Local Environment, Vol. 6, No. 4, 407–419, 2001
ARTICLE
Games Real Farmers Play: knowledge,
memory and the fate of collective
action to prevent eutrophication of
water catchments
LENNART J. LUNDQVIST
ABSTRACT This paper analyses the outcome of an actor game aimed at Ž nding
ways to institutionalis e farmer co-operation in a water catchment threatened by
eutrophicatio n from heavy use of fertilisers . Although offered several advantageous options for collective action, acting farmers stuck to their preference for
individual management in spite of very draconian measures from central
authorities . Theories on collective action developed by Mancur Olson and Elinor
Ostrom cover some ground in explaining this puzzling outcome, as do Fritz
Scharpf’s models of games played out under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. However, the most decisive factor for the farmers’ choice of strategy seems to stand
Mancur Olson’s theory on its head, and adds to the importance of trust and
reciprocity emphasised by Elinor Ostrom. Because the farmers knew each other
well, and because of the transparenc y of farmers’ action in the geographicall y
limited catchment, they turned down options of co-operation ; too few farmers
were considered trustworth y enough to make it worthwhile to engage in
collective action. Theories of ‘collective memories of the history of play’ in an
area or on an issue should thus be given more concern in future efforts to bring
about collective action towards common pool resources.
LENNART J. LUNDQVIST , Juegos que los reales agricultores juegan: conocimiento,
memoria y el destino de la acción colectiva para prevenir la eutroŽ cación de
captación de agua. Este documento analiza el resultado de juego de actor
dirigido a encontrar formas de institucionaliza r la cooperación entre agricultores en la captación de agua amenazada por eutroŽ cación de fuerte uso de
fertilizantes . Aunque ofrecieron varias opciones ventajosas para la acción
colectiva, los agricultore s participante s se quedan apegados a sus preferencias
de manejo individual a pesar de las medidas bastante draconiana s de las
autoridade s centrales. Las teorias de acción colectiva desarrollada s por Mancur
Olson y Elinor Ostrom cubren algún terreno en explicar este curioso resultado,
al igual que los modelos de juego de Fritz Scharpf jugados bajo la “sombra de
Lennart J. Lundqvist, Department of Political Science, Göteborg University, Box 711 Se-40530,
Göteborg, Sweden. Email: [email protected]
1354-983 9 Print/1469-671 1 Online/01/040407-13 Ó
DOI: 10.1080/1354983012009170 7
2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
L. J. Lundqvist
jerarquia”. Sin embargo, el factor mas decisivo para la estrategia de decisión
de los agricultore s parece poner la teoria de Mancur Olson de revéz y se suma
a la importancia de la conŽ anza y reciprocidad enfatizada por Elinor Ostrom.
Debido a que los agricultore s se conocian bien y a la transparenci a de la accion
de agricultore s en la captacion limitada geograŽ camente, ellos rechazaron
opciones de cooperación; muy pocos agricultore s fueron considerado s de
suŽ ciente conŽ anza para que merecieran participar en acción colectiva. Las
teorias de “memorias colectivas de la historia del juego” en una área o sobre
un asunto deben de esta manera estar mostrando mayor interes en esfuerzos
futuros para atraer la acción colectiva hacia recursos de fondo común.
Coercion or Co-operation to Save the Commons?
By the mid-1990s it became clear that Sweden would not achieve the 50%
decrease in nutrient load targeted in the 1980s. Nitrate leaching from intensive
farming areas in the Halland and SkaÊ ne regions continued to cause periods of
oxygen deŽ cit in Laholm Bay. The bay and parts of its catchment area had been
declared particularly sensitive to eutrophicatio n in 1986, when oxygen deŽ cit
resulting from excessive nutrient load caused massive death of the bottom fauna
(Sveriges Nationalatlas, 1991). Indeed, the 50% decrease seemed unattainable;
eutrophicatio n caused by nitrate leaching from agriculture threatened to cause
the complete death of the bay’s marine life (Wittgren et al., 2000).
The situation was approaching a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968).
