Producer, Consumer, Family Member:
The Relationship between Trade Attitudes and Family Status
Judith Goldstein
Yotam Margalit
Douglas Rivers
Stanford University
Preliminary Results:
Please Do Not Cite Without Permission
Paper Prepared for the Princeton Conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic
Policy, Princeton University, April 19-20, 2008.
1
Introduction
As the U.S. moves into the 21st century, trade has become an increasingly
important issue on the political agenda of aspiring and elected officials, who are often
quick to blame trade openness for the country’s economic ills. This “new” protectionist
sentiment has rekindled debate within both the scholarly and policy community about the
origins and effects of mass attitudes towards trade. Scholarly interest has been spurred in
part by the apparent disparity between economic theory that shows free markets to be
collectively welfare enhancing and actual public policy, which often entails high levels of
government intervention to close or regulate markets. However, it is not only the
apparent lack of good sense among the elected officials that has fueled scholarly debate.
The fact that international trade is an issue area where the effect of public policy is
largely knowable, ex-ante, provides an opportunity to assess the extent to which
individuals recognize and then articulate the effects of globalization in the political arena.
The study of trade attitudes has a distinguished history. Most analyses derive from
two models that suggest how the opening of trade borders should influence the incomes
of different domestic groups: Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) and Ricardo-Viner (R-V). These
models, one based on factor endowments and the other on the sector of employment,
generate predictions about who will gain or lose from trade liberalization. Rogowski
(1989), in the seminal work in this field, used factor endowments as a vehicle for
explaining how these distributive effects translate into political coalitions and policy
outcomes. Others, such as the work by Magee (1978) suggest that sectoral interests lead
actors to invest in political lobbying. Although no consensus exists on the exact causal
chain between interests and policy outcomes, all of this literature treats peoples’ labor
2
market standing as the main source of their trade preferences, and by that implicitly
assumes that individuals’ own employment characteristics determine their attitudes on
trade.
In this paper we offer an expansion to this basic model of trade preferences.
Instead of focusing only on an individuals’ own labor-market standing, we argue that
characteristics of the household unit also provide insight to people’s thinking about trade.
Empirical evidence in other policy domains has convincingly shown that political
attitudes are not determined in a vacuum; rather, the beliefs of others in the family, the
community and even the workplace exert significant influence on individuals’ political
attitudes (Jennings and Niemi, 1991; Mutz, 2006, for example). These studies suggest
that family members often share political positions not only because of ideological
affinity between partners but also because of shared economic interests (Lancaster, 1966;
Becker, 1981). We hypothesize that this insight is also likely to apply to people’s
preferences on trade policy.
In particular, as a growing number of households are composed of two-earner
families, the labor market exerts a direct effect on the interest of more than one family
member. Trade attitudes, by this logic, should be affected not only by an individual’s
employment circumstance but also by the employment position of other family members.
Contemporary trade policy, we conjecture, may be set less by how an individual views
his job and income prospects in a globalized economy, than by how his or her family unit
is affected as a whole by international trade integration.
Our analysis focuses on what we see as a set of puzzles that derives from the
interaction between individuals’ different roles in the household as producers, consumers
3
and family members. Three sets of issues are the basis for the analysis. First, substantial
evidence demonstrates that people’s prospects in the labor market affect their attitudes on
trade (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2001, 2004; Mayda & Rodrik, 2005). Do individual
calculations of interest change when they become part of a family unit and what
preferences emerge if the interests of individuals in the family diverge? If one household
member is in a secure job and the other is not, for example, are the effects of global trade
pressures ameliorated or exacerbated? Second, a consistent empirical finding is that
females are more supportive of trade protectionism than are men, even when controlling
for key demographics (Burgoon and Hiscox, 2003). Does the effect of gender differ
depending upon whether a person is single or part of a family unit? Third, research
suggests that individuals who recognize the consumption benefits of open trade are more
supportive of globalization (Baker 2003, 2005). To what extent do people perceive a
tradeoff between trade as a source of lower prices for the household’s consumption and
lower job security? By shifting the unit of analysis from an individual to a household,
this paper seeks to address this set of questions, and thus offer a better account of
people’s trade policy preferences.
Our analysis suggests the following set of answers. We find that preferences on
trade policy do differ across types of households: married individuals tend to be more
trade protectionist than individuals who are not part of a family unit, even when
controlling for a set of possible confounding factors. Moreover, this difference holds
across both men and women. Second, we find a strong relationship not only between
people’s labor market standing and their attitudes on trade but as well, between their
spouse’s job situation and their own support for trade policy. The “spousal effect” on
4
one’s own policy views is shown to be greater when the spouse provides a greater share
of the household income. Last, we find that shopping habits are correlated with support
for trade, but that gains as consumers only weakly offset family concerns about the labor
market standing of the household members.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the
motivation for this research and review the main findings in the literature on the question
of individual level trade preferences. We then develop our argument about the role of
household considerations in shaping people’s preferences and lay out a set of predictions.
In Section III we present the survey design we developed to test these predictions, and
discuss measurement issues. In Section IV we present the results of the empirical
analysis. We begin by demonstrating consistent differences in trade preferences between
different types of households. We then proceed to test possible mechanisms that account
for this finding. The final section discusses our main findings and concludes.
II. Motivating Questions
The canonical position on trade policy preferences is that an individual’s
propensity to favor openness is a function of his or her factor endowment. The focus is on
the individual’s vulnerability in the labor market as a result of exposure to foreign
competition. Yet this view ignores the presence of conflicting interests within households
that may interact with, or even offset, the effects of an individual’s employment.
Imagine a family in a textile producing state where one member of the family
(say, the husband) is employed in a labor-intensive clothing factory and is exposed to
heightened job insecurity. He should oppose a free trade deal with China either because it
is more abundant in low-skilled labor than the United States or because his industry of
5
employment is import competing. But suppose his wife is working in a non-tradeable or
export oriented sector, or has skill qualifications that make her job highly secure from
competition with China. Research on voting behavior suggests that as a couple they are
likely to vote similarly, despite their conflicting employment interests (e.g. Rabinowitz,
19xx). Will the spouse’s interests affect the husband’s views also on the question of
trade? Will they ultimately favor or oppose a free trade agreement with China? Further,
imagine they shop at Wal-Mart or at any other store that brings inexpensive products to
their hometown. To what extent will these hypothetical household members recognize a
trade-off between job security and the consumption benefits attained by increased access
to products from other countries? How do family members resolve their different roles –
as workers, consumers, or family members – in forming a policy preference?
Standard economic theory provides us with a starting point for analysis. To
predict the distributive consequences of trade exposure, economic theory suggests we
look at the factor endowments of the country and whether or not one is employed in a
sector relying on the relatively scarce or abundant factor: opening up a country’s borders
to trade will lead to income gains (losses) among those employing the abundant (scarce)
factor. Whether or not one is able to move across factors is the other key variable
considered by economic analysis. According to the Ricardo-Viner model, if factor
mobility is limited, the interests of the individual will align with the sector of his or her
employment, and not with the factor.
In short, the hypothetical worker described above could find his interest aligned
with other textile workers employed in the same company he works for, or with the
textile workers in the industry as a whole. In both cases, the individual’s occupation,
6
income and ease of finding a new job should help explain whether or not they favor trade
openness.
