Philosophy and Democracy
Author(s): Michael Walzer
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1981), pp. 379-399
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
MICHAEL WALZER
Institute
for Advanced Studies,Princeton
I.
The prestigeof politicalphilosophyis veryhighthesedays. It commands the attentionof economistsand lawyers,the two groups of
academicsmostcloselyconnectedto theshapingof publicpolicy,as it
has not done in a long time.And it claims the attentionof political
and judges,mostespeciallyjudges,witha newand
leaders,bureaucrats,
The commandand the claim follownotso much
radicalforcefulness.
fromthe factthatphilosophersare doing creativework,butfromthe
factthat theyare doing creativeworkof a special sort-which raises
again, aftera long hiatus,the possibilityof findingobjectivetruths,
"truemeaning,""rightanswers,""thephilosopher'sstone,"and so on. I
wantto acceptthispossibility(withoutsayingverymuchabout it) and
thenask whatit meansfordemocraticpolitics.Whatis thestandingof
the philosopherin a democraticsociety?This is an old question;there
are old tensionsat workhere:betweentruthand opinion,reasonand
theone and themany.Theseantipodalpairs
will,value and preference,
differfromone another,and none of themquite matchesthe pair
"philosophyand democracy."Buttheydo hangtogether;
theypointto a
fortheir
centralproblem.Philosophersclaima certainsortof authority
sort of authorityfor their
conclusions;the people claim a different
decisions.What is the relationbetweenthetwo?
I shall beginwitha quotationfromWittgenstein
thatmightseemto
resolve the problem immediately."The philosopher,"Wittgenstein
of ideas. That is whatmakes
wrote,"is not a citizenof anycommunity
himintoa philosopher."'This is morethanan assertionofdetachment
in itsusual sense,forcitizensare surelycapable,sometimes,
ofdetached
judgmentseven of theirown ideologies,practices,and institutions.
is assertinga moreradicaldetachment.
Wittgenstein
The philosopheris
and mustbe an outsider;standingapart,notoccasionally(injudgment)
butsystematically
(in thought).I do notknowwhether
thephilosopher
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 9 No. 3, August 1981379-399
? 1981Sage Publications,Inc.
379
380
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
does say any community,
has to be a politicaloutsider.Wittgenstein
and thestate(polis,republic,commonwealth,
kingdom,or whatever)is
certainlya communityof ideas. The communitiesof which the
not a citizenmay,of course,be larger
philosopheris mostimportantly
the
state.
That
will
or smallerthan
dependon whathe philosophizes
about. Butifhe is a politicalphilosopher-notwhatWittgenstein
had in
fromwhichhe will
mind-then the stateis the mostlikelycommunity
have to detach himself,not physically,but intellectually
and, on a
certainview of morality,morallytoo.
has twoforms,and I shallbe concernedwith
Thisradicaldetachment
and analytic;those
only one of them.The firstformis contemplative
in changingthecommunity
whose
who participatein it take no interest
as it jS."2 The second
ideas theystudy."Philosophyleaves everything
form is heroic. I do not want to deny the heroic possibilitiesof
contemplationand analysis.One can always take pridein wrenching
itis noteasyto do, and many
onselfloose fromthebondsofcommunity;
importantphilosophicalachievements
(and all thevarietiesof philosophicalarrogance)have theiroriginsin detachment.But I wantto focus
on a certaintraditionof heroicaction,alive,it seems,in our owntime,
fromthecommunity
wherethephilosopherdetacheshimself
ofideas in
orderto founditagain-intellectuallyand thenmaterially
too,forideas
have consequences,and everycommunityof ideas is also a concrete
community.He withdrawsand returns.He is like the legislatorsof
ancientlegend,whose workprecludesordinarycitizenship.3
in thelong historyof politicalthought,thereis an alternative
to the
detachmentof philosophers,and that is the engagementof sophists,
To be sure,thesophistswhomPlato
critics,publicists,and intellectuals.
attackswerecitilessmen,itinerant
teachers,buttheywerebyno means
of ideas. Theirteachingdrewupon,
strangersin theGreekcommunity
was radicallydependentupon,theresourcesofa commonmembership.
In thissense,Socrateswas a sophist,thoughit was probablycrucialto
ofhismission,as criticand gadfly,
hisown understanding
thathealso be
a citizen:theAthenianswouldhavefoundhimlessirritating
had he not
been one of theirfellows.But thenthe citizenskilled Socrates,thus
itis sometimessaid,thatengagement
demonstrating,
and fellowship
are
notpossibleforanyonecommitted
to thesearchfortruth.Philosophers
cannot be sophists.For practicalas well as intellectualreasons,the
distancethattheyputbetweenthemselves
and theirfellowcitizensmust
be widenedintoa breachoffellowship.And then,forpracticalreasons
only,it mustbe narrowedagain bydeceptionand secrecy.So thatthe
philosopheremerges,like Descartesin his Discourse,as a separatistin
in practice.
thought,a conformist
Walzer / PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
381
He is a conformist,
at least, untilhe findshimselfin a positionto
transform
practiceintosome nearerapproximationto thetruthsofhis
thought.He cannotbe a participant
intheroughand tumblepoliticsof
the city,but he can be a founderor a legislator,a king,a nocturnal
councillor,or a judge-or, morerealistically,
he can be an advisorto
in theear ofpower.Shaped bytheverynature
suchfigures,whispering
ofthephilosophicalproject,he has littletasteforbargainingand mutual
accommodation.Because the truthhe knows or claims to know is
singularin character,he is likelyto thinkthatpoliticsmustbe thesame:
a coherentconception,an uncompromising
execution.In philosophyas
in architecture,
and so in politics,wroteDescartes:Whathas beenput
togetherbitbybit,bydifferent
thantheworkofa
masters,is lessperfect
singlehand. Thus,"thoseold places which,beginningas villages,have
developedin the courseof timeintogreattowns,are generally. . . illproportionedin comparisonwiththosean engineercan designat willin
an orderlyfashion."4Descartes himselfdisclaimsany interestin the
politicalversionofsucha project-perhapsbecausehe believesthatthe
onlyplace wherehe is likelyto reignsupremeis hisownmind.Butthere
is always the possibilityof a partnershipbetween philosophical
authorityand political power. Reflectingon that possibility,the
philosophermay,like Thomas Hobbes, "recoversome hope thatone
timeor other,thiswriting
ofminemayfallintothehandsofa sovereign,
whowill. .. bytheexerciseofentiresovereignty
. .. convertthistruthof
speculationinto the utilityof practice."5The crucialwords in these
quotationsfromDescartesand Hobbes are "designat will"and "entire
sovereignty."
Philosophicalfoundingis an authoritarianbusiness.
II.
