The Consequences of
Collaboration between
Political Parties
EXPLAINING PARTY POLICY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH POLICY
TRANSFER
Judith Sijstermans
University of Edinburgh
Abstract: The 2015 General Election marked the entry of a more collaborative style of politics
into the mainstream British political sphere. This was indicated through the emergence of a
‘Progressive Alliance’ led by three peripheral parties. This paper asks, what are the policy
implications of this relationship? Specifically, to what extent does the Scottish National Party
influence Plaid Cymru policy development? Before addressing influence, this paper reviews
pluralist explanations for party policy development and argues that no existing approach
explains party collaboration. Policy transfer is a useful alternative theoretical approach to
policy choice. Using party document analysis, this paper identifies multiple cases of
convergence between Plaid and the SNP, particularly caused by the transfer mechanisms of
learning and imitation.
Keywords: policy transfer; political parties; British politics; Scottish National Party; Plaid
Cymru
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1. Introduction
One of the iconic images of the United Kingdom’s 2015 General Election campaign was an
embrace between the leaders of the Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru (the Party of
Wales), and the Green Party at the end of the leaders’ debate (Dathan, 2015). The public
collaboration between the three leaders (self-termed the ‘Progressive Alliance’) challenged the
political status quo (Mason, 2015). What are the policy implications of collaborative parties?
Do parties learn from one another? While the debate introduced the parties’ collaboration to a
broader audience, collaboration occurred in the past. The relationship between Plaid Cymru
and the SNP particularly ‘reached its apogee during the independence referendum when there
were hordes of Plaid Cymru members in Scotland.’1 Specifically, to what extent did the
Scottish National Party influence Plaid Cymru policy development?
This paper challenges existing competitive, spatial approaches to political party
choices. It adapts policy transfer theory to explain how parties influence one another’s policies.
I test this adapted theory on the SNP and Plaid Cymru during and after the 2014 independence
referendum. I find that Plaid Cymru transferred policies from the SNP through learning and
imitation. Policy convergence is observable on HS2/HS3, fracking, devolution, and EU
referendum policy. This confirms that party collaboration has policy implications and that, with
adaptations, policy transfer can explain these implications. In applying the policy transfer
approach to parties, I operationalise convergence, transfer, learning, imitation, policy clarity,
organisational culture and power asymmetry. These are the building blocks of my hypotheses.
I empirically claim that convergence does occur between Plaid and the SNP and suggest that
policy transfer can explain that convergence. Then I hypothesise that: (1) learning will be used
in more detailed, technical policy areas and imitation will be used in more electoral,
1
Interview with Plaid member. Full names and dates of interviewees included in appendix one.
2
reputational areas; and (2) policy clarity, asymmetry, and organisational characteristics will
enable and hinder transfer.
These claims are tested in two steps, using party manifestos, press releases, speeches
and interviews. These sources allow me to map policy over time and to triangulate findings.
Drawing on press releases, I first show that there is policy convergence (and non-convergence)
between the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Then, I dig deeper into specific cases to test if policy
transfer can explain convergence. Two mechanisms, epistemic learning and imitation, emerge
as prominent processes. The evidence of transfer demonstrates that the collaboration of
political parties on the periphery has important policy implications. A more collaborative
political system requires not only broader election debates, but new theoretical approaches to
explain parties’ policy choices.
2. Theoretical Approaches to Nationalist Party Policy Choice
The centre-periphery cleavage, competitive positioning, national contexts, and parties’ internal
dynamics have all been cited as causes of nationalist party choices. The first two explanations
see parties as driven by broader systems; the second two explanations compare parties’ internal
and contextual processes. The first sees parties as primarily competitive, whereas the second
focuses on individual parties rather than their interaction. Since neither can explain parties’
collaborative relationships, I argue that policy transfer theory is a useful alternative approach.
2.1 Party Policy Choices as Systematic
Some scholars see party policy choices as driven by broader systems, such as ideological
cleavages or competitive positioning. Cleavage scholars believe that party choices are
‘anchored in the cleavages and issues that gave rise to their birth’ (Tursan, 1998: 5). Cleavages
are ‘long term structural conflicts’ which then create relatively stable dynamics of political
opposition (Rommele, 1999: 7; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). New party policy choices thus
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reflect ‘the past in the present’ (Marks and Wilson, 2000). According to this perspective,
minority nationalist parties draw on their defence of the periphery against the centre to
formulate new policies. However, when the ideological cleavage structure is extrapolated to
explain individual policies, explanations cannot account for technical policy details or minor
changes over time. Further, in practice, minority nationalist party policies move beyond the
centralization/decentralization issue. Socio-economic issues are most prevalent in stateless
nationalist and regionalist party (SNRP) manifestos (Alonso, Cabeza, Gomez, 2013: 10).