Empirical support for these propositions has been mixed. Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) find that lower skill levels and earnings are predictors of support for trade
protectionism, suggesting that factor-type and not sector of employment is a better
predictor of trade attitudes. In addition to this employment effect, they also find that
assets held by an individual generate interests that affect trade preferences. Measuring
assets such as home ownership, they suggest that fear of declining value for this asset can
interact with employment effects and lead to more support for protectionism. Thus
residing in an area where others are suffering income loss because of employment in an
industry hurt by trade, will lead an individual to become more anti-trade than predicted
from his or her own job situation. Other studies find individual preferences on trade to be
associated with skill level, but in a pattern not entirely consistent with the H-O’s factor
approach. Examining data from a large set of countries, Mayda and Rodrik (2005), for
example, find that high-skilled workers in countries that are skill abundant are more protrade oriented than similarly skilled workers in skill-scarce economies. However, this
study, as well as several others, all find that within the country, higher-skilled individuals
are more supportive of trade than lower skilled individuals, regardless of the country’s
factor endowment (e.g. Sinnott and O’Rourke 2001; Beaulieu et al. 2004; Baker 2005)
Except for the consideration of asset holdings as a factor shaping preferences, few of
these studies directly consider a possible trade-off between individual factor endowments
and other household-level characteristics.
7
Work on consumerism and trade preferences has been explored less. Andy Baker
(2005) notes that previous literature “has tended to overlook varying demand and
consumption patterns as a possible source of trade policy preferences”. Arguing that
consumption patterns do matter, he looks at survey data from forty one countries and
finds that those who consume exportable products are more protectionist-oriented than
are those that are heavy consumers of imported and import-competing products. The
result is logical: with the opening of borders, prices of the goods that a country will
export will rise. If an individual consumes a large basket of such goods, then their real
income will decline. Thus as Baker suggests, “the propensity to consume skill-intensive
goods should be negatively correlated with support for free trade in skill-abundant
countries and positively associated with pro-trade inclinations in skill-scarce countries”1.
Finally, a number of studies have reported that women’s attitudes differ in a
systematic manner from men’s. Burgoon and Hiscox (2003) report that women are less
likely than men to favor trade openness, even when controlling for a wide range of
individual level characteristics. The gender difference is most acute among collegeeducated women; older women are also consistently more opposed to free trade than are
their younger cohort. Nonetheless, in all groups, the gender difference is an enduring
result that still begs explanation.
III. The Household Unit as the Source of Trade Preferences
The prevailing position in the study of trade policy preferences, as discussed
above, is that an individual’s propensity to favor openness is a function of his or her
factor endowment. Knowing about one’s exposure to foreign competition in the labor
1
Baker 2005, p. 925
8
market is assumed to offer important insight into that person’s perceived self-interest
regarding trade. This approach largely ignores people’s interests as family members. Yet,
the increasing proportion of family households with multiple earners, both confronting
the vagaries of the labor market, suggests that a “spousal effect” on trade preferences
may be growing in importance. In 1985, the ratio of dual earner households and single
households was three to two. By 2000, dual income households outnumbered individual
earners by a ratio of two to one. This trend is also true for other industrialized countries2.
It is not contentious to suggest that members of two-worker households face
conflicts and considerations that differ from single-earner households. Family members
could have different endowments or be employed in different sectors. Yet, research on
voting behavior suggests that as a couple they are likely to vote similarly, despite their
conflicting employment interests. The question is whether interests on trade policy follow
a similar pattern. In other words, how do couples resolve the conflicting interests that
arise from working in different sectors with different opportunities and risks associated
for each with growing trade openness?
In a similar survey administered by Polimetrix/YouGov in 2006, results suggest
that there is a relationship between family circumstances and preferences on trade policy.
Individuals living in two-adult households were approximately ten percentage points
more likely than single people to think that it was “very important” for the U.S.
2
In Canada the proportion of two earner families among husband-wife families with dependent
children increased from 20 per cent to more than 70 per cent between 1961and 1990 (Rose and
Villeneuve, 1998).
9
government to protect American businesses from foreign competition3. This difference
holds also when a host of controls are introduced. Similarly, cross-national surveys also
points towards a similar pattern in which married households are more protectionist than
individuals who are not married (see Appendix for analysis of such cross-national data).
What accounts for this relationship between household type and trade
preferences? One mechanism might be that people internalize the job insecurities of other
household members when thinking about the effects of trade. In families in which one
member’s labor market prospects are tenuous, support for trade of the other (i.e. “jobsecure”) spouse will be lower than his/her own position in the labor market would
suggest. If indeed the “spousal effect” operates through the labor market prospects of the
spouse, three issues follow. First, do the spouse’s job prospects exert an influence on
one’s trade policy preferences that is similar in magnitude to the effect of one’s own job
prospects? If spouses serve as a “perfect substitute” to oneself, then the identity of the
family member whose job is insecure should not matter. It is however plausible that
people’s own position in the labor market exerts a greater influence on their thinking
about policy. Second, it is plausible, given earlier findings, that the existence or
magnitude of the effect varies by gender. Third, one might expect the effect of the
spouse’s job insecurity to have a greater influence on one’s own trade policy preferences
in instances where the spouse is the main source of income in the household.
We can now summarize this study into a series of organizing questions. We
begin by looking at what occurs when individuals become family members.
3
The wording of the question was: “For each of the issues listed below, please state whether you think it
should be a high priority or low priority issue for an American government: Protect companies and workers
from foreign competition.
10
•
What is the nature of the “spousal effect”: holding all else equal, do individuals
with spouses who differ in their labor market prospects also differ in their trade
policy preferences? Most generally, does the less job-secure spouse make both
family members more trade protectionist?
•
All else equal, will the spouse’s job-insecurity have a greater impact on one’s trade
preferences when the spouse provides a greater share of the household income?
•
In households with greater awareness of trade’s benefits to consumers, are the job
prospects of self or spouse associated with a weaker effect on respondent’s trade
attitudes?
A second mechanism that may explain the findings in Table 1 is the “female effect”. As
noted above, past research indicates that women have consistently more protectionist
attitudes. It is plausible that over time household members influence each other and
“pull” them closer towards their policy positions. If that is the mechanism at play, we
would expect the following:
•
Married men should be more protectionist and married women more pro-trade than
their single counterparts.
Last, a third mechanism that may offer insight on the relationship between family
circumstances and trade preferences is people’s tolerance of risk. A substantial literature
in economics on gender differences in risk attitudes (typically examining monetary
gambles) finds that females are either more risk averse (see Eckel and Grossman 2002) or
that there are no consistent gender differences in risk aversion (see Byrnes, Miller and
Shafer, 1999)4. We conjecture that what may be tying the “female protectionism” finding
to the fact that single people are more pro-trade, as well as the linkage between people’s
sense of job security and trade preferences, is their degree of risk acceptance. It could be
4
Byrnes et al conduct a meta-analysis of 150 risk experiments, and find that while women are more risk
averse in some situations, a large number of studies find no evidence of a gender difference in risk
attitudes.