A quick comparisonmay be helpfulhere. Poets have theirown
traditionof withdrawaland engagement,
butradicalwithdrawalis not
commonamongthem.One mightplausiblysetalongsideWittgenstein's
sentencesthefollowinglinesofC. P. Cavafy,written
to comfort
a young
poet who has managedaftergreateffort
to finishonlyone poem.That,
Cavafysays,is a firststep,and no small accomplishment:
To set yourfootupon thisstep
you mustrightfully
be a citizen
of the cityof ideas.6
Wittgenstein
writesas iftherewere(as thereare) manycommunities,
whileCavafyseemsto suggestthatpoetsinhabita single,universalcity.
382
POLITICAL THEORY /IAUGUST 1981
But 1 suspectthat the Greek poet means in factto describea more
particularplace: the city of Hellenic culture.The poet must prove
himselfa citizenthere;thephilosophermustprovethatheis nota citizen
anywhere.The poet needs fellowcitizens,otherpoets and readersof
and sentiment,
poetry,who sharewithhima backgroundofhistory
who
willnotdemandthateverything
he writesbe explained.Withoutpeople
like that,his allusionswill be lost and his imageswillecho onlyin his
forthetiesof history
own mind.Butthe philosopherfearsfellowship,
sentiment
his
He
needs
to
look
at theworldfroma
and
corrupt thinking.
like a total stranger.His detachmentis speculative,
distance,freshly,
willful,alwaysincomplete.I do not doubt thata cleversociologistor
historianwilldetectinhiswork,as readilyas inanypoem,thesignsofits
timeand place. Still,thephilosopher'sambition(in thetraditionthatI
am describing)is extreme.The poet, by contrast,is moremodest-as
Auden has written:
A poet's hope:
to be like some valleycheese
local, but prizedelsewhere.7
The poet may be a visionaryor a seer; he may seek out exile and
trouble; but he cannot,shortof madness,cut himselfofffromthe
ofideas. And perhapsforthatreason,he also cannotaspire
community
to anythingquite like sovereignty
over thecommunity.
If he hopesto
become a "legislatorformankind,"it is ratherby movinghis fellow
citizensthan by governingthem. And even the movingis indirect.
"Poetrymakesnothinghappen."8Butthatis notquitethesamethingas
as it is. Poetryleavesin themindsofits
sayingthatit leaveseverything
readerssome intimationof the poet's truth.Nothingso coherentas a
philosophicalstatement,nothingso explicitas a legal injunction:a
poem is nevermorethana partialand unsystematic
truth,surprising
us
byitsexcess,teasingus byitsellipsis,neverarguinga case. "I havenever
yetbeenable to perceive,"wroteKeats,"howanything
can be knownfor
truthby consecutivereasoning."9The knowledgeof the poet is of a
different
sort,and itleads to truthsthatcan,perhaps,be communicated
but neverdirectlyimplemented.
111.
Butthetruthsdiscoveredorworkedoutbypoliticalphilosophers
can
be implemented.
Theylendthemselves
readilyto legalembodiment.
Are
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
383
these the laws of nature? Enact them. Is this a just scheme of
distribution?
Establishit. Is thisa basic humanright?Enforceit. Why
else would one want to know about such things?An ideal cityis, I
suppose,an entirely
and it maybe the
properobjectof contemplation,
case that"whetherit existsanywhereor everwillexistis no matter"that is, does not affectthe truthof the vision. But surelyit would be
betterifthevisionwererealized.Plato's claimthattheideal cityis "the
onlycommonwealthin whose politics[thephilosopher]can evertake
inthepoliticsofSyracuse
part"is beliedbyhisownattemptto intervene
he
whenan opportunity
or
so
for
arose,
thought, philosophicalreformation.'0 Plato neverintended,ofcourse,to becomea citizenofthecityhe
hoped to reform.
-The claim of the philosopherin such a case is thathe knows"the
patternset up in the heavens."He knowswhatoughtto be done. He
cannotjust do it himself,however,and so he mustlook fora political
instrument.
A pliable princeis, forobviouspracticalreasons,thebest
possible instrument.But in principleany instrumentwill do-an
a vanguard,a civilservice,eventhepeoplewilldo, so long
aristocracy,
as its membersare committedto philosophicaltruthand possessedof
sovereignpower.Butclearly,thepeopleraisethegreatestdifficulties.
If
theyare not a many-headedmonster,theyare at least many-headed,
to educateand likelyto disagreeamongthemselves.
difficult
Norcan the
philosophicalinstrument
be a majorityamongthepeople,formajorities
in any genuinedemocracyare temporary,
shifting,
unstable.Truthis
one, butthepeoplehave manyopinions;truthis eternal,butthepeople
continuallychangetheirminds.Here in itssimplestformis thetension
betweenphilosophyand democracy.
The people'sclaimto ruledoes notrestupontheirknowledgeoftruth
(thoughit may,as in utilitarian
thought,restupon theirknowledgeof
manysmallertruths:the accountthatonlytheycan giveof theirown
painsand pleasures).The claimis mostpersuasively
put,itseemsto me,
notin termsofwhatthepeopleknowbutintermsofwhotheyare.They
are thesubjectsofthelaw,and ifthelaw is to bindthemas freemenand
women,theymustalso be itsmakers.Thisis Rousseau'sargument.
I do
not propose to defend it here but only to consider some of its
consequences.The argumenthas theeffect
ofmakinglaw a function
of
popular will and not of reasonas it had hithertobeenunderstood,the
reasonof wise men,sages,and judges.The peopleare thesuccessorsof
gods and absolutistkings,butnotofphilosophers.Theymaynotknow
therightthingto do, buttheyclaima rightto do whattheythinkis right
(literally,what pleases them)."I
Rousseau himselfpulledback fromthisclaim,and mostcontemporary democratswould wantto do so too. I can imaginethreeways of
384
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
democraticdecisions,whichI willoutline
pullingback and constraining
briefly,drawingon Rousseau, but withoutattemptingany explicit
analysisof his arguments.First,one mightimposea formalconstraint
on popular willing:the people mustwill generally.'2Theycannotsingle out (exceptin electionsforpublicoffice)a particularindividualor
Thisis
set of individualsfromamongthemselvesforspecialtreatment.
no bar to publicassistanceprogramsdesigned,say,forthesickor the
old, forwe can all getsickand we all hopeto growold. Itspurposeis to
againstindividualsand groupswho have,so to
ruleout discrimination
of
names.
Second, one mightinsiston theinalienability
speak, proper
of
on
the
those
institutions
indestructability
the popularwill and then
and practicesthat guaranteethe democraticcharacterof the popular
will:assembly,debate,elections,and so on. The peoplecannotrenounce
now theirfuturerightto will (or, no such renunciationcan ever be
Nor can theydenyto some group
legitimateor morallyeffective).'3
withor withouta propername,therightto particiamongthemselves,
pate in futurewilling.
