Using oral history to (re)write the account: Supplying the
Australian Army during the Second World War
Public lecture for the National Archives of Australia, presented in Canberra
by Frances Miley
18 May 2006
A divide has developed in accounting between those researching using traditional
approaches to historical research and those undertaking new accounting history
research (Hammond and Sikka, 1996; Tyson, 1995). This difference of opinion has
centred on the use of narrative, which is the establishment or description of items of
fact (Previts, Parker and Coffman, 1990). The traditional view is based on an
assumption that history may be portrayed in a non-analytic manner. New accounting
historians adopt a critical and interpretive view of accounting developments
examining relationships and interpreting facts in a manner more akin to the social
sciences (Previts et al., 1990). Prima facie, these two approaches appear irreconcilable.
New accounting historians believe traditional histories ignore the social struggles
behind accounting developments (Hammond and Sikka, 1996; Hopper and
Armstrong, 1991; Miller, Hopper and Laughlin, 1991; Miller and O’Leary, 1987),
presenting accounting history as a neutral examination of the smooth transition of
the discipline and ignoring realities. New accounting historians have been concerned
that traditional approaches to history give voice only to power elites to the exclusion
of other groups within society (Funnel, 1998).
Traditional historians criticise new accounting historians for the lack of convincing
evidence supporting their interpretations (Tyson, 1995). Their concern is that the
interpretive process necessarily entails the inclusion of the researcher’s biases. The
written record is seen as inviolate whereas other evidence is less cogent.
According to traditional accounting historians, the erudite arguments of new
accounting historians may be at odds with historical facts. Traditional historians
warn that the arguments of new accounting historians may be more persuasive than
the facts (Tyson, 1995), so that the interpretive process can create a view of history
which is at best misleading and, at worst, false. In response, new accounting
historians use a similar argument, contending that the there is no objective reality
and that facts can never speak for themselves: they must always be subject to
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
1
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
interpretation and this inevitably entails the researcher’s biases becoming part of the
interpretation (A. Tinker, Merino and Neimark, 1982).
The weakness and the strength of new accounting history is that it incorporates a
diverse range of approaches to understanding and a disparate body of research
questions. The weakness and strength of traditional history is its reliance on archival
and other verifiable evidence only.
Despite the apparent stand-off in the accounting literature between traditional
historians and new accounting historians, there does appear to be some common
ground in the use of oral histories. Oral history is capturing the oral reminiscences of
a person who has first-hand knowledge of an event.
It has been suggested that a major methodological contribution of new accounting
historians has been to expand the range of source materials that accounting
historians will consider (Carnegie and Napier, 1996). Carnegie and Napier (1996)
describe oral history as ‘an innovation (in accounting history research) particularly
worthy of comment’. At the time they were writing, there had been a flurry of
accounting histories incorporating oral history techniques (Spacek, 1990; Collins and
Bloom, 1991; Mumford, 1991; Hammond and Streeter, 1994; L. Parker, 1994; McKeen
and Richardson, 1995; Hammond, 1996; Hammond and Sikka, 1996), which has not
continued at the same pace despite the agreement by those researchers using oral
history of its usefulness in adding an insight that could not otherwise be obtained.
Although new accounting historians have recognised the ontological soundness of
oral history (Spacek, 1990; Mumford, 1991; L. Parker, 1994; McKeen and Richardson,
1995; Hammond, 1996), it has also gained acceptance from traditional accounting
historians. Referring to the history of standard setting, Zeff commented:
From what I have learned, I would estimate that there are scores, if not
hundreds, of untold stories that would serve to enlighten us about the
actions that were, and were not, taken by standard setters (Zeff, 1980).
Tyson (1995) presented evidence from personal interviews with M. Louise Coulton,
in his study of standard costing in the men’s clothing industry in the United States
between the late 1910s and early 1920s, thus validating oral history as a source of
research data. Three personal interviews were conducted with Ms Coulton between
September 1991 and March 1992. The recollections of the interviewee were matched
with written notes she made between 1925 and 1929, validating her later comments.
In a footnote, the use of the three interviews was justified:
Personal interviews are incorporated in the study to allow an individual
with practical, first-hand experience to present her views, in her own
words. While the voice of participants is subjective and potentially biased,
it is too rarely heard amid many retrospective, theoretical perspectives that
speculate on participants’ motives and intentions. Coulton’s comments are
presented in detail so that readers can more fully appreciate her outlook
on these issues (Tyson, 1995).
In using oral history, Tyson did not acknowledge a debt to new accounting historians
in opening the way for him to incorporate oral histories because he does not view
oral history as a legacy from new accounting historians. He is scathing about the
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
2
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
‘antipathy towards factual evidence’ that he sees in new accounting histories (Tyson,
1995, p. 18). The secondary evidence of interviews is allowed because it provides an
opportunity for the interviewee to shed light on her earlier writings.
Understanding Tyson’s use of oral history is central to the stand-off between
traditional and new accounting historians because it illustrates the issue of
objectivity. Despite assertions to the contrary by new accounting historians,
traditional historians do not view accounting as neutral and objective.
Conventional historians recognize that one’s perspective on the world is
influenced by a myriad of social factors and life experiences. They also
know that the selection and observation of specific factual evidence is
necessarily subjective. Despite these limitations, new historians should not
discount the relevance of factual evidence simply because of the potential
for bias or differing interpretations (Tyson, 1995, p. 28–29).
Although writing in a critical framework, the warning by Merino (1998) that all
historians must be aware of the illusion of objectivity is apposite; facts are neither
passive nor silent (Hansen, 1979) and the process of writing history is inevitably the
process of the historian reconstructing events (T. Tinker and Puxty, 1995).
Traditional historians rely primarily on the written record to compile their histories,
yet they understand that there are inherent dangers in assuming that the written
record is neutral (R. Parker, 1991). In the case of accounting records and financial
statements, Parker (1991) provides examples of accounts written as exemplars of
good accounting, those written fraudulently or using creative accounting techniques,
and those which adopt accounting techniques or conventions unfamiliar or subject to
misunderstanding by the modern historian.
The dangers of assuming the neutrality of the written record are potentially
compounded by interviewing a subject to provide clarification and elucidation of an
earlier record written by that subject. Although this approach has the benefit of
enabling the researcher to choose the most appropriate interpretation of the primary
evidence, the danger is that it allows the interviewee to interpret previous statements
in new ways with the benefit of hindsight.
