Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan:
2009-2010
Sevinç ALKAN ÖZCAN*
Abstract
Key Words
One of the most critical foreign policy issues
for Turkey in 2009 and 2010 was the US
expectation that Turkey would contribute more
troops to Afghanistan within the framework
of the AfPak Strategy. The US requested
Turkey to send troops to combat missions in
Afghanistan and expand the mandate of the
Kabul Central Command southward to an
area where conflicts had intensified. In effect,
Turkey was asked to review its policy of not
taking part in armed conflicts in Afghanistan.
As a response to American requests, Turkey
increased its diplomatic efforts to establish
peace and stability in the region in 2009 and
2010, including tripartite summits between
the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This article examines Turkish foreign policy
towards Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010 in
light of basic principles formulated within the
general framework of its initial reactions since
2001: supporting international cooperation,
not taking part in armed conflicts, protecting
civilians and acting in accordance with the UN
Security Council resolutions.
Turkey, Afghanistan, AfPak Strategy,
ISAF, American Operation.
* Dr., Coordinator, Center for Global Studies,
Foundation for Sciences and Arts, Istanbul,
Turkey.
Introduction
The Afghanistan crisis, which has
been one of the turning points of the
international system of the post-Cold War
era, has played a very significant role in
identifying newly-emerging perceptions
of security, threat and interest in Turkish
foreign policy. Since Turkey is a country
located in a geographical position
adjacent to the areas of conflict in the
post-Cold War era, its historical and
cultural ties have made it an important
player in these conflicts. However, since
Turkey mostly took part in international
peacekeeping activities rather than
political and diplomatic processes in
the beginning of the post-Cold War era,
Ankara is considered to be a significant
military actor in regional politics. From
this perspective, the immediate reaction
of Turkey just after American operations
in Afghanistan constituted an answer
to this question: Will Turkey remain a
country which is seen as an important
PERCEPTIONS, Autumn - Winter 2010, Volume XV, Number 3-4, pp. 133-146.
133
Sevinç Alkan Özcan
player only in terms of its military
potential and capacities?
After the attacks of September 11,
almost all states concentrated mainly on
the question of how they would respond
to the new international atmosphere
rather than the question of who was
behind these attacks. The answer to this
question was more important for Turkey
than for any other state. Turkey became
a very significant actor in the postSeptember 11 international atmosphere,
because of the following factors: Turkey
was the only Muslim country in NATO;
Ankara’s long-term experience in fighting
terrorism; and the possible demand of
the US to use Turkey’s air space and the
Incirlik air base.
The September 11 attacks and the
American operation in Afghanistan
that started on 7 October 2001 shaped
the formulation of the basic principles
of Turkish foreign policy towards
Afghanistan. In this article, Turkish
foreign policy towards Afghanistan
between 2009 and 2010 will be evaluated
in light of Turkey’s initial reactions to and
policies towards the new international
atmosphere in 2001.
The American Operation
in Afghanistan and Turkish
Foreign Policy
Immediate official statements of
Turkey after the September 11 condemned
134
the terrorist attacks against the US and
international terrorism in general.1 In
these statements, the emphasis was on
Turkey’s long-standing struggle against
terrorism.2 The initial reactions of Turkey
were very deliberate and responsible
regarding the discussions on Islam and
terror.3 In those days, Turkey benefitted
from the situation by expressing its view
on terror to Europe and to the world.
Turkey also reminded others that, for
several years, it has been defending the
necessity to make Article 5 of the NATO
Charter operational against terrorist
attacks, but Western countries had not
responded to these requests. However,
appreciating the NATO decision to
operate under Article 5, Turkey declared
through official statements made by the
president, the prime minister and the
minister of foreign affairs that it would
fulfill its obligations arising from this
Article.4 In this framework, referring to
the strategic partnership between Turkey
and the US, it was also stated that Turkey
supported the international cooperation
in the fight against terrorism and, in case
of necessity, Ankara would be open to
American requests for the use of Turkish
airspace and airports by American
transport aircraft.5 However, in order to
understand Turkey’s Afghanistan policy,
we should highlight an important point.
