Communism Unit Outline
1) Notes: Background knowledge
2) Video: Russian Revolution
- maps photos and background of Czars and 1905 revolution,
1917 revolution.
- Notes on Lenin and the Russian Revolution
- Hand out readings on Lenin 1902, October Manifesto, and
more, you need something that calls into question Lenin as
Saint and what a revolution takes to complete)
3) Seminar: based on Lenin primary documents
4) Posters used as method of discussion and note taking. NEP,
problems of the Civil War, death of Lenin
5) Video: Life Under Stalin hand out Life Man of the Year article,
clippings of actual documents with interpretation up until
peristroika
6) Seminar: Sinner or Saint Stalin: Discussion
7) Essay Question:
Vocabulary
Autocratic, Serf, Tsar, Russo Japanese War, October Manifesto, Lenin, Stalin, Marx,
Trotsky, Duma, World War One, Treaty of Brest Litvosk, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks,
N.E.P., War communism, Soviets, April Thesis, International, Kerensky, Whites, Reds
CHEKA, Purges, Ukrainian Famine, Collectivization, Kulaks, gulag
- What conditions made Russia ripe for a revolution? 1917?
- What were the differences between Lenin and Marx?
- What were the similarities between Stalin and Marx?
- What were the similarities between Lenin and Stalin?
- What was the April Thesis?
- What were the main Bolshevik (Communist Party Policies) that when they began the
revolution?
Essay Question
“Lenin began a great revolution that was later betrayed by the methods and ideology of
his successors.”
or
“Stalin was a great man, he made tough decisions that were necessary given the
pressures of the times in which he lived.”
Agree or disagree with one of these statements. Usual essay rubric, don’t forget I want
to see some serious, no smiling research notes.
Notes
1. The Russian Revolution: The March Revolution
The fall of the Romanov dynasty started with a series of food demonstrations in the
capital.
 In March 1917, the women of Petrograd demonstrated over food shortages. They
received the support of factory workers. The food strike became a general strike.
 The traditional tool of repression, the Cossak troops, refused to fire on the
demonstrators.
 Some Cossaks joined the demonstrators. Effective government ceased to exist.
2. Contested "Legitimacy": An Ideological Struggle
On March 12, a provisional government was formed by the Duma. The Tsar abdicated and
the Romanov Dynasty came to an end. Two political bodies competed for the support of the
people. Each had its own vision of Russia's future:
The Provisional Government
 Was controlled by liberals and moderate socialists.
 Wanted to continue the unpopular war
 Had no plans to break up the large estates and give land to the peasantry.
The Soviets
 Workers and soldiers had created their own representative councils, the "soviets".
 The soviets claimed to represent the "true" interests of the people.
 The soviets wanted to end the war.
3. Increasing Public Discontent
The military disasters of 1917 only intensified the dissatisfaction with the war.
 The number of desertions increased.
 In the countryside, the peasants disregarded the Provisional Government and seized
the large estates.
Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin)
Many Russian revolutionaries had been exiled during the rule of the Tsars. At the time of
the March revolution, Lenin resided in Zurich.
He wished to return to Russia and participate in the momentous events.
Lenin, a disciple of Marx, believed that only a violent revolution would destroy
capitalism. To accomplish this task required the leadership of a highly disciplined
workers' party.
 A small revolutionary elite would lead the revolution.
 This leadership or vanguard would ensure the ideological integrity of the movement
and direct activities to precipitate the revolution.
 The vanguard would exercise power after the revolution to ensure that the
revolution continued properly.
The Germans assisted Lenin to return to Russia. Appearing before the All-Russian
Conference of
Soviets, he issued his "April Theses" which enunciated his program:
 all power would be given to the soviets;
 the provisional government had to be eliminated;
 capitalism would be destroyed, the war would be ended; and,
 the peasants would be given land.
The Provisional Government faced many problems:
 The western powers demanded that Russia continue its war effort.
 The peasants were seizing land.
 Non-Russian parts of the nation were seeking independence.;
 It had many opponents on the extreme political right
and left.
Aware of the general unrest and political instability, the Bolsheviks attempted a coup
in July.
 The coup failed and Lenin fled to Finland.
The Provisional Government, led by Alexander Kerenski, called upon the General
Kornilov to restore order.
 Kornilov did not support democracy and rather than eliminating the political
opponents of the government he attempted a military coup.
 The failed coup damaged the credibility of the government.
The Bolshevik Assumption of Power
The Bolsheviks claimed the credit for stopping Kornilov. Throughout the summer of 1917,
they increased their support among the workers and soldiers of Petrograd.
In November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized control of Petrograd. Many members of the
Provisional Government were arrested.
The Bolshevik seizure of power was not universally supported. The Bolsheviks were unable to
gain a majority in the constituent assembly elections shortly after the coup.
4. Peace with Germany
Lenin realized that the existence of his new regime depended on ending the war.
 Negotiations with the Germans were quickly initiated.
 The Germans dictated the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Russia lost a third
of its population. Poland and Finland gained their independence.
5. Contested Legitimacy: Civil War in Russia
Lenin now faced civil war. Leon Trotsky organized and directed the "Red" army. Those
opposing the Bolsheviks included army officers, royalists, liberals and many others who
became known as the "Whites".
Concepts (Knowledge Objectives)
Russia's wartime allies supported the Whites.
 They sought to prevent the Red Army from seizing supplies they had sent to the
Tsar's regime and hoped to topple the Bolsheviks.
