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PROC. OF THE OKLA. ACAD. OF SCI. FOR 1966
An Episode In Nazi Diplomacy:
The German-Swedish Transit Ag....ment of July 8, 1940
DOUGLAS BALE, OIdaho.a State UDl'venity, Stillwater
IPrlDC came to Sweden with an ita wonted splendor in lHO.
the IUIlIIY lIldu and receding mows failed to inspire the elation of former
,earL 8erenlty and peace reigned over the countryside, but beneath the
Thoup
cU8clpUned and taciturn facade of Swedlah ute there festered tension and
UIlcertainty. War appeared from every Idde to tlare&ten the abundant .octet, which the Sweclu had fuhloned for themHlvea. The little nation beIatedJ7 looked to ita del. . . . with ODe overriding quutlon in view: What
caD Sweden do to protect her neutrality and remain at peace fl
A combination of aood fortune, aldl1, and determination was to p~
..... Sweden fl'om the liorror and de8trueUoa of the war· widell engulfed
SOCIAL SCIENCES
319
her netghbol'8. The peace had Ita price, however, rmd there were maJlY
who were unwtlllng to pay it at the tbne. Among the moat painful sacrifices required of the nation was her forced departure from the path of
absolute neutrality. In July, 1940, Sweden granted Germany the right to
use her territory and equipment for the tranaport of the Wehf'tnGCht. In
so doing, she compromised one of the basic tenets of her neutraliat polley.
This paper purports· to survey the diplomatic negotiations which led to
these transit concessions and &88e88 their Blgnlflcance on the COUI'H of the
war.
Neutrality as a cornerstone ot Swedish polley bad Its roots deep in
the past. The nation had enjoyed uninterrupted peace. since 181.. At the
outbreak ot the Second World War, Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson had
reaftirmed Sweden's commitment to complete neutrality.I Within a few
months, however, this pollcy was subjected to serious strain when the Soviet Union attacked Finland in November, 1939. Despite her historic ties
with Finland and sympathy for the Finnish cause, Sweden llmlted her assistance to providing medical supplies and munitions for her beleagueNd
neighbor. Even in this, the Swedes exceeded the bounds of strict neutral-
ity.1
The next threat to Swedish security came from the west. The British and French were anxious to open a new theater of war in Scandinavia
and shut off the supply of Swedish iron ore to Germany. Early in 19"0
they began preparations tor the occupation of Swedish and Norwegian
territory and simultaneous intervention in the Russo-Finnish War. On
March 2, 1940, the Allles requested permission to send reinforcements to
Finland across Sweden and Norway. Both neutrals quickly denied t1WI
request which, in any case, came too late, since the Russo-Finnish Arm18tice was concluded on March 12.4
A far greater danger to Sweden was posed by the German invaaion
of Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940. Despite Gennan usurances that
Swedish neutrality would be respected. the government at Stockholm expected attack at any moment. Policy considerations ot her great neigh-·
bora, Germany and the Soviet Union, spared her this tate, however. Russia, the traditional enemy on the east, was anxious to preserve Sweden as
a neutral buffer between Soviet and German spheres ot interest in the
Baltic.' Germany also had nothing to gain from a war with Sweden. Hitler's Norwegian campaign had been launched in an effort to forestall A1l1ed
intervention in SCandinavia, secure air and naval bases tor attacka on
Britain. and gain unlimited access to the rich iron mines of the GlUllvareKiruna region of northern Sweden (see map). These mines supplied
Germany with approxbnately ten million tons of ore annually, or about
28.5% ot the total Gennan supply in 19-'0. Sweden was, moreover, one of
Germany's best customers: 38% of Sweden's total imports came from
Germany.' A neutral Sweden could serve Gennan interests better thaD
a conquered one.
Britain was tully cognl.zant of thfa fact. Winaton Churchill was convinced that Swedish ore supp1Jea were a decf81ve factor In the German war
effort. "What we want," he declared on April 11, "la that Sweden should
not remain neutral, but declare war on Germany. . .. It would be disutrous it they remained neutral and bought Germany off with ore from
GeWvare laicJ down the Gulf of Bothnla.'"
