(oi)
NON-CIRCULATING
YUN INTERVIEW
ALEXI ROSCHIN
*.S 4+..-f
VS «
MOSCOW, RUSSIA- ij.i:"v"! v..
MAY 25. 1990 *
'INTERVIEWER. SUTTERLIN
.,,
:
r
UN LIBRARY
v
4 1993
UN/SA COLLECTION
T a b l e o f Contents
The Founding o f t h e U n i t e d
NOV
Nations
The San F r a n c i s c o Conference
The S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n
Molotov's p a r t i c i p a t i o n and p o s i t i o n s
Membership o f U k r a i n e and B y e l o r u s s i a
Stalin's role
Competence o f G e n e r a l Assembly
Authority o f the Secretary-General
Enforcement measures
M i l i t a r y S t a f f Committee
I n f l u e n c e o f atomic weapons
D r a f t i n g o f the Charter
F u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e Conference
Self-determination
Economic and s o c i a l c o - o p e r a t i o n
Human r i g h t s
soviet expectations
B e g i n n i n g o f t h e C o l d War
R o s c h i n ' s appointment
The v e t o
L o c a t i o n o f UN
Membership
P e r s o n a l i t i e s a t San F r a n c i s c o
Assessment o f U n i t e d N a t i o n s
Korea
1
1-8
4-5
7
8-10
11
11 -12
12 -13
13 -14
14 -15
15 -16
16 -18
19 -20
20 -21
21 -23
23 -24
24 -27
28; 31
2831 -32
33 -34
35 -37
37 -40
V
YUN INTERVIEW
ALEXEI ROSCHIN
MOSCOW. RUSSIA
MAY 25. 1990
Interviewer. S u t t e r l i n
JSS
Ambassador Roschin, I want t o f i r s t thank you f o r g i v i n g
the time and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y O r a l
H i s t o r y P r o j e c t on t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
to begin
I f I may I'd l i k e
by a s k i n g you t o i n d i c a t e what you were
doing
i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference where t h e
U n i t e d Nations was founded.
delegation,
Roschin
I
was
You were p a r t o f t h e S o v i e t
I believe.
advisor
o f our d e l e g a t i o n .
I t was
persons who were a d v i s o r s o f our d e l e g a t i o n .
only
three
A t t h e same
time t h e American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were s e v e r a l dozen o f
a d v i s o r s as w e l l as t h e B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n t o o .
JSS
And
you o n l y had t h r e e
advisors.
Yes, but p a r t i c u l a r two a d v i s o r s o n l y and one,
Roschin
was t h e e x p e r t .
And a l l now gone away,
Arkadiev,
unfortunately.
I n c l u d i n g o f c o u r s e Mr. Molotov who was t h e r e .
JSS
Yes,
Mr. Molotov, Mr.
Gromyko was t h e r e , y e s , and a l s o
Roschin
the
l e a d e r o f t h e t r a d e union, Kuznetsov.
alive,
yes, p r o b a b l y
He i s s t i l l
t h e o n l y person, b u t a t any r a t e
persons who s i g n e d t h e C h a r t e r now a r e a l l gone away.
JSS
Did you t r a v e l t o San F r a n c i s c o w i t h Mr. Molotov?
Roschin
No, we chose t h e s o - c a l l e d E a s t e r n way through S i b e r i a ,
Alaska,
and Canada and was 4 Douglas A i r p l a n e s . F o r Mr.
1
Molotov was s e n t t h e p l a n e C-54, e s p e c i a l l y f o r him.
came d i r e c t l y t o Washington t o see Truman.
He
He t w i c e had
an audience w i t h Mr. Truman, and u n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e f i r s t
was v e r y
w e l l and t h e second was v e r y ,
very s o - c a l l e d
angry.
JSS
I t was a v e r y v e r y angry i n t e r v i e w , as I understand.
So
t h a t Mr. Molotov a r r i v e d i n San F r a n c i s c o i n a bad humor.
Roschin
Rather bad humor, b u t he was, g e n e r a l l y he was n o t an
open-minded man.
JSS
I believe that i n i t i a l l y
S t a l i n d i d n o t i n t e n d t o have
Molotov come and i t ' s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h a t Truman and
C h u r c h i l l both urged t h e S o v i e t Union t o be
at
San
Roschin
the senior l e v e l ,
represented
a t the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r l e v e l , a t
Francisco.
There a r e t h r e e reason why Molotov was n o t b e i n g s e n t a t
first.
F i r s t reason was t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s o f t h e American
and B r i t i s h w i t h t h e German g e n e r a l K a r l Woolf about t h e
end
of military
operations.
Our p e o p l e
and
Stalin,
p e r s o n a l l y , were f o r t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s but he asked t o
send a p e r s o n who would f o l l o w t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s but he
was r e f u s e d i n t h i s f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s
only pertained t o I t a l y - m i l i t a r y operations
The
second
reason
q u e s t i o n o f Poland.
[not t o send Molotov] was t h e
F o r i n s t a n c e , we i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e
P o l i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e be admitted
Conference
i n Italy.
and u n f o r t u n a t e l y
t o t h e San F r a n c i s c o
i t was
not, because t h e
q u e s t i o n o f t h e Poland
government was n o t s e t t l e d up t o
now and t h e Western s i d e , p a r t i c u l a r l y U n i t e d S t a t e s and
Great B r i t a i n , r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e P o l i s h d e l e g a t i o n .
The
t h i r d q u e s t i o n was t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e admission o f
U k r a i n e and B y e l o r u s s i a .
Why?
Because i n t h e middle o f
March, 1945, we r e c e i v e d from o u r ambassador Gromyko t h e
c a b l e when he spoke w i t h Mr. Dunn, Mr. Dunn was a t t h e
time t h e deputy...
JSS
Under-Secretary
o f S t a t e , t h a t was James Dunn.
Roschin
James Dunn s a i d t o o u r ambassador t h a t he never thought
about t h e U k r a i n e and B y e l o r u s s i a and i t r a t h e r i r r i t a t e d
S t a l i n , t o o , and i t was d e c i d e d t h a t t h e d e l e g a t i o n would
be
headed
by
Gromyko
with
persons
from
the
Foreign
M i n i s t r y and t h e M i n i s t r y o f Defense, t o o . But Molotov
was excluded
as w e l l
as t h e head
of the trade
union,
Kuznetsov, and Patyonkin who was a t t h e time M i n i s t e r o f
E d u c a t i o n o f t h e R u s s i a n F e d e r a t i o n , and L a v r e n t i e v , who
was
Minister
Federation.
f o r Foreign
A l l these
Affairs
of
the
persons were excluded
a f t e r t h e death o f R o o s e v e l t
Russian
and o n l y
(which t o o k p l a c e t h e 12th
o f A p r i l , 1945) i t was d e c i d e d t h a t Molotov s h o u l d g e t i n
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n headed by Mr. Truman.
JSS
And
i t was d e c i d e d a f t e r t h e s p e c i a l r e q u e s t from Truman
and
C h u r c h i l l t o send Mr. Molotov t o San F r a n c i s c o .
I see, t h a t ' s v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g .
3
So t h e t h r e e p o i n t s
r e a l l y were t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e German g e n e r a l i n
I t a l y , t h e q u e s t i o n o f Poland, and t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n o f
B y e l o r u s s i a and U k r a i n e .
Roschin
But
negotiations
Switzerland,
with
that's
Wolff
why
took
this
place
is a
i n Berne, i n
rather particular
t h i n g , and a t any r a t e H i t l e r had i n mind a t t h i s moment
t o completely
JSS
Yes,
S t a l i n was a f r a i d o f t h a t .
Stalin
Roschin
afraid,
very
much,
and he was
very
much
as f a r as t h e founding
of the United
N a t i o n s was
concerned t h e S o v i e t a t t i t u d e was p o s i t i v e s t i l l , was i t ?
Yes,
Roschin
was
against t h i s enterprise.
But
JSS
e l i m i n a t e t h e Western a l l i e s i n t h i s war.
i t was p o s i t i v e a t t h e Moscow c o n f e r e n c e on f o r e i g n
affairs
i n 1943 when Molotov, H u l l ,
principle
i t was d e c i d e d
that
a
and Eden met.
[founding]
In
conference
s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n was s e t up.
The
second s t a g e was a t Dumbarton Oaks when t h e C h a r t e r was
o u t l i n e d , except t h e v o t i n g i n t h e S e c u r i t y c o u n c i l and
some
particular
convocation
question
of
inviting
countries
and
o f t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference, as w e l l as
the c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n was n o t s e t t l e d ; t h a t q u e s t i o n was
not s e t t l e d i n Dumbarton Oaks.
And i t was s e t t l e d
only
i n t h e Y a l t a c o n f e r e n c e i n F e b r u a r y 1945.
JSS
When you g o t t o San F r a n c i s c o
d i d you t h i n k
that the
q u e s t i o n o f t h e e n t r y o f t h e U k r a i n e and B y e l o r u s s i a was
4
a l r e a d y s e t t l e d , o r d i d you r e a l i z e t h e r e was
s t i l l some
problem when you got t o San F r a n c i s c o ?
Roschin
When
I
got
to
San
Francisco
U k r a i n e and B y e l o r u s s i a .
1945
i t was
I t was
a
problem
about
o n l y [on] 25 o f A p r i l
t h a t the meeting between t h e American and E n g l i s h
m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , as w e l l as our p e r s o n n e l , near
Saxonion
town o f Turgau.
A p r i l by S t e t t i n i u s .