Farmers used more fertilisers to increase their production, thus causing externalities to other water users, but lacked incentives to change their fertilising
practices to improve catchment water quality. To break this deadlock, the
Administration Board in Halland County (where Laholm Bay is situated) in 1996
suggested a pilot study to test the implementation of environmental quality
standards, a concept so far never used in Swedish environmental regulation. This
led the Investigatory Commission on Water Catchments—mandated by the
government in 1996 to propose a system for managing Swedish water catchment
resources (see SOU, 1997a, b)—to commission a study of the GenevadsaÊ n
catchment. This catchment discharges into Laholm Bay between the larger
Nissan and Lagan rivers. Its coastal part is dominated by agriculture (SOU,
1997b).
The Genevad study was set up as an actor game, and played out from
November 1998 to January 1999. The overarching purposes were: (1) to test the
implementabilit y of legally binding environmental quality standards; and (2) to
investigate the possibilitie s for collective action through negotiated and institutionalised actor co-operation. Its other purposes were to Ž nd agriculturally
feasible and economically cost-effective measures for lowering the nitrogen load
and to test mathematical modelling for the management of nitrogen leakage and
transport in water catchments (Wittgren et al., 2000).
I Ž rst give a short description of the Genevad simulation game. Then follows
an analysis of the game’s outcome in terms of collective action to promote water
quality in the catchment, geared towards answering the following question: why
did the game that the farmers around GenevadsaÊ n took part in playing not lead
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to negotiated settlements involving them in institutionalise d co-operation to
reach ecologically necessary reductions in nitrate transport and loading?
The non-co-operativ e outcome of the game is puzzling: Ž rst, in terms of the
numbers of actors and the transparency of action, since the size of the catchment
and the number of farmers seemed to provide good opportunitie s for collective
action (see Olson, 1965); secondly, in terms of the institutiona l setting, since
even hierarchical authority structures provide possibilitie s for negotiated stakeholder co-operation rather than imposed state action (see Scharpf, 1997); and
thirdly, in terms of the design principles for successful co-operation in common
pool resource situations, since the game provided the farmers in a well deŽ ned
area with legally deŽ ned opportunitie s to participate in co-operative institution s
(see Ostrom, 1990).
An Outline of the Genevad Game: actors, institutions, phases and outcomes
Using concepts such as ‘actor constellations ’, ‘institutiona l settings’ and ‘modes
of interactions’, Scharpf (1997, p. 48) contends that by “combining analyses of
actor constellation s with the analysis of modes of interaction, we will have
extremely powerful tools for explaining the outcomes of speciŽ c policy interactions”. The actor constellatio n of the game involved local farmers and municipal
and regional environmental authorities, including a regional watershed authority
(RWA), specially tailored to the Swedish environmental code and the envisaged
system of future water districts. Furthermore, players included municipal and
regional planning and development authorities, local media and local environmental non-governmenta l organisations . A steering group headed by a game
leader prepared the game and led the three sessions, assisted by an administrative
reference group and a team of scientists who helped preparing the background
material.
Institutiona l settings structure courses of action by specifying what must, must
not or should be done. Positive or negative incentives change the value of
pay-offs of different strategies (Scharpf, 1997). The setting of the Genevad game
built on the 1999 Swedish environmenta l code, with some parts reinforced and
others developed speciŽ cally for the game. The Genevad game code thus
included the following.
(1) Legally binding standards for the maximum load of pollutants to re ect
environmental objectives, and several European Union (EU) environmental
regulations not presently in the Swedish environmental code:
· a binding maximum loading standard for nitrogen transport at the mouth
of GenevadsaÊ n (200 tonnes of nitrogen per year; a reduction of anthropogenic—read agricultural—loading by 50% in a speciŽ ed time period);
· a groundwater quality standard for maximum allowable concentrations of
nitrate in groundwater (10 mg/l nitrate; EU nitrate directive makes water
quality measures mandatory at 11.3 mg/l).
(2) Strong rules of implementation directly linking water-related activities to
environmental quality standards:
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· non-compliance with the standards and deadlines could lead to prohibitio n
of municipal and private plans or actual expansion of economic activities
detrimental to water quality in the area.