Another systematic perspective portrays party policy choices as relative to their
political competitors. These relative explanations of policy place parties along a spatial
dimension, like the left-right scale, and predict future choices using these models (Massetti,
2009; Erk, 2010). In the case of nationalist parties, relating choices to state-wide parties can
provide a useful anchoring point (Jeffery, 2010: 146). The opportunities of sub-state devolution
also open up multi-level competitive dynamics, challenging nationalist and statewide parties
to adapt policies (Jeffery, 2009; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006).
These spatial approaches build on Downs’ foundational claim that parties are rational,
vote maximizing organisations in a zero-sum game (1957: 137). However, in multi-level
systems, parties do not only interact competitively. Multi-level politics, either in a federal
system or in the European Union, encourages parties to interact with parties they don’t compete
with electorally. A new theoretical approach is needed to understand the policy implications of
non-competitive relationships between parties. Policy transfer is able to explain collaborative
interactions. Further, in contrast to systematic approaches, transfer theory takes into account
specific policy processes rather than broad systematic values or positions.
2.2 Party Policy Choices as Internal and Contextual
A second, process-oriented group of scholars studies how internal organisational
configurations or nationally specific context influences party policy choices. Researchers
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differentiating policies based on national contexts argue that unique combinations of
opportunity structures produce specific policy choices (Kitschelt, 1986: 58). For example, in
the case of SNRPs, researchers might question how the existence of a minority language affects
nationalist party policies (Williams, 1984; Van Morgan, 2006; May 2011; Alonso, Cabeza,
Gomez, 2013: 14).
Organisational scholars, on the other hand, might argue that parties’ choices are a result
of internal interest negotiation. For example, choices might vary depending on whether parties
are seeking office, policy or votes (McAngus, 2013). Varying relationships between elites,
members and voters might also affect party priorities (Poguntke, 2002). For example,
professionalization can increase the importance of party staff (Webb, 1992: 281).
While party policies are influenced by internal and contextual variables, this strand of
literature loses sight of broader trends. The creation of European party groups shows that
parties can find common ideological impetuses and common internal structures, beyond their
nationally specific structures (Bardi, 1994). My policy transfer framework is one way of
explaining how these transnational similarities might allow for policies to move across
different national contexts. While explaining policy convergence between parties is a more
systematic goal, my framework incorporates contextual and internal differences as intervening
variables.
While I have separated explanations of party choices in this brief review of the
literature, party choices are usually driven by multiple causes. Political parties are embedded
in national contexts, driven by complex organisations and staff, and acted upon by their
‘historical, institutional and political environment’ (Elias, 2008: 563). Policy transfer from
other political parties should be seen as one such environmental influence. The next section
will highlight how transfer theory can explain the influence of party collaboration on party
policy choices.
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2.3 Policy Transfer as an Alternative Approach
Policy transfer is an explanation of policy convergence, which is an increasing
similarity in policies between two political contexts. Convergence may also be caused by legal
harmonisation or ‘independent similar responses’ to the same problems (Holzinger and Knill,
2005: 780). Policy transfer is not a coincidental instance of similar policy. Transfer is part of
the policy process, when ‘knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions,
etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative
arrangements and institutions in another time or place’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344). The
mechanisms underpinning this movement of policy are: learning, competition, coercion,
imitation, and socialisation (Marsh and Sharman, 2009: 271; Graham, Shipan and Volden,
2013: 690).
Transfer theory has not often been applied to political parties. Nonetheless, parties are
possible transmitters and recipients of policy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 10). Contagion
theory describes a competitive version of transfer, in which issues are diffused within domestic
party systems by distinctive emerging parties (Chandler, 1977: 756). This paper develops a
policy transfer framework to explain the movement of policy between parties that collaborate
and do not compete electorally.
The application of policy transfer to collaborating political parties may have been
neglected due to the critiques of policy transfer. Transfer theories have failed to clearly
differentiate themselves from the rational policy model, to be explanatory and to develop
evaluation tools (Evans, 2009: 238). Furthermore, transfer theory is ‘piecemeal’ and
‘disconnected’ (Graham, Shinpan and Volden, 2013: 675). To navigate the breadth of transfer
theory, I emphasize the underlying mechanisms and focus on one type of actor, in one
geographical area. While transfer theory has its weaknesses, it can explain the policy
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consequences of party collaboration and complement competitive approaches. The next section
explains how policy transfer is used in this paper.