 The allied intervention and impact on the civil war was minimal. The western public
was tired of war.
Trotsky's efforts were aided by the German collapse in 1918. The Red Army recaptured the
Ukraine. The failure of the White forces to coordinate their military efforts contributed
to the Bolshevik victory.
War Communism
On the home front, Lenin established "war communism" in an attempt to mobilize all
resources. All banks were nationalized. Grain was seized from the peasants. Rationing was
instituted.
 Those who opposed the Bolsheviks were severely punished. The secret police, the
Cheka, sought out "enemies of the state" and executed thousands. The Tsar and his
family were executed.
6. The civil war ended in victory for Lenin and the Red Army.
The Rise of Totalitarianism and the Impact on the Individual
Despite winning the civil war by 1921, Lenin's new regime faced many difficulties.
 The peasants were resisting any attempt to take their lands.
 The party did not have the expertise to run industries and production declined.
 Other nations refused to trade with a communist state.
Lenin realized that some departures from Marxist doctrine were required to restore the
economy and ensure the survival of the new Communist regime.
Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) allowed some measure of private enterprise.
 Private ownership of small factories was permitted.
 Peasants were allowed to sell part of their produce on the open market.
 These policies stimulated both the economy and foreign trade.
Policies of the Bolshevik Party (Lenin)
1. Abolition of private land ownership
2. Nationalization of all banks, all industry, the merchant marine. (Before the
revolution Lenin told the workers that they would have control of industry. Once
in power he introduced government control because theoretically the workers
were the government.)
3. Abolition of the stock market
4. State monopoly on all gold.
5. Replacement of the old Russian Calendar by the Western Calendar.
6. Abolition of all government debt.
7. Abolition of the right of inheritance.
8. Abolition of old aristocratic titles and their replacement with titles of citizen or
comrade.
9. Permission for the church to exist. (many church leaders were arrested and
religious teaching educational institutions was not allowed.)
10. Modernization of Russia.
Lenin changes Marxism “What is to be done”
1. Karl Marx, writing in industrial Europe during the middle of the mid 1800’s believed
that the established system of capitalism was about to be overthrown by the workers. A
new government of the workers would gain power. Marx believed that this revolution
would be a spontaneous uprising by the workers.
Lenin proposed that Russia’s revolution be carried out be a small group of carefully
trained professional revolutionaries rather than by the large masses of party members.
These professional revolutionaries should not wait for the revolution to occur but rather
make it happen.
Lenin:
“Our very first and most imperative duty is to help to train working class
revolutionaries… therefore; attention must be devoted primarily to the task of
raising the workers to the level of the revolutionaries, and not to lowering
ourselves to the level of the laboring masses”
The only serious organizational principle the active workers of our movement can
accept is strict secrecy, strict selection of members and the training of
professional revolutionaries.
The working class revolutionary must also become a professional revolutionary.
Give us organization of revolutionaries and we shall overturn the whole of
Russia.”
2. Marx believed that the workers or proletariat would lead the revolution. They would
seize the property of the rich classes and then own, operate and control them for the
benefit of everyone.
Lenin agreed with this, but he believed that the peasants should be included with the
proletariat since the industrialized working class was still very small in Russia.
3. In carrying out their revolution, Marx believed that the revolutionaries should use any
means available to them, including violence, to seize power. Lenin agreed with this.
Lenin: “Never reject terror on principle.”
“Truth does not count unless it serves an end.”
“Our tactic, absolute distrust.
“There are no morals in politics.
“Regard all persons without sentiment”
“Promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken”
“Scheme …zigzag… retreat… anything to hasten the coming of communism.”
4. Marx called the period after the revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat. During
this time Marx believed that the revolutionaries would fight the remaining capitalists to
establish a new classless society.
Lenin agreed that the proletariat must rise up against capitalists. But Russia didn’t have a
large industrial class like the countries Marx intended for the revolution. Russia did have
a Tsar, and nobility. Lenin directed the revolution against them.
Lenin Seminar Documents Read For ________________
“What is to be Done” 1902
“April Thesis”
“Call To Power”
“Hanging Order”
Modern History Sourcebook:
Vladimir Illyich Lenin:
What is to be Done, 1902
In this text, Lenin makes his argument for a coherent, strictly controlled party of
dedicated revolutionaries as a basic necessity for a revolution. Some have seen an anlogy
with the Jesuit Order in his proposals for an elite corps to lead the masses. One may see
in Lenin's proposals a deep insight into to necessary requisites for a revolution, or a deep
contempt for the working classes.
The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is
able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e, it may itself realise the necessity for
combining in unions, for fighting against the employers and for striving to compel the
government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc. The theory of socialism, however,
grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the
educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. According to their
social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves
belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. Similarly, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of
Social Democracy [Note: By "social democracy" Lenin means revolutionary political
Marxism, not the later concept of "moderate" socialism] arose quite independently of the
spontaneous growth of the labour movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome
of the development of ideas among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. At the time
of which we are speaking, i.e., the middle of the nineties, this doctrine not only
represented the completely formulated programme of the Emancipation of Labour group,
but had already won the adherence of the majority of the revolutionary youth in Russia.