(3) Incentives for environmental co-operation among stakeholders, to bring
about collective action.
(4) Regulations for the establishment and use of environmental improvement
funds.
The setting also included environmental and economic parameters. The catchment situation was presented via monitoring data and model calculations,
describing (1) present conditions with respect to nitrogen leaching from type
farms, (2) inputs from other sources (atmospheric deposition , forestry and
wastewater discharge), (3) groundwater concentrations of nitrate and stream
transport of nitrogen and (4) calculations of the outcome of suggested measures
in terms of environmental impacts and economic impacts on type farms.
The game went through four distinct phases providing or implying speciŽ c
outcomes in terms of nitrogen loading in the catchment.
(1) The adaptation phase: enforcement of standards already existing under the
environmental code and other environmentall y relevant legislation , leading
to a nitrogen load reduction from 317 tonnes to 260 tonnes annually just by
changing to more labour-intensiv e but not cost-increasing agricultural management practices on the type farms. However, groundwater concentrations
of nitrated nitrogen still exceeded the standard in 29% of catchments.
(2) Passive implementation of the Genevad game code: no changes from
ongoing land use, and voluntary compliance from the farmers. The RWA
particularly tried to stimulate environmental co-operation to redistribute
manure among farms. This would further decrease nitrogen loading by about
11 tonnes annually. The farmers were positive towards this measure as such
but remained critical of the form of co-operation. Hence, manure redistribution was never implemented.
(3) Active implementation of the Genevad game code: mandatory annual cuts of
5% of the contributio n to nitrogen loading from every water-polluting
enterprise or activity in the catchment, farming included, until the standard
was met. The RWA’s implementation plan included strict regulations
concerning land use, but also allowed for the transfer of ‘nitrogen loading
rights’ among farmers. Furthermore, rules allowed for the establishment of
environmental improvement funds, based on ‘environment improvement
fees’ from polluters, and backed by external state or regional money
(Wittgren et al., 2000).
(4) Alternative farming strategies, including measures on individual farms as
well as the collective or individual establishment of wetlands. This would
bring nitrogen loading at the mouth down to between 205 tonnes and 212
tonnes annually, and concentrations in groundwater would exceed the
standard in less than 10% of the catchment. At least one farming strategy—
no manure application prior to autumn sowing, no ploughing of ley in early
autumn and the establishment of wetlands—implied costs low enough to
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qualify the farmers for already existing regional environmenta l improvement
subsidies.
The institutiona l setting of the game is best characterised as one of hierarchical
authority. Armed with the strengthened environmenta l legislation of the Genevad
game code, the RWA could impose catchment-wide decisions and rules for
water management on the resource users and have such decisions enforced by
superior force (see Scharpf, 1997). This would seem to point towards hierarchical direction as a dominant mode of interaction in the process.
There were, however, moments and phases where the setting shifted to
networks engaged in Ž nding negotiated agreements. Under the extended
Genevad game code, farmers could institutionalis e co-operative schemes where
individual ‘improvement surpluses’—as deŽ ned within the limits of the nitrate
bubble established for the catchment—could be traded between farmers. Later in
the game farmers could establish collective environmental funds, enabling them
to lower nitrate transport from their property to levels demanded under the RWA
implementation plan. In the Ž nal stage of the game, farmers could choose among
different strategies of unilateral action within such a co-operative catchment
regime.
Several features in the institutiona l setting thus favoured negotiated co-operative agreements. The farmers had ample opportunitie s for ‘time-outs’ to consider
strategic options, both among themselves and through negotiation s with local
authorities. Furthermore, the farmers could foresee that if negotiated solutions
were not found, there would be unilateral RWA imposition of regulations. The
puzzle is why farmers did not use these opportunitie s for co-operation. They
stuck to their preference for individual environmental management plans negotiated with local environmental authorities, despite the historically poor record of
such plans as a way of reducing nitrogen leakage from farming practices. Why?