3. Research Design: Adapting Policy Transfer to the Case of Plaid Cymru and the SNP
Given the complexity and critiques of transfer theory, a structured research design is needed. I
initially asked whether the SNP influenced Plaid Cymru’s policy choices (the dependent
variable). I then posited that policy transfer theoretically structures ‘influence’ between parties
and provide a useful counterbalance to existing approaches. In light of transfer theory, the
question can be rearticulated:
(1) Do Plaid Cymru and SNP policies converge? (2) If
convergence exists, what causes it? I first empirically highlight policy areas in which the parties
become more similar. Then I argue that, in some cases, policy transfer mechanisms explain
convergence. To further specify the circumstances under which party policies might be
transferred, I hypothesize that:
I.
Learning will occur in specific, technical policy contexts, whereas imitation will be
prevalent in electoral or reputational policies.
II.
Clear expressions of policy, electoral asymmetry, and personal connections
between parties are most likely to foster policy transfer.
III.
Organisational differences, resource asymmetry, and lack of policy clarity are most
likely to hinder policy transfer.
I develop indicators to test each concept. These indicators stem logically from the
conceptual definitions and draw on my intuitions about how they might occur in political
parties. These are then tested against policy documents and statements from each of the parties.
3.1 Identifying Convergence, Transfer and its Mechanisms (Hypothesis I)
Most generally, policy convergence is the adoption of increasingly similar policies over
time (Seeliger, 1996: 287). If Plaid’s policy is converging with the SNP’s their (1) policy
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positions (2) policy framing, and/or (3) policy naming will near one another. Convergence is
caused by policy transfer when actors’ movement towards similar policies are driven by
knowledge of one another. Policy transfer would, at a most abstract level, be indicated by (1)
direct communication; (2) common information; and (3) knowledge of one another’s policies.
To make more specific claims about how policy transfers, I focus on specific mechanisms.
Epistemic learning and imitation remain the most likely mechanisms. Epistemic learning is
instrumental, focused on finding a better way to reach an existing goal (rather than redefining
goals) (May, 1992: 335). It alters specific arguments behind policies. Networks of issuespecific professionals (epistemic communities) may encourage this type of learning by
producing and sharing information with multiple parties (Dunlop, 2009: 290-292). Indicators
of epistemic learning by Plaid Cymru would be: (1) the use of evidence that draws on the
Scotland/the SNP; (2) expression of the policy as evidence based; (3) reliance on the same
epistemic communities/documents; and (4) change driven by technocrats.
Imitation occurs when a party directly copies another party’s policies in order to relate
themselves to the virtues of the other actor rather than the virtues of the specific policy (Shipan
and Volden, 2008: 842-843). Learning is motivated by problem solving and improving
outcomes, while imitation may be driven by symbolic or strategic thinking (Meseguer, 2005:
73; 77). This difference can mean that imitation results in a more ad hoc and un-adapted transfer
of policy (Stone, 2004: 548). Imitation will be indicated if: (1) the policy is not locally adapted;
(2) the transfer is of a singular policy; (3) the transferring party seeks credibility in the policy
area; and (4) the policy is supported by claims about the success of the other actor.
3.2 Identifying Intervening Variables (Hypotheses II and III)
Certain factors might hinder or enable transfer between the SNP and Plaid. These
barriers/conduits fit into three broad categories: policy clarity, asymmetry, and organisational
characteristics. Policies will be understood as ‘clear’ when they are culturally compatible
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between parties. Cultural compatibility facilitates communication, based on shared knowledge
(Gee, 2014: 12). Culturally incompatible policies are difficult to adapt to new political contexts
(particularly for small parties without needed resources to ‘translate’ policies. If policy clarity
enables transfer, transferred policies will be: (1) simple, non-technical; (2) well
documented/articulated and (2) culturally adaptable.
Asymmetry between parties can be driven by different sources of power. My
hypotheses focus on two types: electoral and resource asymmetry. Electoral asymmetry could
drive imitation, because actors would seek credibility from a more successful actor. The role
of a more electorally powerful actor in encouraging imitation is exemplified by the common
currency process. In adopting euro, ‘a clear centre of gravity, represented by the Deutschmark’
encouraged institutional imitation of the German monetary system (Radaelli, 2000: 13). Power
allows a party to define the ‘most successful’ ways of behaving. Electoral asymmetry enables
transfer if policy statements refer to the electoral strength of the other actor.
While electoral asymmetry might encourage transfer, resource asymmetry might
discourage it. Parties may be less able to choose a policy due to constitutional and financial
differences. Asymmetry is characteristic of the unbalanced UK devolution settlement (Keating,
Cairney and Hepburn, 2012: 289). As one Plaid Cymru member explained in an interview,
power asymmetry means, ‘the SNP will do things that we just physically can’t because we
haven’t got the powers.’ Further, the parties have different levels of staffing and funding which
mediate their ability to make policy. If resource asymmetries hinder transfer, I expect
convergence will not occur in: (1) policy areas devolved to one but not the other; (2) low
priority policy areas; and (3) very complex policies.