Although in the beginning Turkey had a
positive attitude towards the American
demands for the use of Turkey’s airspace
and airports, it was reluctant to provide
troops for a possible military operation.
Turkey stated that if a military operation
were to happen, instead of providing
troops, it would provide military
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010
After the fall of Taliban-controlled
cities and regions, the issue of deploying
an international military force to
Afghanistan came to the international
When the US launched an operation
agenda in November 2001. After this
in Afghanistan with the UK on 7 October
development, instead of sending a
2001, as a first reaction, Turkey declared
limited number of troops, Turkey started
that it would act under the framework
to discuss the possibility of leading an
of NATO and support international
international peacekeeping force with
cooperation. Turkey also expressed its
a large military contribution. During
concerns about the protection of civilians
7
these discussions, Turkey’s main concerns
during the operation. The Turkish official
concentrated on the questions of the size
view stated by the Presidency, the Prime
and length of its contribution and the
Ministry and the General Staff between
region, where Turkish troops would be
11 September and 7 October was that
deployed. Turkey’s willingness to deploy
Turkey’s contribution to the operation
its troops only in the Kabul region
would be within the framework of Article
was emphasized by
5 of the NATO
Charter, but after a Turkey stated that if a military official statements at
very short period of operation were to happen, instead different levels.9 UN
Council
time the government of providing troops, it would Security
Resolution 1386,10
asked the permission
provide military education and adopted on 20
of
the
Turkish
2001,
Parliament to send intelligence aid to the Northern December
Alliance
forces.
was
very
significant
troops abroad. The
for Turkish foreign
Turkish Parliament
policy as well as
approved the request to send troops
for the future of Afghanistan. With
abroad on 10 October 2001. In addition
this resolution, the Security Council
to this development, on October 31,
authorized the establishment of the
Turkey showed a positive attitude
International Security Assistance Force
towards the American requests to send
(ISAF) consisting of 4,500 troops, for
Turkish troops by deciding to dispatch
8
the maintenance of security in Kabul and
a special operations team of 60 soldiers.
surrounding areas under the command
This team would perform their duties
of the UK, with forces and assets from
in the northern region of Afghanistan
18 other countries. At the initial stage,
under the control of Northern Alliance
Turkey declared its support of ISAF with
forces. If necessary, the team would take
its willingness to contribute 267 troops.
part in armed conflicts. In fact, this
decision contradicted the principle of
not entering into any armed conflict that
In accordance with UN Security
had been formulated at the beginning of
Council Resolution 1413 adopted in
the crisis.
May 2002, Turkey started to lead ISAF
education and intelligence aid to the
Northern Alliance forces.6
135
Sevinç Alkan Özcan
II and its command continued until
February 2003. From 20 June 2002 until
10 February 2003, Turkey’s contribution
increased to a battalion-sized task force
with approximately 1,300 troops. Turkey
ran the Kabul International Airport and
the Multinational Headquarters under
the mandate of the ISAF, which was
composed of 4,800 personnel from 22
countries. From February 2003 to August
2004, Turkey contributed around 300
personnel to ISAF operations.
After NATO took over the command
and coordination of ISAF on 11
August 2003 and the ISAF mission was
expanded beyond Kabul to throughout
Afghanistan, the task of the Senior High
Civil Representative of Afghanistan was
given to Turkey in January 2004. Turkey’s
contribution to peacekeeping activities in
Afghanistan and being the only Muslim
country in NATO were determining
factors behind this decision.
From 13 February 2005 until 4
August 2005, Turkey led ISAF for the
second time. During its command,
Turkey provided the single largest
contingent in ISAF, with 1,700 troops
in the force.11 Turkey assumed the
leadership of the Regional Command
Capital for 8 months from 6 April 2007
to 6 December 2007 when it contributed
780 personnel to ISAF. Turkey established
a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
in the district center of Meydan Sehir in
Wardak Province in November 2006.