A.ware of theae Brltlah de8Igna aaaln8t their neutraUty, the Swedllh
Government adopted a more cooperative and conctUatory attitude toward
Germany than did the Swedim public In general. The majority of the
population was sympathetic to Britain and nap1cIoua of Nazi lntentiou.
The Swedish Forelgn Klnl8ter, Qu'l8tlan GUnther, found dittlcu1ty In moderating the tone of the anti-GermaD preM autt1clently to avoid ~viD« the
lmpreeslon of UDDeUtral behavior.' At the 8&IJle time. PrIme JIIDl8ter
aa.n.-
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PROC. OF THE OKLA. ACAD. OF SCI. FOR 1966
Main Swed1ah Ran ConnecUona with Norway and Finland in 1940
SOCIAL SCIENCES
821
IOn reiterated his government's polley ot nonallgninent. empbaetzlnc that
it I. not conal.tent with .trict neutraUty to permit aDl' bellla_Nnt to make ue
ot Swedlah territory tor Ita operation. Fort.un.tell' no demand. in such .. dinetlon have been made of UI. Should aDy lucb demanda be made, the;, lIlut be
refuled.-
Hansson did not have long to walt tor tbls resolution to be tested.
The test came as a result of the critical position ot German forces at
remote and frigid Narvlk, the chief iron ore port and grand prize of the
Norwegian campaign. Though the Germans had occupied this strategic
port on April 9, an Allied expeditionary force estabUshed a beachhead in
the area. several days later. In order to supply their Isolated and beleaguered troops at Narvlk, the Germans reqUired the use of Swed18h ran·
roads. Hermann Goering, who considered himself an expert in Swedish
affairs, immediately began dlscussions with l'epresentative8 of the Swed1lJh
Government to th1B end.to
Under considerable pressure, Stockholm pennitted the passage of a
trainload of mecUcalsupplles, food, clothing, and medical personnel through
Swedl8h territory to Narvik.
The returning supply train brought more
than five hundred stranded sailors back to their Gennan homeland at the
end of April. This was a clear violation of Swedish neutrality. GUnther,
stung by criticism in the Swedish press, 188ued an otflclal denial that any
"war material" bad passed through Sweden and took a firmer tone toward
German demands. Though the Swedes permitted additional shipments of
rations and allowed the evacuation of wounded to be carried out over their
ralls, their attitude began to stiffen.1I
These minor concessions ot April, though heartening to the German
forces at Narvlk, would never suffice to meet German requirements for
men and materiel in the battle zone. Joachim von Rlbbentrop, Nazi Foreign Minlster, cast about for a convenient instrument to apply pressure on
the Swedes. He found it in an undelivered order for torty-eight mllllon
Reichsmark8 worth of arms which Sweden had purchased from Germany.
At the beglnnlng ot May, Rlbbentrop made arms deliveries to Sweden contingent on SWedish compliance with the German demands for unrutricted
transit of men and weapons on Swedish raUs.1I
The Swedes remained adamant. They had refused to aid Britain and
Norway before, they argued; they could hardly aid Germany now. How
could Sweden ever justify such an act to Norway? To grant Germany
transit rights, declared Arvid Richert, Swedish Minister to Germany, would
"burden the Government with a scandal which, in view of Nordic common
feeling, they would not be able either to shake oft or to bear."tt Throughout the month ot May, 19'0, Stockholm restated Nazi demanda on the quatlon.
In the meantime, however, German arms bad astounded the world.
Belgium and Holland had fallen in quick succession, and by the middle of
June the onrushing WehrmacM had forced the evacuation of Paris. The
Allies abandoned their tenuous hold on Narvlk, and by June 10 the war in
Norway was over. These overwbelmlng military trlumpbs cleared the
way for Nazi diplomacy. The Germans were no longer in a mood to haggle over interpretations of international law. Threatt would DOW 8uttlce.
On June 15, Rlbbentrop summoned the Swedlsh Mlnlater to a conference in
Be1g1um. Troops and arD18 were needed in Norway, the Nazi· J'orelp
IQnIster declared; Sweden must permit the pa8l&Ce of German for~ by
ran. It Stockholm caWled any dltflcu1ty about the matter, Rlbbentrop
warned, the Fuehrer "would repro it .. a d1rectIy bD8We act.""