Finally, different organisational cultures might hinder transfer. Organisational culture
is a set of collective ideas that members of an organisation have about their organisation and
its work (Mahler, 1997: 526). Ingrained organisational cultures encourage actors to follow
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common rules (Stone, 2004: 547-548). If organisational cultures are different, different shared
norms would provide resistance to policy transfer. If organisational culture hinders transfer, I
would expect non-convergence when parties express fundamental belief or identity differences.
While organisational culture is powerful, leaders can change it. For example, in
cooperative business cultures leaders ‘serve as role models of the desired behaviour’ (Goh,
2002: 26). One Plaid member explained: ‘The strength of the relationships makes it easier to
disband policy differences.’ If leaders’ relationships encourage or reinforce transfer processes,
I expect convergence will occur when leaders (1) express policy agreement and (2) encourage
collaborative behavior.
3.3 Case Selection, Data Collection and Methods
To test whether these variables and transfer mechanisms are important players in party policy
choices, I will study Plaid Cymru and the SNP before and shortly after the Scottish
independence referendum. Plaid Cymru and the SNP provide an ideal testing ground for the
role of policy transfer.
The parties have mostly been studied comparatively (Fusaro 1979; McAllister 1981).
Although the two both emerged in the early 20th century, it was in the 1970’s that the SNP
began to significantly outperform Plaid Cymru (Fusaro, 1979: 369). In the 1979 devolution
referendum, the Welsh pro-devolution side won only 11% of the vote. This crucial defeat,
compounded with economic transformation in the 1980’s, put Welsh regionalism on the
backburner for some time (Christiansen, 1995). The 1999 referendum was more successful for
both nations and opened up new electoral opportunities. The SNP made the ‘transition to
power’ in 2007 and solidified its reputation as ‘an electoral professional party with a
membership to match’ (Mitchell, Bennie and Johns, 2012: 1). For Plaid Cymru, ‘the centre of
gravity clearly moved to Cardiff.’2 Nonetheless, Plaid has continued to fall behind the SNP
2
Interview with Plaid Cymru member.
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electorally. In the 2015 General Election SNP won 50% of Scottish votes while Plaid Cymru
won only 12.1% of Welsh votes.
Electoral divergence is partially due to the parties’ differential ability to compete over
‘disaffected Labour voters’ (Levy, 1995: 306). The SNP’s 2007 campaign presented the party
as a credible alternative to Labour (Lynch, 2009: 622). Instead of presenting themselves as an
alternative, Plaid Cymru compromised with the Greens and Labour (Lynch, 1995: 205-208).
National contextual differences may have necessitated different tactics. Plaid focuses on the
defence of Welsh language and culture. As such, they did not confirm support for independence
until 2003 (Levy, 1995: 307). Meanwhile, the SNP have been firm in wanting independence,
despite internal tensions over how to reach that goal (Lynch, 2011: 252-254).
Despite divergence, the parties have regularly communicated. For example, they held
weekly meetings to coordinate Westminster parliamentary strategies throughout the 1980s and
collaborate in the European Free Alliance Group in Brussels. The referendum reaffirmed their
alliance, most visibly through the scores of Welsh nationalists that came to Scotland to support
the Yes campaign. To test whether these interactions had policy consequences, I focus on the
independence referendum period, beginning 1 June 2014 and ending with the 2015 General
Election. I use press releases, catalogued from each party’s website (the SNP’s ‘Media Centre’3
and Plaid’s ‘News’ sections), manifestos and leaders’ speeches at conferences to show that
SNP and Plaid Cymru policies converged. The samples align in time period, scope, and method
of communication. Interviews with 3 Plaid Cymru members4 support insights gained through
documents.
In the first empirical section, I chronologically map press releases to identify
convergent policy areas. In the second empirical section, I test the identified cases of
3
Since data collection, the SNP removed the Media Centre archive from their website. However, press releases
and the Media Centre were cached by the WayBack Machine and verifiable through SNP Headquarters.
4
Names, dates and positions are listed in Appendix Two.
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convergence against the previously outlined indicators of transfer and the intervening variables.
I also note how parties frame their policies, with a focus on policy justifications and word
choice. Discourse analysis recognises that press releases, manifestos and speeches are designed
documents, not straightforward truths (Gee, 1999, p.97). In deconstructing parties’ policies, I
find evidence that Plaid Cymru learned from and imitated the SNP’s policies.
4. Convergence and Non-Convergence between Plaid Cymru and the SNP
As explained earlier, Plaid Cymru and the SNP will be defined as having convergent policies
when they develop (1) more similar policy positions; (2) more similar policy representations;
and/or (3) more similar policy frames. The parties converged on the EU ‘double majority,’
fracking, HS2/HS3, and devolution policies. They did not converge on policies previously
agreed upon (austerity), policies framed in a localised way (the NHS), and policies reflecting
different organisational cultures (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). The
selected cases are prototypical examples; other areas of convergence/non-convergence were
identified but cannot be addressed due to space constraints.
