US HISTORY
JFK FOREIGN POLICY
DECISION MAKING MODEL- POWERPOINT PROJECT
INSTRUCTOR NOTES: This project is to coincide with your Cold War unit, students should be well
versed with early Cold War policies of Truman and Eisenhower. Students should have also analyzed the
outcome of the 1960 election and the differences in age and stature between Kennedy and Khrushchev. For
the media piece, students should know basic power point skills.
KNOW: After winning the Presidency in one of the most hotly contested elections in US History, John
Fitzgerald Kennedy was thrust onto the world stage. In his short lived Presidency, Kennedy had to deal
with many Cold War and Civil Rights crises.
UNDERSTAND: Kennedy's foreign policy was called "Flexible Response," or being able to use a wide
variety of methods to deal with foreign policy issues, which was a shift away fiom the Massive Retaliation
of the Eisenhower administration.
BE ABLE TO DO: In groups, students will research primary sources of Kennedy's foreign policy and
create a power point presentation based upon a decision making model. Emphasis will be placed upon the
ability of students to use primary sources in three types of media and to analyze how these events have
changed the course of United States History.
Essential Question: What are the long term historical consequences of Kennedy's foreign policy?
Events: Students will be given one of the events below:
Bay of Pigs Invasion
Berlin Wall Crisis
Cuban Missile Crisis
The Space Race
The Peace Corps
Vietnam 1961-1963
Slides to be placed into power point presentation:
1. Title page slide: Group names, date, topic chosen, picture
2. Overview slide: Give a general historic overview of your event:
-Who? What? When? Where? How?
3. Based upon your research, and the sources provided, create a T -Chart that lists the major
problems and potential solutions to your event.
4. After your T chart is completed, pick the one problem your group felt JFK had to solve fust. Then
create another T chart of pros and cons of potential solutions to the problem chosen.
5. Discuss the solutions Kennedy considered in solving your crisis.
6. Include the US perspective to this event with a primary source. What did America have to gain or
lose in regards to this event?
7. Include the Soviet perspective to this event with a primary source. What did the USSR have to
gain or lose in regards to this event?
8. Students must include an audio or video clip of a speech by JFK in relation to your event, no more
than 1 minute in length.
9. Results of your events. What actually happened? During the time of the event, did the results
benefit the US or USSR internationally? How did results of this event affect JFK's image at
home?
10. Works Cited page: If you choose to use other sources than the ones provided, you must cite them.
Use example format.
Other components of presentation:
-Artifacts: Groups must include 5 related primary source artifacts in their presentation
Source List for Kennedy foreign policy project:
Online: www.jfklibrary.org
1. Click on education and public programs
2. For Teachers Or For Students
3. Materials, Resources, and Activities
Bay of Pias Invasion:
and photos of Kennedy. www.ifklibrarv.org. Click on Historical Resources and JFK in
1. O v e ~ e w
History
2. Kennedy diary of Bay of Pigs Invasion. www.ifklibrary.org. Click on Historical Resources and
then Presidential Diary
3. Letter from Congressman Gerald R Ford to President Kennedy about the release of Cuban exile
hostages. December 20, 1962. www.ifklibrarv.org. Click on Historical Resources and then
archives.
Cuban Missile Crisis:
1. 13 Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Robert Kennedy. W.W. Norton and Company
Inc, New York. 1969
2. The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis. ExComm members. Time Magazine. September 27,
1982.
3. Soviet Statement on US Provocations. September 11, 1962. De-Classified document provided by
the JFK Library. Boston, Massachusetts.
4 . Letter to Nikita Khrushchevfiom Fidel Castro. October 26, 1962. De-Classified document
provided by the JFK Library. Boston, Massachusetts.
5 . JFK monologue on Cuba. October 18, 1962. JFK Library, Boston Massachusetts
6. JFK radio and TV remarks on USSR arms buildup in Cuba. Audio
Berlin Crisis:
1. Let Us Begin Anew, An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency. Gerald and Deborah
Strober. HarperCollins Publishers, 1993
2. Audio: JFK remarks at the Rudolph Wilde Platz. (Ich bin ein Berliner speech)
3. National Action Memorandum Number 117. www.jfklibrary.org
Svace Race
1. Audio: Space Race Priorities Discussion, November 2 1, 1962. JFK Library. Boston,
Massachusetts.
2. Memorandum from Kennedy to Vice President Johnson on the space program. April 20, 1961.
www.ifklibraw.org. Click on historical resources and JFK in history.
3. Memorandum from Vice President Johnson to President Kennedy on the space program. April 28,
1961. www.ifklibrrn.org. Click on historical resources and archives.
Peace Corps:
1. Making a DzfSerence, the Peace Corps at Twenty Five. Milton Viorst. Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
New York. 1986.
2. Waitingfor the Snow. Thomas Scanlon. Posterity Press, Chevy Chase, Maryland. 1997.
3. Statement Upon Signing the Order Establishing the Peace Corps. President Kennedy, March 1,
1961. www.ifklibrary.org Click on historical resources and archives.
Vietnam 1961-1963:
1. www.ifklibrarv.org. Click on Historical Resources and Vietnam
2. President Kennedy's statements dictating his thoughts on the coup in Vietnam. November 4, 1963.
Group Names:
Scoring Guide for JFK Foreign Policy Project
Standard
Power Point slides
-have clear transitions
-can be seen fiom back
of class
-include media
requirements
-all directions followed
Historical Content
-content is accurate
-content is related to
topic presented
-both US and USSR
perspectives used
Problem Solving
-T charts and problem
solving skills are
displayed
-JFK perspective
included
-Potential solutions are
presented
Use of Primary
Sources
-US and USSR sources
included and are related
to topic
-JFK speech included
-Groups use 3 media
sources including JFK
library web site
Presentation
-all members participate
-is professional
-is carefully planned
-able to use technology
effectively
-keeps audience
attention
Total Points:
Instructor Feedback:
10
Group includes all
features in the left
column and slides are
professional and has a
natural flow.
7
Group is missing one or
more features, slide
transitions or media lack
flow or items are
missing
5
Group is missing many
key features and slides
lack professionalism
Content includes all
features in left column,
and advances the
historical significance of
the event
Content is solid but has
elements of inaccuracy.
Perspectives are either
inaccurate or make little
sense
Content is thrown
together and does not
include many of the
features listed
Slides include all the
features listed, show
detail of thought, are
accurate and are blended
well into the
presentation
Slides are included but
lack depth of thought or
show signs of
inaccuracy. Solutions
are not reasonable or
valid.
Slides do not provide
any advancement of
thought in regards to
problem solving or
solutions
Slides include all
features listed, all media
is included with
accuracy. Sources are
linked effectively into
the presentation, all 3
media pieces are used.
Primary sources and
JFK speech do not relate
to topic or do not
advance presentation of
topic. Two media
pieces are used.
Many features are
missing or do not relate
to topic presented, one
or less media pieces are
displayed.
Presentation is
professional with
confidence by all
members. Shows a lot
of planning went into
presentation
Signs of disorganization
or lack of preparedness.
Not all students
participated
Group is unprepared, is
dominated by one
person in group, or did
not make good use of
technology.
150 x 2=
1100
Individual Constructive Response
JFK Foreign Policy Project
Name:
Based upon your research and the in class presentations, answer the following prompt below:
Using a one paragraph statement, explain what you believe is the main historical legacy or
consequence of Kennedy's Flexible Response foreign policy. Use three historical examples to support
your conclusion. Answer in the space provided. Use Rockwood Social Studies Six Trait Scoring
Guide for assessment.
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a
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.d
0
%
k)
Ideas
Strong controlling idea
E s e d on interesting and
meaningful thesis narrows
focus
Clearly addresses topic and
provides specific and relevant
concrete details and/or
reasons
Shows complexity and
freshness of thought
-Effective,
insightful
commentary connects concrete
detail to thesis
Controlling idea based on a
zaningfui thesis begins to
narrow focus
-Addresses the topic using
relevant details and/or
reasons
-Shows some compIexity
and/or freshness of thought
-Strong commentary relates
concrete detail to thesis
Contains some sense of
direction, but may lack focus
-Addresses the topic, but
relies on generalities (lists)
bD rather than specifics
(development)
-Limited complexity and/or
.dj freshness of thought
-Weak colnmentary
n
-4
Six-Trait Assessment for High School Writers
Conventions
I Word Choice
Organization
-Effective beginning, middle, and
end; engaging introduction; strong sense
of closure
-A clear, strong thesis statanent
governs entire essay; the writer skillfully
emphasizes irnpo~tantideas
-Use paragraphing effectively
-Progresses in a logical order
-Uses effective cohesive devices
(transitions, repetition, pronouns,
parallel structure) between and within
paragraphs
Successfully follows assigned format
-Clear beginning, middle and end
with an effective introduction and
conclusion
-A clear thesis statement governs the
entire essay; important ideas stand out
-Uses paragraphing appropriately
-Generally progresses in a logical
order
-Uses cohesive devices between and
within paragraphs
-Accurately follows assigned fonnat
W
.6
W
Is difficult to follow and
i l k s focus
May address the topic, but
"ks details
-Lacks complexity and
freshness of thought
Attempts commentary
iisuccessfu~~
-Little or no evidence of a beginning,
middle, and/or end
-Thesis statement unclear
-Little or no evidence of
paragraphing
-Does not progress in a logical order
and may digress to unrelated topics
-Lacks cohesion
-No evidence of format
Sentence Fluency
-Uses precise and
vivid language
-Effective use of
writing techniques
such as imagery and
figurative language if
appropriate
-Consistently
avoids redundancy
-Contains
-May contain errors in
-Uses precise
language
-Uses writing
techniques such as
imagery and/or
figurative language if
appropriate
-Avoids
redundancy
-Contains
grammar/usage,
punctuation,
capitalization, and/or
spelling that are not
distracting to the reader
-Fragments or run-ons
are rare (unless stylistic)
-Very few errors in
agreement and tense
-Evidence of a beginning, middle and
end
-Thesis statement attempted, but may
not govern the entire essay; some
important ideas begin to surface
-Shows evidence of paragraphing
-Inconsistency in logical order
-Inconsistent use of cohesive devices
-Attempts assigned fonnat
I
-Contains few errors in
grammarlusage,
punctuation,
capitalization, and/or
spelling
-Intentional or clever use
of atypical sentence
structure
-Correct
pronoun/antecedent
agreement and
subjectlverb agreement;
consistent verb tense
grammarlusage,
imprecise language
punctuation,
1 -Attempts to use
capitalization, and/or
some writing
spelling that may be
techniques such as
distracting to the reader , imagery and/or
figurative language if
-Some run-ons and/or
sentence fragments
appropriate
-Inconsistent
Some obvious
subjectlverb agreement
redundancy
and or verb tense
-Contains repeated
r u s e s imprecise
errors in grammarl
language
usage, punctuation,
Shows little o r no
evidence of writing
capitalization, and/or
spelling that are
techniques such as
imagery or figurative
distracting
-Numerous run-ons
language
andlor fragments
-Obvious and/or
-Frequent errors with
distracting
agreement andlor tense
1 redundancy
Modified based on the work of the Northwest Regional Edzrcational Laboratory, Portland Oregon
I
98 1
I
Voice
~
-
- Shows individual
perspective; personality comes
through
sentences that are
clear and varied in
length and structure
-Variety of sentence
beginnings
-Natural rhythm,
cadence and flow
-Clearly shows an
awareness of audience and
purpose
-Writer's enthusiasm for the
topic is evident
-Effectively uses writing
techniques (such as humor,
point of view, tone) that evoke
a strong elnotional response
- Shows some individual
perspective; personality begins
to show
sentences that are
clear and show
some variety in
length and structure
-Not all sentences
begin with the same
pattern
-Sections of writing
have rhythm and
flow
-Shows an awareness of
audience and purpose
-Writer cares about topic
-Uses writing techniques
(such as humor, point of
view, tone) that may evoke an
emotional response
-Contains
-May lack individual
sentences that are
generally clear, but
lack variety and
complexity
-Some sentences
begin the same
-An occasional
section of writing has
rhythm and flow
perspective
Shows some awareness of
audience and purpose
-Writer shows limited
connection to the topic
-Attempts to use some
writing techniques (humor,
point of view, tone) to evoke a
response
-
-Contains
sentences that lack
variety and clarity
Most sentences
begin the same way
-Writing is choppy;
needs rereading to
follow the meaning
I -Lacks individual
I
Bold descriptors = MAP criteria
perspective
Shows little or no
awareness of audience or
purpose
Treatment of topic is
predictable
Shows little or no evidence
of writing techniques to evoke
a resvonse
Revised Aug. 2004
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" ~ a e s d dmorning
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October 16, 1962 . . .
>I
0
MORNING,
OCTOBER 16, 1962,
shortly after g:oo o'clock, President Kennedy called and
asked me to come to the White House. He said only that
we were facing great trouble. Shortly afterward, in his
office, he told me that a U-2 had just finished a photographic mission and that the Intelligence Community
had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles
and atomic weapons in Cuba.
N
TUESDAY
That was the beginning of the Cuban missile
crisis-a confrontation between the two giant atomic
nations, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which brought the
world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of
mankind. From that moment in President Kennedy's
office until Sunday morning, October 28, that was my
life-and for Americans and Russians, for the whole
world, it was their life as well.
At ii:45 that same morning, in the Cabinet
Room, a formal presentation was made by the Central
Intelligence Agency to a number of high officials of the
government. Photographs were shown to us. Experts ar-
Thirteen Days
rived with their charts and their pointers and told us
that if we looked carefully,we could see there was a missile base being constructed in a field near San Cristobal,
Cuba. I, for one, had to take their word for it. I examined
the pictures carefully, and what I saw appeared to be no
more than the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house. I was relieved to hear later that this was
the same reaction of virtually everyone at the meeting,
including President Kennedy. Even a few days later,
when more work had taken place on the site, he remarked that it hoked like a football field.
The dominant feeling at the meeting was
stunned surprise. No one had expected or anticipated
that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in Cuba. I thought back to my meeting
with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in my office
some weeks before. He came to tell me that the Russians
were prepared to sign an atrnospheric-test-ban treaty if
we could make certain agreements on underground testing. I told him 1would transmit this message and the accompanying documents to President Kennedy.
I told him we were deeply concerned within the
Administration about the amount of military equipment
being sent to Cuba. That very morning, I had met on
this subject with the President and the Secretaries of
"Tuesday morning, October 16,1962
\
. . ."
State and Defense. There was some evidence that, in addition to the surface-to-air-missile(SAM) sites that were
being erected, the Russians, under the guise of a fishing
village, were constructing a large naval shipyard and a
base for submarines. This was all being watched carefully-through agents within Cuba who were reporting
the military buildup in a limited but frequently important way, through the questioning of refugees who were
screened and processed as they arrived in Florida, and
through U-2 flights.
It was election time. The autumn days of September and October were filled with charges and countercharges. Republicans "viewing with alarm" were
claiming the U.S. was not taking the necessary steps to
protect our security. Some, such as Senator Homer E.
Capehart of Indiana, were suggesting that we take military action against Cuba.
I told Ambassador Dobrynin of President Kennedy's deep concern about what was happening. He
told me I should not be concerned, for he was instructed
by Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to assure
President Kennedy that there would be no ground-toground missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba.
Further, he said, I could assure the President that this
military buildup was not of any significance and that
Thirteen Days
"Tuesday morning, October 16,1962
. . .,,
Khrushchev would do nothing to disrupt the relation.shipof our two countries during this period prior to the
electidn. Chairnian Khrushchev, he said, liked President
Kennedy and did not wish to embarrass him.
I pointed out that I felt,hehad a very strange way
of showing his admiration; that what the Russians had
kind of warning and pointed out the serious conse-
been doing in Cuba was a matter of the deepest concern
to the United States; and that his protestations of friendship meant little alongside the military activities in the
Caribbean. I told him we were watching the buildup
carefully and that he should know it would be of the
gravest consequence if the Soviet Union placed missiles
in Cuba. That would never happen, he assured me, and
left.
I reported the conversation to President Ken-
cluding Cuba.
nedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, and relayed my own skepticism, and suggested that it might be advisable to issue
a statement making it unequivocally clear that the U.S.
would not tolerate the introduction of offensive surfaceto-surface missiles, or offensive weapons of any kind,
into Cuba.
That same afternoon, September 4, from a draft
prepared by Nicholas Katzenbach, the Deputy Attorney
General, and myself, the President issued exactly this
quences that would result from such a step.
A week Bter, an September 11, Moscow disclaimed pnblic£y any intention of taking such action and
stated that there was no need fur nuclear missiles to be
transferred to any country outside the Soviet Union, inDuring this same period of time, an important
official in the Soviet Embassy, returning from Moscow,
brought me a personal message from Khrushchev to
President Kennedy, stating that he wanted the President to be assured that under no circumstances would
surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.
Now, as the representatives of the CIA explained
the U-2 photographs that morning, Tuesday, October
16, we realized that it had all been lies, one gigantic
fabric of lies. The Russians were putting missiles in
Cuba, and they had been shipping them there and beginning the construction of the sites at the same time
those various private and public assurmces were being
forwarded by Chainnan Khrushchev to President Kennedy.
Thus the dominant feeling was one of shocked
incredulity. We had been deceived by Khrushchev, but
we had also fooled ourselves. No official within the gov-
Thirteen Days
ernment had ever suggested to President Kennedy that
the Russian buildup in Cuba would include missiles. On
a number of occasions, the President had asked for a
specific evaluation on what the Intelligence Community
felt to be the implications for the U.S. of that buildup.
The Intelligence Community, in its National Estimate
of the future course of events, had advised him-on
each of the four occasions in 1962 when they furnished
him with official reports on Cuba and the Caribbeanthat the Russians would not make offensive weapons
available to Cuba. The last estimate before our
meeting of the 16th of October was dated the 19th sf September, and it advised the President that without reservation the United States Intelligence Board, after considerable discussion and examination, had concluded
that the Soviet Union would not make Cuba a strategic
base. It pointed out that the Soviet Union had not taken
this kind of step with any of its satellites in the past and
would feel the risk of retaliation fiom the United States
to be too great to take the risk in this case.
We heard later, in a postmortem study, that reports had come from agents within Cuba indicating the
presence of missiles in September of 1962. Most of
the reports were false; some were the result of confusion
by untrained observers between surface-to-air mis-
"Tuesday morning, October 16,1962
. . ."
siles and surface-to-surface missiles. Several reports,
however, turned out to be accurateone from a former
employee at the Hilton Hotel in Havana, who believed
a missile installation was being constructed near San
Cristobal, and another from someone who overheard
Premier Fidel Castro's pilot talking in a boastful and intoxicated way one evening about the nuclear missiles that
were going to be furnished Cuba by Russia.
But before these reports were given substance,
they had to be checked and rechecked. They were not
even considered substantial enough to pass on to the
President or other high officials within the government.
In -retrospect,this was perhaps a mistake. But the same
postmortem study also stated that there was no action
the U.S. could have taken before the time we actually
did act, on the grounds that even the films available on
October 16 would not have been substantial enough to
convince the governments and peoples of the world of
the presence of offensive missiles. in Cuba. Certainly,
unsubstantiated refugee reports would not have been
sufficient.
The important fact, of course, is that the,missiles
were uncovered and the information was made available to the government and the people before the missiles
became operative and in h e for the U.S, to act.
Thi. ?n Days
'
The same group that met .that first morning in the
Cabinet Room met almost co~tinuouslythrough the
next twelve days and almost daily for some six weeks
thereafter. Others in the group, which was later to be
called the "Ex Comm" (the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council), included Secretary of State
Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara;
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency john McCone; Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; President Kennedy's adviser on national-security affairs, McGeorge Bundy; Presidential Counsel Ted Sorensen; Under Secretary of State George Ball; Deputy Under
Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson; General Maxwell
Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Edward
Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America;
originally, Chip Bohlen, who, after the first day, left to
become Ambassador to France and was succeeded by
Llewellyn Thompson as the adviser on Russian affairs;
Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretby of Defense; Paul
Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense; and, intermittently at various meetings, Vice-President Lyndon B.
Johnson; Adlai Stevenson,Ambassador to the United Nations; Ken O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President;
and Don Wilson, who was Deputy Director of the
United States Information Agency. This was the group
"Tuesday morning, October 1 6 , 1 ~
...
3,
that met, talked, argued, and fought together during
'that crucial period'of time. From this group came the
recommendations from which President Kennedy was
ultimately to select his course of action.
They were men of the highest intelligence, industrious, courageous, and dedicated to their country's wellbeing. It is no reflection on them that none was consistent in his opinion from the very beginning to the very
end. That kind of open, unfettered mind was essential.
For some there were only small changes, perhaps varieties of a single idea. For others there were continuous
changes of opinion each day; some, because of the pressure of events, even appeared to lose their judgment and
stability.
The general feeling in the beginning was that
some form of action was required. There were those, although they were a small minority, who felt the missiles
did not alter the balance of power and therefore necessitated no action. Most felt, at that stage, that an air strike
against the missile sites could be the only course. Listening to the proposals, I passed a note to the President: "I
now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl
Harbor."
'The President
have t o act."