I t was
the
d e c l a r e d o n l y on 27 o f
During t h i s time t h e problem
was
s e t t l e d , t h e problem o f t h e p r e s i d e n c y o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e ,
as
well
as
Byelorussia.
From t h i s
less
JSS
the
problem
of
admission
of
Ukraine
and
These were s e t t l e d o n l y 27 o f A p r i l ,
time
the
conference
was
1945.
f u n c t i o n i n g more o r
normally.
What were your g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n s o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e i n
San F r a n c i s c o ?
Roschin
I
was
rather
impressed
by
this
conference.
u n f o r t u n a t e l y I do not share t h e b e h a v i o r o f our
of
d e l e g a t i o n , Mr.
four
questions
opinion
of
our
on
Molotov.
which
people.
I
But
chief
Unfortunately, there
did
The
not
first
rather
share
question
i n v i t a t i o n o f France as a s p o n s o r i n g power.
was
are
the
the
I would say
t h e r e t h a t our a t t i t u d e toward France s h o u l d be more o r
l e s s f a v o r a b l e because France was
our a l l y .
Our problem
l a y w i t h the m i l i t a r i e s from Germany, and t h a t ' s why
a t t i t u d e o f our government, and e s p e c i a l l y
the
our c h i e f o f
d e l e g a t i o n , not t o accept t h e p o s i t i o n o f s p o n s o r s h i p f o r
5
France
was
not r i g h t .
The
second
question
s t r u g g l e f o r presidency i n the conference.
i s the
The Western
s i d e i n s i s t e d t h a t S t e t t i n i u s s h o u l d be p r e s i d e n t from
the host country.
But Molotov i n s i s t e d r a t h e r s t r o n g l y
t h a t S o v i e t Union s h o u l d a l s o s e r v e as p r e s i d e n t - and
a l l s p o n s o r i n g powers, f o u r powers, s h o u l d r o t a t e i n t h e
presidency.
third
q u e s t i o n was t h e q u e s t i o n
Argentina.
when
I r a t h e r c o n s i d e r e d t h i s as d o u b t f u l .
The
of the i n v i t a t i o n o f
I was p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e p r e l i m i n a r y s e s s i o n
Stettinius
Argentina
and
despite
other
Western
the fact
that,
powers
accepted
strongly
Argentina could not p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s .
speaking,
But t h e L a t i n
American c o u n t r i e s p u t [acceptance o f A r g e n t i n a ] i n v i t i n g
as a p r e c o n d i t i o n t o i n v i t e B y e l o r u s s i a and t h e U k r a i n e .
Molotov s h o u l d a t any r a t e have accepted t h i s c o n d i t i o n
which was p u t by t h e L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s .
But he
d i d n o t a c c e p t and he v o t e d a g a i n s t and he e x p l a i n e d even
his position
this
i n the press conference.
attitude.
The
f o u r t h was
I do n o t share
the question
competence
o f t h e General
Assembly.
competence
o f t h e General
Assembly
of the
The q u e s t i o n o f
was
even
sent t o
Moscow and where Ambassador Harriman e s p e c i a l l y asked t h e
audience
of
compromise,
solution
Mr.
Stalin
some s o l u t i o n
was p r a c t i c a l l y
and
proposed
of t h i s
to
question.
t h e same as proposed
Western Powers, by t h e Western c o u n t r i e s .
6
find
some
And t h e
by t h e
I t was s a i d
t h a t the competence o f the G e n e r a l Assembly encompassed
the
competence
[scope]
of
the
Charter,
that
is,
the
f i e l d s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e c o u n c i l s r e p o r t i n g t o the
G e n e r a l Assembly - t h a t means t h e
C o u n c i l and T r u s t e e s h i p
scope
of
the
of
the
General
What d i d the S o v i e t s i d e o r i g i n a l l y want?
Roschin
The
security
position
Assembly
s i d e o r i g i n a l l y wanted o n l y the
problem.
accepted
The
was
p r e s e n t e d f i r s t by the Western s i d e .
JSS
Soviet
Social
c o u n c i l , as w e l l as the SC.
competence
a c c e p t e d as i t was
Economic and
And
Western
side
question
enlarged
i n Dumbarton Oaks and
of
this
said that
the
G e n e r a l Assembly s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h a t every i n t e r n a t i o n a l
problem i n the
sphere o f
international influence.
Yes.
We were s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t t h i s , m o t i v a t e d by concern t h a t
t h i s would be m i x i n g i n t h e i n t e r n a l sphere o f i n f l u e n c e
of
each
side.
Was
But
finally
we
accepted
the
mistaken.
Molotov the d e c i s i v e f i g u r e i n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t
S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the f o u n d i n g o f the U n i t e d
Roschin
No,
all
I doubt i t .
the
Molotov
have
Why?
The d e c i s i v e f a c t o r was
i n s t r u c t i o n s and
was
instructions.
so.
Western
Molotov, i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, f o r my p o i n t o f
view was
JSS
country.
very
received
punctually
T h i s was
Nations?
S t a l i n who
a l l the
of
wrote
[reports].
following
these
a l s o h i s drawback, i f I may
say
Because i f he had been more f l e x i b l e he would
gained
much
more
7
substantial
results
in
the
conference.
JSS
Yes, he d i d , I b e l i e v e , manage t o a l i e n a t e a l l o f t h e
L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s .
the
Soviet
Union
They became r a t h e r h o s t i l e t o
because
of
the
position
taken
on
Argentina.
Roschin
Rather, r a t h e r , y e s , and e s p e c i a l l y t h e L a t i n
countries
veto.
were s t r o n g l y
against
the p r i n c i p l e
o f the
They t r i e d even t o e l i m i n a t e t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t h e
v e t o from t h e C h a r t e r o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
r a t e our ambassador,
our
American
But a t any
Ambassador Gromyko, was t h e head o f
d e l e g a t i o n a f t e r Molotov l e f t t h e c o n f e r e n c e .
I t was
i f I'm not mistaken t h e 10 o f March a f t e r t h e s i g n i n g o f
the
t r e a t y w i t h Germany, and he as w e l l as Kuznetsov, t h e
head o f t h e t r a d e u n i o n d e l e g a t i o n o f our c o u n t r y , he
left
San
Francisco
at
the
time
F r a n c i s c o w i t h a v e r y s m a l l number.
t a k e n two
committees,
and
we
were
at
San
U n f o r t u n a t e l y I had
as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
of the
Soviet
Union.
JSS
You were on two
commissions?
Roschin
Two committees.
There were t w e l v e committees under f o u r
commissions.
committee
I t a k e two
committees,
committee
1 and
2.
JSS
What were t h e y concerned w i t h ?
Roschin
They were concerned w i t h t h e G e n e r a l Assembly.
The f i r s t
committee was about t h e s t r u c t u r e and p r o c e d u r e and the
second, p o l i t i c a l
f a c t i o n s and t h e competence
8
of the
General
Assembly.
from the U n i t e d
The
first
S t a t e s was
committee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
S o l Blum, and
( i n a u d i b l e ) r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f Great B r i t a i n , and
other
was
Vandenberg,
C h a r l e s Webster was
Senator
Arthur
JSS
Vandenburg,
from Great B r i t a i n .
w i t h S o l Blum and C h a r l e s Webster was
i n the
My
and
relationship
good.
And t h e r e were not s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s between the S o v i e t
side
and
the
Western
side with
regard
to
the
General
Assembly a t t h i s p o i n t , I t h i n k .
Roschin
No,
there
were
several d i f f i c u l t i e s .
appointment o f t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l .
Especially
the
S o l Blum contended
t h a t appointment o f the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l does not e n t e r
i n t o the sphere o f the v e t o .
I n o t i c e d t h a t he was
And
he i n s i s t e d t h a t he
was
r i g h t and l a t e r the American d e l e g a t i o n s a i d t h a t he
had
committed an e r r o r .
or
not.
mistaken,
d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t
I don't know whether i t was
Concerning
Assembly,
as
the
I have s a i d
competence
t o you,
q u e s t i o n and Senator Vandenberg was
of
the
right
of
the
General
of
i t was
the
right
General
a very
acute
f o r t h e enlargement
Assembly
and
that
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l s h o u l d p r e s e n t a r e p o r t t o the
the
General
Assembly, and General Assembly s h o u l d have the r i g h t t o
a c c e p t o r r e j e c t r e p o r t . I t was d e c i d e d t h a t t h e S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l s h o u l d o n l y p r e s e n t the r e p o r t without
from t h e G e n e r a l Assembly.
even more important was
9
acceptance
The next q u e s t i o n which
was
the q u e s t i o n o f the r e v i s i o n o f
treaties.
General
S e n a t o r Vandenberg was
Assembly
should
o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t the
have t h e
right
to
revise
t r e a t i e s , the f o r e i g n t r e a t i e s concluded with
countries.
States
was
I t was
rather
the
p o s i t i o n of
a t the time o f t h e T r e a t y
Sykes-Picot
the
United
o f V e r s a i l l e s when i t
concluded
f o r instance the t r e a t y of
which d i v i d e d t h e A r a b i a n c o u n t r i e s which a t
t h e t i m e belonged t o T u r k e y .
F i n a l l y , we
a g a i n s t the r e v i s i o n o f the t r e a t i e s .
the
different
a g a i n s t the t r e a t i e s t h e Western A l l i e s had
d u r i n g t h e F i r s t World War,
the
treaties
We
of mutual a s s i s t a n c e w i t h
Poland, Y u g o s l a v i a ,
and F r a n c e .
