
own neo-mercantilist Keynesian political economic strategy along
lines more similar to the larger Latin American states than to
those of colonial territory administrations).
African colonies
and Africans had indeed been exploited and because of lack of
resources to carry out exploitation in any other way subjected
to a high degree of overt repression.
But more than either they
had been disregarded - increasingly treated as the periphery of
the periphery; a reserve army perhapstbut not of labour power that
it was in the metropolis ' interest to exploit nor to its danger to
allow to become increasingly pauperised.
VI
In 19^5 it was not clear that the colonial era in Africa
was moving to its close.
Africans would have been almost as
startled as Europeans at an assertion that by 1965 only the Portugues
and Spanish colonies and the Southern redoubt would remain or that
by 1975 the former would be in the last stages of dissolution and
South Africa seeking to buy a temporary detente by jettisoning
Rhodesia and Namibia.
Indeed the late 19^0s and early 1950s were
marked by the most energetic attempts at colonial territorial develop
ment since the initial conquest; efforts which were not then seen as
laying the base for a new neo-colonial relationship but for a long
continuation of colonial rule.
In retrospect the circumstances and elements which led to
a metropolitan transformation of capitalist relationships with Africa
21
to a new neo-colonialismc gradually evolving into mere complex
22
forms of dependence
can be seen more clearly:
a)
the Second World War had -.in complex ways - shaken both
metropolitan self confidence and will and African belief in
the invincibility of Europeans;
b)
the early dissolution of the Asian empire reinforced beliefs
and doubts tending toward running down colonialism in Africa;
c)
the changed balance among the metropolitan capitalist economies
n uQ
c.
strengthened the USA which had a continuing ex-colony’s
general objection to colonialism and a "free trader's"
self interest in the substitution of less tightly focused
patterns of dependence.
d)
the enhanced power of the socialist industrial economies
both (in 19^5-1955) required concentration of effort on
"stabilising" the European political economic and territorial
balance (thus putting a higher opportunity cost on large
scale colonial repression) and influenced African aspirations
and concepts of the attainable in ways which made direct
colonialism harder to sustain without rising repression;
e)
the success of the colonial system in creating a pattern of
infrastructure and institutions adequate to sustain a new
neo-colonialism meant that - if the training of Africans
to operate them;already begun on cost saving grounds, could
be stepped up - the economic ends of colonialism could
apparently be furthered without continued direct rule;
f)
the failure of the colonial system to yield high and growing
surpluses over 191^-19^5 on the one hand provided a case
for re-equipping it in physical and personnel terms to meet
anticipated expanded metropolitan import and export needs
and, at the same time, for cost and risk cutting
on the overhead side.
especially
The former strand was not necessarily
inconsistent with guided neo-colonial states and the latter
positively favoured them over colonies;
g)
both the successes and failures of colonial rule had created
African formations intensely frustrated in social, economic
and political terms, increasingly unwilling to accept the myth
of European omniscience and omnipotence, and - critically in the case of many elite and some producer groups perceiving
independence in terms of taking over the colonial state and
» production strategy so that Africans could run it for them­
selves and at a brisker pace but not in a radically different mann
There were African formations who had a very different view of
what independence should mean but far more metropolitan energy
was put into seeing that they did not become the inheritors,
or that they were socialised into the patterns and objectives
of the colonial territorial political economic model by
"transitional rule" participation, than in root and
branch
resistance to independence of non-settler colonies.
"Who"
and "When" came to be seen as crucial to maintaining: the
- 29 benefits of metropolitan - peripheral relations with Africa
'and "whether" in respect of formal independence an increasingly
dead issue;
h)
the increasing
oligopolisation of international economic
transactions (including in respect to African territories where
it had always been at a higher level than for intra­
metropolitan transactions) and the growing importance of soft
technology (e.g. marketing, purchasing, financing, organising)
and hard technology (e.g. machines, processes and the ability
to operate, maintain, reproduce and adapt or develop them)
steadily reduced the actual and the perceived danger of political
independence leading to effective economic nationalism of the earlj
19th century USA or turn of the century Japanese varieties.
(In Latin America this was to mean a metropolitan reconquest
of the control lost during 1930s first wave economic nationalist
import substitution, in Africa and Asia a generally easy shift
from colonial to post colonial economic supremacy patterns.)
This schema is
arbitrarily abstracts
deceptively simple in four senses.
First, it
from non-political economic and non geo-political
factors which were of significance in Africa and in Europe.
Second,
it is retrospective in the extreme, nobody analysed in these' terms
and with this degree of articulated foresight in 1 9 ^5 - 5 5 although
variants of most of these considerations can be identified in
policy statements and actions of that period.