. . . knew he wozlld
A
FTER THE M E E ~ G
in
the Cabinet Room, I
walked back to the Mansion with the ~residknt.It
would be dficult; the stakes were high-of
the highest
and most substantial kind-but he knew he would have
to act. The U.S.could not accept what the Russians.had
done. What that action would be was still to be determined. But he was convinced from the beginning that
he would have to do something. To keep the discussions
from being'inhibited and because he did not want to
arouse attention, he decided not to attend all the meetings of our committee. This was wise. Personalities
change when the President is present, and frequently
even strong men make recommendations on the basis of
what they believe the President wishes to hear. He instructed our group to come forward with recommendations for one course or possibly several alternative
courses of action.
It was during the afternoon and evening of that
Thirteen Days
"The President
. . . knew
he would have tc
t."
first day, Tuesday, that we began to discuss the idea of a
would be bringing about a confrontation with the Soviet
quarantine or blockade. Secretary McNamara, by
Union by stopping their ships, when we should be concentrating on Cuba and Castro.
Their most forceful argument was that our installation of a blockade around Cuba invited the Russians
to do the same to Berlin. If we demanded the removal of
missiles from Cuba as the price for lifting our blockade,
they would demand the removal of missiles surrounding
the Soviet Union as the reciprocal act.
And so we argued, and so we disagreed-all dedicated, intelligent men, disagreeing and fighting about
the future of their country, and of mankind. Meanwhile,
time was slowly running out.
An examination of photography taken on
Wednesday, became the blockade's strongest advocate.
He argued that it was limited pressure, which could be
increased as the circumstances warranted. Further, it
was dramatic and forceful pressure, which would be understood yet, most importantly, still leave us in control
of events. Later he reinforced his position by reporting
that a surprise air strike against the missile bases alone
-a surgical air strike, as it came to be called-was militarily impractical in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that any such military action would have to include all
military instauations in Cuba, eventually leading to an
invasion. Perhaps we would come to that, he argued.
Perhaps that course of action would turn out to be inevitable. "But let's not start with that course," if by chance
that kind of confrontation with Cuba, and of necessity
with the Soviet Union, could be avoided.
Those who argued for the military strike instead
of a blockade pointed out that a blockade would not in
fact remove the missiles and would not even stop the
work from going ahead on the missile sites themselves.
The missiles were already in Cuba, and all we would be
doing with a blockade would be "closing the door after
the horse had left the barn." Further, they argued, we
Wednesday, the 17th of October, showed several other
installations, with at least sixteen and possibly thirtytwo missiles of over a thousand-mile range. Our military
experts advised that these missiles could be in operation
within a week. The next day, Thursday, estimates by our
Intelligence Community placed in Cuba missiles with
an atomic-warhead potential of about one half the current ICBM capacity of the entire Soviet Union. The
photography having indicated that the missiles were
being directed at certain American cities, the estimate
was that within a few minutes of their being fired eighty
T4irteen Days
million Americans would be dead.
The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
unanimous in calling for immediate military action.
They forcefully presented their view that the blockade
would not be effective. General Curtis LeMay, Air
Force Chief of Staff, argued strongly with the President
that a military attack was essential. When the President
questioned what the response of the Russians might be,
General LeMay assured him there would be no reaction.
President Kennedy was skeptical. "They, no more than
we, can let these things go by without doing something.
They can't, after all their statements, pennit us to take
out their +ssiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do
nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly
will in Berlin."
The President went, on to say that he recognized
the validity of the arguments made by the Joint Chiefs,
the danger that more and more missiles would be placed
in Cuba, and the likelihood, if we did nothing, that the
Russians would move on Berlin and in other areas of the
world, feeling the U.S. was completely impotent. Then it
would be too late to do anything in Cuba, for by that
time all their missiles would be operational.
. .
General' David M. Shoup, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, summed up everyone's feelings: "You are
"The President
. . . knew he would have
act."
in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President." The President answered quickly, "You are in it with me." Everyone
laughed, and, with no final decision, the meeting adjourned.
Later, Secretary McNamara, although he told
the President he disagreed with the Joint Chiefs and favored a blockade rather than an attack, informed him
that the necessary planes, men, and ammunition were
being deployed and that we could be ready to move
with the necessary air bombardments on Tuesday, October 23,if that was to be the decision. The plans called
for an initial attack, consisting of five hundred sorties,
striking all military targets, including the missile sites,
airfields, ports, and gun emplacements.
I supported McNamara's position in favor of a
blockade. This was not from a deep conviction that it
would be a successful course of action, but a feeling that
it had more flexibility and fewer liabilities than a military attack. Most importantly, like others, I could not
accept the idea that the United States would rain bombs
on Cuba, killing thousands and thousands of civilians in
a surprise attack. Maybe the alternatives were not very
palatable, but I simply did not see how we could accept
that course of action for our country.
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson began
Thirteen Days
attending our meetings, and he was strongly in favor of
an air attack. I was a great admirer of his. In 1961, President Kennedy asked him to prepare a report for the National Security Council recommending a course of action to deal with the Russian threat to Berlin. Listening
to his presentation then, I had thought to myself that I
had never heard anyone so Iucid and convincing and
would never wish to be on the other side of an argument
with him. Now he made his arguments that an air attack
and invasion represented our only alternative in the
same clear and brilliant way. He said that the President
of the United States had the responsibility for the security of the people of the United States and of the whole
free world, that it was his obligation to take the only action which could protect that security, and that that
meant destroying the missiles.
With some trepidation, I argued that, whatever
validity the military and political arguments were for an
attack in preference to a blockad'e, America's traditions
and history would not permit such a course of action.
Whatever military reasons he and others could marshal,
they were nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a
surprise attack by a very large nation against a very
small one. This, I said, could not be mdertaken by the
U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home
"The President
. . . knew
he would have t
:t."
and around the globe. Our struggle against Communism
throughout the world was far more than physical survival-it had as its essence our heritage and our ideals,
and these we must not destroy.
We spent more time on this moral question during the first five days than on any other single matter. At
various times, it was proposed that we send a letter to
Khrushchev huenty-four hours before the bombardment
was to begin, that we send a letter to Castro, that leaflets
and pamphlets listing the targets be dropped over Cuba
before the attack-all these ideas and more were abandoned for military or other reasons. We struggled and
fought with one another and with our consciences, for it,
was a question that deeply troubled us all.
In the midst of all these discussions, Andrei
Gromyko came to see the President. It was an appointment made long before the missiles were uncovered, and
the President felt it would be awkward to cancel it. He
debated whether he should confront the Soviet Foreign
Minister with our knowledge of the missiles' presence
and finally decided that, as he had not yet determined a
final course of action and the disclosure of our knowledge might give the Russians the initiative, he would
simply listen to Gromyko.
They met late Wednesday afternoon in the. Presi-
Thirteen Days
"The President
. . . knew
he would haus
act."
dent's office in the White House. Gromyko began the
States and was a source of great concern to him. Because
conversation by saying the United States should stop
threatening Cuba. All Cuba wanted was peaceful coex-
of the personal assurances he had received from Khrushchev, he had been taking the public position that no
istence, he said; she was not interested in exporting her
system to other Latin American countries. Cuba, like
the Soviet Union, wanted only peace. Premier Khrushchev had instructed him, Gromyko said, to tell President Kennedy that the only assistance being furnished
Cuba was for agriculture and land development, so the
people could feed themselves, plus a small amount of defensive arms. In view of all the publicity in the American
press, he said, he wanted to emphasize that the Soviet
Union would never become involved in the furnishing
of offensive weapons to Cuba.
Gromyko said he wished to appeal to the U.S.
and to President Kennedy on behalf of Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet Union to lessen the tensions that
existed with regard to Cuba.
action was required against Cuba, and yet the situation
was becoming steadily more dangerous.
Gromyko repeated that the sole objective of the
President Kennedy listened, astonished, but also
with some admiration for the boldness of Gromyko's position. Firmly, but with great restraint considering the
provocation, he told Gromyko that it was not the United
States which was fomenting discord, but the Soviet
Union. The U.S.S.R.'s supplying of arms to Cuba was
having a profound effect on the peopIe of the United
U.S.S.R. was to "give bread to Cuba in order to prevent
hunger in that country." As far as arms were concerned,
the Soviet Union had simply sent some specialists to
train Cubans to handle certain kinds of armament,
which were only "defensive." He then said he wished to
emphasize the word "defensive" and that none of these
weapons could ever constitute a threat to the United
States.
The President replied that there should be no
misunderstanding of the position of the United Statesthat that position had been made clear to the Soviet
Union in meetings between the Attorney General and
Ambassador Dobrynin and in his own public statements. To avoid any misunderstanding, he read aloud
his statement of September 4, which pointed out the serious consequences that would arise if the Soviet Union
placed missiles or offensive weapons within Cuba.
Gromyko assured him this would never be done,
that the United States should not be concerned. After
Thirteen Days
touching bridy on some other matters, he said good-by.
I came by shortly after Gromyko left the White
House. The President of the United States, it can be said,
was displeased with the spokesman of the Soviet
Union. . . .
"A majority opinion . . . for a
blocbde . . ."
I3
there was a majority
opinion in our group for a blockade. Our committee
went from the State Department to the White House
around 9:15 that night. In order to avoid the suspicion
that wodd have ensued from the presence of a long line
of limousines, we all went in my car-John McCone,
Maxwell Taylor, the driver, and myself all crowded together in the front seat, and six others sitting in back.
We explained our recommendations to the President. At the beginning, the meeting seemed to proceed
in an orderly and satisfactory way. However, as people
talked, as the President raised probing questions, minds
and opinions began to change again, and not only on
small points. For some, it was from one extreme to another-supporting an air attack at the beginning
of the meeting and, by the time we left the White
House, supporting no action at all.
The President, not at all satisfied, sent us back to
Y THURSDAY NIGHT,
The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis
For 13 chilling day^ Sn Oetober 1962, it seemed that John. R ognitioxr oCtbe need for thordgh averfiigbt, not without its hazKennedy and Nikita S. Xhrtishchev m&ht bep l a p ' ~out the o m - ards, that produced the decisive photographs. The usefulness
ing scenes of Warld War III. m e Cuban rniif.de crtrh war a and scope of inspaction h m above, also employed in monimhg
uniquely compact moment pfhistom. For thefirst rime in the na- tho Soviet miss& withdrawal, should ncvcr be undwestimatcd.
clear age, the two supmpowersfixnd themselves in a sort of moral When the imponance of accumte Wonnarion for a mnblpolicy
. decision u high enough, risknot otherwise acceptable in collecting
rwdtest of their apocalypticpowers.
intelligencecan bewmep~ountilyprudent.
7'he crisis blew up suddenly. me US.dhcowed rhar rhe S&
et Union, despite repeated and solemn denial#, was installing nuTHIRD: The President wisely took his timc in choosing a
dear missile In Cuba. An Americnn U-2 spy phne carna buck
with photographs &the buses and their mpponhciltties under course of action. A quick decision would ceahinly have been less
consmcrfon: clear, irr&bble evidence. Kennab assembled r cardWly dcaignd and could well havo procluccd a much higher
task / i c e qfadvi.~ersSome of them wanted to inv@e Cuba.In the risk ofaimstrophaTbe &t that the crisis did not become publie
end,'Kennedy chose a cour~eof a d 1remaint; he &id down a M- in its ,&st week obviously made it easier for Reddent Kumady
wl quamntine 4 e r .9tx day, Khru~hchevannounad that the 6 to consider hie optimswith a maximum d care and a minimum
ofoutslde presnm. Not every future ujsis will be so q u k in im
Vier mLrsZle~w t l d be dismantledThc
w m d some ~umaws.The U.S. and the S O W first phase, but Americans should a h y s rewed the need fm u be- cdsis
Union have had no wmp~rable wilision
riodof co@dent&l an2 careful delfbeta~m
since then. Chr the other hand, the humilia;Indealiq with a major interntttio~lcrisis.
tion rhat Khrushchev .v&ered ?nay have
hastened h b fill. Tire experfence may be
FOURTW; ~e dezisik military elemem
partly responsible for both the Svz-et rniliin the resolutionof the crisis was our clearly
available and applicable su@oAty in cmtary buildup in rhe part rwo decodes and
-%atever~ i h u s i o ~the
m Swiets have disventional weapons within the area of the
crisis. US. naval forces, quickly deployable
yedfbr nuclear disarmament.
fin tbe blockade of offensive weapons tbat
Now,on the 20th anniwfsary of the
sis, six of Xennrdy's men haw aollabomred
was
termed a quarantine, and the
on a remarkable loah! statmenr on the lesavailabitity of U.S. gmund .and air forces
mns &hat atober. h contains some new in-'
sufEsient to execute an invasion if necesformation, particularly in Pofnt Mglit, and
sary,made the difference. American nudeat IeaPl one of their conclusions t.r starfling
ar superiority was not in our view a critical
and c6ntroverskl: their thought that, wnfactor, for the fundamental and controlling
hnry to the wide.~pread arsumprion of the.
reason that nudear war, already in 1962,
past nv6 tiecade.~,the Amsn'can nuclear suwould have bean an unexampled 'catatmperioriry over rhe Soviets in 196.2 had no cruphe for both sides; the balance of t e r m so
a a l ifluence with Washington w M ~ g w~ematr
s l p n k Q h i crranthr
eloquently described by Wmton Churchill
at the time-and chat in general, nuclear suscvcn cars carlicr ~ hinfd
s
operation. No
penR&ty i.$ insigni/lcmt.
one of ue evtrrcvicwcd the nuclear balance for ccdbd in thaco
me auth&s are Dean Rusk. then Secretcry of State; RbbM bard weeks. % Cuban missile crisis illustrates not the J.r;gni/iMcNamam. Scmtary tfWanse: Geogu W.Ball, Under Sems cane? but the insripn$cunn of nuciew superimiity in the face of
rary of Statr; RaweIl L GYbaRit, Dsputy Seaarnry of Mensc; su~vr'vablethermonuclearrdliaaroryf m . It also show the nu7Xeodore Somnsen, special mnael to the Realdent; and ciol role drap'dly milable cmmh'onalsbength.
McGeorge Bundy. ,cpeu:Ial assistant to rhe Prcsldent fm n a d o d
secrtriry flairs. I17rcir analyds:
m.The political and military pxwsurc created by the
quarantine was matched by a diplmatic eBm that ignored no
Xn the ytsra since rhe Cuban miiiiic'criei8,Lii comrihcnta-. nslevant means of communicatiun with b&h our fiiends w d our
tors have examined the flair and ofbed a wide variety of can- adwnary. Communication to and &om our allies b Europe was
elusions. It seems fitring now that some of us who worked panic- ip-,
and their support sturdy. The Organizaticm of American
ularly closely with President Kennedy d u r k that crisis should ' States gave the nmml and logal authority dits regional backing
offer a fm comments, with the advantagesbDtb dparticiparion to the quarantiat, makiw it plaid chat Saviot nude% weaand of hindsight.
, were prohbildly unwelcome i
n thc Americas. In the U.N.,Ambassador Adlai Stevcnmn drove horac with angry eloquence and
H E R The crisis could and s h d d have been avoided If we unanmgable pboto~raphicevidcncc Ihs facls of tbe W e t dehad done an earlier, stronpcr and cl-r
job of explaining our p10ymenland deception.
po8itioo Sovict nuclear weapons in the WOstern Hemisphere,
Stin m m important, commImicatio~lwss c$(ablishcd and
or if the Sovict gwcmmcnt had more carcfdly asscasd.theevi- maintained,mce our baaic tourst was set, with 8 c g m ~ n m c n t
I
E that did exist on this point, it b likely rhat the
d the Swiel Union. I f the cri& itself show& thc cost ofmmal
k ~d never have been sent to Cuba The fmpdrtanceof ~ c ~ u r u r eincmhprehaosion, its resolutim showed the value d serious and
munral as.wssment of interests bemen the nuo .mpewoyer# is en2 sustained communication,and in particular ofdirect exchdent and continuous.
between thcawoheads of govefnment
When great srates come anywhere near the brink in the nuSECOND; RcliabIc intemence permian effective dear age. there is no room far gamcs of blindmass buff. Nor can
choice ofres,mdewas obtained onlyjust in.time. 11was primari- friendsbe led by silence. Thcy must h o w what we are doing md
ly a mistake by policymakers, not by pmfessid?, that made why- mecrt've communication is never mom impmtant *han,,,her,
such inteIligenceuoavailablesooner.But i! was ds4 a timely rcc- r h m ts a millrary COlrfrDontatjon.
--
-~
'
I
Essay
'
S ~ H : diplanatic emand indeed ow whole course of
by the fact that our p i t i o n was
action wcIc ~p.catly
hfitable svidenct that the Sovlpt govern, squanly bas&
that tt
menL was doibg exactly what it had repeatedly
would do. The support of our allies and the readmess of the So?et gove-ent
to draw back were heavily afFected by the ~ u b b c
demonstration of a Soviet course of conduct that simply m e
na defcndd, In
&mo~trationno cvidcncc lea exphclt
and authdtative than that of photography wouId bav? pen suf&ient. and it
one of Praident Kennedy's best decxslm that
the o r d h a ~requirements of scCreCy in Such matters
be
h s h e d mide in the interest of persuasive exposition.
are
times when 0 d;jp[dy of hard evidence is more v a t ~ ~ b l e Protection of intelIQence re,chniques.
mattor lva.not pm33od b a mdclusion in
foU&g y- &
a h a , the missile crisis itself reinforced the President's convictions. It was entirely right h L t h o Soviet gouersunent should udemhnd this real it^.
Thirr sccand assurance was kept searer because the 'few
who knew about it at the time wctc in unanimous agreement
that any orha come would have had arphive and desm=
tive d f = t ~ on the security of the U.S. apd jta allies. If made
public in the context of rhe Soviet p r o m m a b a
a e U a t d d d s i w reached by the Prcsidcng would haw
beela *d
an ~ w i W n g~ c t s s l a ngrantod in fisat at
the expense of an ally. It seemed better tr~toll the Savieb &e
real position in private, and h a way that would prevent any
such Inkunderatanding. Robert K m w madm it plain to
Ambassador Dobrynia that any attempt
treat the Presithe s u c - ~ r t ~ ) ~ u t i of
o nthe crisis, restra;at dent's uailateral a~9um~e
aa put of a deal would simply
-S
was a s important aa strengrh. Jnparticular, we avoided any ear- make that assurance inopefltive.
A l t k E h for separate reasoos aeither the publio m r
ly initiation of battle by American forces, and indeed we took no
priever became a f o n d co&mcnt
of the u.9.
acdm of any kind chat would have lorced an instant a d ~
i . vate
- ~3ralidily of both was demonstrated by
Jek
bIy &co~id&reponse. Moreover, we limited Our demands -eOt,
a c m there
no ~ . &
of Cuba, and the w r a b l e misto the restoration of the stdtus'quo rmte, that is, the
s & ~ W ~(and
YI-)
Were withbwn. with allied con-of any Soviet nuclear capability from Cuba. The* cm9
. no d*
~ ~ t h
m d for "tad dctory" or ' h d t i o n a l su~tnder." These m e t , t6 b teplaced by invulnerable ]Pol& sub&05,
3were in Our own clear intern4 and boa
Wechoices tzave the Soviet government both rime and o ~ ~ o r t u n im
t~t
helpful & making it &cr h r
&.-&Gnd iith eqd
re
the biet-govunmcnt to d e
straint tr Lr wrong, in inlatide to withdraw its missiles.
tlonr between the suparpowfn put lhle w a mret
~
diers, fir either side to / e m the
lom ma^, including s. secret
orher with no my out bur n~
or Irumiliatim.
-net. Any Eail~12 to
make good on that assurance
EIGWTH:Oa tw4 points of
would obviously havo had
interest to the 30damwing e[fects on w e t &$can
relatiom But it is
viet government, we made
sute that it had the benefit of
of critical importance here
that the M i d e n t gave no asknowing the independearly
S W C C that went beyond big
reached witions of President Km.aedy. One w u r own presidential powers; in
a c e was public and the
Patti~Ularhe m
d
m no annUs. m y - p b phatographshowing a Cubgl mlssHesite
other private.