We
were s t r o n g l y
had
concluded
Czechoslovakia,
had a t t h e t i m e f o u r
t r e a t i e s o f mutual a s s i s t a n c e .
JSS
Which were a l r e a d y i n e x i s t e n c e . . .
Roschin
Which were i n e x i s t e n c e a t the time and f o r t u n a t e l y t
was
against
the
fact
Vandenberg p r o p o s a l
that
formally
i t was
very
strongly
presented
by
despite
the
Bolivian
d e l e g a t i o n and t h e B o l i v i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was
t h e head
o f o u r second committee, committee 2.
this
proposal
committee
and
Conference.
was
was
rejected
not
by
accepted
But t a k i n g t h i s now
r a t h e r p o s i t i v e r e s u l t i f i t was
the
by
And
fortunately
majority
the
San
of
the
Francisco
I doubt t h a t i t would be
accepted
because i t was
impossible t o r e j e c t the t r e a t y t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n
t h a t the G e n e r a l Assembly had no p o s i t i v e r i g h t , o n l y the
r i g h t o f recommendation.
10
JSS
Yes, e x a c t l y .
I would t h i n k today t h e Western s i d e would
a c t u a l l y a l s o oppose any such p r o v i s i o n .
You mention t h e
q u e s t i o n o f the e l e c t i o n o f t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l .
One
of t h e t h i n g s i n c l u d e d i n the C h a r t e r i s A r t i c l e 99 which
gave t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l a p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n which the
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l o f t h e League o f N a t i o n s had not
Was
had.
t h i s a matter o f concern t o t h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n o r
had you simply accepted t h a t a l r e a d y .
Roschin
Unfortunately
committee 1-2.
r a t e we
this
But
considered
concerning
basically
Oh y e s , we
military
you
matters,
T h i s was
accepted
our
the
Now
it
international
stand.
provision
that
was
99.
a t any r a t e v o t e d f o r t h e whole C h a r t e r ,
the C h a r t e r was
JSS
the
we were not i n f a v o r o f e n l a r g i n g h i s
i n c l u d e d i n the C h a r t e r , the A r t i c l e
Roschin
by
were not i n f a v o r o f e n l a r g i n g the c a p a c i t y o f
s a n c t i o n s , and so on.
JSS
was
I was not p r e s e n t a t t h i s time but a t any
Secretary-General;
power
question
accepted unanimously, by the
and
way.
t h e C h a r t e r a l s o p r o v i d e s f o r enforcement measures,
provides
f o r the establishment
of a m i l i t a r y
force.
How
s e r i o u s l y d i d you take t h a t on t h e S o v i e t s i d e ?
you
expect
t h a t t h e r e would r e a l l y be a m i l i t a r y
Did
force
a v a i l a b l e t o the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ?
Roschin
I r a t h e r doubt i t because enforcement measures would be
v e r y much a m i r a c l e , i f I may
was
rather
difficult
to
11
say so.
envisage
Why
that
? Because i t
the
Western
c o u n t r i e s and
be
at
the
same l e v e l
That's why
as
s i d e , the S o v i e t Union, would
the
other
Western
the enforcement measure was
r a t h e r the use
rather
the E a s t e r n
never [ r e a l i s t i c ] ,
of these i n p r a c t i c e .
doubt i t , and
the
Military
countries.
And
t h a t ' s why
Committee up
to
I
now
does not f u n c t i o n a t a l l .
JSS
I t doesn't f u n c t i o n a t a l l - I was
question
because
I
have
seen
g o i n g t o ask you
some
developed and were used a t the San
a f t e r Dumbarton Oaks.
in
a very
important
Security Council.
the
charts
Francisco
that
the
were
Conference
I t shows the M i l i t a r y
p o s i t i o n , almost
that
Committee
same as
the
Did you oh the S o v i e t s i d e expect t h a t
M i l i t a r y S t a f f Committee would be a v e r y
important
instrument?
Roschin
By the way,
d u r i n g the Dumbarton Oaks we had a d i f f e r e n t
p o s i t i o n than l a t e r i n the San F r a n c i s c o on t h i s matter.
In
Dumbarton Oaks we
Committee should
l a t e r we,
insisted
that
be e s t a b l i s h e d and
the
Military
should
function
and
r a t h e r under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f the C o l d War
at
t h a t time, a t the change i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the
States
and
Staff
so
on,
we
rather
tried
to
United
reconsider
a t t i t u d e towards the M i l i t a r y S t a f f Committee.
We
our
were
a g a i n s t the a c t i v i t y o f t h i s body.
JSS
Really.
Soviet
That's i n t e r e s t i n g because as you
Union,
45
years
later,
know now
i s proposing
that
the
the
M i l i t a r y S t a f f Committee be g i v e n more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
12
Roschin
Unfortunately
I don't know t h e p r e s e n t
p o s i t i o n of the
S o v i e t Union i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i d e .
JSS
W e l l t h i s i s i n t e r e s t i n g because I had n o t heard
that
there
was
a
change
i n your
attitude
before
between
Dumbarton Oaks and San F r a n c i s c o .
Roschin
Between t h e Dumbarton Oaks we i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e M i l i t a r y
S t a f f Committee should f u n c t i o n as a r e g u l a r body and we
even proposed t h e c r e a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l army i n o r d e r
t o mix i n t h e d i f f e r e n t p a r t o f t h e w o r l d t o e s t a b l i s h
a guarantee o f s e c u r i t y .
L a t e r we changed t h i s p o s i t i o n
we c o n s i d e r e d t h a t our a t t i t u d e c o n c e r n i n g
the presidency
o f Truman and h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was r a t h e r
complicated
and here i t was t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e C o l d War.
JSS
T h i s i s a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n b u t t o what e x t e n t
do you t h i n k t h a t t h e atomic bomb, t h e p o s s e s s i o n
United
S t a t e s o f t h e atomic weapon, i n f l u e n c e d S t a l i n ' s
a t t i t u d e a t t h a t p o i n t on q u e s t i o n s
Roschin
of the
such as t h i s ?
T h i s i s a n o t so easy t o answer now b u t my impression i s
that
t h e atomic
weapon
influenced
f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f t h e S o v i e t Union.
B e r l i n question,
Berlin crisis
the B e r l i n c r i s i s
- taking
s u b s t a n t i a l l y the
A t any r a t e i n t h e
i n 1948 - t h e f i r s t
into consideration
that a t that
time we do n o t p o s s e s s t h e atomic weapon we r a t h e r t r i e d
t o f i n d p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n on t h i s problem.
And g e n e r a l l y
the absence from o u r s i d e o f t h e atomic weapon and t h e
p o s s e s s i o n o f t h i s weapon by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n f l u e n c e d
13
t h e whole s i t u a t i o n i n f o r e i g n
JSS
relations.
Now a t San F r a n c i s c o , was t h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n aware o f
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e atomic bomb?
Roschin
I doubt i t ,
JSS
That's r i g h t , t h e U. S. d e l e g a t i o n was n o t aware o f i t
Roschin
I doubt i t .
I doubt even t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
was n o t aware
JSS
No, S t e t t i n i u s d i d n o t know
Roschin
S t e t t i n i u s d i d n o t know about
President
it,
d i d n ' t know because
and as w e l l , even t h e
i t was n o t proved, t h e
p r o o f was o n l y i n t h e f i r s t o f August, o r something
like
that.
JSS
I want
t o a s k you about
Charter i t s e l f .
the actual
drafting
On t h e American s i d e t h e r e was a man
named P a s v o l s k y who was a c t u a l l y o f R u s s i a n
origin
Roschin
Yes, I know him.
JSS
And on t h e S o v i e t s i d e , A r k a d i e v , as you s a i d .
Roschin
No, i t was Sobolev a t t h i s time.
an
active
part
of the
I knew him a t t h e time.
i n these
A r k a d i e v was n o t t a k i n g
negotiations with
Pasvolsky.
With P a s v o l s k y , Sobolev was t h e same rank, i f I may say
so, as w e l l as from t h e B r i t i s h s i d e was Gladwyn Jebb and
P a s v o l s k y , Gladwyn Jebb and Sobolev c r e a t e d a t t h e time
a triumvirate of s p e c i a l i s t s i n the p a r t i c u l a r things
concerning the Charter o f the United Nations.
JSS
And a good b i t o f t h e wording was developed between these
three,
right?
And
especially
Pasvolsky?
14
between
Sobolev
and
Roschin
And Sobolev a t any r a t e knew E n g l i s h more o r l e s s w e l l ,
more o r l e s s w e l l .
JSS
And t h a t was a v e r y good r e l a t i o n s h i p , I b e l i e v e .
Roschin
Yes. A t t h e time, by t h e way, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a l l
d e l e g a t i o n s , w i t h t h e American d e l e g a t i o n as a whole, was
quite
good.
After
t h e San
Francisco
Conference
I
r e c e i v e d a s p e c i a l l e t t e r from S t e t t i n i u s t h a n k i n g me f o r
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the united Nations organization a t the
San
Francisco
Conference, and so on, b u t I don't know
where t h i s l e t t e r i s now.
JSS
L e t me j u s t ask one q u i c k q u e s t i o n .
I s Mr. Sobolev s t i l l
a l i v e , o r i s he dead?
Roschin
He passed away l o n g ago.
JSS
So d i d P a s v o l s k y ?
Roschin
Sod d i d P a s v o l s k y .
P a s v o l s k y was n o t a young man a t t h e
time.
