Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, University of Uppsala,
Sweden, April 13-18, 2004
Workshop THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING IN CABINETS IN CENTRALEASTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE
Coalition Governments and the Decision Making Process in CEE
First Draft (Please do not use for quotations)
Dobrinka Kostova
Introduction
The region of Eastern Europe has a unique historical experience and how it is
developing in the present is an important social and scientific issue. For us it is of significance
to reveal the progress of the cabinet structures, their strength, power and authority in the
various countries of CEE and thus to demonstrate the similarities and differences with regard
of the role of the political elite within diverse spaces. In this way one can contribute to the
usefulness of the theoretical models or propose their modification when specific
circumstances give such confidence to the political processes.
The proposed paper focuses on a comparative analysis of the coalition governments of
the studied EEC, on the partners of the coalitions – is it the similar political philosophy or
interests for power that unite the partners and how does that impact the coalition and the
decision making process. In parliamentary democracies the parliaments choose the cabinets
and they can survive only if the parliaments support them. Very often not a single party
controls the parliament and thus a number of parties come together to form coalitions. The
aim of the paper is to analyze the dynamics of coalitions’ formation, functioning and survival.
Using comparative data we intend concretely to analyze the impact of consolidation or
conflicts on decision making process and how it is managed during the existence of coalition
governments.
The analysis relies on empirical investigation realized in 2003/2004 in ten countries
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia)1. This leads to the data-model that forms the common denominator of our
project and which provides the empirical basis for inter-temporal and international
1
The research is funded by the Deusche Forschungs-gemeinschaft
1
comparisons. We have designed our research as an analysis of aggregate data related to the
political backgrounds of eastern European states. Our database is organised as a three
dimensional data-matrix, whereby the sides are formed by time, countries and variables.
Comparisons can be carried out in a party by party, nation by nation, or party by nation mode.
Our study extends the established ways of social and political background research on
political elites by pursuing comprehensive international comparisons, providing to a definite
extent continuous time-series extending from the 1989 to the present day. The data reveal
some tendencies about the researched countries, they, however, cannot give the full picture of
the 1990-s as the data set has some limitations as different representativeness for the various
cabinets and for the various countries. Regardless, it is a solid basis for comparisons in the
field of the decision making process, which is the objective of the research team.
Parliamentary Democracy and Coalitions in CEE: The Voice of Loyalty between
Coalition Partners
In established multiparty systems coalition governments either have a long tradition or
are a rare phenomenon. In establishing multiparty systems in EEC the coalition governments
prevail as a form of cabinets in the 1990-s. 14 out of 16 EEC have coalition governments
during the studied period. This can be confirmed by the data of other researchers (Table 1) as
well as from our own data (Table 2).
Table 1: Cabinet Types in CEE
(Percent of Time Governed by Minimal Winning Coalition or Single-Party)
Hungary 0
Slovakia 24.2
Bulgaria 44.9
Macedonia 0
Romania 25.0
Lithuania 51.1
Slovenia 0
Estonia 34.3
Croatia 73.2
Albania 3.8
Czech Rep. 39.9
Moldova 73.6
Latvia 19.6
Poland 40.3
Average 32.8
Source: Calculated from Blondel 2001 and Lijphart 1999.
2
As a whole the trend in CEE is of domination of coalition governments. There are
influential explanatory factors for that among which of significance for our analysis are:
•
the possibility to get greater population support for the reforms in all
social spheres,
•
to rebuild the multiparty system after the decades of socialism,
•
the need to achieve consensus among the political elite on major
political, economic and social changes,
•
the interest to have a power position in the transition period when the
distribution of country’s wealth is taking place,
•
the necessity to share responsibilities when all political, economic and
social structures are rebuilt.
Table 2: Type of government in the studied 10 EEC
Fr
equency
Valid
single
party government
minimal
winning coalition
surplus
coalition
single
party minority
government
multi
party minority
government
caretaker
government
Total
Pe
rcent
1
98
81
Valid
Percent
.4
38
.4
31
.8
Cumu
lative Percent
.5
.5
47.3
47.8
39.1
87.0
5
2.