~ U I I W i tthat rcquired conPublicly we made it clear
@&onrrl approval or even
&at the u.9.wvdd not invade Cuba if the Soviet missks . ~support
a The decision that the missiles in l b r b y should be
withdrawn. Tho -1dent
never shared theview Bat the ttussile moved was one'that the President had fbll and unquatiwed aucharity to make and execute.
cIri8b should bc "used" to pick a fight to the finish
+tro;
he cwrecrly insisted that the real issue in the cdsk Was wltb !he
When it will help your own cvunby fhryawr adversgry know
Soviet govcmment, and that the one vita1 bone d conteatlon Vour settled lnmtions, YOU s h u f d f i d e&cn-ye w o y ~of making
was thc secret and deceit-covered movement of soviet .mlSsiles sure rhat he d m . and a m t asmrance isj d e d when you
Hc r e c o e e d h t an invasion by U.S.. f ~ e s
~ M NP ~ w
F r d . and b) no other course can avoidgravt, darninto
fnt-&.
be bitter and bloody, and that it would leave festering wyn* m age to your counfryv: le~tfmate
the body politic of thc WcstEsn Hsmisphere. The no-lnvaslon
assudnce was not a c~ncedaa,but a statement of our own clear
N I m
@a& risk in th.isCMS
was not rhat cithor head
pmfaence--once the missile4 w m withdrawn.
of gowmmsnt desired to initlate a
d a t h but that
The second and pdvate aasu#nec-communicatd on the maU.9 Would prod- actions, reactions or &Jculations carthe conflict bcycmd the control of one or the other of both.
midcnt's instructions by Robert Kennedy lo Soviet A m b m - d%
dor Anst06 Dobonih on the evening of Oct 27-was that the In retrospect we are inclined to think that bcth mm would have
President had determined that once the c.cish waer rcsolvcd,.the taken every possibIe stcp to pmvent such a -It,
but rhe
American missiles then in nrkey would be removcd. (The cs- no one near the lop deitber govenment could have wt =ai
smca of this secret assurar\ce was revealed by Robat Kenndy tainty about ths other side. In any cri& h)r~Im'w
the 3uperpow
.i.nhis 1969 bmk nlrtesn DUN. and n more detailod accountt eW/inn contrd by the head9 dboth gbvernrnen~is essential rq ths
dmwn Gommany sources but not from discurnion with any ofW avofdance of an unpredictably escalatiw e d i c t .
was publlshcd by Artbur M. Schlesi&r Jr, in Roben Kennedy
. .
and His Timer i.n1978. In the90 circumstances, we chink it is now
ENfW: The successful resolution of the Cuban mimfie
proper for those of us privy to that decision to discuss the mat- was hdamenralty the achievcmmt of two men, John E.Kepnetcr.) This could not be a "deal"--our miss* in Turkey for ch.eirs dy and Nikita S Khrushchtv. Wc know thst in this ahvers8ty
I
in Cub%-- the M e t government had just proposed The mat- Year John Kennedy wauld wish us to e m p b i z e the cmtributfon
tcr involved the concernspf our aNieg, and wc could not put our- of Khrushche~the fact that ad carlicr and 1- prudmr decbio0
selves in the position of appearing to trade their prot=~tionfor by the Soviet leader made ~ h crisis
c
inovitsble doe not dcrmt
-uown. But in Fact Praidmt Kcnn~dyhad long sinFe reached from the statesmanshipof his change of course. we may bc for.c conclusion that the outmoded and vulnerable missiles in given, however, if we give chc last and highe= word of honor to
Turkcy should be withdrawn. In the spring of 1961 Secretall' our Own President, whose cautious determination,, steady corn.
Rusk had begun the necessary discussions with hiSh 'X'urkish of- Posure. decp-seated compassion and, a h aU continuouslyatficials. These officialsasked for delay, at least ur).til.Polaris sub- tentive CUIICSOI
of our options and actions brilliantly served his
thc Mediterranean. While t11c
marines could be deployed
country and aU mankind.
1
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i
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86
TIME. SEPTEMBER 27.1982
BB 12
:
...
.
SOVIET S T A T E ~ N TON
u. s
. PROVOCAT'IO~S
-
... .. ..
n
.
.
USSR INTSw!i TIOIJAL . AFFAIRS
11 Septeiuber 1962
>
.
Moscov '11,'1SS i n E ~ g l i s ht o Eur.ope 0938 GMT 11 September 3962--L
r
(~ex-t;) Moscow--The Soviet Government has authorized ZPSS t o s t a t e
t h a t t h e U.S. Government i s staging provocations which might plunge
t h e world i n t o t h e d i s a s t e r of a universal world war with t h e use of
thermonuclear weapons. 'Slhe Government of the USSR decleres t h a t "one
callnot now at,taclr Cuba aod exgect t h ~ tth e aggressor w i l l 7;e f r e e from
p u n i s b ~ e n tf o r t h i s attaclr. If such an attack is made, t h i s w i l l be
t h e beginning of uzleashing war." m e Soviet Government appeals t o
t h e Government of t h e United States, urging it t o "display cormon
sense, not t o lose self-control, and soberly t o assess what i t s actions
might lead t o i f it unleashes war."
'
The Soviet Government declares t h a t it t r i l l not follow the road of t h e
United States, which i s &XLing up 150,000 r e s e r v i s t s . Instead, it
"regards it a s i t s duty t o display vigilance i n t h e present s i t u a t i o n
and t o i n s t r u c t t h e minister of defense cf the Soviet Union and the
Cormand of the Soviet Arriy t o take a l l measures t o bring our armed
forces i n t o t h e highest s t a t e of coinbat readiness."
"However, 'I the statement says, "these a r e e::clusively precauticlnary.
measures. I.Je s h a l l do our utmost t o see t o it t h a t peace i s not
vicleted." The Soviet Government appeals t o the peoples, urging them
t o denounce t h e aggressive schemes, not t o allow t h e U.S. aggressors
t o engineer l,mr, and t o safeguard world peace.
m e following i s t h e f u l l t e x t of t h e TASS statement.
The Soviet ~overnment.has'authorizedTASS t o malre t h e following
statement:
The Soviet Government has s t a t e d inore than once t h a t i n carrying out a
policy of peaceful coexistence with a l l , countries i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r
s o c i o - p o l i t f c a l order it has exer ted and i s exerting every e f f o r t t o
safeguard peace f o r a l l the peoples of t h e vorld and t o secure agreement
on g m e r a l and complete disarmament under s t r i c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l control.
The Soviet Government deems it necessary t o draw the a t t e n t i o n of a l l
governments and world opinion t o t h e provocations the U. S. Government i s
nov staging, provocations which might plunge the world i n t o t h e d i s a s t e r
of a univers al thermonuclear world war.
U.S. bellicose-minded reactionary elements have long been conducting
an unbridled propaganda campaign against the Cuban Republic i n the U.S.
Congress and press, c a l l i n g f o r an attaclr on Cuba and an a t t a c k on
Soviet ships carrying t h e necessary commodities and food t o t h e Cuban
people; i n short, c a l l i n g f o r war.
.
and‘ Democrats--following the 'custom i n i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s , v i e with
each other t o see who can h u r l more infamies a g a i n s t t h e peace f o r e
Unfortunately, there s t i l l a r e many people &'I t h e United S t a t e s who
a r e being fooled by t h i s ' v i l e propaganda, U.S. monopoly capital,
which m s the e n t i r e radio-press communications system, all means of
influencing the minds of the peoples, i s keephg the American people
capk.ives of ignorance and taking advantage- of t h i s t o condition U.S.
public opinion i n a d i r e c t i o n that s u i t s them. During t h e many years
of coexistence with t h e United S t a t e s have become acaus-tomed t o t h i s
t o it.
which, according t o t h e United States, i s aggravating tension and
a l l b u t creates a t h r e a t t o other c'mntries.
Such a s t e p by t h e U.S. Government- cannot be assessed othenvj-se. than
as a screen from the aggressive plans and intent:ions of t h e United S t a t e s
i t s e l f , and w i l l inevitably l e a d t o aggravating %he iu5ernat i o n a l
atmosphere. It i s said that t h i s s t e p is allegedly degigned t o ease
tension, 'but it has never been thou&. t h a t a f i r e can )Je put
out by kerosene o r gasoline. Each throughtful person understands
t h a t such steps do no% lead t o the relaxation of t e n s i o ~ ; on the
contrary, they are a means of aggravating tension t o the 1it;it and
creating a s i t u a t i o n where t h e d i s a s t e r of a world ther~nonuclearw a r
could be sparked off by some accidee-5. Hence,. t h i s is :-t pro~rocation
a g a i n s t peace, tal&n i n the h t e r e s t s of war, in t h e i i i t e r e s t s of
aggression.
:.
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14
LssE UTXEfiTI Qbz& j 4 m L 3
1
1September 1962
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The U.S. ieziiiers Ere se;;aki.?g t c ! expLp.$i this.: s t e p by X?e. a$gi-evation
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cf t e n i i o n
I32t , cocpared ~ i y t i ?.t>e sj-tua5j.an a year or .e7;eu +Ywo8
'ago,
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. n
. o s s e c i z l clzaiige c z a 5e +served.
Herice; such a s t e p . . i s &esignedY.
. . .not to' ease but t o aggr:-c?ratetensiop in.Yne interna-bioqal s'%%uatj,ou:
' .. . . . .,.+ .
. .F;P'hc.-!"Ls i-t, t l ~ e ~ thaJ;
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has t$.k.-n-place ~rhichh a s . alarmed and impelled. .
:the U,3.. Gsver2iller;t t o take such aggressive actions? I,ic:~nljers of tl~?:]::
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U.S. C o n p e z s ?zcl Tress 82:e calling a spede a spade, thus gi-riog
m a y .the r e a l k s i d d s t o r y behind .su& U.S. s t e s s . 9%
U.S.
. i n ~ e r i a l l s . t sh,~ v ebeen alarmed .by t h e f a i h r e ~f the U.S.-s-Leged
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ecorzc!nxic blocade ~f r z - ~ o l u t i o a a r yCuba. .They !eould l i k e t o
. . stsaAgle i210.CuSa p e ~ p L - 2t ~
o make them e e i r sa.i;ellite, t o vfpe
o a t the a.chievements of .the r e v c l u t i ~ i zazcomp.kished by the ' c e ~ o $ c .
pao2ie of Cuba. To e k t a i n t h e s e ends they have refused t o purchase. .
su.gar f r o a Caha end t o s e l l t o it their k o o ~ s , Lncludbe. even medicine:
.
a ~ food;
d
they ha-~enot even stopped a t seeking t o straxigle children9
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olii folk, and a d u l t s by the- rawbonsd hand of s-1;arvation.. 'And aiL this.
they c n l l hunaiieness
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The Sarie.i; mion, l i k e t h e other s o c i a l i s t countries, has stretched . .
out, a h a 5 d of assistance t o the Cuban pecple b e c a ~ s ewe fu3ly
,:?.z3srstand Cu7;ars s i t ~ a t i o z t . 'After Yne October Revolufvion, hen the young
i3wiet stake was i n a capitsEs'r-, encisclem&nt and the peoples of
,O
E
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: cciuntry l i v e d through tremendous difI"icul.ties caused by postwL!,r
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dest:?sc%icn, t h e United- s t a t e s , instead of rendering assistance,
s.ta,:c:r; . armed in'tervention. a g d n s t t h e Soviet Republic. U.S t r o o p s
. we.rc l:mded i n i%~?m&sk, Archangel, and i n the' Par East;
1!1-5,tc.ic;h troo2s were landed a t Archangel and occupied Baku; French
u ; c ~ &were
~ 8 landed a t Odessa, a d Japanese i n Primorye Bay. .%e
7
m n
:L.&.-ri%J-i.s
t powers se-t; up counterrevolution~ryarmies uxder the
leocesahip cf r(olch~k, Yu.denich, Denikin,. tzrd Fira~gel, and mcbllized
8:ad sy..meC t h e e n t i r e counterrevolutionary mob, *his scum. T0.q 3eocl.e~ ..
of t h e Soviet. U ~ i o n.firmly. resolved t o establish t h e i r .own i z t e r n a l
o r s e r which would accord with t h e i r a s p i r a t i o a s . They exerted g r e a t
e f z o r t c l d ~ s c r r l f i c e dmany l i v e s t o smash t h e i n t , ? m a l c~*mterr.evolutfou .
and expel t h e fore'ign invaders. f roa t h e c o ~ a t r y .
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l%.e Soviet U~.icn, in s p i t e -of tremendous' d i f f icul-kies, not c:Ly he'rii
. ,:
c u t i n %he strug;:le f o r .it,ilndependsnce but a l s o demonstrated t o t h e
.
whale IT brld the su2eriori:cy of the 'people s s o c i a l i s t order, i n whi-c2i >.€I~L~.
means of productior~belong t o t h e people and where every:bhing i s close
f 01: t h e saks of t h e .people. me .whole world knows thal; the S ~ v i e Euica
t
was the f&st s o c i a l i s t - country t o make tremendous progress i n t h e
ad-cctnce of its economy, science, and cultu- snd t h e frrst ':;a blaze a
t r i a l i j t o o ~ t e space,
r
saccessfully c o n t k x ~ g - i t es x p l o ~ a t i ~ i .; .
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15
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USSR TNTZRNATIONALAIZALRS
U ~eptember1962
..
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!J3e peaceful constructive l a b o r of the Soviet people i s yielding r i c h
f r u i t . Tbe f l i g h t of two Soviet s.~acelnlen:.s~d.e,
by s i d e f o r t h r e e t o
four'.ciays and the sfmultaneous .landing of t h e i r spaceships ove~wh.e.?.rned
t h e minds of a l l honest people, who r e j o i c e in progress., i n t h e
successes of t h e S ~ l k . ' - Union, and i n the e q l o r a t i o n of outer space
f o r peacerul purposes- ... This: has .'Peen a. s t r i k i n g manifestation of t h e
t
whose every e f f o r t i s aimed
peace-loving policy of t : h e . . ~ w i eUnion,.
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a t safeguarding peace and t h e progress of rnwkind.
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If one 'is honest and
from the understanding of t h e
need f o r l i v i n g i n pezce, declared by tne U.S. President himself--to
safeguard peaceful boexist'enee between s t a t e s i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r
socio-politicaL.order--what.cauld'have'alzrmedt h e U.S. leaders?
What b $he-:reason for raisbg this d e v i l 'e @ebbsth over Cuba i n .Congress
and i n t h e U-.S. press?
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m e point is, they say, ;hat arloafients and even troops a r e being shipped
from 'the Soviet Union t o Cuba. ..To t h i s one can say: Gentlemen, you
' a r e 'evidently s o frightened t h a t you a r e aTrzid of your arn shadow
.
.
YOU d o no< believe i n ' t h e s t r e n g t h of y o u r i d e a s and your c a p i t a l i s t
. . .
.
order. You have been: s o . f r i ~ 3 t e n e db. y t h e October S o c i a l i s t Revolution
and t h e s u ~ c ~ s s eofs the Soviet"union, achieved and developed on t h e
1'; b a s i s of this r & v o l u t i o n , , . ~ gitt seems to' you hordes a r e moving t o Cuba
*;. . when potatoes, Gi1, trac.tors, h a r v e s t e r corilbines, and other farming and
'>
industrial.machihkry 'are actually. being transpol-ted t h e r e t o maintain
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. i '.,p ~ economy.
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.:. We' can say t o these people t h h t ltjlese a r e our ships, and t h a t what
; . 'cre c a r r y in them i s no. busine.s& of & e i r s ; it i s t h e i I I t e l - L I R 1 a f f a i r . .
.
: . of. t h e s i d e s engaged 3,n t h i s eomrne$cipl transaction.
we can quote
t h e popular saying : Don Z st.ick, your noses i n t o other people1 business.
,:. .But we a r e n o t hiding from the..world t h e f a c t t h t we a r e r e a l l y supplying
Cuba with i n d u s t r i a l equipment and goods which a r e h e 1 p . i ~t o strengthen . ..
. i t s ekonomy' &d raise the well-being
of t h e Cuhan 'people.
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EB 16
USSR I?PFTrNA!J!IOPm AFFAIRS
P.t. t h e request of t h e 'cub& Government, we a r e a l s b .sendir.g Soviet ,
.. ..
a g r o n o ~ s t s ,machine operators, t r a c t o r drivers, and livestock experts . t o shaye the:'~r experience a ~ ? d!mot?ledge with t h e i r Cuoan f r i e n d s i n
. .
orddr t o help them r a i s e t h e country's economy. W
e axe a l s o sending
Yank-and-file. s t a t e and c o l l e c t i v e f ~ r mworkers and accepting thmsands.
oif Cubans i n t h e Soviet Union t o exchange e ~ p e ~ i e n cand
e teach them t h e
,more progressive rne.bh0d.s of agricultwe, t o help them master t h e Soviet
farm machinery which i s being. supplied them.
'
I-i; w
i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t a c e r t a i n emount of a.maments i s a l s o being
shipped f r o n t h e Soviet Union t o Cuba a t t h e request of t h e Cuban
. Governmen!
i n c o h e c t i o n with the t h r e a t s bjr aggressive inlperialist
c i r c l e s . The Cuban statksmen ai50 requested. t h e Soviet Covermen* t o
send Soviet m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s .arrd techniczns tlho would t r a i n t h e Cubans
i n handling up-to-date weapons, because up-to-date weGpons now c a l l f o r
high s k i l l and much ,knowledge, It i s only n a t u r a l tha-t Cuba does not
y e t have such s p e c i a l i s t s . That i s why Ire considered t h i s request.
I t must' be said, however, t h a t t h e number of Sovizt m i l i t a r y s p e c i d i s t s
sent t o Cuba can i n no way be compared t o t h e number of agricul*ural ->:is
TJorBers being 'sent there.
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The armaments and m i l i t a r y equipment sent t o Cuba are designed exclusively
for defensive' purposes, and t h e U. 9. President and military, j u s t as . t h e
How can t h e s e
.. m i l i t a r y o f , a g y country, -know what means of d e f e n s e a r e .
..
means threaten t h e United Stat,es?
i s t h e revoluti.onary.s p i r i t you , f e a r , 2nd not t h e m i l i t a r y equipment
received by t h e Cubans f o r t h e f r own defense. And wh? should t h i s
alarm you i f t h e statement' by t h e U. So President t h a t t h e United S t a t e s
i s not preparing an : aggression 'against Cuba, i s not contemplating an
a t t a c k against it, acccrds with t h e - r e a l intentions of t h e U.S.
government l ' If t h i s i s an honest statement, and t h e U.S. Government .
.
.
The Soviet Government has a l s o authorized TASS t o s t a t e t h a t t h e r e i s
no need ?or t h e Soviet Union t o s h i f t i t s weapons f o r t h e repulsion
...
of aggression, f o r a k e t a l i a t o i y 'tiloFr, t o any other country--like Cuba....
Our n u c l e w weapons a r e .so ' p o ~ ~ e r f ui nl t h e i r explosive force, and t h e
Soviet Union ,has such--.poverfuL.rockets t o carry these nuclear warheads,
t h a t . t h e r e is' no need t o search f o r s i t e s f o r them. beyond. t h e boundaries
of t h e Soviet Union.
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USSR 'INTERNAT~:ONAL
AFFAIRS
11 September 1962
.
F7e have s a i d and we repeat t h a t Tf >mr i s unleashed, i f t h e aggressor
makes a n a t t a c k on one s t a t e o r another, and t h i s s t a t e asks f o r
a s s i s t a n c e , the.Soviet Union can render a s s i s t a n c e t o any peace-loving
state--and not only t o Cuba--from i t s own t e r r i t o r y . And l e t no one
doubt t h a t t h e Soviet Un2on w i l l render such bssistance just as it was
ready i n 1956 t o rGnder m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o Egy-pt a t t h e time of
t h e Ango~fiench-.Israeliaggression i n t h e Suez Canal region. We a r e n o t
saying t h i s t o f r i g h t e n anyone. Intimidation i s a l i e n t o t h e foreign
p o l i c y of t h e Soviet State, Threats and blackmail a r e a n i n t e g r a l p a r t
of t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s . The Soviet Union stands f o r peace and does
not ,want w a r .
The Soviet Government c a l l s t h e at-1;ection of t h e world public and a l l
governments which s t a n d f o r peacerkl coexistence t o t h e f a c t t h a t even
ROW, when t h e United S t a t e s i s p r e p r i n g an a c t of aggression and i s
i n c r e a s i n g i t s anned..forces f o r t h i s purpose by c a l l i n g up 150,000
r e s e r v i s t s i n t o t h e army, when t h e U.S. President i s asking Congress
f o r permission t o do t h i s , USSR Minister of Defense Marshal b.lalivovskiy
has o r d e r e d t h a t those servicemen who have completed t h e i r teMn and be
discharged and then t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e reserves.
Trainad sold3ers. a r . m being r e l e a s e d from t h e Soviet armed forces and
r e c r u i t s a r c being :called up t b -r&pl.enish t h e u n i t s , This alone i s
a c l e a r enough i n d i c a t i o n ' of our pea.cef'ul intentions. No government
~ ~ o u tladk e such a measure if it cont.emplated any a c t i o n of a m i l i t a r y
t1ahn-e. One niust r e a l i z e ' w h ~ it
t means when t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s a r e being
released
from
t
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e
array
and
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i t s c a l l e d c.p who must y e t be trained-.
and Chis i s not so easy t o ' do 'considering t h e complex m i l i t a r y equipment
of
which r e q u i r e s a gren-t: amount of knowledge not only from
cornmauders but from every p r i a t e . I n t a k i n g t h i s s t e p we a r e r e a l i z i n g
measures i n our d a i l y l i f e which cordinn t h a t t h e Soviet Union is
fallowing a ,policy:of
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i n s u r i n g peace and friendship with a l l peoples,
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Th? S 0 ~ e Union
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k.11.not take:any similar r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n t o t h e
&-up
?f 150,000 r e s e r & , s t s i n t h e United States, t h e more so s i n c e
t h i s cannot be of'.any serious m5litar-y importance, given up-to-date
If in t h e p a s t t h e yardstick f o r
means o f nuclear rocket.warfare.
a v i e s o f t h e b e l l i g e r e n t s was rnaLnly.the number of..soldiers, sabers,
and bayonets, i n our time.the might of these armies is determined by
a d i f f e r e n t yardstick--nuclear rocket weapons.