Civilian and military personnel work
together in the Wardak PRT, whose
136
mission includes: “[d]evelopment of
the administrative and judiciary system;
training of the Afghan Police Force and
increasing their capabilities; conducting
activities aimed to improve and support
infrastructure, and public works and
social support to raise the life quality of
local population.[sic]”12
The perspective of international
law was very strong in Turkey’s
foreign policy towards Afghanistan
after the September 11 attacks.
As indicated above, the perspective
of international law was very strong
in Turkey’s foreign policy towards
Afghanistan after the September 11
attacks and the US/UK-led operation.
The basic principles of insistence to
operate in accordance with Article 5
of NATO, supporting international
cooperation, not taking part in armed
conflicts, protection of civilians and
acting in accordance with the UN
Security Council resolutions have been
clearly emphasized by Turkey since the
launch of the operation. It should be
stressed that, from time to time, Turkey
came to a position contrary to the
parameters of international law. After
the US/UK-led operation that was not
authorized by UN resolutions, Turkey
has come to take part in this military
intervention by passing decisions in
the Turkish Parliament to send troops
abroad. However, since the US/UK-led
operation lasted for only a short time,
in which Turkey did not take part, the
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010
immediate formation of ISAF based on
UN Security Council Resolution 1386
enabled Turkey to act in accordance with
international law.13
Tough Years for Afghanistan
(2009-2010): The AfPak
Strategy of Obama and
Afghanistan
in
Turkish
Foreign Policy
In order to concentrate on the
occupation of Iraq, the US handed over
the command of ISAF to NATO in
August 2003. In this way, many states,
including Turkey, deployed troops to
Afghanistan within the framework of
NATO once again. However, handing
over the command of ISAF to NATO
was not sufficient to ensure security and
stability in Afghanistan. On the contrary,
Afghanistan increasingly has been
mentioned as a second Vietnam for the
US. The Taliban forces which withdrew
to the eastern and southern parts of the
country after the US/UK-led operation
in 2001 increased their ability to inflict
dramatic damage on NATO forces with
the support of secure areas provided by
its borders with Pakistan.14 The heavy
casualties of English, Canadian and
French forces, as well as those of the
US in 2008, compelled the incoming
American President Barak Obama to
rethink the American policy towards
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are
located at the center of the fight against
terrorism.
The AfPak Strategy of President
Obama, as declared by his National
Security Advisor James Jones on 27
March 2009, can be considered as a
response to the increasing number of
American casualties in Afghanistan
in 2008. The statement of Obama
affirming his decision to send 17,000
additional troops to Afghanistan in
February 2009 confirmed this strategy.
The US wanted to send a message that,
with this strategy, the US would focus
on Pakistan, along with Afghanistan,
in fighting against terrorism in the new
era. It was stated in the strategy that the
US would be cooperating with these
two important regional players, Pakistan
and Afghanistan, on many fields but
specifically in intelligence sharing,
military cooperation at borders, trade,
energy, and economic development.15
With the AfPak Strategy, these two
countries became the focal point of
Obama’s foreign policy and this strategy
aimed at cracking the resistance of the
Taliban. In this context, this strategy
also aimed at increasing military and
economic aid to Pakistan, cooperation
for border security and intensification
of diplomatic relations with Russia
and India along with Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
The most significant element of the
new American strategy was the decision
confirming the deployment of 30,000
more troops in Afghanistan. At the time,
there were almost 110,000 allied troops
there, 70,000 of which were American
soldiers. The commander of NATO in
137
Sevinç Alkan Özcan
Afghanistan recommended expanding
the number of troops to 150,000.
Thereafter Obama declared that the
US would send 30,000 more troops
to Afghanistan and he called on allied
forces to support this new initiative. As
a response to this call, NATO’s Secretary
General declared that allied forces would
contribute 5,000-7,000 more troops to
support the new American strategy.
Turkey supports the basic elements
of the AfPak strategy of the Obama
administration, except for sending
combat forces to Afghanistan.
