Jordanian Marketing System
for
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables
A KAFA’A Assessment
Submitted by the Academy for Educational Development
March 17, 2004
Prepared by:
Rich Magnani
Senior Agribusiness Advisor
Ruby Assad
Marketing Coordinator
Dr. Samir El-Habbab
Agribusiness Consultant
Table of Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................................. 3
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 4
Purpose............................................................................................................................ 4
The Opportunity.............................................................................................................. 4
Constraints to High Value Exports ................................................................................. 5
Export Market Linkages ................................................................................................. 6
Production Linkages ....................................................................................................... 7
Private Sector Institutional Leader.................................................................................. 7
Recommendations to Strengthen JEPA .......................................................................... 9
A New Company........................................................................................................... 10
Export Constraints ............................................................................................................ 11
Technology Transfer and EurepGAP Training............................................................. 12
Accredited Pesticide Residue Analysis Laboratories ................................................... 13
Grades and Standards.................................................................................................... 13
Domestic Market Information....................................................................................... 13
International Market Information ................................................................................. 14
Transportation ............................................................................................................... 15
Wholesale Marketing System ....................................................................................... 16
Municipal Wholesale Markets .................................................................................. 17
Assembly markets..................................................................................................... 17
Sorting, Grading, and Packing Facilities .................................................................. 18
Packing and Packaging Materials ............................................................................. 18
Pre-Cooling Units ..................................................................................................... 19
Cold storage Units..................................................................................................... 19
Key Constraints and Proposed Interventions.................................................................... 19
Improved Access to International Buyers..................................................................... 21
Promote Production Linkages among Exporters and Small Farmers ........................... 22
The Modern Valley Farms Model............................................................................. 23
Integrated Agricultural Project Model ...................................................................... 23
Private Sector Institutional Support - the Role of JEPA............................................... 23
Export Market Dimensions ............................................................................................... 27
Gulf and Middle East Markets...................................................................................... 27
EU Fruit Markets .......................................................................................................... 29
Strawberries .............................................................................................................. 29
Table Grapes ............................................................................................................. 30
Galia Melons............................................................................................................. 31
EU Vegetable Markets.................................................................................................. 31
Fine Green Beans...................................................................................................... 31
Cherry Tomatoes....................................................................................................... 33
Snow and Snap Peas ................................................................................................. 33
Asparagus.................................................................................................................. 33
Other EU Crop Opportunities ....................................................................................... 33
Annex A. EU-Jordan Partnership Agreement................................................................... 35
...............................................................................................................................................
2
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AMD
Agriculture Marketing Department (Ministry of Agriculture)
EurepGAP
Euro-Retailer Produce Good Agricultural Practices
GAP
Good Agricultural Practices
GCC
Gulf Cooperation Council
HEIA
Egyptian Horticulture Improvement Association
JEDCO
Jordan Export Development and Commercial Centers Corporation
JEPA
Jordan Exporters and Producers Association
NCARTT
National Center for Agriculture Research and Technology Transfer
TTS
Technical Transfer Specialists
3
Executive Summary
Purpose
The purpose of this mission is to assess the constraints that restrict the production,
distribution, and marketing of horticulture produce in export markets, with a focus on
high quality and less water intensive produce. The output of the mission is to recommend
and prioritize KAFAA project interventions that will:
•
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•
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Allow existing exporters to increase sales in export markets;
Increase the number of exporters able to penetrate these export markets;
Increase the numbers of farmers that are participating in sales to these export
markets: and,
Enhance high quality sales opportunities in the local market.
These outputs will provide the foundation for subsequent design and implementation of
an export marketing plan.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Opportunity
Jordanian exports of high quality produce to European, Gulf (GCC), Middle East markets
are small in volume, and small relative to production. The dominant flow of exports is
low to mid-quality vegetables (with smaller volumes of fruits) to Arab markets. Produce
exports to more quality discriminating markets, for example in the EU, remain very
small. In 2002 only 1,174 tons of fruit and 21,487 tons of vegetables were exported to
non-Arab markets. Of this amount, Western Europe accounted for only 206 tons of fruit,
and 2,620 tons of vegetable exports. Israel, Turkey, and countries of Eastern Europe
accounted for the majority of exports to non-Arab countries. Contrast this volume with at
least 15 non-EU competitor exporters that shipped more than 200,000 tons of fruit to the
EU in 2001, and at least 8 non-EU competitors that shipped in excess of 40,000 tons of
vegetables to the EU. Obviously, Jordan lacks the resource base to achieve these export
volumes, but clearly has the opportunity to dramatically expand the export volume of
high quality fruits and vegetables.
Numerous crop opportunities are available during the production off-season in the EU for
high quality exports – strawberries, seedless table grapes, galia melons, cherry tomatoes,
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asparagus, okra, fine green beans, and snow/snap peas to name a few1. Many of these
products offer similar opportunities in high quality retail markets in the GCC. Profit
potential will vary dramatically depending, in large part, on the timing of shipments
during the marketing window and the position of competitive exporters during these same
time periods. Volumes and profits will rise to the extent that Jordanian farmers and
exporters can capitalize on early (or late harvest) periods before (or after) competitors
enter the markets.
Perhaps as many as 20 medium to large exporters of high quality produce may emerge if
the constraints discussed below can be resolved. These exporters have the potential to
spread the benefits to many other small farmers that have the willingness and capability
to join in production agreements with exporters.
A small volume opportunity exists for high quality produce in the domestic market, but is
limited to higher income consumers in Amman. The high income consumer base to target
is probably between 5% and 10% of the population of Amman.
Constraints to High Value Exports
Numerous studies have diagnosed the constraints, and many problems have been noted.
These include:
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•
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Production and marketing extension support to farmers that need experience in
post-harvest handling;
Cold chain infrastructure from field to air or truck shipping points such as precooling, cold storage, and refrigerated trucking ;
Market research and market information systems;
Accredited laboratories for pesticide residue analysis;
Enforcement of quality standards;
Regulatory structure of the wholesale market system ;
Airfreight rates to EU markets and air cargo capacities;
Jordanian EurepGAP Certification Body (CB);
Water quality in the Jordan Valley that affects crops exported to the EU; and,
Quality of locally produced packaging materials.
We contend that some of these issues are not significant constraints. The wholesale
market structure primarily affects bulk volume exports to GCC and Middle East markets,
but regulations prohibit farm sales direct to retailer grocery shops. Thus, farmers
interested in producing high quality produce and selling directly to retailers that target
consumers who are willing to pay for higher quality produce are unable to do so. Air
freight rates are not unreasonably high and adequate cargo capacity for produce is
available if planned in advance. EurepGAP certification can be obtained from any
1
Crop opportunities are based on previous market window analyses which require updating.
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number of international CBs.2 While the vast majority of farms lack pre-cooling and cold
storage, arrangements (discussed below) can be made to alleviate these problems. The
refrigerated trucking fleet is old, but a few modern trucking services are available. As
more exporters demand better refrigerated trucking services, service competition will
increase and rates will decline. The Agriculture Credit Corporation is preparing a plan to
finance the purchase of refrigerated trucks to increase the fleet size to 2,400 trucks. Poor
water quality is a significant issue but can be solved with installation of costly
desalinization equipment. And good quality packaging materials are easily imported.
The other issues impose more significant constraints. However, activities along several
fronts supported by the World Bank Horticulture Export Promotion and Technology
Transfer project are directly addressing these constraints. This support is allowing
JEDCO, NCARTT, and the AMD to work toward solving these problems. Implicitly our
recommendations will require coordination with and, more important, cooperation of
KAFAA and the World Bank sponsored activities.
So why are high quality exports of Jordanian produce so small? The almost unanimous
feedback from stakeholders (exporters, farmers, government representatives) interviewed
for this mission focus on two factors.
1. Linkages to the export markets
2. Production linkages between exporters and farmers.
Trends in export markets shape the signals from import buyers to exporters that are the
fundamental driving force in the production to market chain3. Nonetheless we believe
that the production linkage deficiencies are a more serious problem in Jordan than
linkages to export markets as discussed below.
Export Market Linkages
Only a few exporters have made the necessary investments to their production and postharvest handling systems to meet the stringent quality requirements of EU buyers. These
quality requirements generally exceed those in the high quality retail grocery segment in
GCC markets. These few exporters have taken the necessary steps to establish market
linkages with export buyers. The process is straightforward but certainly not easy. It
requires direct contact with prospective buyers through trade shows, market study tours,
or other means to identify buyer needs (variety, quality specifications, price, volume,
timing, payment terms, etc.). If the exporter is product ready, trial shipments typically
follow. Feedback from the buyer allows the exporter to make adjustments and if all goes
well, a buyer/seller relationship is established. If the exporter is not product ready he/she
2
Although we believe that a Jordanian EurepGAP CB is not necessary to promote EurepGAP certification,
we recommend that an assessment of costs and benefits of establishing a local CB be conducted so that an
informed decision can be made.
3
Throughout this report the term importers encompasses the retail supermarket buyer. In fact, not all
supermarkets directly import; some work through independent importers and wholesale agents.
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must make the necessary changes (EurepGAP certification, different varieties, etc.) in
order to prepare trial shipments.
We believe that linkages to export buyers are not an overwhelming constraint. JEDCO
sponsored study tours and trade shows offer ample opportunity for serious exporters to
contact buyers. And contact is not limited to market visits. Donor support can facilitate
buyer missions to Jordan to present market requirements to farmers and exporters.