***
It is only natural that a Social Democrat, who conceives the political struggle as being
identical with the "economic struggle against the employers and the government," should
conceive of an "organisation of revolutionaries" as being more or less identical with an
"organisation of workers." And this, in fact, is what actually happens; so that when we
talk about organisation, we literally talk in different tongues. I recall a conversation I
once had with a fairly consistent Economist, with whom I had not been previously
acquainted. We were discussing the pamphlet Who Will Make the Political Revolution?
and we were very soon agreed that the principal defect in that brochure was that it
ignored the question of organisation. We were beginning to think that we were in
complete agreement with each other-but as the conversation proceeded, it became clear
that we were talking of different things. My interlocutor accused the author of the
brochure just mentioned of ignoring strike funds, mutual aid societies, etc.; whereas I had
in mind an organisation of revolutionaries as an essential factor in "making" the political
revolution. After that became clear, I hardly remember a single question of importance
upon which I was in agreement with that Economist!
What was the source of our disagreement? The fact that on questions of organisation and
politics the Economists are forever lapsing from Social Democracy into trade unionism.
The political struggle carried on by the Social Democrats is far more extensive and
complex than the economic struggle the workers carry on against the employers and the
government. Similarly (and indeed for that reason), the organisation of a revolutionary
Social-Democratic Party must inevitably differ from the organisations of the workers
designed for the latter struggle. A workers' organisation must in the first place be a trade
organisation; secondly, it must be as wide as possible; and thirdly, it must be as public as
conditions will allow (here, and further on, of course, I have only autocratic Russia in
mind). On the other hand, the organisations of revolutionaries must consist first and
foremost of people whose profession is that of a revolutionary (that is why I speak of
organisations of revolutionaries, meaning revolutionary Social Democrats). In view of
this common feature of the members of such an organisation, all distinctions as between
workers and intellectuals, and certainly distinctions of trade and profession, must be
obliterated. Such an organisation must of necessity be not too extensive and as secret as
possible.
***
I assert:
1. that no movement can be durable without a stable organisation of leaders to
maintain continuity;
2. that the more widely the masses are spontaneously drawn into the struggle and
form the basis of the movement and participate in it, the more necessary is it to
have such an organisation, and the more stable must it be (for it is much easier for
demogogues to sidetrack the more backward sections of the masses);
3. that the organisation must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary
activities as a profession;
4. that in a country with an autocratic government, the more we restrict the
membership of this organisation to persons who are engaged in revolutionary
activities as a profession and who have been professionally trained in the art of
combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to catch the
organisation, and
5. the wider will be the circle of men and women of the working class or of other
classes of society able to join the movement and perform active work in it....
The active and widespread participation of the masses will not suffer; on the contrary, it
will benefit by the fact that a "dozen" experienced revolutionaries, no less professionally
trained than the police, will centralise all the secret side of the work-prepare leaflets,
work out approximate plans and appoint bodies of leaders for each urban district, for each
factory district and to each educational institution, etc. (I know that exception will be
taken to my "undemocratic" views, but I shall reply to this altogether unintelligent
objection later on.) The centralisation of the more secret functions in an organisation of
revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and the quality of the
activity of a large number of other organisations intended for wide membership and
which, therefore, can be as loose and as public as possible, for example, trade unions,
workers' circles for self-education and the reading of illegal literature, and socialist and
also democratic circles for all other sections of the population. etc, etc We must have as
large a number as possible of such organisations having the widest possible variety of
functions, but it is absurd and dangerous to confuse those with organisations of
revolutionaries, to erase the line of demarcation between them, to dim still more the
masses already incredibly hazy appreciation of the fact that in order to "serve" the mass
movement we must have people who will devote themselves exclusively to Social
Democratic activities, and that such people must train themselves patiently and
steadfastly to be professional revolutionaries.
Aye, this appreciation has become incredibly dim. The most grievous sin we have
committed in regard to organisation is that by our primitiveness we have lowered the
prestige o revolutionaries in Russia. A man who is weak and vacillating on theoretical
questions, who has a narrow outlook who makes excuses for his own slackness on the
ground that the masses are awakening spontaneously; who resembles a trade union
secretary more than a people's tribune, who is unable to conceive of a broad and bold
plan, who is incapable of inspiring even his opponents with respect for himself, and who
is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art-the art of combating the political
police-such a man is not a revolutionary but a wretched amateur!
Let no active worker take offense at these frank remarks, for as far as insufficient training
is concerned, I apply them first and foremost to myself. I used to work in a circle that set
itself great and all-embracing tasks; and every member of that circle suffered to the point
of torture from the realisation that we were proving ourselves to be amateurs at a moment
in history when we might have been able to say, paraphrasing a well-known epigram:
"Give us an organisation of revolutionaries, and we shall overturn the whole of Russia!"
From, V.I. Lenin: "What is to Be Done?", Lenin: Collected Works Vol V, pp. 375-76,
451-53, 464-67
This text is part of the Internet Modern History Sourcebook. The Sourcebook is a
collection of public domain and copy-permitted texts for introductory level classes in
modern European and World history.
Unless otherwise indicated the specific electronic form of the document is copyright.
Permission is granted for electronic copying, distribution in print form for educational
purposes and personal use. If you do reduplicate the document, indicate the source. No
permission is granted for commercial use of the Sourcebook.
(c)Paul Halsall Aug 1997
[email protected]
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1902lenin.html .Nov.25/
LENIN ON HIS 'APRIL THESES'
I have outlined a few theses which I shall supply with some commentaries. I could not,
because of the lack of time, present a thorough, systematic report. The basic question is
our attitude towards the war. The basic things confronting you as you read about Russia
or observe conditions here are the triumph of defencism, the triumph of the traitors to
Socialism, the deception of the masses by the bourgeoisie. . . . The new government, like
the preceding one, is imperialistic, despite the promise of a republic - it is imperialistic
through and through.
