TENSIONS
AND TECHNOLOGY
SERIES
THE NATURE
OF CONFLICT
Studies tip? the
sociological aspects of
international tensions
TENSIONS A N D
T E C H N O L O G Y SERIES
Titles in the same series:
Education in a Technological Society, a preliminary international
survey.
The Community Factor in Modern Technology,by Jerome Scott and
R. P. Lynton.
Cultural Patterns and Technical Change, a manual prepared by the
World Federation for Mental Health and edited by Margaret Mead.
Social Aspects of Technical Assistance in Operation, a report by
M o m s E. Opler.
Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa
South of the Sahara, prepared under the auspices of Unesco by
The International African Institute, London.
THE NATURE OF
CONFLICT
Studies on the sociological aspects of
international tensions
by
THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICALASSOCIATION
in collaboration with
JESSIE BERNARD,
T.H.PEAR,
RAYMONDh O N , ROBERTc. ANGELL
UNESCO
Published in 1957 by the United Nations
Educational. Scientific and Cultural Organization
19 avenue Kle'ber.Paris-16e
Printed by G. Thone, Li2ge
0 Unesco 1957
Printed in Belgium
SS. 56. V. 6 A
PREFACE
The International Sociological Association has been concerned in
various ways with the Unesco Tensions Project.The association was
consulted about the project in its different phases, and many individual sociologists have collaborated with Unesco in preparing
reports and in planning research in this field.
When the Second World Congress of Sociology, held in Libge,
August 1953,was being planned,it was decided to devote one of the
major sections of the congress to the subject of ‘Inter-groupConflicts and their Mediation’. For this section, of which the chairman
was Dean Georges Davy (University of Paris) and the rapporteur,
Professor Arnold M.Rose (University of Minnesota), 44 papers were
contributed, dealing with international industrial and racial conflicts,as well as with methodological problems in the study of conflict. A general report on the papers and discussions, written by
Arnold M.Rose and%aroline C.Rose, was published in the Znternational Social Science Bulletin (Vol.VI,No. 1, 1954) and a number
of the papers in this section are being published in the American
Journal of Sociology and the Revista Mexicana de Sociologia.
The present book owes its conception to the discussion at the
Second World Congress of Sociology. The framework of these discussions and of the papers contributed was provided by a working
paper on current research in the sociology of conflict by Professor
Jessie Bernard (University of Pennsylvania). After the congress meetings, the ISA was invited by the Social Sciences Department of
Unesco to prepare a comprehensive critical survey of current research,both sociological and psychological, on inter-group conflict,
and an evaluation of the most useful directions to be taken by future
research. One contribution to such a survey was already available
in the shape of Professor Bernard’s paper. The International Sociological Association has been fortunate in obtaining other contributions from ProfessorsRobert C.Angell, Raymond Aron, T.H.Pear
and the Centre d’Etudes Sociologiques (Paris).A n editorial meeting
held in May 1954, and attended by Professors Raymond Aron,
Jessie Bernard,Otto Klineberg,T.H.Pear and Mr.T.B.Bottomore,
finally determined the contents and arrangement of the book.
Following an introduction prepared by Unesco on its Tensions
Project, the first two chapters by Professor Bernard and Professor
Pear are general surveys of research in the field of conflict, one by
a sociologist, and the other by a social psychologist. Both are concerned with a number of different types of conflict, but they lead to
a closer consideration of one particular type: conflict between
nations. Research in this field is the subject of Professor Aron's
chapter, which particularly brings out the relevance of historical
inquiries to the problem of international conflict. The concluding
chapter, by Professor Robert C. Angell, is mainly concerned with
the planning of future research. Drawing on the material in the preceding chapters, on the discussions at the Second World Congress
of Sociology in which he took an active part, and on his knowledge of
the development of the Unesco Tensions Project, Professor Angell
focuses attention on the most important and promising areas of
research, especially in relation to the vital practical problems of the
mediation of conflict. The classified and annotated bibliography has
been prepared by one of the member organizations of the ISA,the
Centre d'atudes Sociologiques (Pans), under the supervision of the
librarian of the Centre, Mrs. E. Thomas. This bibliography is
intended to cover mainly books and articles published since 1945, but
it includes also earlier publications which are referred to in the text
of the book.