The American request to send more
troops to Afghanistan, was conveyed to
Turkey during the NATO Summit held
in April 2009, as well as during Obama’s
visit to Turkey. This development
illustrated that Turkey was asked to
take part in armed conflict under the
framework of this new American strategy.
It was reported that NATO demanded
5,000 more troops from all NATO
member countries and 1,000 of them
were asked from Turkey.16 However,
Turkey reiterated its previous position
after this demand and emphasized
that 1,750 Turkish troops were already
deployed in Afghanistan and Turkey was
determined not to send combat troops.
Turkey’s contribution to Afghanistan
was mainly focused on training of the
security forces and improvement of
social and economic conditions of the
people and it has also given importance
to civil support projects in Afghanistan.
Since Turkey has a very positive image in
138
the eyes of Afghan people, Ankara was
reluctant to send combat troops to take
part in armed conflict.
Turkey supports the basic elements
of the AfPak strategy of the Obama
administration, except for sending combat
forces to Afghanistan. Turkey agrees with
the American government on the basic
issues like protecting security and stability,
holding democratic elections, increasing
economic development, preventing civil
casualties, and reconstruction. Moreover,
the demand to increase the number of
American and NATO troops was not
welcomed, not only by Turkey but also
by other NATO member countries.
For example, Germany refused to
send troops to the southern regions in
which the conflicts are concentrated.
Meanwhile, Canada declared its plan to
withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in
2011. American and European public
opinion also increasingly demanded
their countries to withdraw their troops
from Afghanistan.
The confidential report prepared
by the commander of NATO forces
in 2009, which depicted an extremely
negative picture about the security
situation of Afghanistan, was seized by
the Washington Post. The McChrystal
Report17 maintained that if the number
of troops in Afghanistan is not increased,
the US would lose the war and the Afghan
government would be endangered. The
report also emphasized the necessity to
protect the Afghan government rather
than to crack down on the resistance.
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010
The Turkish government had
concerns about the possible losses
of Turkish troops in a conflict.
This report clearly shows the failure of
the US and the security vulnerability in
Afghanistan. In addition, the impact of
corruption in the Afghan government
on the resistance and the increasing
sympathy for al-Qaeda because of illtreatment and torture in prisons were
also indicated in the report. The report
revealed that the US and NATO forces
could not prevent financial and logistical
assistance from going to al-Qaeda and
they experienced serious intelligence
weaknesses.18
The Turkish government had
concerns about the possible losses of
Turkish troops in a conflict, since taking
part in armed conflicts could result in
Turkey losing the sympathy of the Afghan
people and undermining its humanitarian
activities. The visits of Turkish Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu,
to Pakistan and Afghanistan, on 9-13
June 2009 were significant because these
visits showed that no change would
occur in Turkish foreign policy towards
Afghanistan. Davutoğlu’s visit in May to
the Şah Mansur refugee camp, in which
4 million Pakistani refugees live because
they had been displaced as a result of
operations launched by the Pakistani
army against the Taliban,19 showed
that Turkey was concerned about the
humanitarian dimension of the issue.
After his visit to Pakistan, Davutoğlu
went to Afghanistan and visited shrines,
mosques, hospitals and schools in some
provinces, before arriving in Kabul.
He referred to the peace messages of
Mevlana during his visit to Mezar-ı
Sherif, the center of Belh province,
which is the homeland of Bahaeddin
Veled, the father of Mevlana. He gave
the message that “we have not forgotten
Afghanistan” by coming together with
Hashim Zari, the Governor of Shibirgan,
and promised to build a mosque, a school
and a hospital there. Davutoğlu’s visit
to the Afghanistan-Turkey Friendship
Children’s Hospital and Habibe Kadiri
School for Girls in the town of Akca20
also showed that Turkey placed much
emphasis on the civilian dimension of
the Afghanistan problem.
One of the crucial events of 2009 in
Afghanistan was the controversial elections
which were held on 20 August. It was
controversial because it was impossible
to have legitimate and fair elections
in a country that was experiencing the
highest level of security problems in the
world. The fighting between the Taliban
and the NATO forces in the eastern and
southern regions prevented millions of
Afghan people from casting their votes.