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USSR .INTl!3iUTIO?aL AFFAIRS
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BB 18
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11 September 1962 .
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But a t a & m e n t when the. United' S t a t e s : i s t a k l n g measures t o mobilize
i t s a m e d : f o r c e s and prepartng f o r s g ~ r e s s i o na k a i n s t Cuba and
o t l k r peace-loving s,tates, t h e S a v i e t Goverm,ent aould l i k e t o draw .
.
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t one .cannot attac!c.~uba and.;expect that.
.
the aggr&spr w i l l be f r e e from-;?unishent. If t h i s ' a t t a c k i s made,
i t ~ J ~ L b. .L
e . t h e beginning
of . t h e unleashing of war.
. .
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How are.&he '>rkperations i f o r aggression a g a i n s t Cuba b e i n g explained?
. ,By saying t h a t Soviet merchant s h i p s a r e carrying car.:oes t o Cuba,
and::t h e United S t a t e s . considers them t o bc m i l i t a r y cargoes. But
. t h i s is a p u r e l y i n t e r n a l ' m a t t e r between t h e s t a t e s vhich send t h e s e
cargos. and t h o s e ~ ~ h i .buy
c h nnd r e c e i v e them.
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. , ~ q u a rl i: g h t s and e q u a l oppok%unities must be recognized f o r a l l - . .
. c o u n t r i e s of t h e world. ?&is nqt,. only 'conforms w i t h t h e recognized
n-.
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: standards ,of i n t e r n a t i o n a l -law which have already taken shape, b u t
.
.should : b e s t r i c t l y adhc2e.d t o ' i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e and activi-by. And
. .
whab hapgens In,f a c t 7 The '~niiedStates, f o r instance, i s . now
,. .
a l l e g e d l y niobilizing because our merchant s h i p s a r e proceeding t o Cuba.
Y
~ ~ , u , s .'ships, a n d . i t i s not a question of merchant ships but
. .
warships--the .ent;lre U;S. siX6h Fleet--are i n t h e Mediterranean. HOW
. many kilometers i s t h i s from t h e United S t a t e s ? . The U.S.
Seventh
F l e e t i s in ~ a i w a nS, t r a i t . By how many thousands o f .kilometers
i s : , t h i s f l d e t . separated from U.S. shores? It i s even s a i d i n t h e
.
Uhited St'ates t h a f t h e y have t h e r i g h t t o be t h e r e .
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The whole world knows t h a t - t h e U l ~ i t e ds t a t e s has ringed %he s o v i e t
Union and oil-:?r t h e s o c L a l i s t . counti-iep t r i t h bases. What have t h e y
s t a t i o n e d t h e r e - - t r a c t o r s ? . A r e t h e y perhips growing r i c e , wheat,
. . ' .. ~ o t a t o e s , o r some. o t h e r farm crops there.? No, they have brought a r m a ~ e n t s
t h e r e i n t h e i r ships, and thesearrnaments, s t a t i o n e d a l o n g t h e
.. .
f r o n t i e r s of t h e ' s o v i e t Union - - in: Turlrey, Iran, Greece, 1 t a ly, ':.'!, .,
. Britain, - Holland, .Pakistan,. a m o t h e r ,countries belonging t o t h e .:
.#.
mi-litary b l o c s o f .l!IATO, CENTO, and SEXTO - - a r e s a i d t o be t h e r e
lewfully, by r i g h t . They.consider t h i s t h e i r r i g h t . But t o o t h e r s t h e
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defense,
and
trhen
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measures a r e n e v e r t h e l e s s taken t o strengthen t h e defenses of t h i s o r
t h a t ' country t h e United. S t ~ t e sr.a i s e s . a n outcry: and d e c l a r e s t h a t an
otrtack; i f y ~ u . ' ~ l e a s ei ,s being prepared a g a i n s t them. What conceit.
The Uaitea S t a t k s apparently ,be.lievei t h a t under p r e s e n t conditions. .
p, n e can proceed t o aggression w i t h ,impunity.
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' . F o r what purposes a r e t h e s c f l e e t s i n t h e Mediterranean and i n
Taiwan S t r a i t ? T h e y a r e n o t p e ~ c e f u lones, That much i s c e r t a i n .
: They have aggressive, mili.tary. aims. And can t o be conducive t o
. n o Q a l r e l a t i o n s ~ f h e nU.S. t r i r s h i p s c r u i s e o f f t h e shores of o t h e r .
s t a t e s , while American admirals and generals, a s i f competing w i t h
.. . each other, ' p r a t t l e i n t h e p r e s s .and r a d i o from tinie t o time about
t h e S i x t h and Seventh f l e a t s being
desigmd f o r attack, f o r destroying
.
t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s ? '. ,
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III.Tjii~TA
F137TAi ~ i ~ > ~ ~ ~ , S
11 September 1962
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As long a s t h i s maciikss continues, t h i s policy r i L l not coutribwtc
' . : .- . t o strengthening' peacc but;
on the contrary, w i l l altrays 5 c a soui.ce
:which riiigllt . a t any nloiient produce a hf1t.t.ary cord l i c t w i t h a l l .t h e
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attendant conseq~edces. . .
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A v i l e campaign a g a i n s t the ~ o v i &UL?-:on
t
i s D.GGI being.cofi&actec7i n tte Unftdd S+;ates. It - i s s!~outed 2:'ronl t h e houseto2s t h a t sjnce
'a - merchant f Leek i s plgiag between tile 38Sii ond m a , carrying
Zreight, t h i s ' gives 'tile United S t a t e s t h e r i g h t t o a t t a c k C ~ b a
and t h e Soviet Union. But what pu3:pose 2s' sex-v'ed b y t h z p:resence
of U.S. warships i n Turkish ports, and by s~ha-t;r i g h t i s t h e i r s t a y
t h e r e regarded a s law2ul an3 no::mal? What do ",ley want --to obtain
f b r .themselves some e x c h s i o n TrOm tile ge?zerel r.iics? \ f i a t f s declared
o. v i o l a t i o n .of stanclards f o r oae i s regarded a s norzal f o r others.
W& warn t h a t given -present conkitions t h e s o c i s l i s t camp has no
fewer
f o r c e s and oppo%tunitics than t h e United S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s
.
i.'n v a r blocs. This must be taken i n t o consideration. One nust be
guided by thSs inp o l i t i c s so.'-ihat it does not pre3udice on3 s l d e
o r t h e other. Only under these conditions can one avoid. s mlli33ry
'con?lLct and safeguard peace. To r e s o r t t ~ . ' ~ r ~ v o c a t i o
under
n , t'nc
'absurd expectation of f r i g h t e n i n g .the o t h e r side, m e a m i r r e s p o n s i b l e
Lead
playing w i t h i h e destinies of 'the. world. 3ach a p o l i c y can 0 9 1 ~
%o Ciisiric~Sr e s u l t g .
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a should be remembered
t h a t t h e ,time has gone forever wk~ent h e
United S t a t e s had a monopoly on nuclear weagons. Today Lhe Soviet
Union has t h e s e %capons i n s u f f i c f ent q u a n t i t i e s . and of a lligher
. q u a l i t y . It should, therefore,. be known t h a t he %rho s t a r t s a var, .
he who SOFTS' t h e wind, w i l l reep , t h e .liurricane
I n digging an, zbyss
f o r i t s opponents a n aggressor w i l L invevitably f a l l .)Lrito it himself.
. .Only a masman can now t h i n k ' t h a t a war. s t a r t e d by him w i l l be a ,
calamity only f o r t h e people :against whom . it i s unlzashed. So,
b y now H i t l e r t s experience should have taught sometking t o those
who contemplate .aggression todar. . ' H i t l e r , who s t a r t e d a war alor,g with
Elussolini, perished i n it himsejr and brought d5sas'cer t o a13 people
o f , t h e ;world A war now l/rould be a hundredfold more t e r r i b l e , . and
it uould b r i n g calanitrtes both Lo t h e people against shcm the.
United s t a t e s is now pzeparing aggressfon and t o t h e people of t h e
United S t a t e s i t s e l f - - a n d probably great'er r a t h e r t h a n lesser colaratties
a t t h a t . ThLs t r i l l be even more t r u e of those s t a t e s , a l l i e s of t h e .
United States, which border on'khe. Soviet Union, and a l s o of i t s
o t h e r a l l i e s i n Europe a n d Asia. .
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~ u those.
t
. q u a r t e r s t h a t deternine - t h e p o l i c y of the United S t a t e s
--.donot take t h i s . . i n t o consideration. They s e t up m i l i t o r y bzses on
t h e . t e r r i t o r y of U.S. alllies, . b u i l d up n u c k a r veo2ons s t o r e s there, and
i n s t a l l roclcets, f o r ' e x a m ~ l e , i n &rkey,. I t a l y , and Japan. It i s not
d i f f i c u l t t o understand what f a t e ' t h e y a r e preparing .for these, .:
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..their allLes, i n c3se of.t;.&r. F O ~a11 t h i s i s <one t o a t t a c k . t h z
Soviet Union, the.Cl~X, tile DPFS.;, aad o t h e ~ socLalls't
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states; 'his
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~mel.i.can'bases . i n :. those.. c o u ~ l t . r i ( ~ ? These
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f l i g h t s a r c explained by
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and t h e Gernan Federal RepubLic, and e r e making f Sights from
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:' I n l i g h t of t h e 14-test events, i n l i g h t of the request of t h e U.S..
h-csident t o ~ o n g r c s sf o r thk peq-iisslon t o c a l l up 150,000 r e s e r v i s t s ,
. t h e Soviat Goverriient a l s o assPsses d i f f c r e r i t l y t h e f l i g h t of t h e
:' AmrLcau 11-2 reconnaissance plane ovcr ..Soviet t e r r i t o r y i n t h e
region of 311,-halin on.._?OAugust of t h i s year. Rzports have appeared t o
. e f f e c t . t h e t U - 2 planes 'are. being 'based. i n B r i t a i n , Japan, Turkey,
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i s w e l l understood by t h e p e o p l e i n those very coxntrics wller~?
U.S.
. m i l i t a r y bases a r e beiilg e s t a b l i s h e d , f o r e x a a p l e , i n Japan,
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.vhase people a r e r e s o l u t e l y p r o t e s t i a g against these bases.
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t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t they have p e a c e f u l puqoscs--they take a i r samples,
study cloud r:iovements. But'.today it i s - even more c l e a r trhat samples
' t h e y an taking ~ r i df o r what purposes t h e s e f l i g h t s a r e made.
!J?hat i s why t h e Soviet .GoVermient. appeals - t o t h e people, urging them
t o r a i s e a ' v ~ i c e ' d e n o u n c i naggressive
~
schemss, t o prevent %he
AmerLcan aggressors froin unleashing war, t o safeguard world peace.
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The USSR G.overnment appecls t o the Sr>viet people, urging them t o continue
trorking a s s u c c e s s f u l l y a s they a r e now. The government of t h e
. S o v i e t u n i o n ii~illdo i t s utmost t o safeguarc? peace and peaceful
.coexistence w i t h a l l . c o u n t r i e s . But t h i s does not always depend on
us. The Soviet Union d i d not want World War 11, but H i t l e r imposed
' , I t an us and wo wore. forced t o w ~ g c
war, That Z s why w e must do
everythink t o be p r e ~ a r e d , t o see t o it . t h a t our a m d forces-.-the
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s t r a t e g i c rocket f o r c e s a ~ tdh e ground forces, t h e a n t i a i r c r a f t defense,
t n e nzvy, and especially . t h e submarine f l e e t \of t h e Soviet Union--are
a b l e t o cope w i t h t h e i r tasKs. ,If t h e aggressors unleash war,
' . . ' our armed f o r c : ~ must
s
b e ready t o s t r i k e a crushing r e t a l i a t o r y
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blow a g s i n s t t h e aggressor.
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BB 21
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USSR INTmATIONAL
11 September 1962
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The Soviet Governmnrltt.:a.p$celst o t h e ;)overnment 02 t h e United S t a t e s ,
.urg'Zng
ii; t o d i s p l a y coxanoiisense, not t o l o s e self-&j?tl.ol, and t o s o b e r l y
. .:,.. . a s s e s s where i t s a.cti.ons m i g h t lead i??.
it unleashes war, Instead. of
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-,: agp;ra-~at'ing
the. ztinosphere by such a c t i o n s a s t h e mobilization of
. r e s e r v t s t s , which i s ' t a n t a n o u n t to. t h e t h r e a t of' s t a d i n g war, it would
.
be much more sensible i f . t h e gover-eut
of t h e United S t a t e s , displayifig
~lisdorn, would o f f e r a. kind gesture--wbuld e s t a b l i s h diplomatic a.nd t r a d e
reSdtions with Cuba, t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y 'of which has been r e c e n t l y
declzred by t h e cuban Goverment. I f t h e Americah Government displayed
t h i s . wisdom, t h e .peoples ~ ~ o u cl id~ s e s st h i s properly a s a r e a l i s t i c
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contribution of t h e Unlthd S t a t e s t o t h e relaxation of i n t e r c a t i o n a l
tecsion, t h e strengthening of world peace.
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..Ifnormal diplomatic and t r a d e r e l a t i o n s were established between t h e
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The Soviet Gc rernrnent has declared more than once and declares now:
Weare
stre5chink
hand
of fl ri ikeen d
s hpool
i p t oour
t h eepeople
and government
of t h e Uizited
S t a t eout
s . aW
e would
'to
f f o r t s with
the
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governments of t h e United S t a t e s arid other countries t o solve a l l r i p e .
i n t e r n a t i ~ n a lproblemsg t o safeguard peace on earth. To do .so,. one must
agree,' above a l l , on the. .first . s t e p which might be a solution of t h e
problpm of ending nuclear weapons t e s t s . We a r e ready f o r t h i s , ready
.
t o s i g n a rdlevant a.greement. We a r e ready to reach agreement-- .
on % g e n e r a land com~dete
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disarmament under s t r i c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l control.
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The Soviet Government expresses t h e hope t h a t t h e 'U, S. Government w i l l
. a t last draw s';>3erconclusior,s concerning t h e need f o r a-peace t r e a t y
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with Germany. . There have been zany negotiations on' t h i s question, but
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progress has t h u s f a r been niade. A pause has now been reached i n t h e
.
. .!..t;alIcson a German peace t r e a t y , but t h e i s s u e remains as sharp as ever
1
S e f o r e and i s f e l t 'even more h i ~ t e l ynow i n view of t h e p r 0 ~ 0 C a t i 0 n ~
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by revanchists i n We$% E e r l i s ' aga5,nst t h e GDR. It i s s a i d t h a t it i s
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d i f i ' i c u l t f o r t h e Ufiited S t a . t e s ' $ negotiate on t h e German peace
' . t r e a t y :now as e l e ~ t i o nt ~
o . t h e American Congress aze due i n November.
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W
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t h e Soviet ~6vernmenti s prepared t o reckon with t h i s . But 'one
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caayot- l i the.
~ s o l u t i o n of t h e question of .a German peace treaky a l l
t
h
e
tiie
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l e c t i o n s i n - t h i s o r t h z t country. . ~ l e c t i o n sa r e h d d of%&-.. .
noTq here, now.,there--.and f ~ r . t h e rdelay i n s e t t l i n g t h e question of a Geman
t r e a t y can only aroZuca f r e s h d i f f i c u l t i e s and f r e s h . dangers. The
S o v i e t ~ d ~ ~ & n . ea sn before,
t
:stands' f o r t h e e i r l i e s t C O ~ C ~ U Sof~ Oa ~
Goman peace . t r e a t y 'and t h e adjustment . o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n . Vest ~ e r q n
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United S t a t e s of hnexica and Cuba, t h e r e would be no hked f o r Cuba t o
'strengkhen i t s . d e f e n s e s , ' i t S armed forces. For then nobody would menace
Cu5a with war o r o t h e r : ~ : a g ~ e s s i v e . a c t i b n sa.nd
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t h e s i t u a t i o n would become
,normal. This i s how' matters now stand. Such i s t h e s i t u a t i o n a t gresent.
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BIZ 22
USSR I~~T-E33IAT1'0l%L
A-FFAIDS
11 September 1962
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T h i s t a s k nust be acccmghished, and it w i l l 5e accom-cl-isheci..
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The
sovl?reigtit-i of t h e GDR mus-t be.protccted., and it wi?-;.;be p r o t e c t e d .
?"nk v e s t i g e s of IZorlci blar' IT i n Byope,. .iuciudin,? .the occlrpatlon regime
i n Yest Ber.lin,:'m~~st:
.be l i q u i k t t j d , and , t h e y w i l l bd liquids-bed. This
a.ccords not only with: -thc?'intei-ests of i h e Sov5e.t Uiliou a n d t h e GLR,
.'-$ accos2s with t h e . v i t a l ~ n t e r e s t sof a l l s t a t e s , a 1 1 peoples.
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T5e S O + ~ & L U i i o a i s s t r e t c h i n g 'out. h hand of f r i e n d s h i p t o a l l c o u n t r i e s ,
t o a l l peo2les o:f the world, i n order t o achiove by common e f f o r t t h e
estadlishm.+t of a n end!iring, i n v t , ~ ? ~ a bpeace
le
on our p l a n e t . -4s
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regares qu2stions.of the i n t e r n a l s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l orser o f s t a t e s , they
must be s e t t l e d by each m t i o n independently and without any ~ u t s i d e
i n t e r v e n t i o n , Peace c a n ' b e . s a f e ~ a r & d . o n l yif o n e r e s p e c t s t h e
i n a l i e w b l e r i g h t . of each, n a t i o n t o indepecdence, i f one s t r i c t l y
o3serves t h & pprlnciple of.nonin.bervention by same s t a t e s i n t h e domest;ic
q?EaTrs of other s t a t e s . That. i s p r e c i s e l y t h e meaning. of peaceful
coexistence, underlying t h e peaceable p o l i c y of t h e Soviet s t a t e .
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in , ~ a n i s h
t a .Latin,i i d ,-$ 2300 GMT8 September 1962--3
( Commentary by/~arch.evi,$
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( ~ e x t ) Every dny t h e world l e a r n s 02' f r e s h t'nrcats a g a i n s t pencepal
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u b from kggressive U.S. c i r c l e s . Cuba i s khreatened i n nu'olic
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congressmen. The RepuSlican l e a d e r s h i p ,
. . .' statetuenks bby t h e beXlicose U.S.
i n Congress.,&nsis%so?? adopting a n anti-Cuban r e s o l u t i o n . Its sponsors
.
say t h e r e s o l u t i o n . wouid give , P r e s i d e n t Kennedy t h e r i g h t t o -Lake any
m
e a s , ~ e - . h. ef e e l s necessary a g 3 i n s t Cuba.. For a long time t h e U,S,
. .
press ha;. been d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e measures with c y n i c a l frankness.
Among o t h e r t h i n g s , i-i;'.spea.ks of a . n i l i t z r y blockade o f t h e i s i a n d and
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d5rec-b afmed. invasion. -. .
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It i s r e p o r t e d from Washington t h a t P r e s i d e n t Kennedy i s a s k i n g Congress
for. a u t h o r i t y t o c a l l up l50,COO r e s e r v i s t s f o r duty. This measure can
on?Q7be considsred b l a c h a i i and a t h r e a t t o t h e Cuban Republic. This
i s understood even i n t h e United S t a t e s .
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The SLate C e p r t m e n t i s ~ a l r i n g ' i t sc o n t r i b u t i o n $0 t h e anti-Caban hysteria.
2e.cretary of' S?ate Rdsk i s p e 2 a r i n p ; a n informal meeting of L a t i n .
American d i p l o m a t s ' f o r t h e purpose of' a g a i n c r g i n g Cuba's s i s t e r :
n a t i o a s t o t a k e aggressive s t e p a g a i n s t t h e i s l e of freedom. A n ~ t h e r
a.tterf2-t i s being made t o cnrry out a n infamous t a s k under t h e GAS. flag,
' t h a t of dragging t h e h t i n h e s i c a n zeoples i n t o a f r a t y i c i d a l 'bu'ar.
l{lleanwhile, t h e Pentagon concentrates miLitary f o r c e s i n t'ne Caribbean.
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bbn~itsdair .tzUat R w k , probably Ball sod 3ehatmo.' AcheoOn ~tigfinJly.
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..Fdlar plt r t r U e t . McNLmara rad Thylsr (wbaoattitursd
A C ) L I ~ ~ ) ~ ~
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Bahlen'e- 2nd chollca,
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-a Blockade: BaMsae Thomp~w.probaMy )~.&tb&
pritbabiy McMunara
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Rusk favor I# the limited or i9murgi+lMair .trike without .p*r
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w a r T h i s i ~ oppoeed
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by 3 ~ P O U ~ B ~ .
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By the dfpian~atr(BaMea, Thornpeon, probably M a d 4 wh6 bebt.,Uw&.
.......