What was Sweden to do1 Stockholm wu tun of rumors that DOt 0Dly
J'rance, but Britain too was ready to sue for peace. The Swedlah J'orelp
Ottlce was in reception of bud8teDt reporta that Germany p1anDecl ucom_
822
PROC. OF THE OKLA. ACAD. OF SCL FOR 1968
pulalve meuures" agalnst Sweden. MiD1ster Richert warned his superiors
in the Swedf8h capital that a negative reply to the Gennan demands would
have "catastrophic consequences tor our land."M On June 19, the Swedes
gave lD.
After aeveral weeks of negotiations, a transit agreement was signed
on July 8 which pennltted shipment of men and materiel between the Reich
and Norway on a regular schedule. In order to render the unpleasant conce8810n as tolerable as poBSible, the Germans agreed that their troops
would remain unarmed and in closed cars en route. Shipment of weapons
and supplies could be carried out virtually without limit, however. Jf
The Swedish government was hard put to reconcile these concessions
with its policy of neutrality, but manfully, if somewhat speciously, argued
that Bince hostilities in Norway had ceased, Sweden was under no obligation to restrict German traffic. Britain reacted with restrained annoyance to the transit agreement, while the Norwegian Government in exile
condemned the move as a flagrant breach of the Fifth Hague Convention ot 1907. Some newspaper comment in Sweden reflected this indignation, but it was apparent that a majority of the Swedish people reluctantly
supported their government's action 88 the lesser of evils. II They realized,
as Prime Mfn18ter Hansson put it, that
Tbe .eneral European situation ha. under8'one a fundamental change in recent
weeki•••. We In our land cannot l8'nore the unfolding of events which reveal
that wholly or In part seven countries of Europe are occupied and that Franee
ha. accepted an armi.tlce. 1t
While clinging to the ideal ot neutrality, Sweden yielded before the overwhelming fact that Germany was now master of the continent.
The agreement of July 8 established a principle which was to be followed tor three years, but the scope and nature of German troop movements were gradually enlarged Within a year and a half, some 670.000
members ot the Wehrmacht had crossed Swedish territory. Following the
Nazi invasion of Russia in June, 1941, a fully equipped German division
was shipped across Sweden to join battle on the Eastern Front.1lI Only in
August, 1943, after the decline in Axis fortunes had become quite obvious,
did Sweden ttnd herself in a position to repudiate the transit agreement
and cooperate openly with the Allies. h
While in torce, the agreement had made possible the transfer of from
200,000 to 300,000 German soldiers over Swedish routes each year. Such
mobllity kept the northern bastion ot Featutlg Europa strong and secure
and NorweJtlan-based aircraft and submarines coursing the North Atlantic
at peak efttciency. Transit through Sweden bolstered the morale of the
troops in Norway and freed vital German shipping tor duty elsewhere.
By maintaining a firm grip on Scandinavia, Hitler assured himself of a
conUnued 8upply of Swedish products vital to his war effort." The transit
aareement was an Axis victory in itself.
But, in a deeper sense, it was a Swedish victory too. The transit concel8iona averted German aggression in 1940 when it mlght well have succeeded. By 1943, when the Wehnnacht began planning a blow against
Sweden, it was too late." Thus, the Swedes bought time, and the price
they paid seems not unreasonable when one considers the benefits it
brought. Few European states can clalm that they simultaneously remained at peace, pursued a profitable foreign trade, maintained national BOVereignty. and kept their people tree during World War n. Sweden can.
L1'l'ERATUBE
crrm
lKartJIa GeUhom. ''Fear Comes to Sweden,tt CollfertJ1 CV (Feb. 3.
lIMO). 20-22; s. S. Jon_, "War Comes to ScandlDavta." A~80C1ftd'­
. ." ,&Mew.. XXVIII, No.2 (June, tHO). tO~lt7.
SOCIAL SCIENCES
323
00"
'Per Albin Hansson, S1J6Mk Mllntng
Aandltng: UttalatSdeta under
Tldens FtSrlag, 1945). 16.
krigs4ren (Stockholm:
'Naboth Hedin, "Sweden: The Dilemma of a Neutral," FOf'frigft Pol~
Reports, XIX, No.5 (May 15, 1943), 51; Samuel Abrahamsen. SW6tUm'.
