Party Politics
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Democracy within Norwegian Political Parties : Complacency or Pressure for
Change?
Jo Saglie and Knut Heidar
Party Politics 2004 10: 385
DOI: 10.1177/1354068804043905
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PA RT Y P O L I T I C S
V O L 1 0 . N o . 4 pp. 385–405
Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publications
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London
Thousand Oaks
New Delhi
DEMOCRACY WITHIN NORWEGIAN
POLITICAL PARTIES
Complacency or Pressure for Change?
Jo Saglie and Knut Heidar
ABSTRACT
How democratic are the political parties in Norway? We use survey data
from Norwegian party members (1991 and 2000) and Congress delegates
(2000–1) to discuss two main questions: how do party members and
Congress delegates evaluate the state of intra-party democracy? And
what kind of intra-party democracy do they prefer? The analyses do not
support the thesis of an increasing centralization of party decisionmaking. Members were reasonably satisfied with the leadership, but
those in positions of power were more satisfied than the grassroots.
Participants at all levels preferred the present delegatory type of
democracy to more direct democratic procedures. The attitudes of the
participants do not indicate any strong pressure for organizational
change, but declining membership and lack of legitimacy may still bring
changes to intra-party decision-making.
KEY WORDS intra-party democracy Norway party membership
‘The political parties created democracy and . . . modern democracy is
unthinkable save in terms of the political parties’, according to E. E.
Schattschneider (1942: 1). Accepting that still leaves open the question of
the ways in which parties are instrumental to democracy. One line of
argument is that parties allow citizens to exercise some control over public
policy, especially by giving voters a choice between competing programmes
(e.g. Downs, 1957). Another view is that parties offer the voters a choice
between competing teams of leaders, or at least that the voters have the
opportunity to kick the incumbent rascals out (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942). But
while inter-party competition is widely appreciated, intra-party democracy
is questioned. Is intra-party democracy possible? Ought parties to be internally democratic? Why should we expect parties to be internally democratic?
1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068804043905]
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Schattschneider (1942: 60) stated the case against intra-party democracy:
‘democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties’.1 Prooligarchy arguments usually build on the analogy between politics and
markets. Political parties compete for votes, and should be accountable to
their voters rather than to their members. Maurice Duverger, for example,
pointed to a contradiction between party democracy and efficiency. A party
may very well be internally democratic, but, ‘organized in this fashion, a
party is not well armed for the struggles of politics’. If one party in a party
system ‘organize[s] itself along authoritarian and autocratic lines, the others
would be placed in a position of inferiority’ (Duverger, 1954: 134).
Several arguments are put forward in favour of intra-party democracy
(see, e.g., Heidar, 1988; Teorell, 1999; Ware, 1987). First, the participatory
argument states that democratic parties enable citizens to take an active part
in decisions that affect their lives. This is often discussed in terms of selfdevelopment. Participation may foster a civic orientation; citizens need
experience from micro-democracies to build a macro-democracy. Second,
the deliberative argument points to parties as arenas for formation of preferences through public discussion and debate. Particular interests may be
reconciled with more general interests through intra-party deliberations.
Third, the competitive argument – often used against intra-party democracy
– may be turned around. Intra-party democracy may prevent oligopolistic
collusion between the party elites (Ware, 1979: Ch. 5). In more recent terms,
internally democratic parties will be less prone to cartelization.
The debate on the merits of internally democratic parties, however, is
more prominent in political science than in political practice. Party leaders
in democratic societies rarely recommend oligarchy – not at least in public.
Intra-party democracy is widely recognized as the only legitimate form of
organization. On the other hand, scholars since Michels (1962 [1911]) have
told us that all allegedly democratic parties turn into oligarchies. Duverger
(1954: 133) remarked that party leadership ‘is democratic in appearance
and oligarchic in reality’, except for fascist parties that ‘are bold enough to
confess in public what others practice in secret’. But since party leaders
usually praise the quality of democracy within their party, democratic norms
and practices should be appropriate yardsticks to measure parties by.
The question, however, is what internally democratic parties should look
like (Linz, 2002: 309–11). The abstract principles of democracy must be
embodied in concrete institutions and procedures. Should participation be
limited to party members or should voters be allowed a say? Should
decisions be taken by delegatory or direct democracy? These issues are
usually contested, and we would expect party members and activists to take
different views.
The subject of this article is democracy within the seven main Norwegian
parties. Our method is to ask members at different levels within the parties
about their experience of decision-making and their opinion on institutional
design and procedures. Our data are from surveys with Norwegian party
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members and Congress delegates. We ask two main questions: how do
party members and Congress delegates evaluate the state of intra-party
democracy? And what kind of intra-party democracy do they prefer?
Party Democracy: Developmental
and Theoretical Perspectives
The story of party change, as it unfolds in the literature on party organizations, is usually one of democratic decline since the ‘golden age’ of the mass
party. Party researchers tend to follow Kirchheimer’s (1966) analysis of the
transformation of party organizations – from mass parties to catch-all
parties. The organizational dimension of Kirchheimer’s catch-all thesis
describes a shift in the intra-party power balance. Catch-all parties downgrade the role of the individual party member, while the party leadership is
strengthened. This centralization is explained by the assumed trade-off
between internal democracy and electoral efficiency. Intra-party democracy
is seen as a threat to the electoralist strategies of the elite. And when one
party in the party system adopts a more efficient (and less democratic)
organizational structure, party competition ensures that the other parties
follow.