The operations of the US/UK against
the Taliban in the Helmand region
before the elections that were designed
to create a secure environment, there
were not successful at all. The general
elections that were held in Afghanistan
for the second time after the American
intervention, witnessed the race among
President Hamid Karzai, Abdullah
139
Sevinç Alkan Özcan
Abdullah – the former foreign minister
who was an important name from
Rabbani’s group-, Ramazan Besherdost–
the former planning minister who was
educated in French schools and was
known as a defender of human rights-,
and Ashraf Gani– finance minister of
the Karzai government who had top
positions in the World Bank and UN
missions.21
the country and they will cooperate with
Pakistan in different areas, fight against
corruption, prevent drug trafficking and
provide representation of all groups in
the new Afghan government. However, it
was difficult for Karzai to meet all of these
conditions given his first term’s legacy
since he is not supported by all ethnic
groups in the country, particularly the
Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Turkmens.
During his first term he was mostly the
supported by the Pashtuns and carried
out policies that satisfied mainly them.24
Karzai was reelected as president
for the second time as a result of these
controversial elections. Although in recent
years, Karzai has been seriously criticized
Davutoğlu was among the highby the Western media for corruption and
level attendees of Karzai’s inauguration
nepotism, but he was
ceremony.
Along
still an indispensable Ensuring security and stability in with many states,
name for the coalition
Afghanistan very much depends on especially the US,
forces.22 Karzai began
UK, France and
an international coalition taking
Pakistan,
Turkey
his second term
into
account
the
demands
of
local
also believed that
with a swearing-in
Karzai should fulfill
ceremony held in the actors.
these
conditions
capital, Kabul, where
because the security vacuum created by
he said that the priority in the country
the Taliban forces was a major source
was to put an end to the violence. Karzai
of concern for Turkey. It seemed that
promised that Afghan forces would take
the American and NATO troops newly
the control of the country’s security
dispatched to Afghanistan would
within five years with NATO’s assistance
not be able to overcome this security
and he would fight seriously against
problem. Ensuring security and stability
corruption,23 because he has lost the
in Afghanistan very much depends on
confidence of the Afghan people as well
an international coalition taking into
as that of international actors due to the
account the demands of local actors.
allegations of corruption. Therefore, he
From the beginning, Turkey defended
became the president again in order to
this principle and preferred to stand at an
meet several conditions of the coalition
equal distance from different members of
forces, especially the US. The primary
the international coalition. The visit by
conditions were: the Afghan government
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and security forces would take more
on 27 October 2009 can be considered
responsibility in ensuring the security in
140
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010
Turkey
does
not
perceive
Afghanistan as a question to be
resolved only within the borders
of Afghanistan, but believes that
a regional approach must be
developed.
as an important turning point in terms of
Turkey-Pakistan relations in the context
of Afghanistan.25 Historic ties between
the peoples of Pakistan and Turkey
enable these two countries to play an
important role in ensuring stability and
peace in Afghanistan and the region.
Pakistan, by supporting the Pashtun
resistance movement Hizb-ul Islami
and its leader Gulbeddin Hikmetyar
during the Soviet occupation, had
played a significant role in the rise of the
Taliban movement after 1994. Pakistan
is arguably the power that ensured the
Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in
a very short time. Pakistan, by using the
Islamic resistance groups in Afghanistan
against India in the Kashmir problem,
has provided training for the Kashmiri
insurgents in many parts of Afghanistan
under the control of Taliban.26 With the
AfPak strategy, the US has sent a message
that Pakistan should change its policy in
Afghanistan and the region. Otherwise,
Pakistan will continue to be named as a
bastion of terrorism, which is expressed
by the US and UK frequently. Indeed,
these two states, on the one hand,
request Pakistan to continue its goodwill
towards the AfPak strategy, but on the
other hand, they continue to pressure
Pakistan by playing the India card.27
In 2009 and 2010, Turkey increased
its diplomatic efforts to establish peace
and stability in the region. The “TurkeyAfghanistan-Pakistan Tripartite Summit”
held on January 25, 2010 was the
fourth summit of the process initiated
in 2007. At the Summit in which
President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai,
President of Pakistan Asıf Ali Zerdari
and President of Turkey Abdullah Gül
participated, the mechanisms to improve
cooperation between the Afghani and
Pakistani governments were discussed.
