U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
69
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
By Hsi-hsun Tsai ∗
The U.S. and China have long been considered as the major
roots of Taiwan’s political and economical problems as well as
solutions, so the U . S . - Ta i w a n - C h i n a t r i a n g l e is a popular
framework in Taiwan to interpret American Asian policies. But
American global strategic intents are not limited on the region
of Taiwan and China. Japan is the very partner of American
and has been an economic super power for a long time .
Politically, Taiwan has neglected this childhood player—
Japan since the end of World War II.
U.S. does hold the supremacy in Asia. U.S. is extending
its reach and leverage, as the other countries benefit from
its leadership. However, Asian economic community is being
shaped, and is accumulating wealth to compete with American
economic power directly. Moreover, “Is U.S. a very popular
country right now?” is an emerging question. U.S. does need
Japan’s support to maintain Asian stability. Japan’s economies are
recovering from the stagnation in the 1990s. Its political intention
is emerging right now, so this paper hypothesizes Japan as the
leading role. Although this paper is centered upon Japanese is
s u e s a n d p ro s p e c t s , it does not m e a n t o d e n y American’s
leadership in Asia and the significance and influence of other
∗
D r. H s i - h s u n Ts a i i s c u r r e n t l y t h e f u l l - t i m e A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r a t t h e
G r a d u a t e I n s t i t u t e o f J a p a n e s e St u d i e s o f Ta m k a n g U n i v e r si t y. H e i s P h . D .
o f Na t i o n a l To h o k u U n i v e r s i t y, J a p a n a n d s pe c i a l i z i n g i n Ja pa n e s e
m a na ge m e n t . H e c a n be r e a c hed a t < t s a i 4 2 6 @ m s 5 1 . h i n e t . n e t > .
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countries. This paper uses the diamond framework of U.S.-T
aiwan-China + Japan to study Japanese issues and prospects.
The art of partnering is not a new game, but the level of
need for collaboration may not be even for each member.
The inter-partner gaps may occur. The diamond partnerships
bring value to the member beyond what each member can
accomplish alone. Effective diamond partnerships are built
with a clear strategic intent. Each member should develop
a process for track moving targets and hold the attitude of
“When the facts change, I change” to reassess its
partnerships. “What can the member contribute?” is a basic
w a y t o re c o n f i r m i t s s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n ing . Holding the
bargaining powers, including capabilities and resources, is
a ticket to participate in these partnerships. Maximizing the
value of partnerships is a common direction and interest for
all four partners. Creating value is a collaborative mood, but
sharing created value is competitive style. It is ongoing and
reciprocal: Longer collaborative mood helps create greater
collective benefits; greater collective benefits help build
longer collaborative mood. 1
Key words: Japan, Strategy, Partnership, Collaboration, Value,
Framework, Triangle, Pendulum, Diamond, U.S.Japan Alliance.
1
Yves L. Doz and Gary Hamel, Alliance Advantage: The Art of
Creating Value through Partnering (Boston, MA, Harvard Business
School Press, 1998).
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
71
No country can go alone. Strategic partnerships have
become central issues to the foreign policy in the
globalization age. Many of the capabilities and resources
essential to a country’s prosperity and stability lie outside the
country’s boundaries, and outside direct control. Alliance is
not an option or fashion but a necessity. The capacity to
collaborate is a core competence for policymakers. The
alliance advantage is a new landscape. 2 Collaboration is not
the destination, but an ongoing dynamic process. Furthermore,
this process is a living system, co-evolving progressively in
its possibilities. Partnership can be described as the metaphor
of eco-system. The value should be created within alliance;
otherwise it will be terminated or just a professed intention.
We usually use a specific framework to recognize a
partnership. But there is no framework that is the only or
absolutely correct. In order to deepen our understanding, it is
better to hold more frameworks. A new framework gives us a
new window to approach partnerships.
The U.S. and China have long been considered as the
major roots of Taiwan’s political and economical problems as
well as solutions, so lots of Taiwanese always use the
framework of U.S.-Taiwan-China triangle to interpret
American Asian policies. But American global strategic
intents are not limited on the region of Taiwan and China.
Japan is the very partner of American and has been economic
super power for a long time. Politically, Taiwan has neglected
this childhood player—Japan since the end of World War II.
Nowadays Japan is maintaining and reinforcing the U.S.2
Ibid., ix.
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Japan alliance. 3 According to Dr. Michael Green, “It’s clear
now that there is a strong consensus in Washington to focus
on the alliance, and to strengthen alliance relations with
Japan.” 4 Thus, Japanese issues and prospects give Taiwan a
new window to redefine American Asian policies and
Taiwan’s strategic positioning. We should not let go this
golden opportunity.
Because this paper is centered upon Japanese issues and
prospects, I use the diamond framework of U.S.-TaiwanChina + Japan, instead of the familiar triangular framework
of U.S.-Taiwan-China. Strategic diamond is a unique
framework for assessing each member ’s advantage. This
paper does not mean to deny American’s leadership in Asia
and the significance and influence of other countries. Because
of the space limitations and Japan’s relative importance to
Taiwan, I focus my attention on Japan. The important
strategic question is: How can each member increase the
relative uniqueness of its contributions to the strategic
diamond?
Analysis of the U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan Framework
Many Taiwanese scholars and articles always use the
triangular framework and the sequence of U.S.-China-Taiwan
to elevate the three members’ relations (see Figure 1). But the
bargaining powers of these three parties are unbalanced. The
U.S. holds the bargaining powers over economies and politics.
3
4
Yomiuri Shimbun, March 9, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/main/news/20040309it02.htm
http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje.opening.html
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
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Its political power is also reinforced by strong military force.
China’s bargaining powers are the high economic growth and
military
modernization.