The problem with this story, however, is that Duverger’s mass party model
is presented as the ideal type of the membership-oriented bottom-up party.
But – as mentioned above – Duverger himself was sceptical regarding the
democratic qualities of the mass party. Following Michels, Duverger knew
very well that formal democratic structures might cover oligarchic practices.
Moreover, the mass party organization might have been less widespread
than assumed in the literature (Scarrow, 2000). Briefly, the ‘golden age’
might have been less golden than is sometimes presumed.
But why should there be increased party centralization? And why should
there be a trade-off between internal democracy and vote-seeking? One
explanation is found in May’s (1973) ‘special law of curvilinear disparity’.
According to this ‘law’, party activists have more extreme attitudes than
both party voters and party elites. It follows that parties that listen to their
activists will adopt extreme policy positions and therefore lose votes.
Internal democracy causes electoral defeat. On the other hand, a ‘reductionist psychology’ (Kitschelt, 1989: 403), where party leaders are driven
by a thirst for power while the party rank and file are uncompromising ideologues, is not very convincing. Systematic efforts to test May’s theory have
given little support to the law of curvilinear disparity.2 To be sure, voters
are more moderate than party members and activists, but party elites are
usually just as extreme as the activists, perhaps even more so.
A rejection of May’s law, however, does not necessarily invalidate the
trade-off between democracy and efficiency. Scarrow et al. (2000: 132) have
pointed out that party leaders might want to increase their flexibility, even
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without any fundamental policy conflict between leaders and members. In
addition, developments within the mass media may reduce the feasibility of
democratic procedures. Journalists demand quick responses to new issues,
so that even democratic-minded leaders may find it hard to organize a
proper party debate. Democracy – whether direct, delegatory or deliberative – is both time-consuming and risky.
Even pure vote-seeking party leaders may find members useful as it may
improve their ability to reach out to their electorate (Scarrow, 1996). This
creates a dilemma for party elites: they want to attract and retain members
while at the same time keeping decision-making flexible. Members today,
however, might be even more demanding than before, owing to rising levels
of education and improved access to political information. They will
presumably not tolerate oligarchic decision-making. Katz and Mair’s (1995)
cartel party thesis offers a solution to this dilemma. In the cartel party, the
members have more formal rights than in the catch-all party. However, they
exercise their rights as individuals rather than through the party apparatus.
Decisions are taken by membership ballots, and non-members might also
be invited to participate. Party elites thus empower the docile and passive
members, dilute the power of the activists and consequently increase their
own power. An apparent democratization is in reality centralization. In
short, the cartel thesis appears to reiterate Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’.
Direct democracy has become a much-debated alternative procedure for
party decision-making. Membership ballots on policy and personnel questions have been introduced, or at least discussed, in many parties (Heidar
and Saglie, 2003a; Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Scarrow, 1999; Scarrow et
al., 2000; Seyd, 1999; Young and Cross, 2002). The cartel thesis interprets
these reforms as indications of enhanced leadership autonomy. We should
not, however, assume a priori that intra-party democratization is impossible. Both direct and delegatory democracy may certainly be manipulated
by oligarchic elites – but they might also actually function in a democratic
way. As Scarrow et al. (2000: 150) note, ‘even the most strategically calculating electoralist leaders may find themselves operating in an authentically
democratic context of sorts’. Our analytical starting point will be that there
are different democratic procedures as well as different degrees of internal
democracy – ‘democracy’ is a continuum, not a categorical issue. The choice
between different decision-making mechanisms will, however, presumably
affect the balance of power between different groups within the party. In
other words: parties may vary, and our task is to find out how they vary.
Operationalization, Measurements and Data
Taking low participation within parties as an indicator of oligarchy, the
members appear to be marginalized. The Norwegian party member surveys
show that more than half the members had not attended any party events
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(branch meetings, seminars, gatherings, parties, etc.) during the last year
(Heidar, 1994; Heidar and Saglie, 2003b). The relative share of reasonably
active members taking part in at least four party events a year – roughly
one in five – has been stable during the 1990s. But as the actual number of
members has declined sharply, the overall number of active members has
also dropped. Internet-based activities have not become alternative channels
for the otherwise passive members, but appear to be supplementary tools
for the few activists.
Lack of participation is not necessarily due to oligarchy, however.
Another interpretation is that the members have in fact marginalized themselves. Members may feel that they enjoy opportunities to participate in the
decision-making process, but may nevertheless refrain from using these
opportunities (Zielonka-Goei, 1992). The quality of intra-party democracy
may not just depend on actual participation, but also on the opportunities
for participation should important conflicts arise and members feel the need
to engage themselves.