Clearly,thesefirsttwo constraintsopen the way forsome kindof
some kindofenforcement,
against
reviewof populardecision-making,
and democraticrights.
the people if necessary,of nondiscrimination
will have to make
Whoeverundertakesthis reviewand enforcement
characterof particularpieces of
judgmentsabout the discriminatory
legislationand about themeaningfordemocraticpoliticsofparticular
on freespeech,assembly,and so on. But thesejudgments,
restrictions
eithertheirimportanceor their
thoughI do notwantto underestimate
limitedin theireffects
willbe relatively
comparedto thesort
difficulty,
it
is
the
third
constraint.
And
on
thethirdconstraint
ofthingrequiredby
thatI wantto focus,forI do notbelievethatphilosophersin theheroic
traditioncan possiblybe satisfiedwiththe firsttwo. Third,then,the
people mustwillwhatis right.Rousseau says,mustwillthecommon
good, and goes on to arguethatthepeoplewillwillthecommongood if
theyare a true people, a community,and not a mere collectionof
egoisticindividualsand corporategroups."' Here theidea seemsto be
thatthereexistsa singleset-thoughnotnecessarily
an exhaustivesetof corrector just laws thatthe assembledpeople, the votersor their
maynotgetright.Oftenenough,theygetitwrong,and
representatives,
ofa judge.
thentheyrequiretheguidanceofa legislatoror therestraint
Rousseau's legislatoris simplythe philosopherin heroicdress,and
thoughRousseau denieshimtherightto coercethepeople,heinsistson
hisrightto deceivethepeople.The legislatorspeaksinthenameofGod,
not of philosophy.5 One mightlook fora paralleldeceptionamong
Walzer / PHILOSOPHY
AND DEMOCRACY
385
contemporary
judges. In anycase,thisthirdconstraint
surelyraisesthe
about
Rousseau's
fundamental
mostseriousquestions
that
argument,
politicallegitimacy
restson will(consent)and noton reason(rightness).
IV.
The fundamental
argumentcan be putin an appropriately
paradoxical form:itis a featureofdemocraticgovernment
thatthepeoplehavea
rightto act wrongly-inmuchthesamewaythattheyhavea rightto act
stupidly.I shouldsay,theyhavea rightto act wrongly
withinsomearea
thefirsttwoconstraints,
(and only,following
iftheactionisgeneralover
the area and does not precludefuturedemocraticaction withinthe
is alwayssovereignty
area). Sovereignty
somewhereand withregardto
some things,noteverywhere
and withregardto everything.
The people
can rightfully,
letus say,enacta redistributive
incometax,buttheycan
theirown income,not those of some neighboring
only redistribute
nation.Whatis crucial,however,is thattheredistributive
patternthey
choose is not subjectto authoritative
correctionin accordancewith
philosophicalstandards.It is subjectto criticism,
ofcourse,butinsofar
as the criticis a democrathe will have to agree that,pendingthe
conversionof the people to his position,thepatterntheyhave chosen
oughtto be implemented.
Richard Wollheimhas argued in a well-knownarticlethatdemocratictheoryconceivedin thisway is not merelyparadoxicalin some
loose sense;it is a strictparadox.16He constructs
theparadox in three
steps.
(1) As a citizenof a democraticcommunity,
I reviewthechoicesavailableto the
and concludethatA is thepolicythatoughtto be implemented.
community
(2) The people, in theirwisdomor theirwillfulness,
choose policy B, the very
oppositeof A.
(3) 1 stillthinkthatpolicyA oughtto be implemented,
butnow,as a committed
democrat,I also thinkthatpolicyB oughtto be implemented.
Hence,I think
that both policiesoughtto be implemented.
But thisis incoherent.
The paradox probablydependstoo much upon its verbal form.We
mightimaginea moremodestfirstperson--sothatthefirststepwould
go like this:
(1) 1 concludethatA is the policythatthe people oughtto chooseforimplementation.
386
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
Then therewould be nothingincoherentabout saying:
I nowconclude
thatB
(3) Sincethepeopledidn'tchooseA, butchoseB instead,
oughtto be implemented.
butitis consistent,
and I thinkitmakessense
This is notveryinteresting,
of the democraticposition.What underliesWollheim'sversionof the
firststepis a philosophical,and probablyan antidemocratic,
argument
thathas thisform:
andthatitoughtto be implemented
thatA istheright
be(I) I conclude
policy,
causeitis right.
is therightreasonfor
Butitis notat all obviousthata policy'srightness
it.It mayonlybe therightreasonforhopingthatitwillbe
implementing
itintheassembly.Supposethatthere
and so fordefending
implemented
existeda push-button
and thatthetwobuttons,
implementation
system,
markedA and B, wereon mydesk. Whichone should I push,and for
what reasons?SurelyI cannotpush A simplybecause I have decided
thatA is right.Who am I? As a citizenof a democraticcommunity,
I
mustwait forthe people's decision,who have a rightto decide. And
then,ifthepeople choose B, it is notthecase thatI facean existential
choice, wheremy philosophicalargumentspoint toward A and my
democraticcommitments
pointtowardB, and thereis no wayto decide
betweenthem.Thereis a way to decide.
thatI am trying
to drawhere,betweenhavinga right
The distinction
to decideand knowingtherightdecision,mightbe describedintermsof
proceduraland substantivejustice. Democrats,it mightbe said, are
committed
to procedural
justice,and can onlyhopethattheoutcomesof
just procedureswill also be substantively
just.But I am reluctantto
accept that formulationbecause the line between procedure and
substanceseems to me less clear thanit suggests.What is at stake in
discussionsabout proceduraljusticeis the distribution
of power,and
thatis surelya substantivematter.No proceduralarrangement
can be
defendedexceptbysome substantiveargument,
and everysubstantive
argument(in political philosophy)issues also in some procedural
arrangement.Democracy rests,as I have already suggested,on an
argumentabout freedomand politicalobligation.Hence it is not only
thecase thatthepeoplehavea proceduralrightto makethelaws.On the
democraticview,it is rightthattheymakethelaws-even iftheymake
themwrongly.
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
387
Againstthis view, the heroicphilosophermightargue thatit can
neverbe rightto do wrong(not,at least,once weknoworcanknowwhat
an argumentabout the
is right).This is also, at least incipiently,
of politicalpower,and it has two implications.First,that
distribution
ofwhatthey
thepowerofthepeople oughtto be limitedbytherightness
someone
else
be
and
that
to
do;
second,
ought
empoweredto review
in
when
and
what the people do
step
theyrnovebeyondthoselimits.
Who else? In principle,I suppose,anyonewho knowsthetruthabout
Butin practice,in anyongoingpoliticalorder,somegroupof
rightness.
people will have to be foundwho can be presumedto knowthetruth
thanthepeople as a wholedo. This group
betteror moreconsistently
will thenbe awarded a proceduralrightto intervene,
groundedon a
substantiveargumentabout knowledgeand moraltruth.