Despite these limitations, traditional accounting historians view oral histories as
secondary evidence which supports the primary evidence of the written record. New
accounting historians do not make this distinction, viewing oral histories as cogent
evidence in their own right. Oral history can capture the testimony of those excluded
from the written record, providing a more comprehensive or different insight from
that provided by the written archive alone. In addition, it can provide understanding
where there is no written archive.
There have been attempts to cross the divide between traditional and new
accounting historians. These have focused on the use of narrative by new accounting
historians (Funnel, 1998) and re-examination of the written record (Arnold and
McCartney, 2003).
This is not an attempt to reconcile new and traditional accounting history.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
3
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
[T] here have been some simplistic and misguided attempts by those new
to history to justify their analysis and provide a reconciliation of the new
with the traditional (Gaffikin, 1998).
New accounting history has failed to move beyond its infancy not because of the
fetters of traditional approaches but because of its reluctance to explore other forms
of evidence to supplement the narrative. Oral history is potentially one of those
forms.
[N]ew accounting historians continue to construct their histories with
basically the same tools as their more traditional colleagues. New
accounting historians in their efforts to extend the frontiers of accounting
history have not removed themselves completely from the security of the
fold (Funnel, 1998, p. 153).
During the Second World War, the Australian Army maintained detailed accounting
procedures to supply soldiers and support staff. A comparison between the Army’s
perspective on this process and the perspective of users is provided. The written
archive is used to describe the Army’s approach. To give voice to wartime users, oral
histories are used. This group has not previously been heard because there is no
existing record of their perspective.
Insofar as the oral history contradicts the written record and gives voice to the
previously silent users of the Army’s accounting system, this analysis falls squarely
within the domain of new accounting history. But it also meets the tests posited by
Tyson (1995), who accepted the admission of oral history when it allowed
individuals with practical, first-hand experience to present their views in their own
words, because those views, although subjective and potentially biased, alleviated
the researcher from the contentious responsibility of theorising on motives and
intentions.
The interview process
Forty hour-long interviews were conducted over a week. All participants were
retired and lived in the Returned Services’ League Village in Sydney, Australia. This
is a complex of houses, townhouses and nursing homes that houses more than 2000
veterans and their immediate families. Coordinating staff at the village published
details of the research project in an in-house newsletter for villagers and coordinated
responses from volunteers. All volunteers were interviewed and all interviewees had
relevant oral histories to contribute.
None of the interviewees had been in the Army prior to the Second Word War. With
one exception, a tank commander who remained in the Army, all discontinued
service within 18 months of the end of the Second World War, which was the legal
period for demobilisation to be effected. None of the interviewees had accounting
training or experience before being called up and none of the interviewees pursued a
career in accounting after demobilisation.
There were some particular difficulties encountered during the interview process.
These had not been envisaged and required interviewer flexibility.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
4
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
The first problem was that some interviewees were concerned that they might be
identified by name or from the stories they told. They were reassured by a promise of
anonymity, which none required to be in writing, although written forms had been
prepared to cover this eventuality. Although some interviewees had no objection to
their names and other details being disclosed, it seemed more appropriate to
maintain the anonymity of all interviewees, rather than disclosing identifying details
for some and not others.
Some participants explained why they wanted anonymity. The main reason
provided was that they had to live in a village with other veterans, and their wartime
memories were their main bond and the main topic of conversation. They were
concerned that these stories, which included pilfering and ignoring Army
procedures, if known in the village, might alter perceptions that other villagers had
about them. One man was concerned that the Army has, to use his words, ‘a long
memory’, and that he might lose his house in the village if his former flouting of
Army procedures became public. Another man was worried that his family might
think less of him, because he had spent years telling them inflated stories about his
wartime adventures. Those who were happy to have identifying details disclosed
tended to be proud that they had managed to flout the Army system and were
amused that they had an opportunity to tell their stories after so long.
Although participants were keen to talk about their experiences, many were
uncomfortable with the idea of interviews being recorded electronically. This meant
that detailed handwritten notes had to be taken, which then needed to be transcribed
and read by the interviewees for accuracy, significantly adding to the data collection
burden.
Semi-structured interviews were planned, with interviewees being asked how they
identified the need for supplies, the paperwork that had to be completed and who
completed it, the process for ensuring the paperwork followed the right channels to
ensure supply, the length of time to receive supplies, methods of accounting for
received goods and any problems that were encountered. The aim of the research
was to identify whether the Army logistical accounting system operated during
wartime at the same level of efficiency and effectiveness with which it operates in
peacetime. This issue is of relevance to the Australian Army today because a
performance audit by the Australian National Audit Office of the efficiency and
effectiveness of deployment by the Australian Army to East Timor1 was scathing in
its comments about the Army’s financial and logistics management. Since there is
evidence that many of the problems in these areas are systemic and have existed for
many years,2 there may be lessons from the past that have relevance to current
operational deployment.
1
Australian National Audit Office, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments
to East Timor, Report No. 38, 2002.
2
Among the reports that refer to the long-term and systemic nature of the problems of
financial management or logistics in the Australian Defence Force are: Australian
National Audit Office, Defence Cooperation Program, Report No. 32, 2001; Australian
National Audit Office, Management of Major Equipment Acquisition Projects, Report No. 13,
1999; Australian National Audit Office, Test and Evaluation of Major Defence Equipment
Acquisitions, Report No. 30, 2002; Australian National Audit Office, Management of
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
5
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
The advantage of semi-structured interviews was that interviewees were free to talk
of their memories without intrusion from the interviewer. The disadvantage was that
interviews took a long time because interviewees often digressed, although in some
cases the digressions provided important interview material because it was then that
interviewees became less guarded in their comments.
Not everything that interviewees said was recorded. Extremely personal and painful
memories unconnected to the research topic were not recorded. Memories were only
recorded where doing so would not seem unduly intrusive. Since interviewees were
looking at transcripts of their interviews, the interviewer had to make a judgment
about whether an interviewee would be able to bear reading his or her words on
some of the more sensitive topics. This may be seen as a weakness in the interview
technique due to a lack of objectivity by the interviewer, who should not be making
value judgments or culling information,3 but sometimes sensitivity by an interviewer
is necessary for an interviewee to feel comfortable continuing with the interview.