Why are there so few exporters of high quality produce? Investment requirements are
significant, and collateral requirements to obtain investment credit are high. Some
stakeholders reported that most exporters are not sufficiently serious to expend the effort
and money. Others reported a shortage of entrepreneurial ability. Yet others noted that
access to more land (leased or purchased) is financially too risky, and that establishing
supply arrangements with farmers is an unknown, and thus, also too risky.
Production Linkages
Exporters want more high quality production and cannot or do not want to expand into
new production areas, and farmers want access to better markets. Both groups can be
served through formal or informal supply arrangements (variously referred to as
contracting, pre-contracting, and satellite farming). These arrangements are difficult to
establish for various reasons. The relationship must be based on trust between farmer and
exporter. A legal contract becomes meaningless if the one party anticipates bad faith from
the other. The increasing importance of produce quality and safety requires that farmers
supplying exporters to the EU become EurepGAP certified, and retailers of high quality
produce in the GCC are moving to requiring GAP certification. This requires investments
of money and effort by farmers. Supply arrangements can also fail because of insufficient
support from the exporter to the farmer, or if dramatically different spot market and
contracted prices cause one of two parties to renege on the contract.
At least two farmer supply models are being used with success in Jordan. Modern Valley
Farms, the only EurepGAP certified exporter in Jordan, works with 4 farmers under
contracts. And the Integrated Agricultural Project model has organized 8 farmers to
produce okra and sweet peas that are marketed by Modern Valley Farms, but with a
different contract mechanism. The Integrated Project model does require a one-time
subsidy for infrastructure to prepare the farmers for EurepGAP, and to pay the farm
manager’s salary for the first year. We believe that these models can be and should be
replicated with other exporters and other farmers.
Private Sector Institutional Leader
Another critical deficiency not recognized by many stakeholders is the need for a private
sector institutional body capable of organizing exporters and farmers and delivering
needed services to increase productive capacity, high quality production, and expanding
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market linkages to export buyers. We believe that the Jordan Exporters and Producers
Association for Fruits and Vegetables (JEPA) should fill this role. However, JEPA as
currently structured, financed, and operated cannot serve this purpose. JEPA must be
revitalized and strengthened if it is to be effective in expanding production and exports of
high quality produce. A strong association can provide other benefits which include the
following:
•
Advocate for regulatory change to support the produce export sub-sector. JEPA
would analyze regulations to assess the costs and benefits of regulatory change,
write position papers, and represent the private sector in dialogue with the
government. An example would be the recommendation by JEPA management to
petition the government to allow JEPA to issue Certificates of Origin rather than
the Chamber of Commerce. Issuance of the Certificates would be a source of
revenue for JEPA. For controversial or sensitive issues JEPA should request
KAFAA to participate. KAFFA will lend a sense of objectivity to the government
that JEPA may not be able to present.
•
Self-regulate the sub-sector by requiring that all members adhere to a JEPA Code
of Conduct that stipulates a minimum standard of conduct focusing on the
elimination of extra-legal and unethical business practices. The Code can be used
as tool by JEPA to build credibility with the government and among players in
the horticulture sub-sector.
•
Provide training for producer/exporters and, to the extent practical, public sector
extension agents, in a variety of agronomic disciplines, Good Agricultural
Practices (GAP), and specifically EurepGAP, post-harvest handling, and packing
and packaging. This can be coordinated with NCARTT (perhaps on a fee based
agreement) which will soon hire 16 Technical Transfer Specialists (TTS) to train
farmers in appropriate technology. Alternatively, JEPA could hire agricultural
engineers to be trained by NCARTT to serve JEPA members, and possibly public
sector extension agents. Another option is to send JEPA staff for training by the
Horticultural Export Improvement Association (HEIA) in Cairo. HEIA has
established a strong staff of training specialists.
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Promote production linkages between JEPA exporters and farmers using the
Modern Valley Farms or the Integrated Agricultural Projects model. JEPA would
need to negotiate an agreement with Modern Valley Farms to perhaps use their
trainers to train other exporters and farmers. A source of funding must be
identified if JEPA is to promote the Integrated Agricultural Project model.
•
Work directly with JEDCO as it develops the web-based international market
information system, so that JEPA can be prepared to assume responsibility for
managing and maintaining the information system.
•
Establish a JEPA Seal of Quality based on a comprehensive quality control
system with internal quality standards following the approach used by HEIA to
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develop its Seal of Quality. Only produce that meets these minimum quality
standards are eligible to use the Seal.
•
Organize conferences and workshops and invite EU buyers to discuss
consumption trends, market dynamics, and market requirements for fruits and
vegetables.
These services should be promoted to farmers as well as exporters and can be used to
create a membership category for small farmers. Member dues for these farmers would
be far less than for exporters and larger farmers and would not include full membership
voting rights.
Recommendations to Strengthen JEPA
The objective is to strengthen JEPA so it can become a self-sustaining association that
can effectively represent member interests in advocating for policy change, and attract
and maintain a larger base of members willing to pay for a selected menu of services that
offer value. Though an initial external source of funding is required, service fees and
membership dues must reach a level to fully support the association, perhaps in 3 to
5 years. Donor dependency has to be avoided, and can be avoided if the JEPA board
and management establish a rational action and growth plan which is fully
transparent to membership.
Our recommendations are as follows:
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Hire a professional executive manager with experience in horticulture production
and/or horticulture marketing.
•
The KAFAA project should provide a part-time institutional advisor who will do
the following:
o Provide operational and strategic support to management and the Board of
Directors;
o Develop good association governance practices to ensure transparency to
members;
o Assist in redrafting the JEPA mission statement;
o Assist in developing a JEPA Code of Conduct;
o Ensure coordination between the World Bank project sponsored activities
(with JEDCO, AMD, and NCARTT) and KAFAA to avoid duplication
and to ensure efficient use of financial and technical assistance; and,
o Develop, with the board and the executive manager, a rational action plan
for developing expertise to provide fee-based services for members, and
guide the JEPA staff in executing the plan.
•
Hire a junior agricultural engineer to work directly with JEDCO to:
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o Develop expertise in conducting marketing studies, study tours, and
participating in trade exhibitions, and
o Develop expertise in managing and maintaining the web-based
international market information system so that JEPA becomes the natural
home for the web-site when JEDCO transfers the site to the private sector.
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Increase JEPA membership dues from JD 100 per year. The level of dues will
depend, in part, on the level of services JEPA decides to offer, and the extent of
outside funding available.
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Establish a cost-sharing arrangement for services with members from the outset to
avoid a common problem with externally financed associations; that services will
continue to be free. JEPA will not be able to rely on external sources of finance in
the long-term, and so will have to depend on service and membership dues
revenues in order to be sustainable. Initial cost-sharing can be a small percentage
of the cost of providing the service, but over time a larger portion of the cost
burden can be shifted to members that receive the service. The cost recovery plan
should be apparent to members from the beginning.
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Board terms should be staggered. Currently, the entire Board is re-elected at the
same time. Board terms should remain at 2 years, but elections should be held
every year for only one-half of the Board. The other half can be elected the
following year.
A New Company
Concerns about export performance of the horticulture sub-sector have led to
considerable debate about establishing a new private sector company to increase exports,
but as yet no consensus regarding its structure or business objectives has emerged. Some
stakeholders want a new commercial post-harvest center for cooling, sorting, and packing
that can be rented by farmers and exporters that otherwise lack access to these facilities.
Other stakeholders want a privately owned marketing company that, in addition to
cooling, sorting, and packing, will directly market the produce. While there may be a
need for a post-harvest commercial center, we believe other more critical steps need to be
taken first that will build demand for a center. These steps discussed above include
expanding export marketing linkages, production linkages to farmers, and strengthening
JEPA. Otherwise, the investment may be wasted.
We do not believe that a new export marketing company, as currently envisioned to
leverage production from numerous small farmers and to cool, sort, package, and market
high quality produce, can be viable. We believe that the necessary pre-requisites are to
improve the production linkages to small farmers through training and other methods of
technology transfer which can be accelerated through a stronger JEPA. As this is
accomplished exporters will be more interested in contracting for their production. JEPA
can play the important role of bringing more farmers and exporters together under
production contracts.
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Export Constraints
Our methodology for assessing marketing opportunities and export constraints is as
follows:
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Demand Pull: focus on what the market wants, when, and how much will it
pay—rather than pushing existing production similar to the patterns of bulk
produce exports to Arab markets;
Increase Efficiency: find ways to cut the costs of production and movement of
produce through the distribution system to final domestic and export customers,
and;
System Improvement: improve technical, physical, and market linkages
throughout the production marketing system using tools and techniques such as
production contracts, and enforcement of grades and standards.