Popular legislationmightbe revieweddemocratically:in ancient
Athens,for example, citizensconcernedabout the legitimacyof a
particulardecisionoftheassemblycould appeal fromtheassemblyas a
wholeto a smallergroupofcitizens,selectedbylot and empanelledas a
jury.Thejuryliterally
putthelaw on trial,withindividualcitizensacting
and its verdicttook precedence
as prosecutorsand defenseattorneys,
17 In thiscase,obviously,
no specialwisdom
overthelegislativeact itself.
was claimed;the same argumentor the same sortof argumentwould
justifyboththeact and theverdict.More often,however,groupsofthis
on aristocratic
ratherthandemocraticgrounds.The
sortare constituted
selfishor
appeal is frompopular consciousness,particularinterests,
of thefew:Hegel's
shortsighted
policiesto thesuperiorunderstanding
corps of civilservants,Lenin'svanguardparty,and so on. Ideally,the
of
groupto whichtheappeal is mademustbe involvedinthecommunity
ideas, orientedto action withinit, but attunedat the same timeto
philosophersoutside.In butnotwhollyin,so as to providea matchfor
the philosopher'swithdrawaland return.
V.
In the UnitedStatestoday,it is apparentthattheninejudges ofthe
SupremeCourthave beenassignedsomethinglikethisrole.The assignmentis mostclearlyarguedintheworkofa groupofcontemporary
law
professors,all of whom are philosopherstoo or, at least, much
influencedby political philosophy.'8Indeed, the revivalof political
philosophyhas had itsmostdramaticimpactinschoolsoflaw-and for
388
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
a reasonthatis notdifficult
to makeout. In a settleddemocracy,
withno
revolutionin prospect,judges are the most likelyinstruments
of
philosophicalreformation.
Of course,theconventionalroleofSupreme
Court judges extendsno furtherthan the enforcement
of a written
constitutionthat itselfrestson democraticconsentand is subjectto
democraticamendment.And evenwhenthejudges act in waysthatgo
beyond upholding the textual integrityof the constitution,they
oftruthand rightness
generallyclaimno specialunderstanding
butrefer
themselvesinstead to historicalprecedents,long-establishedlegal
or commonvalues.Nevertheless,
theplace theyholdand the
principles,
powertheywield make it possibleforthemto impose philosophical
constraints
on democraticchoice.And theyare readilyavailable(as the
as to thenatureof those
people are not) forphilosophicalinstruction
constraints.I am concernedherewithjudgesonlyinsofaras theyare in
factinstructed-andwithphilosophersbeforejudges becausea number
of philosophersseem so readyto providetheinstruction.
The tension
betweenjudicial reviewand democracydirectlyparallelsthe tension
betweenphilosophyand democracy.But the second is the deeper
tension,forjudges are likelyto expandupon theirconstitutional
rights
or to sustaina programofexpansiononlywhentheyare in thegripofa
philosophicaldoctrine.
Now,judges and philosophersare (mostly)different
sortsofpeople.
One can imaginea philosopher-judge,
but the union is uncommon.
Judgesare in an importantsensemembersof thepoliticalcommunity.
Most ofthemhavehad careersas officeholders,
or as politicalactivists,
or as advocatesof thisor thatpublicpolicy.Theyhave workedin the
arena; theyhave participatedin debates.Whentheyare questionedat
theirconfirmationhearings,theyare presumedto have opinionsof
roughlythe same sort as theirquestioners-commonplaceopinions,
much of the time,else theywould neverhave been nominated.Once
confirmed,to be sure, they set themselvesat some distance from
everydaypolitics;theirspecial standingin a democracyrequiresa
certaindetachment
and thoughtfulnes.
Theydon therobesofwisdom,
and those robes constitutewhat mightbe called a philosophical
temptation:
to love wisdombetterthanthelaw. Butjudgesaresupposed
to be wise in thewaysof a particularlegal tradition,whichtheyshare
withtheirold professionaland politicalassociates.
The stance of the philosopheris very different.
The truthshe
commonlyseeks are universaland eternal,and it is unlikelythatthey
can be foundfromtheinsideofanyrealand historiccommunity.
Hence
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
389
the philosonher'swithdrawal:he mustdenyhimselfthe assurancesof
To whatsortofa
thecommonplace.(He does nothaveto be confirmed.)
place, then,does he withdraw?Most often,today,he constructsfor
himself(since he cannot, like Plato, discoverfor himself)an ideal
commonwealth,inhabitedby beingswho have none of the particular
characteristics
and none of theopinionsor commitments
ofhisformer
He imaginesa perfectmeetingin an "originalposition"
fellow-citizens.
or "idealspeechsituation"wherethemenand womenin attendanceare
liberatedfromtheirown ideologiesor subjectedto universalizing
rules
of discourse.And then,he asks whatprinciples,rules,constitutional
thesepeople would choose if theyset out to createan
arrangements
actualpoliticalorder.19Theyare,as itwere,thephilosophicalrepresentativesoftherestofus,and theylegislateon ourbehalf.The philosopher
himself,however,is the only actual inhabitantof the ideal commonwealth, the only actual participantin the perfectmeeting.So the
withwhichhe emergesare in factthe
principles,rules,constitutions,
productsof his own thinking,
"designedat willin an orderlyfashion,"
he imposesupon himself.Nor are
subjectonlyto whateverconstraints
even
when
anyotherparticipants
thedecisionprocedureofthe
required,
is
in
terms
of consensusor unanimity.
ideal commonwealth conceived
For iftherewereanotherpersonpresent,he wouldeitherbe identicalto
the philosopher,subjectto the same constraintsand so led to say the
same thingsand movetowardthesame conclusions,or he would be a
derivedcharacteristics
particularpersonwithhistorically
and opinions
and then his presence would underminethe universalityof the
argument.
The philosopherreturnsfromhis retreatwithconclusionsthatare
fromtheconclusionsofanyactualdemocraticdebate.Atleast,
different
theyhave,or he claimsforthem,a different
status.Theyembodywhatis
right,whichis to say forour presentpurposes,theyhave beenagreed
upon bya set of ideal representatives,
whereastheconclusionsreached
throughdemocraticdebateare merelyagreedupon bythepeopleor by
theiractual representatives.
The people or theirrepresentatives
might
then be invitedto revisetheirown conclusionsin the lightof the
philosopher'swork. I suppose that this is an invitationimplicitly
extendedeverytimea philosopherpublishesa book. At themomentof
publication,at least,he is a properdemocrat:his book is a giftto the
people. But the giftis rarelyappreciated.In the politicalarena, the
philosopher'struthsare likelyto be turnledinto one more set of
opinions,triedout,arguedabout,adoptedinpart,repudiatedinpart,or
390
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
ignored.
Judges,
on theotherhand,maywellbe persuaded
togivethe
philosopher
a different
sort.of hearing.Theirspecialrole in the
democratic
community
is connected,
as I havealreadysaid,to their
andthoughtfulness
is a philosophical
thoughtfulness,
posture:
judicial
statuscanonlybeehancedbya little
realphilosophy.