1. In our attitude toward the war not the slightest concession must be made to
"revolutionary defencism," for under the new government of Lvov & Co., owing to the
capitalise nature of this government, the war on Russia's part remains a predatory
imperialist war. In view of the undoubted honesty of the mass of rank and file
representatives of revolutionary defencism who accept the war only as a necessity and
not as a means of conquest, in view of their being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is
necessary most thoroughly, persistently, patiently to explain to them their error, to
explain the inseparable connection between capital and the imperialist war, to prove that
without the overthrow of capital it is impossible to conclude the war with a really
democratic, non-oppressive peace. This view is to be widely propagated among the army
units in the field. . . .
2. The peculiarity of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition
from the first stage of the revolution - which, because of the inadequate organisation and
insufficient class-consciousness of the proletariat, led to the assumption of power by the
bourgeoisie - to its second stage which is to place power in the hands of the proletariat
and the poorest strata of the peasantry. . . . This peculiar situation demands of us an
ability to adapt ourselves to the specific conditions of party work amidst vast masses of
the proletariat just wakened to political life.
3. No support to the Provisional Government; exposure of the utter falsity of all
its promises, particularly those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Unmasking,
instead of admitting, the illusion-breeding "demand" that this government, a government
of capitalist, should cease to be imperialistic. . .
4. Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies our
party constitutes a minority, and a small one at that, in the face of the bloc of all the petty
bourgeois opportunist elements..... who have yielded to the influence of the
bourgeoisie....... It must be explained to the masses that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies
is the only possible form of revolutionary government and that, therefore, our task is,
while this government is submitting to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a
patient, systematic, and persistent analysis of its errors and tactics, an analysis especially
adapted to the practical needs of the masses. . . .
5. Not a parliamentary republic - a return to it from the Soviet of Workers'
Deputies would be a step backward - but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural
Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the land, from top to bottom.
 Abolition of the police, the army, the bureaucracy. . . .
 All officers to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, their salaries not to
exceed the average wage of a competent worker. . . .
6.
In the agrarian programme, the emphasis must be shifted to the Soviets of
Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.


Confiscation of private lands.
Nationalisation of all lands in the country, and management of such lands by local
Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies.
 A separate organisation of Soviets of Deputies of the poorest peasants.
 Creation of model agricultural establishments out of large estates . . .
7. Immediate merger of all the banks in the country into one general national
bank, over which the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should have control . . .
8. Not the "introduction" of Socialism as an immediate task, but the immediate
placing of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in control of social production and distribution
of goods . . .
9. Party tasks:
A. Immediate calling of a party convention.
B. Changing the party program, mainly:
1. Concerning imperialism and the imperialist war.
2. Concerning our attitude toward the state, and our demand for a
'commune state."
3. Amending our antiquated minimum programme.
10. Rebuilding the International. Taking the initiative in the creation of a
revolutionary International, an International against the social-chauvinists and against the
"centre" . . .
Modern history sourcebook. http://www.dur.ac.uk/~dml0www/aprilths.htm .
Nov.25th/2004
Modern History Sourcebook:
Lenin: Call to Power,
Oct 24, 1917
The situation is critical in the extreme. In fact it is now absolutely clear that to
delay the uprising would be fatal.
With all my might I urge comrades to realize that everything now hangs by a
thread; that we are confronted by problems which are not to be solved by
conferences or congresses (even congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by
peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed people.
The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovites show that we must not wait. We must
at all costs, this very evening, this very night, arrest the government, having first
disarmed the officer cadets, and so on.
We must not wait! We may lose everything!
Who must take power?
That is not important at present. Let the Revolutionary Military Committee do it,
or "some other institution" which will declare that it will relinquish power only to
the true representatives of the interests of the people, the interests of the army, the
interests of the peasants, the interests of the starving.
All districts, all regiments, all forces must be mobilized at once and must
immediately send their delegations to the Revolutionary Military Committee and
to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks with the insistent demand that under
no circumstances should power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co.... not
under any circumstances; the matter must be decided without fail this very
evening, or this very night.
History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be
victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk
losing much tomorrow, in fact, the risk losing everything.
If we seize power today, we seize it not in opposition to the Soviets but on their
behalf.
The seizure of power is the business of the uprising; its political purpose will
become clear after the seizure....
...It would be an infinite crime on the part of the revolutionaries were they to let
the chance slip, knowing that the salvation of the revolution, the offer of peace,
the salvation of Petrograd, salvation from famine, the transfer of the land to the
peasants depend upon them.
The government is tottering. It must be given the death-blow at all costs.
This text is part of the Internet Modern History Sourcebook. The Sourcebook is a
collection of public domain and copy-permitted texts for introductory level
classes in modern European and World history.
Unless otherwise indicated the specific electronic form of the document is
copyright. Permission is granted for electronic copying, distribution in print form
for educational purposes and personal use. If you do reduplicate the document,
indicate the source. No permission is granted for commercial use of the
Sourcebook.
(c)Paul Halsall Aug 1997
[email protected]
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1917lenin1.html
Hanging Order
11-8-18
Send to Penza To Comrades Kuraev, Bosh, Minkin and other Penza communists
Comrades! The revolt by the five kulak volost's must be suppressed without mercy. The
interest of the entire revolution demands this, because we have now before us our final
decisive battle "with the kulaks." We need to set an example.
1. You need to hang (hang without fail, so that the public sees) at least 100
notorious kulaks, the rich, and the bloodsuckers.