Constraints in Jordan that have resulted in low levels of high quality fruit and vegetable
exports are many and well known as a result of many studies by donor agencies and local
authorities in recent years. Previous studies have evaluated the various physical and
institutional infrastructure deficiencies and have concluded the following:
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Weak farm extension system which lacks the tools and resources to transfer
knowledge to farmers to support improved production of exportable fruits and
vegetables. As a result exporters must invest to provide their own extension
services;
The small number of producer/exporters that have EurepGAP certification which
will soon be a requirement for all produce exporters to the EU. EurepGAP
certification will also be a valuable selling tool in non-EU markets, particularly
high value retail markets in the GCC and in Eastern Europe;
The absence of accredited laboratories in Jordan for pesticide and heavy metals
residue analysis for exports, resulting in costly delays at import sites where testing
must be done;
No enforcement of grades and standards which encourages the export of low to
mid-quality produce to Arab markets, and damages the reputation of Jordanian
produce;
Inadequate market research and domestic marketing information available to
farmers, particularly for crop planting intentions and prices, resulting in
uninformed planting and marketing decisions. Similarly, international marketing
information on export requirements and linkages to buyers is inadequate;
Air transportation costs and cargo capacity availability that do not encourage
produce exports;
Inadequate cold chain from farm to market including on-farm pre-cooling and
cold storage systems, an old refrigerated trucking fleet, and the absence of
produce operations at the cold storage facility at Queen Alia airport. These
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•
deficiencies increase post-harvest losses, and significantly reduce product quality
and shelf life; and,
A wholesale market structure that limits the development of a higher quality local
market segment and encourages the export of low to mid-quality produce to
Middle East and Gulf (GCC) markets.
The discussion below assesses these constraints.
Technology Transfer and EurepGAP Training
The Ministry of Agriculture lacks the resources to improve the capacity of its extension
workers to provide technical support to fruit and vegetable farmers. NCARTT, with the
direct support of the World Bank Horticulture Export Promotion and Technology
Transfer Project, is working to enhance the capacity to transfer technology directly to
farmers. In March – April 2004, NCARTT will hire 16 Technology Transfer Specialists
(TTS) who will be trained for 3 months before being placed in the field to work directly
with farmers. Each of the TTS will be a crop specific specialist. To support the work of
the TTS, NCARTT will develop up to 30 export crop protocols that will assist the TTS in
training farmers in GAP, and more specifically EurepGAP.
In addition, Dr. Abdel Nabi Fardous, Soil and Irrigation Director General of NCARTT
has indicated an interest in developing a model for satellite (or contract) farming for
NCARTT. Dr. Fardous expressed interest in cooperating with KAFAA and JEPA to
develop a model(s) and further indicating a willingness to explore ways in which the TTS
could train JEPA exporters and their contract farmers.
EurepGAP is a protocol aimed at reducing food safety risks, environmental risks, and
worker welfare through a series of best practices (Good Agricultural Practices otherwise
known as GAP) and reference points that can be measured and monitored before the
product reaches the farm gate. By the end of 2004, or shortly thereafter, EurepGAP will
be a requirement of all exporters of fresh produce to the EU. EurepGAP will not be a
requirement for exporters to GCC, Middle East, or even Eastern European markets, but
exporters that intend to target high quality retailers in these markets should become GAP
or EurepGAP certified. It is only a matter of time before large supermarket chains in the
GCC begin to require GAP certification. Certified exporters will be far better prepared to
meet buyer requirements.
As of this writing Modern Valley Farms is the only Jordanian exporter that is EurepGAP
certified. JEDCO has started the process of training farmers in EurepGAP. In late March
2004, trainers from Center for Promotion of Imports (CBI), a Dutch company, will
provide training for 15 farmers in Jordan, which will lead to certification for the farmers.
KAFAA hopes to coordinate with JEDCO to include selected private and public sector
extension workers to particulate in the training sessions.
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Accredited Pesticide Residue Analysis Laboratories
The Ministry of Agriculture laboratories for pesticide residue analysis and the NCARTT
laboratory for heavy metals residue analysis are not internationally accredited. As EU
importers increasingly require EurepGAP certification, it is essential that these labs
obtain accreditation. While both labs provide analysis for produce exporters, the lack of
accreditation cause some importers, particularly in the EU, to conduct analysis at EU
accredited labs. This adds cost and time delays in reaching markets. Both agencies have a
plan in place to achieve accreditation. The World Bank project is providing funding for
the pesticide residue analysis lab which will result in a new building and new installed
equipment by the end of 2004. The expansion will more than double the residue analysis
capacity of the lab. The lab will soon begin ISO training for staff and when the new lab is
functional ISO certification followed by HACCP certification processes will begin.
NCARTT’s heavy metals lab will follow the same timetable for ISO certification.
Grades and Standards
The absence of a quality standards system contributes to the image of low quality
Jordanian produce in GCC markets, and hinders exports to the EU. Without such a
system there are no regulatory mechanisms in place to require exporters to identify their
produce according to standards specified in the regulations. Jordan has yet to fully
implement a quality standards system for fruits and vegetables, but as it is obligatory
under WTO, the AMD, with World Bank support, is working to implement a technical
system.
The steps include the establishment of a set of quality standards consistent with
international standards, and then to establish a conformity agency that can provide ISO
certified inspection and testing services. The AMD is working with The Jordan Institute
for Standards and Metrology (JISM) to establish a Product Conformity Certification
Program. JISM selected Bureau Veritas as the entity that will be responsible for issuing
conformity certificates attesting that produce tested are in accordance with required
standards. Bureau Veritas will become accredited according to international laboratory
and testing standards. The AMD indicates that the system will be fully operational by
early 2005. According to the Director of the AMD, establishment of the quality standards
and use of a label on exported product to identify the produce according to standard will
be obligatory, but the issuance of conformity certificates for exporters will be voluntary.
Domestic Market Information
Farmers want to make informed decisions based on reliable market information.
However, most farmers obtain information on the local market from their neighbors and
from commission agents. And many decisions are made by following the leading farmers
in the area. Leading farmers can help speed replication of new technologies, but can also
result in planting duplication which can excessively increase production and lower prices.
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AMD of the Ministry of Agriculture provides daily domestic market information by
request. The AMD faxes the information to about 30 recipients – mostly exporters. The
daily information on more than 16 crops including prices (daily high, low, and most
frequent), daily market volume, container weight in kg of product, comparison of most
frequent price with the previous day, import quantities and prices and country of origin
(important for products coming from Turkey, Syria, Lebanon being trans-shipped to GCC
markets), and highest price for the highest quality. The information covers the Amman,
Irbid, and Zarka municipal wholesale markets. The report does not include movements of
product from the 3 wholesale markets to domestic retail, processing and catering markets
or export. The AMD attempted to collect these data but were unable to obtain them from
the commission agents. The AMD will establish an expanded web-based market
information system with the financial support of the World Bank project. The AMD is
procuring hardware and software to set up the system.
According to the AMD the most requested market information that is not now available is
vegetable crop planting intentions. Farmers can use this information early in the season to
make alternate planting decisions for seasonal vegetable crops. This information could
help ameliorate seasonal production variations. Otherwise farmers will make planting
decisions based, in part, on last season’s harvest and current prices. Thus, short crops that
lead to high prices will encourage excessive plantings and resulting in very large
production and much lower prices. The opposite can occur in the following season.
However, the AMD has been unable to obtain the cooperation of the agriculture
extension service to obtain these data.
Other possibilities include collecting and disseminating hourly price and quantity data to
producing areas. Then farmers could decide quickly when to take his produce to the
wholesale markets. This would be a valuable market tool, but the costs of implementation
are not clear. Enumerators would be required to record hourly transactions from
commission agents and then submit them electronically to selected production areas
where the prices and quantities would be posted in written form.
International Market Information
The World Bank project is supporting JEDCO to develop a web-based international
market information system. The World Bank project reports that the ultimate objective is
to transfer the completed information system to a private sector organization.
International market information is clearly important particularly for newcomers to
export or to a new market. General information on international markets, production,
consumption and trade statistics, importer and freight forwarder contacts, import
regulations, duties, shipping requirements, price trends, and so on, is valuable. However,
information systems are in no way a substitute for direct contacts with buyers to forge
deals.
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Transportation
Air Transport
Small volumes of high quality produce are shipped by air primarily to the EU, with
smaller volumes to the US by less than 10 Jordanian exporters via Royal Jordanian
Airlines. There is also some export of specialty produce and flowers by air to Saudi
Arabia. That almost no fruits and vegetables use the modern airport cold storage facility
underscores the low volumes of produce export by air.4
Air freight rates are not a significant export constraint. Current rates to London are
$0.85/kg, $0.66/kg to Western Europe, and $0.35/kg to Dubai. (These rates are reported
to be 20%-25% less than general dry cargo rates as incentive to use air freight). Nor is air
cargo capacity a significant constraint. Royal Jordanian runs 5 cargo freighters each week
to Europe: 1 to London, 1 to Hahn in Germany, and 3 to Maastricht. These are A-310
freighters with cargo capacities of 38 tons each. Exporters can also ship via passenger
aircraft, though cargo capacities are lower. Royal Jordanian has daily flights to London,
and 3 flights per week to Paris. The cargo capacity of these passenger flights varies from
7 to 12 tons each, depending on the season and the different passenger aircraft used.
Rarely does an airline satisfy exporters regarding timing, carrying capacities, and
destinations. For example, exporters to London report shortages of carrying capacity
during the harvest season. Alternatives are to store the product overnight at the cold
storage facility, or ship to Maastricht and forward ship via freight forwarder by truck to
London (roughly 10 hours at $0.10 - $0.20/kg). Neither is an optimum solution when an
exporter wants to satisfy an importer with on-time delivery, but neither are they hurdles
that cannot be reasonably overcome.
Land Transport
The number of refrigerated truck in Jordan in 2003 is about 1,200 trucks. Most of the
truck transport fleet is old; the World Bank estimates that 90% of the total fleet is older
than 20 years. Nevertheless, some exporters interviewed for this mission reported that
modern and efficient refrigerated trucking services are available. The greater problem
reported is the high costs of providing good service to European markets given the small
volume exported. This problem will be solved by competitive market forces as volumes
increase and more trucking companies enter the trucking market. The Agriculture Credit
Corporation is preparing a plan to finance the purchase of refrigerated trucks. They have
estimated that the fleet size should increase to 2,400 trucks from the current estimate of
1,200.