0
2.4
89.4
19
7.
5
9.2
98.6
1.4
100.0
1.
2
20
81
7
.2
Missing
System
18
48
.8
Total
25
10
5
0.0
Source: Data file Ministers in Central Eastern Europe, 2004
3
100.0
The preferred model in the researched CEE is of a minimal winning coalition (Table
2). One of the clarifying justifications may be voters demanding checks on the power of
governments. Another most probably is the significant number of cases when the successors
of the communist parties need to legitimate their post-socialist political activity. Minority
governments, by contrast, may be the result of parties being unwilling to assume the costs of
governing economies in free-fall or non-willingness to join coalitions with communist
3
successor parties. More, single party governments are typically constituted when the party has
a large electoral base. All these factors to a greater or lesser extent have their impact on the
political development in CEE in the 1990-s but there is a need of future research to resolve
which of these issues are the most significant in the preferences for coalition cabinets.
The type of coalition depends on the character of the parties in the specific country –
small/big, influential or not, ideological or managerial; on the stage of development – start of
the reforms, transition or consolidation; on the election system – proportion, majority or
mixed, the minimum winning percentage required to enter the parliament; and on the
philosophy of the parties – left, right or centrist, if only two opposing camps are formed or the
political scene is more complicated. J. Blondel (1995: 131) proposes an interrelation
autonomous-interdependence for the relation party-government. There are 3 types in his
model – autonomous government with parties playing min role as in USA, government
dependant on party like the coalition in Belgium and party dependent on the government as is
the case of France or UK. In EEC the length of multiparty system is brief to have so well
differentiated models of coalition government relations. The pattern still depends on the
specificities of the parties rather than on a state model. However, this is an essential issue as if
the system is structured according to short term interests and often leftist and rightist parties
fall into the same orientation, this results into a very unstable political system and thus into
weak governments. The combination of relative ideological proximity and of practical party
considerations thus has as an outcome a marked limitation in the amount of debate taking
place in the cabinets.
In EEC the composition of the coalitions is characterised by closeness in their political
programmes and in the philosophy for the reforms. To a considerable extent this is a result of
the inner and outside consensus on the directions of development in the studied countries. In
some of them as Latvia, Estonia and to a somewhat lesser extent Hungary, Lithuania, Poland
the cooperation between coalitions is close and fruitful while in the other countries the mutual
trust is still under construction. The close cooperation is a typical characteristic for 36.1% of
the partners and the modest collaboration - for 46.2%. There is no cooperation between
partners in 7.2% of the coalitions in the studied EEC (Table 3). This is specific especially for
Romania.
4
Table 3: Relations between Coalition Partners by Country (in%)
coalition partner
close
cooperation
country code
Bulgaria
cooperation
no
cooperation
not
Total
applicable
23.1
46.2
15.4
15.4
100.0
20.0
40.0
40.0
0.0
100.0
Estonia
73.7
15.8
0.0
10.5
100.0
Hungary
30.0
65.0
5.0
0.0
100.0
Latvia
63.6
31.8
4.5
0.0
100.0
Lithuania
25.0
16.7
5.6
52.8
100.0
Poland
39.0
53.7
2.4
4.9
100.0
Romania
20.0
26.7
3.3
100.0
Slovenia
9.5
90.5
0.0
0.0
100.0
Slovakia
59.1
40.9
0.0
0.0
100.0
36.1
46.2
7.2
10.4
100.0
Czech
Republic
Total
little
50.0
Source: Data file Ministers in Central Eastern Europe, 2004
Within the coalition governments each party has a definite number of ministerial
places and their representatives defend the interests and the programme of this party within
the cabinet. In this sense the role of the parties in coalition governments is of considerable
weight. Particular for EEC is that many parties sit in the parliaments. According to the data
(Andrew Roberts 2003:4) there are 4 effective parties on the average in EEC. The trend is of a
decline with the time. This significant quantitative party presentation is most probably shaped
by the fact that voters need time to gain knowledge about the correct representative who could
best stands for and defend their interests in the parliament. However, sometimes it is difficult
to differentiate between the parties as they split and unite according to the election needs.