4.1 Cases of Policy Convergence
Timeline One: Party Press Releases Supporting an EU Double
Majority Rule
18-Sep-14
7-Nov-14
27-Dec-14
15-Feb-15
Plaid
6-Apr-15
26-May-15
15-Jul-15
SNP
The EU double majority policy is the most complete example of convergence, because the
novelty of the EU referendum issue required parties to take entirely new policy positions. The
EU double majority policy is the position that a majority within each of the UK’s four nations
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(rather than the country as a whole) should vote to leave the EU before an exit can occur. This
policy was proposed by the SNP before being formally adopted by Plaid Cymru on 3 June 2015
(Brooks, 29 October 2014; SNP, 6 November 2014). Timeline One shows a pattern of
convergence in which the policy was mentioned by the SNP extensively and adopted wholesale
by Plaid Cymru shortly after the General Election.
Other cases of convergence display alignment of Plaid Cymru’s policy framing with
the SNP’s. One such case is fracking, a method of releasing gas and oil from shale rock, which
has been opposed by both the SNP and Plaid Cymru. The arguments justifying that position
shifted over the time period. The issue has been a more visible policy for Plaid Cymru due to
their ecological nationalism (Hamilton, 2002). In 2013, Plaid MP Hywel Williams stated,
‘Plaid Cymru is opposed to shale gas exploration for very good environmental and safety
reasons’ (Williamson, 2013). Since then, Plaid Cymru’s policy on fracking has converged with
the SNP’s in two ways: a move towards promoting a fracking moratorium (a new policy choice)
and the connection of fracking to devolution (a new policy frame, indicated in grey on the
timeline). Section five will explore how these two types of convergence occurred through
different transfer mechanisms.
Plaid Cymru shifted from absolute rejection of fracking to a focus on a moratorium,
based on evidence seeking. This echoed the SNP’s ‘cautious and considered approach to
Timeline Two: Party Press Releases on Fracking
10-Jun-14
30-Jul-14
18-Sep-14 7-Nov-14 27-Dec-14 15-Feb-15
Plaid
SNP
6-Apr-15 26-May-15
Plaid: Fracking as a Devolution Issue
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unconventional oil and gas’ (SNP, 15 August 2014). Plaid began to argue not that fracking was
bad as a clear environmental fact but rather that fracking’s safety ‘is both unproven and
uncertain’ (Plaid Cymru, 24 September 2014). Both parties’ 2015 manifesto policies
supporting a moratorium on fracking (Plaid Manifesto, 2015: 45; SNP Manifesto, 2015: 10).5
Plaid’s shift in framing connected fracking with devolution rather than the environment. The
shift aligns with the devolution of the power ban fracking to Scotland. This shift in framing is
exemplified by a press release which began: ‘Wales must have the same powers to ban the
controversial practice of fracking for onshore gas as is being proposed for Scotland’ (Plaid
Cymru, 3 December 2014). The press release does not highlight environmental implications
until the sixth paragraph.
For some issues, chronological patterns are less clear because of the lack of press
releases. In these cases, convergence must be identified by press releases’ content. One such
case is the HS2/HS3 rail project. On 27 October 2014, Plaid Cymru released a press release
titled ‘Plaid warns HS3 'will leave Wales in the slow lane’’ which mimicked the phrasing used
in a 23 June 2014 SNP press release titled ‘HS3 plans leave Scotland in the slow lane.’ This
would be a clear sign of convergence of policy representations since Plaid Cymru adopted
almost exactly the SNP’s wording.
On devolution, press releases have been plentiful for both parties, whose primary goal
is greater autonomy. Chronological convergence is not immediately clear. However, once Plaid
Cymru’s ‘parity with Scotland’ narrative is disaggregated, convergence on devolution policy
can be found. Earlier, Plaid’s emphasized the devolution of specific competences but during
the campaign, devolution policy shifted to a focus on parity. This is a case of policy
convergence because Plaid Cymru completely aligned their policy with Scotland’s devolution
demands and successes.
5
Neither addressed fracking in their 2010 manifestos.