The book, therefore, presents an up-to-date survey and evaluation of research by sociologists and social psychologists into the
nature, conditions and implications of human codict, and particularly conflict between nations. A discourse on the importance of
the subject is hardly necessary. The danger of atomic war is ever
present. The sociologist or the social psychologist has no special
authority in prescribing the ends of social policy. H e can, however,
contribute a great deal to rational policy-making by describing and
analysing, as impartially and objectively as possible, the situations
with which policy-makers have to deal, and by making known the
relevant facts.
The contributors to this volume show what a wealth of data has
already been collected on the sources of codict and on methods
of reducing and controlling conflict. But they also indicate the
complexity and difficulty of analysis and research in this field, and
draw attention to outstanding gaps in our knowledge. It is hoped
that this general survey will encourage and help social scientists to
undertake new research on these topics, and also that by diffusing
knowledge already acquired among a wider public it will make
some contribution to the achievement of the aims of Unesco.
It remains to express, on behalf of the ISA and Unesco, our thanks
to the authors for their friendly collaboration.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION. The Unesco Tensions Project
.
.
.
.
9
CHAPTERI. The sociological study of conflict, by Jessie
.
33
CHAPTER
11. The psychological study of tensions and conflict,
by T. H. Pear . . . . . . . . . . .
118
Bernard
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CHAPTER
111. Conflict and war from the viewpoint of historical
.
177
CHAPTER
IV.Discovering paths to peace, by Robert C.Angel1
204
sociology, by Raymond Aron .
.
.
.
.
.
.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
I. Sociology and psycho-sociology of intergroup conflicts:
tensions, stereotypes, prejudices, strategy, communication
225
General studies, 225; Methodological studies, 246; Experimental studies and monographs, 250.
11. International relations .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
254
Theory of war, national character and national stereotypes.
political, ideological and cultural antagonisms, 254; Federalism, international organizations, chances of peace, 269;
Methodological, experimental and monographic studies, 276.
111. Racial conflicts: colonialism .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
281
General studies, 281 ; Methodological, experimental and
monographic studies, 296.
IV.Industrial and agrarian conflicts: class problems.
.
.
301
APPENDIX .
LISTOF
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
310
ABBREVIATIONS .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
311
.
.
INTRODUCTION
THE UNESCO TENSIONS PROJECT
Progress since 1948
Ever since the first session of the General Conference, Unesco has
been aware of the contribution that the social sciences can make to
the development of better international understanding and the
removal of tensions arising from preconceived, stereotyped ideas
about foreign countries and their inhabitants; and on the authority
of its Constitution, which states that ‘wars begin in the minds of
men’ and that ‘it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace
must be constructed’,the Organization decided to include in its programme a systematic,co-ordinatedstudy of social tensions and their
repercussions in international life.
The ‘tensionsproject’which was worked out in pursuance of this
decision was adopted by the General Conference at its second session,
held in Mexico City in 1947.In the final form approved by the
General Conference the following year, this project covered six
fields for detailed inquiries by social scientists,the results of which
would represent the contribution made by their respective branches
of study to the investigation of the psychological and social bases
of peace. These inquiries were to deal with:
1.The distinctive character of the various national cultures, ideals
and legal systems.
2.The ideas which the people of one nation hold concerning their
own and other nations.
3. Modern methods developed in education,political science,philosophy and psychology for changing mental attitudes, and the
social and political circumstances that favour the employment
of particular techniques.
4.The influenceswhich make for international understanding or for
aggressive nationalism.