JSS
What
was
your
Conference?
the
impression
of the functioning
of the
Mr. A l g e r H i s s was t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l
Conference a t t h a t time, and d i d you f e e l
of
that i t
f u n c t i o n e d e f f e c t i v e l y , was i t done w e l l , d i d t h e S o v i e t
s i d e have any c o m p l a i n t s ?
Roschin
No, we had n o t any c o m p l a i n t s c o n c e r n i n g
organization
o f t h e San F r a n c i s c o
t h e a c t i v i t y and
Conference.
Alger
H i s s , because o f h i s a b i l i t y , was a r a t h e r e f f e c t i v e man.
Only a t t h e P r e p a r a t o r y
Commission, he was n o t t h e head
o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n because t h e P r e p a r a t o r y
15
Commission
was
convened
Gladwyn
i n Great
Jebb
government.
executive
who
Britain,
was
much
i n London,
closer
He was t h e e x e c u t i v e
secretary,
of
the
to
and
the
secretary,
Preparatory
i t was
British
so-called
Commission.
A l g e r H i s s , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t he was a v e r y a b l e
from my p o i n t o f view, he was not t h e head o f
a c t i o n i n the c r e a t i o n of the convocation
session
JSS
o f t h e G e n e r a l Assembly
meetings o f t h e S e c u r i t y
Council.
Right.
London
Were
you
in
and
for
man
consecutive
of the
first
first
preliminary
the
Preparatory
Commission?
Roschin
Yes,
I was i n t h e P r e p a r a t o r y
Commission.
I t was Gromyko
who was t h e head o f our d e l e g a t i o n and I was h i s deputy
at
t h a t time.
JSS
And Mr. A d l a i Stevenson was t h e r e on t h e American sides
Roschin
From t h e American s i d e A d l a i Stevenson was t h e deputy o f
S t e t t i n i u s , and he i n v i t e d me once f o r a lunch p a r t y and
I was
JSS
Right.
i n t h e same c a p a c i t y ,
i f I may
say so.
You were t h e o p p o s i t e number, as we say, o f A d l a i
Stevenson.
There a r e s e v e r a l p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e
Charter
t h a t were r e l a t i v e l y new and one o f them was the concept
of
self-determination.
How
did
you
interpret
the
p r o v i s i o n f o r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t was i n t h e Charter?
Was i t c o n s i d e r e d
going
t o be
a
important, d i d you f o r e s e e t h a t i t was
rather
major, a s p e c t
f u n c t i o n s i n t h e f u t u r e o r not?
16
of United
Nations
Roschin
For me
i t ' s not
so easy t o speak t o you
because t h e q u e s t i o n o f t r u s t e e s h i p ,
connected
scope
with
of
invited
Mr.
in
self-determination,
Sobolev
the
at
the
committee,
Fairmont H o t e l which was
the
delegation.
I was
a
representative,
British
which was
was
time.
the
on t h i s
Stassen
residence
I
presented.
We
was
insisted
that
determination
the
trust
was
o f the
and
in
a
was
I t was
And
the
colonies
A t any r a t e China
question
question
and
and
we
of
self-
where
insisted
self-determination
o f the U n i t e d
the
aim
was
Nations.
of
self-determination
self-
that
the
the
main
in
trusteeship
of
the
the
as
trustee
T h i s i s a v e r y important p o i n t from our s i d e .
a t the
time.
I suppose you were aware t h a t i t was
B r i t i s h were s e n s i t i v e
Roschin
no
was
the main o b j e c t o f the development o f
incorporated
colonies.
the
colonial
article
we
as
v e r y important from our p o i n t o f view.
Charter
76
in
American
I don't know i f t h e r e
why
purpose o f the
independence
JSS
That's
territories,
independence
once
Paul
and no p r e t e n s i o n f o r c o l o n i e s a t a l l .
determination
was
the
committee,
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f China because China had
not
in
v e r y g l a d t o meet Lord Cranbourne
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f France, and,
was
closely
rather
Only
topic
a p o i n t t h a t the
on...
The B r i t i s h were v e r y s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t the c o n s i d e r a t i o n
o f c o l o n i a l problems d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the American
17
s i d e was s t r o n g l y
f o r consideration
The
tried
American
side
of this
t o open t h e c o l o n i e s
question.
f o r the
r i g h t o f e x p l o i t a t i o n i f I may say so, t h e s e c o l o n i e s .
But
the decision
of Churchill,
correspondence
between
stressed
he
that
c o l o n i a l problem.
was
and I have
Churchill
against
and
Eden,
consideration
read t h e
and
he
of the
I f America would l i k e t o r e c e i v e t h e
M a r s h a l l and C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s i n t h e P a c i f i c t e r r i t o r i e s
they would support them f o r t h i s b u t n o t as [a precedent]
f o r acceptance o f B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
He was s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t i t .
JSS
And o f course t h e T r u s t e e s h i p
from your p o i n t o f view.
this
Council
Council
was
established
From t h e S o v i e t p o i n t o f view,
would have an important
f u n c t i o n then i n
t a k i n g over t h e t e r r i t o r i e s t h a t were t h e r e s u l t e i t h e r
of
German
occupation
or that
had come down
from t h e
League o f N a t i o n s , t h i s was t h e i d e a .
Roschin
We were a t any r a t e
strongly
first
f o r the Trusteeship
Council
very
o f a l l because t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o f t h e
independence and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of the trusteeship
t e r r i t o r i e s was our aim i n t h i s way and our p a r t i c i p a t i o n
in this
Council
was f i x e d
a t any r a t e by t h e C h a r t e r .
We were f o r t h e T r u s t e e s h i p
question
opinion
Council very
strongly.
The
o f c o l o n i e s was a t any r a t e a t t r a c t i n g p u b l i c
i n t h e whole w o r l d .
k i n d o f approach.
18
We were i n f a v o r o f t h i s
JSS
Now
the other
element
i n t h e C h a r t e r which
had been
d i s c u s s e d b u t n o t v e r y much a t Dumbarton Oaks was t h e
provision
f o r cooperation
questions
as
being
one
on
economic
important
maintenance o f peace i n t h e f u t u r e .
and
element
social
i n the
The S o v i e t s i d e a t
Dumbarton oaks I t h i n k had n o t been e n t h u s i a s t i c on t h i s .
What was t h e f e e l i n g on t h e S o v i e t s i d e i n San F r a n c i s c o
on i n t r o d u c i n g t h i s element o f economic c o o p e r a t i o n i n t o
the Charter?
Roschin
We
considered that
organization
problem
should
generally that
mainly
o f the s e c u r i t y
the United
[be concerned]
and we
were
Nations
with
the
not very
much
e n t h u s i a s t i c t o e n l a r g e t h e s e i n t h e Economic and S o c i a l
Council.
But as i t was a c c e p t e d by t h e Dumbarton Oaks
c o n f e r e n c e as w e l l as by t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference,
we o n l y t r i e d t o combine t h e s e two c o u n c i l s [economic and
s o c i a l ] i n one c o u n c i l - one c o u n c i l , and we t r i e d
create
body
i n the General
-
one
economic
Assembly
and
a subsidiary
social
to
borders?
committee
-
but
u n f o r t u n a t e l y i t was n o t accepted.
JSS
So you would have p r e f e r r e d t o see a committee o f t h e
General
Assembly
r a t h e r than
a separate c o u n c i l
which
would have somewhat decreased i t s importance.
Roschin
Yes, y e s .
But a t any r a t e
I was n o t p r e s e n t
a t the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference; I don't know what d e l i b e r a t i o n
took p l a c e a t t h i s c o n f e r e n c e .
19
A t any r a t e i n t h e Moscow
meeting
of the three
foreign
c o n s u l t a t i o n o f t h i s matter.
Oaks Conference.
ministers
Despite
enlarge
We p u b l i s h e d
a l l documents
concerning
favorable i n
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Western s i d e t r i e d t o
the a c t i v i t y
economic
accepted
We a c c e p t e d t h e dumbarton
t h e s e b o d i e s and o u r a t t i t u d e was r a t h e r
this.
we
and s o c i a l
of the United
problems,
we
Nations
were
not
on t h e
strongly
against i t .
JSS
Now t h e t h i r d
question
r e f e r s t o human r i g h t s .
r i g h t s were g i v e n c o n s i d e r a b l e prominence i n t h e
How d i d t h e S o v i e t s i d e i n t e r p r e t t h i s ?
Human
Charter.
Obviously
there
were d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e Western i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
human
rights
rights.
and t h e S o v i e t
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f human
D i d t h i s cause a problem f o r t h e S o v i e t s i d e i n
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e C h a r t e r and t h e wording o f t h e c h a r t e r ?
Roschin
A t any r a t e t h e d e c i s i o n about t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f Human
R i g h t s was a c c e p t e d a t t h e t h i r d s e s s i o n o f t h e G e n e r a l
Assembly.
I t was i n 1948.
accepted t h i s D e c l a r a t i o n .
Human R i g h t s .
Our a t t i t u d e was t h a t we
We s i g n e d t h i s D e c l a r a t i o n o t
But l a t e r , from my u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t we
t r i e d r a t h e r t o a v o i d t h e problem o f human r i g h t s i n t h e
S o v i e t Union,
t h i s was o u r drawback which concerned a l l
t h e S t a l i n epoch.
We were n o t i n f a v o r o f human r i g h t s
i n S t a l i n ' s era.