Traditionally,
China
takes
precautions against American political roles in the AsiaPacific region. Conversely, Taiwan is in resource-poor and
ambition-rich situation. It is a small island and does not have
the equal powers of capabilities and resources to negotiate
with both super powers directly. Taiwan struggles to survive
in a small space between these two big countries. The U.S.
and China see Taiwan as a platform and card to show their
bargaining powers for their own national interests
respectively. The order of U.S.-Taiwan-China reflects the real
strong-weak-strong relations and Taiwan’s pinch situation.
Thus, this paper takes the order of U.S.-Taiwan-China.
Figure 1 Triangular Framework
U.S
.
Taiwan
China
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Figure 2 Pendulum Framework
U.S
.
E xtre me Lin e
Extre me Line
Taiwan
China
Central Line
It is not a secret that Taiwan and China usually push and
talk to each other through White House. U.S. is being the
center for three members’ relations. Uncle Sam acts as a
mediator and judge for the Taiwan Strait issues. Maintaining
the Taiwan Strait’s stability is the U.S. basic policy. The U.S.
does not allow Taiwan and China to change the status quo
unilaterally. Thus, the pendulum framework is another
approach to interpret the U.S.-Taiwan-China relations. The
U.S.-centered pendulum swings between Taiwan and China.
There are two extreme lines on Taiwan side and China side
respectively, e.g., Taiwan independence and China’s military
attack. U.S. has taken a long-term balance to carry out the
U.S.-Taiwan-China policies (see Figure 2).
No matter the triangular or pendulum framework, the
figure of Japan is not seen yet. Because the purpose of this
paper is centered to clarify issues and prospects of relevance
and importance to Japan, I leave the space for enlarging
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
75
thoughtful exploration about Japan. The relations of U.S.Taiwan-China + Japan can be drawn as a strategic diamond.
Of course, this paper uses Japanese standpoints to study this
framework.
Figure 3 Diamond Framework
U.S.
Taiwan
China
Japan
U.S. does hold the supremacy in Asia. It is extending its
reach and leverage, as the other three members benefit from
its leadership. But “Is U.S. a very popular country right
now?” is an emerging question. However, Asian economic
community is being shaped, and is accumulating wealth to
compete with American economic power directly. Japan is the
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Asian economic leader and has the potential to handle
international affairs. The U.S. does need Japan’s support to
maintain the Asian stability. Japan’s involvement will create a
new world order. Therefore this paper hypothesizes Japan as
the leading role in this framework. Japan is not an isolated
island, however, but a critical nation connected to the other
three members vertically and horizontally in the diamondrelation framework. Japan is a potential bonanza for each
member willing to rearrange the puzzle pieces (see Figure 3).
The diamond framework of U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan
determines the prosperity and stability of Asia. It is a
dynamic and reciprocal structure, but not a stable one.
Because it is also an interdependence relation, exploring
common interests among these four parties is more significant
than emphasizing on conflict. Collaboration and coordination
are complicated tasks for all the four sides. Contributing
something for somebody is a ticket to participate in these
partnerships. Thus, each member must keep identifying that
what kinds of resources it can contribute to their partners.
The superior resources must have four characteristics: (1)
they must be valuable, (2) they must be rare, (3) they must be
imperfectly imitable, and (4) there cannot be any strategically
equivalent substitutes. 5
Because the U.S.-Japan partnership has supplied a strong
base for Asian prosperity, peace and stability for a long time,
firstly this paper studies the U.S.-Japan relations.
5
Jay Barney, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,”
Journal of Management 17, no 1 (1991): 99-120.
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
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U.S.-Japan Relations
The Invisible Japan
Japan, without natural resources, achieved economic
miracle after World War II. Under the direction of the Allied
Occupation, Japan gained the chance to revamp its
institutions more democratic and more effective. Especially,
the U.S.-centered GHQ (General Headquarters) contributed
much to rebuilding the devastated nation.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, American companies were
prospering, so few of them took the Japan’s rising seriously.
American companies shared their management knowledge and
built partnership with Japanese firms freely and readily,
which helped Japanese firms enter markets. Japan became the
only Asian participant in the global market. 6 Japan’s success
supplied a mirror for America. American policymakers
praised the Japanese government model, called Japan Inc.
Japan’s postwar economic policy was expressly to keep
foreign investors at bay. In the 1980s, Japan looked
economically invincible, but was stagnating in the 1990s.
Although Japan suffered the collapse of bubble economy, its
economic might is still second only to that of the U.S. in the
21st century. We cannot underestimate growth potential of
Japan. The untapped potential of Japan economy is huge.
From 2003, some reports, e.g., stock price and profitability,
have shown Japan’s recovery.
Once Japan has developed into the world’s most
competitive industrial power, then the need for politics is
more keenly required. Although U.S. has expected Japan to
6
Michael E. Porter, Hirotaka Takeuchi and Mariko Sakakibara, Can
Japan Compete? (London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000): 15.
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reinforce political and military influence for the international
collaboration, Japan is reluctant to show its figure in the
international community. Actually, Japan has contributed
much money and energy to the world, such as the ODA
(Official Development Assistance). Because of Japanese
character, they prefer to remain anonymous. Sometimes even
the acceptors do not know that they have accepted Japanese
contributions. Thus, Japan looks like an invisible donator, not
a cold country.
U.S.-Japan Alliance
Japan is a main supporter for American foreign policies.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is a backbone for two countries’
stable relations. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said, “If
you think about North Korea, we have to say the Japan-U.S.
security alliance has been a great deterrence.” “I will handle
international affairs while at the same time looking closely at
our alliance with the U.S. and thinking about the need for
international cooperation.” 7 Thus, Japanese perspective is
that supporting American foreign policies is in Japan’s best
interests. From the approach of American global strategic
interests, the U.S.-Japan alliance, the defense of Japan, and
the Japanese bases are critically important. 8
Now Japan is not only an economic superpower, but also
has begun to commit more political roles in the international
community. Japanese positive political involvement can be
7
8
Mainichi Shimbun, March 5, 2003.
http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-news/898075/alliance-0-12.html
http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje2.okinawa.html
Nikkei Shimbun, Dece mber 9, 2003.
http://www.nikkei.co.jp/sp1/nt69/20031209AS1E0900K09122003.html
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
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seen on the Iraq recovery. U.S. has asked Japan to be a player
playing on the field, not just being an audience sitting on the
seat. Besides, Middle East is also the main resource of oil for
Japan. Japan had a bad experience at the first Gulf War. They
had provided financial aids, but did not send any soldier to
participate in that war. Consequently, Japan was criticized as
a free rider. This past experience keeps reminding Japanese
government.