Relative trucking and air freight costs are shown in the 2 tables below.
4
Operating rates at the airport cold storage facility are not restricting its use. The current rate reported by
the Airport Cargo Manager is 2-3 piasters per kg per 24 hours. The cold store managers have discussed
eliminating all charges if it will encourage use of the facility.
15
Cost of Transport per Truck
Destination
Lebanon
Kuwait
Bahrain
UAE
Saudi Arabia
Cost ($ per Truck)
900
1,500
1,800
2,200
1,600-1,800
Overland and Air Transportation Costs
Destination
Gulf States
Lebanon
Western Europe
London
Overland ($/kg)
0.14
0.07-0.1
0.37-0.42
---
Air ($/kg)
0.35
--0.66
0.85
Wholesale Marketing System
The primary concern with the structure and operations of the wholesale marketing system
is that the system contributes to exports to GCC and Middle East markets of large
volumes of low to mid-quality product. Official quality standards for fruits and
vegetables are not implemented so there is no regulatory check on product exports. The
result is that almost all Jordanian products in these markets have a low quality image. The
structure also contributes to the entry of regional exporters that purchase from the
municipal markets, grade and sort to improve quality and then sell in GCC and Middle
East markets at higher prices. The value-added function, in these cases, is captured by
non-Jordanian exporters.
Regulations prohibit farmers from selling directly to retailers within the municipality
borders; instead they must sell their products to the wholesale market. Thus farmers who
want to market directly to retailers that seek high quality produce cannot do so. This
prohibition adds a layer of difficulty and cost to retailers interested in selling higher
quality produce. (The added cost is the 4% fee that must be paid to the wholesale
market.) We believe that this regulation should be changed. Another change to improve
the quality of locally sold produce would be to establish a stall in each of the 3 main
wholesale markets, owned by the municipality, a cooperative, commission agents, or a
private company, that would be reserved for only the highest quality produce. Contracts
could be arranged with retailers interested in assured sources of supply and farmers
interested in capturing higher margins for their higher quality produce.
16
Municipal Wholesale Markets
The wholesale marketing system is composed of a central wholesale market in Amman,
seven municipality wholesale markets, four assembly markets and one cut-flower
wholesale market. The basic function of these markets is to provide a market place for
producers, retailers, and commission agents to conduct selling and buying transactions.
The Amman central wholesale market consists of 220 stalls for commission agents (of
which 106 are rented to 82 commission agents at an annual rent of JD 2,000), 53 banana
ripening units and 40 stalls for input dealers, importers, and banks. The seven wholesale
markets have been established in Zarqa, lrbid, Jarash, Tafileh, Salt, Karak, and Mafraq .
The number of commission agents operating in these wholesale markets is as: Zarqa, 20;
Irbid, 40; Jarash, 13; Tafileh, 4; Salt, 4; Karak, 7; and Mafraq, 6.
The wholesale markets of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa are the most important delivery points
for farm produce. During 2002, these markets handled 915,164 tons of fruits and
vegetables, the majority of which, 696,567 tons, were vegetables. About 95% of this
volume is produced locally and 5% are imports. Amman is the key market handling 77%
of the produce sold to through the three municipal markets in 2002; Irbid handled 17%
and Zarka 6%. Only minor volumes move through the other wholesale markets, but no
records are maintained. The three municipal markets handled 67% of total fruit and
vegetable production in 2002; 47% of vegetable production and 31% of fruit production.
Assembly markets
Assembly markets were established in the Jordan Valley to provide farmers with
marketing facilities, including storage, grading and packaging. Markets were established
at Wadi Yabes in the Northern Ghor, Al-Arda (Maaddi) in the Middle Ghor, South
Shouneh in the Southern Shor, and Al-Safi in the Karak/Safi Ghor. Presently, auctioning
is carried out only at Al-Arda Market. The South Shouneh market was retained for export
operations, but it is not operational. The other two markets are also not operational.
Al-Arda Market is a seasonal market operating during winter, from December through
June. Farmers bring their produce to the market to be sold at auction by commission
agents. Some of the commission agents in the Amman Central Wholesale Market also
operate in Al-Arda Market during its season. The Market now has 22 stalls, all of which
are rented to commission agents and to the Potato Marketing Cooperative.
The main buyers in the market are retailers from nearby towns and villages, commission
agents (representatives of large middlemen in Amman Central Market) and some
exporters who buy and repack produce for export, especially to Lebanon and GCCC
markets during May. The limited number of commodities sold in the market dampens the
interest of buyers. The quantities handled by this assembly market are limited. This may
be due to the fact that many farmers are obliged to sending their produce to commission
17
agents in Amman (from whom they have received loans), or because they feel that they
can obtain better prices and returns by selling at Amman. Now this market is managed by
the Municipality of Maaddi.
Sorting, Grading, and Packing Facilities
Thirteen grading and packing facilities owned by the public and private sectors have been
established in Jordan since the 1970s. These include two grading and packing centers
owned by AMPCO and located at its marketing centers in South Shouneh and Wadi
Yabes in addition to eleven units established by the private sector. The South Shouneh
and Wadi Yabes grading and packing centers are owned by AMPCO.
Other facilities include the following:
• The Jordan Valley Corporation (JOVAC) station in the middle ghor grades
vegetables, has a fruit and vegetable grading and packing capacity of 5 tons per
hour.
• Sharab station at Jwaideh, has a total packing capacity of 15 tons per hour.
• Barrad al-Janoub packing station/Qastal area, has a total capacity of 5 tons per
hour and is used mainly for grading and packing apples. It has complete lines for
washing, drying, sizing, grading, waxing and packing.
• Orient Company station at Deir Alia, for grading vegetables (5 tons/hour).
• AFCO station at Yadoudeh for grading vegetables (5 tons/hour).
• Abu El-Haj Farms station at Shoubak, for fruit and apple grading (5 tons/hour).
• Olavyan and Al-Hashlamoun station at Shoubak for apple grading (5 tons/hour).
• Zannouneh Farms station at Shoubak for apple grading (5 tons/hour).
• Abdul-Hameed Al-Hashlamoun Farms station at Shoubak for apple grading (4-5
tons/hour).
The following grading stations are not operational:
•
•
•
Shahine Sons packing station in the middle ghor.
Ibrahim El-Sheikh packing station.
Agrico packing station at El-Samek
Packing and Packaging Materials
Most fruits and vegetables are packed in polystyrene containers (5-10 kg capacity of 47
by 27 by 10 cm or 47 by 27 by 15 cm). This type of container is light but relatively weak,
is not easy to clean, and does not offer proper ventilation or vertical support. Often the
produce rests on itself during transportation. Other container types used are plastic and
wooden. The use of the wooden container is declining and the use of the plastic
containers (20-25 kg) is almost restricted to delivering tomatoes for processing. Three
factories offer cardboard containers in different models and sizes, but they are used
18
mainly for export to GCC markets. The few successful exporters to the EU reported that
the quality of domestic cardboard containers is inadequate. They import these materials.
A major problem is overfilling containers as with some products properly filled
containers carry a lower price at the municipal markets than over filled containers. This
occurs because most fruits and vegetables are sold per container (per packing unit and not
according to the weight per unit). Retail buyers are more likely to buy overfilled
containers with subsequently greater proportions of damaged produce.
Pre-Cooling Units
At present, there are only three pre-cooling units in Jordan, and exporter interest in using
the units is still low. Two of the three are owned by the private sector and the third was
owned by the Agricultural Marketing Organization and was operated by JEPA.
Cold storage Units
There are 26 refrigerated stores in Jordan with a total storage capacity of 64,000 tons, one
of which is at Queen Alia International Airport which opened in 1997 but is not now
handling fruits and vegetables. The Airport coldstore is owned by Royal Jordanian
Airline. About 50% of the other storage capacity is owned by the public sector and the
remaining 50% by the private sector.
Most fruits and vegetables have short shelf life and so must be marketed rapidly
following harvest. These crops require only short, but critically important periods of cold
storage. Longer periods of cold storage can be used for fruits such as apples and citrus.
Many apple growers have their own cold storage rooms, while others rent such facilities
for few months to store their produce. The capacity of cold storage facilities owned by
apple growers is about 20,000 tons. In addition some cold storage facilities owned by the
private sector were established for commercial purposes. Their capacity is estimated at
15,000 tons. These are used for apples, oranges, lemons, potatoes, onions and garlic.
Key Constraints and Proposed Interventions
All of the above constraints are important. Their solution can be considered as necessary
to provide a foundation for increasing exports of high quality fruits and vegetables, but
they are not sufficient to increasing exports. The few successful exporters to the EU in
Jordan have managed to overcome these constraints with significant investments of
money and effort. If the pace of improvements of these constraints were to remain
unchanged over the next 3 to 5 years, we believe that the number of successful exporters
to the EU will increase slowly increase, and that the volumes exported to the EU will
increase slowly as well. At the same time, we believe that the solution of all of these
19
constraints will increase the number of exporters and the volume of exports only
marginally, compared to the no change scenario.
What then is needed to dramatically expand high quality produce exports? First, we can
readily identify the supportive role that the government should play. This role should be
limited to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Improve the export regulatory environment,
Improve the extension service,
Maintain accredited laboratories required to improve export efficiency,
Provide a readily accessible domestic market information system;
Give the AMD sufficient authority to implement a quality standards control
system for exports and the domestic market; and,
Possibly provide short-term financial incentives to encourage investments in
export horticulture.
