India
needs
no
Monroe
Doctrine (Foreign Policy ,GS
paper 2,THe Hindu )
New Delhi’s approach to its neighbours has increasingly been marked by
muscularity, evident in its recent attempts to browbeat Nepal into
carrying out amendments to its Constitution. What South Asia needs is
a friendly India, not a powerful big brotherIndia has been involved in
Nepal’s Constitution-making process since the beginning. So, it is
unlikely that the passage of the Constitution would have come as a
surprise Both in Nepal and Myanmar, the Modi administration seems to
have displayed a lack of sensitivity towards the aspirations of
smaller, sovereign nations. This could be because the security
establishment has started to overshadow the Ministry of External
Affairs or because domestic considerations have started to shape
foreign policy
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s sharp initial focus on improving relations with
countries in the neighbourhood evoked much optimism. Inviting the Prime
Ministers of our neighbouring countries, including Pakistan, to his swearing-in
ceremony was rightly billed as a great move. Mr. Modi’s visits to Bangladesh,
Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka were seen as runaway successes because the Prime
Minister effectively stressed the region’s shared destiny and promised that the
countries would move forward together.
India’s huge relief effort after the Nepal earthquake earlier this year was also
welcomed in the Himalayan country, despite some critical voices alleging that
limits had been crossed. This was India playing a ‘big brother’ in a rather
positive way — taking responsibility and assisting its neighbours without
expecting reciprocity.
But it is in Nepal now that India has got itself into a huge tangle.
New Delhi’s efforts at influencing the Nepali political elite to
effect constitutional amendments — that will fulfil the aspirations
Subir
Bhaumik
of the Madhesis and the Tharus — have provoked a huge backlash in
Nepal, with a ‘Back off India’ campaign gaining traction on social
media. Some anti-India groups may be trying to take advantage, as
Indian envoy in Kathmandu, Ranjit Rae, suggests, but the Indian
handling of the issue has also provided them with necessary
ammunition.
Threat of blockade
Nepali politicians and media allege a re-run of the economic blockade of the
late 1980s, since the amendments desired by India have not been carried out.
The petroleum products crisis in Bhutan and the way it effected a regime change
there after the erstwhile Prime Minister Jigme Thinley was seen hobnobbing with
China is surely not lost on its Himalayan neighbour.
After nearly a decade of uncertainty, Nepal has finally got a Constitution,
sparking off some initial celebrations. It may not be the perfect Constitution,
but it is federal, republican and, most importantly, secular. Nepal is no longer
a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ (which might upset some in India). Like Bangladesh, it has
given itself a secular polity despite the huge majority enjoyed by one
particular religious group. In fact, the ‘Hindu Rastra’ of yore is seen as a
legacy of the monarchy that Nepal has given up, in keeping with the spirit of
its long pro-democracy movement.
India has been involved in the Constitution-making process in Nepal — its top
diplomats and leaders have been in regular touch with the Nepali leaders. So,
should we believe that the Constitution, which 85 per cent of the 601-member
Nepali Constituent Assembly (CA) voted for in September, came as a surprise to
India despite the latter having a huge diplomatic and intelligence presence in
that country?
When Mr. Modi dispatched Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar post-haste to Kathmandu
to seek some necessary amendments, his visit was seen as ‘15 days too late’ by
some Nepali leaders, and ‘15 days too early’ by a few others. Many leaders said
India should have respected the ‘will of the Nepali people’, reflected in the
verdict of the CA. The voting made clear the broad consensus in Nepal, with even
some representatives of the recalcitrant Madhesi and Tharu communities voting
for the Constitution. It was always possible to get some amendments done after
the Constitution took effect and New Delhi should have been patient.
However, its muscular approach in pushing for seven amendments straight away,
and leaking them to the Indian press, has diluted the goodwill that Mr. Modi’s
two visits to Kathmandu had created. The visits had resulted in some beneficial
deals, especially in the power sector.