2. Publish their names.
3. Take away all of their grain.
4. Execute the hostages - in accordance with yesterday's telegram.
This needs to be accomplished in such a way, that people for hundreds of miles around
will see, tremble, know and scream out: let's choke and strangle those blood-sucking
kulaks.
Telegraph us acknowledging receipt and execution of this.
Yours, Lenin
P.S. Use your toughest people for this.
______________________
TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS: Lenin uses the derogative term kulach'e in reference to
the class of prosperous peasants. A volost' was a territorial/administrative unit consisting
of a few villages and surrounding land.
[not numbered]
Modern History Source book.
http://archive.ncsa.uiuc.edu/SDG/Experimental/soviet.exhibit/ad2kulak.html.
Nov.25th/2004
Stalin Notes
7. Stalin and the Creation of a Police State
Lenin's death in 1924 initiated a struggle for the leadership of the Communist Party.
*
The two major rival were Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin. The two men had
different visions of the future of communism.
*
Trotsky believed that communism could not survive in one nation and therefore, a
world revolution had to be promoted.
*
Stalin argued that it was first necessary to consolidate the communist revolution in
Russia and then promote a world revolution.
8. Stalinist Era: The Impact on the Individual
Stalin gained control of the Party by 1927, by placing his supporters in key positions. The
Party adopted his policy of "socialism in one country" and all deviations from Stalin's policies
were to be condemned.
The Five-Year Plans: Centralized Planning
Stalin's economic policies were enunciated in a series of five-year plans.
*
Agriculture was a priority on both ideological and economic grounds. The peasants
had won their land and would become, in Stalin's view, a conservative antisocialist force if
allowed to keep their land. Private ownership of land had to end.
Collectivization
All peasants were to give up their farms and form large state-run collectives.
*
In 1929, the peasants were ordered to surrender their land and livestock and form
collectives.
*
The Kulaks, the wealthier peasants, were to be liquidated as a class. Most of them
either died of starvation or were deported to forced-labour camps for "re-education".
*
Despite the resistance of the peasants, by 1939 over 90% of farms had been
collectivized.
*
Collectivization did not result in an increase in productivity.
Industrial Production
Stalin's industrial five-year plans proved to be more successful. The output of industry
doubled during the first five-year plan. Steel production increased 500% between 1928 and
1937.
*
The industrial gains were achieved by limiting the production of consumer goods.
Creation of a Police State
To create the new socialist state required the compliance of the citizenry. The traditional
tools of totalitarian regimes were used to ensure that compliance.
*
Unrestricted police terrorism was characteristic of Stalin's regime.
*
Stalin eliminated any opposition within the Communist party. A series of public trials
of well-known Communists were staged. Forced confessions became the standard feature of
these trials. All potential political rivals were eliminated.
The Red Army's officer core was purged in the late 1930s. This greatly weakened the
morale, leadership and effectiveness of the Army when the Germans invaded the Soviet
Union in 1941.
The ordinary citizen was not immune to the intrusion of the state.
*
There was continuous propaganda campaign to indoctrinate the citizen and glorify
the revolution, socialism, and Stalin. This campaign intruded into every aspect of the
citizen's life.
*
Party activists lectured the factory workers and the peasants on the new collective
farms.
Women in Stalin's Soviet Union
Although life for the average Soviet citizen was not greatly improve during Stalin's regime,
the opportunities for women did increase.
*
Throughout the 1920s, women were encouraged to work outside of the home and to
be liberated from traditional constraints.
*
Education become accessible to Soviet women. Increasing numbers were allowed to
study and to enter better-paying occupations in industry and science. Women came to play a
prominent role in the medical profession.
Stalin had felt that the western powers had been reluctant to open a second front
preferring to see Germany and the Soviet Union inflict enormous damage on each
other.
*
The postwar future of Europe became a subject of disagreement.
*
The Atlantic Charter, signed by Britain and the U.S., called for peace without
territorial gains, national self- determination and free elections.
*
The Charter's terms conflicted with Stalin's demand that the Soviet Union's
western borders be moved further west, thus annexing non-Soviet lands.
In the interest of Allied unity and the successful prosecution of the war effort, agreement
on contentious political issues was postponed until the end of the war.
The wartime conferences of the Allies allowed the differing agendas of each power to
emerge.
Seminar Articles Stalin
“Industrialization of the Country, 1928”
“UKRAINIAN FAMINE”
“Letter to Bolshevik”
“Grain Problem”
“Joseph Stalin: Die, But Do Not Retreat “
Modern History Sourcebook:
Joseph Stalin (1879-1953):
Industrialization of the Country, 1928
The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so
acutely as it does now if we had such a highly developed industry and such a
highly developed technology as Germany, Say, and if the relative importance of
industry in the entire national economy were as high in our country as it is in
Germany, for example. If that were the case, we could develop our industry at a
slower rate without fearing to fall behind the capitalist countries and knowing that
we could outstrip them at one stroke. But then we should not be so seriously
backward technically and economically as we are now. The whole point is that we
are behind Germany in this respect and are still far from having overtaken her
technically and economically.
The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us
so acutely if we were not the only country but one of the countries of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in
our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France,
say.
If that were the case, the capitalist encirclement could not be so serious a danger
as it is now, the question of the economic independence of our country would
naturally recede into the background, we could integrate ourselves into the system
of more developed proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for
making our inclustry and agriculture more productive, supplying them in turn
with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we could, consequently, expand our
industry at a slower rate. But you know very well that that is not yet the case and
that we are still the only country of the proletarian dictatorship and are surrounded
by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and
economically.