Moreover,
judges
are admirably
theopinions(temporarily)
placedto mediatebetween
established
in thedemocratic
arenaandthetruths
workedoutin the
idealcommonwealth.
Throughtheartof interpretation,
theycan do
theartofdivination.20
doesthrough
whatRousseau'slegislator
VI.
thecaseof"rights."
Ouridealrepresentatives
Consider
inphilosophicomeup witha listofrights
thatattachtoeachindividual
cal seclusion
humanbeing.Letus assumethatthelistis,as itcommonly
is among
meditated
andserious.
contemporary
philosophers,
deeply
Theenumerforma coherent
atedrights
whatit mightmeanto
whole,suggesting
recognizein anotherman or womanthespecialqualitiesof moral
The philosophical
listdiffers
agencyand personality.
fromthelist
in thelaw,butitalso overlapswiththelawand
established
currently
withwhatwe can thinkof as thesuburbsofthelaw,theclusterof
towhichweescape,ifwecan,whenever
opinions,
values,andtraditions
wefindtheinnercityofthelawconstraining.
Nowthephilosopher-I
meanstilltheheroicphilosopher,
thephilosopher
as founder-invites
thejudgesto attempt
a moreorganized
escape,fromthelaw,through
thesuburbs,
totheidealcommonwealth
Theinvitation
beyond.
isallthe
moreurgentin thatrightsare at stake.For rights
havethisspecial
theirviolationrequires
characteristic:
immediate
reliefor reparation.
Andjudgesarenotmerely
theavailable,theyarealsotheappropriate
instruments
ofrelief
and reparation.2'
In effect,
thephilosopher
proposesa decisionprocedure
forjudges
modeledonthatoftheidealcommonwealth.
Thisis inpartflattery,
but
it also has a factualrationale.For thediscussions
ofjudgesamong
themselves
thearguments
thatgo on in theideal
reallydo resemble
commonwealth
(inthemindofthephilosopher)
muchmoreclosely
than
democratic
debatecaneverdo. Anditseemsplausible
tosaythatrights
aremorelikelyto be defined
correctly
bythereflection
ofthefewthan
by thevotesof the many.22
So thephilosopher
asks thejudgesto
recapitulate
intheirchambers
theargument
hehasalready
worked
out
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
391
in solitaryretreat,
and thento givethatargurnent
"theutility
ofpractice"
firstbylocatingitinthelaw orinthetraditions
andvaluesthatsurround
the law and then by decidingcases in its terms.When necessary,the
judges mustpreemptor overrulelegislativedecisions.Thisis thecrucial
point,foritis herethatthetensionbetweenphilosophyand democracy
takes on materialform.
thenat leasttheeffective
The legislatureis,ifnotthereality,
representationof the people assembledto rulethemselves.Its membershave a
rightto act withinan area. Judiciallyenforcedrightscan be understood
in twodifferent
butcomplementary
wayswithregardto thisarea. First,
theyare boundariescircumscribing
it.Fromthisview,a simpleequation
follows:the more extensivethe list of rights,the widerthe rangeof
the less room there is for legislativechoice.
judicial enforcement,
The morerightsthejudges awardto thepeople as individuals,theless
freethe people are as a decision-making
body. Or, second,rightsare
principlesthatstructure
activitieswithinthearea, shapingpoliciesand
institutions.Then judges do not merelyoperate at the boundaries,
howeverwide or narrowtheboundariesare. Theirjudgmentsrepresent
deep penetrationraidsinto thearea of legislativedecision.23Now, all
threeoftheconstraints
on popularwillingthatI describedearliercan be
conceivedin eitherof theseways,as defenseor as penetration.
Butitis
clear, I think,that the thirdconstraintsimultaneouslynarrowsthe
boundariesand permitsdeeperraids.As soon as thephilosophicallistof
rightsextends beyond the twin bans on legal discriminationand
politicalrepression,
it invitesjudicial activitythatis radicallyintrusive
on whatmightbe called democraticspace.
But this,it can be objected,is to considerrightsonlyin theformal
sense,ignoringtheircontent.Andtheircontentmaywellenhancerather
thancircumscribe
popularchoice.Imagine,forexample,a philosophically and thenjudiciallyrecognizedrightto welfare.24
The purposeof
such a rightis plain enough.It would guaranteeto each citizenthe
to exercisehis citizenship,
opportunity
and thatis an opportunity
he
could hardlybe said to have,or to havein anymeaningful
fashion,ifhe
werestarvingto deathor desperately
seekingshelterforhimselfand his
family.A defensibleright,surely,and yietthe argumentI have just
sketchedstillholds.For thejudicialenforcement
ofwelfarerightswould
radicallyreduce the reach of democraticdecision. Henceforth,the
judges would decide,and as cases accumulated,theywould decide in
increasingdetail,what the scope and characterof the welfaresystem
should be and what sortsof redistribution
it required.Such decisions
392
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
wouldclearlyinvolvesignificant
judicialcontrolofthestatebudgetand,
at least,oftheleveloftaxation-theveryissuesoverwhichthe
indirectly
democraticrevolutionwas originallyfought.
This sort of thingwould be easierforcommitteddemocratsifthe
intotheconstitution
througha
expandedlistofrightswereincorporated
popularlycontrolledamendingprocess.Then therewould existsome
and
powerofphilosophers
democraticbasisforthenew(undemocratic)
judges. The people would, I think,be ill-advisedto agreeto such an
incorporationand to surrenderso large a part of theirday-to-day
authority.In themodernstate,however,thatauthorityis exercisedso
indirectly-itis so far,in fact,frombeingday-to-dayauthority-that
to be a minormatter.The rightstheygain
theymightfeelthesurrender
as individuals(in this case, to welfareservicesfroma benevolent
bureaucracy)mightin theirview far outweighthe rightstheylose as
members.And so it is not implausibleto imaginethe constitutional
ofjustice.25
ofsomething
like,say,Rawls'stwoprinciples
establishment
be handed
would
of
area
distributive
effectively
entire
justice
Then the
overto thecourts.Whata rangeofdecisionstheywouldhaveto make!