India’s advice to Nepal to resolve differences “through dialogue in an
atmosphere free from violence and intimidation” so as to “enable broad-based
ownership and acceptance” is seen as a big shove, not a gentle push — and that
is provoking deep resentment among citizens and the political class alike. This
is interventionism at its worst. It would be really unfortunate if Indian
interests are seen as being synonymous with those of some communities of Indian
origin, whose leaderships remain deeply divided, even if not discredited. India
needs to identify with the larger Nepali aspirations, after all the Modi talk of
sacrifices by the Gorkhas to protect India. New Delhi’s reaction to the adoption
of the Constitution — merely ‘noting it’ rather than greeting it — did not go
down well with even the most pro-Indian of Nepali politicians.
It would be still more unfortunate if Indian reaction in the future is
influenced by the dynamics of the Bihar elections. In a way, if India tries
taking a hard-line approach to get what it wants in Nepal, it may end up driving
Kathmandu further into China’s embrace. A former National Security Advisor (NSA)
had confided to a senior Nepali diplomat recently that the blockade was the
‘most stupid thing’ India ever did in dealing with a neighbour.
Good diplomacy is all about effective, gentle persuasion minus threats or use of
force. India should have lobbied discreetly on getting some of its concerns
addressed in the Nepali Constitution, not thrown tantrums after the statute was
adopted by a sweeping majority. This does not sit well with India’s image at a
time when the Modi administration is making a determined bid for a permanent
seat in the UN Security Council.
India’s failure to deliver on the Teesta water-sharing treaty has left trusted
ally Bangladesh and its Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina uncertain. The land
boundary agreement did help lift her spirits and Mr. Modi was seen as delivering
on promises made, but unless the Teesta deal goes through, Ms. Hasina will never
be able to convince her countrymen (and women) that India is a worthy friend. A
fair share of water from a major river is much more important for Bangladesh — a
nation dependent primarily on agriculture — than a few enclaves.
Here again, domestic considerations are a major problem. The Modi
administration’s decision to regularise the stay of Hindu refugees from
Bangladesh and Pakistan, a move that may get the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
some electoral dividend in West Bengal and Assam, has also unnerved the ruling
party in Bangladesh. The Awami League is keen to prevent a large-scale migration
of Hindus to India for a whole host of reasons.
Hype over hot pursuit
Mindless chest-thumping over hitting rebels “deep inside Myanmar” has already
cost India. Despite the subsequent damage control that has led to important
state visits, Myanmar has refused to hand over the National Socialist Council of
Nagalim–Khaplang (NSCN-K)’s leader, S.S. Khaplang, and three of his confidantes,
who India wants to put on trial for attacks on its security forces. Myanmar
peacemakers have actually held formal negotiations with Khaplang’s
representatives on a national ceasefire agreement that the Thein Sein government
is planning to sign with its ethnic rebel armies, ahead of the November
parliament elections.
The two countries’ forces have, since the mid-60s, forayed into each other’s
territories in ‘hot pursuit’ of rebels. So there was nothing new in the Indian
cross-border raids. However, they were surely not “deep inside Myanmar” as the
Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, R.S. Rathore, claimed. The
uncalled-for Indian braggadocio is what has upset Myanmar, and the Pakistanis
shot back saying, “We are not Myanmar”.
Both in Nepal and Myanmar, the Modi administration seems to have displayed a
lack of sensitivity towards the aspirations of people of these smaller sovereign
nations. Whether this is because the security establishment has started to
overshadow the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), or because domestic
considerations have started to shape the Indian response, is a matter of
speculation. However, a muscular neighbourhood policy, especially with smaller
neighbours, will not work for India. It will not only help drive them into the
Chinese fold, but will also provide traction to Pakistan’s sustained campaign
against ‘Indian domination’ in the region.
Coming as it does after allegations that Indian agencies helped bring down the
Mahinda Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka, these actions will only raise the spectre
of an Indian ‘Monroe Doctrine’ — under which India treats its neighbourhood as a
sphere of influence — a doctrine India cannot afford to enforce; nor is it
capable of enforcing such a principle. If the sentiments echoed by participants
from neighbouring countries at a recent South Asian Economic Conclave in Delhi,
which I attended, are any indication, South Asia wants a friendly and an
understanding India to get its regionalism back on track — not a muscular
cowboy, flaunting American attitudes and helicopters.
Source: New feed