Third, because of the
lack of any clear decolonisation model the process was - at least at
the secondary level - both particular to territories in Africa and
to metropolitan powers and marked by false starts and dead ends
e.g. the French drive for integration (impossibly expensive if carried
to its Cartesian logical end and self contradictory if stopped part
way) and the Belgian for colonial maintenance by tecnnico-economic
bolstering and intellectual isolation of the peoples of the Belgian
Congo.
Finally, wherever large numbers of settlers or a belief
(as in the Portuguese case and a fortiori the South African) that
empire and nationhood were intertwined were at stake,the transition
from colonialism to deper.dence began later, was characterised by
much higher levels cf violence and, therefore, in a majority of
cases (not all,e.g. Kenya) to result in a successor state more
altered from its colonial predecessor than in the "easy transition"
cases.
The basic themes remain.
Colonialism in Africa was on the
verge ,of retreat in 19^5 not because the metropolitan powers did
not possess the power (in absolute'terms) to maintain it (vide
Madagascar in the late 19^0s) nor because economic dominance had
become less desirable.
As the burst of late colonial, transitional
and early neo-colonial capitalist state and private investment in
Africa bear witness, the latter was the reverse of the truth.
African production and trade were#and were seen to be;about to
become of more importance to the central economies than at any point
in the previous thirty years.
Rather, the potential now existed/and
was increasingly perceived to exist/ to substitute dependence for
direct colonial rule at a net political economic gain to a majority
of the central capitalist economies and their dominant decision
taking groups and a significant number of African leaders and
formations saw such a shift as quite consistent with their own
interests.
The foundations for the 19^5-1965 transition to neo­
colonialism as the dominant political economic relationship
between Africa and the world capitalist system had been laid.
NOTES
The t e r r i t o r i a l d i m e n s i o n of this p ap er t h er ef o re dive rg es
f r o m S a m i r A m i n ' s o f " U n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t a nd D e p e n d e n c e in
B l a c k A f r i c a - O r i g i n s a n d C o n t e m p o r a r y F o r m s " J o u r n al o f
M o d e rn A f r i c a n S t u d i e s , Vol 10, no. 4, a l t h o u g h n o t f r o m
his o v e r a l l b o d y of w o rk w h i c h does analyze M e d i t e r r a n e a n
A f r i c a at the c a s e s t u d y l ev el .
T e r ri to ri a l frames of
r e f e r e n c e a re n o t e x c l u s i v e : the M e d i t e r r a n e a n R e g i o n or
th e A r a b W o r l d a re a l s o p o t e n t i a l l y u s e f u l a n d p a r t i a l l y
o v e r l a p e a c h o t h e r as w e l l as A f r i c a .
Similarly
M e d i t e r r a n e a n A f r i c a , W e s t A f r i c a , E a s t A f r i c a as w e l l as
B l a c k A f r i c a c a n be u s e f u l t e r r i t o r i a l f r a m e s at a m o r e
l i m i t e d b u t s t i l l c r o s s t e r r i t o r i a l le vel.
The c a s e f or
u s i n g A f r i c a , c o n t i n e n t a l l y b o u n d e d , in t h i s c o n t e x t is
t h a t o v e r 1 8 0 0 - 1 9 4 5 its p e n e t r a t i o n b y the m e t r o p o l i t a n
c a p i t a l i s t p o w e r s h a d e n o u g h b a s i c e l e m e n t s in c o m m o n to
m a k e it a u s e f u l r e f e r e n c e f ra m e .
" S t a g e s " in t hi s s e n s e are a n a l y t i c a l or m e t h o d o l o g i c a l
tools not temporal sequences, i nevitable po i nt s of arrival
cF e m p i r i c a l c a t e g o r i e s .
M a r x ' s s t a g e s ar e of t h i s type;
R o s t o w ' s a n d - in a d i f f e r e n t w a y - K u z ne t s' a re not.
Th e C o n g o B a s i n T r e a t i e s ' " f r e e t r a d e " p r o v i s i o n s are n o t
an a d e q u a t e t o t a l e x p l a n a t i o n .
France c i r c u m v e n t e d them
f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g in A E F a n d the U K a v o i d e d (or s e c u r e d
e x e m p t i o n s f r om ) t h e m w h e n e v e r th is w a s r e l e v a n t to its
E a s t or C e n t r a l A f r i c a n e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s .
O n a n d f r o m are n o t i d e n t i c a l in t h is c o n t e x t .
A study
c e n t e r e d on T a n z a n i a ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s
c o u l d be f r o m a m e t r o p o l i t a n e c o n o m y p e r s p e c t i v e .
