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The Annapolis Meeting:
Too Little too Late!
Hassan A. Barari
Novmber 2007
Center for Strategic Studies
University of Jordan
The Annapolis Meeting: Too Little too Late!
As of writing this piece, no final date has yet been set for the Annapolis meeting, but most
likely it will be the last week of November. Amid the premature optimism, the concerned
parties need to realize that the meeting is likely to fail. Indeed, rejectionists on both sides
are already rubbing their hands gleefully in anticipation of a colossal failure. Therefore,
many observers have warned that this summit requires careful planning and, more importantly, a day-after strategy, should the meeting fail. They argue that US Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice has backtracked from her original plans and has changed the
agenda of the conference in such a way that it will have a limited purpose. The new thinking is that the Annapolis meeting should be seen as a process and not as an event. This
article sheds light on the dynamics that will determine the degree of success.
Historical Background
Unfortunately, the high expectations that accompanied the Camp David Summit of July
2000 were smashed when the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the late Palestinian President Yassir Arafat failed miserably to resolve the conflict. Worse still, the
huge investment on the part of President Clinton failed to bridge the gap between Israel
and the Palestinian Authority, thus laying the ground for the hand-off (non-interference)
policy adopted by President Bush during much of his presidency. Ever since the collapse
of the Camp David Summit and the ensuing eruption of the bloodiest confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians, there has been no genuine third party intervention to
broker an agreement.
If anything, the mantra that “there is no Palestinian partner” or “there is no one to talk
to” has quickly gained currency in Israel and has become the pretext for Israel’s insistence
on unilateral polices. By and large, Israelis have made the case that Palestinian leaders
were not interested in peace with Israel – especially Arafat, who was, according to Israel,
capable of, yet unwilling to settle the conflict once and for all. They often point to the Intifada as a strategic choice of the Palestinian leadership and as a clear indication that there
was no partner. Unsurprisingly, Arafat thus became irrelevant in the business of conflict
resolution. This perspective has been dominant both in Israel and much of the rest of the
world.
For a balanced account of the Camp David summit see, Ron Pondak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” Survival, vol.43, no.3 (autumn 2001).
After the failure of the Camp David summit, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak insisted that there was no Palestinian partner to any peace deal. For Barak’s view on this issue see, Benny Morris,
“Camp David and After: Am Exchange”, The New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002.
Israeli Studies Unit, Center for Strategic Studies-University of Jordan Tel:962 6 5300100 Fax:962 6 5355515
Email: [email protected]
rooted in their rejection of the peace process in the first place. Not only did they vote against
the Oslo agreements but they also created the tense atmosphere in Israel that allowed for
the assassination of Rabin, an obvious blow to the peace process. The Intifada continued
despite the enormous price the Palestinians paid while it was going on, simply because
there was no one to talk to in Israel. Put differently, the mantra “there is not partner” was
applicable to both side.
These years of reciprocal hostility have left deep scars on both sides, leading to mutual
mistrust. Additionally, the years of ongoing confrontations between the two sides have
triggered profound changes within each society. Internal wrangling over how to address
the conflict has dominated both Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics, thus rendering
the mere thought of negotiations unrealistic. Political manifestations of these changes are
evident in the rise to power of right-wing politicians on both sides. This is, to say the least,
a revealing statement about the status of the peace process. In this light, the rise of Hamas
and its refusal to recognize the Quartet’s three conditions (acknowledging Israel, accepting
the previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and denouncing
violence) have only given credibility to the Israeli argument. Yet events that have unfolded
since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007 which have paved the way for the proposed
Annapolis meeting.
The Context of the Upcoming Annapolis meeting
First of all, the calls for this meeting came as a result of a third party intervention. Although
President Bush is obsessed with Iraq and the prospect of a military confrontation with Iran,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has convinced Bush that the time is ripe for such an effort on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Here desire to pursue a political horizon has been triggered by her understanding of the changing reality in the Middle East. Rice is intrigued by
the idea that in the aftermath of the Lebanon war, there is a convergence in the perception
of threat between moderate Arab states and Israel. Iran is seen as the country that poses a
genuine threat to both Israel and the rest of the moderate Arab states.