Imagine a class action suit testingthe meaning of the difference
theclassrepresented
principle.Thejudgeswouldhaveto decidewhether
in the suit was reallythe most disadvantagedclass in the society(or
whetherall or enoughofitsmembersfellwithinthatclass).Andifitwas
(or if they did), the judges would then have to decide what rights
principleunderthe materialconditions
followedfromthe difference
currently
prevailing.No doubt,theywouldbe drivento consultexperts
and officialsin makingthesedecisions.It would make littlesensefor
however,forto thesequestions,ifrights
themto consultthelegislature,
are reallyat issue,theremustbe a rightanswer-and thisansweris more
judges,experts,and officialsthan
likelyto be knownbyphilosophers,
by ordinarycitizensor theirpoliticalrepresentatives.26
that
Still,ifthepeople cameto feeloppressedbythenewauthorities
theyhad established,theycould alwaysdisestablishthem.The amendingprocesswouldstillbe available,thoughitmightbe thecase thatthe
gradual erosion of legislativeenergywould make it less available in
Partlyforthisreason,and partlyfor
practicethanit was in principle.27
reasons to whichI will now turn,I want to argue thatphilosophers
should not be too quick to seek out the judicial (or any other)
and that judges, thoughthey must to some extentbe
instrument,
into
philosophersofthelaw,shouldnotbe too quickto turnthemselves
political philosophers.It is a mistake to attemptany extensive
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
393
incorporationof philosophical principlesinto the law either by
For thatis,ineithercase,to takethemout
oramendment.
interpretation
of thepoliticalarena wheretheyproperlybelong.The interventions
of
philosophersshould be limitedto thegiftstheybring.Else theyare like
Greeksbringing
gifts,ofwhomthepeopleshouldbeware,forwhatthey
have in mindis the captureof the city.
VII.
"The philosopheris not a citizenof anycommunity
ofideas. That is
what makes him into a philosopher."I have takenthesesentencesto
mean that the politicalphilosophermustseparate himselffromthe
politicalcommunity,
cut himselfloose fromaffective
tiesand conventional ideas. Onlythencan he ask and struggleto answerthedeepest
questionsabout the meaningand purposeof politicalassociationand
theappropriatestructure
of thecommunity
(of everycommunity)
and
its government.
This kind of knowledgeone can have onlyfromthe
outside.Inside,anotherkindof knowledgeis available,morelimited,
more particularin character.I shall call it political ratherthan
philosophicalknowledge.It answersthequestions:Whatis themeaning
and purposeofthisassociation?Whatistheappropriatestructure
ofour
communityand government?
Even if we assume thatthereare right
answersto theselast questions(and it is doubtfulthatthe particular
questionshave rightanswerseven if the generalquestionsdo), it is
thecase thattherewillbe as manyrightanswersas thereare
nevertheless
communities.
Outsidethecommunities,
however,thereis onlyone right
answer.As thereare manycavesbutonlyone sun,so politicalknowing
is particularand pluralistin character,whilephilosophicalknowingis
universalistand singular.The politicalsuccessof philosophers,then,
would have theeffectofenforcing
a singularovera pluralisttruth,that
is, of reiteratingthe structureof the ideal commonwealthin every
previouslyparticularistcommunity.Imagine not one but a dozen
philosopherkings: theirrealms would be identicallyfashionedand
identicallygoverned,except for those adjustmentsrequiredby an
ineradicablyparticularist
geography.(If God werea philosopherking,
He would have allocatedto each community
an identicalor equivalent
set of geographicconditions.)The case would be the same with a
dozen communitiesfoundedin the originalposition:thereis onlyone
original position. And it would be the same again with a dozen
394
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
communication
communities
shapedbyundistorted
amongan idealized
set of members:forit is a featureof undistortedcommunication,
as
distinctfromordinarytalk,thatonlya veryfewthingscan be said.28
Now, we may or may not be readyto assignvalue to particularism
and pluralism.It is not easy to know how to decide. For pluralism
impliesa rangeof instances-a rangeof opinions,structures,
regimes,
policies-with regardto each of whichwe are likelyto feeldifferently.
We mightvaluetherangeor theidea ofa rangeand yetbe appalledbya
large numberof the instances,and thensearchforsome principleof
exclusion. Most pluralistsare in factconstrainedpluralists,and the
constraints
theydefendderivefromuniversalprinciples.Can it stillbe
said thattheyvaluepluralism?
Theymerelylikevariety,
perhaps,orthey
are not readyyetto makeup theirmindsabout everycase, or theyare
Or theyhave an instrumentalist
view: many
tolerant,or indifferent.
will
lead
one
that
is
far
to a single
off)
social experiments
day (but
day
truth.All these are philosophicalperspectivesin the sense thatthey
requirea standpointoutsidethe range.And fromthat standpoint,I
suspect,pluralismwill alwaysbe an uncertainvalue at best.But most
people stand differently.
Theyare insidetheirown communities,
and
theyvaluetheirown opinionsand conventions.
Theycometo pluralism
only throughan act of empathyand identification,
recognizingthat
otherpeople have feelingslike theirown. Similarly,the philosopher
mightcome to pluralismby imagininghimselfa citizen of every
ratherthanofnone.Butthenhemightlosethatfirmsenseof
community
himselfand hissolitudethatmakeshima philosopher,and thegiftshe
bringsmightbe of less value thantheyare.
I do notmeanto underestimate
thosegifts.Butitis important
nowto
suggestthatthevalue of universaltruthis as uncertainwhenseenfrom
insidea particularcommunityas is the value of pluralismwhenseen
fromoutsideeveryparticularcommunity.
Uncertain,I meanto say,not
unreal or negligible:forI do not doubt that particularcommunities
improvethemselvesby aspiringto realize universaltruthsand by
incorporating
(particular)featuresof philosophicaldoctrineintotheir
own ways of life.Andthisthecitizensalso understand.But fromtheir
standpoint,itwillnotalwaysbe obviousthattherights,
say,ofabstract
menand women,theinhabitants
ofsomeidealcommonwealth,
oughtto
be enforcedhereand now.Theyare likelyto havetwoworriesaboutany
such enforcement.
First of all, it will involveoverridingtheirown
traditions,
conventions,
and expectations.These are,ofcourse,readily
accessibleto philosophicalcriticism;
theywerenot"designedat willin
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
395
an orderlyfashion"bya founderor a sage;theyaretheresultofhistorical
negotiation,intrigue,and struggle.But that is just the point. The
productsof a sharedexperience,theyare valued bythepeopleoverthe
philosopher'sgiftsbecause theybelongto the people and the giftsdo
not- muchas I mightvalue some familiarand much-usedpossession
and feeluneasywitha new,moreperfectmnodel.
The secondworryis morecloselyconnectedto democraticprinciple.
It is not onlythe familiarproductsoftheirexperiencethatthepeople
value, buttheexperienceitself,theprocessthroughwhichtheproducts
wereproduced.And theywillhave some difficulty
understanding
why
the hypotheticalexperienceof abstractmen and womenshould take
precedenceover theirown history.Indeed, the claim of the heroic
philosophermust be that the firstsort of experiencenot only takes
universal
precedenceoverbuteffectively
replacesthesecond.Wherever
truthhas been established,thereis no room fornegotiation,intrigue,
is
and struggle.Hence,it looks as ifthepoliticallifeof thecommunity
to be permanently
Withinsomesignificant
interrupted.
partofthearea
overwhichcitizenshad oncemovedfreely,
theyareno longerto moveat
all. Whyshouldtheyacceptthat?Theymightwellchoose politicsover
truth,and thatchoice,iftheymakeit,willmake in turnforpluralism.
whosemembersshapetheirowninstitutions
Anyhistoricalcommunity
and lawswillnecessarily
producea particularand nota universalwayof
life.Thatparticularity
can be overcomeonlyfromtheoutsideand only
by repressinginternalpoliticalprocesses.