5.Population problems affecting international understanding, including the cultural assimilation of immigrants.
6.The influence of modern technology upon the attitudes and
mutual relationships of peoples.
Considering the scope of the field of investigation assigned to the
specialists, and the complete novelty of such an undertaking at the
9
international level,this was an ambitious venture. It was in fact an
attempt to apply, to such complex phenomena as the development
of social structures and the origins of conflicts, methods which had
been tried out at the national level in a very few countries and in
a limited number of cases. These methods had to be used with
great caution and, in certain respects, to be regarded as providing
working hypotheses rather than any tried and tested means of
carrying out reliable ‘scientific’research.
Those who planned the tensions project-and, still more, the
research workers who took part in it-were aware that, for the
time being, they must leave a certain number of basic questions
unanswered, because they had not the necessary material for their
solution. What common factor may there be in individual and national aggressiveness, for instance, or in other phenomena which
are encountered at both levels? Is the aggressiveness shown by a
small group of people towards another group, with which they have
direct and continuing contacts,of the same nature as aggressiveness
towards another people, which in many cases is distant and unfamiliar? What relationship may there be, moreover, between
aggressiveness, which is a psychological characteristic, and the
outbreak of a war, which is a social phenomenon in the broadest
sense? D o the same factors come into play in the start of a not or
a lynching and in that of an international conflict? A whole series
of ‘cause and effect’ relations which, could they have been postulated, would have provided valuable guidance for research, had
to be regarded as unknowns which it might perhaps be possible to
isolate and define at a later date, as the result of empirical investigations conducted by different methods in a variety of directions.
The purpose of the tensions project was not only to discover
scientific truths but to put the results to practical use, as a means
of fostering better international understanding. Social psychologists,
however, are hardly in a position to state that objective knowledge
changes the attitudes of individuals or groups in accordance with
any fixed rules. It is extremely difficult to establish what influence
the publication of the results of scientific inquiries may have on the
peoples (it may vary according to whether we take a short-term
or a long-term view) and to what extent such publication may be
regarded as a means of treatment suitable for application to the
international community.
The first thing to be done, therefore, was to make a systematic
diagnosis, in preparation for subsequent detailed analysis, of the
various causes of disturbance found within national communities,
many of which have repercussions at the international level. It was
also necessary to make a general survey of the social science work
which had already been done in various countries, in order to consider which portion of it had a direct bearing on the studies pro10
posed, and to draw as sharp a line of demarcation as possible between the field of established knowledge and that of hypothesis.
Before attempting to assess, however briefly, the work so far done
in connexion with the tensions project, it may be advisable to indicate the ideas underlying the execution of this project. Generally
speaking, it was agreed, when the project was adopted, that the concept of ‘tension’was rather too rigid and narrow, and that to confine
the study to tensions was liable to distort the picture of social conditions as a whole. The essentially negative and pathological conception of ‘tension’was also inadequate for our purposes, since psychologists tend to regard tensions as normal features of life, provided
that they do not go beyond a certain pitch of intensity. The real
problem, therefore, is not so much to remove tensions as to direct
them into useful channels and to turn them to constructive social
ends, taking appropriate measures to control the conditions in which
they arise and the factors which affect them. It was therefore thought
necessary to adopt a very flexible frame of reference and, to a large
extent, to carry out inquiries in the field of sociology and social
psychology which would reveal the conditions conducive to the
development of harmonious social relations and attitudes favourable to international understanding. As a result, a number of problems which were originally connected with the tensions projectsuch as the human problems arising out of migration, technological
advances, or race-proved to be of such importance as to justify
their study for their own sake.