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that opening up the country’s market to the international economy is perceived to be a
more unknown departure from the status quo, and in that sense a more risky proposition5.
If that were the case, we should observe two empirical regularities:
•
Risk tolerance should be correlated with greater support for free trade, where riskaverse individuals should be more protectionist on trade policy.
•
Single people should be more risk acceptant than married individuals and men
should be more risk acceptant than females.
In the next section we move on to discuss the survey we administered and the
construction of the different measures used in the subsequent analysis.
IV. The Data and Measurement Issues
The typical national survey with a sample size of 1,000 or so does not provide
enough observations to analyze differences between one and two-earner married couples.
In 2006, about 58% of adults were married and, of these, about 52% had two earners and
27%, one earner. Thus, in a sample of size 1,000, the effect is computed based on a
difference between subsamples of roughly 300 and 160 respondents. Further, households
with single earners overwhelmingly represent households with a male worker, so gender
is confounded with single-earner family status. In order to better understand how
individuals approach economic trade-offs of the household that arise from an integrating
world economy, we conducted a survey that utilized an over-sample of two-earner
married couples to understand how spousal employment affects trade policy preferences.
Respondents were selected from the YouGov/Polimetrix PollingPoint panel. The
design stratified panelists according to marital status and employment, with an over
5
Clearly, closing the borders to trade is also a departure from the status quo. The conjecture here is that
greater exposure is viewed as a more risky change than less exposure.
12
sample of married couples. The survey was fielded in July 2007 with a total of 6,357
interviews completed. The samples were selected using the sample matching
methodology described in Rivers, 2007. The resulting sample was then ranked by stratum
to match the age, gender, race, and education marginals in the 2005 American
Community Survey. The unique feature of the survey, aside from its large number of
married two-earner couples, was that data were collected on the employment status,
including both industry and occupation, of both husband and wife.6
Survey questions asking about attitudes on trade are, like questions on many other
policy issues, susceptible to framing effects (Hiscox 2006). In other words, emphasizing
certain positive (negative) aspects of trade openness generate responses more favorable
(unfavorable) to free trade. To gauge respondents’ attitudes on trade, we asked several
different questions. The basic trade policy question was:
“Overall, do you think trade with other countries should be expanded,
reduced or kept at its current level?
A second question deals with people’s self-assessment of whether or not trade was
good for them and their family. That question was:
“Do you think that growing trade and business ties between the United
States and other countries is a good thing or a bad thing for you are your family?”
And also, whether or not it was good for the average American:
“Do you think growing trade and business ties of the US with other
countries has made the average American better or worse off?”
6
We are not the first to incorporate household characteristics in the study of trade preferences.
Scheve and Slaughter (2001), using the National Election Study, include education, occupation and
industry employment of the spouse in their analysis. They report that, “household differences were
generally consistent with individual ones.” (p .287). In another study utilizing the NES data, Hainmueller
and Hiscox consider whether household income (as opposed to individual income) affects the relationship
between education and support for trade. They find that the education effect is identical among those that
live with a spouse versus individuals that do not.
13
On the Trade Policy question, respondents were prompted with five possible answers, ,
ranging from “expand greatly” to “reduce greatly.” When responding to the questions on
whether or not trade was good for their own household and for others, they were
prompted with four answers varying from “very good” to “very bad”. In subsequent
analyses, the binary variable of Support for free trade includes those who wanted to
either maintain or expand current US trade.
The particular hypotheses we want to test deal with whether or not, and in what
ways, attitudes change when individuals become part of a two-worker household. Since
the way individuals form preferences on trade may vary with their different roles in the
household, we begin by looking at the most visible aspect of economic integration: job
security and labor market prospects. To address the question of how employment
position influences attitudes, we examine both objective and subjective (i.e. self-reported)
measures of respondents’ standing in the labor market. All indicators were also calculated
regarding the spouse’s occupation.7
Objective measures of job security are calculated by asking respondents to specify
their employment status, their general industry of occupation, as well as their narrow
occupation category at the 3-digit NAICS classification level. We then calculate two
different indicators of job security. The first measure is based on the exposure to trade of
the industry the respondent works for. We classify industries of employment as either:
Net Importer, Net Exporter, or Non-tradeable. This classification is based on the average
net exports of the industry in the years 1999-2004, using data provided by the Census
Bureau. The second objective measure we develop for job security is Industry
7
The difference being that the subjective measure of the spouse’s situation was obtained by asking the
respondent about their spouse’s job security.
14
Employment Change, for which we calculate the change in national employment for each
occupation category over a period of five years (1997-2002)8. If individuals’ trade
preferences, as the Ricardo-Viner model suggests, are linked to their sector’s interests,
then an industry’s employment trend should be a good proxy for people’s perceived
employment security in the market.
Respondents’ subjective perceptions of job vulnerability in the job market are
measured again using three different survey items. Each respondent was asked, “Looking
forward to the next couple of years, how confident do you feel about being able to keep
your current job?” The four possible responses, ranging from ‘very insecure’ to ‘very
secure,’ were scored from one to four as the variable Own Job Security. Respondents
were also asked the same question about their spouse’s job situation that was measured
on the same scale (Spouse’s Job Security). A follow-up question asked respondents about
the anticipated ease or difficulty in finding a new job as “as good or better” than their
current job, if they were to become unemployed. The responses, coded on a five point
scale as Job Replacement Difficulty, takes the highest value for respondent’s saying it
would be “very difficult” to find such a job9.
Most existing studies that seek to understand trade preferences find that
individuals’ attitudes are closely associated with their standing in the labor market.
Examining this relationship with the data, indeed, there appears to be a close relationship
between labor market prospects and support for a free trade policy. As table 1 shows,
support varies from 66% to 37% depending upon the ease with which currently employed
8
Since some respondents did not report their detailed industry classification, we also generate a dummy
not-reported category, so as to avoid having to drop these individual from the analysis.
9
See Appendix for a correlation matrix of the different objective and subjective measures.
15
respondents thought they would be able to find a new job. We return later to discuss this
relationship in greater detail.
Figure 1. Support Trade by Labor Market Prospects
As noted earlier, one possible factor accounting for variation in people’s trade
preferences could be their degree of risk aversion. If trade is viewed as a high-risk/higher
reward policy, namely a policy that could yield substantial benefits but also generate
substantial loss, degree of risk aversion would be negatively correlated with support for
free trade. To test this hypothesis, we construct a measure of tolerance of risk based on
responses to two hypothetical questions. The first asked: “Would you agree to receive a
10 percent pay cut today in return for a guarantee not to lose your job in the next ten
years?” Answers range from “definitely yes” (1) to “definitely not (4). The second
question describes the opposite tradeoff: “If another company offered you a 30% payraise to do the same job you currently have, but at a substantially higher risk of being laid
16
off in the next three years, would you accept the offer?” Again, the answers ranged on the
same four-point scale. By deducting the response to the first question from response to
the latter question, we get a seven point Risk Acceptance measure ranging from three
(most risk averse) to minus three (most risk acceptant). For ease of presentation, we also
collapse the distribution into a three-category variable denoting risk acceptant, risk averse
and “risk neutral” individuals (with the latter being the middle category).