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p r i ~ rpolitled action 1.' ee6aatW and not h f d d
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By the d i t a s y ( M c N ~ m a r a ,Tayios. MeCone) who Ln&L.I&at the
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stir s$.rlb;ecauXd not be l k m i t 9 8 '
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Letter to Nikita Khrushchev from Fidel Castro regarding defending Cuban air space
October 26,1962
Dear Comrade Khrushchev:
Given the analysis of the situation and the reports which have reached us, [I] consider an attack
to be almost imminent-within the next 24 to 72 hours. There are two possible variants: the first
and most probable one is an air attack against certain objectives with the limited aim of
destroying them; the second, and though less probable, still possible, is a full invasion. This
would require a large force and is the most repugnant form of aggression, which might restrain
them.
You can be sure that we will resist with determination, whatever the case. The Cuban people's
morale is extremely high and the people will confront aggression heroically.
I would like to briefly express my own personal opinion.
If the second variant takes place and'the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it,
the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union
must never allow circumstances in which theimperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike
against it.
I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists' aggressiveness makes them extremely
dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba--a brutal act in violation of
universal and moral law--then that would be the moment to eliminate this danger forever, in an
act of the most legitimate self-defense. However harsh and terrible the solution, there would be
no other.
This opinion is shaped by observing the development of their aggressive policy. The imperialists,
without regard for world opinion and against laws and principles, have blockaded the seas,
violated our air-space, and are preparing to invade, while at the same time blocking any
possibility of negotiation, even though they understand the gravity of the problem.
You have been, and are, a tireless defender of peace, and I understand that these moments,
when the results of your superhuman efforts are so seriously threatened, must be bitter for you.
We will maintain our hopes for saving the peace until the last moment, and we are ready to
contribute to this in any way we can. But, at the same time, we are serene and ready to confront
a situation which we see as very real and imminent.
I convey to you the infinite gratitude and recognition of the Cuban people to the Soviet people,
who have been so generous and fraternal, along with our profound gratitude and admiration to
you personally. We wish you success with the enormous task and great responsibilities which are
in your hands.
Fraternally,
Fidel Castro
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3 8
OVAL O F F I C E
President Kennedy: [Unclear] Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gil-
I
patric, General Taylor, Attorney General, George Ball, Alexis Johnson, Ed
Martin, McGeorge Bundy, Ted Soren~en.~
During the course of the day, opinions had obviously switched from the advantages of a first strike on the missile
sites and Qn Cuban aviation to a blockade
Dean Acheson, with whom I talked this afternoon, stated that, while he was
uncertain about any of the courses, he stated the first strike as being most likely
!
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to achieve our result and less likely to cause an extreme Soviet reaction. That
strike would take place just against the missile sites.
When I saw Robert Lovett later, after talking to Gromyko, he was not
convinkd that any action-was desirable. He felt that the missile strike, the first
strike, would be very destructive to our alliances. The Soviets would inevitably
bring about a reprisal; that we would be blamed for it-particularly if the
reprisal was to seize Berlin; and that we'd be regarded as having brought about
the loss of Berlin with inadequate provocation, they having lived with these
intermediate-range ballistic missiles for years.
Bundy continued to argue against any action, on the grounds that there
would be, inevitably, a Soviet reprisal against Berlin and that this would divide
our alliances and we would bear that responsibility. He felt we would be better
off to merely take note of the existence of these missiles, and to wait until the
crunch comes in Berlin, and not play what he thought might be the Soviet
game.
Everyone else felt that for us to fail to respond would throw into question
our willingness to respond over Berlin, [and] would divide our allies and our
country. [They felt] that we would be faced with a crunch over Berlin in 2 or
3 months and that by that time the Soviets would have a large missile arsenal
in the Western Hemisphere which would weaken our whole position in this
hemisphere and cause, face us with the same problems we're going to have in
Berlin anyway.
The consensus was that we should go ahead with the blockade beginning
on Sunday night. Originally we should begin by blockading Soviets against the
shipment of additional offensive capacity, [and] that we could tighten the
blockade as the situation requires. I was most anxious that we not have to
announce a state of war existing, because it would obviously be bad to have
the word go out that we were having a war rather than that it was a'lirnited
blockade for a limited purpose.
It was determined that I should go ahead with my speeches so that we don't
take the cover off this, and come back Saturday night [October 201.
b
6a
1
"LET U
ANE
97
An Oral History of the
Kennedy Presidency
GERALD S. AND
DEBORAH H. STROBER
Harper CollinsPublishers
.
.
364' "LETITS BEGIN ANEW
said that I had underestimated what was going on and that I had been
rather cavalier in saying, Why would anybody expect us to predict that
they were going to put up a wall? That is nonsense. The decision to put
up the Berlin wall was made from one day to the next, by Honecker, as I
recall, Now, we didn't have any agent sitting in Honecker's lap, nor did
we have anybody inside his head. I think it would have been very difficult to have found out about a decision he hadn't even made until he
made it, and went ahead and put the wall up, so I don't feel any discomfort about that. God did not give me the gift of prescience, and anybody
who thinks we are going to be able to run an intelligence organization
inside the head of every chief of state in the world is suffering from delusions.
Willy Brandt There was a good deal of fear in the city. People didn't
realize that what was going on; it was terrible, from many poillts of
view-one had the other part of one's family on the other isde and shatnot. But they did not realize that it did not mean that one had to expect a
Russian or East German invasion into West Berlin. This was part of the
thing.
Then there was the other element-that most people did not understand that withln the decisions taken before, the Western powers could
not move, so what could one do then? One could bring together a crowd
of people, one of the biggest meetings we've had, on the sixteenth, in
front of the city hall, and there one could say I've sent a letter to the president of the United States to express our eoncern. And if you look into
that paper, the kind of proposals I make express what I call helplessness.
This happens in a situation like this. You do something which looks like an
action and in reality isn't much more than a piece of public relations.
Martin Hillenbrand Willy Brandt's reaction was that somehow or
other we had fallen short of taking the necessary steps to react against
the wall. I discussed this with him on a number of occasions, years later,
and I always had the impression that, somehow or other, his confidence
in the U.S. was weakened and that some of the things he later did and
said were partially attributable to his disappointment at the American
reaction, even though, as I have pointed out to both Brandt and Egon
Bahr [official in Brandt's government] on occasion, if they had read care-
THE B E R L J CRISIS
365
fully the diplomatic exchanges, and particularly the president's speech
after his return from Vienna, his first speech after the note-the
response to the aide-memoire-had gone forward: that we had never
claimed that it was a vital interest of the U.S. to prevent action in East
Berlin which was contrary to the basic Four Power agreements. We had
always spelled out our vital interests as affecting our position and the
position of the British and the French in West Berlin and the access to
the city, and it was never our intention to move military force into East
Berlin under any circumstances. So the idea that, somehow or other, we
should, with our meager tank force and bulldozer equipment, have
knocked down the wall-with twenty-one Soviet divisions in the neighborhood-would have been utter futility, in my view.
They could simply have rebuilt the wall. Had we knocked down a
portion, they could have built it a hundred feet further in the rear. We
would have been faced with an endless progression. That never made
much sense to me, but I recognized that in Brandt's own thinking about
the reliability of American protection, because after all we were the
major nuclear power here, that somehow or other we had fallen short.
This is a case where our planning and the logic of our position as specifically spelled out in diplomatic exchanges, and in the presidential speech,
fell far short of what the Germans, and particularly Willy Brandt-I can't
say the same of Adenauer-expected of us, although Brandt was never
very specific at the time or subsequently in spelling out exactly what he
wanted us to do.
Willy Brandt
Kennedy was absolutely right when he said-I don't
remember 'now the occasion or the date-that nobody advised him to
take military action against the erection of the wall. And when he said
nobody gave him that advice, he included my name: "Not even the
mayor of Berlin did," which is true.
Responding to the erection of the wall, President Kennedy sent fifi
teen hundred troops over the autobahn to bolster the U.S, garrison in
West Berlin. The president also sent Vice Presidentlohnson to the city to
reassure its citizens of the American resolue that they should remain free.
In addition, the president dispatched Gen. Lucius Clag, a hero of the
1948 airlij?, as his personal emissay to the city.
366 "LF- 'JS BEGIN ANEW'
McGeorge Bundy The wall was a shock to morale in Berlin-to
everybody from Brandt on down. We didn't respond to that overnight; it
took us three or four days to send reinforcements-to send the vice
president. But if some in Germany think we should have made war out
of it, I think that's a lot of nonsense. And we did get there on time. It's
worth noting that we were a little quicker in reacting than the chancellor
of the Federal Republic, who might have been thought to have been
closer to the problem. Certainly the citizens of Berlin did not hold it
against Keimedy-as we all know from what happened when he went
there.
William Colby Khrushchev felt he could crowd Kennedy, so Kennedy
had to stand up to him. That was what the mobilization in Berlin was all
about. Khrushchev was a very elemental guy. He thought, If I just snarl
at him, he'll get frightened. He did get frightened, and then decided
he'd have to do something about it.
Richard Helms I don't think that President Kennedy had any intention of trying to start World War 111, and I think that it could have been
very dicey if we had put a lot of troops in there to face the Red Army.
They had a lot of forces in East Germany, and they could have put up
one hell of a battle. Anything that would have brought that on would
have been a big mistake, just as I thought that Kennedy was prudent in
not bombing Cuba when the missiles showed up there.
Martin Hillenbrand You know, after the wall was built, and after the
foreign ministers' meeting in Paris, with the consent of President
Kennedy, who agreed to calling up the reserves and augmenting the
troops in both Berlin and West Germany and asking the Congress for
more money for a military buildup, the State Department position-and
obviously as secretary, Dean Rusk took this position-was that we should
at the same time explore whether there was any possibility of meaningful
negotiations.
And so, for over year, he conducted with Foreign Minister Gromyko,
both in New York during the GA [General Assembly] sessions and also in
Geneva, on a number of occasions he explored-the designated description of these talks was "exploratory talks to determine whether a basis for
negotiations exists." Now this had seemed to me, and in the State
THE BEiLkIN CRISIS
367
Department, the logical way to go about handling the thing-that this
was one way of deferring any ultimative execution on the part of the
Soviets. We gained time and eventually, after the Cuban missile crisis,
even though threats to our position in Berlin continued, the Berlin crisis
gradually faded away,
So the delaying tactics which Dean Rusk executed with Foreign
Minister Gromyko turned out to be effective. But it is true that the
White House, some of the people there and some of the people in the
State Department who had come down with the Kennedy administration-and I exclude completely Dean Rusk from this category-were
prepared to make major concessions in the course of the negotiations
they were advocating, which I, Foy Kohler [assistant secretary of state
for European affairs], and Dean Rusk felt would be giving away the
store. First of all, these people were basically not well versed in what had
happened during the Eisenhower administration, and they never came
up with a detailed plan as to what our position in our negotiations would
be. They were merely seeking negotiations in order to avoid what they
feared would be a confrontation, and they were quite opposed to the
recommendations that Dean Acheson made in his memoranda, which
were, in effect, to test the Soviet will by running convoys through and so
on. That whole summer of intense diplomacy, certainly from my point of
view almost the most intense in which I've ever been involved, has never
been fully recorded.
Alexei Adzhubei Marshal Koniev [Ivan Stepanovich Koniev] came to
see Khrushchev and told him that the Americans would succeed; the
gun was loaded, and Khrushchev was scared. He was silent for a long
time, and then he said, "Let our tanks go away." But Koniev said, "They
will get through," and Khrushchev said, "I don't think so." The American
tanks stayed for an hour more, and then they went away Everybody had
to observe the balance between the political structures. Kennedy had his
generals, and Khrushchev had his.
VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S AND
GENERAL CLAY'S VISITS
Willy Brandt I think Johnson's visit, under the given conditions, was a
very successful one-again, more from the publicrelations view. Berlin-
368 ' "LET US BEGIN ANEW'
ers got the impression that if the vice president comes, looks at things,
discusses things, this means we can be sure the United States will not let
us down.
Of course he was very able i,n making contact with people. The fact
that the vice president was there in West Berlin, in a way to welcome the
Americans when they came in on the autobahn, that he went to the big
refugee camp that we had and spoke to the people who had just come
from East Berlin and East Germany, was a most effective way of counteracting this feeling of uncertainty which was spreading during these
days following August 13.
Martin Hillenbrand This was something unprecedented internationally. I can't remember any previous situation which even vaguely duplicated the building of a wall to stop a massive outflow of refugees. Of
course I think the initial reaction was perhaps not sufficient to meet the
problem of Berlin morale. That's why Vice President Johnson was sent
there to demonstrate great concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Other morale-building actions were taken in order to impress
the Berliners that we still cared.
I think on the whole, despite some rather peculiar peripheral chinapurchasing activities on the part of the vice president-who had an avid
desire wherever he went to acquire china-apart from that, I think his
visit did contribute to the partial restoration of Berlin morale.
My deputy, Frank Cash, accompanied Vice President Johnson on
the trip to Berlin. I think the atmosphere was mixed. The overt expression was to condemn this iniquitous wall, which was totally inhumane,
totally contrary to international practice, and so on.
But I think there was also a feeling on the part of some, which could
not be expressed, obviously, because of the effect it would have had on
Berlin morale, that the Berlin Wall, despite its iniquitous appearance
and the iniquitous concept it expressed, did relieve some of the pressure, from the Soviet and East German point of view.
Willy Brandt Sending Clay meant a way to signal a grand coaktion on
the question of defending West Berlin, and I think it was understood this
way. Berliners loved General Clay in a way. He himself was a very communicative person, and in the eyes of Berliners, even Germans, he was
the man who, one remembered, had organized the airlift. And a year
later, he came back and brought the Freedom Bell to Berlin. A big
THE B,
,IN CRISIS
36:
crowd was there at the time. So he was in a way regarded as the mar
who had worked so West Berliners could survive.
Martin Hillenbrand We felt concern that Clay was not the right man
in the right place, even though we had a great deal of respect for Clay's
performance as head of military government in the formative period
prior to the existence of the FRG. I had been in Germany during the
early years after the war and respected Clay. He provided the kind of
leadership and firmness that we needed in those early years. But we also
knew that Clay took certain positions then which, translated into the
scene in 1961, might very well be out of tempo with the general
approach which we thought was desirable-the Rusk approach, the idea
of delaying talks, stretching out talks with the Soviets as long as we could
in order to eliminate any ultimative threat.
Some in the State Department felt that this was not necessarily a wise
thing to do, that General Clay might turn out to be somewhat of a loose
cannon on an empty deck, which of course was not contrary to the way
things actually turned out.
My own impression was that after Clay got there and went into
action, the president quickly came to regret having sent him there, but
could not really withdraw him without a decent interval of time passing,
because Clay had been sent there as a morale booster, as a prominent
Republican who was now enrolled in the cause of protecting Berlin, so
there was no way of getting him out until Clay made the mistake of the
tank confrontation, which not only worried Washington but also
incensed General Norstad [Lauris Norstad, supreme commander,
NATO forces] and General Bruce Clark [commander, U.S. forces,
Europe]. They felt that Clay, without any military command authority,
was attempting to use American forces, without even consulting the
commanding generals.
On June 28, 1963, President Kennedy further demonstrated the U.S.
gouernrnent's commitment to Berlin by. visiting the city himself and
nddressing a massive crowd in front ofthe city hall.
Martin Hillenbrand By '63 I was already in Germany as deputy chief
of mission. It was absolutely part ,of the required drill that the high-level
visitor go to Berlin and repeat the American commitment to the protec-
s/u :'LET US BEGIN A N E W
tion of the 1.Failure to do that would.have been an enormous blow to
Berlin morale, so it was automatically assumed that when Kennedy came
to the Federal Republic, a visit to Berlin would have to be part of the visit.
Every subsequent president has been in exactly the same position.
The problem that'we have always faced-parenthetically, I might add
this-with subsequent presidents was that Kennedy's visit to both West
Germany and to Berlin was such a triumphal thing that subsequent pres'idents have always felt somehow or other they had to duplicate it at least.
Willy Brandt I then called it one of the greatest days in the history of
that city. I wonder if there has been any other occasion after the end of
the war when so many people were in the streets and felt involved in this
event. Today perhaps I would add November 1989. There was nothing
in between which in a way had the same importance as far as the
involvement of the people was concerned. The fact that Adenauer also
came of course was important, even if it was a short time before Adenauer left his office here in Bonn.
THE B. ,IN CRISIS 371
must have been four hundred newspapermen!-and the president is tc
walk up to the tower of Checkpoint Charlie. As we get close to the end,
there is a red-faced, enthusiastic guy in the press section-it was Bill
Hearst [William Randolph Hearst, Jr.1-and he says, "Hiya, Jack!" and
.
the president turns to him and says, "Why,it's Mr. Hearst!"
"ICH BIN EIN BERLINER"
Martin Hillenbrand The idea of the president's saying "Ich bin ein
Berliner" was improvised on the flight up to Berlin, and there was some
doubt as to whether Kennedy's German was equal to those four words.
Willy ~ r a n d t My own contribution to the speech was that before he
went out-he was at my office at the city hall-he tried to get a reasonable pronunciation of the sentence, "Zch bin ein Berline~"Well, it was a
moving thing. And he worked hard at it, at the pronunciation.
John Kenneth Galbraith When Kennedy went to Berlin and talked
about himself as a ~ e r l i n e ithought
,~
this was unduly extravagant.
Angier Biddle Duke Berlin was so thrilling; it was one of the most
exciting periods of my life. There was sparring between Willy Brandt
and Konrad Adenauer over where each of them would sit in relation to
President Kennedy Under American protocol the most important person is on the right, and the next most important person is on the left, and
the least important person is on the extreme left. Under German protocol you go: One, two, three. We were going to have to decide whether
German or American protocol would be followed, and we weren't in
Germany; we were in Berlin-in the American Zone. Willy Brandt said,
"I am the mayor of Berlin and the number one person here, and I get to
sit next to the president under American protocol." Somehow this got
back to Adenauer, He said, "Fine," and it was ,quite amusing, because
Brandt did get to sit next to the president, but five million people turned
out-two and one-half million people on either side of the street-and
Adenauer had two and a half million on his side of the street, the president had two and a half million on the other side, and Brandt, between
them, was out of sight, so in winning he got lost.
Martin Hillenbrand There's a tendency, obviously, when you have
presidential visits which turn into mediacircuses, inevitably to attribute
more historic importance to them than they necessarily may have ten
yeais later. Certainly it seemed.like the Kennedy visit was of intense historical significance in German American relations. Perhaps, in the light
of hindsight, some of the consequences of th& visit faded sooner in
terms of German-American relations thari we had expected at the
time--of course we've had all sorts of crises'since in German American
relations. Nevertheless, of all the visits of American presidents that I've
. been involved with, either as a member of the American delegation or
having been at the receiving end in an embassy, this was certainly the
most spectacular, and perhaps-if spectacular is equivalent to 'successful-then it was also the most successful of presidential visits.
We get to Checkpoint Charlie and get out a block ahead. We get out of
our cars, and the press rushes up ahead, to the barricades-God, there
more than just Berlin. Especially his speech at the university which, in a
way, took up the theme from his university speech of June 10, I think it
was-his dealing with what he called the winds of change which went
Willy Brandt Looking back at it .now, of course it meant a good deal
372 "LET TTS BEGIN ANEW'
beyond the Iron Curtain-all this went a good deal beyond the question
of taking care of West Berlin and was the source of a good deal of hope.
Of course nobody then could know that he only had a few months more
ahead of him.
ASSESSING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE CRISIS
Martin Hillenbrand The Berlin crisis could have escalated if the Soviets had taken action to induce' escalation in a way that could ultimately
have involved a fundamental decision on the use of nuclear weapons.
Fortunately it never came to that. The way it turned out, despite all the
static coming from members of the Kennedy team in the White House,
and a few of them planted in the State Department, it was handled in
about as good a way as one could have expected. The decisions that the
~iesidentmade were part of a coherent process of decision making
within the government, even though his style obviously was completely
different .than that of President Eisenhower, who provided a kind of
reassurance that a man like Kennedy simply couldn't provide.
Yuri Barsukov It looks like Khrushchev at that time was acting more
decisively than John Kennedy, because there was a big risk that could
lead to direct confrontation in Europe between the Soviet Union and
Western powers. My feeling is that the risk was quite big, so that's why I
think Khrushchev gambled.
But fortunately both leaders apparently realized that it was a very
serious issue and found a solution.
:RichardHelms It was a very tense period; there's no doubt about it.
On the other hand, I think the Cuban missile crisis was tenser.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
THE PRELUDE
Norbert Schlei The very first thing I was asked to do when I joined
the department was when the attorney general called me in and said, "I
want you to write a memorandum for the president about what the
United States could do as a matter of international law if the Soviet
Union put missiles in Cuba. As far as we know they don't have any, but
there has been a lot of talk about it and we would like to make a warning
statement. Before we make the statement, we'd better figure out what
we could do if they disregard it. We would like to know what the lay of
the land is." So I started to work on a memorandum. I am the originator
of the quarantine concept that the president used, although quarantine
was his own word. I did the memorandum during August, and it was circulated just before the Labor Day weekend. I met with Dean Rusk and
Nicholas Katzenbach on Labor Day to talk about it, and in early September the president did make a warning statement to the Soviet Union.