Internal conditions. But besides the external conditions, there are also internal
conditions which dictate a fast rate of development of our industry as the main
foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring to the extreme
backwardness of our agriculture, of its technical and cultural level. I am referring
to the existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance of small
commodity producers, with their scattered and utterly backward production,
compared with which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island in the
midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding daily, but which is
nevertheless an island in the midst of the sea.
External conditions. We have assumed power in a country whose technical
equipment is terribly backward. Along with a few big industrial units more or less
based upon modem technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and
factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point
of view of modem achievements. At the same time we have around us a number
of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed and up-todate than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that
their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds,
outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one
hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and
the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the
other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet
power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the
final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?
What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and
outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We ha,~e
overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of
establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not
enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must
also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we
do this, or we shall be forced to the wall.
This applies not only to the building of socialism. It applies also to upholding the
independence of our country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement.
The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate
industrial basis for defence. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our
industry is not more highly developed technically.
That is why a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary and
imperative.
We cannot go on indefinitely, that is, for too long a period, basing the Soviet
regime and socialist construction on two different foundations, the foundation of
the most large-scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most
scattered and backward, small commodity economy of the peasants, We must
gradually, but systematically and persistently, place our agriculture on a new
technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and bring it up to the level of
socialist industry. Either we accomplish this task-in which case the final victory
of socialism in our country will be assured, or we turn away from it and do not
accomplish it-in which case a return to capitalism may become inevitable.
Source:
From Joseph Stalin, "Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in
the C.P.S.U., November 19,1928," in J.V Stalin, Works, vol. 11, 1928-March
1929 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), pp. 257-58, 261-63.
This text is part of the Internet Modern History Sourcebook. The Sourcebook is a
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© Paul Halsall, July 1998
[email protected]
UKRAINIAN FAMINE
The dreadful famine that engulfed Ukraine, the northern Caucasus, and the lower Volga River area in 19321933 was the rssult of Joseph Stalin's policy of forced collectivization. The heaviest losses occurred in
Ukraine, which had been the most productive agricultural area of the Soviet Union. Stalin was determined
to crush all vestiges of Ukrainian nationalism. Thus, the famine was accompanied by a devastating purge of
the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Ukrainian Communist party itself. The famine broke the peasants' will
to resist collectivization and left Ukraine politically, socially, and psychologically traumatized.
The policy of all-out collectivization instituted by Stalin in 1929 to finance industrialization had a
disastrous effect on agricultural productivity. Nevertheless, in 1932 Stalin raised Ukraine's grain
procurement quotas by forty-four percent. This meant that there would not be enough grain to feed the
peasants, since Soviet law required that no grain from a collective farm could be given to the members of
the farm until the government's quota was met. Stalin's decision and the methods used to implement it
condemned millions of peasants to death by starvation. Party officials, with the aid of regular troops and
secret police units, waged a merciless war of attrition against peasants who refused to give up their grain.
Even indispensible seed grain was forcibly confiscated from peasant households. Any man, woman, or
child caught taking even a handful of grain from a collective farm could be, and often was, executed or
deported. Those who did not appear to be starving were often suspected of hoarding grain. Peasants were
prevented from leaving their villages by the NKVD and a system of internal passports.
The death toll from the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine has been estimated between six million and seven
million. According to a Soviet author, "Before they died, people often lost their senses and ceased to be
human beings." Yet one of Stalin's lieutenants in Ukraine stated in 1933 that the famine was a great
success. It showed the peasants "who is the master here. It cost millions of lives, but the collective farm
system is here to stay."..
Letter to Bolshevik
To the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
We appeal to you, asking you to pay a minimum of attention
to our request.
We are prisoners who are returning from the Solovetsky
concentration camp because of our poor health. We went there
full of energy and good health, and now we are returning as
invalids, broken and crippled emotionally and physically. We are
asking you to draw your attention to the arbitrary use of power
and the violence that reign at the Solovetsky concentration camp
in Kemi and in all sections of the concentration camp. It is
difficult for a human being even to imagine such terror, tyranny,
violence, and lawlessness. When we went there, we could not
conceive of such a horror, and now we, crippled ourselves,
together with several thousands who are still there, appeal to
the ruling center of the Soviet state to curb the terror that
reigns there. As though it weren't enough that the Unified State
Political Directorate [OGPU] without oversight and due process
sends workers and peasants there who are by and large innocent
(we are not talking about criminals who deserve to be punished),
the former tsarist penal servitude system in comparison to
Solovky had 99% more humanity, fairness, and legality. [...]
People die like flies, i.e., they die a slow and painful
death; we repeat that all this torment and suffering is placed
only on the shoulders of the proletariat without money, i.e., on
workers who, we repeat, were unfortunate to find themselves in
the period of hunger and destruction accompanying the events of
the October Revolution, and who committed crimes only to save
themselves and their families from death by starvation; they have
already borne the punishment for these crimes, and the vast
majority of them subsequently chose the path of honest labor.
Now because of their past, for whose crime they have already
paid, they are fired from their jobs. Yet, the main thing is
that the entire weight of this scandalous abuse of power, brute
violence, and lawlessness that reign at Solovky and other
sections of the OGPU concentration camp is placed on the
shoulders of workers and peasants; others, such as
counterrevolutionaries, profiteers and so on, have full wallets
and have set themselves up and live in clover in the Soviet
State, while next to them, in the literal meaning of the word,
the penniless proletariat dies from hunger, cold, and backbreaking 14-16 hour days under the tyranny and lawlessness of
inmates who are the agents and collaborators of the State
Political Directorate [GPU].