Even though actual participation in decision-making is vital, the
members’ own assessments of influence are clearly important ‘circumstantial evidence’ in the study of party power (see, e.g., Heidar, 1984). Members’
experiences will be reflected in their evaluation of how party democracy
actually works, and their views on how to design internal democracy will
reflect their level of satisfaction with the status quo. To reach a final verdict
on the quality of democracy within Norwegian parties is hardly possible,
but the problem of interpreting the data can be partially overcome by our
opportunity to compare both different parties and different intra-party
groups. The research is based on two mail surveys of Norwegian party
members (1991 and 2000) and a mail questionnaire to all party Congress
delegates (2000–1).3 We focus on both the perceptions – how the state of
intra-party democracy is evaluated – and the norms – how it should work,
and how it can be improved. Three comparisons are made. First, between
different levels within the parties: Congress delegates, active members and
passive members; second, between members in 1991 and 2000; and third,
between the seven parties included in these studies.
Each party sample in the two member surveys was made up of a random
selection of 400 members registered in the party archives. All delegates to
each party’s national Congress (ranging between 192 and 300 people) were
included in the delegate survey. The overall response rates were 68 percent
in the 1991 member survey, 61 percent in the 2000 member survey and 71
percent in the delegate survey. In reporting the views of ‘party members’ as
a whole in the member surveys, the data are weighted to be representative
of the universe of ‘Norwegian party members’. This weighting is of course
not done for the party-specific analyses. The weights are calculated on the
basis of the seven parties’ relative share of the aggregate number of party
members in Norway. Small parties are strongly over-represented in the
universe of Congress delegates compared with the universe of members.
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This may cause problems for overall comparisons between members and
the delegates. Therefore, we must see whether general differences between
levels also are found within each party.
Views on National Level Party Democracy
What kind of perceptions should we – on the basis of the party literature –
expect Norwegian party members and Congress delegates to hold? The
catch-all thesis assumes centralization. If true, we can expect both members
and Congress delegates to be dissatisfied with the quality of intra-party
democracy – and increasingly so. Congress delegates should be less dissatisfied given that the powerful top elites are among the delegates.4 The
cartel thesis leads us to expect a different pattern: delegates (except for the
top elites) and active members will be less satisfied than passive members,
and increasingly so. We do not, however, expect to find this ‘cartelized’
pattern in Norway. Even though some of the characteristics of the cartel
party are in place – such as a dependence on state subventions – their
decision-making procedures do not correspond to the cartel thesis. Norwegian parties practise delegatory democracy.
Our questionnaires included three statements on intra-party democracy
at the national level. Members and Congress delegates were asked about
the attentiveness of the leadership, the importance of personal connections
and whether a strong leadership was a problem. Only the first-mentioned
question was included in the 1991 survey. To answer our question on
change, we must therefore focus on how members perceived the attentiveness of the central leadership.
Figure 1 shows that the change has been modest. About one in four party
members register satisfaction with the leadership’s attentiveness. Most
respondents chose the middle category or the ‘don’t know’ option. The
balance of opinion (the percentage stating agreement minus the percentage
stating disagreement) changed from 6 in 1991 to 12 in 2000. This means
that the satisfied members (i.e. those who agreed that the leadership pays
attention) only just outnumbered the dissatisfied in 1991, and that the
satisfied majority became slightly stronger in 2000. Even though this
increase is statistically significant, the substantial change is weak. We can
nevertheless conclude that there are no indications of an increased marginalization of party members during the 1990s.
Were there any differences between passive members, active members and
Congress delegates in the 2000–1 surveys? Given the low activity within the
parties, we defined ‘active members’ as those who attended more than one
party event last year. The results are given in Table 1. There was one general
difference between the three levels. Not surprisingly, the ‘don’t know’ share
was highest among the passive members and almost non-existent among the
Congress delegates.
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5
Agree completely
8
19
19
Agree somewhat
1991
37
38
Neither agree nor disagree
2000
12
10
Disagree somewhat
6
5
Disagree completely
21
20
Don't know
0
10
20
30
40
50
Figure 1. Perceptions of the leadership’s attentiveness among party members,
1991 and 2000 (percent)*
Q: The central party leadership is good at paying attention to the views of ordinary party
members.
*To be representative of Norwegian party members, the figures are weighted. Those who did
not answer (5 percent) are excluded. Unweighted N (1991/2000): 1816/1620. Significance
(chi-square test) 0.003.
When we focus on those who expressed an opinion, the response pattern
varies between the three items. A large majority – regardless of level – agreed
that personal connections are crucial and far more important than formal
positions. The expected difference between Congress delegates and members
appeared in the other two questions. Congress delegates were more convinced
that the leadership pays attention than the members were. A majority at all
levels did not see strong leadership as a problem – but the satisfied majority
was much greater among the Congress delegates.5 It is of course difficult to
interpret disagreement with this statement. Some might disagree because
they did not object to strong and dominant leaders as such; others might
disagree because the actual leadership in their party was considered too
weak.
We found a curvilinear pattern on two of the questions (attentiveness and
personal connections): active members were less satisfied than both passive
members and Congress delegates. The difference between active and passive
members, however, was small. The main conclusion that emerges from
Table 1 is that Congress delegates were happier with the state of intra-party
democracy than members were – except that all groups were equally
worried about the – presumably undue – influence of personal connections.