Being a responsible member of the international
community, Japanese government believes that the SDF (SelfDefense Forces) can play a key role in Iraq’s recovery. The
diplomacy of reconstruction assistance is entering the crucial
moment. Japan does not want to be absent in any of the
international collaboration. The magnifying and strengthening
of Japanese international assistance will intensify Japanese
position in the international community. Meanwhile, the trust
relations of U.S.-Japan alliance will be much more deepened,
too. 9
Therefore, Japan has responded American request to send
the SDF for Iraq reconstruction assistance. Meanwhile,
Japanese Constitution has kept strict control over the SDF, a
product of the caution following Japan’s militarism that led to
its devastated defeat in World War II. Because of the
historical context, Japanese also consider deliberately other
Asian countries’ reaction for sending SDF. The southern Iraqi
town of Samawah is so far largely unscathed by the violence
that followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, so it is much
easier for Japanese government and people to accept it. Japan
9
Yomiuri Shimbun, March 3, 2004.
http://www.yo miuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20040302ig90.htm
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did not involve the Iraq Wars directly. Besides Japan-Iraq
relations are maintained friendly. Japan has the technologies
to help Iraq recover from war. 1 0 The SDF members are
concentrating on establishing fresh water supplies and other
civil duties. Thus, the Japanese troops are trusted and
welcomed by Iraqis in Samawah.
Like the U.S., Japan also contributes the economic
support greatly. The SDF and economic support act like car ’s
two wheels for Iraq assistance. Being an invisible donator is
Japanese character, but still, Japan tries to achieve a visible
assistance this time.
According to the Nikkei Shimbun, March 1, 2004, the
Japan Defense Agency has announced that it will set a special
force in the SDF for international contribution. 1 1 Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi also told the cadets at the
Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, “Japan
is standing at a position to contribute to the world’s peace
and prosperity. I want you to create an SDF that can
contribute to peace and safety in the international
community.” 1 2
Of course, sending the SDF and being a partner of U.S.
may make Japan to become the target of terrorist attack.
According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, March 18, 2004, al-Qaeda
has published one statement in a London-based Arabic
newspaper, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, warning Japan, Britain, Italy,
10
11
12
Mainichi Shimbun, March 20, 2003.
http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-news/898075/UN-0-9.html
Nikkei Shimbun, March 1, 2004.
http://www.nikkei.co.jp/sp1/nt69/20040301AS1E0100C01032004.html
Mainichi Shimbun, March 21, 2004.
http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/20040321p2a00m0dm012002c.html
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
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Australia, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to expect a Madrid-style
attack in their countries. This statement described these six
countries as “servants” of the U.S. This statement was signed
by Abu-Hafs Al-Masri/al-Qaeda Brigades, which claimed
responsibility for the Madrid bombings. This terror group
warned that their “death squads” are preparing to strike
appropriate targets with their “iron fist.” Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda 1 3 responded cautiously, “We are not
sure where the statement was genuine or not. You will
sacrifice public order if you cave into the demands of people
who want to dictate using violence. The international
community must unite to fight against terrorist.” Abu-Hafs
Al-Masri had issued a similar warning against Tokyo when
Japanese government decided to send the SDF to Iraq. 1 4
Because Japan government does not yield to the
terrorists’ threat, one of Japanese subjects is to take
countermeasures to prevent terror attack. For example,
Kabutocho, Tokyo is the center of Japan’s stock market,
whose role is similar to Wall Street in New York. If
Kabutocho was attacked, it will cause an economic disaster
like the 911 Incident. The Mainichi Shimbun reported that
Japan’s National Police Agency had ordered the police to
tighten security at about 650 locations, including nuclear
power plants, government facilities and U.S. military bases in
February 2004. The New Tokyo International Airport in
Narita also showed its anti-terrorist special police units and
13
14
May 7, 2004, Chief Caninet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda resigned,
because some top politicians, including himself, were found to have
failed to pay national pension premiu ms.
Mainichi Shimbun, March 18, 2004.
http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/20040318p2a00m0fp002000c.html
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equipments. 1 5 The U.S.-led occupation once succeeded in
Japan after World War II, but it has troubles in Iraq this time.
The violence of anti-U.S.-led coalition is not ceased in Iraq.
Non-Iraqis are becoming the kidnap targets. The SDF in
Samawah may have been the target of a terror attack. Some
explosions were heard near the camp from Wednesday, April 7,
2004. On the next day, Thursday, April 8, Qatar-based
satellite broadcaster Aljazeera reported that three Japanese
citizens, two men and a woman, are taken hostage in Iraq.
Aljazeera’s video also showed the three hostages’ face, names
and passports. According to the Aljazeera video report, the
group, who calls itself “Mujahedeen Brigades” in English,
accused American’s invasion and killing Iraq’s children.
Although they feel the friendship, respect and love to
Japanese, Japanese government is supporting American
military. Thus, they will use the same ways to treat Japanese.
This group demands: Withdraw Japanese troops from Iraq
within three days, or the three hostages will be burned alive.
All the video and armed group’s statement were aired in
Japanese NHK evening news on April 8, too. This scene
shocked Japanese greatly. Many anti-war demonstrators
demanded the recall of Japanese troops from Iraq.
Japanese government was demanding the release of their
citizens, accusing this terrorism and pledging to keep the SDF
in Iraq immediately. Japan did not yield to this group request
to withdraw the SDF. “Japan will never withdraw the SDF
from Iraq.” “We must not bow to the terrorists’ threat.” “We
must not forgive the terror act of taking innocent civilians
15
Ibid., April 5, 2004.
http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/photojournal/09.html
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
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hostage,” said Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. “We are
sending the SDF for humanitarian reconstruction efforts, and
therefore there is no reason the SDF should withdraw from
Iraq.” “This act of the terror is unforgivable,” said Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda in the press conference.