A blockade is an absolute bar to traffic; you stop everythinginedicines or food or whatever. It seemed to me that that was hard to
justify; what we were justified in blocking was offensive weaponry. So I
proposed a partial blockade that would only stop offensive weaponry and
let everything else go by, I called it "visit and search blockade." I argued
that this would be justified because the essence of self-defense is proportionality: you may do something that is proportional to the threat. So
if someone is simply creating a threat by putting in missiles, it's hard to
just+ bombing, because you are meeting a potential threat by inflicting
Appendix A
SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS
Date
Interviewee
TitleIActivity During Kennedy Administration
5/12/92
Morris B. Abram
2/27/9 1
1/13/92
4/2/92
1/9/92
Alexei Adzhubei
Worth Bagley
Bobby Baker
George Ball
7/27/9 1
5/20/91
1/22/92
Yuri V. Barsukov
Lucius D. Battle
David Bell
General counsel, Peace Corps, 1961; U.S. member, UN
Subcomission on Prevention of Discrimination and Persecution of
Minorities, 1962-64
Editor in chief, Zzuestia, 1959-64; son-in-law of Nikita S. Khrushchev
Assistant to Gen. Maxwell Taylor for Southeast Asia
Secretary to the Senate majority, Jan. 1955-0ct. 1963
Undersecretary of state for economic affairs, Jan. 1961-Nov. 1961;
undersecretary of state, 1961-66
Washington correspondent, lzvestia
Assistant secretary of state for educational and cultural affairs, 1962-64
Director, Bureau of the Budget, Jan. 1961-Nov. 1962; administrator,
Agency for International Development, Jan. 1963-July 1966
Deputy director of plans, Central Intelligence Agency, 1959-62
Member, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
i/3/91
.1/2Y89
Richard M: Bissell
Julian ~ o n d
Venue
Telephone
Moscow
Telephone
Washington, D.C.
Princeton, N.J.
Moscow
washington, D.C.
Cambridge, Mass.
Farmington, Conn.
Cambridge, Mass.
P961 '"1-1961
'asuajap jo h ~ a ~ ahan sd a a
u o f i ~ q s 'Xssequr2
e~
!la-els~'uo!ss!mjoja!qa h n d a a
3u44!3 '7 [[afis"kI
J V 3 FqaaplOM
asueqaxa rauosud ueqn3 uo ~uap!saldaqJ OJ rasppv
--
~9-1961' s ~ ~ juo!4ez!m21o
je
puogewaJu! roj ~ J - ~ J S JhOj a r a a s ~m~s!ssy
IGua2~a a u a % ~ a ~
p 1u ~~u a 3'sapurysa puogeu '~sleXpuem q a N
9961 'Clad-I961 'uel
'slgjjrs h u m a s @uoyeuroj ~uap!sa~d
ayJ OJ JueJs!sse ppads
XI
pmla~a13U ~ I ~ H
' l a ~ e .Q
3 a2roa3
Xpuna a%oa3am
a
Interviewee
Title/Activity During Kennedy Administration
Venue
Andrew J. Goodpaster
Brig. Gen., U.S. Arm . Staff secretary to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, involve in transition to Kennedy administration
U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Aug. 1961-Jan. 1966
Deputy chief of mission, British Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
l:
Lincoln Gordon
Denis Greenhill
(Lord Greenhill of Harrow)
Najeeb E. Halaby
August Heckscher
Richard M. Helms
3
Roger Hilsman
3
U. Alexis Johnson
Philip Kaiser
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Clark Kerr
Sergei Khrushchev
Philip Klutznick
Intemewee
Title/Activity During Kennedy Administration
Venue
Robert W. Komer
Victor H. Krulak
Senior staff member, National Security Council
Major general, U.S. Marine Corps; .special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, OffiCe of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-64
Chairman, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, 1963-66
Assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, 1960-61; U.S.
ambassador to Mexico, 1961-63
Assistant secretary of state for public affairs, 1962-64
Assistant attorney general in charge of the Civil Rights Division,
1961-64
Assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, 196042; assistant
secretary of state for inter-American affairs, 1962-63
Deputy director, Democratic National Comrnittee;campaign aide
U.S. senator (D., Minn.), 1959-71
Campaign aide; director, Office of Emergency Planning; 'member,
National Security Council
Director, Food for Peace Program, 1961-62; U.S. senator (D., S. Dak.),
1963-8 1
Civil rights activist
U.S. congressman (R., Mass.)
Field secretary, Mississippi Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee, 1961-65; director, Council of Federated Organizations,
1962-65
Washington, D.C.
Rev. Theodore Hesburgh
Martin J.-Hillenbrand
1
)
John Lewis
Thomas Mann
Robert J. Manning
Burke Marshall
Edwin M. Martin
Louis Martin
Eugene J. McCarthy
Edward A. McDermott
George S. McGovern
James H. Meredith
F. Bradford Morse
Robert Moses
'
0
9
y
E
London, England
Arlington, Va.
New York, N.Y.
Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency, 1961-65
Adviser to the president on the arts
Deputy to the director for plans, 1952-62; deputy director for plans,
Central Intelligence Agency, 196.2435
Member, United States Civil Rights Commission, 1959-72;president,
Notre Dame University, 195287
Deputy director, Berlin Task Force, U.S. Department of State 1961-62;
director, 1962-63
Director, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Feb. 1961-May 1963;Assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs, 1963-64
Deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs, 1961-64
U.S. ambassador to Senegal, Mauritania
Assistant attorney general, 1961-62: deputy attorney general, 1962-64
President, University of California, 1958-67
Son of Nikita S. Khrushchev
U.S. ambassador to UN Economic and Social Council
1
1
UI
9
Washington, D.C.
Telephone
Athens, Ga.
New York, N.Y.
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
New York, N.Y.
Telephone
Cambridge, Mass.
Chicago, 111.
San Diego, Calif.
Washington, D.C.
Austin, Tex.
Boston, Mass.
New Haven, Conn.
Washington, D.C.
Diamond Bar, Calif.
Washington. D.C.
8
c!
h
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
Washington. D.C.
Telephone
-
5
Fj
2
M
<
m
Telephone
vr
1
2
lnterviewee
TitlefActivity During Kennedy Administration
Venue
Frank E. MOSS
Gaylord A. Nelson
Maurine Neuberger
John patterson
Claibome Pell
Esther Peterson
Norman Podhoretz
Roman Puchinski .
Marcus Raskin
U.S. senator (D., Utah), 1959-77
Governor of Wisconsin, 1958-62; U.S. senator (D., Wis.), 1963-81
U.S. senator (D., Oreg.), 1960-66
Govemor of Alabama, 1959-63
U.S. senator (D., R.I.), 1960Assistant secretary of labor for labor standards, 1961-69
Editor, Commentay, 1960U.S. congressman (D., Ill.)
Member, special staff, National Security Council; staff member,
Bureau of the Budget
Vice chairman, Americans for Democratic Action, 1957-92
Member, Cuban Revolutionary Council
Telephone
Washington, D.C.
Telephone
Montgomery, Ala
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
New York, N.Y.
Chicago, Ill.
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Manuel Ray
1
L
Dean 0.Rusk
Austin, Tex.
Athens, Ga.
Interviewee
TitlelActivity During Kennedy Administration
Venue
Pierre E. Salinger
Paul Samuelson
Teny Sanford
Walter Schirra
Norbert A. Schlei
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
Glenn Seaborg
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
John Seigenthaler
R. Sargent Shriver
Rev. Fred Shutdesworth
White House press secretary, Jan. 1961-Mar. 1964; campaign aide
Adviser on economic affairs
Governor of North Carolina, 1961-65
Astronaut, Mercury Program
Assistant attorney general, Office of Legd Counsel, 1962-66
Special assistant to the president, 1961-64
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-71
Deputy director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Administrative assistant to the attorney general, 1961-62
Director, Peace Corps
Secretary, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 1957-70;
president, Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights, 1956-70
Deputy assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs
Astronaut, Mercury Program
U.S. senator (D., Fla.), 1951-69
Major, U.S. Air Force; special assistant to Gen. ~ & e u Taylor
(General Taylor served as military representative to the president
and as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1961-Oct. 1962),
Oct. 1962-June 1964
Son of Adlai E. Stevenson
Interpreter for Nikita S. Khrushchev
London
Cambridge, Mass.
Washington, D.C.
Telephone
Telephone
New York, N.Y
Telephone
Cambridge, Mass.
Washington, D.C.
Telephone
George W. Romney
Charles R. Ross
Walt W. Rostow
Joseph Sisco
Donald ("Deke") Slayton
George A. Smathers
William Y. Smith
Adlai E. Stevenson I11
Viktor M. Sukhodrev
5--2
%
@
*
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
San Juan, Puerto
Rico
Secretary of heath, education and welfare, Jan. 1961-July 1962;
U.S. senator (D., Conn.), 1963-80
Chairman of the board and president, American Motors Corporation,
1954-62; governor of Michigan, 1963-69
Member, Federal Power Commission, 1961-68
Deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs,
1961; chairman, State Department Policy Planning Council, 1961-66
Secretary of state, Jan. 1961-Jan. 1969
Abraham A. Ribicoff
cn
New York, N.Y.
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Washington, D.C.
Seabrook, Md.
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
Chicago, Ill.
New York, N.Y.
g
S
g
-Z
2
4
3m
<
V)
Cn
0
The Vision
by Sargent Shriver
Oscar Wilde is said to have observed that America really was discovered
by a dozen people before Columbus but that the discovery remained a
secret. I am tempted to feel that way about the Peace Corps. A national
effort of this type had been proposed many times in previous years, but
only in 1961 did it become reality.
In quantitative terms, the Peace Corps has never been a big idea. It
started the first year with a few thousand Americans being dispatched to
serve in the underdevel~~ed'world,
and, though the number has gone
up and down, the concept has remained essentially thesame. Compared
to the millions in uniform who have served America abroad, the ambition was modest-perhaps too modest. Compared to the funds our government transmits in foreign aid to countries less affluent than ours, the
budget was barely visible. Still, those'of us who were present at the creation nurtured the notion that the Peace Corps had a huge potential for
promoting the peace of the world and the well-being of humanity. After
twenty-five years, though poverty and war remain with us, I think I see
some evidence that we were right. Qualitatively, the Peace Corps has succeeded.
My own interest in the Peace Corps idea had started quite a few years
before, when I was a part of and, later, leader for Experiment in International Living groups in Europe in the 1930s. In the 1950s I visited
several Asian countries-Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailandand, when I returned, I proposed sending three-man political action
teams to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ~ h e s eteams were to consist
of vigorous and imaginative young labor leaders, businessmen, and politicians. They would offer their services at a grass-roots level and work
Sargent Shriuer, a senior partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriuer
ington, D.C., was the first director of the Peace Corps.
[3Jar ' -9nin
Wash15
16
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
directly with the people, contributing to the growth of the economies, to
the democratic organization of the societies, and to the peaceful outcome of the social revolutions under way. When the idea of the Peace
Corps emerged during the presidential campaign of 1960, it seemed to
offer the possibility of realizing, in a new form, this old objective, which
seemed to me more important than ever.
A month or so after President Kennedy took office, he asked me to
report to him on how the Peace Corps could be organized, and then to
organize it. John Kennedy believed Americans had decent ideals that
were going untapped, and a physical and spiritual resilience that was
being unused. He told me to make the Peace Corps a tough agency, to
prove wrong those who were skeptical about the willingness of Americans, especially young Americans, to make the kind of sacrifices that the
Peace Corps would require. "Go ahead," he said, "you can do it," and to
do it we assembled the best people we could find from the professions,
from our universities and foundations, from our corporations and unions,
from private agencies and the civil service. We knew the Peace Corps
would have only one chance to work. We felt like parachute jumpers:
the chute had to open the first time, o r we were sure to come to an
abrupt end.
Within the team I had assembled, we wrestled with a hundred questions of policy, debating around the clock, in those early days of 1961.
Not the least of the questions was the name we would give to the undertaking. For a while, "Peace Corps," which Kennedy had used during the
election campaign, was not the first choice. Some of the President's advisers scoffed at it, arguing for a solid bureaucratic title like "Agency for
Overseas Voluntary Service." conservatives, furthermore, said the word
"peace" sounded soft, vague, and weak. They insisted Communists had
corrupted it by applying it to every political initiative and even to every
war they were involved in. Not to be outdone, many liberals disliked the
word "corps." They said it sounded militaristic.
But I thought we should try to recapture the term "peace," to liberate
it, so to speak. I thought we should be able to use it without its sounding
like propaganda, metaphor, or corn. As for "corps," I was not uncomfortable with conveying the militance of our purpose, at least a quiet
militance. The fact was that I could not visualize the elimination of war
except through the kind of effort in which the Peace Corps was to engage. Peace was our goal, and we were not embarrassed to envisage this
effort as a genuine way station along the road.
We knew there were misgivings about the new Peace Corps. I was
disappointed when some very distinguished Americans made fun of our
conviction that volunteers could do a serious job in the developing world.
Congressmen and columnists called it a range of invidious names, but
Americans were not alone. U Nu, who was then prime minister of Burma,
asked me during a visit to Rangoon, "Do you think you can send me a
young man from Kokomo, Indiana, who will have the dedication, determi~iation,and sense of mission of someone from Communist China?
Make no mistake about the kind of person you will be competing with."
We were not so sure ourselves how well Peace Corps volunteers would
work, nor were we sure that our idea would catch on, either overseas or
at home. I recalled with'some apprehension an African proverb I had
heard, which went, "Until you have crossed the river, don't insult the
crocodile's mouth."
Our Peace Corps task force worked literally day and night for weeks,
readying recommendations for the President. John Kennedy had set the
theme of the new administration with his inaugural statement, "Ask not
what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." Those were inspiring words, and at that point, many were asking,
il*
"All right, what can we.do for our country?" We considered speed essential in order to maintain the momentum of the Kennedy theme.
d
@:
By March 1, 1961, we were ready with a detailed report, which rec%.:
ommended to P,resident Kennedy the Peace Corps' immediate, full-scale
.f$
g: establishment. We rejected proposals for pilot programs o r small, exper%.
imental iniriatives. We.asked for an independent agency; not answerable
.
to the Agency of International Development, and we turned down sug.
gestions to limit the mission of the Peace Corps to supplementing efforts
of the Junior Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, or other American
groups working abroad. We rejected uniforms, badges, medals, and any
other distinctive clothing, along with rankings and grades. We said we
.,y.
wanted no special housing, food, schools, or anything else, except health
services: we decided to send our own doctors to care for the volunteers.
?<.
We even promised to discourage vacations in the "fleshpot" cities of the
.%k
world, though many were accessible.
Yet we did not stake the Peace Corps gamble on the power of a few
thousand Americans to accomplish a physical transformation of the
i$
. underdeveloped world. We based our gamble on a conviction that it was
I:'1
B . not muscle power but idea power that changed the world. We did, after
all, have some precedent. Religious movements have long demonstrated
:i
how ideas transform societies. Ideas were the driving force behind the
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, even the Industrial Revolution,
f
movements that gave the West a new, a m o r e dynamic social character.
The idea of the American Revolution, born more than two hundred
years ago, continues to resound with explosive force throughout the world.
1, while
I shall always remember a visit I received in 1ndia in early
'I!
f
'
r
,#
4.
18
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
I was exploring the prospects of sending one of our first contingents for
service there. Ashadevi Aryanayakam, an extraordinary woman who had
been an associate of Mahatma Gandhi, traveled three days and nights
on a train to see me in New Delhi. "Yours was the first revolution," she
reminded me. "Do you think young Americans possess the spiritual values they must have to bring the spirit of that revolution to our country?
India should not boast of any spiritual superiority. There is a great valuelessness spreading around the world. Your Peace Corps volunteers
must bring more than science and technology. They must touch the idealism of America and bring that to us, too. Can they do it?" I was stunned
by the question, but inspired, too. Later, in describing the experience
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I said, "Our answer,
based on faith, was yes."
It reminded me, of course, that an idea, to conquer, must fuse with
the will of men and women who are prepared to dedicate their lives to
its realization. We had a sense twenty-five years ago that there were such
men and women in America waiting to be called, impatient to carry the
idea of service to mankind. As it turned out, I think we underestimated
both their numbers and their dedication. Thousands responded when
we first raised the Peace Corps banner, and thousands have been responding in every succeeding year. Therein lies the true grandeur of
our country.
Since 1961, the Peace Corps has sent more than 120,000 Americans
to serve overseas. They are patriots, committed to the special vision upon
which the Peace Corps was founded, and they have helped to disseminate this vision far and wide. As Americans in service abroad, they have
gone beyond Cold War competition, beyond careerism, beyond fun and.
adventure, to dedicate their best efforts to the idea of raising up humanity. And there could easily have been a quarter-million or a half-million
of them by now, if precious tax dollars had not so often been squandered
on programs of violence, vengeance, and vituperation.
The Peace Corps is unique among American institutions. Though it is
an agency of government, it is profoundly nonpolitical. That does not
mean the Peace Corps is indifferent to the national interests of the United
States. But it was conceived to reach beyond domestic political goals, and
beyond international rivalries, to touch the deepest hopesoofman. Without trumpets, banners, or weapons, the Peace Corps serves America
abroad. It renders this service to our country by promoting an idea of
an America that is caring and humane.
I remember an Asian prime minister many years ago summing up the
vision of the Peace Corps for me, after reminding me that the arrival of
the first twenty-one volunteers in his country had provoked Communist
THE IDEAL
"
.
udently, I asked him whether the protesters thought
were spreading germs. "In a certain sense, yes," he told
olunteers were simply twenty-one more Americans, there
would be no interest in them at all. But these volunteers come representing an idea, the Peace Corps idea. That is why there is opposition."
one Americans were a microcosm. They represented a
1 of the kind of world-a world of commitment to.;freedom, to human well-being, to personal dignity-that we wanted our own
c.hildren, and childr,en everywhere, to live in. That is the message the
-PeaceCorps has carried to foreign lands.
at we wanted to.convey, we made some deliberate choices
he composition of the body of volunteers. What we envi.sioned was a microcosm not s o much of what America was as what we
.&ought it should be. These choices, I am glad to note, have since beof our society. But back then, if I may say so, making
a bit of audacity. We knew that most of our volunteers
college graduates with liberal educations. But we also
ple who were older, more mature, and more experiand we enlisted superb volunteers in their fifties, 'their
sixties, and even in their seventies. More controversial was the decisio-n
e same opportunity 2s men to serve. The conventional
that the Peace. cbrps inevitably had to be a man's world.
uld not be, and since the first days, nearly one out of three
1,unteers has been a woman. The role of the two genders has been
-ce issue, which in
ohesion of our society. We
and other minorities into
ace Corps, but actively to recruit them:And blacks responded to
1. I recall being told the story of four volunteers, living and workther at a small college in Nepal, visited one evening. by a young
who was prepared to denounce the Peace Corps for its Ameriracism. The Marxist, however, could not reconcile his beliefs
.fact that he found one of the four to be black, and a graduate
America's best-universities. T h e volunteers never denied that
cism existed in America, but after several visits, the Marxist was perded that a change in our country was under way.
o me, that story illustrates the new politics which the Peace Corps
ant to represent. The foreign minister of Thailand once told me
onsidered the Peace Corps "the most powerful new force in the world
." In this age when nuclear stalemate and the danger of total devwer and
n limit the use of military power, he said, we must re,
20
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
use a power that often seems to have atrophied from disuse. "The secret
of your greatness," the foreign minister said, "is the power of American
ideas and ideals." It is a secret which, he said, the United States has not
adequately shared with the world. I agree with him. In every country,
we are famous for our bombs, our high-powered technology, our capacity for organization, our wealth. "How many of us in foreign lands," the
foreign minister said, "know that in the United States ideas and ideals
are also powerful?"
I suspect the reason so few people appreciate our ideas and ideals is
that we ourselves fail to understand our potential in this area. As a result, we consistently sell ourselves short. When we hear of a "secret"
American power, our minds seem to turn automatically to killer devices.
It is true that our weapons and our wealth are what is most clearly visible
to the majority of the world. But our real "secret" power, I believe, is the
vitality of our democratic life. I would like to quote David Crozier, who
lost his life in an air accident while serving as a Peace Corps volunteer in
Colombia. In a sadly prophetic letter to his parents, he said, "Should it
come to it, I would rather give my life trying to help someone than to
give my life looking down a gun barrel at him."
How much does the world know notjust of the Peace Corps but of the
great network of our private voluntary agencies, community organizations, labor unions, service clubs, or philanthropies? Do we not fail to
convey our real pride in such federal programs as the TVA, VISTA, the
National Institutes of Health, Social Security, and Head Start, in our
individual liberty, free speech, and free elections? In fact, I think we take
them for granted, leaving the world tao intimidated by the power of our
weapons and insufficiently aware of the power of our democracy. It is
the humanity and concern of our system that the Peace Corps represents.