What differences might be found between the parties? First, the parties
of the right have traditionally had the more independent parliamentary
party groups. We may thus expect to find more perceived intra-party democracy in the parties of the left, even though the party organizations of the
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Table 1. Perceptions of intra-party democracy among party members and
Congress delegates, 2000–1 (percentage)*
Leadership pays
attention to the
views of members
PM
AM
Personal
connections
are crucial
A problem that
the leadership
is too strong
CD
PM
AM
CD
PM
Agree completely
6
11
15
Agree somewhat
19
19
35
Neither agree nor
37
40
37
disagree
Disagree somewhat
7
15
8
Disagree completely
4
7
4
Don’t know
27
8
1
Sum
100 100 100
Balance of opinion**
14
8
38
Significance***
0.000
Unweighted N
1010 610 1154
22
29
18
23
38
19
19
40
26
6
11
20
5
7
9
1
2
4
25
11
2
100 100
100
45
52
46
0.000
977 594 1148
21
21
21
100
–25
AM
CD
7
14
25
4
6
19
23
29
24
41
7
1
100
100
–26
–60
0.000
972 593 1148
Q: (a) The central party leadership is good at paying attention to the views of ordinary party
members. (b) To influence decisions in the central party leadership, personal connections are
crucial and much more important than formal positions in the party. (c) A problem with
the party today is that the leadership is too strong.
*PM: passive members (participation at less than two party events – branch meetings, seminars,
gatherings, parties, etc. – last year); AM: active members (two events or more); CD:
Congress delegates. Party member figures are weighted. Those who did not answer (1
percent of Congress delegates, and 8–11 percent of members) are excluded.
**Percentage stating agreement minus percentage stating disagreement.
***Significance levels in all tables and figures are based on chi-square tests.
left and right have become increasingly similar over time (Svåsand et al.,
1997). Second, following Michels (1962 [1911]) we would expect lack of
democracy to be more widespread in large parties, where the organization
is complex and the distance between the individual member and the leadership is greater. Third, we expect intra-party democracy to be more vulnerable in governing parties, where adopted party policies often must yield to
economic realities or the need for compromises. Labour minority governments were in power when our surveys were carried out.
These expectations all share a common problem, however, which is that
the perceptions of our respondents depend on both the actual state of
democracy within their party and the respondent’s own standards for
democracy. Consider, for example, a party with strong democratic
traditions. This party may actually be more democratic than its competitors, but if its members set higher standards than the others do, they may
be just as dissatisfied as the others.
Table 2 presents the balance of opinion among members and delegates
within the seven parties. Two general conclusions can be drawn from this
table. First, the relationship between the members and the delegates was
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Table 2. Perceptions of intra-party democracy among party members (M) and
Congress delegates (CD) 2000–1, by party. Balance of opinion*
Labour
Conservative
Liberal
Centre
Socialist Left
Christian
Progress
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
Leadership
pays attention
to members
Personal
connections
are crucial
A problem that
the leadership
is too strong
Smallest N
–2
–7
2
46
22
18
19
52
19
47
31
61
48
70
56
56
50
60
52
50
46
47
34
25
43
48
41
39
– 2
–52
–37
–78
–26
–42
–34
–77
–50
–48
–48
–67
–35
–62
231
219
182
185
259
137
206
145
287
152
193
179
204
129
*See Table 1 for question wording and definition of ‘Balance of opinion’.
more or less unchanged after control for party affiliation. Second, Labour
members and delegates perceived their party as less democratic than respondents from other parties did. Party differences regarding the ‘personal
connections’ item were minor. Respondents from all groups agreed that
personal connections are more important sources of influence than formal
positions. Differences between parties were much clearer on the other two
items. Labour members and delegates were the only groups with a negative
balance of opinion on the question of attentiveness, i.e. that those who did
not perceive the leadership as listening outnumber those who did. Conservative members were the only other group with a similar balance, while
Progress Party members and delegates were the most satisfied. Regarding
the last statement that describes strong leadership as a problem, the
predominant view in all parties and at both levels was disagreement. Labour
members, however, stood out as the only group with an even balance.
Intra-party democracy was put under stronger pressure in Labour than
in most other parties. The negative evaluations of the Labour Party confirm
our expectations regarding large parties and governing parties. However,
the findings may also reflect the fact that Labour’s democratic traditions are
probably more ‘demanding’ than for parties of the right and that the actual
state of intra-party democracy may in fact have declined. The strong hold
of informal connections in Labour Party decision-making, the perceptions
of weak leadership attentiveness and the strong member segment holding
that leadership is too strong all suggest a lack of confidence in the internal
party democracy of the Labour Party.
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Returning to our discussion about the different party models, these data
do not allow us to conclude in absolutes. Congress delegates and active
members were more satisfied than passive members were, but there is no
visible trend during the 1990s towards decreased satisfaction. The parties
may well have become catch-all parties, but if so they were already that in
the early 1990s.
Views on Local Level Party Democracy
According to the cartel thesis, a centralization of the national organization
does not necessarily affect the way local branches work. The cartel thesis
assumes a ‘stratarchy’, where the central party and the local parties operate
relatively autonomously of each other (Katz and Mair, 1995: 21). If this is
the case, members may view the national party and their local branch differently. We therefore turn to member evaluation of democracy within local
branches to see if perceptions differ.