Collective Action: the logic according to the farmers
Olson (1965) argues that a rational individua l will not opt for collective action
if the beneŽ ts of such action do not clearly exceed the individua l cost. The core
of his argument is that:
… unless the number of individual s is quite small, or unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individual s act in their
common interest, rational, self-intereste d individual s will not act to
achieve their common or group interests. (Olson, 1965, p. 2, original
emphasis)
For the logic of collective action to become operative, actors must be self-interested and rational in economic terms (Olson, 1965). Undoubtedly, the farmers in
the Genevad game knew their individual economic interests. Whatever alternatives were discussed, they kept using their own practical experiences to challenge the calculations of economic and agricultural experts (Wittgren et al.,
2000). Collective action further depends on group size and transparency of
action. One-third of the 224 km2 of the Genevad catchment is agricultural land.
There were fewer than 200 active farmers in 1999 (see Joelsson, 2000), and most
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of them know each other by name or reputation. They also have some overview
of others’ actions, since most are local branch members of the Federation of
Swedish Farmers (LRF) (Eckerberg, 1994). The LRF provides comprehensive
information services to member farmers, and promotes environmental and
resource management programmes. One of the game farmers was environmental
representative of the regional LRF branch, and another was chairman of the local
LRF branch (Wittgren et al., 2000). There had also been intensive environmental
research and information since the 1980s in the Laholm Bay area, including
experiments with farmer co-operation on more environment-friendl y fertilisation
schemes (Eckerberg, 1996). The farmers thus entered the game with some
general perceptions of the costs and beneŽ ts of improved water quality.
Now, however, sophisticate d scientiŽ c modelling unravelled the contributio n of
individual farms to eutrophication , and could thus determine the costs to
individual farmers of redressing water quality in the catchment (see Wittgren
et al., 2000).
However, knowing one’s self-interest does not automatically lead to the
perception of the common group interest that Olson (1965) sees as necessary for
collective action. The individual farmer wants to get as much in return from his
work as possible. Nitrate leakage from the fertilised Ž elds into the catchment is
none of his business, provided there are no negative effects on the productivit y
of his own or closely adjacent farms. Furthermore, some farms are close enough
to the stream to see the effects of eutrophication, while others are distant enough
not to recognise their links to the water problem. Indeed, farmers participating
in a survey of agricultural practices and nitrate leakage in the Laholm Bay area
in 1998 clearly rejected adapting their fertilising practices to improve catchment
water quality (Joelsson et al., 2000).
As the group contributing most to the water problems in the catchment area,
farmers realised that their individua l beneŽ ts from improved water quality might
be lower than the costs of provision. Once provided, the collective good of clean
water would bring larger beneŽ ts to all and everyone in the area, and even to
recreational interests and businesses outside the catchment. This Olson (1965,
p. 29) calls the “systematic tendency for ‘exploitation ’ of the great by the small”.
The 200 farmers saw themselves as stuck with a disproportionat e share of the
burden for providing water quality, while a large share of the beneŽ ts would go
to the 4000 1 ‘non-paying others’ in the catchment.
Since farmers did not see it as their common interest to provide clean water,
and assumed a negative balance of individual costs and beneŽ ts, it was only
logical that collective action was not forthcoming, despite the relatively limited
number of farmers and the transparency of farming activities and their effects.
What remained was either the offer of “some separate incentive … to the
members of the group individually ” (Olson, 1965, p. 2) or coercion. Throughout
the game, however, farmers remained sceptical towards the proposed incentive
of individuall y usable ‘improvement surpluses’ (Wittgren et al., 2000). Farmers
preferred individual management plans worked out with local environmental
authorities, as well as individua l environmental subsidies from national and EU
programmes (Wittgren et al., 2000). The game thus came to resemble one of
deadlock: “Every individual actor Ž nds universal defection better than universal
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co-operation” (Bengtsson, 1998, p. 104). Would the possibility of coercive
measures break it up?
In the Shadow of the State: farmers and the frontiers of possibility
As shown above, the Genevad game code contained strong elements of state
coercion. The game code faced farmers, environmentalist s and local and regional
environmental and planning ofŽ cers with speciŽ c water quality standards for
nitrate concentrations in surface water and groundwater, linked to precise
deadlines for achievement backed up by strong enforcement clauses. The RWA
could punish non-complianc e by prohibitin g any new or extended economic
activities possibly detrimental to water quality in the area. A considerable part
of the game was thus played in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (see Scharpf, 1997).