If you complain or write anything ("Heaven forbid"), they
will frame you for an attempted escape or for something else, and
they will shoot you like a dog. They line us up naked and
barefoot at 22 degrees below zero and keep us outside for up to
an hour. It is difficult to describe all the chaos and terror
that is going on in Kemi, Solovky, and the other sections of the
concentrations camp. All annual inspections uncover a lot of
abuses. But what they discover in comparison to what actually
exists is only a part of the horror and abuse of power, which the
inspection accidently uncovers. (One example is the following
fact, one of a thousand, which is registered in GPU and for which
the guilty have been punished: THEY FORCED THE INMATES TO EAT
THEIR OWN FECES. "Comrades," if we dare to use this phrase,
verify that this is a fact from reality, about which, we repeat,
OGPU has the official evidence, and judge for yourself the full
extent of effrontery and humiliation in the supervision by those
who want to make a career for themselves. [...]
We are sure and we hope that in the All-Union Communist
Party there are people, as we have been told, who are humane and
sympathetic; it is possible, that you might think that it is our
imagination, but we swear to you all, by everything that is
sacred to us, that this is only one small part of the nightmarish
truth, because it makes no sense to make this up. We repeat, and
will repeat 100 times, that yes, indeed there are some guilty
people, but the majority suffer innocently, as is described
above. The word law, according to the law of the GPU
concentration camps, does not exist; what does exist is only the
autocratic power of petty tyrants, i.e., collaborators, serving
time, who have power over life and death. Everything described
above is the truth and we, ourselves, who are close to the grave
after 3 years in Solovky and Kemi and other sections, are asking
you to improve the pathetic, tortured existence of those who are
there who languish under the yoke of the OGPU's tyranny,
violence, and complete lawlessness....
To this we subscribe: G. Zheleznov, Vinogradov, F. Belinskii.
Dec. 14, 1926
True copy
.................................................................
TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS: The letter is written in very poor
Russian.
For the sake of clarity, the translator corrected the
grammar and substituted a few words.
Source library of the congress
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/d2presid.html
Grain Problem
Addendum to the minutes of Politburo [meeting] No. 93.
RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINIAN
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE ON BLACKLISTING VILLAGES
THAT MALICIOUSLY SABOTAGE THE COLLECTION OF GRAIN.
In view of the shameful collapse of grain collection in the
more remote regions of Ukraine, the Council of People's
Commissars and the Central Committee call upon the oblast
executive committees and the oblast [party] committees as well as
the raion executive committees and the raion [party] committees:
to break up the sabotage of grain collection, which has been
organized by kulak and counterrevolutionary elements; to
liquidate the resistance of some of the rural communists, who in
fact have become the leaders of the sabotage; to eliminate the
passivity and complacency toward the saboteurs, incompatible with
being a party member; and to ensure, with maximum speed, full and
absolute compliance with the plan for grain collection.
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee
resolve:
To place the following villages on the black list for overt
disruption of the grain collection plan and for malicious
sabotage, organized by kulak and counterrevolutionary elements:
1. village of Verbka in Pavlograd raion, Dnepropetrovsk
oblast.
...
5. village of Sviatotroitskoe in Troitsk raion, Odessa oblast.
6. village of Peski in Bashtan raion, Odessa oblast.
The following measures should be undertaken with respect to
these villages :
1. Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete
suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and
removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores.
2. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both
collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers.
3. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early
repayment of credit and other financial obligations.
4. Investigation and purge of all sorts of foreign and
hostile elements from cooperative and state institutions, to be
carried out by organs of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.
5. Investigation and purge of collective farms in these
villages, with removal of counterrevolutionary elements and
organizers of grain collection disruption.
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee
call upon all collective and private farmers who are honest and
dedicated to Soviet rule to organize all their efforts for a
merciless struggle against kulaks and their accomplices in order
to: defeat in their villages the kulak sabotage of grain
collection; fulfill honestly and conscientiously their grain
collection obligations to the Soviet authorities; and strengthen
collective farms.
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC - V. CHUBAR'.
SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE - S.
KOSIOR.
6 December 1932.
True copy
Library of the Congress
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/k2grain.html
January 4, 1943 Life Magazine
Joseph Stalin: Die, But Do Not Retreat
The year 1942 was a year of blood and strength. The man whose name means steel in
Russian, whose few words of English include the American expression "tough guy" was
the man of 1942. Only Joseph Stalin fully knew how close Russia stood to defeat in 1942,
and only Joseph Stalin fully knew how he brought Russia through.
But the whole world knew what the alternative would have been. The man who knew it
best of all was Adolf Hitler, who found his past accomplishments turning into dust.
Had German legions swept past steel-stubborn Stalingrad and liquidated Russia's power
of attack, Hitler would have been not only man of the year, but he would have been
undisputed master of Europe, looking for other continents to conquer. He could have
diverted at least 250 victorious divisions to new conquests in Asia and Africa. But
Joseph Stalin stopped him. Stalin had done it before--in 1941--when he started with
all of Russia intact. But Stalin's achievement of 1942 was far greater. All that Hitler
could give he took--for the second time…
... But the 1942 accomplishments of Chiang, of Churchill and of Roosevelt will not bear
fruit till 1943. And, worthy though they may prove, they inevitably pale by comparison
with what Joseph Stalin did in 1942.