A question on the likelihood of an ‘ordinary member’ winning the local
party branch over to his/her point of view was asked both in 1991 and
2000. The results are reported in Figure 2. The most striking difference from
Figure 1 is a very high percentage without any opinion – almost half the
members. This may be reasonable, as members may form opinions on the
national party organization on the basis of the mass media. Formation of
attitudes towards the local branch requires, to a greater extent, personal
Disagreement
rarely expressed
13
Leadership
usually wins
17
18
Members win
occasionally
17
Members win
quite often
20
1991
2000
20
4
4
42
Don't know
0
10
20
30
40
45
50
Figure 2. Perceptions of party member influence in local branches among party
members, 1991 and 2000 (percent)*
Q: What is your impression of the chance of an ordinary party member winning the local party
branch over to his/her point of view?
*Weighted figures; 4 percent did not answer the question and are excluded from the calculations.
Unweighted N (1991/2000): 1812/1671. Significance (chi-square test) 0.002.
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experience – which is obviously lacking for most members (Heidar and
Saglie, 2003b). Since the level of participation is low, the lack of perceptions is no surprise. Another sign of low activity is that some of the members
– 17 percent in 1991 and 13 in 2000 – reported that political disagreement
was rarely expressed in the local branch. One in five, however, had the
impression that the ordinary member occasionally won over the party
leadership.
Turning to what happened during the 1990s, the answer – again – is:
nothing much! The ‘top-down score’, i.e. the percentage who stated that the
leadership won most of the time minus those who felt that members won
occasionally or quite often, revealed no sign of increasing member marginalization. The substantial change is weak: the top-down score changed from
–1 to –6, which means that the democratic ‘bottom-up’ view only just
outnumbered the oligarchic ‘top-down’ perception both in 1991 and 2000.
Table 3a on party differences meets the expectations based on the effects
of party size. The ‘bottom-up’ perception was most widespread in the smaller
parties – especially among the Liberals. The Conservative Party stood out as
the most leadership-dominated party in 1991, but by 2000 had become fairly
average. The difference between Labour and the other larger parties was
small. Labour’s status as a government party had presumably less effect at
the local level, as different parties were in power in different municipalities.
Table 3b brings to light the relationship between perceived influence and
party activity. This question was not asked in the Congress delegate study,
but the difference between active and passive members is clear. Not surprisingly, the ‘don’t know’ percentage was highest among the armchair
members – among whom only about one-third formed an opinion. We also
see that the balance between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perceptions
levelled among the passive members, while the activists clearly perceived
their local branch as democratic. The problem, however, is that the views
Table 3. Perceptions of party member influence in local branches among party
members (1991 and 2000), by party and activity
a) By party
Labour
–91 –00
Top-down score* –4 –1
N
273 257
b) By activity**
Top-down score*
Percent don’t know
Unweighted N
Christian
Conserv.
Progress
Centre
Soc. Left
Liberal
–91 –00
–1 –3
272 217
–91 –00
9 –7
202 193
–91 –00
–7 –10
209 219
–91 –00
–11 –14
272 223
–91 –00
–20 –16
331 290
–91 –00
–21 –31
253 272
None, n.a.
One
–91
9
64
868
–91
3
41
212
–00
0
66
813
–00
0
48
239
Two to four
Five or more
–91
–13
19
355
–91
–24
6
377
–00
–7
23
288
–00
–28
7
331
Q: See Figure 2.
*Top-down score: the percentage stating that the leadership won most of the time minus those who felt that members
won occasionally or quite often – even against the leadership’s wishes.
**Participation at party events during the past year. Weighted figures.
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of both groups may be less than reliable. The relatively negative evaluations
among the passive members may be dismissed as hearsay, while the active
members were more likely to hold party office, and as such may in fact have
evaluated their own democratic qualities.
In sum, there is no doubt that members evaluate national and local levels
differently, but the difference is not the one assumed by the cartel thesis.
First of all, members have more opinions on what is happening at the
national level. It also appears that larger parties intrinsically have greater
problems with maintaining democracy than smaller ones.
Should Congress, Members or Voters Decide in Parties?
Intra-party democracy in Norway is confined to members, and organized
according to the principles of delegatory democracy. Debates on party
decision-making have only recently questioned the members’ privileged
position. We used two kinds of questions to measure support for different
democratic models. The first question contrasts voter-oriented leadership
(i.e. the catch-all party) with a leadership bound by membership democracy
(the mass party). Second, three questions on democratic procedures measure
the choice between the direct democracy of the cartel party and the delegatory democracy of the mass party. These questions were not asked in the
1991 survey, so we cannot study changes over time.
In terms of what democratic parties should look like, and the norms
sustaining such beliefs, our expectations are less ambiguous than our expectations about perceptions. We expect quite simply that each party grouping
wants to increase or maintain its own power. Members will support direct
democracy, whereas Congress delegates will be in favour of delegatory
democracy (i.e. that decisions are made by the Congress). On this basis we
would also expect all intra-party groups to be sceptical about increasing the
party voters’ influence – at the expense of party members. However, the
passive member has (and possibly wants) less influence anyway, and may
be less sceptical than the other levels.