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Timeline Three: Party Press Releases on Devolution
10-Jun-14
30-Jul-14
18-Sep-14
Plaid
7-Nov-14
SNP
27-Dec-14
15-Feb-15
6-Apr-15
26-May-15
Plaid's 'Parity with Scotland' Narrative
4.2 Cases of Non-Convergence
Just as convergence occurred in various ways, non-convergence varies. While I do not review
all cases of non-convergence, I use one key case to illustrate variants in turn: anti-austerity
policies, the NHS, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The first
type of non-convergence occurs when policies are the same, but do not become more similar
over time. Opposition to austerity is fundamental to both parties. Plaid Cymru’s 2010 manifesto
began with a policy of protecting Wales from cuts (p.7). The SNP’s 2010 manifesto included
the slogan ‘more nats, less cuts’ (p.7). Both frame anti-austerity policies as opposition against
the ‘London’ approach. However, these policies predate the time period studied; a longer case
study would be needed to understand how the parties developed parallel positions.
Timeline Four: Party Press Releases Against Austerity
10-Jun-14
30-Jul-14
18-Sep-14
7-Nov-14
27-Dec-14
Plaid
15-Feb-15
6-Apr-15
26-May-15
SNP
Another cause of non-convergence is in cases of localised policy. I originally hypothesized
that policy areas devolved to both regions or not devolved at all (i.e. areas of constitutional
15
symmetry) would be likely to display convergence. In fact, policy areas devolved to both
become localised so they are less likely to show convergence. For example, NHS devolution
hindered convergence because institutions developed regionally specific issues. Divergence on
NHS policy, devolved to Wales and Scotland, has been previously identified (Greer, 2008).
Alvarez-Rosette et al. were ‘astonished at the difficulty, and in some cases impossibility, of
obtaining valid comparable basic statistics on the NHS in the four countries’ (2005: 949). This
divergence in institutional practice is reflected in the parties’ approaches. For Plaid Cymru, the
main NHS related issue is doctor recruitment (see press releases: 22 April, 25 March, 12
February, 10 February, 29 January, 26 January, 5 January). The SNP favours policy statements
about its ability to ‘protect’ NHS budgets (22 April, 19 April, 3 April, 13 March, 28 January,
21 January). This also shows how electoral asymmetry is more complex than initially
conceptualized. SNP’s electoral success and role in government (a source of power) means it
focuses on policy successes while Plaid Cymru focuses on the failures of the Welsh
Government.
Party funding asymmetry is a more fitting intervening variable. Party staffing asymmetry
is clear in the differing numbers of press releases produced. For example, in April 2015, Plaid
Cymru wrote 44 press releases; the SNP wrote 163. Convergence was often unobservable
because Plaid simply did not express policy positions on as many issues.
One final type of non-convergence is when the parties have the same policy position, but
varying framing, as is the case with TTIP policy. While both parties object to the inclusion of
the NHS in TTIP in their 2015 manifestos, Plaid’s rejection is more all-encompassing (Plaid
Manifesto, 2015: 37; SNP Manifesto, 2015: 19). The NHS is the only issue addressed in SNP
press releases (see: 21 November 2014, 18 February, 25 February, 26 February, 28 March, and
22 April 2015). Plaid Cymru goes much further. The party oppose TTIP because of its
connections to large international corporations, threat to workers’ and environmental rights and
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democratic processes (Plaid Cymru Manifesto, 2015: 37). This reflects Plaid’s self-image as
more principled than the SNP. Plaid members see their own party as ‘a more left party than the
SNP.’ There is also a sense within Plaid ‘that we are unwilling to compromise on our principles
and ethics.’6 On the other hand, the SNP has defined itself much more loosely as ‘a social
democratic political party committed to Scottish independence’ (‘About Us,’ SNP website). It
has been called a ‘consensual, ideology-lite (and electorally successful) Nationalist party’
(Lynch, 2009: 635). Having addressed why parties might not converge on certain policies, the
following chapter highlights how learning and imitation can cause the identified cases of policy
convergence between the SNP and Plaid.
5. The Role of Policy Transfer in Plaid Cymru Policy Making
Policy transfer can be identified as the cause of convergence between the SNP and Plaid Cymru
because indicators of policy learning and imitation are prevalent. Additionally, the identified
intervening factors (power asymmetry, policy clarity, and organisational characteristics) play
a role in hindering and enabling those processes, confirming hypotheses II and III. Further,
confirming hypothesis I, the cases of learning are specific, technical policies while imitation
occurs in electoral, public situations. The issues in which learning occurred (HS2/HS3 and
fracking policies) are significantly less high priority than those in which imitation occurred (the
EU double majority and devolution policy). For example, the SNP and Plaid Cymru wrote a
combined 8 press releases about HS2/HS3, as opposed with the 128 about devolution.
HS2/HS3 and fracking are discrete and technical issues. Devolution and the EU double
majority are much more ideological, broad policies. The EU double majority was publicly
emphasized by party leaders; Wood addressed it during First Minister’s Questions and
Sturgeon to a large public audience. Plaid’s ‘parity with Scotland’ devolution narrative was the
6
Quotes both from interviews with Plaid Cymru members.