If a negotiated agreement between the RWA and the farmers could not be found
under the game code, the farmers “would have to reckon with the unilateral
imposition of (conceivably ill-informed and inefŽ cient) state regulations”
(Scharpf, 1997, p. 202). To avoid this, the farmers might be expected to move
“the location of the non-agreement point away from the status quo” (Scharpf,
1997, p. 202).
The game code’s clauses on collective implementation provided ways for the
farmers “to lower pollution in a more cost-effective manner through co-operation
rather than strict implementation of regulations” (Wittgren et al., 2000, p. 193).
Farmers could co-operate to distribute manure more optimally within the
catchment. They could jointly enter into co-operative implementation agreements negotiated with the RWA. They could participate in collective environmental funds to lower their individual nitrate emissions to levels demanded
under the bubble (Wittgren et al., 2000). But even when pushed and pulled
towards negotiated agreements, the farmers did not extend the ‘possibilit y
frontier’ to permit “less demanding options to be practiced” (Scharpf, 1997,
p. 197). They stuck to the status quo of locally negotiated individua l management plans.
What were the capabilities or potential strategies of the farmers as an actor
constellatio n and what views did they hold of possible pay-offs and the
compatibility of these pay-offs? The acting farmers in the game were driven by
their preference to get increased individua l pay-offs from farming, but they also
knew the historical record of catchment eutrophication, a knowledge further
enhanced by the scientiŽ c background material. However, they saw the balance
between costs and beneŽ ts of collective action to improve water quality as
incompatible with their Ž rsthand preference as farmers. Furthermore, they knew
that most farmers in the catchment did not see it as their responsibilit y to provide
the collective good of clean water.
The agricultural actor constellatio n thus did not fulŽ l Scharpf’s (1997)
conditions for negotiated agreements and collective self-regulation . These are (1)
that the interests contributing to or affected by a societal problem are highly
organised, and (2) that there is a reasonable chance that the problem can be
effectively dealt with through negotiated agreements among organised groups.
Farmers are highly organised as individua l producers of agricultural products as
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a result of (a collectively recognised) economic self-interest, but they have no
such tradition or recognised collective interest to provide clean water. They have
different individual links to the catchment, and collectively lack exclusive access
to or control over the water resources. No wonder they had difŽ culties Ž nding
any advantage of collective action in comparison with individual management
plans.
Using Scharpf’s (1997) analysis of the possibilit y frontiers for negotiated
agreements in the shadow of hierarchy thus leads us to conclude that the actor
constellatio n of farmers in the Genevad game did not see the provision of clean
water in the catchment as their collective responsibility . Nor did they join in
collective action simply to avoid some of the rather grim consequences of the
‘dead hand’ over economic and development planning activities in the catchment
area by the RWA’s active implementation (Wittgren et al., 2000). Their
preferences and views of different outcomes favoured individual solutions over
and above collective action. To wit, they preferred to stay individuall y in the
shadow of hierarchy rather than coming out collectively to probe the possibilit y
frontier provided by the game code’s chapters on co-operative implementation.
Drawing the Limit: farmers and the governance of the commons
In her classic Governing the Commons, Ostrom (1990, p. 18) argues that when
“individual s repeatedly communicate and interact with one another in a localised
physical setting … it is possible that they learn whom to trust … and how to
organize themselves to gain beneŽ ts and avoid harm” (emphasis added). When
individual s are allowed to communicate directly, they develop shared norms,
mutual trust and group identity. They thus come to possess the social capital
necessary to engage in collective action to govern common pool resources
(Ostrom, 1990, 1998).
However, interaction and social norms may not sufŽ ce to bring about
institution s for collective action. The boundaries of the resource must be deŽ ned,
together with the circle of relevant actors sharing the costs and the beneŽ ts of
managing that resource. Furthermore, actors must Ž nd the incentives for collective action advantageous enough to engage in building institutions . This is
dependent on recognition from the political and administrativ e hierarchies of the
stakeholders’ right to organise and to establish rules for resource management
(Ostrom, 1990).