Although the SDF is there to provide humanitarian
support for Iraqis, it is under the administration of U.S.-led
occupation. Anti-U.S. activities are not ceased in Iraq, so
Japan’s humanitarian missions are misunderstood easily.
Japan is one of the American’s staunchest allies, so the
withdrawal of SDF will collapse the international
collaboration, which could result in a broader retreat by
coalition partners. Tokyo emphasizes that it will not pull the
SDF under the terrorist threat, but the pressures form the
public opinion and Opposition parties are increasing.
Meanwhile, U.S. has expressed its appreciation of Japan’s
decision of not to yield to the terrorists’ demand. U.S. Vice
President Dick Cheney thanked Japan’s support and called the
United States and Japan the “most bilateral relationship in the
world” on his Japan visit on April 12, 2004. “The fact that it
is so important is reflected, obviously in the growth and our
cooperation on economic matters and trade, as well as our
mutual efforts with respect to national security issues, to the
war on terror, and working to improve the situation not only
here in the Asia-Pacific region, but around the world,” said
Vice President Dick Cheney. 1 6 Fortunately, these three hostages
were released on April 15, 2004. This kidnap case has proved the
16
Yomiuri Shimbun, April 13, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/main/news/20040413it04.htm
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/04/12/cheney.japan/index.html
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firmness of U.S.-Japan alliance again.
U.S.-Japan-China Triangle
U.S. is a global leader; Japan is the Asian regional leader. The
U.S.-Japan partnership has contributed much to the Asian peace
and prosperity. These two countries have built mutual trust
relations. If American military withdrew from Japan, the U.S.Japan alliance would be worsened. Besides, Washington cannot
handle the issues of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait.
American military bases in Japan are necessary for regional
stability. The American military should not withdraw from
Japan. 1 7
The question is that how long will the honeymoon of
U.S.-Japan alliance last? Is Japan or China being American’s
best Asian partner? China’s economies have kept growing.
Superseding Japan is China’s strategic intent, which is called
China’s threat. Following the achievement of China strategic
role in Asia, Japan could be isolated in the future.
Consequently, the importance of U.S.-Japan relations will
decrease; the U.S.-China relations will be reinforced
economically and politically. For example, Vice President
Dick Cheney appreciated Japan for not bowing to demands
from Iraqi militants to withdraw the SDF. Meanwhile, he also
praised China for its efforts to handle North Korea issues and
promised to “do good work together” on his Asia trip. 1 8
China’s rising is testing Japan’s adaptive capabilities. The
17
Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as No.1? (Tokyo, Tachibana, 2000, in Japa
nese), part 7.
18
Nikkei Shimbun, April 14, 2004.
http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/main/20040414AT2M1401A14042004.html
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/04/13/cheney.asia.ap/index.html
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reinforcing of U.S.-China relations is not always detrimental
to the U.S.-Japan relations. These three countries are
exploring a win-win-win model. U.S.-Japan-China strategic
triangle is challenging the bilateral partnership.
U.S., Japan and China are competing for the economic,
political and military leaders globally and regionally. It is
much easier to find the common economic interests than the
political and military subjects. Japanese political intents are
emerging gradually, but its military ones are not clear right
now. Because of the historical context, Asian people are very
concerned about the possibility of Japan’s militarism
reappearance. Japan has bought most of its advanced weapons
from U.S. and collaborated with American military. American
has the military bases, aircraft carrier and soldiers in Japan.
Japanese government emphasizes and relies on the U.S.-Japan
alliance, so Japan is still a better partner for America right
now.
North Korea Issues
North Korea is a test ground for the strategic triangle of
U.S.-Japan-China, which shows the importance of China’s
strategic role. U.S. needs China to solve the North Korea
issues. North Korea asks China’s help, too. China has hosted
the six-nation talks and been instrumental in bringing North
Korea back to the negotiating table over the deadlock. The
hostage issues and nuclear weapon programs of the North
Korea have irritated Japanese government. Should the North
Korea crisis occurs, Japan really needs American support.
Thus, the North Korea issues are the main reasons for Japan
to emphasize the U.S.-Japan alliance, including sending the
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SDF for Iraq’s recovery.
Japanese government approaches North Korea with both
pressure and dialogue. The abduction issue has worsened the
deadlock. North Korea admitted that they had kidnapped some
Japanese as language teachers for its agent. The reunion of
Japanese abductees is the main issue between Japan and
North Korea. It is also a main topic on the six-nation talks.
The abducted Japanese and their family are urging Tokyo to
resolve its dispute with Pyongyang, so they could reunite
with their family who are left behind in North Korea.
Meanwhile, almost all the Government parties and the
Opposition parties agree that Japan should have some kinds
of pressure to push North Korea over abduction issue.
Unfortunately, Pyongyang’s reluctance in solving the
hostage issues has aroused Japanese anger, so Japan brings an
intense emotion to the six-nation talks. Recently, Japan has
passed a bill to unilaterally impose economic sanctions on
North Korea. The revised law enables Japan government to
increase its pressure on North Korea to solve the abduction
issue. 1 9
North Korea is afraid of the economic sanctions, so it is
shifting the major trade partner from Japan to China and
South Korea. In 2003, the trade volume between North Korea
and Japan decreased about 30%, but increased approximately
40% between North Korea and China. But North Korea is
suffering trade deficit to both China and South Korea right
now. Conversely, it enjoys the trade surplus and imports lots
of used trucks and bicycles from Japan, so Japan is still an
19
Mainichi Shimbun, February 9, 2004.