The Government should have no role in assisting the private sector in marketing. The
burden to dramatically expand volumes of high quality produce clearly should fall on the
private sector.
We contend that the KAFAA project should prioritize its interventions to focus on
repairing and strengthening market linkages from production to export market. These
linkages comprise several components.
1. Improved access to international buyers of high quality produce, particularly in
the EU and GCC. These interactions will provide the correct market and product
information (variety, price, volume, timing, packaging, payment terms, etc.) that
serious and dedicated exporters need to meet buyer requirements.
2. Production linkages, with proper technology and other inputs, to larger numbers
of farmers to leverage the capacity of the few producer/exporters that have the
entrepreneurial and marketing expertise so they can substantially increase their
exportable volume.
3. Government or private sector institutional support systems that can assist the
producer/exporter to meet the quality requirements through extension support,
EurepGAP certification, and pesticide residue analysis by accredited labs.
4. Financial support mechanisms to ease the investment burden required for
cooling, sorting, and packing systems and conform to international standards such
as EurepGAP.
The discussion that follows will address the first three components as financial support
mechanisms are beyond the scope of the KAFAA project.
20
Improved Access to International Buyers
Understanding market requirements is the critical first step. Then interventions can be
designed and implemented to meet market needs. The importance of meeting market
needs is well understood by some exporters, particularly those oriented to EU markets
which have far more discriminating consumers. Most Jordanian exporters that are
oriented to Arab markets simply are not market focused. Rather, they focus on the
produce they purchase direct from farmers or through the municipal wholesale markets,
and because they deal with bulk low to mid quality product, price is usually the driving
variable.
Direct contact with international buyers addresses another concern expressed by many
non-exporters interviewed for this mission - uncertainty about crop variety selection.
Import buyer requirements will, depending on the commodity, include variety
specification. This information is conveyed to the farmers that will supply exporters
under supply arrangements such as production contracts. Farmers not working under
supply arrangements can obtain this information via Ministry of Agriculture or private
sector association market information website. Other dissemination methods to reach
other farmers are discussed below.
This does not mean that we propose to segregate the markets as high quality EU markets,
which are promising, and low quality Arab markets, which are less promising. On the
contrary, we believe that high quality retail grocery markets in Arab counties are even
more important than EU markets for most current and prospective exporters for several
reasons. One, EU product quality standards are more restrictive compared to Arab
markets. Two, Western and Arab cultural dissimilarities are problematic for some, but
certainly not all, exporters. (While this can complicate the buyer/seller relationship, an
open-minded seller can surmount these problems through increased exposure to Western
buyers.) Three, closer proximity should permit more frequent contact between buyer and
seller so that accounts are well serviced.
Fortunately, the World Bank project is directly supporting JEDCO to improve the
capacity of the agency to promote horticulture exports. JEDCO does so through:
•
•
•
•
Export market and demand studies such as the 2003 Holland market study.
Study tours to export markets, such as the recent tour to Oman and the UAE, in
which exporters can learn directly from importers and import agencies of the
problems exporters must overcome to gain market access. The UAE tour
reportedly resulted in a potential contract for $10 million in high quality produce.
International tradeshow participation such as in February 2004 at Fruit Logistica
in Berlin. JEDCO covers part of the cost for exporters to exhibit.
Development of a web-based international market information system which will
include access to a “how to” manual for exporters.
21
According to the World Bank project, because JEDCO is a public/private entity,
JEDCO’s export promotional activities will ultimately be transferred to a private sector
entity. One option discussed below is to transfer this function to JEPA.
Promote Production Linkages among Exporters and Small Farmers
The constraint to increasing exports that was most often raised in many discussions with
private and public sector stakeholders during this market assessment mission was the lack
of supply arrangements or production contracts between exporters and farmers. The
absence of these production supply linkages means that exporters of high quality product
are limited to the volumes they are able to produce on their own farms, and will be unable
to satisfy the large volume demands of importers.
Contract farming, common in many parts of the world, refers to advance agreements in
which supermarket, processors, or hotel, restaurant, and institutional buyers will purchase
a farmer’s or group of farmers’ products under specified conditions. In the absence of
contracts, farmers face higher risk in order to meet production quality requirements
without the technical and financial support of guaranteed markets and reliable contracts.
In addition to a guaranteed market with pricing guarantees or guidelines, contracting
firms often provide credit, seed and other production inputs and, in some cases, extension
advice, where expertise from government extension agents is lacking.
Production contracts are favored by buyers that need assured sources of supply, and are
unwilling or unable to increase their own production. They are also popular with
processors that require a variety of fruit or vegetable not commonly grown, e.g., an onion
variety well suited to drying, or high solids potatoes for French fries.
Workable contracts are based on trust. This makes the contracting process tenuous when
buyers and sellers have little or no working history. The typical complaint by farmers is
that firms renege on their promises of price and conditions of sale, such as quality
specifications. Contracting firms in turn complain that farmers accept their credit, inputs
and extension advice and then sell their crops elsewhere if the spot market price moves
above the contracted price. A common problem with contracts is that the contract
mechanism itself is emphasized rather than the relationship between producer and buyer
and the benefits that both parties gain over the long term. Seasonal production and price
variations will, depending on the kind of supply arrangement, invariably result in an
advantage for one party over the other from season to season. Short production years and
high market prices will favor the buyer with a fixed price contract at a lower than spot
market price. The opposite will occur during high production seasons where market
prices fall. This can be overcome by flexible pricing policies in the contracts. It can also
be overcome by a realization that the arrangement is intended to be long term, and that in
the long term advantages and disadvantages tend to be evenly distributed among the
parties.
22
Another critical component is that the increasing importance of produce quality and
safety requires that farmers supplying exporters to the EU become EurepGAP certified,
and retailers of high quality produce in the GCC are moving to requiring GAP
certification. This requires investments of money and effort by farmers.
Two approaches to contract farming in Jordan have shown initial success, and should be
considered as models to be replicated to expand the reach to other small farmers.
The Modern Valley Farms Model
Modern Valley Farms is the only EurepGAP certified exporter in Jordan and is exporting
produce to the EU. The experience of Modern Valley Farms with contract growing
arrangements illustrates the difficulties inherent in establishing such arrangements.
Modern Valley started working with 22 satellite farmers 4 years ago. They now have
formal supply arrangements with only 4. Part of the problem is attributable to Modern
Valley Farms internal production systems, which have improved through their process of
gaining EurepGAP certification. They found that most of the 22 original farmers were
unable to adhere to EurepGAP standards. Shukry reports that now they are better
prepared to expand from the current group of 4 satellite farmers.
Integrated Agricultural Project Model
The make-up of the Farm Owner’s Model is different from the more commercial
approach by Modern Valley Farms in that it involves initial subsidies. The first pilot farm
is being implemented on 510 dunum with 8 farmers growing okra and sweet peas. The
startup costs of JD 150,000 were provided by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation to pay
for the farm manager, and structural changes and equipment required to bring the farms
into EurepGAP compliance. Limited government funding is anticipated for the second
year, and it is expected that the enterprise will be self-sustaining by the third year. The
farmers, under the guidance of Mustafa Hamarneh, an agricultural consultant at the
University of Jordan arranged a marketing contract with Modern Valley Farms who sold
the okra, and will sell the sweet peas following harvest.
Private Sector Institutional Support - the Role of JEPA
Farmers and exporters that need help in horticulture production and marketing cannot
rely on the government to provide the assistance. Notable exceptions are the World Bank
project support of JEDCO, NCARTT and AMD. We believe that a private sector
institution, specifically an association, is needed that can deliver fee-for-service
technology transfer, export promotion, and other services to its members.
Associations can be effective in developing economies where transparency is lacking and
the systems governing business setup and operations often appear arbitrary, corrupt,
23
unequal, or unfair. Entrepreneurs do not have similar access to the various regulatory,
license, finance and credit, and other authorities needed to establish and operate a
business; the playing field is not level. Power and position can play a greater role in
enterprise success than entrepreneurial skill. In this environment, confidence and trust in
the system dissipates. It fosters a mindset of secrecy among successful entrepreneurs
because of their often disparate and unique recipes for success. A unique path, if shared
with others, eliminates a business advantage. Knowledge becomes more important and
powerful. It is no wonder that associations face far greater obstacles in these
environments. Members lack the willingness to cooperate, to share ideas and information
necessary to empower the association to meet member’s objectives. Willingness to share
follows from the common ground members occupy.
A successful association must concentrate first and foremost on what the member’s
customers need and provide a selected menu of services that allow the members to meet
their customer’s needs. We contend that JEPA is the best candidate to provide these
market and production linkage services, to find common ground among members, and to
coordinate among JEDCO, AMD, NCARTT, and other donor related activities. JEPA
was established in the mid-1990s and now has 51 members, of which about 6 ship to
GCC markets, and 3 to 4 ship to EU and/or Eastern European markets. Several years ago,
when JEPA membership was greater, many more exported to GCC markets. Most of
those exporters left JEPA and now form the core of a group of that export large volumes
of low to mid-quality produce to these markets. The majority is commission agents and
most sell to the GCC on consignment basis.