For instance, one interviewee had been a prisoner of war and had worked on the
Thai-Burma Railway. Recollecting how they obtained illegal supplies while being
transported to the camp and at the camp unleashed many difficult and still raw
memories. The interviewee commented that he was talking about matters that he had
never been able to talk about before. He said that since the war, he seen doctors
about his physical and mental wounds, and many psychologists had encouraged him
to talk about the treatment received by prisoners in the camps. He had been unable
to do this. He commented that recollecting the way that prisoners had tried to obtain
the more simple day-to-day supplies somehow made it easier for him to talk about
the bigger things. This was the most difficult interview for the interviewer but the
interviewee described it as cathartic and said that it lifted a burden he had carried for
half a century.
It did not seem appropriate to record this man’s words or to ask further questions. It
seemed more sensitive simply to listen. People have to come before research needs
and this is nowhere more evident than in areas of oral military histories where
interviewees are often recollecting the most painful memories of their lives.
The Army perspective
During the Second World War, the Australian Army maintained detailed accounting
procedures to supply those at the battle front. The quantities and type of equipment
available to field units4 had been determined in Australia during peacetime prior to
Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, Report No. 38, 2002; Senate Committee
Report, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Commonwealth of
Australia, Materiel acquisition and management in Defence, March 2003.
3
The counter-argument to this is that oral history is never objective. In selecting what to
ask, or which part of an interview to use, an interviewer is inevitably making a subjective
judgment. In selecting which recollections to reveal and how to describe them,
interviewees are also making value judgments. This does not destroy the validity of oral
history but does mean that it should be used with care and an awareness of its
limitations.
4
A field unit refers to an Army unit in an operational zone. The size of the unit may vary.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
6
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
the Second World War and they were strictly adhered to during the Second World
War. At the end of the war, the procedures used by the Australian Military Forces for
accounting during the Second World War were compiled into a single manual as a
guide for commanding officers (AMF, 1945).
The foreword to the manual sets the tone, instilling the importance of an appropriate
system of accounting for clothing, personal equipment, weapons and vehicles:
Conservation of war material is a vital contribution to victory, and it is
essential that a proper attitude of mind towards the care, preservation and
maintenance of stores should become a prominent part of the mental
equipment of the soldier, whether officer or man … Experience shows that
the essential basis for systematic care, preservation, protection,
safeguarding, economy and control of war material is a system of
recording or accounting appropriate to the location and role of each unit
(AMF 1945).
During the Second World War, the Australian Army had two independent
accounting systems to manage supply. Firstly, in the units that operated the Army’s
warehouses in Australia and managed the supply system, a ‘full’ accounting system
was used because of the ‘greater opportunities for loss’ (AMF 1945). The Army called
these units ‘line of communication units’, but they have been termed ‘supply units‘
in this paper for the sake of simplicity.
The supply unit accounting system required keeping records of inventory acquired,
requisitions for supply and inventory taken from stock to meet requisition orders for
supply. There were regular reconciliations of stock holdings to acquisition and
supply records. These records were not consolidated at year end into the Army’s
main financial accounting system because the Army was not required to report
year-end inventory balances under the Audit Act 1901 (Cwlth); it was only required
to account for the amount of budget funding spent during the year to acquire
inventory.
The supply accounting system was designed to control stock loss through theft and
to ensure that inventory holdings were kept at a level that allowed requisition orders
to be met promptly.
Secondly, a less detailed accounting system operated in field units. As the guide for
commanding officers stated:
A field unit during operations has little opportunity to keep detailed
records. Records for such units are primarily for the purpose of
determining what replacements, repairs, etc., are necessary (AMF 1945).
Every field unit was allocated a set amount of equipment based on the number of
men in the unit. The allocation was listed in a document called a Wartime Equipment
Table, but also referred to as the ‘WET’. The WET was a table with columns detailing
the part or category code number, total number allocated for the unit, number on
hand and number required to complete the allocation, if the number on hand was
less than the total allocation. The WET for special purpose units, such as medical
units or those laying communication lines, had additional allocations of special
purpose equipment appropriate to their normal tasks.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
7
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
The weakness of the system was that the allocation had been determined in Australia
from training needs, which were considerably different to battle conditions. The
main purposes of the field unit accounting system were to be able to count inventory
to identify if allocations fell below the WET and, if they did, to requisition
replacement stock from the logistical supply units in Australia, and to account for
replacement stock received to ensure that field units were fully equipped.
Since no item could be issued unless there was a WET requirement, the WET
provided the basic unit authority for drawing supplies. When an item was issued,
the field unit also received all ‘associated stores’ (ie spares) but these were issued in
proportion to actual holdings of equipment and quantities could not be altered even
if a commanding officer determined that his unit’s need was higher or lower than the
set quantity. Mobile units had to carry all spares unless they could off-load them to
other units, which required completion of additional paperwork, a Form AAF F114.
Commanding officers who transferred stores, or returned them to a Returned Stores
Depot, were required to transfer all associated stores. There was no provision for
transferring less than 100 per cent of the allocation.
There was a procedure for altering the WET. It required written authorisation from
Australia following the submission of the appropriate form, handwritten in triplicate.
In the fluidity of battle, such a procedure was decidedly onerous, which had the
practical effect of ensuring that requests for change were never made, something
which the Army took as evidence of the appropriateness of WET allocations.
There was one other way of dealing with items surplus to needs: quantities excess to
need could be disposed of in accordance with GRO5 0.232/1944 and GRO 0.738/1943
paragraph 3(a). The process prior to disposal was cumbersome. The unit commander
was required to submit three copies of the request on Form AF G1033 to the
Assistant Director of the Ordinance Service or the Deputy Assistant Director of the
Ordinance Service, both of whom were in Australia. When permission was given, a
copy of Form AF G1033 was returned to the field unit with the instructions for
disposal. The method of disposal depended on the item in question.
A complete stocktake of inventory to compare actual stocks to holdings according to
the WET was required whenever a field unit had a change of commanding officer,
accounting officers, quartermasters or quartermaster-sergeants (AMF p. 20), and a
certificate AAF F51 signed by the officers taking over and relinquishing command
had to be completed.
The procedure became more complicated when items were lost or found to be
deficient for use. In addition to altering the WET when approval to do so was
received from Australia, the field unit was also required to make a financial
adjustment under GROs A348/44 and F311/44, which was reversed on receipt of
replacement equipment from Australia. If the unit failed to submit a maintenance
indent6 for replacement of the stores, write-off vouchers had to be prepared in
5
General Routine Orders. These are mandatory written orders of an administrative nature.