Sweden is divided into 119 main inland water catchments, and subcatchment
boundaries are also delineated (SMHI, 1995). The catchment of GenevadsaÊ n was
thus clearly identiŽ able as the localised physical setting of the game. However,
the circle of relevant stakeholders remained contested. Farming activities account for about two-thirds of the anthropogeni c nitrate load in the catchment
(Wittgren et al., 2000). This means there are other contributors to the eutrophication problem. Some of these—like road transport—are not even physically
linked to the catchment. No wonder, then, that the farmers kept asking why they
should bear all the costs of bringing nitrate loads down when the beneŽ ts could
be enjoyed also by all catchment dwellers as well as by non-contributin g
outsiders (Wittgren et al., 2000).
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The major ‘stick’ of the Genevad game’s environmental code was the
mandatory implementation plan, determined by the RWA. The code provided
few openings for actor participation to in uence decisions on the contents and
on the processes of implementing that plan (Wittgren et al., 2000). The ‘carrots’
consisted of options for co-operative implementation agreements (CIAs), to be
set up between the RWA and an association of actors contributin g to eutrophication. But these CIAs could take precedence only if they led to equal or greater
improvements of water quality compared with those of the RWA implementation
plan. The association members would be mutually responsible for monitoring
individual compliance. If implementation failed, the RWA could prescribe
measures to be collectively paid for by the association members (Wittgren et al.,
2000).
Why did not this recognised right to organise appeal strongly to the farmers,
used as they are to co-operating in producer associations and local LRF
branches, given their shared norms and strong group identity? Here, one must
keep in mind that these shared norms re ect their situation as individual farmers.
Membership of producer associations aims at acquiring the means of producing
as cheaply, and selling the products of farming as dearly, as possible in a
competitive, but increasingly regulated market (Wittgren et al., 2000). The time
is long gone when farmers joined associations to share machinery and equipment
in common, jointly elaborating schemes for shifting this equipment from farm to
farm and mutually monitoring adherence to these schemes (Dellien, 1999).
Mutual monitoring is difŽ cult enough when actors share norms and identities
around something actually held or used in common, but far more so when the
‘commons’ is contested and norms of collective responsibilit y must develop as
the implementation proceeds.
There is thus no automatic link from frequent social encounters over shared
norms and identities to the joint supply of institution s for collective action. When
shared norms and identities concern individual activities viewed by farmers as
necessary agricultural practice, given pressures from the market, there are strong
incentives not to abandon individual action plans, adapted to the farm’s economy
and speciŽ c characteristics, in favour of collective institution s whose prospects
of success and of returns to the individual are dim. This is where the farmers
drew their limit. The game’s options for collective implementation of negotiated
agreements with degrees of self-regulation were insufŽ cient. Collective governance of the catchment should involve all those responsible for pollution , not
just the farmers (Wittgren et al., 2000). Farmers also pointed to the catchment
‘outsiders’, whose actions might destroy the collective efforts of the ‘insiders’
and/or reap the collectively provided beneŽ ts (see Ostrom, 1990). Better, then,
to stick to individual management plans that implied lower transaction costs, and
a (possibly) favourable adaptation to the conditions of individual farms (see
Wittgren et al., 2000).
Memory: a game real farmers play
Why this strong preference for individual action plans amidst massive evidence
of the agricultural contributio n to eutrophication , and gradual acceptance of
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L. J. Lundqvist
responsibilit y for this among farmers living in a physical setting allowing for
transparency of action, and threatened by the hierarchical imposition of harsh
measures?
The previous analysis does not fully capture the farmers’ own central
argument for not joining in collective action. That argument points to the
centrality of the concepts and proposition s in Ostrom’s (1998) synthesis of work
on successful collective solutions to social dilemmas. It indicates the insufŽ ciency of some of Olson’s (1965) core assumptions about group size and the
transparency of individual actions. It also provides a behavioural key as to why
Scharpf’s (1997) predictions about collective action under outside pressure may
not come true.