An additional effect touted in support of trade liberalization is in providing access
to cheap foreign imports. Since low price goods are often provided to the US market
through imports, price-conscious individuals may be more supportive of free trade. To
see whether or not there is a “consumer effect”, we asked respondents about their buying
habits and the extent to which the price of products influenced where they shopped. First,
participants were asked: “What overall effects do you think trade with other countries has
on the prices of products sold in the US?”. Answers ranged on a five-point scale from
“much cheaper” to “much more expensive”. Second, we asked respondents about the
frequency in which they shop at discount retailers such as Wal-Mart or Costco. Here,
responses arrayed on a four-point scale from “very frequently” to “never”.10 Finally, in
order to better understand whether or not trade policy was seen as contributing to cheap
prices, we also asked respondents to tell us, in their own words, why they thought these
stores had cheaper products. We use theses different measures to examine the
relationship between consumption gains and support for trade.
Lastly, to test whether the income provision responsibilities in the household have
an effect on the importance assigned to the spouse’s job security, we compute the
10
Perhaps expectedly, responses to the two questions are more highly correlated among females (0.38) than
among males (0.31).
17
variable Income Share which measures the importance of each member of the
household’s contribution to their overall income. To assess the relative income shares, we
asked respondents how much of total family income came from their own earnings versus
their spouse’s. Responses ranged from “mostly me” to “mostly spouse”. As in previous
studies, we include a set of demographic variables such as age, gender and education (see
Appendix for descriptive statistics and coding definition of variables)11
V. Results
Preferences on trade policy represent a mixture of individual and collective
considerations. Most previous analyses have assumed, at least implicitly, that attitudes
toward trade reflect the perceived effect of trade openness on people’s own welfare12.
Most people, however, live in households in which income is shared. Consequently,
when one member of the household loses employment, the income of the entire family
declines13. It is plausible that in these situations, it is better to assume a household utility
function instead of an individual utility.
Before analyzing the joint effect of one’s own and spouse’s labor market
prospects on trade preferences, we begin with two general observations. First, responses
to our set of questions on trade preferences elicited a range of views on globalization. On
the question of whether or not trade was good for the individual respondent and their
family, 80% said that it was either very good or good. However, when we asked them to
comment on whether or not trade was good for the average American, only 43% thought
11
We measure education by the highest degree attained, ranging from “no high-school” (1) to post-graudate
education (6).
12
A recent exception is Mansfield and Mutz (2006), who focus on sociotropic considerations.
13
Obviously, job loss has additional negative implications beyond the loss of income.
18
that trade was good or very good14. Asked for their preferences on US trade policy, 46%
thought that the US should reduce trade with other countries either somewhat or greatly.
This difference between the perceived effect of trade on the individual and her preferred
policy suggests that the two are not measuring the exact same thing and that caution
should be used in interpreting different measures of “trade attitudes”.
Table 3 presents the relationship between self-assessments of the effect of trade
and trade policy preferences. Of those who responded that trade was good for them, there
was only a small difference between those that supported a policy of trade expansion and
those that did not. Even those who perceive free trade in a good light seem divided on its
policy implications. Among respondents who feel that trade is hurting them (and their
family), however, there is almost uniform support for closing markets.
Table 3. Perceived Effect of Trade on Family and Trade Policy
Preferences
U.S Trade Policy
Expand
Keep as Is
Decrease
Total
n
Trade for Family
Bad
Good
3%
39%
10%
35%
87%
26%
100%
100%
1,836
3,862
Note: Figures refers to the percentage of individuals that answered that trade
openness was either good or bad for their family.
14
This asymmetry is not unique to the issue of trade. Survey questions about the general state of the
economy show a similar bias: When asked how the economy is doing and also how well the respondent
herself is doing economically, people’s assessments of the economy at large are much more negative than
their reporting of their own economic situation.
19
Second, as shown in table 1 above, we find a relationship between marital status
and attitudes toward trade. Members of households appear to be more negative on open
trade than single workers. This difference remains, even when each confronts similar
labor market prospects, as shown in Table 4. When we separate the analysis by income
level or limit it to older cohorts, the differences between married and single individuals
do not disappear.
Table 4: Family Status, Job Replacement Prospects and Support for Trade
Easy
Finding a New Job
Moderate
Difficult
Single
71.4%
(283)
61.3%
(121)
56.3%
(120)
Married
62.6%
(1209)
60.4%
(527)
44.8%
(895)
Note: Figures denote percent support for maintaining or expanding U.S trade. Numbers of
observation are in parentheses. This analysis only married and single individuals, and excludes all
other marital status categories (e.g. divorced, separated, etc).
Household Preferences
To begin our examination of how households reconcile conflicting interests, we
look at the interaction between respondent’s own labor market standing and that of the
spouse. In Table 5 we present levels of support for trade given the job prospects of both
household members. The results reconfirm the empirical relationship between the labor
market prospects of their spouse and their own trade policy preferences15. Among
respondents that believe that both they and their spouse can easily find a comparable job,
15
We do not include any controls in this analysis, though as we later show, results remain largely the same
also when examined in a multivariate analysis.
20
67% support open trade. This number declines quite substantially as either one of the
household members fears their prospects when facing the job market.
Examining the results further, a pattern emerges: the biggest decline in support for
trade is observed when comparing a household in which both members feel confident
about their job prospects to a household with an insecure member. This is the case
regardless of which is the insecure member, though the decline is sharper when one’s
own labor market prospects are worse. However, the differences in pro-trade attitudes
between households with one anxious spouse to a household in which both spouses face a
difficult tough job prospects is quite small. Compared to households with both members
optimistic about the ease of finding a comparable job, a household with weak prospects
for the spouse is on average less supportive of trade openness by approximately 15%.
Households in which the respondent himself expects to face difficulties findings a
comparable job are on average 26% less supportive of trade openness. Lastly, households
in which both members are pessimistic about job replacement, support for trade is only
marginally lower than when only the respondent is facing poor job replacement
prospects.
Table 5: Job Replacement Prospects and Support for Trade
Spouse's Job Replacement Prospects
Own Job
Replacement
Prospects
Not Easy
Easy
Not Easy
Easy
37.60%
40.40%
(280)
(223)
50.80%
66.20%
(372)
(1106)
Note: numbers on top of cell denote the percent of respondents supportive of maintaining
or increasing current levels of trade. Number of observations in parentheses.
21
These results suggest that the spouse’s labor market prospects “matter” to
people’s own thinking about trade. However, the importance of the spouse’s position may
vary across gender or it could vary as a function of the income sharing responsibilities of
the household members. On the issue of gender, we replicate the analysis in Table 5,
separately for men and women (see appendix). The results are quiet similar among both
groups, though the “spousal effect” on one’s own trade preferences is weaker among
females.
Labor Market Effects
Our results seem to vary according to the variable used to measure individuals’
labor market standing. To judge labor market effects, we rely upon a range of different
objective and subjective measures to proxy for people’s prospects in the labor market as
predictors of trade policy preferences. The dependent variable is the respondents’ support
for free trade, measured on a five-point scale; higher scores imply greater support for
trade openness. The model is estimated using an ordered probit model with four
thresholds relating a latent continuous dimension of support to the four-category scale.