6
It seems inappropriate to use the term ‘maintenance indent’ for a document that was
requesting replacement of lost or damaged stores since the term ‘maintenance’ suggests
repair. This term was used because the aim of the indent was to ensure that the WET
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
8
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
Australia on Form AAF F2. Losses due to enemy action were not subject to this
formal write-off procedure; it related to all other losses. Losses due to enemy action
simply required a requisition for resupply. The practical effect of this was that all
losses were reported as being due to enemy action, even though records indicate that
many occurred in areas nowhere near the enemy when units were on leave or other
stand-down from active duty.
There was strong incentive for commanding officers to follow the procedures,
cumbersome though they were. Under Army Military Regulations and GRO 0.693,
all stores were placed under the charge of the commanding officer. Commanding
officers were personally liable for the loss of stores unless ‘the loss was due to the
wrongful act, default or neglect of some other person definitely proved’ (AMF, 1945).
If no other person could be found liable, the commanding officer could argue in his
defence that he had followed all reasonable instructions and that the stores had been
adequately supervised (AMF, 1945, p. 16), but he had the onus of proof. The
difficulty for a commanding officer was that the Army considered all its instructions
for field units to be reasonable so the exigencies of the wartime situation in which the
unit operated was an insufficient reason to ignore accounting requirements.
The Army emphasised the importance of correctly maintaining its accounting
systems at all times. Commanding officers in both supply and field units were told
that ‘wholehearted application [of the relevant accounting system] is not only
essential as a contribution to the readiness and efficiency of a unit for its role, but … a
national requirement’ because ‘stores are ultimately equivalent to money’ and
‘avoiding waste and extravagance’ would alleviate Australian and overseas industry
from unnecessary demands and onerous burdens (all quotes, AMF, 1945, p. 5).
Despite the acknowledged importance of the supply unit and field unit accounting
systems, they were not audited during the war, either for compliance or
performance, although other aspects of Defence business were audited. The system
appeared to work well because military units requested supplies, and, barring the
inevitable supply chain problems associated with wartime, Army accounting
paperwork indicated that units received them in due course.
From the Army’s perspective, these were well documented accounting systems that
maintained an audit trail, and official records indicated that units were supplied with
what they requested. Internal control procedures were rigorously maintained – only
authorised persons could request and receive supplies, and supplies could only be
sent to certain designated locations where a proper accounting of their receipt was
maintained. This applied both to military equipment and the personal items
necessary for the personal hygiene and morale of military and medical personnel.
The glaring weakness of maintaining two independent accounting systems was at
best overlooked and at worst ignored: there was no reconciliation between the two
accounting systems. The supply units were only concerned with issuing items that
had been requisitioned. There was no reconciliation between items issued by supply
units and those received by field units.
allocation was maintained at the correct level, which could only occur when the lost or
irreparably damaged stock was replaced.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
9
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
The Army did not receive any formal complaints about its dual supply unit and field
unit accounting systems. From this, it assumed they were successful. They were
considered so successful that they continued to be used during the Korean War and
Vietnam War, although some additional accounting requirements then had to be
introduced to account for the large amount of supplies purchased by the Australian
Army from the United States.
The user perspective
The view of those in field units, who were dependent on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Amy’s supply system, was not as favourable as the Army’s view.
Sometimes the problems of wartime supply to a battle zone were outside Army’s
control:
We had asked for personal things … sanitary napkins. We heard they were
on the ship and we were very excited. We could see the ship coming in.
But then the bombing started and the ship was sunk right in the harbour.
Everything went with it. We girls were so upset. We raided the hospital for
supplies so we could improvise then felt guilty because those things were
needed for our [wounded] boys [in the hospital]. But eventually we
needed the things so badly that we reasoned the hospital had plenty of
gauze padding … so we took what we needed after all … just enough until
the next ship came. (Nurse, Papua New Guinea7)
Most of the problems were within the Army’s control. Some were due to the actual
logistics of supply. The Army used a supply-push approach.8 This meant that troops
were allocated onto ships as the first priority and spare space was allocated to
equipment. The load-master of a ship or aircraft determined the weight and volume
of the load and load safety requirements were paramount. This led to unusual
outcomes:
We were the first peacetime fellows to go out to the Middle East. I was a
mechanic. There was nothing for us to fix so they sent us to help out the
Air Force. But there weren’t any aircraft for us … so we ended up helping
out a new US squadron. (Sergeant)
We were laying wire for communications. The US had trucks that could go
30 miles with a roll of cable, laying it as they went. They could follow the
direction of the road. But we had to carry everything ourselves and lay it
manually so we had to follow a straight line. And we were short of pliers,
tape … all the small stuff. There were never any supplies available. And
there was nowhere you could get the things. They’d put big stuff on the
7
8
Male interviewees have been identified by rank at the time of the recollection. Female
interviewees all served as nurses. They were captains or lieutenants, but they preferred
not to be identified by rank but by profession. Unless the quote makes the location clear,
general locations have been identified. Many of the interviewees had difficulty being
specific about locations not because time had dimmed their memories but because of the
mobile nature of battle.
This system was also used in recent deployment to East Timor by the Australian Army.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
10
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
ships [to Papua New Guinea] but never think of the small stuff. It
happened again in Timor9 … they forgot toilet paper and had to buy out
Darwin. (Corporal, Papua New Guinea)
We went for about six months with an orange as a bathplug. When one
went soggy, we’d throw it out and get another one. You had to improvise.
Nobody had thought about bathplugs. It was the small things. They never
thought about them. (Nurse, Papua New Guinea)
From an accounting perspective, items were recorded as supplied when they were
issued from an Army warehouse in Australia. There was no reasonableness check on
the time taken between issue and delivery so there was no incentive to prioritise
items for delivery and the supply-push system did not readily accommodate
prioritisation. There was no check that items issued had reached their final
destination. If they failed to do so and a field unit requested re-supply of an item, the
supply unit treated the re-supply as a new request so there was no follow-up to
determine why an item had failed to arrive at its destination. These weaknesses were
the direct result of the lack of reconciliation between the two logistics accounting
systems.