http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200402/09/index.html
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
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important resource for Pyongyang to gain foreign currency. If
Japan really engaged the economic sanctions, Pyongyang
cannot gain the necessary foreign currency and used cars. It
will cause a big trouble for North Korea’s economies. Thus,
Japan concludes that economic sanctions do have
considerable influence on North Korea. However, North
Korea is shifting the trade partners to China and South Korea,
so the collaboration of China and South Korea is important to
reinforce the power of Japanese economic sanctions. 2 0
In order to push North Korea with more pressure,
Japanese government has passed a bill to ban boats from
North Korea entering Japan on June 14, 2004. This bill
targets a specific ship, usually entering the Port of Niigata
and suspected as a spy ship. This bill is regarded as the
second pressure card to force North Korea into making a
compromise on the abduction issue. However, Tokyo has no
intention of immediately invoking this new law. It is
dependent on North Korea response toward the unsolved
abduction issues. Transport Minister Nobuteru Ishihara said,
“From the viewpoint of Japan’s security and diplomacy, the
government should decide whether to ban vessels from a
specific country from entering Japanese ports as sanction
measures.” 2 1
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi revisited North Korea
and brought back five children of former abductee couples on
May 22, 2004. Charles Robert Jenkins, husband of former
20
Sankei Shimbun, March 24, 2004.
http://www.sankei.co.jp/news/morning/24iti003.htm
21
Mainichi Shimbun, February 17, 2004.
http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-news/899644/North20Korea-0-6.html
88
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abductee Hitomi Soga, and his two daughters expressed their
reluctance to visit Japan, because he defected to North Korea
and could be extradited to the U.S. This family has reunited
in Jakarta, on July 9, 2004, and then entered Japan on July 18,
2004. There are still ten cases, which are not solved yet.
Pyongyang says that these ten people are dead or never
entered North Korea, but it promises to reinvestigate. North
Korea aims to normalize relation and receive economic aid
from Japan. It means that Japan’s economic sanction pressure
works. Moreover, North Korea approaches Japan to relieve
the tension with the U.S. over nuclear issues. But many
Japanese criticize that their government uses ransom to
exchange these five people and North Korea are not
trustworthy. Overall, Japanese evaluate this visit positively.
Military threat is the other conflict issue between Japan
and North Korea. North Korea uses nuclear arms programs
and missiles to threaten Japan. Especially, Pyongyang fired a
long range Taepodong missile over Japan’s main island,
which accelerates Japanese efforts to build a ballistic missile
defense system. The threat posed by North Korean further
enhances the U.S.-Japan relations. On April 5, 2004, the
Yomiuri Shimbun reported that U.S. government is also
considering to bring the defense missiles, called PAC3, into
Japan for a state of emergency, e.g., against North Korea’s
mid-range Rodong missiles. 2 2
But some Japanese consider the Taepodong threat calmly.
22
Yomiuri Shimbun, April 5, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20040405i101.htm
Nikkei Shimbun, June 2, 2004.
http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/main/20040602AT2M0101N01062004.html
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
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89
This threat is not so terrible; the SDF do have the abilities to
combat against North Korea invasion. Thus, “terrible” is only
a habit of saying, but not Japanese honne (frankness). North
Korea is nothing and a Stalinist regime in lots of Japanese
minds.
An interesting question is that if the North Korea
military threat were not so terrible, why would Japanese need
to spend much money to build and maintain Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) against the North Korean threat? Another
question is that are all China’s missiles targeting on Taiwan?
One viewpoint shows that TMD is used to defend China’s
missile threat. Although it is not so necessary to worry about
China attacking against Japan directly, the U.S.-Japan
alliance and Okinawa base should not be overlooked. If U.S.
unfortunately goes to war against China over the Strait issues,
maybe China would use missiles to pressure Tokyo not to
support the U.S. effort to help Taiwan. 2 3 To U.S., building
TMD likes sending the SDF is much appreciated. Building
TMD is important for Japan’s defense and reinforcing the
trust of U.S.-Japan alliance. Unfortunately, it may also
stimulate China and Russia to engage on an armaments
proliferation race. 2 4
Autonomy Issues
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi always affirms the U.S.Japan alliance, because it is in the national interest to do so. But
not all the Japanese will accept American-style disciplines. The
23
24
http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje1.tmd.html
Mainichi Shimbun, March 24, 2004.
http://www.mainichi.co.jp/news/flash/seiji/20040324k0000m010152000c.html
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
90
Opposition parties, especially the Democratic Party, criticize
that the government is just being a follower of U.S.
Meanwhile, anti-American activities are seen, especially in
Okinawa. For example, America refused to hand over the
soldier, who was suspected to commit a rape crime, to
Japanese police, which had provoked Japanese anger and
demonstration. How to transfer the suspect of American
soldier is an issue straining the U.S.-Japan ties. 2 5
American will claim their opinions and debate directly, but
Japanese are used to the indirect communication. Japanese style of
communication is heart-to-heart conversation—i-shin-den-shin.
Consensus decision is a typical Japanese way. Japanese have the
reserve characters and almost have no voice on international
political issues. They are not good at expressing the opposition
ideas. “No” is not a popular word in their daily conversation, but
many American see Japanese as “naive.” Therefore, some Japanese
do not like American style of direct communication.
Moreover, there are some doubts in Japanese minds. Because
American foreign policy is centered on its “national interests,” does
the defense of Japan always meet American national interests? Will
American national interests collide with Japanese national interests
in the future? Following the shift of political power, Uncle Sam
always changes its foreign policy. Are the North Korea issues more
important than the national interests for American? Some Japanese
insist that the North Korea should not be an excuse for Japan not to
say “no” to America. Japanese should protect their country by
themselves, instead of always depending on America. Briefly, the
autonomy is a conflict factor between the U.S. and Japan.
25
Yomiuri Shimbun, April 2, 2004
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20040402it05.htm
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
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91
Taiwan-Japan Relations
Economy-Based Relations
In 1972, Japan had entered into diplomatic relations with China;
Taiwan-Japan official relations were terminated and become the nongovernment practical relations. In order to maintain Taiwan-Japan
relations, Japan instituted the Interchange Association; Taiwan
established the Association of East Asian Relations. The two
associations are still carrying out the windows for the Taiwan-Japan
relations right now. Fortunately, Taiwan-Japan economic relations keep
growing firmly since then.