As Table 6 shows, the trade exposure of an individual’s industry of employment
is not a significant predictor, neither for the respondent nor for the spouse. In fact, the
signs for the spouse are the opposite of what one might have expected, as the individuals
in net exporting industries are less supportive of trade than those in net importing
industries. We also examine a second objective measure, which is the percentage change
in employment in the respondent’s industry over a five year period (1997-2002). Again,
the results are weak for both respondent and spouse, as increasing and declining
industries (in terms of occupation) are not associated with different preferences on trade.
22
In clear contrast, the two subjective measures of labor market prospects are
strongly associated with people’s views on trade. Both the question about likelihood of
keeping one’s job (Job Security) and the prospects of finding a comparable job if one
were to lose their job (Job Replacement) are a substantively large and statistically
significant effect. Holding all variables in Model 4 at their means, a change in job
security from “very secure” to “not at all secure” corresponds with a 29% decrease in
pro-trade attitudes. A change in the expected ease of finding a comparable job from “very
easy” to “very difficult” is associated with a 13% decline in support for free trade.
Interestingly, the “spousal effect” is weaker in the job security measure than it is with the
job replacement measure.
Two different explanations may account for the weakness of the objective
measures of labor market standing as predictors of trade-policy preferences. It could be
that these objective measures are simply too crude to capture people’s actual position in
the labor market, and that a finer indicator of exposure to foreign competition would
produce a stronger empirical relationship with attitudes on trade. Alternatively, it could
be that people’s perceptions of security or insecurity in the labor market are not heavily
grounded on the objective circumstances of their industry or firm. This is an issue we
take on in a separate study.
23
Table 6. Support for Trade Trade by Labor Market Standing of Self and Spouse
Education
Female
Age
Age2
Household Income (log)
Export Oriented Sector
Import Oriented Sector
Export Oriented Sector (sp)
Import Oriented Sector (sp)
Model 1
0.051**
(.016)
-0.406**
(.075)
-0.059**
(.02)
0.001**
(.000)
0.183*
(.079)
-0.117
(.247)
-0.173
(.179)
-0.146
(.219)
0.241
(.161)
Employment Change in Industry
Model 2
0.064**
(.016)
-0.360**
(.071)
-0.050*
(.022)
0.001*
(.000)
0.144+
(.075)
Model 3
0.065**
(.016)
-0.318**
(.073)
-0.040*
(.02)
0.000+
(.000)
0.095
(.074)
Model 4
0.065**
(.016)
-0.365**
(.071)
-0.045*
(.021)
0.000*
(.000)
0.103
(.074)
0.001
(.002)
-0.003
(.003)
Employment Change in Industry (sp)
Job Insecurity
-0.252**
(.041)
-0.026
(.041)
Job Insecurity (sp)
Difficulty Replacing Job
-0.097**
(.031)
Difficulty Replacing Job (sp)
-0.111**
(.034)
Observations
1544
1803
1805
1803
Log likelihood
-2198
-2577.53 -2547.51 -2541.61
Pseudo R-squared
0.027
0.026
0.038
0.04
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
24
Model 5
0.056**
(.017)
-0.370**
(.076)
-0.044*
(.019)
0.000*
(.000)
0.106
(.081)
0.059
(.231)
-0.071
(.177)
-0.21
(.28)
0.198
(.184)
0.000
(.003)
-0.001
(.004)
-0.203**
(.047)
0.011
(.047)
-0.057+
(.032)
-0.087*
(.038)
1533
-2133.14
0.05
Next, we examine the effect of the income sharing responsibilities on the
relationship between spouse’s job security and support for trade. As stated earlier, our
expectation is that the job situation of the spouse would matter more in households in
which the spouse is the main income provider. When the contribution of the spouse is
less significant, trade preferences are more likely to reflect the individuals’ own standing
in the labor market.
Table 7 looks at the relationship between the distribution of income provision
within a household and the respondent’s trade preferences. We examine it separately by
the labor market prospects of the two household members. The results reveal several
notable patterns. First, in all four categories of households (in terms of job prospects),
reliance on the spouse as the main source of income is associated with lower levels of
support for trade (though the differences are not statistically significant). It is an open
question why self-reliance is associated with greater support for trade16. Second, among
households in which the spouse faces difficult labor market prospects, support for trade is
lower as the reliance on the spouse as a source of income is greater. This relationship
provides support to the notion that people’s trade policy preferences do indeed reflect a
household-unit interest; the earning prospects of both members, as well as the division of
income provision responsibilities, interact in shaping people’s policy preferences.
16
This result does not differ across gender. Both men and women are more supportive of trade when their
reliance on the income provided by the spouse is lower
25
Table 7. Support for Free Trade by Earnings and Job Prospects of Self and Spouse.
Spouse Main Provider
Finding A Comparable Job
No
Yes
Difficult for Both
43.9%
(146)
31.3%
(133)
Difficult for Spouse
46.2%
(91)
36.7%
(130)
Difficult for Self
53.0%
(249)
45.8%
(122)
Easy for Both
68.4%
(736)
62.0%
(360)
Note: Numbers in top of cell refer to the percent that support maintaining or expanding U.S. level
of international trade. Numbers in parentheses are the weighted number of respondents in each cell on
which the percentage is based.
Consumption as Source of Preferences
So far the analysis has focused on people’s roles as producers or as spouses (of
producers). Next we examine people’s role as consumers as a source of household
interests shaping trade preferences. Much of the public discussion of foreign trade in
consumption context has involved the massive growth of large discount retailers relying
on cheap foreign goods, particularly Wal-Mart and Costco. As wages have stagnated,
access to these cheap consumer goods has been one of the most positive and visible
aspects of globalization. To examine the relationship between consumption and trade
attitudes, we therefore looked at the trade policy preferences of individuals as a function
of how regularly they shop at these discount stores. Because price sensitivity and
shopping at large discounters are both likely to be confounded with family income, we
analyze the patterns separately by income group. This effect is displayed graphically,
26
with support for trade openness on the vertical axis and consumption frequency at the
large discounters on the horizontal axis. 95% confidence intervals are also reported.
Figure 2
Support for Free Trade (%)
.4
.5
.6
.7
Support for Trade, by Frequency of Shopping at Discount Retailers and Income
Frequently
Sometimes
Rarely
Frequency of Shopping at Wal-Mart/Costco
Low Income
High Income
Medium Income
Figure 2 illustrates that an individual’s attitude on whether or not trade is good for
him and his family appears vary somewhat by shopping habits. Those who shop regularly
at discount stores are more supportive of trade than those that rarely shop at such stores,
though this result is evident only among middle and lower income individuals. The
question that now arises is whether recognizing the gains for consumers diminishes the
effect job prospects of the self or of the spouse exerts on trade preferences. Conversely,
27
are the benefits to consumers something appreciated only in households with certain
levels of job security?