According to the research data (James Druckman and Andrew Roberts 2003: 8) the coalition
governments of EEC number 76 from 256 parties. The successors of the communist parties
(CP) in the EEC receive less governmental seats than their share; the majority parties in more
advanced EEC get a smaller portion or a similar partition imitating in that way Western EC
while in the less developed EEC – the big parties have bonus places taking from the
successors of the CP as well as from other coalition parties. Regardless, even in these
countries there is a movement toward proportionality (James Druckman and Andrew Roberts
2003:14f.). The post-communist history shows that the first decade of the reforms can be
5
characterized with a change of the ruling coalition after each election. The voters voice moves
from the less experienced reformers to the ex-communists and back expecting better social
development.
Qualitatively, parties, with the exception of the former communist parties, did not have
enough time in the 1990-s to develop strong organizations and membership basis. Further, due
to election requirements some parties unite before elections and split afterwards (as shows the
example of Bulgaria). To govern a country in a transition period is difficult because of the
many reforms that have to be realized. That shortened the lifespan of parties and encouraged
the birth of new ones. In the case of left-wing coalition governments, additional parties may
be required to provide credibility against slipping back into old communist policies. When
forming a coalition the partners weight many circumstances before taking the decision. It
includes mostly the future expectations as well as the prospects for the success on the
forthcoming elections.
The running of the coalition involves maintaining a definite internal party loyalty and
discipline. Divisions and party rebellions when not under the control of the leadership could
easily weaken the coalition. In coalition governments parties markedly limit the extent to
which conflicts occur in cabinets or ensure that matters are decided elsewhere and not in the
cabinet. Parties must be strong enough to be able to impose on the cabinet its philosophy and
requirements. If they are weak, especially if they are based on individuals who have come
together mainly for reasons of electoral simplicity, they may just not have the power to force
ministers to follow their lead. Parties invest in coalitions for different reasons. In EEC the
most significant argument is to be in power rather than in opposition in this significant period
of changes. The data from the research confirm the above hypotheses. It reveals that the
predictors of positive influence for the stable relations between coalition partners in the
studied EEC are the parties and the prime minister. There is an empirical evidence that the
coalition relations negatively effect the decision making process in the cabinets in the sense
that there is a strong try for a move of the DM from the cabinets to the partners. That has a
negative impact on the cabinets’ effectiveness that is declining.
To keep on going with the good relations some of the coalition partners have preelection agreements; others establish them after the elections on the basis of mutual
understanding and agreement. In this way coalition cabinets could be more in control of
themselves than single-party cabinets. As most coalitions tend to be ‘minimum winning
coalitions’ (F.Muller-Rommel/K.Fettelschoss 2004: 5) or a little larger, they are likely in EEC
to be composed of parties which are not ideologically very distant from each other: this
6
constitutes a limitation on the scope to which conflicts could occur. Moreover, coalitions exist
as a number of parties decide that it is in their interest to form and support a cabinet/partly
because they see advantages or because they fear an alternative government composed of
opposition parties. To prevent troubles within the cabinet, a governmental ‘coalition
agreement’ is thus crucial: this determines, sometimes in detail, what and how the government
will do. Such an agreement may leave even less space for debate among ministers than is the
case of single party governments. The effect may be that the ministers from the parties
belonging to the coalition become ‘ambassadors’ of their own party. Potentially conflict
issues are either not raised at all (the coalition agreement being silent about them) or, if they
come to be raised, they are dealt with by the parties who have to look for compromises if the
government is to remain in being. This is a positive side of the coalition governments as it
encourages a consensus type of policy.