A strong JEPA can provide many valuable services and functions to its members and to
the horticulture sub-sector at large. These may include:
•
Advocate for regulatory changes to support the produce export sub-sector. JEPA
would analyze regulations to assess the costs and benefits of regulatory change,
write position papers, and represent the private sector in dialogue with the
government. An example would be the recommendation by JEPA management to
petition the government to allow JEPA to issue Certificates of Origin rather than
the Chamber of Commerce. Issuance of the Certificates would be a source of
revenue for JEPA. For controversial or sensitive issues JEPA should request
KAFAA to participate to present an objective position.
•
Self-regulate the sub-sector by requiring that all members adhere to a JEPA Code
of Conduct that stipulates a minimum standard of conduct focusing on the
elimination of extra-legal and unethical business practices. The Code can be used
as promotional tool by JEPA.
•
Provide training for producer/exporters and, to the extent practical, public sector
extension agents, in a variety of agronomic disciplines, Good Agricultural
Practices (GAP), and specifically EurepGAP, post-harvest handling, and packing
and packaging. This can be coordinated with NCARTT (perhaps a fee based
agreement with NCARTT) which will soon hire 16 Technical Transfer
24
Specialists (TTS) to train farmers in appropriate technology. Alternatively, JEPA
could hire agricultural engineers to be trained by NCARTT to serve JEPA
members, and possibly public sector extension agents. Another option is to send
JEPA staff for training by the Horticultural Export Improvement Association
(HEIA) in Cairo. HEIA has established a strong staff of training specialists.5
•
Promote production linkages between JEPA exporters and farmers using the
Modern Valley Farms or the Integrated Agricultural Projects model. JEPA would
need to negotiate an agreement with Modern Valley Farms. A funding source
must be identified if JEPA is to promote the Integrated model.
•
Work directly with JEDCO as it develops the web-based international market
information system, so that JEPA can be prepared to assume responsibility for
managing and maintaining the information system.
•
Establish a JEPA Seal of Quality based on a comprehensive quality control
system with internal quality standards following the approach used by HEIA to
develop its Seal of Quality. Only produce that meets these minimum quality
standards are eligible to use the Seal.
•
Organize conferences and workshops and invite EU buyers to discuss
consumption trends, market dynamics, and market requirements for fruits and
vegetables.
These services should be promoted to farmers as well as exporters and can be used to
create a membership category for small farmers. Member dues for these farmers would
be far less than for exporters and larger farmers and would not include full membership
voting rights.
We believe that JEPA is not prepared to assume the leadership role in the horticulture
sub-sector as currently structured, financed, and operated. JEPA must be strengthened so
it can become a self-sustaining association that can represent member interests in
advocating for policy change, and attract and maintain a larger base of members willing
to pay for services that offer value. Though an initial external source of funding is
required, service fees and membership dues must reach a level to fully support the
association, perhaps in 3 to 5 years. A number of interventions will be required to
strengthen the association. We recommend the following:
5
•
Hire a professional executive manager with experience in horticulture production
and/or horticulture marketing.
•
The KAFAA project should provide a part-time institutional advisor who will do
the following:
Refer to the HEIA website for more information at www.heia.org
25
o Provide operational and strategic support to management and the Board of
Directors;
o Develop good association governance practices to ensure transparency to
members;
o Assist in redrafting the JEPA mission statement;
o Assist is developing a JEPA Code of Conduct;
o Ensure coordination between WB Export Promotion project sponsored
activities (with JEDCO, AMD, and NCARTT) and KAFAA to avoid
duplication and to ensure efficient use of financial and technical
assistance; and,
o Develop, with the board and the executive manager, a rational action plan
for developing expertise to provide fee-based services for members, and
guide the JEPA staff in executing the plan.
•
Hire a junior agricultural engineer to work directly with JEDCO to:
o Develop expertise in conducting marketing studies, study tours, and
participating in trade exhibitions; and,
o Develop expertise in managing and maintaining the web-based
international market information system so that JEPA becomes the natural
home for the web-site when JEDCO transfers the site to the private sector.
•
Increase JEPA membership dues from JD 100 per year. The level of dues will
depend, in part, on the level of services JEPA decides to offer, and the extent of
outside funding available.
•
Establish a cost-sharing arrangement for services with members from the outset to
avoid a common problem with externally financed associations; that services will
continue to be free. JEPA will not be able to rely on external sources of finance in
the long-term, and so will have to depend on service and membership dues
revenues in order to be sustainable. Initial cost-sharing can be a small percentage
of the cost of providing the service, but over time a larger portion of the cost
burden can be shifted to members that receive the service. The cost recovery plan
should be apparent to members from the beginning.
•
Board terms should be staggered. Currently, the entire Board is re-elected at the
same time. Board terms should remain at 2 years, but elections should be held
every year for only one-half of the Board. The other half can be elected the
following year.
26
Export Market Dimensions6
Vegetable exports dominate fruit exports in terms of volume and rate of growth. In 2002
vegetable exports were 802,000 tons compared to 80,000 tons for fruit. During the 1995
to 2002 period, vegetable exports grew at an average annual rate of 17% compared to
only 5% for fruits (Table 1). By far the dominant vegetable export is tomato, accounting
for 26% of 2002 exports. Watermelon, lemon, and clementine made up 37% of total fruit
exports.
Jordan’s export orientation is clearly to Arab markets in the Gulf States (GCC) and to
Syria and Lebanon. For example in 2002, 53% of vegetable production was exported to
Arab markets compared to only 1.4% to European and other non-Arab markets. Fruit
exports as a percentage of production are not as high; only 11% was exported to Arab
markets and 0.2% to non-Arab markets.
Vegetable exporters to Arab markets are concentrated in the June to Nov period (67% of
total annual exports). The Jordanian vegetable export season is very long because of
different ago climatic zones that allow production of different vegetables throughout the
year. Vegetable exports to the EU are concentrated in the December to April period.
Gulf and Middle East Markets
Exports to the Middle East and Gulf markets are composed mostly of low to mid-quality
bulk produce purchased through the three wholesale markets in Jordan and exported by
truck. The primary competitors for GCC markets are Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and Syria.
Destination markets in 2002 are shown in Table 2.
6
Seminar on Development of fruits and vegetables production for export in Jordan. September 2000,
sponsored by the French Embassy.
27
Table 1. Horticultural Production & Exports, 1995,1998-2002 (MT)
Production
1995
1998
1999
2000
Tomato
Cucumber
Squash
Pepper
Green Beans
Strawberry
Grapes
608,000
89,000
45,000
14,000
23,000
505,000
85,000
57,000
23,000
18,000
545,000
109,000
43,000
24,000
10,000
618,000
84,000
56,000
25,000
18,000
527,500
97,300
45,200
26,900
14,600
683,000
154,200
50,900
26,200
19,500
57,000
59,000
53,000
67,000
80,500
64,000
1,304,000
447,000
1,232,000
614,000
1,203,000
482,000
1,529,000
659,000
877,900
623,500
1,484,149
717,300
131,409
29,256
16,078
12,549
7,836
189,877
27,402
17,149
20,712
14,410
180,216
26,011
13,621
15,426
8,195
189,958
30,419
15,728
13,557
7,644
855
1,051
904
1,121
201,273
30,722
16,414
16,364
6,748
7
989
204,183
31,478
21,198
20,978
8,525
103
671
255,046
56,606
377,722
53,636
314,151
41,660
340,113
41,727
739,054
75,241
781,428
78,954
1,549
1,109
248
620
399
2,279
1,384
282
647
574
6,606
2,048
303
1,943
870
22
138
2,539
1,310
184
645
255
25
49
7,920
1,583
281
568
117
60
70
Total Vegetables
Total Fruits
Export to Arab Countries
Tomato
Cucumber
Squash
Pepper
Green Beans
Strawberry
Grapes
Total Vegetables
Total Fruits
Export to non-Arab Countries
Tomato
Cucumber
Squash
Pepper
Green Beans
Strawberry
Grapes
Total Vegetables
Total Fruits
Total Export
Tomato
Cucumber
Squash
Pepper
Green Beans
Strawberry
Grapes
Total Vegetables
Total Fruits
2001
2002
437
349
2,011
1,551
229
1,575
630
28
217
4,626
786
7,230
965
8,773
1,483
14,247
476
12,508
899
21,487
1,174
132,958
303,365
16,326
13,169
8,235
192,156
28,786
17,431
21,359
14,984
1,292
1,400
182,227
27,562
13,850
17,001
8,825
28
1,121
196,564
32,467
16,031
15,500
8,514
22
1,259
203,811
32,032
16,598
17,009
7,003
32
1,038
212,103
33,061
21,479
21,546
8,641
163
741
259,672
384,952
322,924
354,360
751,562
802,915
57,392
54,601
43,143
42,203
76,140
80,127
Exports as % of Production
Fruits to Arab Countries
Vegetables to Arab Countries
13%
20%
9%
31%
9%
26%
6%
22%
12%
84%
11%
53%
Fruits to non-Arab Countries
Vegetables to non-Arab Countries
0.2%
0.4%
0.2%
0.6%
0.3%
0.7%
0.1%
0.9%
0.1%
1.4%
0.2%
1.4%
Total Fruits
Total Vegetables
13%
20%
9%
31%
9%
27%
6%
23%
12%
86%
11%
54%
28
Table 2. Jordan Exports of Fruits and Vegetables to Middle East and Gulf Markets, 2002
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Qatar
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Syria
Lebanon
Others
Fruits
Tons
10,124
8,775
9,508
7,367
16,889
1,498
8,314
16,466
13
Vegetables
Tons
0
254,486
77,971
74,463
142,773
56,820
123,630
51,284
1
Total
78,954
781,428
EU Fruit Markets 7
In 2001, EU imports of fruits represented a value of about $14.4 billion of which non-EU
countries supplied 42%. Fruit imports were about 18.5 million tons. Germany is the
major market accounting for 24% of total import volume in 2001, followed by the UK
(16%) and France (13%). The leading imported fresh fruit product in 2001 was bananas
followed by apples, grapes, and oranges.