Whether the sphere of U.S.-Japan alliance includes Taiwan Strait
or not is a disputed issue for a long time. It is a major job for the new
Taiwan representative in Japan. However, this situation is changing
recently. American government is reinforcing the military force of
Okinawa base. U.S. and Japan are carrying out large-scale maneuvers
near Taiwan. Taiwan and China are also carry out large-scale
maneuvers simultaneously. It is not a coincidence, but inevitability.
Consequently, the Taiwan-Japan political relations are being
strengthened.2 6
On March 11, 2004, the Foreign Minister of Japan said,
“Economically, Taiwan is an important country to Japan.” Usually,
Japan uses the word of “area” to describe Taiwan, instead of “country.”
The word of “country” seems to be an oral mistake. 2 7 No matter
country or area, Taiwan is an important economic partner for
Japan. Taiwan and Japan keep a symbiotic relation in
economic affairs.
26
27
Takeo Hukuchi, “Japan-U.S. Alliance and Taiwan Security in the 21st Century,”
http://www.cdn.com.tw/daily/1998/10/10/text/871010c2.htm
Yomiuri Shimbun, March 12, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20040311ia28.htm
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
92
In the age of Japan as Number 1, 2 8 Taiwanese companies
were the subcontractors for Japanese firms. It looked like a
father-son relation. Japanese firms adopted Tokyo-centered
strategies and dominated the key technologies, key devices
and channels. Tokyo was being the headquarters to make key
decisions. Japanese firms in Taiwan and other countries were
the outside unimportant ones and just followed the Tokyobased decisions. In the “Lost Decade” or “Decade of
Stagnation” of the 1990s, many Japanese firms fell into debt,
which suppressed investment and then looked for outsourcing.
They were more willing to transfer or sale technologies to
Taiwan’s companies. Of course, OEM (Original Equipment
Manufacturing) had been a good opportunity for Taiwan’s
companies to learn many technologies and skills from
Japanese firms.
Now the Taiwan-Japan economic relations have entered a
new stage. The new Taiwan-Japan alliance is a more equal
relation. There are two reasons for this change. Firstly,
Taiwan’s industries have been upgraded to produce products
of good quality. Secondly, the growth of China markets has
given Taiwan’s companies many complementary resources for
Japanese needs.
Japanese have known that globalization is a world trend;
Tokyo-centered strategies are not suitable for this hypercompetition age. Lots of Japanese firms have entered or are
going to land China’s markets. Chinese is a foreign language
for Japanese businessmen. China’s culture is not so easy for
them to understand. They are looking for a partner.
28
Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number 1: LESSONS FOR AMERICA
(New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979).
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
93
Meanwhile, there are many Taiwanese businessmen investing
in China. Taiwanese can speak Chinese and understand
China’s culture easily. The language skill and culture
background are Taiwanese advantages. The past good
experiences have built a deep trust relation between them.
Consequently, Taiwan’s companies have become the best
partners for Japanese firms to ally with for entering China’s
market. Allying for entering China’s market is a new
partnership for Taiwan and Japan.
Discontinuity of Human Resources
Relation performance drops when communication is
insufficient. Good communication includes language skills,
knowledge of the host culture, mutual understanding, and trust.
Japanese do attach importance to trust relations, which takes
time and energy to build. Continuity of personnel can help build
understanding and trust between partners.
The generation shift of Japan-related human resources is
ongoing in Taiwan. Those elder generations, who had taken
Japanese educations, are native Japanese speakers. They can
think in Japanese ways and understand Japanese minds easily.
But they are retiring from the first lines. The numbers of those
familiar with Japanese affairs and Japanese people is decreasing.
For instance, former president Lee Teng-Hui is the most
important person for Taiwan-Japan relations. He is pro-Japanese
and has an authority on Japanese affairs. Many Japanese,
especially the elder generation, know him and like him very
much. In Japan, there is no other Taiwanese who can replace his
respectable position. Former president Lee Teng-Hui is not
young anymore, so Taiwan cannot count on him forever.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Japanese educations (including the language, culture,
and so on) were not highly valued in the government’s
educational policies until the 1980s. The national universities
or colleges were prohibited to establish the Japanese major
department basically. At that time, only four private
universities, Tamkang University, Soochow University, Fu Jen
Catholic University and Chinese Culture University, had the
Japanese major departments. Finally, the Japanese major
department was established in National Taichung Institute of
Commerce in 1980, reorganized and expanded to become
National Taichung Institute of Technology in 1999.
Consequently, Taiwan is suffering the vacuum of human
resources who hold the authority on Japan affairs. The
tractors for improving Taiwan-Japan relations are weakening.
In recent years, Taiwan government attaches importance
on the policies toward Japan. Shinkansen is a milestone
achievement. Some associations and teams are instituted for
reinforcing the Taiwan-Japan relations in Taiwan. The
interchange of congressmen is performing. 2 9 Japanese
newspapers, e.g., Yomiuri Shimbun, elevate their importance
by serving as communication channels for both sides.
Japanese reporters are actively interviewing Taiwan
government. For example, Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian
accepted a solo interview of Yomiuri Shimbun, and then
expressed his political policies on April 1, 2004. 3 0
Strengthening the weakening linkages with Japan is an
29
The Interchange Association, ed., Taiwanese Economic Affairs
(Tokyo, Ribuko, 2002, in Japanese): 211-214.
30
Yomiuri Shimbun, April 2, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/news/20040401i115.htm
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
95
emergency task. Unfortunately, only a few persons in the
universities and think tanks research about Japan’s economic
and political affairs. In order to intensify the linkages, the
American-style think tank is a good model. American think
tanks help America’s leader and shape U.S. foreign policies.
We can learn from American think tanks to build think tanks
working on Japanese studies.