At the present time, Unesco’s programme in the applied social
sciences, as defined b y the decisions adopted by the General Conference at its eighth session, in December 1954, comprises four
main heads.‘
The first, which is a more or less direct continuation of the tensions project adopted in 1947, provides for research on methods
of mediation and other procedures successfully employed in the past
for the prevention or settlement of international disputes and conflicts. It also covers the first stage in a study of the development of
public opinion in various countries as regards the United Nations
and the Specialized Agencies, and various projects designed to
promote a knowledge and understanding of foreign cultures. The
second head covers surveys and pilot projects, and the circulation
of information calculated to promote the application of the
principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights
with regard to non-discrimination in respect of race, sex, religion or
nationality. A third group of studies, organized in close co-operation
with the United Nations and the other Specialized Agencies, deals
~
1. Generally speaking, these fields of research are being continued under the 1957-58 programme as adopted by the ninth session of the General Conference in Delhi, Dec. 1956.
11
with the social impact of technological change and industrialization,
and problems resulting from the rapid development of local communities and the growth of towns.Finally,there is a series of projects
more particularly concerned with the use of social science methods
for an objective evaluation of the efficacy of certain activities undertaken either by Unesco or by other national or intergovernmental
organizations.
In addition, Unesco will be able, to a much greater extent than
hitherto, to carry out investigations, at the request of individual
Member States, which have a direct bearing on the programme
described above and which relate to those States’ most urgent
needs. Several of the investigations proposed under this two-year
programme are intended to throw light on the problem of the
relation between the public’s information and the attitudes it adopts.
This applies,in particular,to the study of the development of public
opinion as regards various aspects of international co-operationin
the system of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.
The investigations which are to be carried out on the results of
certain Unesco activities-such as literacy compaigns-and on the
long-term effects of international seminars are also designed to
assist in evolving practical methods of evaluating the extent to
which international organizations are achieving their aims, and of
determining the criteria by which the efficacy of their work is to be
judged. This is a key problem, the solution of which would be of
capital importance for the preservation of peace throughout the
world. For, while propaganda and the dissemination of tendentious
information for the purpose of indoctrinating the people in preparation for war have, in the recent past, been seen to be dangerous
weapons, there are grounds for believing that the circulation of
accurate and unbiased information by the same methods might
make an appreciable contribution to international co-operationand
peace.
STUDY OF TENSIONS AND OF THEIR INFLUENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
How can the social sciences be used in the contemporary world for
the prevention or control of tensions which are harmful to peace?
This was the basic question considered by the eight specialists who,
at Unesco’s request,met in Paris in July 1949 under the chairmanship of Professor Hadley Cantril. Drawn from different countries,
holding different political views, and with different scientific training, these eight psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and psychiatrists obviously could not be expected to have identical opinions
on so complex a problem.The fact that they succeeded in drawing up
a common statement setting forth the general principles on which
12
concerted action by social scientists for the promotion of peace
should be based is, for this reason, of especial importance. It is
probable that, if any form of international activity necessitated
identity of views in the philosophic sphere on the part of all those
concerned, an organization like Unesco would be doomed to
impotence. The statement issued in July 1949 showed particularly clearly that it is possible to hold differing opinions about the
primary causes of such phenomena as aggressive nationalism, and
yet to agree on a wide range of methods for correcting it.
The specialists who gave Unesco the benefit of their knowledge
and experience had an opportunity of explaining their own particular interpretation of each of the itemsin their statement.The observations drawn up by each of them were also transmitted,after the meeting,to the other members,so that they were able to commenton them
and thus to continue the discussion begun in Paris. All these papers
are included in the volume published under the title of Tensions
that Cause Wars [45]*;*this has, as an appendix, a document in
which a group of 59 eminent Japanese scientists expressed their
warm support of the principles set forth in the common statement
and explained how they proposed to apply them in the pursuit of
their own work.
Tensions that Cause Wars obviously does not put forward an
infallible method for removing all misunderstandings between
peoples. Nor does it establish an order of priority for the different
varieties of research work which may be undertaken by social
scientists for the purpose of improving international understanding.