Delivery was made to designated overseas base command posts. It was then the
responsibility of local commanding officers to ensure that goods were delivered to
front-line troops. Theoretically soldiers were supposed to be rotated on a regular
basis to base camps, where they could rest from battle and obtain supplies. In
practice, this rarely happened. As a consequence, soldiers regularly went without the
supply of basic commodities. The Army did not rectify this problem because the
accounting system made it invisible – goods were accounted for as delivered by a
receiving unit when they arrived at the base camp, which is where the field unit WET
was completed, irrespective of whether this was their final destination.
Some personal supplies were available at Army canteens. The problem
was that most Army units were not co-located with a canteen. It was good
if you were near a canteen. There was a supply of beer in New Guinea …
two bottles a month. We’d put some away for a binge later because we
usually were too far out from the camp to get it. Generally, we only had
occasional comfort goods and Red Cross supplies and even those hardly
ever made it out of the base camp. Mostly, we went without. (Private)
The Army canteen had tinned peaches but we didn’t have a canteen near
us so we didn’t have anything. We were on Good Enough Island and there
was no canteen there. We were the only Australian Army unit there so we
were on tough rations. The trucks had to go past the US camp to dump
rubbish and everyone volunteered to help because then you had a chance
of getting something from the Americans. (Private, Papua New Guinea)
What amazed me in New Guinea was that you couldn’t get bootlaces. You
could buy them from the Army canteens but we weren’t anywhere near a
canteen. (Private)
9
This refers to the recent Australian Army’s deployment to East Timor.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
11
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
In New Guinea, toothpaste was never supplied. You could buy it at the
canteen but we were never near a canteen. (Lieutenant)
When supplies were taken to the more remote locations where troops were based,
such as Kokoda Pass in the Owen Stanley Mountains of Papua New Guinea,
quantities to be delivered had to meet WET specifications but quotas did not allow
for the goods consumed in delivery, such as food or ammunition needed for en route
skirmishes. In Papua New Guinea, where local bearers were hired to carry goods to
troops, the accounting system was not flexible enough to provide food for the bearers
because they did not meet the definition of an Australian Army field unit.
In the Owen Stanleys, each native carrier carried 60 pounds of food
because that’s what they needed to get to each man. But they ate 30
pounds of it getting it to the men so we were still short. (Lieutenant, Papua
New Guinea)
More commonly, supply problems were caused by delays in the Army’s supply
system. Accounting inefficiency was caused by two main factors. Firstly, paperwork
often travelled a circuitous route back to Australia before being actioned. In the
Middle East, it was often sent to Cairo or Alexandria, back to Greece or Italy, on to
London then by sea to Australia. Secondly, three copies of each document had to be
made. Each copy had to be filled in by hand and mistakes were not allowed; a
transcription error meant completing a new form. The Army considered this an
important control feature because an altered document could have been fraudulently
changed.
Everything was sent in parcels (from home). We couldn’t rely on the
supply from the Army. Too slow. All the paperwork. We didn’t have the
time to deal with it. You could buy toothpaste and soap from the canteen,
but if you weren’t near a canteen, you had to get it sent from home. The
same with razors. One fellow received a mixture of cake from home. There
were no fresh uniforms though. That’s what we really needed. (Private,
Middle East)
For soldiers in a battlefront area, a system that led to inordinate delays was
untenable. In Australia, when supplies were issued, they were written off as
consumed, which was the justification for not reconciling goods supplied with goods
received by field units.
We had to send a requisition to Cairo for supplies. It went to an engineer’s
clerk. We had such long waits for supplies that we started keeping small
stocks … our own supplies. It was easier than dealing with the system all
the time. They used to call our Wellingtons ‘those goddam rag craft’
because we had to make do with what we could get. The joke soon wore
thin. I was a mechanic …tanks … and I never waited round to see what
jokes were made about our equipment. But it was just the same with us.
(Corporal)
It annoyed us, the lack of amenities. We never saw canteen services, Red
Cross parcels … nothing. They didn’t get past the basewallahs. No
toothpaste, razor blades. (Private, Middle East)
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
12
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
In Australia, warehouses were geographically dispersed. Dispersal of inventory
among warehouses meant that the spare parts connected with one item of military
equipment were rarely co-located. This added to the complexity of delivery because
requisitions often needed to be passed from one warehouse to another until a
complete order could be filled, yet inventory management was decentralised at the
individual warehouse level, creating coordination problems.
We arrived in the Middle East in 1941. We had 19 Vickers machine guns
minus 19 locks. We couldn’t use them. The locks had to flown in from
Egypt. (Tank commander)
Some supplies were readily available because the Australian Army purchased them
from the United States (US) Army. However, there could still be some unusual
outcomes.
They [the US Army] were supposed to supply milk to us. But if they didn’t
have it, they could substitute with a like item, which meant any other
dairy product. They didn’t have any milk themselves so they gave us
cheese. Lots of bloody cheese. (Tank commander, Europe)
WET quotas had been established in peacetime, before the Second World War.
Theoretically, they could be altered, but in practice they rarely were because the
procedure to do so was so onerous. Unusual items could not be added to the WET
based on geographic and climatic differences in different theatres of operation. Only
quantities could be altered; actual items listed in the WET could not.
We were in New Guinea laying cables. It came on big wire drums. In
Australia, you’d roll the drums along the ground and the cable would
unwind. But New Guinea was just mud. You couldn’t roll the drums a
yard before they were bogged. So we had to unroll the cable, which was
really heavy because it was lead-covered, and cut it into lengths that you
could roll and carry on your shoulder. That meant we had to join the cable
but they didn’t have any soldering equipment for us. Nothing. They
supplied the standard issue for Australia but we weren’t in Australia. The
mud was so bad that if you dropped your wire-cutters, you couldn’t find
them. But there were no more. So we had to improvise, which we did. The
Americans had them and we needed them. They had more than they
needed. So we helped ourselves when they weren’t looking. We had to.
(Private)
We were putting in phone gear. We had these wire wheelbarrows. They
had two handles and a roll of wire in the middle. It was called ‘Special K’.
The wheelbarrows would sink in the New Guinea mud. We had to keep
joining the wire but there was no lead for the joins so we had to strip some
from around the wire. It took so long. We couldn’t do it properly because
we had no equipment. They gave us exactly what they had given us in
Australia. It was useless in New Guinea. We had these big drums of wire
… Don 8, it was called. You couldn’t lift them and you couldn’t roll them
in the mud. So we had to put the wire into smaller drums. But we didn’t
have any. The US did. We helped ourselves and then had to carry the
smaller drums on our shoulders. It was hard work. (Private)
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
13
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
Service personnel only requested what they knew would be supplied through official
supply channels. The Army believed that everything requisitioned was eventually
supplied. The accounting system could not show how many items were needed but
never requisitioned because end users knew they would never be supplied. From an
Army perspective, all orders were met. From a user perspective, it was a waste of
time to request many items.