The EEC coalition agreements, where present, allow to overcome the mutual mistrust
and to create a definite certainty. In this regard single deals contain less attractive payoffs than
package’s deals. In the process of coalition government formation the issues that divide the
partners are the ones to be discussed rather than the ones that unite. The reason is that the
partner parties are concerned in the process of “giving” and “taking” to create a political
equilibrium. Often to reach a balance the partners agree on rather vague than clear
formulations, on compromise commitments and unclear agreements. However, agreements do
not eliminate all tensions. In the space of the coalition there are continuous recalculations on
the pro’s and anti’s of a definite decision with regard of each party’s political benefits. The
research data allows us to a definite extent to reveal in comparative perspective the closeness
or the distance between the coalition partners in the decision making process, the type of
cooperation in the process of decision making, and the reasons when consensus is lacking
analyzing the role of the PM, of the parties or other circumstances of significance. By
analyzing these matters, it is possible to make better informed judgments about the stability of
the coalition governments.
The Stability of Coalition Governments
A basic question is: are coalition governments more stable? And also is significant the
problem of the efficiency of the coalition cabinets. As we have partly shown in the previous
paragraph the answer is not simple. In some cases the coalition makes the government more
stable as it gets stronger parliamentary support but the coalition partners could negatively
7
influence the efficiency of the DM process of the cabinets. Stability and efficiency are the
basic characteristics for coalition governments. Both are dependent on decision making
process of the governments. In CEE cabinets the two indicators - stability and efficiency
depend on a number of factors. Some of them will be discussed below.
The research data reveal that in coalition governments the decisions are taken mainly by
the cabinets as teams. In 41.3% of the studied EEC cabinets the decisions are taken mainly by
the ministries and in additionally 34.5% of the cases - are rather taken by the governments than
by other bodies. Only in 2.6% of the cases the DM process is not in the cabinets at all and
analyzing the countries’ specificity – mainly such answers come from Poland, Slovenia and
Estonia - it is rather a characteristic of a specific government than a national feature. The latter is
even truer when the numbers are so low.
The consensus type of DM is regarded as central by the interviewed ministers from the
EEC cabinets as this mode of operation is felt to be more liberal, more democratic and therefore
an advanced form of decision-making because it results from the fact that the cabinets originate
from the parliament and, to survive, they have to be closely linked at least to the majority,
forming the coalition, if not to the whole of the parliament. The latter is especially accurate when
DM concerns issues of national importance. The data reveal that in everyday DM process the
coalition could be damaging for the quality and effectiveness of the government. There are
frequent differences in judgments mainly on concrete, but sometimes on some fundamental
issues between parties. On principal issues however is more difficult to bargain and that is
why the solution of many of critical issues could be postponed to the future. Equally, in the
name of efficiency, the “team” character of cabinets could be reduced to being “supportively
collegial” on everyday DM issues.
Single party and coalition governments differ in this respect. In single party
governments the number of issues on which there will be major conflict in cabinet will be
limited. Party’s election programme acts as a major restraining element if some ministers
disagree with governmental policy: they have to accept to remain silent or leave the
government and perhaps also the party. In EEC coalitions – the common objectives are
constrained by the election programs of the biggest party in the coalition. Regardless, the
small parties can influence through a control of particular ministries. However, speaking
about party is not fully correct as these are mainly the elite members of the parties while the
ordinary party members have very limited opportunities and channels to influence cabinet
policy.
8
The stability of coalitions depends on the policies and the feasibility of their
implementation as deriving from consistent and analytically correct strategy. For example in
Lithuania – in 1992 and 1996 different strategies are used to form coalitions. The Labor Party
(LDLP) did propose ministerial places to the “third winner” of the elections while LC
(Lithuanian Conservatives) preferred the closest allies – the Christian Democrats and the
Centre Union (Algis Krupavicius 2004:25).
To protect the political stability the governments should retain integrity, teamwork
style of decision-making and collegial environment. Trustful informal contacts and previous
cooperative experience of politicians might play very important role, even between members
of opposition and coalition, because their activities are more understandable and predictable.
This is especially important in avoiding unintended conflicts between members of coalitions.
Not least significant in attaining political balance is the need for continuity in DM
process and thus the changes of cabinets should not result in the termination or the substantial
revision of significant policies launched under the previous cabinets. Obviously this is serious
politics that, besides, should make profit in the policy advice of the incentives of the
administration with high quality.