Hassan A. Barari, “The Impact of the Intifada on the Political Forces in Israel”, in Emad Gad (ed.), The al-Aqsa Intifada: The Ambition of the Idea and the Crisis in Management (Cairo: al-Ahram
Center for Strategic and Political Studies, 2002), pp.131-162
Israeli Studies Unit, Center for Strategic Studies-University of Jordan Tel:962 6 5300100 Fax:962 6 5355515
Email: [email protected]
The second development that triggered this new thinking is the Hamas takeover in Gaza.
Ever since Hamas took power there, Rice has become enchanted with the idea of turning the West Bank into a successful model for the Palestinians to compare with the failed
hams state in Gaza. Furthermore, the Bush administration seems to have rekindled their
interest in helping both sides jumpstart the peace process. It is worth recalling that the
American administration, despite its negative role in the conflict, has been the first to officially adopt a vision of a two-state solution.
Interestingly, the recent developments in Lebanon, with their ramifications regarding
Olmert’s standing in Israel and the weakening of President Abbas, also seem to have led
to a shared interest in the peace process. Both leaders intend to exploit the peace process
to demonstrate to their respective constituencies that they can deliver important achievements. Both are prone to using foreign policy successes to tilt internal political dynamics in their favor. Olmert needs a peace process to survive politically, given the looming
Winograd report, which may end his term prematurely. It is also noteworthy that the
Palestinian’s current position is markedly different from their stance at Camp David. This
time around, the Palestinians find themselves empowered by a pan-Arab consensus on a
two-state solution, as clearly expressed in the Arab peace initiative.
The Arab side is another factor to be taken into account. The Arab peace initiative, which
was adopted in Riyadh in March 2007, has led to two results. First, it has empowered
Abbas’ line of peaceful negotiations to end the conflict. Second, the Israeli leaders have
referred to some of its provisions positively. The other development is the failure of the
Palestinian National Unity Government, which has freed Abbas from structural political
constrains. That said, it remains to be seen how the three parties (the US, Israel, and the
PA) are going to prevail over the odd power dynamics within their constituencies and
translate what seems to be a positive environment into peace in the Middle East. In short
the three sides are too week to make peace due to reasons which we will discuss the next
section.
The Israelis and the Americans often accuse the moderate Arab leaders of failing to encourage Arafat to accept Barak’s “generous” offer at the Camp David Summit.
Israeli Studies Unit, Center for Strategic Studies-University of Jordan Tel:962 6 5300100 Fax:962 6 5355515
Email: [email protected]
Internal Constraints
The history of the peace process illustrates that domestic factors have been the key to understanding the ability of both sides to implement whatever they agree on. For this reason,
nothing short of appreciating the internal dynamics of each side will enable us to assess
the prospects for success.
For the first time in years we have two partners who are on the record advocating a twostate solution to the long-awaited conflict. However, as encouraging as this may seem at
first, the situation is more complicated when considered in depth. A closer look at how
both sides formulate their position reveals -- and here is the crux of the issue -- that a success is not a slam dunk. First, like Abbas, Olmert is a weak leader who has failed to demonstrate leadership since coming into power. He presides over a shaky coalition which
will, in all probability, crumble under a determined peace process, thereby leading to early
elections in which Netanyahu stands a good chance of victory.
The political structure in Israel and the nature of coalition governments have proven that
a prime minister can hardly survive politically, and in some cases physically (witness the
case of Yitzhak Rabin), should he make concessions to the Palestinians. Therefore, the issue of political survival is what shapes Olmert’s moves and tactics. Olmert recognizes that
he will only survive if two parties -- Shas and Israel Beiteinu – stay in power. Given their
renowned extreme positions, they would likely walk out on the government should Olmert commit to providing serious concessions to the Palestinians. This is the main internal
obstacle that puts Olmert, who is concerned with political survival for obvious reasons,
in no position to concede on major issues. Additionally, Israeli Defense Minster Ehud
Barak is not throwing his weight behind the peace effort. On many occasions, Barak has
been cynical and has voiced skepticism over the idea of a peace summit while Hamas is
in power in Gaza. He also said that if Israel is to implement any part of a potential agreement, Abbas must disarm Hamas, a step that would most certainly derail the peace process simply because Abbas is not the one who calls the shots in Gaza.