Party differences might reflect party ideology: we would expect liberally
inclined, individualistic parties to be stronger supporters of direct democracy, while more collectivist parties would lean more towards delegatory
democracy. We also assume that ongoing debates within parties have an
impact. Direct democracy has been discussed, and included in the party
statutes, in some parties but not in all. The attitudes towards direct democracy may be more favourable where such debates have taken place.
There have been few proposals put forward to open the parties to sympathizers or voters. Some argue that the party leadership must be given
leeway to interpret and change party positions to maximize votes, but there
is little pressure to create new channels of serious party decision-making
to non-members.6 Figure 3 therefore pictures surprisingly large support
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favouring the catch-all position – that the leadership should listen more to
the voters than to the members. One in three passive members held this
view and even among Congress delegates one in seven thought this was the
right policy. Some members were clearly willing to reduce their own influence, and thus accept a catch-all strategy. On the other hand, one in four
passive members opposed increased voter influence – or, as they would
probably have seen it, increased leadership influence. There is clearly much
old ‘mass party’ thinking left.
The more integrated in party culture and the closer to the top, moreover,
the less support for the view that voters should have increased attention
from the leadership. The balance of opinion on this issue changed from a
majority of 7 percentage points in favour among the passive members to
negative balances of –9 and –31 among active members and Congress delegates, respectively. Quite a few saw both advantages and disadvantages in
listening more to the voters, and ambivalence was in fact highest among the
delegates; 39 percent neither agreed nor disagreed at this level. On the
whole, these figures support the argument that no group within the parties
likes to lose power. The passive members are less integrated in the channel
Agree completely
12
4
Agree somewhat
10
16
14
17
28
Neither agree nor disagree
14
Disagree somewhat
12
Disagree completely
Don't know
2
Congress delegates
39
27
16
18
13
5
0
19
34
10
20
Active members
30
40
50
Passive members
Figure 3. Norms on member and voter influence among party members and
Congress delegates, 2000–1 (percent)*
Q: The leadership should listen more to the voters than to the members.
*See Table 1 for definition of active and passive members. Party member figures are weighted.
Those who did not answer (1 percent of Congress delegates and 8 percent of members) are
excluded. Unweighted N: passive members 998; active members 604; Congress delegates
1150. Significance (chi-square test) 0.000.
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of decision-making and the ‘cost’ of paying more attention to voters is lower
– which was as expected.
Turning to party differences on this issue, Table 4 upholds the clear difference between members and delegates. The higher negative balance of
opinion, the more sceptical to upgrading the voter impact on party decisionmaking. The overall most negative party was the Socialist Left Party, where
the balance of opinion was massively negative: –37 for the members and
–52 for the delegates. These figures definitely indicate strong support for the
member-oriented mass party model. This was perhaps due to the fact that
shortly before the survey the party had been through an intense debate over
the role of its controversial former party leader. He was seen by many
activists as too much of a public relations man pursuing the maximum vote
rather than member influence. At the opposite end of the spectrum we find
the Labour, Conservative and Progress Party members, where a slight
majority was voter-oriented, more ‘catch-all’.
In the party debates the question of holding membership ballots has been
central (Heidar and Saglie, 2003a). Rules on consultative membership
ballots have for some years been in the statutes of the Liberal and Progress
parties, while the Labour Party adopted a new paragraph on this at its 2000
Congress. The Socialist Left Party introduced both consultative and binding
membership ballots in its statutes at the 2001 Congress, but the Congress
rejected a motion for an election of the party leader by membership ballot.
However, the traditional practice remains. No party has actually held any
national level membership ballot yet.
We asked for opinions on the choice between the delegatory democracy
of the mass party model and the individualized procedures of the cartel
party model (see Table 5). The first two questions concern policy formation
and election of the party leader. It is clearly possible to take up different
positions on the use of ballots depending on the nature of the decision
involved. We can see from Table 5 that this is indeed the case, as more
favoured the use of ballots when deciding on important policy issues than
when electing the party leader. One of our expectations is partially
confirmed in Table 5: the more one presumably has to lose in terms of
power, the less one favours direct democracy. The delegates strongly
preferred to select the leader and decide important issues by themselves.
Table 4. Norms on member and voter influence among party members and
Congress delegates (2000–1), by party. Balance of opinion
Labour
Conserv. Progress
M
M
CD
CD
M
CD
Centre
M
CD
Christian
Liberal
Soc. Left
M
M
M
CD
CD
CD
Balance 14 –23
6 –9
1 –22
–2 –40 –11 –50 –14 –25 –37 –52
N
244 220 185 185 208 127 211 146 202 181 260 139 292 152
Q: The leadership should listen more to the voters than to the members.
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Table 5. Attitudes to delegatory and direct intra-party democracy among party
members and Congress delegates, 2000–1 (percentage)*
Forming
party policy
PM
Delegatory
democracy**
Direct democracy
Don’t know
Sum
Balance of
opinion***
Significance
Unweighted N
AM
Election of
party leader
CD PM
AM
Selection of the
party’s MPs
CD PM
AM
CD
46
64
84
69
79
92
46
56
68
30
24
100
16
28
8
100
36
13
3
100
71
17
14
100
52
16
5
100
63
7
1
100
85
41
13
100
5
40
4
100
16
29
3
100
39
1062
0.000
0.000
0.000
623 1152 1055 619 1155 1050 617 1152
Q: Party procedures for selection of personnel and policy formation have recently been discussed.