JSS
But you d i d n ' t t r y t o change t h e wording o f t h e C h a r t e r
i n San F r a n c i s c o as i t had been developed a t Dumbarton
20
Oaks i n t h i s
Roschin
respect?
No,
not a t a l l , not a t a l l .
was
the competence o f my c o l l e a g u e Mr.
was
i n t h e committee I I (3) d e a l i n g w i t h t h e economic and
s o c i a l problems.
know
his
I t was
o u t s i d e my
instructions
understanding
as
of
Despite
exactly
today
the f a c t t h a t t h i s
A (inaudible)
competence.
but
i s that
at
he
any
was
who
I don't
rate
not
my
against
a n y t h i n g which was p r o c l a i m e d i n the t r e a t y [ C h a r t e r ]
t h a t was
JSS
Now
p r o c l a i m e d a t Dumbarton Oaks.
this
i s a more g e n e r a l
question.
the end
How
question,
a
philosophical
h i g h were t h e hopes on the S o v i e t s i d e a t
o f San
F r a n c i s c o t h a t t h i s new
organization
r e a l l y g o i n g t o be e f f e c t i v e i n p r e s e r v i n g
Roschin
From a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view I may
our
a t t i t u d e was
not v e r y
Nations organization.
the
S t a l i n p e r i o d we
foreign
minister
favorable
the
say t o you
A f f a i r s - i f I'm
that
towards t h e
United
At a l l the f i r s t s e s s i o n s
during
were not
except
same time t h e
was
peace?
the
even r e p r e s e n t e d
second
part
of
Council
of M i n i s t e r s
by
the
s e s s i o n o f t h e G e n e r a l Assembly because i t was
at
and
our
first
convened
for
Foreign
not mistaken, t h e f i f t h meeting o f
Council of Foreign M i n i s t e r s .
I t was
the
concerned w i t h the
a t t i t u d e o f the s a t e l l i t e c o u n t r i e s o f Germany i n Europe:
Hungary, I t a l y ,
Rumania, B u l g a r i a
and
Finland.
understand t h a t our a t t i t u d e a t the time was
o r l e s s s k e p t i c a l , and
I
r a t h e r more
I u n d e r s t a n d the a t t i t u d e
21
But
o f Mr. V i s h i n s k y who v i s i t e d a l l t h e s e s s i o n s from t h e
f i r s t u n t i l t h e seventh and l a t e r on, t h a t he was r a t h e r
v e r y much s k e p t i c a l and o u t s i d e o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.
O u t s i d e o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. And I understand t h a t
he was v e r y n e g a t i v e c o n c e r n i n g t h e people who were from
t h e Western s i d e .
By t h e way he mentioned t h e P h i l i p p i n e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , C a r l o s Romulo, do you remember, yes, t h a t
he was speaking much but w i t h o u t any r e s u l t . I met l a t e r
Mr.
C a r l o s Romulo.
I remember when he was p r e s i d e n t o f
t h e G e n e r a l Assembly - i f I'm n o t mistaken t h e f o u r t h o r
fifth
s e s s i o n o f t h e General Assembly.
He r a t h e r took
me and s a i d , go w i t h me t o t h e d e l e g a t e s ' h a l l .
I was
not v e r y c o m f o r t a b l e because I knew t h e a t t i t u d e o f my
c o u n t r y towards him.
representative,
V i s h i n s k y a l s o mentioned t h e French
i t was Ivan
Delhosse
a t t h e time,
he
mentioned t h a t he s a i d we must run, r u n d e s p i t e t h e f a c t
t h a t t h e c a r d s were taken by t h e cockatoo.
he
was
very
much
negative
towards t h e a c t i v i t y
towards
A t any r a t e
t h e d e l e g a t e s and
o f t h e G e n e r a l Assembly.
r a t h e r S t a l i n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t t h e time.
He was
S t a l i n was
v e r y much n e g a t i v e towards t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
JSS
He d i d n o t p u t g r e a t f a i t h i n t h e U n i t e d
Roschin
Yes.
He much
foreign
policy
more c o n s i d e r e d
and he p r o c l a i m e d
h i s own
Nations?
power
h i s attitude
ina l l
towards
the E a s t e r n s i d e o f Europe,
and d e s p i t e t e n t a t i v e s from
American
side
side
and B r i t i s h
22
r a t h e r t o smooth t h e
s i t u a t i o n i n t h e E a s t e r n p a r t , t o t a k e some p a r t , t o take
some v o i c e i n t h e a t t i t u d e o f Rumania, B u l g a r i a , Hungary,
and
JSS
so on.
That's
But i t was w i t h o u t
right.
That
was
development o f t h e C o l d War.
Roschin
The C o l d War began
conference.
result.
very
influential
i n the
I t h i n k i t began
then.
from t h e end o f t h e San F r a n c i s c o
Even a t t h e San F r a n c i s c o c o n f e r e n c e
I could
f e e l t h e t r e n d o f t h e C o l d War.
JSS
You c o u l d f e e l i t a l r e a d y ?
Roschin
V e r y vaguely,
but a t the Preparatory
Commission and i n
t h e second and t h i r d s e s s i o n s o f t h e General Assembly and
even i n t h e f i r s t s e s s i o n o f t h e G e n e r a l Assembly, v e r y ,
very substantial.
JSS
Yes, w e l l by t h a t time Poland
had become a major i s s u e ,
I think.
Roschin
Poland
was n o t t h e major i s s u e because on Poland
was agreement.
Polish
JSS
there
I n t h e summer o f 1945 i t was s e t t l e d , t h e
question.
That t h e r e s h o u l d be a government t h a t would
represent
both t h e L u b l i n P o l e s and t h e London P o l e s .
Roschin
Not
t h e London
Poles.
From
t h e London
Poles
only
M i k o l a j c z y k was i n c l u d e d i n i t ; b u t Lange and a l l o t h e r s
were excluded
JSS
i n c l u d i n g from o u t s i d e o f London.
From t h e Western s i d e , t h e American and t h e B r i t i s h
that
this
was
not r e a l l y
an
implementation
agreement t h a t had been reached a t Y a l t a .
23
felt
o f the
Roschin
I q u i t e agree w i t h you.
understand
But i t i s n o t so easy now t o
t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e E a s t and West i n
t h e P o l i s h problem.
But a t any r a t e t h e P o l i s h problem
was n o t s e t t l e d i n a good way a t t h e time.
JSS
Ambassador Roschin, I t h i n k you have p u t down a few notes
o f some o t h e r i m p r e s s i o n s t h a t you had o f San F r a n c i s c o .
I wonder i f you would j u s t l i k e t o summarize some o f your
Roschin
thoughts
on t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
I would
only
delegation.
say t o you how
I was
included
i n the
I may say t h a t a t t h e end o f February, 1945
I was w a l k i n g i n London and I r e t u r n e d v e r y l a t e i n t h e
evening.
I was t o l d by our'ambassador t h a t t h e next day
I s h o u l d f l y t o Moscow a t 6:00
received
because a t e l e g r a p h was
t h a t I must go t o Moscow.
I was v e r y
s u r p r i s e d b u t a t any r a t e we made arrangements
much
without
any v i s a t h a t I s h o u l d f o l l o w , I s h o u l d f l y t o Moscow.
JSS
You were i n London f o r t h e European A d v i s o r y Commission?
Roschin
I was a t t h e time i n t h e European A d v i s o r y Commission and
t h e B r i t i s h government, B r i t i s h
had
Foreign Office,
said I
no r i g h t t o t r a n s i t o t h e r than B r i t i s h a i r p o r t s on
t h e way.
I t means M a r s e i l l e s , C a g l i a r i , S a r d i n i a , C a s t e l
B e n i t o , C a i r o , Habana, i n I r a q .
But I had q u i t e t h e same
r i g h t as Mr. Sobolev who was w i t h me t o f l y t o Moscow.
When we a r r i v e d f i v e days a f t e r i n Moscow I
came t o Molotov,
immediately
t h e F o r e i g n . M i n i s t e r , and t h e F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r asked me two q u e s t i o n s .
24
JSS
So you
Roschin
Ah yes, and Molotov put b e f o r e me the q u e s t i o n - whether
the
saw
Mr.
Molotov?
conference should
as a whole?
consider
I s a i d t o Mr.
he answered, so do I .
the
peaceful
settlement
Molotov t h a t I doubt i t , and
And
t h i s was
rather finished.
t h e same day I r e c e i v e d the i n s t r u c t i o n t o w r i t e an
memoir
concerning
received
the
papers.
In
dossier
this
d e c i s i o n o f the
was
trusteeship
in
one
which
list
of
was
this
But
papers
Crimean Conference.
a t the
problem.
only
i n a v e r y awkward s i t u a t i o n , how
attitude.
in
the
At
aide
But
one
list
of
was
written
the
I was
puzzled
and
t o escape from t h i s
same time I understood w e l l
that
i s r a t h e r t h e problem o f a t e s t t o know what I
substance.
JSS
You
Roschin
I was
I
am
Yes.
were b e i n g t e s t e d , you mean.
t e s t e d and
I understood t h a t I was
tested at that
time.
JSS
You must have been s t i l l q u i t e young, i f I may
- how
Roschin
o l d were you
But I was
a t t h a t time?
not so young, I was
a t the time 40 y e a r s ,
I wrote the a i d e memoir c o n c e r n i n g
mandatory system a t the time.
good
question.
and
why
-
that
I
That i s why
I was
found
I t was
very
25
as
good
number one
o n l y about the
considered
my a i d e memoir was
included
yes.
the mandatory system
which e x i s t e d a f t e r the F i r s t World War,
very
interrupt
answer
that I
on
this
found v e r y good
i n the
list
of
advisors.