The stability in coalition governments depends on the partners’ agreement for the
ministerial places. A control over a ministry insures substantial power over a definite field. In
this way the decisions about the distribution of ministerial places is of great significance for
the coalition government. The ministerial payoffs are the most significant harvest for coalition
partners. In principle to support the coalition each member expects a portion of the
governmental seats equivalent to the amount of the resources it contributes to the coalition.
However, there is a constant process of bargaining between the partners regarding the payoffs
in the context of the parliamentary and inside and outside political considerations. Parties in
coalition governments use often the tactics to ensure that matters are decided elsewhere and
not in the cabinets. In this regard some authors predict that the bargaining power of the party
depends on the amount of its payoffs and that there is a doubt that the partners distribute
proportionally the ministerial payoffs (Morelli Massimo, 1999: 809ff.). The issue is if EE
countries are similar in that with Western states. Jean Blondel (Introduction to J. Blondel and
F. Muller, eds., 2001: 2) explains that the inner and outside context in EEC is different than in
west countries. There are authors who consider the inability of EE politicians to compromise
(Holmes L., 1997) as a basic reason for governmental coalition instability. Some of the
specificities in EE countries can be found in the fact that for decades these were the
communist parties that rule the governments. As a consequence in the post-communist period,
9
at least in the first 10-15 years, the prestige of the communist parties or their successors is not
very high. In this sense the bargaining power of the latter is weak when a coalition with its
participation has to be formed. However, the empirical data from this research does not allow
showing a detailed picture on how the bargaining between the various coalition partners is
taking place in the different contexts of EEC.
The EEC coalitions do not develop in isolation of other political elements of the social
system. Their success and efficiency depends on more or less specific features of the political
environment. The strength of the parties is of great significance, also its traditions and
experience. Of significance is also the coalition agreement. The coalition agreements could be
helpful but they are often prepared just before the elections and rely on principles than on
comprehensive analysis of state of affairs in various sectors and hence the proposals, made in
them are very often difficult to fit with the real circumstances.
Another specific characteristic for the stability and effectiveness of EEC cabinets is
their short duration (Table 4).
Table 4: Cabinet Duration
(Years of Average Cabinet Life)
Latvia 0.83
Lithuania 1.31
Croatia 1.87
Albania 0.96
Estonia 1.32
Slovakia 1.93
Romania 1.08
Macedonia 1.52
Czech Rep 2.35
Poland 1.24
Moldova 1.55
Hungary 3.0
Bulgaria 1.22
Slovenia 1.81
Average 1.62
Source: Calculated from Blondel 2001 and Lijphart 1999.
The briefness of the cabinets is may be due to the cabinet type common in this part of
Europe. The longest lasting cabinets tend to be single-party majority cabinets or minimum
winning coalitions. The first as was shown in the previous section are relatively uncommon in
the region. A second reason relates to the circumstances of transition. Governments have been
called upon to head over massive recessions, privatize state industry, and cut social benefits.
Such tasks would test the survival of any government. The EE countries are at the same time
similar and different. In some aspects as economic development, political traditions they
differ, however, the legacy of communism has marked a similarity that sums some of their
common errors and potential. A particular feature is the need of coalition partners to use
10
various tactics to negotiate a decision making process that guarantees or supports political
equilibrium. For that cabinets need reliable negotiators.
The Need of Negotiators
The empirical data allows sharing the idea that the strength of the coalitions depends
on internal parties’ cohesion, on formal and informal space and on the abilities to establish
negotiators who could balance the different interests and requirements. The DM process in
coalition cabinets is extremely difficult as it has to fulfil the requirements of several important
players as are the coalition partners. The mechanisms of criticism and competing power
centers are different with the formation of coalitions. Rarely parties are patient when a
definite deal does not bring them a direct fruitful reward or the agenda management is not
done according to their or collective interests requirements. In this frame in the time of major
reforms as is the period for EEC, the constructive setting is vastly substantial for coalition
cabinets as consensus is significant and then in many cases the different ideologies unite or
develop closely. In the transition period to guarantee continuity in objectives important
decisions should not be made without basic consensus with the opposition. In that case the
Prime Minister (PM) can rely on greater consensus and that stabilizes the government.