Israeli Studies Unit, Center for Strategic Studies-University of Jordan Tel:962 6 5300100 Fax:962 6 5355515
Email: [email protected]
Against this backdrop, we can more easily understand the Ramon Plan, which seeks to
divide Jerusalem. The Ramon Plan is a trial project orchestrated by Olmert and Ramon, although Olmert has distanced himself from the plan without directly criticizing it. It would
be a great surprise if Olmert were to demonstrate leadership and challenge all internal
obstructionists by agreeing to a detailed peace agreement. He could plausibly call for early
elections and campaign on this issue alone. As the majority of Israelis support a two-state
solution, this gamble might work out surprisingly well for him.
On the other hand, Abbas feels that the political future and relevancy of both himself and
the Fateh party is on the line, and that it can only be salvaged through successful achievements in foreign policy. Apparently Abbas agrees with the Israelis and the Americans that
rebuilding Fateh and empowering it vis-à-vis Hamas entails two things: first, the creation
of a political horizon; and second, the rebuilding of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Thus, if he manages to turn the West Bank into a success story,
and in the process improve his public image against the backdrop of an apparent Hamas
failure, Palestinians will, in turn, look towards Fateh and give up on Hamas.
For all of that to happen, a success in foreign policy is a must as it is the only clear comparative advantage that Fateh possesses over Hamas. Failing to do this would be detrimental to Fateh’s political future and would also help Islamists within the Palestinian
polity. Finally, Abbas is also faced with the predicament posed by the split between Gaza
and the West Bank. After all, Hamas has the ability to become a spoiler during the process through resorting to violence. Both sides feel that this chance should not be wasted,
with each party trying to achieve their goals. For Abbas, nothing short of a detailed agreement would succeed in saving face. Abbas has been trying to convince the Israelis that he
needs a document that will address the four core issues: Jerusalem, refugees, borders and
settlements. For Olmert, a general loose statement could give the impression that he is
achieving something, yet simultaneously serve his objective of political survival in Israel.
I personally believe that they can meet half way and each claim that this is only the beginning of the process and of the creation of a new political horizon. There is, therefore, a
clear need to learn from the lessons of the failed summit at Camp David and to lower the
expectations of both sides.
For the Annapolis summit to succeed, four conditions must be met. The first condition
pertains to leadership. The first leader is President Bush. Given the impression that he is
nearing the end of his own political career, his focus is mainly on Iraq and Iran. We can
not expect a presidential investment in the peace process. The United States will not
Israeli Studies Unit, Center for Strategic Studies-University of Jordan Tel:962 6 5300100 Fax:962 6 5355515
Email: [email protected]
apply the necessary pressure to force the other parties to compromise. For this reason, in order for
the peace process to succeed, the local players must be desirous and capable of conflict resolution.
We need leaders who transcend the power dynamics within their respective constituencies. Rabin,
for instance, made up his mind in spite of inter-party balances of power and managed to shift the dynamics in favor of the Oslo agreement. It is true that he paid dearly for his stubborn commitment to
the peace process. Chicken leaders are not expected to transcend internal constraints. Their domestic
opponents will use every trick in the book to undermine their efforts. On the contrary, brave leaders
who can demonstrate statesmanship can make a difference. Olmert is too weak to sign an agreement
that meets the Palestinian’s minimum demands and still survive politically survival. Abbas is weak
and will not be able to deliver. Indeed, he is seeking to utilize foreign policy to enhance his status
and standing among the Palestinians. A second objective is clarity of objectives and a timetable with
benchmarks against which we can measure success. As of writing this paper, it is difficult to see any
clear objective that are being articulated or a time table that is being followed. Short of that, there
should be a thinking of day-after strategies.