At this
conference
I don't want r a t h e r t o
mention t h a t Mr. Truman gave t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y speech by
t h e r a d i o because he d i d n o t f l y t o San F r a n c i s c o .
was a t t h e time i n Washington.
He
We h e a r d i n San F r a n c i s c o
a simultaneous t r a n s l a t i o n , by t h e way.
I t was o n l y two
working languages - French and E n g l i s h ,
and I used t o
speak i n French because ray French was much s t r o n g e r than
the
English.
JSS
The work c o u l d n o t be conducted i n Russian?
Roschin
Not a t a l l , n o t a t a l l .
I don't know how t h e o t h e r
persons d e a l t w i t h t h e problem o f speeches.
rather
active part
i n t h e San F r a n c i s c o
I took a
conference i n
F r e n c h and my p e o p l e d e c i d e d t h a t I knew French v e r y w e l l
and s i n c e then my r e p u t a t i o n was v e r y h i g h from t h e p o i n t
o f view o f my knowledge o f French language.
it
was
considered
different
[placed]
delegates
what
committees
and a d v i s o r s ,
on two committees.
very l i m i t e d .
taken
unfortunately
B e f o r e t h e [European] A d v i s o r y
foreign a f f a i r s at a l l .
by t h e
I was
Because my knowledge was
I was i n t h e p e d a g o g i c a l work.
two
were
Yes. When
Commission,
T h a t ' s why I d i d n ' t know
And I t a k e t h e I I (1) and I I (2)
committees where I e s t a b l i s h e d good r e l a t i o n s
with
S o l Blum d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t once we were i n a q u i t e
different
point
Secretary-General.
o f view
about
t h e nomination
of the
And l a t e r I n o t i c e d t h a t S o l Bloom
was a r a t h e r c y n i c a l man.
26
Our chairman i n t h e committee
II
(1) was t h e T u r k i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,
Hasan Saka, and
a f t e r we f i n i s h e d t h e work a l l d e l e g a t e s gave speeches
f a v o r a b l e towards Hasan Saka.
impressed
Hassan Saka was v e r y much
by t h e s e speeches and S o l Bloom r e t u r n e d t o me
and s a i d t h a t he [ d i d n ' t t a k e a t ] f a c e v a l u e a l l t h a t was
spoken here.
cynical
That's
with
Hassan Saka.
regard
why he was v e r y
much
considered
t o t h e pronouncements
concerning
And i n t h e second committee, I e s t a b l i s h e d
good r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h a r l e s Webster, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f
Great
Britain,
because he was an
good h i s t o r i a n .
He
was
the
h i s t o r i a n and a v e r y
He sent me h i s h i s t o r i c a l e x e r c i s e s .
so-called
[follower]
of
the
Metternich
attitude.
JSS
You used t h e M e t t e r n i c h approach,
then.
Roschin
A t t h e same time my r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h A r t h u r Vandenberg,
who was t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was v e r y
negative.
rather
But we had l i t t l e
contacts.
And he was a
u n p r e d i c t a b l e man and he was n o t bound by t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n s o f h i s government.
conducting
man.
He was
r e v i s i o n of the t r e a t i e s ,
He was v e r y much a s e l f -
raising
the question
o f the
I was v e r y much s u r p r i s e d , I
was speaking a g a i n s t h i s p r o p o s a l , a g a i n s t h i s a t t i t u d e ,
against
h i s conduct
opposite sides.
dealing
with
important.
o f these
I visited
the veto
We
were on
a l s o t h e committee I I I (1)
because
The most important
27
questions.
this
was
very
much
q u e s t i o n was t h e problem
of
the veto.
And I remember t h e B r i t i s h
were
very
s k e p t i c a l about t h e v e t o and they s e n t t h e whole problem
to
Evatt,
the
representative
e l i m i n a t e d themselves
may be produced
of
Australia.
They
and they would c o n s i d e r whatever
as a r e s u l t o f h i s n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e .
JSS
Yes, E v a t t was a v e r y s t r o n g spokesman a g a i n s t t h e v e t o .
Roschin
He was f o r enforcement measure f a l l i n g under t h e v e t o .
But a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t s h o u l d be s e t t l e d w i t h o u t v e t o .
We
couldn't
accept
d i d n ' t p e r m i t us t o .
such
attitude,
our
instructions
The L a t i n Americans were g e n e r a l l y
a g a i n s t t h e v e t o , and when t h e problem was v o t e d ,
Colombia and Cuba v o t e d
against the veto.
only
33 f o r t h e
v e t o , and 15 a b s t e n t i o n s .
JSS
Were you aware, by t h e way, t h a t Mr. Nelson R o c k e f e l l e r
had
c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e i n terms o f L a t i n
American
v o t e s and a t t i t u d e s ?
Roschin
I met Mr. Nelson
Rockefeller only
s e s s i o n o f the General
during
the
second
Assembly when he p r e s e n t e d the
check d e a l i n g w i t h t e r r i t o r y f o r t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
was v e r y much d i s i l l u s i o n e d
United
Nations
uncomfortable
w i t h t h e new r e s i d e n c e o f
organization.
place
I
f o r the United
It
was
Nations
a
very
delegates.
We c o u l d n o t do a n y t h i n g a t t h e time.
JSS
You were unhappy w i t h i t because o f t h e way i t looked i n
New York?
Roschin
I was v e r y much d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h t h e l a c k o f t e r r i t o r y
28
i n New
York and t h a t U n i t e d N a t i o n s o r g a n i z a t i o n
be l o c a t e d i n the New
was
York C i t y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
Commission i t was
made a speech f o r Geneva, f o r Europe.
welcomed him
favor
of
very
greatly during
Copenhagen, t a k i n g
v e r y n e a r t o our c o u n t r y .
you know him,
he was
this
Noel Baker
I may
time.
consideration
he was
that
Our a d v i s o r , K r y l o v ,
mindedness
not m a r r i e d
-
was
it
I
in
was
probably
our f i r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e - judge -
i n f a v o r o f Monaco.
Monaco was
say
I was
on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court o f J u s t i c e from our
and
there
i t was
a
country,
A t t h a t time t h e p r i n c e o f
t h e q u e s t i o n o f open-
possibility
U n i t e d N a t i o n s i n Monaco a t t h a t time?
to
But
situate
the
unfortunately
our i n s t r u c t i o n s were i n f a v o r o f t h e U n t i e d S t a t e s .
We
were i n f a v o r
to
of
the
Untied
States
and
even t r i e d
persuade t h e Uruguayan r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , who,
was
i n f a v o r o f Europe.
We
a t t h e time,
t r i e d t o persuade him,
t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t y u g o s l a v i a was
voting
well
well
for
United
Czechoslovakia.
States
Jan
and
Masaryk who
voted
was
as
at
the
time
and
as
for
the
Czech r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , was
Ambassador i n London a t t h a t
time.
question
By
our
vote,
U n i t e d N a t i o n s was
JSS
I
much i n f a v o r i n my h e a r t f o r Europe, and I remember
t h a t during the Preparatory
who
should
Why
the
decided
f o r New
of
the
site
29
the
York.
do you t h i n k t h a t Moscow a c t u a l l y f a v o r e d t h e
States?
of
United
Roschin
I may say t h a t S t a l i n
considered
that
i f he v o t e d i n
f a v o r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t h e problem o f t h e U n i t e d
Nations
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would c o n s i d e r f a v o r a b l y o u r
requirement
f o r a peace s e t t l e m e n t i n Europe.
And t h a t ' s
why S t a l i n was s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t Europe as a s e a t o f t h e
United Nations.
his side.
I c o n s i d e r t h i s r a t h e r a mistake from
A t t h e time t h e P a l a i s des Nations was b u i l t ,
the P a l a i s des N a t i o n s was c o n s i d e r e d t h e r i g h t p l a c e as
the s i t e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
Noel Baker s t r e s s e d t h i s
v e r y s t r o n g l y and he s a i d t h a t i t i s much n e a r e r t o a l l
member s t a t e s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
at
t h e time
Europe
was
But u n f o r t u n a t e l y
represented
by
only
a
few
c o u n t r i e s , o n l y 14 i n c l u d i n g U k r a i n e and B y e l o r u s s i a , and
we s t a r t e d t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference when Europe was
r e p r e s e n t e d by t e n c o u n t r i e s .
Western
hemisphere
was
But a t t h e same time t h e
represented
by
21,
excluding
Argentina.
When t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference s t a r t e d
there
only
were
46
members
of
o r g a n i z a t i o n , and f o u r were added:
A r g e n t i n a , and then Denmark.
in
Denmark
a t t h e time
was
the United
Nations
B y e l o r u s s i a , Ukraine,
The problem o f government
settled.
50
countries
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference and Poland
s i g n e d t h e C h a r t e r i n October, 1945.
JSS
But i t was c o n s i d e r e d an o r i g i n a l member?
Roschin
I t was c o n s i d e r e d as an o r i g i n a l member because he s i g n e d
and he p a r t i c i p a t e d i n P r e p a r a t o r y Commission.