But it suggests a whole series of possibilities which might well be
tried out on a large enough scale to make it possible to measure
their effects on actual society. The papers written by those who
attended the Paris meeting no doubt reflect divergent views about
the approach to be adopted: some believe that, by starting with the
individual and changing his attitudes, appreciable results can be
achieved at the level of the community,and even of the particular
type of community that we call the State; others consider that the
only real solution lies in a change in the social structure and that,if
society is properly organized, the reactions and attitudes of individuals will, in their turn, undergo changes conducive to a good
understanding between the peoples. As Allport has said,however,2
‘It is unprofitable to ask whether individual or social factors are
basic. The question is rather, how can we effectively interrupt the
* The numbers given in brackets refer to the bibliography, p. 225.
1. Edited by Hadley Cantril, University of Illinois Press, 1951. The work was subsequently
published in French under the title of Tensions et confliw,Paris. Librairie de Midicis, 1951.
It contains contributions by Gordon W. Allport. Gilbert0 Freyre. Georges Gurvitch. M a x
Horkheimer, Arne Naess. John Rickman, Harry Stack Sullivan and Alexander Szalai.
2. op. cit., p. 136.
13
dysgenic cycle now under way? To attack economic and social
barriers to understanding is not incompatible with the social
psychiatric approach. Each procedure aids and supplements the
other. Both are needed.’
After stating and delimiting the question of the way in which the
social sciences can help in abating the tensions found at the international level, it was essential to define the various methods previously used for the study of these phenomena and to list the results
achieved by specialists who have carried out research of this sort,
either individually or in teams, in a certain number of countries.
For this, certain fundamental conditions had to be accepted. In
the first place, it had to be recognized that the social scientist does
not, either at the national or the international level, represent the
‘philosopher-king’to w h o m Plato assigned the chief power in a
model State. O n the one hand, the social sciences, which are still
in their infancy,need to be developed if they are to be of immediate
and direct use to the legislator and the statesman; on the other, the
social psychologist and sociologist are better equipped to deal with
individuals or small groups than to take charge of major structural
reforms. Finally, Unesco is not generally competent to adopt measures calculated to solve the economic and political problems facing
the international community. It was therefore necessary to concentrate first on those factors in the individual which are likely to
affect international relations,but it was unnecessary to make a sharp
distinction between domestic social problems-which, at first sight,
have no repercussions at the international level-and those exerting
a direct influence on the contacts and relations between different
nations. Good international relations presuppose, of course, healthy
national communities, and frustration, anxiety and fear of the future
may greatly contribute-as they did, for instance, in Germany
from 1920 to 1933-to the establishment of totalitarian systems
which seek to solve the State’s domestic problems by fostering the
aggressive feelings of the populace towards other countries or
towards ethnic minorities living in the country.
In his book on Tensions Aflecting International Understanding,l
Otto Klineberg has attempted to give as full an account as possible
of the various types of social science research applicable to the study
of international tensions. H e has concentrated on describing the
various methods whereby psychologists and social psychologists
have tried to analyse the nature of particular attitudes and the causes
which have brought them into being, and to measure the intensity
of these attitudes and their frequency in a given population; and
on suggesting means calculated to modify them when they are
1. Social Science Research Council, 1951 (1441; subsequently published in French under the
title of h t s de tension et comprihension internofionole, Paris, Librairie de Mtdicis, 1952.
14
dangerous to society.Without attempting to summarize this book, in
which the author gives a critical account of the principal studies
conducted on these problems throughout the world-more particularly in the United States of America-in the last 25 years, it may
be mentioned that the social sciences at present command a wide
range of effective methods whereby the state of mind and the
attitudes of a given population may be objectively described. It is
also possible to distinguish various strata in opinions and behaviour,
comparable to the strata of geology. Some date far back into the
past and, in certain cases, are handed down from generation to
generation, such as the idea of the ‘hereditary enemy’, ‘savages’,etc.