In Japanese, kiki (crisis) is combined by two words of
danger and opportunity. The Taiwan-Japan relations are
changing, so the attitude toward Japan should be changed, too.
The retiring of elder generation could be a turning point for
younger generation to build a new style of Taiwan-Japan
relations.
China-Japan Relations
Political Issues
From the 1990s, the issues of “Supremacy or Collapse”
and “Threat or Strategic Partner” have become the two hottest
topics about China studies in the eyes of many observers,
including Japanese. 3 1 The subjects can be divided into
political
and
economic
aspects.
China’s
military
modernization is complicating the political conflicts. Major
trends and events have changed the context of China-Japan
relations and given both parties powerful motives to
collaborate with each other. However, there are still some
difficulties in China-Japan relations, which are not easy to
erase. The conflicts of economic interests are easier to
31
Hsi-Hsun Tsai, “American’s Japanese Dreams: Made in China—A Threat or
Strategic Partner for Japan’s Recovery?” Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 7,
no. 3 (January 2004): 25-52.
96
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
manage than historical sensitivities. Especially, Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s annual visits to Tokyo’s
Yasukuni Shrine for war dead, where convicted war criminals
are among those honored, always provokes China’s anger. 3 2
Meanwhile, lots of Japanese feel miserable for their
government, because Japanese government is always at
China’s beck.
Of course, not all the Japanese agree with Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit; some Japanese sue his
worship. On April 7, 2004, Fukuoka’s justice court judged
that this worship was a public visit and violated the
constitution. But Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi insists
that it is a private worship and he will keep visiting Yasukuni
Shrine.
The disputed sovereignty of Senkaku Islands, known as
the Diaoyu Islands in China, is another typical political
confliction between China and Japan. The Senkaku matter
affects the normal development of China-Japan relations. The
islands lie between Okinawa and Taiwan. China, Japan and
Taiwan all claim sovereignty over the islands, which provide
access to rich fishing grounds and possible oil deposits in the
area.
On the morning of March 24, 2004, seven Chinese
activists landed the Senkaku Islands to claim the sovereignty.
They were arrested immediately. It was the first time for
Japan to arrest any activist who landed these islands without
32
Yoshihide Soeya, Jianwei Wang and David A. Welch, “A New Look at the
U.S.-China-Japan Triangle: Toward Building a Stable Framework,”
Asian Perspective 27, no.3 (2003): 177-219.
Asahi Shimbun, April 1, 2004.
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0401/007.html
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
97
Japanese permission. Many members of the Opposition
parties supported this arrest, too. Japanese police planned to
question these seven on Okinawa before being sent them back
to China. China government demanded Japanese government
for unconditional and immediate release of these seven
activists. China has claimed the territory rights and called the
arrests a violation of its sovereignty. This issue provoked an
emotional conflict. On March 25, some protesters were
burning Japanese flags, also called the rising-sun flag,
outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing. 3 3 A bullish
sentiment was rising in Japan, too. On the morning of March
26, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi said angrily
that this kind of burning Japanese flags is not an allowable
action; Japan firmly protests it. Washington also claimed that
the sphere of U.S.-Japan alliance includes the Senkaku
Islands. Anti-Japan is not a new movement in China, but the
cyber activity is a new trend. Those protesters use the
Internet to express and raise anti-Japan opinion, which is
much more speedy and powerful.
The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that China’s national
strategy is centered on economic development, so the stable
China-Japan relations are necessary. China hopes to solve this
sovereignty dispute through peaceful talks. But China’s
government must handle the domestic public opinions first;
otherwise the anti-Japan action could lead to social instability.
The heated anti-Japan opinion was pushing China’s
government to show a strong attitude toward this issue.
Actually, both of Japan and China did not want to play up this
33
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/25/china.japan.reut/index.html
98
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
incident to worsen China-Japan relations; both sides aimed at
getting the incident under control earlier. 3 4 Fortunately, these
arrested activists were released and returned to China on
March 26, 2004. Nonetheless, the disputes over these islands
still exist and strain the China-Japan ties.
Economic Issues
The China-Japan relations can achieve win-win, win-loss
(or loss-win), and loss-loss results. Win-win result is
Japanese chasing direction. Fortunately, China’s economycentered strategy is helpful to attenuate some tensions;
meanwhile it also causes the economical mood of China’s
threat. In March 2004, Japan’s Diamond Harvard Business
Review has published one special edition to discuss China’s
threat, opportunities, markets, risks, business models and
strategies. Japanese government also reconsiders the yen loan
to China. Japanese think that China’s high economic growth
has denied the necessity of yen loan. 3 5
The industrial hollowing is a typical syndrome of
China’s threat. China’s low-cost labor and potential market
attract lots of Japanese firms to keep transferring to China.
This trend seems to be unstoppable right now. But not all the
Japanese see China as a threat; it is an opportunity, too.
China’s economic growth does give Japanese industries a new
market to export, which contributes much to Japan’s
34
35
Yomiuri Shimbun, March 27, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20040326ia25.htm
Ibid., April 4, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20040403ig90.htm
Ibid., April 3, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20040402ig91.htm
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
99
economic recovery. Moreover, the big firms’ failures and
huge losses force many Japanese to realize that a structural
problem does exist. China’s economic growth is acting as a
positive foreign pressure to push Japan to adjust its industrial
structure faster.
For example, Japanese iron and steel industry has
enjoyed the fruits of China’s economic growth. China, e.g.,
car industry, imports lots of iron and steel from Japan, and
thus have contributed much to the profitability of Japanese
iron and steel industry. 3 6 China needs lots of iron and steel to
support a construction boom, too. China’s companies not only
import, but also produce much iron and steel by themselves.
Thus, they are buying lots of materials, which raise the
material price. The rising material cost has become a big
pressure for Japanese iron and steel industry. Ironically,
Japanese iron and steel industries are enjoying and suffering
from China’s economic growth at the same time.