17
headline demand at the party’s 2015 spring conference (ITV, 7 March 2015). In the following
sections, I highlight how the processes of learning and imitation cause policy convergence and
allow the SNP to influence Plaid Cymru’s choices.
5.1 Learning
Epistemic learning occurs in Plaid policies on the HS2/HS3 rail projects and the fracking
moratorium. Plaid Cymru uses the same evidence as the SNP on the HS2/HS3 issue. In a 25
May 2015 press release, Plaid Cymru ‘pointed to remarks issued by HS2 Ltd that there is ‘no
business case’ for the high-speed rail link to Scotland.’ This argument emerged only a day after
an SNP press release citing the same remarks by HS2 Ltd. The near identical wording indicates
interdependent decision making: ‘Plaid warns HS3 'will leave Wales in the slow lane’‘(Plaid
Cymru, 27 October 2014) and ‘HS3 plans leave Scotland in the slow lane’ (SNP, 23 June 2014).
The specificity of these connections shows that the policies were developed interdependently,
with Plaid's use of evidence and phrasing coming after the SNP's.
HS2/HS3 policy learning is eased by policy clarity, because the parties’ agree on the
problem (the UK Government’s funding of England-only projects). However, full convergence
is hindered by resource asymmetry. The SNP’s 2015 manifesto calls for HS3 to be connected
to Scotland (p.10); Plaid’s 2015 manifesto calls for an equal share of funding, (p.40). This
difference results from geographic difference but also because the SNP controls governmental
funds and Plaid does not. Plaid Cymru calls for the electrification of railways while the SNP
used Scottish Government resources to fund electrification (Plaid Cymru, 27 October 2014;
McArdle, November 2014). Further, HS2/HS3 policy shows how attempts at policy transfer
fail if asymmetry is not in a party’s favour. Plaid argued that ‘devolved administrations should
unite on HS2’ on the basis of the Barnett formula (Plaid Cymru, 11 June 2015). The SNP never
acknowledged Plaid’s proposition, because the SNP has no incentive to adapt themselves to
Plaid’s wishes.
18
HS2/HS3 learning is accomplished by relying on the same documents as the SNP. The
policy shift towards a moratorium on fracking meets two other indicators of epistemic learning:
the use of the Scottish Government as evidence and the portrayal of the policy as rational.
Plaid’s arguments became more qualified with statements such as ‘until there is evidence…’
and ‘the science tells us…’ (Plaid Cymru, 24 September 2014). Furthermore, the Scottish
Government is used as evidence. Plaid Cymru’s press releases note: ‘the Scottish Government
has gained power over fracking’; ‘Scotland has a new planning framework that introduces
tougher rules on fracking’ and ‘the Scottish Government announced it would introduce a
moratorium’ (3 February 2015; 24 September 2014; 4 February 2015). These references show
rational argumentation, using the SNP’s choices to inform Plaid’s. The next section will show
how Plaid also altered its fracking framing through imitation. This highlights that learning and
imitation are not mutually exclusive; they can occur alongside one another.
5.2 Imitation
Imitation is a more holistic copying process. Plaid Cymru displays this behaviour in the case
of the EU double majority and the ‘parity with Scotland’ narrative. The transfer of the EU
double majority policy fits with the ad hoc, singular nature of imitation and the lack of
adaptation of the policy. Nicola Sturgeon first proposed the EU double majority to a public
audience in Edinburgh (SNP, 29 October 2014). The SNP published a series of press releases
on the policy, including one that celebrated that the Labour First Minister of the NAW was
considering the policy (SNP, 4 November 2014). Plaid Cymru’s leader Leanne Wood then
adopted the policy exactly as expressed by Sturgeon (Plaid Cymru, 3 June 2015). The press
release did not use new facts. It relied on the SNP’s position to justify their own. The role of
Wood and Sturgeon in proposing the policies shows how leaders’ buy-in facilitates transfer.
The double majority policy also shows imitation because it has not led to broader
ideological change/learning surrounding EU policy. In 2010, Plaid Cymru’s policy on the EU
19
was that, ‘Plaid Cymru is committed to an independent Wales as a full member of the European
Union’ (p.32). In 2015, Plaid’s manifesto policy on the EU was that, ‘Plaid Cymru wants Wales
to be an independent nation within the European Union’ (p.36). This differed from the SNP’s
policy 2015 manifesto policies on the EU: ‘opposing withdrawal from the European Union’
and ‘making the EU work better for Scotland’ (p.9; p.18). While broader EU policies did not
converge, the double majority rule draws on foundational similarities between Plaid and the
SNP: nationalism and pro-Europeanism. As such, policy clarity facilitated direct policy
imitation.