Table 8. Support for Trade by Consumption Habits and Labor Market Prospects
Job Replacement Prospects
Frequently
Shopping
Freq. at
Sometimes
Wal-Mart/
Costco
Rarely
Difficult for
Both
Difficult for
Spouse
Difficult for
Self
Easy for
Both
37.7%
37.0%
45.7%
66.0%
44.7%
31.8%
63.0%
72.7%
34.1%
49.1%
49.5%
60.1%
Table 8 indicates that there is no clear interaction between consumption habits,
job security of the spouses and their trade preferences. The consumption effect, once
controlling for the job prospects of both household members, is indeterminate. Looking at
the effect of consumption patterns for a household with given employment characteristics
(e.g. both facing difficult job replacement prospects), a frequency of shopping at discount
retailers is not associated with a secular increase in support for trade openness.
When asked in an open-ended question why Wal-Mart is able to offer cheap
products, respondents regularly cited access to cheaper foreign products. Moreover,
When prodded directly about the link between trade and prices, 76% of respondents said
that trade made products somewhat or much cheaper. However, of those who see a
relationship between low prices and trade, over 38% said they would nonetheless want
the US to decrease (by a lot or by somewhat) its trade with other countries. Gains from
28
consumption, it seems fair to say, may be a - but clearly not the - factor underlying
people’s trade policy preferences.
The alternative explanation we proposed for the trade preferences gap between
different status families was the “pull mechanism”: we suggested that may be that over
time, household members influence each other’s preferences and pull them closer
towards their own policy positions. Given that females are overall more protectionist, if
this explanation holds, then we should observe that married men are more protectionist
than their single counterparts, while married women are more pro-trade than single
women. Table 9 presents a simple comparison of trade attitudes by family status and
gender. The results clearly indicate that there is no general “pull effect” taking place;
rather, married individuals are more protectionist than single individuals, and this holds
true among both men and women.
Table 9. Trade Protectionism by Family Status and Gender
Female
Male
Married
54.3%
(2250)
40.8%
Single
36.3%
(438)
30.6%
(2294)
(407)
Note: Numbers denote the percent of respondents who support decreasing U.S.
trade from its current level. ** p < .001
Market Risk and Trade Attitudes
The analysis presented thus far suggests several things. First, attitudes among
members of married households are more protectionist than those of singles; second,
even one insecure member in a household is associated with more protectionist attitudes
towards trade, regardless of whether the insecure person is the respondent or the spouse;
29
third, the effect of the spouse’s job situation is greater when the spouse provides a greater
share of the household income; and lastly, the household differences appear not to be a
result of mutual influence, i.e. of the spouses bringing each other closer to their position
over time. What is missing is a better underlying theory for the conditions in which the
interests of the household affect the trade preferences of the individual, beyond the
“narrow” interest one’s own labor market position generates. Our next set of hypotheses
seeks to offer such a theory.
We propose that attitudes towards trade reflect an individual’s degree of risk
acceptance. As globalization has led to a fundamental shift in US production patterns, it
has increased the exposure of workers to foreign economic forces. It is likely that an
individual’s ability to finesse this risk and to respond to a quickly changing work
environment makes them more supportive of open trade. To test this contention, we
generate a measure of risk based on hypothetical questions about the trade-off between
wages and job security. As explained above, the index is created from respondents’
answers to two questions, which prompted them with a hypothetical tradeoff between
lower (higher) income and greater (lesser) job security. Using this measure, 23% of
respondents are classified as risk averse, 43% as risk acceptant and 34% as neutral.
When examining trade preferences by people’s calculated levels of risk
acceptance, we find that risk-averse individuals, at least in what pertains to employment,
are indeed much more apprehensive about trade openness, even when controlling for
30
other relevant factors17. As Table 5 shows, the positive relationship between pro-trade
attitudes and tolerance of risk holds in all income levels.
Table 10: Support for Trade, by Risk Acceptance and Income
Income
High
Medium
Low
Risk Acceptant
70%
(426)
64%
(434)
52%
(361)
Neutral
66%
(351)
57%
(352)
50%
(241)
Risk Averse
61%
(258)
55%
(241)
44%
(154)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the weighted number of respondents in each cell on which the
percentage is based.
Do differences in tolerance of risk explain the difference in trade preferences
between married and singles, or the difference between men and women? The table
below compares risk acceptance measures of these two pairs on a 7-point scale (from -3
to 3, where 0 is risk neutral). The results are unambiguous: men and women hold almost
identical attitudes towards risk, a distinction that also holds when comparing single men
and single women, or when comparing married men to married women. However, when
comparing singles (from both genders) to married individuals (from both genders), one
finds a substantial and statistically significant difference (p <0.004): married individuals
are more risk averse18.
To summarize this point, differences in tolerance of risk do not account for the
“female protectionist” bias found in the literature, but do offer a plausible explanation for
17
The overall difference between the ‘risk acceptant’ and ‘risk averse’ groups is statistically significant at
the p<0.003 level. The differences between the contagious groups (acceptant vs. neutral, averse vs. neutral)
are not significant at conventional levels.
18
Is this gap in risk tolerance is because married individuals more often have children to care for? When
we compare married individuals that have children to ones that do not, there does not seem to be a clear
difference in levels of risk tolerance. Married individuals with children are no more risk-averse than
married individuals with no children.
31
at least part of the difference observed in the trade policy preferences of individuals in
different living environments. The source of the difference in risk tolerance between
married individuals is not clear. It could be because of the need to care for others, but it
could also be due to selection effect, namely that risk-averse individuals choose to marry
more than risk-acceptant individuals. Alternatively, risk-aversion may be a feature
attractive for potential spouses. Explaining this difference is beyond the scope of the
study, but regardless of the reason, risk aversion appears to be a mechanism that could
account for some of the differences in trade preferences across individuals in different
types of households.
Table 11. Risk Tolerance by Family Status and Gender
Male
Female
All
Single
0.516
0.536
0.526
Married
0.323
0.330
0.326
Note: Numbers in table reflect mean risk acceptance levels on a 7-point scale (-3
to 3). Higher values refer to higher degree of risk acceptance.
Modeling Trade Attitudes
In the analysis below, we examine the explanatory usefulness of the mechanisms
discussed so far in a multivariate regression model, where the dependent variable is again
people’s preferences on whether to expand or limit free trade. In this multivariate analysis
the focus is on family status and trade preferences. In the baseline model, as expected,
higher incomes are shown to be associated with greater support for trade openness, as is
higher levels of education or being a male. When examining the effect of household
status on attitudes, the baseline category is single individuals. Clearly, the negative
relationship appears to withstand the inclusion of controls. Model 3 is analyzed
32
separately by gender, with the omitted category again being singles. The results suggest,
as the previous analysis did, that women in families are even more protectionist than are
single women; men in two-adult households are more anti-trade than are their single
counterparts. In the Appendix, we report the results of estimating the same models using
people’s perceived effect of trade on their family’s well-being (rather than on trade
policy) as the dependent variable. The results all hold, and in particular the effect of
family status remains strong.
Table 12: Marital Status and Support for Trade Policy
Married
Separated/Divorced
Widowed
Domestic Partnership
Model 1
-0.301**
(0.059)
-0.369**
Model 2
-0.238**
(0.075)
-0.092
(0.081)
-0.385**
(0.115)
-0.319*
(0.134)
(0.099)
-0.079
(0.145)
-0.340*
(0.137)
0.203**
(0.037)
-0.306**
(0.045)
-0.041**
(0.009)
0.000**
(.)