We would like to ask for your opinion on some proposals in three different areas:
(A) Forming party policy
–The national Congress should have the final say on important issues.
–There should be membership ballots on important issues.
(B) Election of party leader
–The party leader should be elected by the national Congress.
–The party leader should be elected by a membership ballot.
(C) Selection of the party’s MPs
–The members should – through the constituency nomination convention – select their
constituency party’s MPs.
–The voters should influence the selection of their party’s MPs directly, e.g. by crossing out
or giving extra votes to candidates on the party list.
*Party member figures are weighted. Those who did not answer (1 percent of Congress delegates and 3–4 percent of members) are excluded.
**The first answer in all three items above is taken to be in support of delegatory democracy,
the second in support of direct democracy.
***Percentage in favour of delegatory democracy minus percentage in favour of direct democracy.
These decisions are much too important to be left to the ordinary members.
Contrary to our expectations, however, the members also favoured a
procedure that gave the Congress the final say. Representative or delegatory
democracy – i.e. the old mass party model – clearly has a strong standing
in Norwegian parties.
Our results contrast with the British, Danish and Canadian party member
surveys, where majorities approved of postal ballots (Pedersen, 2001: 16;
Seyd, 1999: 395; Young and Cross, 2002: 687–8). Different question formats
have presumably influenced the answers. British and Danish members were
asked to indicate agreement with a statement that postal ballots strengthened party democracy. The Canadian and Norwegian items, however, are
fairly comparable, as respondents in both countries were given an explicit
choice between the two kinds of democracy.7 The Norwegian enthusiasm
for delegatory democracy contrasts sharply with the Canadian support for
direct election of party leaders. This difference in attitudes corresponds to
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organizational practice in the two countries, as some Canadian parties have
elected their leaders by membership ballots.
The last question presented in Table 5 on how to select the party’s MPs
gives a choice between the traditional internal nomination process and
giving the voters a greater say. Norwegian parties select their parliamentary
candidates by delegatory democracy at the county level (Valen, 1988; Valen
et al., 2002). The only effective choice for Norwegian voters at parliamentary elections is the choice between party lists. The Electoral Reform
Commission unanimously proposed the introduction of preferential voting
in Norway (NOU, 2001: Ch. 8), but this proposal was rejected by the
Parliament in 2003. Here we find the familiar pattern that the higher the
level of party involvement, the less support for giving the voters a say. At
the same time, however, within each group there was stronger support for
voter influence over the selection of MPs than for member influence on
internal matters. About 40 percent of both passive and active members, as
well as 29 percent of the delegates, would welcome more voter influence in
this field. In a way the party people seem to differentiate between the affairs
of the party and the affairs of the voters. With that said, however, a majority
at all levels would still like to keep selection of MPs ‘inside’ the party. The
mass party prevails!
Turning finally to the different party profiles on these issues in Table 6
Table 6. Attitudes to delegatory and direct intra-party democracy among party
members and Congress delegates, by party. Balance of opinion
(delegatory minus direct democracy)
Progress
Conservative
Christian
Labour
Centre
Liberal
Socialist Left
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
M
CD
Forming
party
policy
Election
of party
leader
Selection
of the
party’s
MPs
Party
organization
protection
points*
Smallest N
8
69
28
83
23
86
25
61
21
64
28
69
29
65
39
83
54
89
59
91
55
79
60
90
65
79
69
81
–12
33
–1
22
3
62
17
44
19
65
18
–13
24
59
35
185
81
194
85
239
97
184
100
219
111
135
122
205
220
131
191
186
213
179
253
218
222
146
272
136
291
154
Q: See Table 5.
*Sum of the opinion balances on the three items.
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we find few exceptions to the overall picture. The positive opinion balances
show that delegates in all parties (with one exception) wanted to maintain
delegatory democracy, and they were more strongly convinced about this
than their membership. This was also true for the Labour and Socialist Left
delegates, regardless of the fact that they voted in favour of opening for
membership ballots at the 2000–1 Congresses. The exception is that the
delegates in the Liberal Party favoured stronger voter influence in the selection of MPs. The support for delegatory democracy was also massive among
members of all parties. But when it came to selection of MPs, a majority of
Progress Party members would like to give the voters a say, a view also just
favoured by the Conservative membership.
Summarizing the figures for the opinion balances in all parties into a
kind of delegatory party democracy ‘protection points’ we find the highest
scores among Christian, Centre and Socialist Left parties’ Congress delegates. The Progress Party members had the lowest score, indicating that
they were not that keen on keeping decisions delegatory and within the
party. The difference between members and delegates was smallest among
the Liberals, as it was in Table 4. The Liberal members were relatively
favourable to the traditional procedures, while the delegates were more
change-oriented, particularly so compared with their colleagues in other
parties. All in all, this supports the view that the parties with a liberal or
– perhaps better – individualistic ideology are most open to rearrange the
pyramids of power and to open up to the voters. The Liberal delegates
along with the ‘anti-politicians’ in the Progress Party seem to be the least
anchored in the mass party model.