Red lines
Amid the torrents of analyses, one can hardly predict, let alone be sure, of the exact details of the mutual concessions that enable both sides to strike a historic deal and implement it. Yet, there are two
red lines that neither could even think to bypass. On the Israeli side, the need to maintain a Jewish
state provides the general framework from which Israeli politicians on the whole derive their policy
preferences. Against this backdrop, the Israeli red line is that they will never agree on any peace
agreement if such an agreement states that the Palestinian refugees have the right to return. To them,
realizing this scenario will put an end to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This position reflects
the overwhelming majority among Israelis.
In a recent opinion poll conducted by the Tami Center, some 87% of Israelis said they would not
agree to the return of even a single refugee, even as a quid pro quo for a comprehensive peace agreement. The Palestinian side is aware of this red line and finds it hard to proceed without at least addressing the issue in the upcoming conference. Abbas knows perfectly well that Israel will certainly
back out from any negotiations about refugees, so it is difficult for him to have the Israelis agree with
him, or worse, concede this and face the fury of the Palestinians.
On the other hand, Abbas cannot agree on a peace agreement if Jerusalem is not divided into two cities. Apparently the Israelis are aware of this situation and are discussing ways of meeting the Palestinian demand without undermining the Israeli position in Jerusalem. Against this background one
should look at the debate within Kadima over this particular issue. Haim Ramon’s above-mentioned
plan for Jerusalem was meant to examine the Israeli position on the city. It is worth saying that there
is a split in Israeli consensus about Jerusalem. More people are supporting dividing Jerusalem within
the framework of the peace agreement. Some 37% of the Jewish public in Israel support dividing
Jerusalem.
The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, “Peace Index”, October 2007.
Yediot Ahronot, September 10, 2007. The poll was conducted by Dr. Mina Tzemach and the Dahaf Institute.
Israeli Studies Unit, Center for Strategic Studies-University of Jordan Tel:962 6 5300100 Fax:962 6 5355515
Email: [email protected]
Making peace entails breaking taboos and changing people’s attitudes. Up till now, both parties are
entrenched in their positions. It remains to be seen whether or not both parties can engage in a tradeoff
whereby Israel continues to maintain its Jewish nature and the Palestinians maintain sovereignty over
Jerusalem as their capital. If the two parties cannot accomplish this, they must put together a day-after
strategy.
A Day-After Strategy
The thing that might create a mutual incentive to avoid failure is the cost of failure itself. A failure
would certainly boost radical elements with Hamas, further emasculating Abbas and Fateh and, of
course, some moderate circles within Hamas itself. It would also diminish the status and standing of
Americans across the region. It could also undermine the image of the moderate forces in the Arab
world and would damage the will of some moderate Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to engage
in future peace negotiations. To underline the significance of this, Israelis and Palestinians should remember that the lack of positive interference of moderate Arab states made Arafat reluctant to accept
Clinton’s parameters in 2000. I believe therefore that there is a vested interest for all parties to succeed.
However, both sides must overcome serious impediments, and it remains to be seen how both parties
prepare for the summit. One thing is evident: they both realize that another adventure in trying to
negotiate a final settlement might backfire, plunging the region into years of conflict and bloodshed.
It seems that the three parties are weak and may not be able to carry out a successful peace process.
This meeting is not going to be a conference to solve all thorny issues but can only hope to jumpstart
a process whose dynamic would be under the mercy of political developments on the ground and the
whims and wishes of spoilers. That said, it seems that leaders have not learnt from history or from the
gradual step by step approach that governed the pace of peace after the Oslo agreements. This only
allowed for the extremists from both sides to wreck havoc the peace process.
Israeli Studies Unit, Center for Strategic Studies-University of Jordan Tel:962 6 5300100 Fax:962 6 5355515
Email: [email protected]