Foreign Policy (Washington:
Publlc Affairs Press, 1957), 31-33.
·Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton
Mlfflln Co., 1948), I, 543-548, 560; Earl F. Ziemke, The Gennata Northenl
Theater 0/ OperatioM 19-+0-19-+6 (Washington: G.P.O.• 1959), 22-24.
·Schulenburg to Rlbbentrop, Moscow, April 13, 1940, Da8 Na«otIal80mli8ti8che Deutschland und (fie BowJetUtlWn, 1939-1941 (Washington:
G.P.O., 1948), 156-157; "TASS Statement on Soviet-German Conversations
on Swedish Neutrality," May 4, 1940, Jane Degras, ed., Bovtet Document..
on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), m, 449-450;
David Dallln, Soviet RU88i4'8 Foreign Poltcy, 1939-19-+8 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1942), 206-210; New York Ttma, Oct. 15, 1945, 4.
~.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects 01 StrClteg'c Bombtng on
the German War Economy (Washington: G.P.O., 1945), 247; Hennan
Eriksson, "Foreign Trade," Sweden: A Warttme SurtJey (New York:
American-Swedish News Exchange, 1944), 86; Ziemke, 16-19.
'Churchill, I, 608-609.
SRibbentrop Memoranda, Berlin, April 11 and 24, 1940, Document.. on
German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 (Washington: G.P.O., 1949 ff.), Serles
D, IX, 130-131, 227 (hereinafter cited as DGFP); Richert to O<1nther, Berlin, April 11, 1940, Tratr.8;,tering8!rdgor och ddrmed ..ammanhdngande
spih'amdl, april-juni 1940 (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt, 1947), 12-14.
'Hansson, 88.
lew'eizsA.cker Memorandum, Berlin, April 13, 1940, DGFP, IX, 156-157;
Ziemke, 16, 87-88.
uHeidenstam Memorandum, Berlln, April 15, Beck-Friis Memorandum, April 18, Unden Memorandum, April 19, Engzell Memorandum, Aprll
19, and Note from the German Embassy, Stockholm, Aprll 18, 1940,
Tratr.8iteringsfr4gor ... april-juni 1940, 29-39, 49-51, 60-61, 66-68.
"Note from the German Embassy, Stockholm, April 29, 1940, lind.,
135-136; Wied to Ribbentrop. Stockholm, April 22 and 23, and Ribbentrop
to Wied, Berlin, April 28 and 30, 1940, DGP'P, IX, 216, 221-222, 252-253,
258.
ISRtbbentrop to Wied, Berlin, April 30, 1940, DGP'P, IX, 258-260.
I·We1zsA.cker Memorandum, Berlin, May 18. 1940, 'bid., 369.
uRlchert to G<1nther. Berlin, June 16, 1940, TrBndtermg8/f'dgcm,
december 19-+0 (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt, 1947), 10.
Jtm'-
JIIIl»d., 11.
lfSchnurre to GQnther, Stockholm, July 8. 1940, DGFP, X, 158.
UCommunique from [Swedish] Foreign Office, Stockholm, July IS.
Verbal Note from Norwegian Ambaaaador, Stockholm, .JUly 6. and Ambassador In London to [Swedish] Foreign Office. June 26,1940, TmMUermgll/nlgan, JuflHlecember 19-+0, 21-22, 37, 39-40; Wollmar F. Bo8tr6m,
"German Shipments through Sweden," Amerfcan-BcondMavlan R61MtD,
No.3 (Sept., 1940), 242; Hedin, 52-ts8.
xxvm.
-Ransaon, 91.
824
PROC. OF THE OKLA. ACAD. OF SCL FOR 1968
-scJmurre Memorandum, Berlin, December 1, 1941, 8chnurre and
Wled to Rlbbentrop, Stockholm, June 27, 1941, DGI!P, XIII. 30-32, 927;
Ziemke, 139, 214.
"Nt1W York TtmaJ, Aug. 8, 1943, 1, 5.
lIJ(ent R. Greenfield. ed., Command DeciMon8 (Washington:
1980),72; Abrabam8en, 62.
aztemke, 262·284.
G.P.O.,