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said, on March 23,
2004, “China-Japan relations are very important. Considering
the importance of China-Japan friendships, from now on we
want to deepen the exchange magnification. China has much
influence power to North Korea on the six-nation talks.” 3 7
Until the beginning of 1990s, Japan saw Asia as a
manufacturing base and America as the final market.
Following the economic growth of Asia, Japanese firms are
changing the strategies to regard Asia as both manufacturing
36
Ibid., March 10, 2004.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/business/news/20040310ib04.htm
37
Nikkei Shimbun, March 23, 2004.
http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20040323AT1E2300123032004.html
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
base and market. Especially, China has become an important
market for Japanese firms. Globalization is a world trend;
meanwhile regionalization is another trend. Following the
emergence of EU (European Union) and NAFTA (North
American Free Trade Agreement), the regional competition is
growing more intense. The world economies will be divided
into EU, NAFTA and Asian FTA (Free Trade Agreement) three
strategic territories. This triangle will dominate the world
economy.
Japan is competing with China for the leader of Asian
FTA. China has chased this target for a long time; conversely,
Japan is a FTA developing country. Japan did not have the
intent to talk about FTA until recently. Both China and Japan
intend to ally with ASEAN and dominate the Asian currency.
Japanese yen is a suitable candidate, but the realization of
AMU (Asian Monetary Unit) will have to take a couple
decades.
Conclusion
People are apt to use their established framework to
collect related information and rearrange the context for their
own interests, so everyone will complete a different picture
of jigsaw puzzle. Sometimes the established framework has
become a cliché. Some conventional viewpoints, which had
worked in the past time, are no longer sufficient to interpret
current situations. This unbreakable established framework is
a barrier. Believing an obsolete framework is a selfsatisfaction or self-cheating behavior. This paper uses the
Japan-based diamond framework to replace a traditional
triangular or pendulum framework to redefine American Asian
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
101
policies. Ideally, we should distinguish economies from
politics. Unfortunately, it is almost an impossible mission.
Politics always sacrifice the economic interests. That is why
we have “political economics,” but not “economic politics.”
Maintaining Asian stability is a main concern of
American foreign policies. Alliances are becoming more and
more essential to accomplish this purpose. Alliance
competence is a core concept and national landscape. The
fundamental of U.S.-Japan partnership has been sound for a
long time. They have enjoyed close, stable, and mutually
beneficial security and economic relations. This strong
partnership has supplied a base for Asian stability and
prosperity, too. Japan’s past foreign policy of following
America and neglecting Asia had helped Japan’s economic
growth. Now looking to the West is still the basic rule for
Japan, but looking Asia is also of equal importance.
China has become a super power right now, and its
existence is challenging the U.S.-Japan partnership. Maybe
U.S.-China partnership will replace U.S.-Japan partnership,
and then U.S. must choose one of them in the future. This
paper cannot forecast when it will come, or never come.
Although U.S.-Japan partnership is close now, the bilateral
approach cannot understand these three countries’ relations.
The U.S.-Japan-China strategic triangle is a new model to
replace bilateral framework. Japan is reinforcing its
economical and political influence to prevent being isolated.
From the Taiwan’s perspective, U.S.-Taiwan-China relations
are always the main issues. Combining both viewpoints, a
new diamond framework of the U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan is
emerging in the 21st century.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
In Taiwan, few articles or reports take Japan seriously.
Japan is the missing piece in the puzzle of American Asian
policies and Taiwan’s foreign relations. When studying
American Asian policies, Taiwan should be shifted from the
triangular viewpoints of U.S.-Taiwan-China to the strategic
diamond of U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan. Taiwan holds the
nodal position in the East Asia. The model of collaboration
and coordination of U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan has not been
completed yet. The building of diamond partnerships is a
dynamic and interdependence journey. However, as the
number of partners increases, the strategic and managerial
issues become even more challenging. The goals and
motivation for partnering remain the same.
The level of need for collaboration may not be even for
each party. The inter-partner gaps may occur. The diamond
partnerships bring value to the member beyond what each
member can accomplish alone. The alliance journey is in high
uncertainty situations. “Who are my friends? Who are my
enemies?” is not an easy question to answer and can change
overnight. Somebody may shake your hand and use a sword to
threat you simultaneously. Instability is normal to partnering
that intends to create the future. Not all countries have an
interest in stabilizing their alliances. Someone can benefit
from the acceleration of conflict, not stability. Thus, someone
may aim to cause trouble tactically, and then he/she can gain
benefits from the chaos. No chaos, no chance.
Alliance longevity is one ruler to measure whether an
alliance succeeds or not. From this approach, an alliance is
viewed as a marriage and the duration of the marriage acts as
a ruler of success. But not all alliances must pass the test of
U.S.-Taiwan-China + Japan:
Rediscovering the Forgotten Childhood Player of Taiwan
103
time to create value. Conversely, a long-standing alliance
does not always create value for its members. Effective
diamond relations are built with a clear strategic intent. The
leader should develop a process for track moving targets.
Partners should hold the attitude of “When the facts change, I
change” to reassess their relations. “What can the member
contribute?” is a basic way to reconfirm its strategic
position. 3 8
There are obstacles to erase the conflicts of interest; no
alliance is ever flawless. But it does not mean that diamond
relations must be the “zero-sum” games. The zero-sum games
usually result in winners and losers. Sometimes, these
approaches will cause the worst results of losers and losers;
nobody can become the winner. Indeed, “plus-sum” games are
the right direction and mind for all four partners. No conflict
is only a myth. Co-existing with conflicts is a real picture of
the diamond relations. The longer the collaborative mood
lasts, the greater collective benefits will be created. It is
ongoing and reciprocal: Longer collaborative mood helps
create greater collective benefits; greater collective benefits
help build longer collaborative mood. Partners no longer can
focus solely on their interests. Maximizing the value of
partnerships is a common direction and interest for all four
partners. Creating value is a collaborative mood, but sharing
created value is competitive style. 3 9 The diamond framework
clarifies these partnerships.
38
39
See note 1 above.
Ibid.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
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