But this second worry,whichis the moreimportantof the two, is
probablyexaggerated.For philosophicaldoctrine,like the law itself,
beforeit can be enforced.Interpretations
requiresinterpretation
must
be particular in character,and they invite real and not merely
wins"entiresovereignty"
hypothetical
argument.Unlessthephilosopher
forhimself,
or cutoffpolitical
then,hisvictorywillnotin factinterrupt
activity.Ifhisvictorywereto taketheformthatI havebeenimagining,
it
would merelyshiftthe focusof politicalactivityfromlegislaturesto
to litigation.On theotherhand,insofaras itis
courts,fromlaw-making
a victoryat all, it has to havesomeuniversalizing
tendencies;at least,it
has to imposesome constraints
on thepluralizingtendenciesof a freewheelingpolitics.The morethejudges are "strictconstructionists"
of
philosophicaldoctrine,the morethe different
communitiestheyrule
willlook alike and themorethecollectivechoicesofthecitizenswillbe
confined.So the exaggerationmakes a point: the citizenshave, to
whateverdegree,lost controlovertheirown lives.And thentheyhave
no reason,no democraticreason,forobeyingthedecreesofthejudges.
396
POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1981
ViII.
All thismightbe avoided,ofcourse,ifthejudgesadopteda policyof
"judicial restraint,"
or overruling
preempting
legislativedecisionsonly
in rareand extremecases. ButI wouldsuggestthatjudicialrestraint,like
draws its forcefromsome deeperphilosophical
judicial intervention,
view. Historically,restrainthas been connectedwith skepticismor
It is of coursetruethatphilosophicalviewschange,and
relativism.29
judges mustbe leeryof fallingin withsome passingfashion.But I am
is consistentwiththestrongest
inclinedto thinkthatjudicial restraint
claimsthatphilosophersmakeforthetruthstheydiscoverorconstruct.
For thereis a certainattitudethatproperlyaccompaniessuchclaims,
and hasitsoriginintheidealcommonwealth
ortheperfect
from
meeting
whichtheclaimsderive.This attitudeis philosophicalrestraint,
and itis
simplytherespectthatoutsidersowe to thedecisionsthatcitizensmake
amongthemselvesand forthemselves.The philosopherhas withdrawn
fromthecommunity.
It is preciselybecausetheknowledgehe seekscan
onlybe foundoutsidethisparticularplace thatityieldsno rightsinside.
At the same time, it has to be said that since the philosopher's
withdrawalis speculativeonly,he loses none of the rightshe has as
an ordinarycitizen. His opinions are worthas much as any other
citizen's;he is entitledlikeanyoneelseto workfortheirimplementation,
to argue,intrigue,
and so on. Butwhenheactsintheseways,he
struggle,
is an engaged philosopher,that is, a sophist, critic,publicist,or
and he mustaccepttherisksof thosesocial roles.I do not
intellectual,
mean thathe mustaccepttheriskof death;thatwilldependupon the
conditionsof engagementin his community,and philosophers,like
othercitizens,willhope forsomething
betterthancivilwarand political
persecution.I have in mindtwo different
sortsof risks.The firstis the
riskof defeat,forthoughtheengagedphilosophercan stillclaimto be
right,he cannotclaim any of the privilegesor rightness.
He mustlive
withtheordinaryodds ofdemocracticpolitics.The secondis theriskof
particularism,whichis,perhaps,anotherkindofdefeatforphilosophy.
Engagementalwaysinvolvesa loss-not totalbutseriousenough-of
distance,criticalperspective,
and so on. The sophist,critic,
objectivity,
publicist,or intellectual
mustaddresstheconcernsofhisfellowcitizens,
tryto answertheirquestions,weave his argumentsinto thefabricof
theirhistory.He must,indeed, make himselfa fellow citizenin the
communityof ideas, and thenhe will be unable to avoid entirely
the
moral and even the emotionalentanglements
of citizenship.He may
hold fastto thephilosophicaltruthsofnaturallaw,distributive
justice,
or humanrights,
buthispoliticalarguments
are mostlikelyto look like
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
397
versionof thosetruths,
some makeshift
adaptedto theneedsof a
oftheoriginal
thestandpoint
particular
people:from
position,
provincial;
oftheidealspeechsituation,
fromthestandpoint
ideological.
naturalized
Perhapsweshouldsaythat,onceengaged,
againintothe
is likea politicalpoet,Shelley's
of ideas,thephilosopher
community
not Rousseau's.Thoughhe stillhopesthathisarguments
legislator,
he is firstofall "local."Andso he
reachbeyondhisowncommunity,
ofdistance,
coherent
theprerogatives
mustbe readyto forsake
design,
with
that
breathe
and
seek
instead
and entiresovereignty,
"thoughts
to reachandmovehisownpeople.Andhemust
andwordsthatburn,"
theidealcommonwealth.
giveup anymoredirectmeansto establish
restraint.
is philosophical
Thatsurrender
follows(and so does vanguardrestraint
Judicialrestraint
and
Thejudgesmustholdthemselves
bureaucratic
as closelyas
restraint).
ofthedemocratic
theycanto thedecisions
assembly,
enforcing
first
of
thatserveto sustainthecharacter
all thebasicpoliticalrights
ofthat
itsmembers
fromdiscriminatory
and protecting
assembly
legislation.
enforce
unless
Theyarenotto
rights
beyondthese,
theyareauthorized
todo so bya democratic
decision.
Anditdoesnotmatter
tothejudges
as
listofrights
can be,or thatit has been,
judgesthata moreextensive
Elsewhere
validatedelsewhere.
doesnotcount.
Once again,I do not wantto denythatrightscan be validated
ofpolitics
elsewhere.
Indeed,themostgeneral
truths
andmorality
can
inthephilosophical
andthatrealmhasitsplace
onlybevalidated
realm,
outside,beyond,separatefromeveryparticularcommunity.
But
validationand politicalauthorization
philosophical
are twoentirely
different
distinct
things.
Theybelongto twoentirely
spheres
ofhuman
Authorization
is theworkof citizensgoverning
activity.
themselves
is theworkofthephilosopher
Validation
amongthemselves.
reasoning
aloneina worldheinhabits
aloneorfillswiththeproducts
ofhisown
hasno claimsinthephilosophical
speculations.
Democracy
realm,
and
haveno specialrights
inthepoliticalcommunity.
philosophers
In the
truth
isindeedanother
worldofopinion,
andthephilosopher
opinion,
is
only another opinion-maker.
NOTES
1. Zettel,ed. G.E.M. Anscombeand G. H. von Wright(Berkeley:University
of
CaliforniaPress, 1970),no. 455.