But let me assert the Peace Corps is no naive organization, aiming to
do good while indifferent to the existence of evil in the world. We know
the United States is involved in a contest of ideologies being waged in
many arenas, not the least of them the underdeveloped nations. The
Peace Corps plays a role in this struggle. But let us be clear that its role
lies not in its solicitation of these nations' support for America's political
positions, much less our alliances. The role lies in the contribution the
Peace Corps makes to their success. If these countries succeed in their
plans for economic, social, and political progress, it will not matter much
whether they agree with us on a given issue, or even whether they like
us, If they become healthy, democratic societies, they will not be a threat
to world peace..That is what matters.
The arena in which the Peace Corps makes its stand for America is in
.IS where a peaceful outcome to the world's ideological struggle
the n
THE IDEAL
21
remains possible. Most of the African continent meets that test, as do
Latin America and East Asia. But I exclude no region of the world. We
must not let our preoccupation with the Cold War and military confrontation blind us to the opportunities waiting for us throughout the globe.
Though the Peace Corps volunteers carry no rifles to battle, they serve
their country on fronts that are vital to the peace of the world. They
serve in the Third World, home for hundreds of millions of people whose
only ideology is to create a decent life for themselves, a life that measures
r~chnesswith dignity, that is free of fear and instability. The time to
reach them is not when military action becomes necessary, when war or
violent revolution is impending. Peace Corps volunteers are not trained
to deal with enemies bearing arms. Their enemies are hunger, ignorance, and disease. By forcing these enemies into retreat, the Peace Corps
serves humanity's interests, and America's.
It seems a paradox to say that Peace Corps volunteers make their contribution to American foreign policy by staying out of the foreign policy
establishment, but it is true. Peace Corps volunteers are not trained diplomats, not propagandists. For the most part, they are not even technical
experts. They represent our society by what they are, what they do, and
the spirit in which they do it. They scrupulously steer clear of intelligence activities and local politics. The Peace Corps' strict adherence to
these principles has been a crucial factor in the decision of politically
uncommitted countries to invite American volunteers into their homes,
and even into their classrooms to teach future generations of national
leadership. In an era of sabotage and espionage, Peace Corps volunteers
have earned a priceless but simple renown: they are trustworthy.
When the Peace Corps goes abroad, it spreads the ideal of a free and
democratic society. Its strategic premise is the sense of concern that every
member has shown by the act of volunteering. The Peace Corps' secret
weapon is example. This example proclaims that in America, the color
of a volunteer's skin, or a human's feligious or political beliefs, do not
rmine personal dignity and worth. We have sent black Americans to
e men's countries, white Americans to black men's countries. We
e told that we could not send Protestants to certain parts of Catholic
ntries in Latin America, and that we could not send Jews to Arab
ntries. But we sent them. Rarely have these decisions spawned disntent. Far more often, they have elicited admiration and, if I may say
even envy. On a practical level, what a volunteer has left behind may
a well, or a proficiency among a few students in English, or a better
to raise corn. But he or she has also left behind the germ of the
e Corps vision, and it is a germ that inevitably spread. I believe
ere are few more important contributions to be made.
We never meant for Peace Corps volunteers to go abroad as pro-
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24
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
fact that answers to its problems are generally much more complex than
they appear at first glance. Those who think there are panaceas for the
ills of emerging nations, who believe all that is needed is more money or
more schools or a few more dams, or even more democracy or more
private enterprise, never served in the Peace Corps. The wisdom that
volunteers brought back with them has added to the reservoir of compassion and understanding in America. I t has provided our nation with
insight into the thinking of the great majority with whom we share the
globe. But Peace Corps volunteers, because they were toilers and notjust
observers, also learned that they need not sit by impotently while others
suffer. That, too, is an important lesson for America.
So, in 1986, we look back across a quarter-century of soul-filled history. We have known the summer heat of the Sahara, the biting cold of
the Alte Plano of Peru, the endless rain of the Asian monsoons. We have
often overcome the obstacles of the federal bureaucracy, only to stumble
over our own mistakes. But we have survived, and precious gifts have
been bestowed upon us. We have seen the smile on the face of a child
whom a volunteer has taught to read. We have been grateful that a volunteer has had a hand in building a feeder road, establishing a credit
union, forming a cooperative for buying a tractor or marketing fish. We
have marveled at the energy of a people in a dusty village after a volunteer has persuaded them to lift the dead hand of hopelessness.
In twenty-five years, the Peace Corps has made a start. The idea is in
the air, a seed being carried on the breeze of human contact to people
and institutions throughout the world. I do not know how many converts the Peace Corps has made, but I would like to think it has dealt a
solid blow to ignorance and hunger. I want to believe it has moved human dignity to a higher plane. I pray it has moved peace a trifle clber,
while chasing the shadow of nuclear war to a more distant reach.
Regretfully, I acknowledge it will require more time and still greater
effort for the vision of the Peace Corps to win the world. That a pugnacious nationalism seems once again to be sweeping over our country does
not so much mean that the Peace Corps has failed as that it has not tried
hard enough. I know that, even in its brief life, the Peace Corps has
emitted a glow, faint though it may be, that has helped light the way to
a better and more peaceful life over a great area of the earth's surface.
I take its triumphs, however, not as a cause for congratulation, but as a
challenge. After twenty-five years, the task ahead is clear: to bring the
Peace Corps and its ideals back to the top of America's agenda.
Passing the Torch
by Alan Guskin
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When my wife, Judith, and I think about the letter we wrote that began
the student Peace Corps movement, it still surprises us. We were not
letter writers, nor were we even student activists on the University of
Michigan campus. But thewwe were in the basement of a greasy-spoon
restaurant, composing on a napkin a letter to the editor of the Michigan
Daily that expressed our personal commitment to serve and that urged
others to do the same.
As we began to write the letter,.we thought about what ~ o h nKennedy
had said and what Chester Bowles (Kennedy's foreign policy adviser and,
later, his undersecretary of state) had more or less repeated on our campus. We had been only two out of the ten thousand students who had
heard Kennedy at, 2:00 A.M. on that chilly fall night of October 14, 1960,
. and had joined five hundred students who had heard Bowles a few days
later. We wrote the letter wondering whether others felt as excited as we
did about the idea. We ourselves had not seriously thought of serving
abroad before that week, and we did not know anyone who had done
so. Yet Kennedy had inspired us, and we were ready to make a commitment. Perhaps others were, too. still, we never expected what was about
to happen.
John Kennedy had come to the Michigan Union to get a good night's
sleep, not.to propose the Peace Corps. He had just concluded the third
debate with Richard Nixon and was about to begin a hectic whistle-stop
tour of the state the next day. He was said to have been surprised by the
crowd and did not have a prepared speech. The press, having been told
nothing was going to happen, had gone to bed. No major newspaper or
wire service reported his remarks. Yet what he said touched deeply many
of the students who waited for him, and especially the two of US.
y
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Alan GzlsRin is president of Antioch University.
or
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26
THE IDEAL
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
Why would ten thousand students wait until two in the morning to
hear a few words from a presidential candidate? Curiosity has its limit,
usually about midnight on a cold night. T o understand why we waited
to hear Kennedy, and the response that followed his talk, it is important
to look at the world of twenty-five years ago through student eyes.
There was excitement surrounding the presidential campaign of 1960.
It was not so much the issues discussed-proposals on the Cold War and
the arms race conveyed little excitement-as a feeling that students had
a role to play, that the torch was, indeed, being passed to a new generation. Change was in the air, and students at Michigan and elsewhere
sensed that they were to play an increasing role in making it happen.
The. civil rights movement, begun in the South, was advancing to campuses in the North. Students were organizing politically to influence their
,
were collecting canned food to
own education. In Ann ~ r b o rstudents
send to a tent city, picketing local stores of national chains that didn't
serve blacks, creating a student political party called Voice, and planning
a major conference on the state of the university.
Most significantly, John Kennedy's words that early morning seemed
to present to students on our campus a way to live our idealism, an opportunity to commit ourselves to the service of others. When Chester
Bowles, probably unaware of what Kennedy had said a few days earlier,
described how his son and daughter-in-law were serving in an African
village, he inadvertently triggered a ground swell of enthusiasm among
his restless listeners. What he described was much like what would later
be the Peace Corps.
Bowles had given substance to the idea that Kennedy introduced. There
were, indeed, people intheir twenties living and working in Africa. If
they could do this, why couldn't we? Maybe we could make a difference,
not only by contributing to economic development but also by helping
to create world conditions that could lead to peace and disarmament.
After exciting discussions with some of the students in the room where
Bowles had just spoken, Judith and I sat down to write our letter. It
appeared in the Michigan Daily on October 21, 1960:
. . . Representative Chester Bowles and Senator Kennedy in speeches to
the students of the University of Michigan both emphasized that disarmament and peace lie. to a very great extent in our hands and requested our
participation throughout the world as necessary for the realization of these
goals.
In reply to this urgent request, we both hereby state that we would devote a number of years to work in countries where our help is needed. . . .
We also would like to request that all students who feel that they would
like Yelp the cause of world peace by direct participation send a letter
to ti. .,aper andlor our address. These letters will be forwarded to Ken-
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27
nedy and Bowles as an answer of the students of the University of Michigan to their plea for help. If it is at all possible, we would like students to
start asking others in their classes, dorms, sororities, fraternities, houses,
etc. to send letters expressing their desire to work toward these goals. We
also request that those who have friends at other universities write to them
asking them to start similar action on their campuses.
With this request we express our faith that those of us who have been
fortunate enough to receive an education will want to apply their knowledge through direct participation in the underdeveloped communities of
the world.
The campus was energized overnight. T h e phone in our apartment
rang constantly, spontaneous discussions dominated the campus, and we
did what we could to organize response. We founded a group called
Americans Committed to World Responsibility. In less than two weeks,
eight hundred students had signed petitions committing themselves to
spend several years of their lives serving in developing countries, most
of them students who had never previously been involved in campus
activism of any kind.
The organizing group sensed that this was a rare moment in which.
students could have a considerable impact on the formation of a major
governmental program. We were. right. Millie Jeffrey, a union official
who was Kennedy's campaign director in Michigan, heard about the enthusiasm of the students and contacted Ted Sorensen, Kennedy's chief
aide and speech writer. Sorensen talked to Kennedy, and a few days
before the election, the candidate-describing the response on the Michigan campus-proposed the Peace Corps in a major speech in San Francisco's Cow Palace.
The next day, we were part of a small group that met with Kennedy
at the Toledo airport. When Kennedy was challenged about his intentions on the Peace Corps, he answered, "Until Tuesday [Election Day]
let us be concerned with this country. After Tuesday, the world."
For us, it was an intoxicating three weeks from Kennedy's speech on
campus to the promise of the Peace Corps. Meanwhile, information was
pouring into Michigan-and Washington-about student excitement
elsewhere. We received petitions from students at Antioch, heard of activity at Princeton and Harvard. T h e two of us gave speeches on other
campuses. On December 9th and loth, our group in Ann Arbor held
what would later be called a teach-in, in which students and faculty
members discussed the potential *ark of the Peace Corps. T h e conference organized ongoing seminars, to prepare papers on the Corps' potential requirements. Their work b$came a report that later sL ~ e the
d
agenda of a national conference.
Still, we worried that Kennedy might renege on his promise, so we
28
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
decided to go to Washington for a conference on economic development. We met with Phil Hart, a sympathetic senator from Michigan, who
disappointed us by saying he could not publicly support the Peace Corps
without Kennedy's endorsement. The next day, however, The Washington Post reported that Hart was urging creation of a Peace Corps. Our
disappointment turned to elation!
At the conference itself, we found skepticism about the willingness of
American youth to serve in the Peace Corps. Convinced that the passivity of college students that had characterized the 1950s was still with us,
the panelists urged a small, limited, experimental effort. I challenged
those present with the evidence of the previous two months. Students
were willing to serve,I argued, and were committed to aiding the developing world. Mrs. Chester Bowles came up to us after the session and
spoke fondly of the work done by her son and daughter-in-law in Africa.
In Washington, we also learned of a group at American University
that wanted to run a national conference o,n the Peace Corps. Here was
an opportunity to have collaborators, resources, and a Washington site.
The conference took place in March 1961, a few days after Kennedy
created the Peace corps by Executive Order 10924. Its sponsors were
our Michigan group, the students at American University, and the National Student ~ssociation.Representatives from some four hundred
universities attended.
Senator Hubert Humphrey, generally considered the father of Peace
Corps legislation, delivered a forty-five-minute extemporaneous talk.
Sargent Shriver gave his first public speech as Peace Corps director.
The conference, originally planned to lobby the president and Congress to establish the Peace Corps, becake a major national meeting to
demonstrate the depth of student commitment to Peace Corps service.
The Washington meeting was followed by many others like it around
the country. In the months that followed,' the Kennedy administration
was deluged with offers from tens of thousands of young people who
wanted to serve in the Peace Corps.
Why did this happen? The 1960s was a time in which students like us
were consumed with concern for social values, as well as strategies for
change. We were determined not just to participate, but to have an impact on the events that affected our lives. When Kennedy came to Michigan on that night in. 1960, the message he left behind was that young
people could make a difference in helping to create a better and more
peaceful world. He told us we had skills that were useful and ideals that
could serve the future of our country. We responded.
Kennedy was forty-two at the time, and many of his advisers, including those involved in planning the Peace Corps,. were even younger.
THE IDEAL
29
Around the world, young leaders, having fought for independence, were
taking on the responsibilities of government in more than forty new nations. At home, young men and women were leading the confrontation
with racial discrimination, the most critical domestic issue of our time.
The older generation in America had not done very well on this issue,
and on others related to questions of war and peace. Kennedy wanted a
new beginning for the United States, and we wanted to help him.
That was twenty-five years ago, and in retrospect we are said to have
been a generation that was uniquely idealistic, self-sacrificing, active. Today's young Americans are often described as materialistic, asking not
what they can contribute to society but what they can get from it. Judith
and I sometimes have to remind ourselves that in the 1950s, on the eve
of the Kennedy era, our generation, too, was described as passive and
self-centered. What explains the fact that the Peace Corps is still alive
and well, that thousands of Americans continue to volunteer for service
every year? How bad, how indifferent to others and to their countries
can this generation be? Has it lost all sense of service? Perhaps, like ours,
it is waiting only to be asked.
In the summer of 1961, the two of us were invited to serve as Peace
Corps selection officers in the headquarters in Washington. Shortly
thereafter, we volunteered to serve in Thailand and entered a training
program. On January 18, 1962, we left with the first group of volunteers
for Thailand. We served for two and one-half years as teachers at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. These were among the most gratifying years of our lives.
THE IDEAL
LBJ and the Bureaucrats
by Bill Moy ers
When the Peace Corps was about to be enacted back in 1961, the oldline employees of State and AID coveted it greatly. It was a natural instinct: established bureaucracies do not like competition from new people. There was another, slightly more idealistic, if still myopic reason:
folks who had been presiding over foreign aid all those years simply
thought they knew'best how to do it, and they pooh-poohed the idea
that volunteers could contribute to a field which had been dominated by
professionals.
This was, of course, the fundamental fallacy in their perception of the
Peace Corps. It was not to be economic assistance in the traditional sense.
Money and goods were not to change hands. The Peace Corps wasn't
even to be "technical assistance" in the way the term was used by the
experts. It was to be a sharing of people. Their experiences, talents,
personalities, and eventual contributidns were so diverse that to shoehorn them into the existing job descriptions-which the bureaucracy
wanted to do-would be to diminish, tame, and finally extinguish the
purpose and enduring value of the program.
The very idea of the Peace Corps thus scared the traditional managers
of the foreign assistance sector of government. But they couldn't oppose
the Peace Corps outright because it had such high visibility with the new
President, So they did the next best thing: they sought to absorb it. The
result, we knew, would be anonymity for an organization that needed to
be publicly conspicuous to attract and excite volunteers, and stifling regulation of an idea whose great virtue was that it was by the government
but not for the government. We could not, or so it seemed to us, pour
new wine into an old bottle.
By "we," I mean Sargent Shriver, myself, and our colleagues. I was
Bill Moyers is a commentator for CBS News in New York.
30
31
then working with them in establishing the Peace Corps, having left the
service of my mentor and friend, Lyndon B. Johnson. It occurred to me
that we should seek the counsel of the new Vice President, who had not
only had long experience combating the Washington bureaucracy, but
as a young man had been a director of a program not unlike the Peace
Corps-the New Deal's youth corps. Shriver and I called upon him. His
argument went like this:
"Boys, this town is full of folks who believe the only way to do something is their way. That's especially true in diplomacy and things like
that, because they work with foreign governments and protocol is oh-somighty-important to them, with guidebooks and rulebooks and do's-anddon'ts to keep you from offending someone. You put the Peace Corps
into the foreign service and they'll put striped pants on your people
when all you want them to have is a knapsack and a tool kit and a lot of
imagination. And they'll give you a hundred and one reasons why it
won't work every time you want to do something different or they'll try
to pair it with some program that's already working and you'll get associated with operations that already have provoked a suspicious reputation, and the people you want to work with abroad will raise their eyebrows and wonder if you're trying to spy on them or convert them. Besides,
you don't have money to give out and all these other programs do, so
you'll get treated like the orphan in a big family where your prestige
depends upon your budget. And to top it off, they'll take your volunteers and make them GS ones and twos and you'll send little government
employees marching off into the villages over there when you want those
countries to accept you as American citizens and not employees of the
secretary of state. And most important of all if you want to recruit the
kind of people I think you want, you're going to have to ask them to do
something for their country and not for AID or State.
"This boy here"-he was referring to me-"cajoled and begged and
pleaded and connived and threatened and politicked to leave me to go
to work for the Peace Corps. For the life of me I can't imagine him doing
that to go to work for the foreign aid program. And I don't think your
folks are going to write home and tell their mom and dad that they're
giving up two years of their lives for the Agency for International Development.
"Earl Rudder [then president of Texas A&M] commanded the Rangers at Normandy-toughest little fightin' bunch in the war. He took a
mess of gangly little country boys and turned 'em into the damnedest
crowd Eisenhower let loose that day. Now, there had been a big argument in training over whether they were part of the r e p ' - - forces or
and they
not, but 01' Earl told 'em they were an army unto themsel
32
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
believed it. And I'll tell you this-when they went up those cliffs and
through those hedgerows like Indians after my grandpa Baines' scalp, it
wasn't for' Eisenhower and it wasn't for Marshall and it wasn't for the
Joi,nt Chiefs of Staff-it was for Earl Rudder and glory,
"And if you want the Peace Corps to work, friends, you'll keep it away
from the folks downtown who want it to be just another box in an organizational chart, reportin' to a third assistant director of personnel for
the State Department. Who's your boss in this town is important, and as
much as I like Dean Rusk, do you think he's going to have time to give
to Shriver here when he has a problem that has to be worked out? Hell,
he has to worry about the Russians and the Chinese and Charles de
Gaulle. You'll wind up seeing his deputy's deputy. And who the hell is
going to volunteer to go to Nigeria for the second deputy secretary of
state? Who the hell is the second deputy secretary of state, anyway?"
Well, LBJ loved hyperbole, but his point was not lost on us. And he
felt so keenly about it that he later personally called JFK and implored
him to keep the Peace Corps separate and apart, with a life and identity
of its own. T h e rest is history.
By all of this, I ' d o not mean to disparage our foreign assistance program or our diplomatic force. At its best, foreign aid has also expressed
the magnanimity of the American people. But the Peace Corps is to the
American government what the Franciscans in their prime were to the
Roman Catholic Church-a remarkable manifestation of a spirit too particular and personal to be contained by an ecclesiastic (read: bureaucratic) organization. It is not like anything else.
The Mystique
From the beginning, America has been a sort of comic her-young,
idealistic, friendly, full of curiosity, ready for adventure, ripe for disappointment, never daunted. With self-government their self-proclaimed
purpose and pioneering their way of life, the first Americans took the
world by surprise. So did the first Peace Corps volunteers.
From Pocahontas and the presentation of the first pipe of tobacco to
Queen Elizabeth I to Lindbergh's solo flight to Paris, the Old World has
been fascinated by the bold ambitions, naive enthusiasm, and brash innocence of the new Americans. When Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, the band played, "The World Turned Upside Down." So America
again intrigued the world by founding the Peace Corps.
At the beginning, however, President Kennedy took heat from critics
of the new venture. It hurt politically to have his immensely popular
predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, ridicule it as a "Kiddie Corps." A respected career diplomat, Ellis 0. Briggs, called the Peace Corps a movement "wrapped in a pinafore of publicity, whose team cry is: 'Yoo-hoo,
yoo-hoo! Let's go out and wreak some good on some natives!' " One can
be armed with a comic spirit and still not enjoy being laughed at. Yet
Kennedy went ahead with the plan, and the President's presumption
proved to be prophetic. As one of the first volunteers put it: "I'd never
done anything political, patriotic, or unselfish because nobody ever asked
me to. Kennedy asked."
To present the Peace Corps as "comic" is not to demean it. The category in which the Peace Corps experience falls is neither farce nor is it
at the level of Dante's high comedy about man's spiritual destiny. It is
comedy of the human kind, from which one laughs and learns. A comic
Harris Wofford is counsel at Schnader, Harrison, Segat and Lewis in PI
the author of Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties.