We had to climb trees to put up wires, which meant we had to carry our
ladders. But in New Guinea, they sank into the mud and it was terrible.
Dangerous. The Americans had spurs to climb trees. They were a much
better idea so we pinched them. We couldn’t get them through our supply
route … we didn’t use them in Australia … didn’t need them. So what
could we do but pinch them? I think we left them some ladders though.
(Corporal)
I was in a Signals Squadron in New Guinea. There were 56 of us and we
had picks and shovels to make holes. The Americans had five or six
hundred and trucks that bored holes. We were on the same side. Surely
they could have dug all the holes for us. (Private)
The accounting system did not show the problems for soldiers that the Army’s
fondness for using up surplus World War I equipment caused. The logic was
straightforward: if equipment had proved useful for fighting during the First World
War, it would be useful for fighting during the Second World War. Soldiers knew
better than to complain. So the Army continued to supply the same standard issue
that it had always supplied, with Army decision-makers unaware that what was
being supplied was inadequate.10
It was the personal stuff that was bad. In the Desert, we had old straw
palliasses. They were from World War I. We went to the local tailors and
got them modified into sleeping bags. The Army didn’t give you a
sleeping bag then. (Private, Middle East)
I went to RMC11 in 1949. They fed us on rat packs12 left over from the war.
(Officer Cadet, RMC)
10
The Korean War provides a pertinent example of this. Platoons were supplied with
enough standard issue guns for each soldier and a fixed but smaller number of Owen
submachine guns. The Owen guns proved more useful in battle. When the Australian
Army would not increase the number of Owen guns supplied because it was fixed by the
WET, platoons started to report that their Owen guns had been irreparably damaged in
battle so they would be replaced without question. Instead of sending more Owen
submachine guns, the Army sent an armourer to Korea to determine the problem with
the Owen guns, limiting their supply to troops because it determined they must be faulty.
(Lieutenant, Korea)
A similar instance happened during the Vietnam War when field units requested
additional condoms. These were placed over rifle barrels to stop insects nesting in them.
The Army’s response was to send more chaplains to Vietnam and increase the penicillin
supplies to medical units. (Brigadier, Vietnam)
11
Royal Military College Duntroon. This is an Australian Army officer training
establishment.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
14
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
In the Middle East, we struck the coldest winter in 33 years. They gave us
grey flannel singlets with three buttons down the front. Old World War I
issue. We went to the local tailor and he cut the collar off, put buttons
down the front and made them look more like shirts. That tailor must have
become wealthy on us. (Private)
The supply of personal equipment was also fraught with problems due to the
inflexibility of the Army’s accounting system. A set number of blankets was allocated
for each different climate. Units being trained in Australia were allocated three
blankets per person. Units in the tropics were allocated half a blanket per person. As
training units were posted to the tropics, blankets that were excess to requirements
were collected. An accounting record of their return was made. These blankets were
then destroyed in accordance with Army regulations concerning surplus equipment,
even though there was a general shortage of blankets in Australia during the Second
World War.
I did jungle training on the Atherton Tablelands before going to New
Guinea. We had three blankets each but going to New Guinea, they said
you needed half a blanket and a mosquito net. The rest was surplus to
requirements. The regulations said that anything surplus to requirements
had to be burnt and destroyed and the CO13 had to say that it was done.
The civilians couldn’t get blankets then. I was just married and my wife
came to see me. I gave her as many blankets as we thought we could
without them being noticed. My mate helped me get them one night.
They’d been put in this locked hut ready for disposal. It took two men to
help her get the bundle of blankets on the train when she left. The Army’s
rules led to such waste and the civilians could have really used the stuff.
We used those blankets for years.14 (Lieutenant)
We had half a blanket because we were in the tropics … up near the
Kokoda Trail. They had no knowledge of the tropics at all. It was freezing
in the tropics at night. (Private, Papua New Guinea)
Those sent to the Middle East did not fare any better:
We were dropped off at Ikingi Maryut15 at 2 am. We had one blanket each.
It was freezing. At dawn, my mate did a 360 degree circuit and said ‘Miles
and miles of bugger all being blown about by the wind.’ We weren’t
equipped for it. (Private, Middle East)
We shaved in a horse trough. You had to break the ice. Bloody desert. It
was freezing … and us with half a blanket and a mosquito net. (Captain,
Middle East)
12
‘Rat packs’ are the colloquial expression for Army ration packs, which are packs of food
that can be taken into battle.
13
Commanding officer
14
The interviewer was shown one of the blankets, still in excellent condition and in daily
use.
15
Ikingi Maryut is in Egypt.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
15
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
When the equipment that was supplied was unsuitable, it was necessary to
improvise. Since the Army’s accounting system did not provide a complaint
mechanism for recording the problems of inappropriate equipment, there was no
trigger to lead to improvement. The system only recorded faulty equipment;
unsuitable equipment was not considered faulty.
We were supplied with long-sleeved shirts. It was so hot in the Middle
East. We’d tear away the shirts at the shoulder and wear them sleeveless.
No-one ever told us not to. (Sergeant)
Clothing … we flogged all our old stuff to the Arabs. (Private, Middle
East)
We had these blue short sleeved caesarine tunics with a navy collar and
red capes that we could wear over them if we went out. There was no
summer or winter uniform … just the one. We froze and you couldn’t buy
thermal singlets. My mother knitted me two sleeveless V-necked jumpers
and I wore those under my dresses. It was still freezing cold. They just
weren’t prepared. (Nurse, Papua New Guinea)
In the early part of the war, the Army maintained a policy of writing off equipment
issued to soldiers going into battle. This had the unfortunate consequence of
suggesting that the Army expected all its soldiers to be killed in battle, which was
bad for morale. Otherwise, why would it have assumed that every item of equipment
and clothing would be lost or destroyed? Later, the policy was revoked because reequipping soldiers was too expensive. However, large items of military hardware
were still written off when issued:16
It was February ’41 and we’d been up in the Western Desert for the past
three days. Because it was a combat area, we were completely re-equipped
when we came back … everything … whether we needed it or not. Some
did but I didn’t. I got it all anyway. (Private, Middle East)
Since the Army expected equipment to be lost in battle, it had difficulty from an
accounting perspective if it was not. Initially, the Army was unable to account for
items that had been written off but continued to exist. The Army’s problems were
compounded when equipment was lost at other times because the Army did not
make provision for this. This remained an accounting weakness throughout the war.