Others vary as they are affected by particular events; the time
spent by Australian troops in Greece during World W a r 11, for
instance, had generally beneficial repercussions on the attitudes of
the Australian population towards Greek immigrants in Australia.
While public opinion polls, which have developed to an extraordinary extent during the past 20 years, and the intensive
research work done in such fields as content analysis of the press
and other cultural products, psychological tests, semantic analysis,
sociological community studies, etc. make it possible to form an
exact idea of the nature and intensity of attitudes, on the other hand,
as Klineberg says, ‘Thereis no doubt that much remains to be done
before w e can safely undertake an extensive programme for the
purpose of changing attitudes in international relations.’l Most interesting results have been achieved, but on a Limited scale and in
circumstances reminiscent of experimental conditions in physics
laboratories. The work to be done in the immediate future is not
purely scientific. The essential is to make the educated public and
the public authorities aware of the present resources of the social
sciences in the field in question, in order that more extensive use
of the methods so far developed may, with suitable financial provision, become possible in the future.
Special studies have been carried out on one category of conventional attitudes towards foreign peoples or individuals-generally
known as ‘stereotypes’to which Klineberg had already devoted an
important chapter in his book. These studies were described in a
series of articles published in one issue of the International Social
Science Bullelin under the title of ‘National Stereotypes and International Understanding’; with an introduction on ‘The Scientific
Study of National Stereotypes’[1411,by Otto Klineberg;the articles
are: ‘Stereotypes and Tensions as revealed by the Unesco International Poll’, by William Buchanan; ‘An Experiment in International Attitudes Research’, by Milton D. Graham; ‘Certain
Psychological Aspects of Benelux’, by Pierre de Bie; ‘Attitudes
1. op. cit., p. 154.
15
towards Other Peoples’, by H.E.O.James and C.Tenen; ‘The
Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and
of Relations with Other Countries’, by Jean Piaget and AnneMarie Weil; and ‘French National Images and the Problem of
National Stereotypes’,by G.Gadoffre.
Among the work on stereotypessuggested by the Unesco tensions
project, mention must also be made of two ‘content’studies which
bring out the influence on the public, in this respect, of communication media such as the press, films and broadcasting (to which
television must now be added). In ‘NationalImages:National Types
as Hollywood Presents Them’ [1451,Siegfried Kracauer, approaching the subject as a social psychologist,analyses the way in which the
most powerful film industry in the world presents foreigners in the
Nms it produces. D.V.McGranahan, in the paper entitled ‘International Research on National Images as seen in the Mass Media
of Communication’[321] also gives a brief account of content studies
concerning the press, school textbooks and works of literature,and
of the problems of method arising in connexion with research of
this sort.
In How Nations see Each Other [427], William Buchanan and
Hadley Cantril have collected data regarding national stereotypes
and attitudes provided by periodic polls conducted by public opinion
research institutes in nine countries. They have compared these data
with those collected during the internationalpoll organized by Unesco
in 1948 and have thus compiled an invaluable picture of the ideas
generally held by nine different peoples about one another. As we
know that the samples used for the purposes of public opinion polls
are chosen as representative,and leave room for only a very small
margin of error, the results obtained may be accepted as valid, at
least for the period at which the polls were carried out. It would
be particularly useful if new polls could be taken at regular intervals
in order to assess the extent to which public opinion changes,
particularly as a result of major international events.’
Approaching the problem of attitudes towardsforeignpeoples from
a different standpoint,the Faculty of Psychology of Victoria University,Wellington (New Zealand), has at Unesco’s request,carried
out research on the modification of attitudes. Professor E.Beaglehole and Professor J.R. McCreary,with the help of their associates,
have applied Bogardus’smethod of measuring social distance to an
appropriate sample of the New Zealand population. They have also
carried out a series of special experiments to measure the effects
which may be produced in a given group as the result of the dis1. In connexion with the studies on national characteristics and attitudes, see also the
records of the International Congress of Sociology (1950) published in the ln&ernafionnl
Socid Science Bullefin, Vol. 111, No. 2, 1951 [3031.