Institutional Inertia in Declining Organizations
Our starting point was the catch-all argument: that political parties suffer
from increasing centralization, increased focus on the voters and decreased
internal democracy. We found little evidence for such a change taking place
during the 1990s. With regard to member perceptions of intra-party democracy, very little has changed between 1991 and 2000. The stability is
striking, also in view of the loss of members during the 1990s. The data
indicate that the members were reasonably satisfied with their leaderships.
Some participants were nevertheless more satisfied than others. Respondents from larger parties, especially the governing party of that time, were
more critical of their leaders. Across the parties, those in positions of power
were more satisfied than the grassroots.
Both members and Congress delegates in all parties perceived personal
connections and informal networks as crucial in the decision-making
process. We have earlier used the term ‘network party’ to describe modern
party organizations, where formal procedures seem to lose importance
(Heidar and Saglie, 2003a). Party members apparently agree – even though
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it should be mentioned that personal connections were not unknown in the
‘golden age’. In this respect the organizational practice breaks with the
highly formalized mass party model.
The cartel party thesis assumes that delegatory democracy yields to direct
decision-making. This is – at least so far – not the case in Norwegian parties.
Regardless of recent debates on membership ballots, the decision-making
structures and practices of Duverger’s mass party model prevail. Our data
show that the demand for new procedures is limited. Again, those in a
position of power were the most satisfied with the status quo. But those
who preferred traditional procedures outweighed those who favoured direct
democracy at all organizational levels. Even passive members – who might
gain influence if postal ballots were introduced – preferred the delegatory
system. One explanation is pure institutional inertia, an organizational
conservatism. But our respondents might also have considered the democratic qualities of the mass party structure. The traditional structure is
admittedly hierarchical, but it may also ensure accountability. Organizational pyramids can be torn down, but fluid and informal network structures are not necessarily less oligarchic. Including voter support at the
expense of member support as a legitimate basis of leadership decisions
would actually make party leadership more oligarchic – at least by the
organizationally confined definition of Robert Michels (1962 [1911]).
Briefly, our data on perceptions and norms indicate that there is
complacency – rather than pressure for change – in Norwegian parties. Since
the demand for change was strongest among the non-participants, we might
have concluded that organizational change was unlikely. These data,
however, do not tell the whole story. As mentioned above, the parties are
losing members and passive membership is widespread. Even if parties use
internally democratic procedures, very few people actually participate in
party policy and personnel decisions. And although the remaining members
are reasonably satisfied with intra-party democracy, those on the outside are
more critical. Norwegian, Swedish and Danish voter surveys have shown
that the citizens were sceptical of the democratic qualities of the party
organizations, non-members more so than members (Heidar and Saglie,
2002: 42; Petersson et al., 2000: 74).
Declining membership, inactivity within the organizations and anti-party
sentiments among the voters threaten the legitimacy of the parties and their
policies. Party organizers try almost desperately to make their parties more
attractive. Delegatory democracy is often regarded as unsuitable for the new
information society, where individualization, decentralization and flat structures are required. This may lead to experiments with new structures and
procedures, regardless of current member satisfaction. Our data indicate,
however, that if more extensive reforms are adopted, the party Congresses
will do it rather grudgingly.
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Notes
Earlier drafts were presented at the Norwegian Political Science Conference, Os, 7–9
January 2002, and at the Danish–Norwegian party research seminar at Sandbjerg
Estate, Denmark, 14–16 March 2002. We thank the seminar and workshop participants and Patrick Seyd for their comments.
1 Schattschneider did not, however, discuss democracy within parties with an
organized membership. His famous statement was aimed at the American parties,
and their equation of party voting with ‘party membership’. Schattschneider saw
this ‘membership’ concept as mere fiction, because the party had no control over
its ‘membership’ and the ‘members’ had no obligations to the party. The question
of oligarchy therefore became ‘irrelevant once it [was] realized that party membership [was] unreal’ (Schattschneider, 1942: 60).
2 See, e.g., Kitschelt (1989), Iversen (1994), Herrera and Taylor (1994), Norris
(1995), Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996: 97–9) and Narud and Skare (1999).
3 The Labour Party held its Congress in November 2000, and the other party
Congresses took place during the spring of 2001.
4 The exception is the Labour Party, where the leading politicians are non-voting
participants at the Congress (and are therefore excluded from our survey).
5 Similar, but not identical, questions were asked in Seyd’s 1990 and 1997 surveys
of British Labour Party members (1999: 395). The general results are similar: a
large majority in Seyd’s study rejected the notion that a powerful leader was a
problem, while a slight majority was satisfied with the leadership’s attentiveness.
6 The Labour Party used to regulate county representation at party Congresses on
the basis of a combined ‘member and voter strength’ formula, but that is now
replaced with a ‘membership strength only’ system.
7 UK: ‘Postal ballots of all individual members strengthen party democracy’;
Denmark: ‘Postal ballots are necessary for a strengthening of party democracy’.
Canada: ‘In your opinion, which one of the following is the best way to elect a
party leader? (a) A convention with delegates elected from each constituency; (b)
A direct election, with every member voting; (c) Some combination of direct
election and a convention’.
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