More than seventy countries are responsible for the immense product flow directed at the
European countries. The share of developing countries in EU imports of fresh fruit
amounted to 35% in 2001. The leading developing country suppliers of fresh fruit were
South Africa, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Chile and Columbia. Total developing countries’
share of EU fruit imports in 2001 was 35%. Significant EU import destinations for
developing countries are in declining order: The Netherlands, Spain, UK, Italy, France,
and Germany. For example, 57% of The Netherlands fruit imports in 2001 were from
developing countries, while exports from these sources accounted for only 14% of
Germany’s imports.
Strawberries
Strawberries offers good potential for profitable Jordanian exports to the EU and GCC
markets as the markets are large and growing in most West European countries and GCC
markets. Off-season prices are quite high, and with appropriate technology Jordanian
growers could supply these markets particularly during the highest price periods. EU
imports (including intra-EU trade) of strawberry have increased rapidly. From 1990 to
7
Refer to Annex A for EU market access details by crop.
29
2001, imports of strawberries increased at an average annual rate of more than 20
percent.
Germany and France are the largest strawberry importers in the EU. During the offseason period from November to April in 2000 the two countries combined for about
156,000 tons of imports. The UK is a smaller market with only 19,000 tons of imports
during the off-season period in 2000. While the Netherlands looks like a large importer,
that is partly due to the importance of Rotterdam as major port for incoming produce
destined for the rest of the EU. Total EU imports during the November to April period
were 228,000 tons in 2000, but 203,000 tons were accounted for by Spain.
The major non-EU suppliers are Poland, US, Israel, and Morocco. Spain is the major
player in the late summer market and like Spain has access by truck which provides a
transport cost advantage over non-EU suppliers. Non-EU imports fluctuate partly in
response to the size of local harvests, but this effect is limited to small part of season
when local production is possible. Spanish supplies enter the market in February and
reach their peak in April and May, Morocco and Israel are the significant off-season
suppliers beginning in July through November.
The Jordan - EU partnership agreement limits the exports to the period of January to
March, and limits the exports from Jordan of 100 tons to the entire EU.
Table Grapes
The largest markets are Germany, France, UK, and Netherlands. Germany is the largest
consuming country of these four with imports amounting to 363,000 tons in 2001, and is
by far the largest importing country as domestic supply is almost nonexistent. France is
the second largest importer with 135,000 tons followed by UK with 135,000 tons, and
finally Netherlands with 117,000 tons. Total imports of table grape for the four markets
amounted for 783,000 tons or 91% of total EU grape imports in 2001. The four largest
markets are still unsaturated and open for off-season suppliers during the December to
July market window.
Italy, Greece and Spain supply most of the grapes to the EU market. Italian supplies enter
first into the market in June with small supplies and then as the Italian season comes into
full swing by September and October with Italian supplies reaching 70,000 tons per
month. Italian supplies trail off abruptly in late October, but continue into November.
Greek supplies appear in the EU market during the same market period as Italy. Greek
supplies begin in July and peak in October. Spain is the third largest supplier. Spain
enters the market in July and August, decreases rapidly, and then enters the market again
in November. Chile and South Africa are the largest suppliers in the off-season. Chile
begins to supply the market during January and continues to supply until April. South
Africa supplies the EU market during the same period as Chile. Jordan can supply this
market during the same period.
30
Galia Melons
Germany has no domestic production of Galia melons. Imports in 2001 were almost
90,000 tons. Spain is the major Galia supplier to the German market; however imports
from Costa Rica and South Africa play a significant role. The market is unsaturated
during the winter months from November to April. Germany offers suppliers a market of
more than 80,000 tons during the winter season.
UK imports of Galia have almost doubled during 1998 to 2001. Imports from Northern
America dominate the market and compete directly with Spanish production. The UK
market offers competitors with a market of more than 50,000 tons of Galia melons each
year. French consumers prefer the Chanterais melon. Import trends have increased
substantially from 1998 to 2001. Morocco is the most important non-EU supplier to the
French market. However, significant volumes of melons are shipped from Central
America. France offers an annual import market of about 40,000 tons of Chanterais
melons.
The Netherlands melon market is primarily for re-export, primarily to Scandinavia. The
Netherlands market is open to non-EU supplies moreso than any other EU markets.
Central American suppliers play a significant role in the Netherlands melon market. The
Netherlands Galia melon import market is about 35,000 tons per year. The Italian
demand for Galia melons far exceeds local production resulting in an import market of
about 30,000 tons of per year.
EU Vegetable Markets
Although smaller than fruit, EU imports of fresh vegetables amounted to almost $7.8
billion or 8.7 million tons in 2001. Given the larger production base, vegetable imports
from outside the EU are a much smaller percentage than fruit; only 14% of total
vegetable imports are from outside the EU. Germany was the leading fresh vegetable
importer, accounting for 30% of total EU import volume in 2001, followed by the UK
(17%) and France (16%). The leading imported fresh vegetable is tomato, accounting for
almost 25% EU vegetable imports. Other leading products are capsicum/pimiento,
lettuce/chicory, onions, mushrooms, and cucumbers. The primary developing country
suppliers of vegetables are Morocco, Kenya, Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand. Developing
countries play a significant import role in peas and beans and sweet corn. Smaller, but
still important import shares occur for asparagus, onions, and eggplant. About 29% of
Spain’s imports are from developing countries compared to 20% for France, and 12%
each for Italy and the UK.
Fine Green Beans
Two types of beans are imported by the EU – fine/extra-fine, and bobby beans.
31
European consumers prefer fine/extra-fine beans that are straight, thin, and tender with
low fiber content, compared to bobby beans. Prices and potential profit margins for fine
beans in the EU are high, especially during the off-season. With appropriate production
and post-harvest technology, Jordanian growers could supply the EU during the highest
price periods.
The two largest EU bean-importing countries are Netherlands and France, each importing
between 25,000 tons and 35,000 tons per year. France is a major market but prices until
recently were significantly lower. While the Netherlands is a major import market, much
is trans-shipped to other EU markets, especially Germany. The UK is a somewhat smaller
but highly profitable market. Netherlands imports amounted to 24% of total EU green
bean imports in 2001. France, Germany and UK imports amounted to 23%, 12% and 7%,
respectively. The three countries absorb more than two thirds of total EU imports.
The major intra-EU suppliers are Spain, Netherlands and France. EU production is
concentrated from June through August. Kenya, Egypt, Senegal and Burkina Faso are the
major non-EU suppliers and Morocco has become more important in recent years. Kenya
ships throughout the year, with major concentrations in December to February and May
to June. Egyptian exports also tend to be concentrated in December to February and April
to May. Burkina Faso and Senegal also compete in the winter market. Kenya, Morocco
and Senegal tend to produce and ship fine beans, while Egypt, Spain, Senegal and
Ethiopia primarily produce bobby beans. The US produces large volumes of high quality
green beans, but high production and transport costs make it uncompetitive in the EU
market. Though airfreight dominates transportation because of the short shelf life,
controlled atmosphere transport via truck/sea/truck or truck alone is technically and
commercially feasible and could reduce Jordanian delivered costs significantly.
The prime market window for Jordan is December to May. The best profit margin for
Germany appears to be in February, March and May. The smaller UK market has good
profit potential during the entire year. The French wholesale prices are somewhat lower
than in the UK market. Jordanian exporters can make their best profits in March and in
October. Profit potentials are also reasonably good in October to November, but
exporters should avoid the May to September period. The Netherlands wholesale prices
are even lower than in the French market and are very stable throughout the year. There
is no highly attractive market window in The Netherlands.
The large size of the potential EU market available to Jordan is underscored by an
analysis made by the USAID ALEB8 project in Egypt. The project determined that the
potential EU market for fine green beans available to Egyptian exporters was as high as
15,800 tons per month based on CIF prices of $1.17 per kg CIF.
8
Egypt Fresh Produce Export Opportunities to the European Union 2003. ALEB project. Douglas
Anderson, BMA and Ali A. El-Saied, Ph.D.
32
Cherry Tomatoes
EU off-season imports are estimated at 30,000 tons, as data on cherry tomatoes typically
is not segregated from other tomatoes. The primary import markets are the UK, France,
Belgium and Switzerland. Competition comes from Canary Islands, Morocco, Senegal
and Israel (West bank). Israel exported 14,500 tons of cherry tomatoes to the EU in 2000
mostly from December to April. Senegal exported 1,900 tons. Israel exports have
increased from 5,450 tons in 1995 to 14,500 tons in 2000.
In Germany the most favorable wholesale prices occur from November to February.
Supply to the German market is concentrated during the period April to October. Major
competitors during this period are the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Belgium, France, and
Morocco. The UK market for cherry tomatoes is about half the size of the German
market, with imports of about 300,000 tons per year. The major supplier is Spain,
dominating the market from November to April, supplying 70% of annual imports. The
Netherlands supplies year-round, with largest supplies from May until October. Other
suppliers are France, Italy, Belgium and Portugal. The UK wholesale prices appear to be
higher than in Germany and are most favorable during October to March.