O ne
from a Tanzanian perspective would place central emphasis
o n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n s for a n d to T a n z a n i a a n d
( g ro u ps or c l a s s e s of ) T a n z a n i a n s w h e t h e r or no t it w a s
i n f o r m e d b y an e x p l i c i t o r i m p l i c i t g l o b a l m o d e l .
J a p a n is n o t o f s i g n i f i c a n t r e l e v a n c e to the e c o n o m i c
p e n e t r a t i o n o f A f r i c a o v e r 1 8 0 0 - 1945.
I t s a t t e m p t to
b r e a k i n t o the A f r i c a n m a r k e t in the 1 9 3 0 s w a s b l o c k e d b y
hastily erected tariff modifications.
E x c e p t for L i b e r i a
the U S A w a s a l s o o n l y m a r g i n a l l y i n v o l v e d a f t e r the
d e c l i n e o f the s l a v e t ra de .
A n i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f so me o f t h e s e i s s u e s a p p e a r s
in K a t e N e a l e
" M a r x i s m a n d A f r i c a n H i s t o r y " , A F R A S Reviev/,
no. 1, S u m m e r 1975.
7. E .g . the O i l R i v e r s s t a t e s or - m u c h
E g y p t a n d i ts S u d a n e s e c ol o n y .
later
- M o h a m m e d All's
8.
T h e r a m s h a c k l e n a t u r e o f the E u r o p e a n p r e s e n c e is p e r h a p s
m o s t v i v i d l y portrayed in E u r o p e a n n o v e l s (e.g. C o n r a d ,
C a r y ) a n d its t e r r i f y i n g f ac e in A f r i c a n f i c t i o n .
9.
In the c a s e o f L a t i n A m e r i c a the i n t e r e s t s of the U S A
and
the U K c o i n c i d e d .
K e e p i n g the W e s t e r n h e m i s p h e r e
o p e n to U K t r a d e r e q u i r e d m a k i n g c l e a r t ha t the B r i t i s h
f l e e t w o u l d b l o c k r e c o n q u e s t a nd t h us de f a c t o p r o v i d i n g
the m i l i t a r y s h i e l d f or the Monro: D o c t r i n e 's g e o p o l i t i c a l ,
C a r i b b e a n t r a de a n d c o n t i g u o u s t e r r i t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n i s t
o r i e n t e d r e j e c t i o n of a r e v i v e d S p a n i s h / o r a n y a l t e r n a t i v e
new European/colonial dominance.
Therefore, 1800 - 3945
L a t i n A m e r i c a n i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the w o r l d c a p i t a l i s t
e c o n o m y w a s t h r o u g h the m e c h a n i s m s o f d e p e n d e n t penetration
n o t c o l o n i a l rule.
10.
For e x a m p l e , t he B r i t i s h m i s r e a d t he F a n t i - A s h a n t i s t a t e
conflict.
L o g i c a l l y they s hould have b a c k e d Ashanti,
e s t a b l i s h e d c o a s t a l f o r t s w i t h A s h a n t i a u t h o r i z a t i o n a nd
dealt w i t h As ha n t i n o m i n a t e d i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and p r o ­
c o n s u l s o v e r the F a n t i n o t b a c k e d F a n t i r e s i s t a n c e to
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of A s h a n t i ' s hegemony.
11.
T h i s is n o t i n t e n d e d as a no r ma ti ve j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
It
is a c r i t i c a l e l e m e n t in u n d e r s t a n d i n g L u s i t a n i a n i m p e r i a l
policy.
Of co urse a p o l i t i c a l ec o no m i c el em en t does
enter be ca u s e Po r t u g e s e state d e c i s i o n takers o b v i ou sl y
s t o o d to l o s e b y the r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f P o r t u g a l i n t o a
single, c e n t r a l i z e d Ib er ia n kingdom.
12.
In A s i a the c o n g r u e n c e o f c o l o n i a l o r i e n t e d a nd d o m i n a n t
m e t r o p o l i t a n i n t e r e s t s w a s g r e a t e r e s p e c i a l l y in the
I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t a n d the E a s t I n d i e s .
H o w e v e r , the
m a i n t r a d e a nd i n v e s t m e n t t h r u s t s o f c a p i t a l i s t g l o b a l
e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n in its E u r o c e n t r i c p h a s e w e r e
f o c u s e d on the p e r i p h e r y ' s a r e a s o f E u r o p e a n s e t t l e m e n t the A m e r i c a s a n d A u s t r a l a s i a a n d to a m u c h l e s s e r d e g r e e
A l geria and South Africa.
13.
State
part,
14.