It depended who you dealt with. We were in England in transit and one
fellow had all his kit stolen. He only had the clothes he stood up in. We
even had to lend him underwear. There was an English supply officer and
he wanted so much paperwork to replace the kit that we decided the war
would end before the paperwork got sorted out. Requisitions involved far
too much paperwork. It made it inefficient rather than efficient. Then this
Australian adjutant came to the squadron and the next thing, the kit was
16
This practice has changed but not necessarily for the better. Currently, the Defence
budget statements are prepared assuming that military hardware is written off when
acquired and the Department of Defence’s annual report is prepared assuming that
military hardware is capitalised when acquired then depreciated over its useful life.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
16
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
replaced … without the paperwork. We never asked how. We knew better
than that. (Corporal)
The cumbersome accounting requirements for Army field units encouraged creative
approaches to obtaining supplies. Captured supplies were used:
6 Div Cav17 was our sister unit in Syria. They were mounted on horses …
captured French colonial horses. They called themselves the Kelly Gang.18
Bean19 wrote about it later. (Private, Middle East)
Equipment was stolen. Stealing from the US Army was considered appropriate
because the US Army was seen as being oversupplied. Stealing from another
Australian unit was frowned upon:
Australians became notorious for scrounging but that’s what kept a lot of
us POWs alive. (Private, imprisoned on the Burma Railway)
We all looked forward to the air raids. We were in New Guinea. When the
planes came over, the Americans went to their shelters. We used the air
raid to cut holes in their fence and pinch things. We got used to relying on
the Americans. We had to … our Army didn’t supply us. One time, at
Jacquinot Bay,20 we pinched a generator. We were moved by ship not long
after so we pinched all the light globes on the ship so we could use the
generator. The only problem was that when we lit it up, it blew. There was
a problem with the lights. (Lieutenant)
We were at Jacquinot Bay. Wasps would go in the rifles and settle there.
They’d eat the rings. It was dangerous. We found the best way to get rid of
them was to fire the rifles before we cleaned them. They wouldn’t give us
ammo21 so we couldn’t fire the guns but there was no other way to get rid
of the wasps. That’s when we started helping ourselves to ammo. You had
to. It wasn’t wrong … it was survival. (Private)
I organised foraging parties at night. We weren’t Army Privates. We were
armed civilians. We’d take the wheels off the US22 vehicles at night.
(Private, Papua New Guinea)
One day, this American truck passed us. It had this large container on the
back. It looked like it was about to fall off so we decided to follow the
truck. We followed it for about 11 kilometres and the container fell off. We
17
6th Division Cavalry Unit
18
Named after a gang of bushrangers from Australia’s colonial period.
19
Charles Edwin Woodrow (CEW) Bean, best remembered as the author of six of the
official histories of Australia in the First World War, and for his role as Australia’ s official
correspondent in that war. During the Second World War, he liaised between the Chiefs
of Staff and the press for the Department of Information.
20
Jacquinot Bay is in New Britain (Papua New Guinea).
21
Ammunition.
22
United States Army.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
17
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
grabbed it and got out of there really quickly. When we got back and
opened it, it was full of trousers and they all had about 60-inch waists. We
couldn’t use them. But we were so badly equipped that we thought
anything else we could get was good. (Warrant Officer Class 2)
The Australians were not the only ones who perfected pilfering. Though better
equipped, US Army personnel were not above stealing too:
The Australians are blamed for pinching stuff but the Yanks did too.
They’d pinch jeeps to go to the pictures. One fellow lost one and was
charged and fined. We all knew it was the Yanks.23 (Corporal, Papua New
Guinea)
Items that could not be easily stolen could sometimes be bought:
In the Middle East, the locals were starving. We traded with them. A tin of
bully beef was worth a dozen eggs. They had free-range chickens and
there were always eggs. We traded a lot. The local railway station was the
place to trade. A tin of bacon got a really large quantity of eggs … I forget
how many. We got oranges, tomatoes and other things that way too. But
when we were in the Islands later on, there was nothing to trade. Food was
a premium there. (Lieutenant)
In New Guinea, we bartered grog with the US.24 We had stills going
everywhere and we’d sell spirits at one pound Australian a time … but we
took US25 dollars too. (Private)
We made a lot from the Yanks. They were such easy bait. When the aircraft
would go to Cairo for supplies, we’d get them to buy cheap jewellery
stones then sell them for a lot more. When we were in Tunisia, we found a
lot of war souvenirs in the mountains … bayonets, tin hats. We sold them
all to the Yanks for cash and cigarettes. There was no point selling them to
the RAF26 … they paid less. (Corporal)
We’d pinch things from the Yanks then sell them back to them. We’d use
the money to buy things from the Brits. We should have been able to get
equipment from our own chaps but it was just too hard. (Captain, Greece)
The oversupply of equipment to many American units relieved many of the
problems of inadequate supply by the Australian Army. The problem with this was
that Australian accounting records did not show the inadequacy of the supply
system and American Army records did not show true usage levels.
The Americans were really very generous. We had a book to account for
petrol and we had to record oil usage monthly. But the paperwork was so
onerous and we hated filling it in. The Americans had big 1000 gallon
23
American soldiers.
24
US Army soldiers.
25
United States.
26
Royal Air Force (British).
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
18
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
tanks of petrol on stands. They let us help ourselves … no accounting. We
tried not to abuse it but it was so much easier. We spent hours filling in
our forms … they didn’t care. (Private, Papua New Guinea)
We were near the Suez and had no supplies. The Yanks had ice-cream,
tinned fruit … they ate well. Their PXs27 were full and you never wanted
for chocolate or cigarettes. We could requisition things but it was too hard
… so many forms and long delays. It was good when we were serving
with the Yanks because we could just help ourselves. They didn’t care …
they had no paperwork at all. (Corporal, Papua New Guinea)
The American oversupply eventually led to problems for the Australian troops in
Papua New Guinea:
In New Guinea, we’d get the natives to climb trees for us. We’d pay them
with a tin of bully beef. We’d trade a tin of bully beef for bananas and
coconuts too. Then the US came and they gave the natives a 6-pack of
bully beef so we couldn’t get anything after that. We didn’t have any more
to trade. (Private)
Conclusion
During the Second World War, the Australian Army intended to maintain an
accounting system for battle supply that was efficient and effective. The Army’s view
of the success of its system was apparent in its continued use after the Second World
War.