0.065**
(0.009)
5429
-7813.1
0.03
Household Income
Female
Age
Age2
Education
Observations
Log likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
6272
-9271.8
0.004
Model 3
(Females)
-0.208+
(0.107)
-0.08
Model 3
(Males)
-0.322**
(0.109)
-0.134
(0.133)
0.064
(0.189)
-0.317*
(0.161)
0.131**
(0.05)
(0.148)
-0.271
(0.239)
-0.452+
(0.233)
0.282**
(0.056)
-0.043**
(0.012)
0.000*
(.)
0.065**
(0.014)
2748
-3754
0.026
-0.028*
(0.013)
0.000*
(.)
0.064**
(0.012)
2681
-3998.5
0.022
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
33
The evidence presented so far suggests that in explaining people’s trade policy
preferences, one should consider household effects. We have suggested that gender,
standing in the labor market of both earners, the division of earning provision, and risk
attitudes contribute to the finding that members of married households are less supportive
of trade openness than single people. In a second set of models, we integrate our
observations about labor market standing, consumption habits, division of income
provision and risk acceptance into a single model of trade preferences. By interacting Job
replacement difficulty with Income share of spouse, we examine whether the job
insecurity of the spouse matters more when the family relies more heavily on them as a
source of income. Since the key question in this analysis is the role that household-level
considerations play in the formation of trade preferences, we limit the analysis to married
respondents living in dual-earner households.
The results in the baseline model are in line with previous studies: higher income
and education are both associated with greater support for free trade, while females and
middle-age individuals are less supportive of trade. In Model 2 we add the measures of
job replacement prospects for both the respondent and spouse. The omitted category is
households in which the jobs of both spouses are easily replaceable. The results are
similar to those we discussed earlier, when controls where not included: concerns about
the difficulty of finding a new job for either of the household members is associated with
decreased support for trade. Somewhat surprisingly, in households with only one member
in an easily replaceable job, the effect of the spouse’s job prospects are greater than those
of the respondent herself. The key point however is that even if there is one insecure
34
member in the family, whether it is yourself or the spouse, it is likely to lead both to be
more wary of trade openness.
Table 13. Household Characteristics and Support for Trade
Education
Female
Age
Age2
Household Income
Model 1
0.063**
(0.012)
-0.351**
(0.052)
-0.052**
(0.015)
0.001**
0.000
0.158**
(0.054)
Model 2
0.065**
(0.012)
-0.305**
(0.053)
-0.040**
(0.015)
0.0004*
0.000
0.123*
(0.055)
-0.516**
(0.076)
-0.491**
(0.083)
-0.314**
(0.067)
Model 3
0.083**
(0.014)
-0.294**
(0.059)
-0.038*
(0.016)
0.0004*
0.000
0.156*
(0.062)
-0.418**
(0.085)
-0.644**
(0.092)
-0.319**
(0.073)
0.045+
(0.023)
0.104**
(0.027)
-0.12
(0.078)
1783
-2553.8
0.024
1783
-2517.1
0.038
1468
-2034.1
0.047
Both Jobs Difficult to Replace
Sp Job Difficult to Replace, Own Job Easy
Own Job Difficult to Replace, Spouse's Easy
Risk Acceptance
Wal-Mart/Costco Shopping Frequency
Union Member
Income Share of Spouse
(Both Jobs Difficult to Replace) X
(Spouse's Income Share)
(Sp Difficult, Own Easy) X
(Spouse's Income Share)
(Own Difficult, Spouse's Easy) X
(Spouse's Income Share)
Observations
Log likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
35
Model 4
0.078**
(0.014)
-0.271**
(0.066)
-0.040*
(0.016)
0.0004*
0.000
0.152*
(0.063)
-0.454*
(0.219)
0.005
(0.253)
-0.123
(0.165)
0.044+
(0.023)
0.106**
(0.027)
-0.128
(0.079)
0.008
(0.047)
0.013
(0.095)
-0.285**
(0.106)
-0.114
(0.084)
1461
-2019.7
0.049
Inclusion of additional controls in Model 3 does not change this result, but does
show risk acceptance and consumption habits to be associated with trade preference:
higher tolerance of risk, as well as frequently buying at discount retailers is associated
with greater support for free trade; union members are more protectionist. Model 4
incorporates the income division responsibilities in the analysis. We interact the Income
share of spouse with the job prospects of both spouses. The result is quite intuitive, and
repeats the finding in Table 7, in that we see that the bleak labor market prospects of the
spouse have a particularly large effect among families in which the spouse is responsible
for generating a larger share of the household income. Clearly then, the empirical
evidence suggests that family earning dynamics are indeed exerting a significant effect on
the way people perceive the gains and risks associated with trade openness.
Concluding Thoughts
Our findings from this survey suggest that that trade attitudes may be a function
not only of an individual’s job prospects in a globalized economy but about the overall
effect of trade openness on the family unit. The paper does not dispute the importance of
the individual as a baseline unit of analysis for understanding trade politics. However,
this paper demonstrates that for a large group of individuals who are in dual working
households, an assessment of each individual without consideration of the interests of the
other household member will incorrectly represent their trade preferences.
Voters make choices based on their multiple and overlapping roles. They are both
consumers and producers, and other members of their household are often an important
source of their material security. Perceptions of the benefits and problems associated with
global trade are therefore felt through multiple channels. At times, the effect is more than
36
suggested by the classical analysis of employment, because a second worker in the family
is also put out of work because of vulnerabilities in the labor market. At other times, the
other member of the household acts as a shield to the family from the ill effects of such
market forces. An underlying dimension, which connects family members, is coping with
a shared risk aversion.
While our survey results were able to elucidate family job dynamics, the results
were less helpful on the issue of why women are more protectionist. Two different ideas
were examined. First, women could be more protectionism because they are more risk
averse, and risk is associated with trade attitudes. Second, it is possible that household
attitudes are some amalgam of the two genders akin to what we found with job security.
As the empirical analysis indicated, we found no support for either of these
propositions. Risk does not appear to affect women differently than me,n and the spousal
job security effect is symmetric across gender. In other words, aversion of risk does not
explain female protectionism. Similarly, we do not find that male and female attitudes
move to the “middle” once married. Rather, women and men are more protectionist than
are similarly situated single household members. What the data does confirm is that
women are less free trade oriented than are men, no matter age, income, education, or
risk propensity.
We also looked at whether or not there were consumption effects, given earlier
evidence linking gains as consumers to preferences on trade (Baker 2003, 2005). We find
individual level evidence that price consciousness, at least as reflected in people’s
shopping habits, is indeed associated with policy preferences on trade. We do not see,
however, that consumers view the consumption gains from trade as substantially
37
offsetting the adverse effects of trade on their job situation. In particular, among
households in which individuals are anxious about their labor market prospects, the effect
of consumption habits on trade preferences is not observed.
The opening of the US market has had dramatic effects on employment in the
country. For many Americans, the explanation for factory closings, downward pressure
on their wages, or fewer opportunities and job dislocations is globalization and trade. The
negative effects of trade are presented everywhere -- in the press, by employers and most
recently, by elected officials. Many workers now worry about the security of their own
jobs and fear that finding a new job of the same quality, if they are laid off, may be
difficult. In this environment, it is unsurprising that the loss of a job by either of the
members of a household diminishes both members’ attitudes toward open trade. The
existence of a second wage earner does not eliminate the negative effects of job loss but
rather, seems to cause both family members to worry more about an open U.S. economy.