The farmers’ most crucial objection to environmental co-operative management was not presented directly in the game, but aired in breaks between
sessions. It refers to what Ostrom (1998) puts at the core of a behavioural
explanation as to the outcome of efforts to solve social dilemmas, i.e. trust,
reputation and reciprocity. Having lived in the area for a long time, and worked
on farms owned by the family for generations, farmers develop a keen sense of
whom to trust or not. That reputation becomes widely known through frequent
encounters in such arenas as producer associations , the County Farmer Society
and the local LRF branch. “Since we have such a well developed lore about who
has a reputation for trustworthiness , and since we know that there are quite a few
who do not seem to care to get such a reputation, why should we engage in
trying to bring them into co-operation on water quality? The risk that they will
free ride on our efforts is just too large”, argued the senior acting farmer
(Dellien, 1999).
At Ž rst, this seems to stand Olson’s (1965) ideas on their head: both the small
number of actors and the transparency of their actions may work strongly
against collective action. This comes not primarily from leading the individual
farmer to make a calculated decision of economic costs and beneŽ ts of joining
or free riding, but through cumulative social learning. The farmers’ core
argument re ects a strategy of reciprocity: reciprocity works for collective action
in social dilemmas where the circle of actors “can be limited to those with a
reputation for keeping promises” (Ostrom, 1998, pp. 10, 12). The evidence here
is that it seems to work against collective action when the circle of relevant
actors includes also those not considered trustworthy (Wittgren et al., 2000).
Indeed, the farmers’ feeling for reciprocity and trust was doubly challenged.
First, the circle of actors was exclusively limited to ‘catchment’ farmers,
allowing other catchment dwellers to free ride. Secondly, collective memories of
trust and reputation within the farming community seemed to rule out the
possibilit y of mobilising a ‘critical mass’ of farmers to achieve successful
co-operative solutions. Another strand of collective memories shared within the
catchment reinforced farmer preferences for individual environment-relate d
management plans. Comments from both farmers and local environmental
ofŽ cers characterised these regular contacts as built upon, and building further,
trust and reputation (Kindt, 1999; Skyggeson, 1999).
But even if trust is related to the operational mode of political institutions , “it
is probably not the formal institutio n as such that people evaluate, but its
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historically established reputation in regard to fairness and efŽ ciency” (Rothstein, 2000, p. 489). The farmers in the Genevad game were confronted with the
new and strong RWA, acting under a likewise new environmental code and new
EU-determined water quality criteria. The outside experts and consultants
assisting in the game shared collective memories of the Laholm Bay and
catchment area as threatened by agricultural fertilisation practices. Their information about the effects of past practices, and recommendations about future
action, could be seen as an “attempt to change … [farmers’] … understandin g of
history” (Rothstein, 2000, p. 493).
The game could thus be viewed as being played out by actor constellation s
with different strands of collective memories. Experts and constructors of the
game presented a history of the agricultural contributio n to eutrophication,
thereby implying a collective farmer responsibilit y for bringing down nitrate
loads. Foremost in the collective memory of farmers was the continuous pressure
on individual farms from competition in the market amidst the ever-increasing
regulation of agriculture. They shared memories of the individual implementation of environmental measures negotiated with trustworthy local environmental ofŽ cials. They had also developed collectively shared norms about ‘realistic’
demands and ‘relevant’ assessments of the agricultural contributio n to eutrophication (Wittgren et al., 2000).
Confronted with the option of collective action, the farmers thus fell back on
shared memories of the “history of play” (Rothstein, 2000, p. 493) in the
catchment. They remembered the difŽ culties in co-operating with people not
held to be trustworthy even in genuinely interdependent situations within a well
deŽ ned circle of actors. They could thus foresee that such co-operation would be
even more difŽ cult when (1) initiated by external forces, (2) including actors not
considered trustworthy and (3) leading to beneŽ ts not enjoyed exclusively by
those brought to co-operate.
The Puzzle of Non-co-operation: putting the pieces together
This analysis was provoked by a puzzle: how come the game that the real
farmers in the Genevad catchment took part in playing did not lead to negotiated
settlements involving them in institutionalise d co-operation to improve water
quality in the catchment, despite several institutiona l and actor-centred factors
seemingly favouring such co-operation?