Issues related to military training in
Afghanistan were also discussed through
negotiations of the General Staffs and
the security services. The training of
soldiers and police forces in Afghanistan
in quarterly periods and increasing the
cooperation with Afghanistan in the fight
against terrorism were also agreed in the
negotiations under the framework of the
summit between Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan and President Hamid
Karzai. The tripartite declaration also
included the opening of 68 schools by
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
built by the TİKA (Turkish International
Cooperation and Development Agency).
Additionally, these three countries agreed
to increase their cooperation in the field
of education. 28
The “Friendship and Cooperation
Summit in the Heart of Asia”, held
on 26 January 2010 in Istanbul, was
another indicator of the approach that
intense diplomacy should be used.
In the declaration issued at the end
of the summit attended by countries
141
Sevinç Alkan Özcan
neighboring Afghanistan, the main
directions of Turkey’s foreign policy
were highlighted once again and the
importance of regional cooperation was
emphasized. The following expressions
were also included in the declaration: “A
safe, secure and prosperous Afghanistan
is a vital element of regional peace and
stability, the risks and problems are
common and all forms of terrorism and
illegal drug trafficking affect all countries
in the region.”29 These summits have
indicated that Turkey does not perceive
Afghanistan as a question to be resolved
only within the borders of Afghanistan,
but believes that a regional approach
must be developed for the solution of
the problem. One of the most important
elements of the regional approach is
to increase cooperation with Pakistan,
since Pakistan is a major party to the
problem.
The successful tripartite summits
were led by Turkey in order to thaw
relations between the governments
of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
According to Turkey, increasing
high-level relationships and cooperation
between Afghanistan and Pakistan is
vital for peace and stability in the region.
The successful tripartite summits were
led by Turkey in order to thaw relations
between the governments of Afghanistan
and Pakistan. As a result of these
tripartite summits, the “Summit of the
Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan”
142
was also held under the leadership of
Ankara. Along with Turkey, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, high-level representatives
from Iran, China, Russia, UK, US, Japan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, UAE, OIC, UN,
NATO and the EU also participated
at the Summit, so that it had extensive
international participation.
Another summit on Afghanistan
with extensive international participation
was held in London on 28 January 2010.
“The London Conference,” attended
by foreign ministers and high-level
representatives from around 70 countries,
was the eighth of a series of such
conferences done since 2001. Previously,
the series of conferences were held in
Bonn and Berlin in 2001, London in
2006, Rome in 2007, Paris in 2008, and
Moscow in 2009 for the reconstruction
and future of Afghanistan. What made
the London Conference different from
earlier conferences was that it showed
that the integration of moderate
elements of the Taliban into the Afghan
political structure was possible by getting
them to accept the constitution and lay
down their arms under the framework
of a compromise with Karzai.30 In
addition, transfer of the responsibilities
of international forces to local units was
also on the agenda of the Conference.
It was decided that in order to enable
the Taliban militants to participate in
the political process, a fund of $140
million will be created by the participant
countries. Afghan President Karzai
promised to fight against corruption
effectively. It was also decided that the
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010
international forces will withdraw from
Afghanistan after the Afghan soldiers
reach the ability to ensure stability in the
country.31
In the years 2009 and 2010, NATO
and US troops took serious casualties in
Afghanistan. As a result, European and
American public opinion have increased
calls for the withdrawal of troops from
Afghanistan. The requirement for 30,000
to 35,000 additional troops in order to
put the AfPak strategy in practice clearly
indicated the failure of the US and
NATO in Afghanistan.