So too, at t im es , c o u l d i n t r a - c o a l i t i o n s u p p o r t e.g.
s e l l i n g L a t i n A m e r i c a n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e b o n d s to m i d d l e
c l a s s s a v e r s in B r i t a i n .
15.
J u l e s F e r r y w a s d r i v e n f r o m o f f i c e fo r t w e n t y y e a r s w h e n
a m i n o r s k i r m i s h ( l i t e r a l l y ) in T o n k i n w e n t w r o n g ,
G e n e r a l G o r d o n was not e f f e c t i v e l y s u p p o r t e d or e x t r i c a t e d
nor very p r o m p t l y "avenged".
T he i m p e r i a l i s t c o a l i t i o n
h a s a n a r r o w c a r e b a se, an u n s t a b l e b o d y of l o o s e
a s s o c i a t e s a n d a n y t h i n g b u t c o n s i s t e n t , f i r m c o n t r o l o v er
th e c o m m a n d i n g h e i g h t s o f m e t r o p o l i t a n s t a t e p o l i c y .
s u p p o r t c o u l d be c h a n g e d to t a x p a y e r s w h o we re ,
n o t m e m b e r s o f the c a p i t a l i s t c o a l i t i o n .
in
V
16.
C o c o a in the G o l d C o a s t o w e d a l m o s t n o t h i n g to the
c o l o n i a l st at e.
R e l e v a n t a g ri cu l tu ra l advice and support
w a s n e g l i g i b l e , r a i l t r a n s p o r t w a s s e c o n d a r y to c o c o a
( ev en i f c r i t i c a l f o r g o l d m i n i n g ) , the c r i t i c a l
m a r k e t p r o v i s i o n f u n c t i o n w a s p l a y e d by c o a s t a l b a s e d
m e r c h a n t firms u s i n g up c o u n t r y A f r i c a n and L ebanese
intermediaries.
17.
" M o d e r n " A f r i c a n n e o - t r i b a l i s m and t i t l e s a re b y n o
m eans s im pl e d e s c e n d a n t s of p r e - c o l o n i a l peoples, social
g ro up s and ar istocrats.
T he n e w p o l i t i c a l c l a s s has
o f t e n s k i l l f u l l y m a n i p u l a t e d the g e o g r a p h i c - c u l t u r a l
s o l i d a r i t y e l e m e n t s o f t he " t r a d i t i o n a l " s y s t e m to
c r e a t e a n e w c l i e n t i l i s t b a s e b ut t h e r e is f ar f r o m a
d i r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t his type of p o l i t i c a l
s t r a t e g y and t r a d i t i o n a l ar i s t o c r a t i c b ackground, much
less w o r l d - v i e w .
T h e K a b a k a o f B u g a n d a a n d the
K i g a h d a a r i s t o c r a c y f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h n a t i o n a l
h e g e m o n y in U g a n d a p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y s o u g h t to
r e c r e a t e p r e - c o l o n i a l " n a t i o n a l t r i b a l i s m " a n d f a i l e d to
m a n i p u l a t e " n e o - t r i b a l l o c a l i s m " w i t h the s k i l l of
Dr. O b o t e .
18.
T h i s a n a l y t i c a l f r a m e d r a w s o n the d i v i s i o n s m a d e by
A m i n (op. c i t . , ) b u t is f a r f r o m i d e n t i c a l .
Regional
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a p p e a r s u n s o u n d e v e n in th e A m i n m a t r i x
a n d c o n c e s s i o n a r y c o m p a n y c o l o n i a l i s m w a s a b r i e f ph as e ,
w h i c h c e r t a i n l y i n f l u e n c e d but did not to t a l l y d o m in at e
the s u b s e q u e n t e v o l u t i o n o f c o l o n i a l p e n e t r a t i o n in the
t e r r i t o r i e s in w h i c h it w a s a p p l i e d .
19.
U n e q u a l in t hi s s e n s e r e l a t e s to t e r m s o f e x c h a n g e m o r e
u n e q u a l t h a n the p r o d u c t i v i t y of t he u n d e r l y i n g l a b o u r
fhrce and not f l o w i n g so le ly from p a r t i c u l a r ol i g o p o l y
or o l o g o p s o n y p o s i t i o n s .
It is b a s i c a l l y s i m i l a r to
o n e v a r i a n t of the P r e b i s c h - S i n g e r d e t e r i o r a t i n g t e r m s
o f t r a d e f or p r i m a r y p r o d u c t s case.
20.
T o t h a t e x t e n t A m i n ( o p . c i t . , ) a p p e a r s to o v e r s i m p l i f y .