The Jordan-EU partnership agreement allows for full customs exemptions on imports
from January through the end of March.
Snow and Snap Peas
Limited data is available on these products. EU imports were estimated at 15,000 tons in
2000 double the 1995 import volume. Imports are fairly regular throughout the season.
Leading exporters are Kenya, Guatemala and Morocco. Snap peas are preferred in the
UK and snow peas in France.
Asparagus
Estimated EU imports in 2000 were 16,000 tons, and are concentrated in the November
to March period. Imports include white, green, and purple varieties. White asparagus is in
greater demand with higher prices than white and green. Imports from Peru and South
Africa are dominant. The two exporters have more than 85% of the total market.
Consumption is higher in Germany and in Switzerland and lower in the UK
Other EU Crop Opportunities
The USAID Agriculture Led Export Business (ALEB) project in Egypt completed a
study “Fresh Product Export Opportunities to the EU – 2003” in which the project
identified EU market windows for several crops in addition to those discussed above. The
conclusions of the ALEB report are indicative of the opportunities available to Jordan,
33
though details on the size of the market window available to Egyptian exporters will
differ from those available to Jordanian exporters because of different CIF prices and
harvest times. The ALEB report findings include the following:
Crop
Export
Window
Volume - 2002
130,000
30,000
EU Market
Window
GCC Market
Window
Major
Competitors
Year-round
Nov- Apr
India, Argentina
France
Green Onions
20,000
Year-round
None
Lebanon, Nov
– Apr
None
Fresh Onions
30,000
Nov-Apr
Nov- Apr
Dry Onions
40,000
Year-round
Year-round
Fresh Garlic
45,000
Year-round
Year-round
Sweet Potato
22,000
Year-round
Year-round
Dates
80,000
Year-round
None
Okra
Baby Corn
5,000
10,000
Winter
Year round
Year-round
None
Herbs
Artichoke
34
Israel, Morocco,
EU
India, Pakistan,
Morocco
India, Pakistan,
Morocco
China, India,
Argentina
South Africa
Israel
Tunisia, Algeria,
Morocco
Israel, EU
Israel, EU
Annex A. EU-Jordan Partnership Agreement
The Agreement constitutes of an agricultural calendar that organizes Jordan’s exports of
agricultural products to the EU market as follows:
• Products exported free of customs duties and with neither tariff quotas nor time
restrictions include: molochia, okra, certain types of pepper, dates, dried vegetables,
citrus juices, crushed red pepper, grapefruit, and orange.
• Products exported free of customs duties and with no tariff quotas but within an
agreed timetable include: tomato, garlic, cucumber, beans, aubergines, sweet pepper,
parsley, courgettes, fennel, melon, watermelon, Onions and shallots, Carrots, celery,
and fresh grapes.
• Products exported free of customs duties but with agreed tariff quotas and timetables
include: new potatoes, cabbage, lettuce, asparagus and strawberry.
• Products exported without tariff quotas and timetables and with reduced customs
duties include: mango, and guava.
• Products exported free of customs duties but with agreed tariff quotas and without
timetables include: processed fruit and vegetables, tomato concentrates, white cheese
of sheep milk, fresh mandarins, fresh lemons, roses, and cut flowers.
• Products exported within agreed timetable and with reduced customs duties include
figs.
Tax exemptions and/or reductions are categorized as follows:
1- 100% exemption with no quotas and no time tables of entry: Green Pepper, Jew's
Mallow, Okra, Dates, watermelon peels, citrus peals, dried pepper
2- Less than 100% exemptions with no quotas and no time tables of entry: Mango,
guava (40%)
3- Less than 100% exemptions with no quotas and with time tables of entry: figs
(20/5-1-9 at 40%)
4- 100% exemption with no quotas and with time tables of entry: Onion, carrots,
cucumber parsley, watermelon, pomegranates.
5- 100% exemption with no quotas but the imported quantities should be checked
periodically to make sure of not affecting the local products in EU. In this case the
EU will set reference quantities, if the quantities increased over them, the
following actions will be taken:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Pay full duties: Onion, onion, roots, and potato seeds, grapes during 1/211/7, sweet melon weighting less than 600 grams during 1/11-31/5
Pay reduced duties: tomatoes during 1/12-31/3 (60%), garlic during 1/2315 (50%)
Green beans during 1/11-30/4 (60%)
Eggplant during 1/12-30/4 (60%)
Green Pepper during 15/11-30/4 (40%)
Oranges (60%)
35
• Grapefruit (80%)
6- 100% exemption with quotas9, if the quantities increased over the reference
quantities, the following actions will be taken:
™ Full duties: white cheese (100 tons), roses (shrubs) (100 tons), new
potatoes during 1/1-31/3 (1000 tons), lettuce during 1/11-31/3 (200 tons),
Asparagus during 1/8-31/3 (100 tons) Strawberry during 1/1-31/3 (100
tons) tomato paste (4000 ton)10
EU Entry-price system
In principle, the price setting of products in a free market is established on the basis of
demand and supply. However, in the EU the price setting for imported fruit and
vegetables is regulated following the so-called entry-price system. This system came to
replace the reference price system, which set import duties on fruit and vegetables until
the end of 1994. The entry-price system became operational on January 1, 1995. The
entry price system establishes an EU entry (i.e. minimum) price. If a product’s import
price lies under this entry-price, a duty is imposed (depending on the difference between
the two prices). The entry-price system applies to tomatoes, apples, lemons, cucumbers
and courgettes the entire year and to other products during certain periods.
Following the entry-price system, the value of every imported ‘party’ (the terminology
used in the official documents) must in principle conform to the entry price. If a ‘party’ is
imported at a price under the entry-price, an extra agricultural duty will be applied in
addition to the Customs duty. With this agricultural duty the price ranges between 100%
and 102 % of the entry price. The agricultural duty is applied as follows:
• When the value of the imported party is between 92 percent and 94 percent of the entryprice, 8 percent of the entry-price will be added to the normal Customs duty
• When the value of the imported party is between 94 percent and 96 percent of the entryprice, 6 percent of the entry-price will be added to the normal Customs duty
• When the value of the imported party is between 96 percent and 98 percent of the entryprice, 4 percent of the entry-price will be added to the normal Customs duty
• When the value of the imported party is between 98 percent and 100 percent of the
entry-price, 2 percent of the entry-price will be added to the normal Customs duty.
Parties, which are imported at less than 92 percent of the entry-price, will be penalized by
an extra levy, known as the maximum tariff equivalent. For apples and pears the limit is
set at 86 percent and for lemons at 84 percent of the entry price.
9
the addition of the reference quantities only pay the duties
Reference quantities for tomato paste will increase at 3% annually for four years only.
10
36
The following table lists the products to which the entry-price system applies, together
with the periods during which the entry price is effective, the entry price and the
maximum tariff equivalent.
EU Entry Prices and maximum tariff rate equivalent for fresh fruit and vegetables (in
Euro/100kg)
Fresh Vegetables
Period
Entry Price
Max Tariff Equivalent
Tomatoes
1/1– 31/3
1/4– 30/4
1/5– 14/5
15/5– 31/5
1/6– 30/9
1/10– 20/12
21/12– 31/12
84.6
112.6
72.6
72.2
52.6
62.6
67.6
29.8
29.8
29.8
29.8
29.8
29.8
29.8
Cucumbers
1/1– end/2
1/3– 30/4
1/5– 30/9
1/10– 10/11
11/11– 31/12
67.5
110.5
48.1
68.3
60.5
37.8
37.8
37.8
37.8
37.8
Artichokes
1/1– 31/5
1/6– 30/6
1/11– 31/12
82.6
65.4
94.3
22.9
22.9
22.9
Courgettes
1/1– 31/1
1/2– 31/3
1/4– 31/5
1/6– 31/7
1/8– 31/12
48.8
41.3
69.2
41.3
48.8
15.2
15.2
15.2
15.2
15.2
Oranges
1/1– 31/5
1/12– 31/12
35.4
35.4
7.1
7.1
Clementine
1/1– end/2
1/11– 31/12
64.9
64.9
10.6
10.6
Monreales and satsumas
1/1– end/2
1/12– 31/12
28.6
28.6
10.6
10.6
Mandarins and wilkings
1/1– end/2
1/11– 31/12
28.6
28.6
10.6
10.6
Tangerines
1/1– end/2
1/11– 31/12
28.6
28.6
10.6
10.6
Fresh Fruits
37
Other citrus hybrids
1/1– end/2
1/11– 31/12
28.6
28.6
10.6
10.6
Lemons
1/1– 31/5
1/6– 31/10
1/11– 31/12
46.2
55.8
46.2
25.6
25.6
25.6
Grapes
21/7– 31/10
1/11– 20/11
54.6
47.6
9.6
9.6
Apples
1/1– 30/6
1/7– 31/12
56.8
45.7
23.8
23.8
Pears
1/1– 30/4
1/7– 31/7
1/8– 31/10
1/11– 31/12
51
46.5
38.8
51
23.8
23.8
23.8
23.8
Apricots
1/6– 20/6
21/6– 30/6
1/7– 31/7
107.1
87.3
77.1
22.7
22.7
22.7
Cherries
21/5– 31/5
1/6– 31/7
1/8– 10/8
149.4
125.4
91.6
27.4
27.4
27.4
Peaches and nectarines
11/6– 20/6
21/6– 31/7
1/8– 30/9
88.3
77.6
60
13
13
13
Plums
11/6– 30/9
69.6
10.3
38