The above-mentioned warnings
of General McChrystal, the ISAF
Commander,
expressed
in
his
report invited the ire of the Obama
administration and the general was
removed from his office in June 2010
because of his criticisms in an article
published in Rolling Stone magazine;
General David Petraeus replaced him. It
has been known that General McChrystal
openly criticized Obama’s policy towards
Afghanistan. Considering that the biggest
losses since 2001 occurred in 2008 and
2009 it seems that there is no reason to
say that the US policy has been successful
in Afghanistan. Obama declared that the
Afghanistan strategy would not change
with General David Petraeus. Obama
also stated that the withdrawal will begin
from July 2011 but would continue for
a few years.
One of the most critical foreign
policy questions for Turkey in 2009
In
Afghanistan,
Turkey
has implemented the most
comprehensive
development
assistance program in the history
of the Turkish Republic.
and 2010 was the US expectation that
Turkey would contribute more troops to
Afghanistan within the framework of the
AfPak Strategy. The US demanded Turkey
to send troops to combat in Afghanistan
and expand the mandate of the Kabul
Central Command southward to an area
where conflicts had intensified. In short,
Turkey was asked to review its policy
of not taking part in armed conflicts.
These requests, which had come to the
agenda several times before 2009, were
clearly stated for the first time. Turkey
has undertaken the command of ISAF
twice so far. By undertaking the Kabul
Central Command of ISAF for the
second time in November 2009, Turkey
ensured the security of the region,
provided logistical support, and gave
support for infrastructure. In addition, it
continued the military training activities
in Afghanistan.32 Turkish trainers and
consultants are serving in military
high schools. Turkey also continued
its activities in the fields of health and
education. It has contributed to the
building or restoration of 27 primary
and elementary schools since 2001.
As a result, 38,000 students had the
opportunity to study with the support
of Turkey. Turkey has also pioneered the
opening of a high school for girls and a
women’s development center. According
143
Sevinç Alkan Özcan
to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, “in Afghanistan, Turkey has
implemented the most comprehensive
development assistance program in the
history of the Turkish Republic.”33
Conclusion
The varied contributions of Turkey
are often covered and praised by
international media. Turkey increased
the number of troops from 800 to 1,750
after undertaking the Kabul Central
Command of ISAF. It has also assumed
the duty of forming and organizing the
144
Military Academy. Despite its increased
support in all these fields, Turkey has
not supported the idea of sending
combat troops to Afghanistan. Except
for sending troops to combat in the
operation and making concessions on
the definition of its task area, Turkey has
responded positively to the new strategy
for Afghanistan. In order to increase the
capacity of Afghan security forces, which
is one of the basic preconditions for the
withdrawal, it is expected that Turkey
would provide more contributions in
terms of training and organization for
the Afghan forces.34
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010
Endnotes
1 See: Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardas,“Post- September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance
of Turkey Revisited”, in İdris Bal (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era, (Boca
Raton, Brown Walker Press, 2004, pp.421-455.
2 For official statements see “Başbakan Bülent Ecevit’in ABD’de Meydana Gelen Terörist
Saldırılara İlişkin Olarak Yaptıkları Açılama”, Dışişleri Güncesi, 12 September 2001; “Dışişleri
Bakanı İsmail Cem’in, ABD’ye Yönelik Terörist Saldırılar Hakkında Basın Mensuplarına
Yaptığı Açıklama”, Dışişleri Güncesi, 13 September 2001.
3 “Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem’in, ABD’ye Yönelik Terörist Saldırılar Hakkında Basın
Mensuplarına Yaptığı Açıklama”, Dışişleri Güncesi, 13 September 2001; Derya Sazak,
“Sezer’den Huntington Uyarısı”, Milliyet, 18 September 2001.
4 “Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem’in TV-8 Televizyonuna Verdiği Mülakat”, Dışişleri Güncesi, 20
September 2001.
5 “2001 Yılı Eylül Ayı Gelişmeleri”, Dışişleri Güncesi. 5 October 2001.