30
What e l s e
may
I say
you
that
American
on
the problem o f the
veto?
the
a t t i t u d e of Evatt,
the
countries,
the
I explained
a t t i t u d e of
a t t i t u d e of
the
to
Latin
Soviet
Union,
r a t h e r not i n f a v o r o f E v a t t ' s a t t i t u d e , i t goes w i t h o u t
saying,
Latin
accepted
by
the
Colombia, and
JSS
But
there
Union and
American
33
countries.
countries
15 a b s t e n t i o n s .
was
no
against
Yes,
2,
i t was
difference really
the U n i t e d
Finally
it
was
Cuba
and
accepted.
between the
S t a t e s on t h i s i s s u e , both
Soviet
favored
the veto?
Roschin
But the a t t i t u d e o f the U n i t e d
was
not
very
S t a t e s and
much e n t h u s i a s t i c .
Great
They c o n s i d e r e d
t h e i r a t t i t u d e would p e r m i t them a t a l l times t o
the
procedure,
the
Britain
that
follow
d e c i s i o n , t h a t would emanate from
t h e i r part.
JSS
L e t me
i n t e r r u p t you,
has o c c u r r e d
t o me.
I j u s t want t o ask a q u e s t i o n
At Y a l t a , the S o v i e t s i d e - S t a l i n ,
a c t u a l l y , p e r s o n a l l y - proposed t h a t t h e r e would be
representatives,
to
speak.
The
f o u r s t a t e s from the
Soviet
Union
itself,
Do you have any background on why
Because i t was
four
S o v i e t Union,
Byelorussia,
U k r a i n e , and t h e f o u r t h t h a t he proposed was
Roschin
that
he proposed
r a t h e r a c o u n t r y t h a t had
so
the
Lithuania.
Lithuania?
an a c c e s s from
the p o i n t o f view o f f r o n t i e r , o u t s i d e the S o v i e t Union.
JSS
I t , i n other
words, was
S o v i e t Union.
31
not
totally
surrounded by
the
Roschin
No, i t was surrounded
by t h e S o v i e t Union a t t h e time.
Poland, even f o r i n s t a n c e t h e q u e s t i o n o f Koenigsberg and
so-called
now
Kalingrad,
a l l these
territories
were
outside of Lithuanian t e r r i t o r i e s .
I don't know b u t a t
any
proposed
rate,
a t the f i r s t
stage
we
that
each
r e p u b l i c s h o u l d be r e p r e s e n t e d .
JSS
That was a t Dumbarton Oaks.
Roschin
Yes, Dumbarton Oaks, and f i n a l l y we accepted t h r e e , f o u r
and
secondly
three
accepted.
Even R o o s e v e l t
accepted
t h r e e v o t e s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and he r a t h e r took t h i s
proposal
back,
possibility
but
of
three
at
any
votes
rate
he
belonging
mentioned
to
the
the
United
States, too.
JSS
Hawaii, I t h i n k , was one and p o s s i b l y A l a s k a .
American
side
i n t h e end t h i s
could
But on t h e
n o t be
accepted
because o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y o f s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s
in
t h e U n i t e d Nations
from
t h e American
C h a r t e r and i t was obvious
point
o f view,
Hawaii
was
that
not a
sovereign state.
Roschin
Oh y e s , yes, and i t was not mentioned what k i n d o f s t a t e
should
be r e p r e s e n t e d
b u t we
generally said
that the
U n i t e d S t a t e s had t h r e e v o t e s w i t h o u t q u a l i f y i n g t o which
c o u n t r y belonged
these votes.
T h i s i s a l l what 1 would
l i k e t o add t o my i n t e r v i e w t o you.
JSS
Good.
I do want t o ask you a. c o u p l e more q u e s t i o n s v e r y
quickly.
What was t h e S o v i e t i m p r e s s i o n , what was your
32
impression o f S t e t t i n i u s ?
Roschin
My i m p r e s s i o n s were v e r y good about S t e t t i n i u s .
a r a t h e r c o m p a r a t i v e l y young man.
He was
Secondly he was a v e r y
a c c e s s i b l e man and he was knowledgeable from t h e p o i n t o f
view o f t h e system.
But u n f o r t u n a t e l y I f e e l t h a t h i s
a t t i t u d e was n o t v e r y
enthusiastic
c o n c e r n i n g h i s own
p o s i t i o n i n Truman's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , because he r e c e i v e d
the
post
of
organization,
representative
i t was
thought
to
a
the
United
not very
Nations
high
post
comparatively with the secretary o f s t a t e .
JSS
And you were aware o f t h a t a l r e a d y i n San F r a n c i s c o , t h a t
he d i d n o t have g r e a t f a v o r w i t h Truman...
Roschin
Oh, I don't know about t h a t , a t t h e time I don't
know.
My a t t i t u d e i s v e r y f a v o r a b l e towards him because he was
very
much
personal
open-minded
letter,
towards me
rather
big
p e r s o n a l l y , he
letter
towards
sent
my
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e c o n f e r e n c e , and g e n e r a l l y I was v e r y
much i n f a v o r o f Edward S t e t t i n i u s .
JSS
Were t h e r e any o t h e r f i g u r e s who s t o o d o u t i n your mind
as o u t s t a n d i n g p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n San F r a n c i s c o ?
Roschin
I was r a t h e r v e r y much impressed by Governor S t a s s e n who
was a t t h e time r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y
but who was i n a v e r y good count w i t h P r e s i d e n t Delano
Roosevelt.
Stassen.
R o o s e v e l t was v e r y much i n f a v o r o f Governor
He was r e c a l l e d from t h e Navy.
He p u t t h r e e
R e p u b l i c a n s on t h e d e l e g a t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . I t
33
was
Governor
was,
S t a s s e n , i t was
i f I'm
JSS
Yes, i t was
Roschin
At
not mistaken,
A r t h u r Vandenberg, and i t
Eaton.
Eaton.
t h e same time was S t e t t i n i u s and from t h e s i d e o f
C o n n a l l y was
from
a l s o on t h e Democratic
Democratic
side,
and
wife
s i d e , S o l Blum
of
Roosevelt,
Tom
was
Madame
R o o s e v e l t , E l e a n o r R o o s e v e l t , was not p r e s e n t a t t h e time
a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e because i t was v e r y c l o s e t o t h e death
of
h e r husband.
JSS
But o f course she was
i n London, and
Roschin
She was
i n London, she was
i n the f i r s t
General
Assembly,
active
she
was
later.
session of the
i n a l l stages,
she
handled t h e problem o f s o c i a l and human r i g h t s problems
at
the
time.
favorable
I
towards
V i s h i n s k y was
her,
that
but
i n f a v o r o f her
JSS
He was
i n favor?
Roschin
He was
i n favor.
JSS
Why
Roschin
This
was
remember
our
rather
people
felt
I
say
that
activity.
that?
is difficult
to
explain
to
you
but
because o f our r e l a t i o n s h i p a t t h e t i m e .
in
may
not
a l l s e s s i o n s o f G e n e r a l Assembly.
I
remember
I participated
During t h e
first
s e s s i o n u n t i l the second s e s s i o n o f t h e G e n e r a l Assembly,
d u r i n g the l i f e o f S t a l i n , and l a t e r from t e n t h s e s s i o n
of
JSS
t h e G e n e r a l Assembly and l a t e r
Now,
a final
on.
philosophical question.
34
You were t h e r e a t
the b e g i n n i n g , and as you say you were p a r t o f t h e s m a l l
Soviet
delegation.
So you were one o f t h e important
p e o p l e on t h e S o v i e t s i d e .
How do you judge t h e h i s t o r y
of the United Nations since?
What do you t h i n k o f t h i s
o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t you h e l p e d t o c r e a t e ?
Has i t been a
disappointment?
Roschin
well
from
expensive
my p e r s o n a l
point
organization
o f view,
-
this
unfortunately
is a
much
very
more
expensive than we expected.
When I was a t San F r a n c i s c o
I
that
warned
concerning
our
ambassador
the
expenditures
of
we
have
the
no
United
defense
Nations
organization.
JSS
You mentioned t h a t a l r e a d y
Roschin
I mentioned t h a t a l r e a d y a t t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference.
But
I
may
say u n f o r t u n a t e l y
attention t o t h i s question.
important a t a l l .
to
then?
pay enormous
organization.
he
d i d n o t pay enough
He s a i d t o me t h a t i t i s n o t
And through t h i s time we were o b l i g e d
sums o f money t o t h e U n i t e d
From t h i s p o i n t o f view I was v e r y
Nations
closely
connected t o t h e problem o f e x p e n d i t u r e and I don't v e r y
much l i k e t h i s problem.
I a b s t a i n e d even t o p a r t i c i p a t e
i n t h e F i f t h Committee because we always v o t e d
against
the budget o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s o r g a n i z a t i o n and a t t h e
same time we had no p o s s i b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e t h e i n c r e a s e
of
the expenditure o f the United
point
o f view
I was v e r y
35
Nations.
negative.
The
From
this
substantive
problem
I
feel
ineffective
i s that
organ
United
concerning
Nations
was
t h e problem
p o l i c y and r e g u l a t i o n o f problems.
a
of
very
foreign
A l l wars, a l l c r i s e s
t h a t took p l a c e a f t e r t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e C h a r t e r ,
for
i n s t a n c e t h e B e r l i n c r i s i s , t h e A u s t r i a n c r i s i s , t h e war
t h e near E a s t , t h e war i n Korea, and a l l o t h e r wars - i t
was n o t p o s s i b l e t o s e t t l e a l l t h e s e problems through t h e
United Nations.
That's why from
t h e p o i n t o f view o f
substantive a c t i v i t y o f the u n i t e d Nations o r g a n i z a t i o n
I was n o t v e r y much i n f a v o r .