~Iphiaand
34
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
hero may fall on his face, but the complications and contradictions that
trip him can be both entertaining and instructive.
The peace' Corps is "comic" in the spirit of Mark Twain, and just as
American. Like Huck Finn and Jim rafting down the Mississippi, Peace
Corps volunteers were being sent down larger rivers to deal with dangers more complicated than rattlesnakes.
On March 1, 1961, the President signed an executive order establishing the Peace Corps on a trial basis, a bold step in the absence of any
congressional authorization. More than 25,000 people had already asked
for applications. Congressional hearings on the proposed new program
were soon to begin. But no clear-cut requests for volunteers had yet
come from any country. Shriver and the President would surely fall on
their faces .if volunteers were ready with no place to go.
So Shriver went to talk'with some heads of state. As President Kennedy's special assistant for civil rights, I was lucky enough to go along on
an expedition to Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, and
the Philippines. The most crucial moments of that seven-country "fishing trip" were Shriver's meetings with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and
Jawaharlal Nehru of India, two leaders of the Third World whose reaction could open o r close the doors in many countries.
"We've come to listen and learn," Shriver said upon landing in Accra.
This was a good note to strike with Nkrumah, a graduate of Lincoln
University in Pennsylvania, who wanted to lecture Shriver on American
shortcomings, some of which he had experienced firsthand in the days
when Jim Crow practices prevailed in much of our country.
After some suspense, Nkrumah's response to the Peace Corps was affirmative, with qualifications. In more or less these words, he said:
Powerful radiation is going out from America to all the world, much of
it harmful, some of it innocuous, some beneficial. Africans have to be careful and make the right distinctions, so as to refuse the bad rays and welcome the good. The CIA is a dangerous beam that should be resisted.
From what you have said, Mr. Shriver, the Peace Corps sounds good. We
are ready to try it, and will invite a small number of teachers. We could
use some plumbers and electricians, too. Can you get them here by August?
The Peace Corps had at last been invited, in person, by a head of statel
Shriver vowed that he would break the bureaucratic bottlenecks that had
slowed transmission in most U.S. aid programs and left expectant countries waiting for a year or more. T h e volunteers would be there by August.
Then Nkrumah teased Shriver: Why just one-way traffic? Didn't he
want some young Ghanaians to volunteer for service to America? In the
same half-serious spirit, Shriver said yes, he would welcome and find
worthwhile assignments for some volunteers from Ghana. That pitch for
reciprocity was repeated by others we met on the trip, and planted the
seed for a small experiment a few years later, a reverse Peace Corps of
volunteers to America. But that is another story, as is the fall of Nkrumah, who was overthrown in 1966 by a military coup that he charged
was aided and abetted by the CIA.
In New Delhi, with his customary red rose in his lapel, Nehru created
a different kind of suspense: he seemed almost to fall asleep while Shriver
talked. But then he roused himself and said:
For thousands of years outsiders have been corning to India, some of
them as invaders, sweeping down the plains of the Punjab to the Ganges.
Many of them stayed and were assimilated. Others went home, leaving
India more or less the same as it was before they came, India has usually
been hospitable to these strangers, having confidence that its culture would
survive, and that it had much to teach the newcomers.
In matters of the spirit, I am sure young Americans would learn a good
deal in this country and it could be an important experience for them. We
will be happy to receive a few of them-perhaps twenty to twenty-five. But
I hope you and they will not be too disappointed if the Punjab, when they
leave, is more or less the same as it was before they came.
t
1
'
Though the words were patronizing, this was the green light the Peace
Corps needed. Even more significantly, Nehru's approval was an encouraging signal to countries of the nonaligned Third World.
I,
:
-
In the fall of 1962, when 225 volunteers stepped out of three planes
at the Addis Ababa airport, the Ethiopian minister of education said, "I
haven't seen anything like this since the Italian invasion." The volunteers
were the first of 500 invited by Emperor Haile Selassie to teach in all the
high schools of that spectacularly stark and beautiful mountain country.
They were the largest contingent to go to one country at one time. In
a single swoop they doubled the number of college-educated high school
teachers in Ethiopia and enabled thousands of additional students to be
admitted to studies in the fall. Having resigned from the White House a
few months earlier to become the Peace Corps' special representative to
Africa and director of the Ethiopian program, I was there to welcome
them.
I was also drawn by the unique challenge of the Peace Corps. After
the adventure of organizing the Peace Corps' African programs in Togo
Buildand Nyasaland (now Malawi), my desk in the old Executive 0'
36
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
ing never seemed quite the same. President Kennedy appeared to appreciate my work in the White House, where I served both as advocate
for civil rights and buffer against some of the pressure of the civil rights
movement, but I wanted to work on the larger frontier of world integration. Though he had sired the Peace Corps, Kennedy seemed puzzled
by its peculiar appeal. Even in giving permission for me to accept the
Peace Corps post, he asked, "Wouldn't you rather go out as an ambassador?"
We staff members were ambassadors of sorts, as were the volunteers.
Open sewers openly arrived at were the first sight to strike the new Peace
Corps contingent in Ethiopia as we were bused to the Imperial Palace.
Th,e second was the gorgeous mountain scenery.
Fortunately, no one described the scene on a postcard. By now, every
volunteer knew what had befallen Margery Michelmore, the magna cum
laude graduate of Smith College who was expelled from Nigeria for writing an indiscreet postcard home. (When President Kennedy bid goodbye to me, he said, "Keep in touch-but not by postcard!") A somber
section of the Peace Corps Handbook, entitled "Living in a Goldfish Bowl,"
had warned volunteers: "You never will have real privacy. . . . Your
every action will be watched, weighed and considered representative of
the entire Peace Corps." One earnest volunteer teacher, sensing her full
ambassadorial responsibility, took as her cautious motto: "Don't smile till
Christmas."
Most volunteers, however, smiled soon and often-including at
Christmas, when they were invited to visit the emperor to sing carols,
During the visit, Haile Selassie told them he had favorable reports on
their work from every province and said he had visited the classrooms
of a number of Peace Corps teachers. He seemed to enjoy the informality of the volunteers, and at the Christmas party he got a taste of the
rambunctiousness of the children of Peace Corps staff. As our own threeyear-old son chased a tiny imperial Pekingese between the aging autocrat's legs, the amused emperor said, "If you help us to do away with
some of our unnecessary protocol, that will be another of your contributions to my country."
Indeed, the volunteers' contributions were many, in the classrooms
and in their communities, though in the schools, ironically, their friendly
informality was not as well received as in the Imperial Palace. Teachers
complained that the Peace Corps style undermined traditional authority,
and students, too, were at first disconcerted. Headmasters warned volunteers to wear ties, not sit on desks, and keep their distance from the
students after school. "We want to bring the young up to our standards,
not lower ourselves to theirs," was one frequent refrain from Ethiopian
educatc-- Ethiopians, as well as the many Indians in the teaching force,
.:k%
envied the freedom of the volunteers, who were not dependent upon
their jobs for their future livelihood. Within limits, the Americans could
say what they wanted to say and do more than the career teachers dared
to do-or wanted to do. Moreover, with only two years to serve, the
volunteers had more reason than lifelong career teachers to exert themselves and try to make their marks in a hurry.
Some of these marks were, of course, intangible, while others could be
observed and measured, Ethiopia's choice of English as its language for
all higher education made it essential to have teachers whose mother
tongue was English. The Peace Corps provided a massive infusion of
such teachers, and the students' level of proficiency in English, as measured in both tests and conversation, soared.
Another bottleneck to Ethiopian educational development that 'volunteers helped break was the centralization of teaching resources. T h e
best schools were located in Addis Ababa, the capital, and ~ t h i o ~ i and
an
Indian teachers generally considered provincial assignments a purgatory from which they hoped to escape. Peace Corps volunteers, on the
other hand, usually sought to go to the most arduous outlying posts.
With more than three-fourths of the volunteers teaching in provincial
schools, where they often constituted about half the staff, the,y brought
about a rapid broadening of Ethiopia's educational base. This conveyed
prestige to the provincial schools, which in turn made them more attractive to Ethiopian teachers.
Outside the classroom, the volunteers were no less audacious in shaking up the traditional school system. Before long, in schools that had
previously had almost no extracurricular life, student newspapers, forums, debating societies, drama clubs, glee clubs, handicrafts, scouting,
and many kinds of sports were under way. Volunteers taught night courses
for adults, especially English for the elementary school teachers. In one
town, volunteers advertised courses by beating drums in the marketplace.
In the provincial capital of Dese, U.S./AID had sent the school violins,
cellos, clarinets, saxophones, trumpets, trombones, and drums, along with
a piano and a record player, but before the Peace Corps, there were no
music books and no music teacher. Two volunteers organized a music
program for hundreds of students. Soon, amidst excitement in the school
and town, the forty-member Dese marching band, with uniforms donated from the United States, was called to play before the emperor on
his birthday. T h e school's pop orchestra, featuring Ethiopian songs, was
called to Addis Ababa for national holidays. Soon, a Peace Corps volunteer far to the south at Harar entered the competition, organizing the
loudest student band that side of the Nile.
In another provincial capital, volunteers forcibly broke a lolilitm in the
38
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
distribution of textbooks, which a custodian kept hidden in the school
warehouse "to keep down wear and tear." Each year, the custodian proudly
reported that not a single book had been lost, damaged, or destroyed.
Almost everywhere, in fact, local school librarians made their lives easier
by refusing to lend books, or by keeping the libraries closed most of the
time. In most provinces, volunteers fought the "battle of the books" diplomatically, but in Debre Markos, they actually stormed through the
warehouse door and seized the books for distribution.
In the little town of Ghion, an independent-minded volunteer named
Paul Tsongas-who was later to become a U.S. senator-rented an Ethiopian-style house and invited some of his students to move in. Coming
from villages miles away from the town, from which they had commuted
every day on foot, many did. Later, Tsongas enlisted a brigade of students to work with him in building a hostel-a one-story dormitory with
electric lights that allowed the students to do their homework at night.
It became a showpiece of the town and of the Peace Corps, and in due
course received a visit and an enthusiastic blessing from the emperor.
The presence of women among the volunteers-more than one out of
three of the original contingent-provided an even greater challenge to
local traditions. Before the Peace Corps came, virtually no women taught
in provincial schools, and Ethiopians could not understand why a young
woman would come so far from home to live in a foreign land. They
suspected the worst. Faced for the first time with female teachers, boys
would grumble that a woman's place was in the home, and then (sometimes) flock to their classes. When a particularly attractive volunteer offered an additional course in French,-she was overwhelmed by three
hundred eager male applicants. Some Ethiopian male teachers found it
difficult to maintain a friendship with Peace Corps women that did not
include sex, and unpleasant incidents occurred more than once. But the
volunteers held their own, and not one woman quit because of these
difficulties.
In fact, after the early problems of adjustment, women volunteers
usually earned the respect of their Ethiopian colleagues and students.
They took special satisfaction in the influence they had on female Ethiopians, many of whom had never imagined, much less seen, independent women.
Often the triumphs were as simple as that. In fact, what most irked
volunteers was the overblown publicity in the United States about their
hardships and "sacrifices," as well as the exaggerated accounts that were
published about their allegedly exotic experiences and dramatic successes. The story that ought to be told about them, one volunteer wrote,
was "not of high adventure a la Conrad or Saint-ExupCry-but of dullness." , said volunteers needed a "philosophy which will satisfy our
THE IDEAL
39
craving for accomplishment and a certain nobility, while we are faced
with tedium, fatigue and the desire to sit down and dream."
Yet there were exotic-and comic-moments:
A volunteer who taught school in the port of Mesewa on the Red
Sea lived on a houseboat and was awakened every night by the mullahs
calling the faithful to prayer. During the day, he endured the camels
that poked into his classroom their not-very-intellectual noses, which
he would push out the window with a broom.
Far to the south, at the opposite end of the empire, a volunteer
and staff member were driving a jeep that hit and killed a female camel,
forcing them to flee angry Somali nomads who chased them with spears.
Later, they settled their liability for $100.
As Washington headquarters cut down the number of Peace Corps
jeeps, in response to Congressman Otto Passman's goading of Shriver
about "those blue jeeps roaming the roads of Africa," volunteers turned
to other modes of transportation. Once Shriver told this fabled
congressional penny-pincher: "I'm happy to report, Congressman, that
the donkeys are up and the jeeps are down."
Five volunteers in the northern province of Eritrea nearly died when
they drove a Peace Corps jeep down to the sea for a three-day vacation.
After a wrong turn and two flat tires, they found themselves marooned, fifty miles from the nearest village. With a pint of water, a
peanut butter sandwich, and jovial recollections of Lawrence of Arabia,
two of them set out for help. After walking all day and most of the
night, they collapsed in the next day's noon sun. A Bedouin finally
came to the rescue, with some sour milk from his goatskin bag.
One volunteer got caught up in a dubious project started as a semijocular proposal when he was driving Shriver around Addis Ababa.
Pointing out the confusion caused by the lack of street signs, he boasted
to his VIP visitor, "We could make and put up signs in a week." Hearing about the boast, the mayor assigned the volunteer a crew of city
workers and told him to go ahead. It took longer than expected, since
they had to wait until the city named some of the streets.
A more presumptuous project-my own-took the Peace Corps to
the edge of the politically permissible in that feudal society. We knew
the emperor was being pulled in two opposite directions. Younger
Ethiopians were urging him to move faster with reform; the old guard
was warning him to go slow. T h e Peace Corps itself was a point at issue.
Several of the largest provincial landholders were arguing that the volunteers, by both word and example, were making students dangerously
restive. Haile Selassie's better judgment pointed toward reform, and so
did many of his statements, but his actions were ambigu
After an attempted coup in 1961, the emperor had apyAoveda five-
40
MAKING A DIFFERENCE
year plan to secure "the advance of our Nation at the fastest possible
rate." The programs in that plan-such as universal public education"are in themselves revolutionary," he said. When the volunteers arrived, they were given the five-year plan, which they considered an
eloquent document. But they soon discovered that almost no Ethiopians had ever read it.
The problem was that it had been printed in very limited numbers.
When we proposed to the Ministry of Education that it be adopted as
a text in English classes, the Ministry approved, on the condition that
the Peace Corps reproduce and distribute it. We did, and soon thousands of copies were being read and discussed by students in nearly
every province.
Later, Ethiopian friends-some of them in very high places-urged
me to exploit the special non-diplomatic status of the Peace Corps to
reach the emperor and encourage him to move faster with reform. So,
as our two-year term was coming to an end, I included in my formal
report on the experience a section entitled "The Emergency," which I
wrote with the emperor very much in mind.
A "state of ~ m e r g e n c. ~. . exists in any country where there is one
child without a school or without a teacher or without a textbook," I
wrote. The report then went on:
The Peace Corps was created as an instrument to help interested countries
meet this Emergency. It was not designed as a token for countries wishing
to give merely the appearance of pr6gress-for countries not prepared to
move at the emergency pace required. . . . With millions of children requiring education, a few hundred teachirs is a drop in the bucket of Ethiopia's nedds. But if the.dropping of several hundred American teachers out
of the sky becomes the occasion for a far better and massive training and
utilization of Ethiopia's own manpower, if the coming of the Peace Corps
causes or encourages Ethiopia to double and triple the number of teachers
and students each year, then we will have contributed to meeting the greatest
need of Ethiopia.
Later, without comment, the emperor thanked me for the Teport, but
on only one front did he take any new action that could be viewed as a
response. He endorsed the idea of organizing a domestic counterpart of
the Peace Corps to work in the Ethiopian provinces. "If Americans can
come all this way to teach and work in our most difficult areas," Haile
Selassie remarked to me in one of our last meetings, "how can Ethiopians not do so?" Soon the university was to require Ethiopian students, as
a condition for a degree, to serve for a year as teachers in provincial
schools. For many of us, the farmation of the Ethiopian University Ser-
THE IDEAL
41
vice was the high point in the saga, to paraphrase Mark Twain, of the
volunteer Yankees in Haile Selassie's court.
It should be added, though, that these ~ t h i o ~ i students,
an
radicalized
in the countryside, were to play a significant part in the emperor's overthrow a decade later. As I flew out of Ethiopia in 1964, I knew that the
students whom Peace Corps volunteers had taught, and the studentteachers in the countryside, were impatient and restless. But no one foresaw the kind of revolution that was to come in the next decade.
The Peace Corps survived and even thrived in Ethiopia for a few years
after we left. New volunteers came to add to the group, and to replace
departing members. Each new arrival was invited to the Imperial Palace
and personally welcomed by. Haile Selassie.
But the day came when Haile Selassie, by then almost alone in his
palace with his tame lions and his tiny Pekingese, was driven away to a
dungeon and to death. Thousands of the students whom our volunteers
had taught were also to die. So did other friends and colleagues, including the minister of education, the mayor of ~ d d i Ababa
s
and the president of the university, who launched the program to send students to
work in the countryside.
That was a long time ago and in another country. Years later, Senator
Paul Tsongas revisited Ethiopia to talk with the head of the revolutionary military government. When he returned to the town where he had
taught and had built a hostel, he found few traces of his work. Late at
night in his hotel in Addis Ababa, however, there was a knock on the
door. Two of his former students were there to tell him how much .he
had meant to them.
By 1977, when the Peace Corps was forced to withdraw, more than
three thousand volunteers had served in Ethiopia. When the former volunteers meet, as they do, they remember small lessons learned and large
hopes. But no one can measure how much their teaching and friendship
meant to a half-milliori or more young Ethiopians-or when the seeds
of self-government that they planted will mature and flower. There is
no telling what Americans will discover through the Peace Corps. But
through the men and women who have served, the world has been rediscovering the mystique of America.
THE IDEAL
tune which brought my name to your attention from among the many
who could just as easily have been cited. Now it is my duty to respond,
and I can think of no better way than to tell you more about the people
and place you spoke of. Forgive my presumption in assuming you might
have time to glance through the story. T h e main reason for telling it to
you is that it has taught me something about Communism and the role
of my country in the world. . . . I have been accused by the socialist
press in the most widely circulated newspaper in Chile of deluding you.
Here is my translation of excerpts from the article.
An Exchange Between
President ~ & n e and
d ~
Tom Scanlon
BEATNIK YANKEE SCARES KENNEDY WITH HIS STORIES OF
INDIANS IN CHILE
Tom Scanlon is a Yankee youth of twenty-three years. He ought to have
hair the color of carrots, freckled skin, drink a lot of milk, a shot of whiskey now and then, and chew one Chicklet after another. In his ranch, he
never missed a television program. He likes the ones with lots of redskins.
Now Tom is in Chile. They sent him with the Peace Corps, telling him
that they were modern Boy Scouts, young kids who had to act among the
Indians and the Communists in Latin America. Tom told President Kennedy about his adventures. They're the same as he saw in the television
programs. The grave thing is that a President of one of the largest nations
in the world has believed the story of Indians and villages buried in the
snow. In what television program did Tom see all this? . . .
President Kennedy, in a speech, June 20, 1962:
Recently I heard a story of a young Peace Corpsman named Tom
Scanlon, who is working in Chile. He works in a village about forty miles
from an Indian village which prides itself on being Communist. The
village is up a long, winding road which Scanlon has taken on many
occasions to see the chief, Each time the chief avoided seeing him. Finally he saw him and said, "You are not going to talk us out of being
Communists." Scanlon said, "I am not trying to do that, only to talk to
you about how I can help." T h e chief looked at him and replied, "In a
few weeks the snow will come. Then you will have to park your jeep
twenty miles from here and come through five feet of snow on foot. The
Communists are willing to do that. Are you?" When a friend saw Scanlon
recently and asked him what he was doing, he said, "I am waiting for
the snow."
Scanlon, in a letter dated July 14, 1962:
It was a great surprise for me to hear that you had singled me out for
my spirit. of dedication. I am certain that in many parts of the everincreasing sphere which the Peace Corps encompasses there are many
who have had their dedication tested more than I. I have yet to be sick,
whereas one-fourth of our group has had hepatitis. My living conditions
are clean and comfortable, and I am sure that in other continents, such
as Africa, the daily circumstances of life are much more difficult than
they are in Chile.
Your mention was an undeserved honor involving a flash of kind forTom Scmlon is president of Benchmarks, Inc., i n Washington, D.C.
42
43
I
The conclusions to the story have to do with the rivalry which now
exists between the United States and Communism in these Latin American countries. My experience tells me that Latin America has more to
gain by working with us. T h e Communist solution is a political one, and
it must be presented as the political system to end all systems to a people
whose natural propensity is to make one political experiment after another. Ours is more social and economic-going directly to the real
problems of the people. Our solution is not a political theory which must
wait to be applied, but a stimulus to processes which should begin without delay.
I am jealous, Mr. President, of our country's right to be considered a
leader in the world's struggle for development. Perhaps it is a youthful
idealism to imagine that our whole nation would act in a humanitarian
way even if the fear of Communism were not prompting it to do so. I
believe it is no more impossible than democracy or human compassion
themselves. It could be that this is our most important responsibility as
Peace Corpsmen-the education of our people in their poc+ilities for
doing great things in the world.