Especially in periods of political and economic instability strong social support is needed and
then there is a need for strong leadership of cooperation type.
This part focuses on the role and sources of authority of the Prime Minister in coalition
governments. Analyzing the sources of authority, it is estimated that formal sources are basic,
and for the PM two main characteristics are outlined. First, the PM has a right and duty to
chair cabinet sessions; and secondly, in government formation procedure, the PM is a
negotiator. However, for the leader it is hard to press through his or her preferences as a
negotiator in the coalition, because parties often decide many issues. Therefore, the political
and individual sources of authority become crucial determining the genuine authority and
leadership style of the PM. Considering the latter, the leader’s possibilities for emergence are
rather delicate. The main techniques the leader could use for increasing his/her authority are
either occupying the central policy areas through which it is possible to control other main
policies as well or seeking support among coalition partners and ministers before introducing
ideas or obtaining chief position in the communication and information network and making
use of some important roles defending the stability and survival of the whole government and
11
thus becoming indispensable.
In this way the PM could turn into the most appropriate negotiator in coalition
governments. In the transition period a strong PM could increase the effectiveness of the
government even if the party system is not well established (Blondel and Glosov 1999). The
key role of the PM is to preserve harmony in the coalition that means keeping to the coalition
goals and arbitration in conflicts. To be successful the PM is supposed to manage the
government trying not to take side. Each party has its priorities and in this sense the
management of the priorities of the coalition government is crucial and it requires a degree of
hierarchy. The parties have diversities of issues to discuss and to reach a success the policies
preferred by one of the parties should be supported by the other/s. If not, the result will be a
breakdown.
The dead end in discussions between the members of the Government may emerge not
because the sides are conflicting. Sometimes minister cannot agree with the compromise,
because of fear to take responsibility for decisions that party members may disapprove.
(Hence, when ministers are leaders of the party this would happen rarely.) The personal image
could also be at the stake. If the left oriented Minister of Social Affairs agrees diminishing the
corporate income tax, a proposal introduced by the right politicians, his/her image would
suffer substantially. The PM should be the negotiator to overcome similar problems.
The practice of EEC reveals that to be efficient the coalition governments have to
overcome two barriers: first, the strong interference of the parties and second, a weak
leadership. If these are present the governments may be stable but not certainly effective. The
data for EEC expose a trend toward such type of development. In a time of cabinet conflict
the most common approach is to reach consensus. And this is true for 34.6% (Latvia, Poland,
and Bulgaria) of the researched cabinets. The next frequently used tactics is to discuss the
problem in the cabinets and it is adopted by 25.8% (Slovakia, Latvia) of them. The prime
minister imposition of decisions concerns 18.7% of the studied cabinets (Hungary, Romania,
and Bulgaria).
The data below (Table 5) reveal that the situation, when a politicized coalition has a
threat of inner conflicts, is a likely start for Prime Minister’s emergence as a negotiator. The
further analysis of the empirical material shows that the negotiation objectives of the PM are
successful when the cabinet is the place for decison making. The stronger negotiation abilities
has the PM, the more effective is the cabinet and the more conflictual are the coalition
partners, the less effective is the government.
12
Table 5: The Role of the Prime Ministers in DM
Valid
Frequency
Valid
consensus
62
talking on
ministers
47
individually
forcing the
issue
taking new
initiative
30
14
shaping the
external
11
context
Other
Total
Missing
System
Total
40
Percent
Percent
2
4.3
1
8.4
1
1.8
5.
5
4.
3
1
5.7
20
8
4
0.0
51
Cumulative
Percent
30.4
30.4
23.0
53.4
14.7
68.1
6.9
75.0
5.4
80.4
19.6
100.