C o n c e r n s as to s t a b i l i t y o f s u pp l y, " s e l f " s u f f i c i e n c y
as a g e o - p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h a n d e x t e r n a l a c c o u n t b a l a n c e
w e r e at t i m e s d o m i n a n t a n d s e e n as j u s t i f y i n g c o l o n i a l
t r a d e in p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m i c t e r m s e v e n w h e n l o w e r c o st
s o u r c e s o f s u p p l y j n the s i m p l e r s e n s e c l e a r l y e x i s t e d .
F or t he c o l o n i a l t r a d i n g f i r m " c h e a p " r e l a t e d to c o s t s
v e r s u s s e l l i n g p r i c e a t t a i n a b l e i r r e s p e c t i v e of w h e t h e r
the l a t t e r w e r e a r t i f i c i a l l y h i g h (or low).
21.
N e o - c o l o n i a l i s m is u s e d h e r e to r e l a t e to the f o r m of
d e p e n d e n c e in w h i c h the r o l e o f d o m e s t i c i n t e r m e d i a r i e s
is v e r y l i m i t e d e s p e c i a l l y in t he f i e l d s o f t e c h n i c a l
p e r so nn el , o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n and m a n a g e m e n t of
m e d i u m and large scale e nt erprises.
It is l i k e l y to be
a p h a s e in d e p e n d e n c e n o t a s t a b l e p a t t e r n f o r an y
e x t e n d e d p e r i o d b e c a u s e t he m e t r o p o l i t a n p r e s e n c e is too
o v e r t a n d the b a s e a n d m a s s of t h e i n t e r m e d i a r i e s t oo
narrow.
E i t h e r m o r e m e d i a t e d (but b y n o m e a n s
f
n e c e s s a r i l y l o o s e r or w e a k e r ) -forms o f d e p e n d e n c e or
a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t d e p e n d e n c e (e.g. the A r u s h a
D e c l a r a t i o n an d its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i n T a n z a n i a , the 1 9 7 2 74 p o l i t i c a l e v e n t s in the M a l a g a s y R e p u b l i c ) a re l i k e l y
to e n s u e .
In t h is s e n s e it is n o t a c c i d e n t a l t h a t the
m a i n b o d y o f a n a l y s i s o f d e p e n d e n c e in A f r i c a as
n & o - c o l o n i a l i s m d o e s d a t e to the 1 9 G 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s
w i t h m o r e r e c e n t w o r k t e n d i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y e i t h e r to
s p e a k o f d e p e n d e n c e or to t r e a t n e o - c o l o n i a l i s m
e x p l i c i t l y as o n e p h a s e o f t he d e v e l o p m e n t o f d e p e n d e n c e .
22.
The more " advanced" f orms of depe nd en c e t y p i c a l l y include
a s h a r p l y r e d u c e d v i s i b i l i t y of the e x p a t r i a t e p r e s e n c e ;
a mu c h more s u b s t a n t i a l A f r i c a n b usiness and pr ofessional
g r o u p a n d an e x p a n d e d A f r i c a n p u b l i c s e c t o r c r i t i c a l l y
l i n k e d to, and s h a r i n g at l e a s t s o m e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m i c
i n t e r e s t s w it h , t he d o m i n a n t f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s ;
some d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of e x t er na l e c o n om i c relations
a mong in d us t r i a l e c o n o m i e s and a lesser u n i la t er al
c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n the f o r m e r m e t r o p o l i s .
Wnere these
c o n d i t i o n s are n o t r e a d i l y m et, n e o - c o l o n i a l
r e t r e n c h m e n t m a y l e a d to i n c r e a s e d s t a g n a t i o n a n d
i n s t a b i l i t y (e.g. p r o b a b l y D a h o m e y , N i g e r ) .
W h e r e they
are r e a d i l y f u l f i l l e d a r e g i o n a l i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e
v i s a v is s m a l l e r or " m e r e r e c a l c i t r a n t " d e p e n d e n t
t e r r i t o r i e s m a y be p r o m o t e d b y c e n t r a l c a p i t a l i s t
i n t e r e s t s as w e l l as l o c a l p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n m e m b e r s
(e.g. K e n y a ) .
23.
A c l e a r e x a m p l e - a l b e i t w e l l a f t e r 1945 - is F r a n c e ' s
t r a d i n g a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f the c o s t o f p r o v i d i n g
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r d e p e n d e n t g r o w t h in A f r i c a a g a i n s t a
p o r t i o n of its p r e f e r r e d p o s i t i o n in f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n
m a r k e t s in the o r i g i n a l E E C A s s o c i a t i o n a r r a n g e m e n t s .
t,