At Ž rst glance, Olson’s (1965) explanations seemed enough to solve the
puzzle. The group of farmers was small. The transparency of individual farm
action was good, and further improved by data and models provided by scientiŽ c
expertise. However, the farmers did not meet Olson’s (1965) most crucial
assumption: the logic of collective action becomes rational only for “small
groups interested in collective goods” (Olson, 1965, p. 29, emphasis added). As
pointed out above, the farmers as a group did not see any genuinely common
interest in providing the collective good of clean water. Put to this Olson’s
(1965) axiomatic statement that if marginal costs of additional units of the
collective good are not “shared in exactly the same proportion as the additional
beneŽ ts”, the “amount of collective good provided will be sub-optimal” (Olson,
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L. J. Lundqvist
1965, p. 30). Catchment farmers would clearly experience marginal costs larger
than additional beneŽ ts even if they joined in collective action.
However, Olson (1965, p. 30) assures us that “certain institutiona l arrangements and behavioural assumptions ” could break this “tendency toward sub-optimal provision of collective goods”. The RWA in the game had the authority to
force the establishment of negotiated institution s for catchment management.
Such power “also implies a power to manipulate the institutiona l parameters so
as to affect the balance of relative bargaining powers and hence expected
outcomes” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 201). There was reason to believe that negotiated
farmer co-operation could effectively deal with eutrophication . This is a situation
where “information about situational conditions , preferences and potential solutions” held by the group concerned but “difŽ cult to obtain for government, can
be fully utilized … to … in uence the drift of negotiated settlements” (Scharpf,
1997, p. 201). But water and soil scientists, and agro-economists , presented and
developed information in the game that made the RWA less dependent on farmer
knowledge. Furthermore, farmers in the catchment did not hold exclusive
information as a group of ‘principals’, sharing the water of the catchment in
common and equally dependent on the others’ use of the resource for their
individual beneŽ ts. Their chance to ‘in uence the drift’ of the game through
knowledge was thus limited.
However, the farmers did not stick to their preference for individual management plans only, or even primarily, for institutiona l reasons. They fell back on
their mental maps of local preferences and earlier encounters in many local
arenas. These collectively shared memories made them hesitant about getting
credible commitments from all farmers in the catchment. The farmers thus
illustrate d the centrality of Ostrom’s (1998) assertions about the importance of
reciprocity, reputation and trust: the lack of, or negative interplay among, these
behavioural and socio-cultural factors “generates a cascade of negative effects”
(Ostrom, 1998, p. 14) on the possibilitie s of achieving collective action.
Consequently, the historical record of play is vital to the development of
collective action. It is clear that scientiŽ c experts and administrativ e actors
played the Genevad game primarily as one of knowledge. They expected a logic
of collective action to develop among the farmers as a result of the irrefutable
evidence on nitrate leaching and transport. There are indications that the farmers
began to appreciate their historical and current contribution s to catchment
eutrophicatio n (Wittgren et al., 2000). But as real farmers they played the game
of memory, invoking their experience from earlier games of co-operation played
out within the catchment’s farming community (see Rothstein, 2000). The
institutiona l setting that seemed to impose a strategy for co-operation triggered
their memories of how costly investments necessary to achieve trustworthines s
really are. In the end, they concluded that the pay-offs of co-operation were not
compatible with the “potential advantages in individual interactions” (Scharpf,
1997, p. 138).
A classic in the literature on policy implementation sought to “build morals
on a foundation of ruined hopes” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973, front cover,
emphasis added). What could possibly be the morals of the Genevad game
outcome for efforts to implement collective action among local actors in water
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Games Real Farmers Play
catchments? Quite clearly, such efforts should not be based solely on scientiŽ c
knowledge. Existing collective memories about the history of play in that local
environment must be taken into account. This would lead to more realistic
expectations of the time needed for stakeholder s to take in, assess and accept
new knowledge, and then transform this into new, more positive attitudes
towards collective action. The challenge, then, is to Ž nd ways of presenting
scientiŽ c knowledge in ways that are instrumental in building new collective
memories and identities towards common pool resources.
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419