Although not the intent of this work, this finding has clear policy relevance, as it
suggests that mass support for trade is closely tied to how individuals perceive the
severity of the risks associated with market openness. Policymakers keen on increasing
public support for a free trade deal are more likely to advance their goal only if in tandem
with pursuing a free trade policy they introduce measures aimed at curtailing the possible
downside of international economic competition. Helping workers find new jobs,
subsidizing the retraining process of those workers whose skills have become redundant
or providing insurance to offset sharp decreases in wages earned in the new jobs are all
measures that governments nowadays pursue in varying degrees. As the debate in the
U.S. intensifies about the funding of the Trade Assistance and Adjustment program, these
38
findings suggest that such a program could indeed go some way towards decreasing
apprehension of Americans towards globalization and increasing economic openness.
39
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41
APPENDIX
Table A1: Marital Status and Perceived Effect of Trade on Family
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3 (Females) Model 3 (Men)
Married
-0.134** -0.201***
-0.08
-0.346***
(.058)
(.065)
(.088)
(.1)
Separated
-0.532*** -0.481***
0.23
-0.989***
(.152)
(.154)
(.262)
(.202)
Divorced
-0.169**
-0.064
-0.022
-0.085
(.086)
(.092)
(.122)
(.145)
Widowed
-0.101
0.009
0.168
-0.178
(.128)
(.137)
(.167)
(.253)
Domestic Partnership
-0.233*
-0.262**
-0.132
-0.415**
(.122)
(.125)
(.168)
(.188)
Household Income
0.069***
0.051***
0.087***
(.01)
(.014)
(.014)
Female
-0.287***
(.04)
Middle Age (35-54)
-0.180***
-0.170**
-0.174**
(.052)
(.067)
(.084)
Old (55+)
-0.033
-0.132*
0.091
(.058)
(.079)
(.088)
Education
0.079***
0.136***
0.028
(.015)
(.023)
(.021)
Constant
0.545*** 0.303***
-0.170*
0.476***
(.054)
(.078)
(.1)
(.108)
Observations
4638
4638
2308
2330
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is binary (support for trade openness
= '1'). Omitted category is single, young (18-34), and Models 1-2 also male. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
42
Table A2: Prospects of Finding a Comparable Job and Support for Trade
MALES ONLY
Replacing Spouse's Job
Not Easy
Easy
Replacing
Own Job
Not Easy
Easy
45.7
42.7%
(37.2-54.3)
(31.3-54.0)
53.8%
70.0%
(47.6-60.0)
(66.4-73.6)
FEMALES ONLY
Replacing Spouse's Job
Not Easy
Very Easy
Replacing
Own Job
Not Easy
Easy
31.4
39.1%
(24.4-38.4)
(31.3-46.9)
45.1%
61.2%
(36.2-54.0)
(57.0-65.5)
43
Table A3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Trade Policy
Trade for Family
Trade for Avg. American
Pro-Trade (y/n)
Trade Good For Family (y/n)
Age
Age2
Female
Education
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Single
Domestic Partnership
Household Income (ln)
Income (H/M/L)
Union Member
Employment Change in Industry (%)
Sp. Employment Change in Industry (%)
Export Oriented Sector
Import Oriented Sector
Sp. Export Oriented Sector
Sp. Import Oriented Sector
Job Insecurity
Job Insecurity (sp)
Spouse Job Insecurity
Job Replacement Difficulty
Job Replacement Difficulty (sp)
Job Replacing Easy (y/n)
Job Replacing Easy (sp) - (y/n)
Job Insecurity - (y/n)
Job Insecurity (sp) - (y/n)
Risk (7-point scale)
Risk (3-point scale)
Obs
6309
5846
6325
6309
5846
6346
6346
6357
6355
6314
6314
6314
6314
6314
6314
5483
5483
6323
3094
1775
3994
3994
2544
2544
3928
2895
2895
3918
2893
3918
2893
3928
2895
3157
3157
Note: The notation (sp) refers to spouse.
44
Mean
2.806
2.112
3.151
0.561
0.718
50.361
2740.82
0.510
4.174
0.720
0.014
0.079
0.029
0.122
0.037
11.072
1.998
0.094
18.093
12.903
0.026
0.045
0.027
0.055
1.683
1.746
1.746
2.791
2.641
0.668
0.698
0.541
0.516
0.368
2.207
Std. Dev. Min Max
1.127
1
5
0.884
1
4
1.254
1
5
0.496
0
1
0.450
0
1
14.304
18
89
1436.64 324 7921
0.500
0
1
1.427
1
6
0.449
0
1
0.117
0
1
0.269
0
1
0.167
0
1
0.328
0
1
0.188
0
1
.647 9.90 12.07
0.812
1
3
0.291
0
1
14.575 -12.7
34
12.963 -12.7 30.2
0.160
0
1
0.206
0
1
0.162
0
1
0.227
0
1
0.879
1
4
0.918
1
4
0.918
1
4
1.309
1
5
1.342
1
5
0.471
0
1
0.459
0
1
0.498
0
1
0.500
0
1
1.381
-3
3
0.788
1
3
In order to examine the robustness of the relationship between family status and trade
preferences, we use data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 2003) as
an additional source of data. The survey was administered in 34 countries. The omitted
category in the analysis is of individuals living as singles (never married). Table A4
presents results of an ordered probit estimation, where the dependent variable is
respondent’s answer to the following question: “How much do you agree or disagree with
the following statement: [Respondent’s Country] should limit the import of foreign
products in order to protect its national economy.” (Responses ranged on a five point
scale, from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly”).
Table A4. Family Status and Support for Trade (ISSP 2003)
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Model 1
-0.168**
(.012)
-0.398**
(.022)
-0.159**
(.023)
-0.148**
(.04)
Male
Age
Age2
Model 2
-0.062**
(.015)
-0.089**
(.027)
-0.04
(.025)
-0.047
(.041)
0.140**
(.01)
0.001
(.002)
-0.000**
(.000)
Income (Quintile)
Education
Skill
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
42949
0.031
42733
0.035
Model 3
(All)
-0.081**
(.017)
-0.053+
(.031)
-0.066*
(.028)
-0.007
(.046)
0.135**
(.012)
-0.001
(.002)
0.000
(.000)
0.031**
(.004)
0.117**
(.005)
0.074**
(.006)
33232
0.051
Model 4
(Males)
-0.110**
(.024)
-0.188**
(.056)
-0.064
(.042)
-0.08
(.068)
Model 5
(Females)
-0.074**
(.025)
0.001
(.04)
-0.068+
(.037)
0.028
(.062)
0.007*
(.003)
-0.000**
(.000)
0.031**
(.006)
0.140**
(.007)
0.081**
(.008)
16952
0.057
-0.009*
(.003)
0.000
(.000)
0.032**
(.007)
0.092**
(.008)
0.061**
(.009)
16280
0.044
Standard errors in parentheses. Omitted category is singles (never married). + significant at 10%; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
45