0
100.0
2
0.0
25
1
5
00.0
Source: Data file Ministers in Central Eastern Europe, 2004
However, not all PM are able to distance from their party interests. The chances for
successful coalitions increase if the dominant role perception is consensus. The PM
management is significant but that could mean centralization. Also if PM are actively taking
part on one of the sides their role could be ambivalent and the coalition could be kept but not
in a long duration. If PM are not strong supporters of crucial issues for the coalition or if they
halfheartedly support it, that could lead to coalition failures. Also the leader could misuse
his/her position and threatens the stability of the coalition. He/she could set his/her priorities
in a way he/she can empower government’s most substantive support units as his/her own.
Despite tensions or conflicts all the deals have to be made in a way that all the parties
to have the feeling of positive policy payoffs over time. Economic conditions may enrich or
burden to keep all coalition parties happy.
13
The expectation that cabinets will act as truly united bodies is rooted on the
assumption that ministers are willing to contribute to debates on all matters in a meaningful
manner. Such a conception may have been not realistic for western countries but this is the
case in the cabinets of CEE. In 75.8% of the researched governments it is the cabinet where
the main issues are discussed. In 62.5% of the cabinets the ministers are taking part in
discussions that do not concern their ministry and only in 0.8% this is not the case. This
reveals that the cabinets in EEC function as teams, there is a need for consultation and
consensus on diverse issues and the narrow professionalisation of ministers is not so strong.
Conclusions
The length of a decade is not long enough to draw strong conclusions about the
coalition governments in CEE. The conclusions are rather preliminary than a final word.
The mechanism of learning in the transition period is important. Some countries adopt
the Western models and apply them quickly. Others learn from own errors and positive
results. On general, the political life at the beginning of the transition differs for all studied
countries from the start of the 21 century. At the beginning of the transition such value as
liking/disliking has a stronger impact than the interests of the parties. It is, however, a
dynamic process. The more we analyze the present day, the more interests matter rather than
attitudes.
The coalition governments are the dominant form of cabinets in CEE in the 1990-s.
They are formed emphasising on the similarities in objectives of the coalition parties. They
represent in this way a symbolic act in front of the public demonstrating unity and cohesion.
In the process of the functioning of the governments the partners deal with issues that unite
and sometimes divide them. However, the stability and survival are important concern of
coalition governments. In this respect the decision making process is substantial and that is
why the normal procedures are less common. The decision making process is more difficult in
coalition governments than in single party ones. Making explicit compromises requires higher
transaction costs, but the costs of implementation, with substantive effects, as a rule are lower
than for implicit compromises. As a whole the decision making is party rooted but a definite
professionalisation in EEC is in formation.
14
As a whole the coalition governments of EEC are not a burden but an option in the
transformation to collect experience, to share responsibilities and to balance different
requirements and interests. The region is characterized with system changes and thus broad
consensus is needed. On a small scale it is an arena of public tensions in a time of significant
changes and the ability to reach compromises and equilibrium to a significant extent reveals
the abilities of society for tolerance and respect of the differences.
REFERENCES
Andrew Roberts, 2003, What Type of Democracy is Emerging in EE, AC of MPSA,
internet version
Blondel J., 1995, Toward a systematic Analysis of Government-Party relationship, in:
International Political Science Review, 2
Blondel J. and F. Muller Rommel, eds., 2001, Cabinets in Eastern Europe, New York:
Palgrave, Introduction
J. Blondel and D. Malova, (2004), The Process of Decision Making in Cabinets in
East–Central and Southeastern Europe Since 1990: A Successful Equilibrium
F.Muller-Rommel/K.Fettelschoss,2004, Cabinet Governments and Cabinet Ministers
in CEE Democracies: A Descriptive Cross National Evaluation, Uppsala, ECPR
http://dv2005.guiadoimigrante.com/en/register_en.asp
Holmes L., 1997, Post Communism: An Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press
James Druckman and Andrew Roberts, 2003, Coalition Governance in EE: How
Portfolio Allocation Differs in E and W Europe, internet version
Krupavicius Algis, 2004, The Post-Communist Transition and the Institutionalisation
of Lithuanian’s Parties, internet version
Lijphart Arendt, 1999, Patterns of Democracy, Yale: New Haven
Morelli Massimo, 1999, Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in legislative
Bargaining, American Political science Review 93: 809-820
15