Oral histories from battle-front users tell a different story, indicating that the system
of supply accounting used by the Australian Army was ineffective and inefficient.
These oral histories highlight the problems of obtaining supplies, the inflexibility of
supply management and the difficulties when there was a mismatch between
supplies provided and supplies needed to perform one’s duty properly.
Without the oral testimonies of users, the weaknesses of the Army’s system would
not be apparent. This example of oral history supplementing the written record
illustrates the benefit of using oral history in accounting when the written record is
inadequate or non-existent.
This example provides a glimpse into an area of accounting history that has
previously been overlooked. There is little research into Defence financial history; it
is not an area where the written record has been readily accessible, nor is it one
where the written record has been intrinsically interesting. Yet, by combining oral
history with the written record, a distinctly more approachable aspect of Army
accounting emerges.
There has been little use of oral history in accounting (Collins and Bloom, 1991;
Carnegie and Napier, 1996). There are many areas of accounting history, particularly
concerning the history of accounting bodies and the even more poorly researched
27
Stores canteens.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
19
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
areas of military recollections of financial matters, where there is limited time to
record the recollections of those who shaped accounting’s past. This example
illustrates the practical benefits of accounting research in areas of oral history where
time is of the essence; if the Army had undertaken such a study, it would have
identified the weaknesses of its systems and the oral histories would have provided a
catalyst for change.
The Army’s written record has disenfranchised a large section of society – the users
of wartime supply – by failing to give them a voice. In promoting the Army’s written
record without the counter-balancing interpretative statements from users, the Army
has incorrectly assumed that its system worked. By failing to ask users whether the
accounting system worked from their perspective, the Army has unwittingly
established its procedures as elite knowledge, so that their weaknesses became
systematically entrenched in Army processes.
The debates between traditional and new accounting historians are important in
establishing why historical accounting research matters and what different research
approaches can add to the knowledge base in accounting. Oral history is a useful tool
for both traditional and new accounting historians because it adds to and clarifies the
written record, as the oral testimonies of battle-front users has done. By examining
the written record only, one would conclude that the Army maintained a
comprehensive system with an audit trail, transparency of process, a high level of
accountability, good bookkeeping and sound internal controls. It is only by
interviewing users that it becomes apparent that they were frustrated by the
inadequacies of the system and its inflexibility.
© 2006 Frances Miley. Dr Frances Miley is a Senior Lecturer in Accounting in the School of Business
at the University of New South Wales and the Australian Defence Force Academy. Frances Miley was
a National Archives Frederick Watson Fellow in 2005.
References
AMF, Australian Military Forces unit administration, stores accounting, etc. (war): A guide
for commanding officers, Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 1945.
Arnold, A, and McCartney, S, ‘”It may be earlier than you think”: evidence, myths
and informed debate in accounting history’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting,
14, 2003, pp. 227–53.
Carnegie, G, and Napier, C, ‘Critical and interpretive histories: insights into
accounting’s present and future through its past ‘, Accounting, Auditing and
Accountability, 9(3), 1996, pp. 7–39.
Collins, M, and Bloom, R, ‘The role of oral history in accounting’, Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability, 4(4), 1991, pp. 23–31.
Funnel, W, ‘Accounting in the service of the Holocaust’, Critical Perspectives on
Accounting, 9(4), 1998, pp. 435–64.
Gaffikin, M, ‘History is dead, long live history’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 9,
1998, pp. 631–39.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
20
National Archives of Australia
Using oral history to (re)write the account
Hammond, T, ‘Oral testimony and the history of African-American accountants: the
narratives of Theadora Rutherford, Lincoln Harrison and Richard Austin’,
19th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, Bergen, 1996.
Hammond, T, and Sikka, P, ‘Radicalizing accounting history: the potential of oral
history’, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 9(3), 1996, pp. 79–94, 1996.
Hammond, T, and Streeter, D, ‘Overcoming barriers: Early African-American
Certified Public Accountants’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(3),
1994, pp. 271–88.
Hansen, S, ‘The illusion of objectivism: a review of recent trends in the new political
history’, Historical Methods, Summer, 1979, 105–10.
Hopper, T, and Armstrong, P, ‘Cost accounting, controlling labour and the rise of
conglomerates’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16, 1991, pp. 405–38.
McKeen, C, and Richardson, A, ‘Gender and the accountancy profession: an oral
history of women pioneers in the Canadian accounting profession’, Queen’s
University, Kingston, Ontario, 1995.
Miller, P, Hopper, T, and Laughlin, R, ‘The new accounting history: and
introduction’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16(5/6), 1991, pp. 395–403
Miller, P, and O'Leary, T, ‘Accounting and the construction of the governable
person’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12, 1987, 235–65.
Mumford, M, ‘Chartered accountants ad business managers: an oral history
perspective’, Accounting, Business and Financial History, 1(2), 1991, pp. 123–40.
Parker, L, ‘The case for field studies in management and accounting: towards
informed policy and practice in Asia’, Accounting and Business Review, 1(2),
1994, pp. 211–23.
Parker, R, ‘Misleading accounts? Pitfalls for historians’, Business History, 33(1), 1991,
pp. 18–33.
Previts, G, Parker, L, and Coffman, E, ‘An accounting historiography: subject matter
and methodology’, Abacus, 26(2), 1990, pp. 136–58.
Spacek, L, The Growth of Arthur Andersen and Co, Garland, New York, 1990.
Tinker, A, Merino, B, and Neimark, M, ‘The normative origins of positive theories:
ideology and accounting thought’ Accounting, Organizations and Society, 7(2),
1982, pp. 167–200.
Tinker, T, and Puxty, T, Policing accounting knowledge: the market for excuses affair,
Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, 1995.
Tyson, T, ‘An archivist responds to the new accounting history: the case of the US
men’s clothing industry’, Accounting, Business and Financial History, 5(1), 1995,
pp. 17–37.
Zeff, S, ‘The promise of historical research in accounting: some personal experiences’,
in Nair, R, and Williams, T, (Eds), Perspectives on Research, Madison,
University of Wisconsin, 1980.
Frederick Watson Fellowship paper
21