Plaid’s ‘parity with Scotland’ policy imitates Scotland’s devolution process, driven by the
SNP since they took control of the Scottish Government in 2007. The policy was the first in
Plaid’s 2015 manifesto: ‘the same deal for Wales on funding and powers as Scotland’ (p.3).
Plaid’s framing of fracking also shifted to a parity narrative, to argue that the UK Government
should ‘give Wales parity with Scotland to stop fracking’ (Plaid Cymru, 3 December 2014).
Timeline Five shows how the frames developed in concert.
Timeline Five: Parity with Scotland and Fracking Parity Press
Releases
10-Jun-14
30-Jul-14
18-Sep-14
7-Nov-14
27-Dec-14
Parity with Scotland Narrative
15-Feb-15
6-Apr-15
26-May-15
Fracking 'Parity' Narrative
While it does not copy one specific policy, the parity narrative copies a litany of policies
previously applied in Scotland. Further, the parity policy links Plaid’s future devolution
demands with those of the SNP. Scotland’s new devolution deal (driven by the SNP-led
Scottish Government) is presented as a minimum settlement for Wales. Wood argued: ‘in
20
Scotland the going-rate for devolution in the UK is being increased. Plaid Cymru has argued
that whatever the going rate for devolution is in the UK, then that is the minimum that Wales
should expect’ (Plaid Cymru, 4 March 2015).
The call for parity is supported by claims about the success/credibility of Scottish
nationalists. Plaid tries to validate Wales’s nationhood by comparing it to Scotland’s. Leanne
Wood argued: ‘Wales is every bit as much a nation as Scotland’ (Plaid, 22 January 2015). Plaid
Cymru MP Jonathan Edwards reiterates that, ‘powers made available to Scotland should also
be made available to Wales’ (Plaid Cymru, 27 November 2014). On fracking, Plaid Shadow
Minister Llyr Gruffydd argued that ‘Scotland has already been given this protection’ (Plaid
Cymru, 21 January 2015). The imitation of devolution policy relies on electoral asymmetry,
particularly on the SNP’s success. Wood lamented the inequality was so great that ‘whilst
Crown Estates will be devolved in full to Scotland, they refuse to even open an office in Wales’
(Wood, 2015). Plaid Cymru’s claims about gaining parity rely on the SNP’s greater power,
resources and popularity, making it a typical case of imitative policy making.
The SNP provided credibility directly when leader Nicola Sturgeon publicly supported
Plaid’s claims for parity. Leanne Wood responded that she ‘is very pleased to hear Nicola
Sturgeon supporting Plaid Cymru's key commitment to securing parity with Scotland’ (Plaid
Cymru, 20 April 2015). The exchange confirms leaders’ relationships with one another as an
enabling feature of transfer.
Imitation and learning both lead to policy convergence, but they occur in different policy
areas and Plaid’s policy statements show how transfer occurs through different processes.
Where imitation relies on the SNP’s success as an actor, learning relies on specific successful
policies. These variations and the number of cases of policy transfer show that the SNP’s
influence on Plaid’s party policy development is substantive. As such, the influence of other
21
political parties should be taken into account when explaining party policy choices, particularly
in cases where party collaboration is documented.
6. Conclusion
This paper began by asking how collaboration between two peripheral parties in the UK might
engender policy consequences. It identified multiple cases in which Plaid Cymru adopted the
SNP’s policy, either as a result of learning or copying processes. While these findings were
clear, the limited time span means that other possible consequences of party collaboration, such
as more complex types of learning like socialisation, were not be identified. Further, the
intervening variables, particularly asymmetry, could have been better disaggregated to reflect
parties’ varying resources electorally, institutionally, and financially.
Despite the complexity of the variables, the transfer approach is theoretically useful.
Transfer theory bridges existing studies of parties, which tend to be either systematic models
or detailed comparative studies. Transfer theory explains broader trends while taking into
account individual party policy-making processes. It can also explain increasing similarity
between parties, counteracting the predominant focus on differentiating parties. A
differentiated approach might be most useful in domestic party systems, but in multi-level
political systems, parties also behave collaboratively. For example, the European Union has
encouraged sustained collaboration between parties across Europe through the European
Parliament. Given the amount of policy transfer found between the SNP and Plaid Cymru, a
more widely applied party policy transfer framework may find that parties move policy not
only between regions but across national boundaries.
22
Appendix One: Interviews
Mabon ap Gwynfor, 2015 Plaid Cymru General Election candidate, phone interview, 7 July
2015.
Alan Jobbins, former General Secretary of the Plaid Cymru History Society, phone interview,
15 July 2015.
Dafydd Williams, former General Secretary of Plaid Cymru and current Chairman of the Plaid
Cymru History Society, phone interview, 20 July 2015.
23
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