At the beginning of the year Stalin was in an unenviable spot. During the year before he
had sold over 400,000 miles of territory at the price of saving most of his army. Gone
was a big fraction--how large only he knew--of the precious tanks, planes and war
equipment which he had been hoarding for years against the Nazi attack. Gone was
roughly one-third of Russia's industrial capacity, on which he depended for replacements.
Gone was nearly half of Russia's best farmland.
With all this gone, Stalin had to face another full-weight blow from the Nazi war
machine. For every trained soldier the Germans had lost in the previous year's battles, he
had probably lost as many and more. For every bit of valuable experience which his
soldiers and commanders had gained, the Germans had had the opportunity to gain an
equal amount.
Stalin still had the magnificent will to resist of the Russian people--who had as much
claim to glory as the British people had when they withstood the blitz of 1940. But a
strong people had not prevented the loss of White Russia and the Ukraine. Would they be
any better able to prevent the conquest of the Don basin, of Stalingrad, of the Caucasus?
The strongest will to resist can eventually crack under continued defeat.
Only one new resource had Stalin for 1942: the help of the U.S. And, as events were to
prove, that was to come late and to be bottlenecked by German attacks on the North Sea
route and the Caucasus.
With these reduced resources, Stalin tackled his problem…
… Joseph Stalin (pronounced Stal-yn), an imponderable, soberly persistent Asiatic,
worked at his desk 16 to 18 hours a day. Before him he kept a huge globe showing the
course of campaigns over territory he himself defended in the civil wars of 1917-20. This
time he again defended it, and mostly by will power. There were new streaks of grey in
his hair and new etchings of fatigue in his granite face But there was no break in his hold
on Russia and there was long- neglected recognition of his abilities by nations outside the
Soviet borders...
…For his armies Stalin coined the slogan Umeraite No Ne Otstupaite (Die, But Do Not
Retreat). It had been shown at Moscow that a strongly fortified city can be held as a
strong point against attack by mechanized forces. Stalin chose to make Stalingrad another
such point. While Germans and Russians were booting each other to death in the bombpocked streets, Stalin was organizing the winter offensive which burst into the Don basin
with the fury of the snowstorms that accompanied it.
To keep his home front intact, Stalin had only work and black bread to offer. He added a
promise of victory in 1942 and called to his people to sacrifice collectively to preserve
the things they had built collectively. … …Stalin shrewdly used the world's headlines to
state the Russian case for more aid.
The Past. The Revolution that was begun in 1917 by a handful of leather-coated working
men and pallid intellectuals waving the red flag, by 1942 had congealed into a party
government that has remained in power longer than any other major party in the world. It
began under the leadership of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, on Marxist principles of a
moneyless economy which challenged the right to accumulate wealth by private
initiative.
The world reviled and caricatured the early Bolsheviks as bush-whiskered anarchists with
a bomb in each hand. But Lenin, faced with hard facts and a war-beaten, superstitious,
illiterate people, compromised with Marxism. Stalin, succeeding him, compromised still
further, concentrated on building socialism in one state. Retained through the years of
Russia's great upheaval was the basic conception that the ownership and operation of the
means of production must be kept in the hands of the state.
Within Russia's immense disorderliness, Stalin faced the fundamental problems of
providing enough food for the people and improving their lot, through 20th-Century
industrial methods. He collectivized the farms and he built Russia into one of the four
great industrial powers on earth. How well he succeeded was evident in Russia's worldsurprising strength in World War II. Stalin's methods were tough, but they paid off.
The Present. The U.S., of all nations, should have been the first to understand Russia.
Ignorance of Russia and suspicion of Stalin were two things that prevented it. Old
prejudices and the antics of U.S. communists dangling at the end of the Party line were
others. As Allies fighting the common enemy, the Russians have fought the best fight so
far. As post-war collaborators, they hold many of the keys to a successful peace.
The two peoples who talk the most and scheme the biggest schemes are the Americans
and the Russians. Both can be sentimental one moment, blazingly angry the next. Both
spend their money freely for goods and pleasures, drink too much, argue interminably.
Both are builders. The U.S. built mills and factories and tamed the land across a continent
3,000 miles wide. Russia tried to catch up by doing the same thing through a planned
program that post-pioneer Americans would not have suffered. The rights as individuals
that U.S. citizens have, the Russians want and believe they eventually will receive. Some
of the discipline that the Russians have, the U.S. may need before the end of World War
II.
The Future. In his 25th-anniversary speech Stalin emphasized that the most important
event in foreign affairs, both for war and peace, was Allied collaboration. "We have the
facts and events," he said, "pointing to a progressive rapprochement among the members
of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and their uniting in a single fighting alliance."
This was a frank approach to the post-war world, as realistically sensible as Stalin's
expressed ideas on dealings with Germany. "Our aim," he said, "is not to destroy all
armed force in Germany, because any intelligent man will understand that this is as
impossible in the case of Germany as in the case of Russia. It would be unreasonable on
the part of the victor to do so. To destroy Hitler's army is possible and necessary."
What other war aims Stalin has are not officially known, but there are reports in high
circles that he wants no new territories except at points needed to make Russia
impregnable against invasion. There is also a story in high places that, in keeping with
the "tough-guy" tradition, credits Stalin with one other desire: permission from his allies
to raze Berlin, as a lesson in psychology to the Germans and as a burnt offering to his
own heroic people.