2. L. Wittgenstein
(trans.G.E.M. Anscombe),PhilosophicalInvestigations,
(New
York: Macmillan,1958),para. 124.
398
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981
3. For an account of thisspecial formof philosophicalheroism,see Sheldon S.
Wolin,Hobbesand theEpic Tradition
of Political7heory(Los Angeles:Univ.ofCalifornia
Press, 1970).
4. Rene Descartes,Discourse on Method,trans.ArthurWollaston(Hammondsworth:Penguin,1960),pp. 44-45.
5. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,Part II, ch. 31 (end).
6. C. P. Cavafy,"The FirstStep," in The CompletePoems of Cavafy,trans.Rae
Dalven (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich,1976),p. 6.
7. W. H. Auden,"ShortsII," CollectedPoems.ed. EdwardMendelsohn.(New York:
Random House, 1976).
8. "In Memoryof W. B. Yeats,"in TheEnglishAuden:Poems,Essaysand Dramatic
Writings,
1927-1939,ed. Edward Mendelshon(New York: Random House, 1977).
9. TheLettersofJohnKeats,ed. M. B. Forman(London:OxfordUniv.Press,1952),
p. 67.
10. The Republicof Plato, trans.F. M. Cornford(New York: OxfordUniv. Press,
1945),591A-592B.
11. Thus an Athenianoratorto theassembly:"It is in yourpower,rightly,
to dispose
of whatbelongsto you-well, or, ifyou wish,ill." Quotedin K. J.Dover, GreekPopular
Moralityin the Timeof Plato and Aristotle(Berkeley:Univ.of CaliforniaPress,1974),
pp. 290-291.
12. The Social Contract,book 11,chs. iv and vi.
thatthegeneralwillis inalienable,though
13. Thisfollows,I think,fromtheargument
Rousseau wants to make even more of inalienabilitythan this-as in his attack on
book 111,ch. xv.
representation,
14. Social Contract,book II, ch. iii and passim.
15. Social Contract,book II, ch. vii.
16. Richard Wollheim,"A Paradox in the Theoryof Democracy,"in Philosophy,
Politicsand SocietY(Second Series),ed. PeterLaslettand W. G. Runciman(Oxford:Basil
hereis aboutimplementation,
Blackwell,1962),pp. 71-87.I shouldstressthattheargument
notobedience.Whatis at issueis howor forwhatreasonspoliciesshouldbe chosenforthe
as a whole.Whetherindividualcitizensshouldupholdthisor thatpolicyonce
community
it has been chosen,or assistin carryingit out, is anotherquestion.
17. A.H.M. Jones,AthenianDemocracy(Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1960),pp. 122-123.
18. See, forexample,Ronald Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,
(Cambridge,MA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1977); Frank Michelman,"In Pursuitof ConstitutionalWelfare
Rights,"University
of PennsylvaniaLau4'Review (1973) 121:962-1019;Owen Fiss,"The
Formsof Justice,"HarvardLaw Review(1979) 93: 1-58;BruceAckerman,Social Justice
in the LiberalState (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1980).
19. In this mode of argument,John Rawls is obviouslythe greatpioneer.But the
specificuse ofthenewphilosophywithwhichI am concernedisnotadvocatedbyhiminA
Theoryof Justiceor in any subsequentarticles.
20. Like Rousseau'slegislatoragain,thejudgeshaveno directcoercivepoweroftheir
own: in some ultimatesense,theymustalways look forsupportamong the people or
among alternativepoliticalelites. Hence the phrase "judicialtyranny,"
applied to the
enforcement
of some philosophically
butnotdemocratically
validatedposition,is always
a piece of hyperbole.On the otherhand,thereare formsof authority,
shortof tyranny,
thatraise problemsfordemocraticgovernment.
Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY
399
21. Thespecialinvitation
andthesenseofurgency
aremostclearinDworkin,
Taking
ButDworkinseemsto believethattheidealcommonwealth
RightsSeriously.
actually
validated
so tospeak,inthesuburbs.
Thesetofphilosophically
canalsobe
exists,
rights
interms
oftheconstitutional
andthestanding
heargues,
validated,
history
legalprinciples
theserights
andwhen
oftheUnitedStates,
judgesenforce
theyaredoingwhattheyought
we have.For a different
to be doing,giventhesortof government
readingof our
see RichardEly, Democracyand Distrust(Cambridge,
constitutional
MA:
history,
HarvardUniv.Press,1980).Elyarguesforsomething
verymuchlikethetwoconstraints
liessomewhere
thatI havedefended.
Forhim,too,theidealcommonwealth
the
beyond
It is theproper
and movements,
notofcourts.
U.S. Constitution.
goalofparties
tothiseffect,
seeT. M. Scanlon,
andrather
tentative
22. Fora careful
"Due
argument
andJ.Chapmnan
in NomosXXII,ed. R. Pennock
Process"
(NewYork:NewYorkUniv.
Press,1977),pp. 120-121.
in "FormsofJustice."
someclearexamples
23. Fissprovides
andalso"On Protecting
"Welfare
thePoorThrough
the
24. Cf.Michelman
Rights,"
Fourteenth
HarvardLaw Review(1969)83.
Amendment,"
see AmyGutmann,
LiberalEquality
25. For a proposalto thiseffect,
(Cambridge,
England:Cambridge
Univ.Press,1980),p. 199.
4 and 13.
26. Dworkin,
TakingRights
Seriously,
especially
Chapters
interventions
on behalf
ofindividual
27. Judicial
rights
broadly
understood
mayalso
leadto an erosionofpopularenergies-atleaston theleft.Fora brief
argument
tothis
effect,
see myarticle"TheLeftandtheCourts,"
Dissent(Spring,1981).
28. Evenifwe wereto connectphilosophical
conclusions
to somesetofhistorical
circumstances,
as Habermas
doeswhenheimagines
"discursive
will-formation"
occurring
"at a givenstagein thedevelopment
of productive
forces,"
or as Rawlsdoeswhenhe
suggests
thattheprinciples
worked
outintheoriginal
position
applyonlyto"democratic
societies
itremains
undermodern
conditions,"
truethattheconclusions
areobjectively
trueorright
fora rangeofparticular
communities,
without
regard
totheactualpolitics
of
thosecommunities.
See Habermas,
Legitimation
Crisis(Boston:Beacon,1975),p. 113;
in MoralTheory,"TheJournalof Philosophv,
Rawls,"KantianConstructivism
77
(September,
1980),p. 518.
29. See,forexample,
Ely,Democracyand Distrust,
pp. 57-59.
Michael Walzeris a Professorin the School of Social Sciencesat theInstitutefor
Advanced Stud)' in Princeton,New Jerse'v.His most recentbook is Radical
Principles:Reflections
ofan Unreconstructed
Democrat(New York:Basic Books,
1980).