But a l l my l i f e I was v e r y
c l o s e l y connected w i t h t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
I
participated
Assembly.
i n t h e many
I was once even t h e p o l i t i c a l
o u r d e l e g a t i o n i n t h e New
closely
connected
Nations;
with
United Nations.
unfortunately
And
A l l this
the a c t i v i t y
I was
of the United
towards t h e e x p e n d i t u r e
we were v e r y
Nations
poorly
and
most
represented
because we
acceptable t o the s t a f f
secondly,
of the
Towards t h e s t a r t o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ,
of the United
people
York.
advisor
b u t I was n o t v e r y f a v o r a b l e towards t h e s i t e
of the United Nations,
start
o f t h e General
I was a l s o t h e head o f t h e department o f t h e
United Nations,
of
sessions
F i r s t of a l l
had v e r y
of the United
important,
I
i n the
was
few
Nations.
not
very
f a v o r a b l e towards t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e U n i t e d Nations
i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems.
probably
d i d not coincide
36
with
the policy
This
of our
government because our government I u n d e r s t a n d has a v e r y
favorable
p o s i t i o n toward
the
United
Nations.
But
c o n s i d e r the a c t i v i t y o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s through
X
the
a n g l e o f t h e p a s t y e a r s when I t o o k an a c t i v e p a r t i n the
United
JSS
Nations.
Ambassador R o s c h i n , I don't want t o keep you any
longer.
I had one q u e s t i o n though on a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t
and t h a t i s Korea, the Korean War.
Who
was
i n charge o f
United Nations a f f a i r s i n the Soviet Foreign M i n i s t r y a t
the time o f the Korean War,
Roschin
Yes,
Mr.
M a l i k was
JSS
I know he was
do you
recall?
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f our
i n New
York and
country.
f o r t h e purposes o f
this
h i s t o r y , I am v e r y anxious t o f i n d someone on the S o v i e t
s i d e who
Malik
had
an i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n a t t h a t time.
i s dead, o f course,
i d e n t i f y who
was
and
I have not
Mr.
been a b l e
to
i n Moscow a t t h a t p o i n t i n f l u e n t i a l
on
Soviet p o l i c y .
Roschin
I c o u l d not even imagine, because a l l t h e p e o p l e who
a t t h e time i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s a r e dead.
f a v o r o f our a t t i t u d e i n t h i s war,
a t the time a l s o not i n f a v o r .
were
I am not i n
unfortunately;
I
was
But I c o u l d not pronounce
my a t t i t u d e .
JSS
Because you were not d i r e c t l y
Roschin
I was
involved?
not d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d , but a t any r a t e I was
time - i t was
1950
- I was
t h e deputy head o f t h e
a t the
United
N a t i o n s department - I was t h e head o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
37
Department.
JSS
I f I could
then.
just
ask you one q u e s t i o n
i n that
The S o v i e t Union was n o t p r e s e n t
respect,
i n the Security
C o u n c i l when t h e b a s i c d e c i s i o n was t a k e n .
I t has been
o f t e n s a i d t h a t i t was t h e S o v i e t Union t h a t encouraged
North Korea t o a t t a c k t h e South.
has
The q u e s t i o n i n my mind
always been, i f indeed t h e S o v i e t Union encouraged
North Korea t o a t t a c k t h e South, why was i t t h e n absent
from
the Security
Council
when
the attack
actually
occurred?
Roschin
I can e x p l a i n t o you why we were absent:
i n s i s t e d t h a t China s h o u l d be r e p r e s e n t e d
Nations
body
but
China
was
because we
a t the United
eliminated
and
the
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f Kuomintang - Taiwan - was p r e s e n t e d a t
the time as t h e Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
We were n o t i n
f a v o r o f such a s i t u a t i o n ; S t a l i n was much i r r i t a t e d by
t h i s s i t u a t i o n and he s a i d t h a t we do n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n
the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
I t was T s a r a p k i n who was t h e deputy
o f Mr. M a l i k , he was deputy o f Mr. M a l i k , and he was a l s o
withdrawn from a l l a c t i v i t y .
present
when t h e S e c u r i t y
But a t t h e same time he was
Council
was
seated
at this
moment and when i n August 1950, i t was c o n s i d e r e d
the questions
one o f
(I do n o t remember, I p r o b a b l y can remember
much more e x a c t l y a f t e r some p e r i o d o f t i m e ) , he occupied
the
place
of the Soviet
representative
against the decision of the Security
38
and he
Council.
voted
JSS
He
did?
Roschin
He
did.
JSS
How
was
Roschin
But a t any r a t e i t was,
a t any r a t e he took the p l a c e
the
the
that
possible?
representative
of
Soviet
Union
and
he
of
voted
a g a i n s t , t h i s i s q u i t e normal procedure.
JSS
Well,
there
remain unknown q u e s t i o n s
about the
Korean
s i t u a t i o n . The S o v i e t f i l e s have not been opened on t h a t
p e r i o d of h i s t o r y .
Roschin
I f t h e y e x i s t now.
I doubt whether t h e y e x i s t
some documents were d e s t r o y e d
Stalin;
after
immediately were destroyed,
and
s u r e t h a t t h e s e documents e x i s t even
JSS
But
looking
back, do
you
think
the
because
death
I am
of
not
Mr.
quite
now.
i t was
a basic
Soviet
mistake t o have been absent from the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a t
that
Roschin
point?
I think
so.
I think
that t h i s
t h a t we
withdrew from t h e
is a definite
Security Council
f a c t t h a t the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l may
d e c i s i o n s towards our
was
t h i s time a t the S e c u r i t y
JSS
And
despite
the
make v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l
c o u n t r y and
d e f i n i t e l y a mistake t h a t we
mistake,
towards C h i n a .
This
d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e a t
Council.
l o o k i n g back, d i d you have any a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t
Chinese might i n f a c t i n t e r v e n e
the
i n Korea?
Roschin
China, i f I am
not mistaken, i n t e r v e n e d
JSS
I know i t d i d , but i n the S o v i e t government d i d you have
39
definitely.
any
Roschin
a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t i t would
I don't know, I don't know.
intervene?
I imagine t h a t we may have
r a t h e r envisaged t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y and even we may r a t h e r
have a d v i s e d
t h e Chinese government, Mao Tse-tung, t h a t
t h e y t a k e a more a c t i v e p a r t
i n t h e Korean War.
But
t r i e d t o a v o i d o u r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Korean War.
JSS
I t was t o o dangerous.
Roschin
Too dangerous because i t l e a d t o t h e c o n f l a g r a t i o n w i t h
the United
JSS
States.
Thank you v e r y much, Ambassador R o s c h i n .
40
INDEX OF NAMES
A r k a d i e v , Georgy P e t r o v i c h
l
Baker, N o e l
29-30
Blum, S o l
f
14
9, 26, 34
C h u r c h i l l , Winston
2, 18
C o n n a l l y , Tom
34
Cranbourne, L o r d
17
Delhosse, Ivan
22
Dunn, James
3
Eaton, FNTJ
34
Eden, Anthony
4, 18
E v a t t , H e r b e r t Vere
28
Gromyko, A n d r e i
1, 3, 8, 16
Harriman, W. A v e r e l l
6
Hiss, Alger
15-16
H i t l e r , Adolf
4
Hull, Cordell
4
Jebb, Gladwyn
14, 16
K r y l o v , FNU
29
Kuznetsov, V a s i l i V a s i l i e v i c h
1
Lange, Oskar
23
L a v r e n t i e v , FNU
3
Malik,
37-38
Masaryk, J a n
29
Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw
23
41
Molotov,
Vyacheslav
1-4, 7, 24-25
M.
14-15
P a s v o l s k y , Leo
Patyonkin,
3
FNU
Rockefeller,
28
Nelson
Romulo, C a r l o s
22
Roosevelt, Eleanor
34
R o o s e v e l t , F r a n k l i n D.
3, 32-33
Saka, Hasan
Sobolev,
Stalin,
27
Arkady
14-15, 17, 24
Josif
2-4, 6-7, 13, 20-22, 30-31, 34, 38-39
Stassen, Harold
33-34
S t e t t i n i u s , Edward
Stevenson,
5-6, 14-16, 33
Adlai
16
Truman, H a r r y S.
2-3, 13, 26, 33
T s a r a p k i n , Semen K.
38
Tse-tung,
40
Mao
Vandenberg, A r t h u r
9-10, 34
Vishinsky, Andrei
22
Webster, C h a r l e s
Wolff, General
9, 27
Karl
2,4
42
UNITED NATIONS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
ORAL HISTORY AGREEMENT
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It
$o6cw/i
(Interviewee)
hereby
agree
to
p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s O r a l H i s t o r y P r o j e c t , sponsored
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and consent t o t h e r e c o r d i n g by. magnetic audio tape o f (an)
c
i n t e r v i e w (s)
with
J
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(Interviewer)
on / W r 1<. It*if6> fPafee) a t
/^sr^
or*A
(City),
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(state).
3
I t i s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t a t y p e d t r a n s c r i p t w i l l be made
o f such t a p e ( s ) and r e t u r n e d t o me f o r any n e c e s s a r y c o r r e c t i o n s .
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be p r e s e r v e d a t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s and made a v a i l a b l e f o r
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written permission.
'
(IntervieWe)
^^j/lt^
(Interviewer)
(For
the I n s t i t u t i o n of Social
and P o l i c y s t u d i e s )
(Date)
'fa*, ^7 m&
'
(Date)
(Date)