6 Ibid.
7 “Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer Başkanlığında, ABD’nin Afganistan’a Yönelik Askeri
Operasyonu Konusunda Yapılan Değerlendirme Toplantısına İlişkin Açıklama”, Dışişleri
Güncesi, 8 October 2001.
8 “Ders Vermeye Gidiyorlar”, Milliyet, 1 November 2001.
9 “İsmail Cem’in Yaptığı Açıklama”, Milliyet, 23 November 2001.
10 For details of the resolution, see the United Nations website, “Security Council Resolution
on Afghanistan 1386 (2001)” at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.
11 NTVMSNBC, “Turkey Takes Command of ISAF”, at http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/309
517.asp [last visited 10 June 2010]
12 TSK, “Turkey’s Contributions to the ISAF Operation”, at: http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/
isaf.htm [last visited 17 June 2010].
13 For detailed analysis of this argument, see Sevinç Alkan Özcan, “ABD’nin Afganistan
Operasyonu ve Türk Dış Politikası”, TİKA Avrasya Etüdleri, No. 27-28 (Fall-Winter 2005),
pp. 33-75.
14 Ebru Afat, “Obamalı ABD’nin İlk Hedefi AfPak”, Anlayış, No. 70 (March 2009), p. 76.
15 General James Jones, “President Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy”, at http://
fpc.state.gov/120965.htm [last visited 12 June 2010].
16 “Türkiye Afganistan’a Bin Asker Gönderecek”, Zaman, 11 April 2009.
17 “The McChrystal Report”, 30 August 2009, at http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/mcchrystal_a
fganistan_rapor u.pdf. [last visited 21 January 2010].
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Sevinç Alkan Özcan
18 M. Serkan Taflıoğlu, “Afganistan’da Güvenlik: NATO Kuvvetleri Zorda”, at http://www.
orsam.org.tr/tr/ya zi goster.aspx?ID=369 [last visited 10 May 2010].
19 “Davutoğlu Pakistan ve Afganistan’ı Ziyaret Etti”, Anlayış, No. 74 (July 2009), p. 8.
20 “Davutoğlu Sıradışı Afganistan Turunda”, Radikal, 13 June 2009.
21 Nuh Yılmaz, “Seçimler Afganistan’a Güvenlik Getirecek mi?”, Anlayış, No. 76 (September
2009), pp. 60-62.
22 Ebru Afat, “ABD ve İngiltere’nin Afganistan Oyunu”, Anlayış, No. 75 (August 2009), p.76.
23 BBC Türkçe, “İkinci Karzai Dönemi Başladı”, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/
haberler/2009/11/091119_karzai.shtml [last visited 19 November 2009]
24 Sabri Çiftçi, “Hamid Karzai Afganistan için Çözüm Olabilir mi?”, at http://www.orsam.org.
tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=429 [last visited 20 December 2009].
25 “Turkey and Pakistan”, Daily Times, 27 October 2009.
26 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Afghanistan: The Next Phase”, Perceptions: Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2000- February 2001), p. 8.
27 Syed Talat Hussain, “Londra Konferansı Afganistan’a Yenilikler Getirmeyecek”, Daily Times,
28 January 2010.
28 “Türkiye-Afganistan-Pakistan Üçlü Zirvesi”, Net Gazete, 24 January 2010.
29 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Asya’nın Kalbinde Dostluk ve İşbirliği İçin İstanbul Bildirisi”,at
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_asya_nin-kalbi_nde-dostluk-ve-isbirligi-icin-istanbul-bildirisi.
tr.mfa [last visited 25 March 2010].
30 Fikret Ertan, “Londra Konferansı”, Zaman, 28 January 2010.
31 “Yeni Afgan Stratejisi”, Star, 29 January 2010.
32 Armağan Kuloğlu, “Afganistan’a Operasyon icin Türk Askeri Gider mi?”, at http://www.
orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=451 [last visited 4 February 2010].
33 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Political Relations with Afghanistan”,
at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa. [last visited
19 July 2010].
34 Kuloğlu, “Afganistan’a Operasyon icin Türk Askeri Gider mi?”.
146