16
tribution of a pamphlet, lessons or lectures, and informal discussions on getting to know a foreign country. The brief publication in which the results of this study are set forth, The
Modification of International Attitudes: N e w Zealand Study [
1721,
by J. M.McCreary,makes a substantial contribution to a definition
of the conditions in which the circulation of objective information
may bring about a change of attitudes in groups differentiated by
age, education,profession,etc.
An experiment carried out, under Unesco’s auspices, by H.E.0.
James and Cora Tenen in a British school showed that, in certain
circumstances,when the prejudices or stereotypes are due to lack
of direct contact with individuals belonging to another national or
ethnic group, substantial results in the modification of attitudes can
be secured by education. In the publication The Teacher was Black
[10301, the authors analyse the reactions of schoolchildren to
foreigners whom they have had the opportunity of meeting in their
home town, and their attitude towards two young Negro teachers
from the Gold Coast who were teaching at the school during this
experiment. In this case, however, the circumstances were particularly propitious to a favourable change of attitude, as the spontaneous reactions of the children, who were between the ages of 11
and 15,were not generally distorted by preconceived notions, and
as they had had several contacts, during or immediately after the
war,with a large number of allied soldiers from a great variety of
countries.
Simultaneously with the study ofnational imagesand the prejudices
attaching to them, Unesco has been working for the development
of a better knowledge of foreign countries and cultures. Although
knowledge does not always bring liking,ignorance is at the root of
many prejudices and,if the peoples get to know one another,a very
substantial contribution may be made to the harmonious development of international relations. In our day, these relations are no
longer the exclusive concern of governments, acting through their
accredited diplomats. In every sphere-commercial, technical and
scientific-large numbers of people are travelling abroad and are in
frequent touch with nationals of other countries, whose language
and habits often make contacts somewhat difficult. It is therefore
becoming increasingly important that it should be possible,in a brief
space of time,to acquaint oneself with the way of life and cast of
mind characteristic of a foreign country. Though knowledge does
not necessarily eradicate prejudice, it may to a very large extent
prevent its development.
It is therefore important that all those who, either for the purposes
of their business or simply from healthy and natural curiosity, are
seeking information about a foreign nation, should be able to refer
to material that is as accurate and unbiased as possible, presenting
17
a sort of portrait and at the same time affording opportunity for
comparisons with the national characteristics of other countries.
This was the underlying idea behind the survey on ‘Ways of Life’
undertaken by Unesco in 1948. A series of 15 monographs was
prepared, on uniform lines, by experts of the countries concerned?
Each of them contains a number of chapters dealing with the people
and their history, political institutions, economic institutions and
ideals, family life and education, religious life, and the international
relations of the countries in question.2 In several cases, each of the
chapters was written by a different person, so that advantage could
be taken of the knowledge of the foremost specialists in each particular field.
These ‘self-portraits’of various nations had necessarily to be
confined to a general picture of their special characteristics,without
giving a detailed presentation of the factors which may have a
direct influence on the relations between nationals of different
countries.
Investigations concerning national characteristics have also been
made experimentally by the method of community studies. Detailed
monographs were written on four rural communities and four urban
communities in Australia, France, India and Sweden and were coordinated at the international level. The writers sought to show,
firstly, the state of human relations within each community and
the social tensions, if any, to which they give rise, and, secondly,
the relations between these communities and the outside world and
the attitudes that their members adopt towards ‘foreigners’-whether
these are compatriots from another part of the country or nationals
of another State. Starting from the direct personal contacts that
members of the community might have had with outsiders, the
investigators sought to discover how far such ‘occasional’ relations help to create stereotypes or images about another province
or a foreign country, These studies, several of which have already
been published,’ thus converged, at least in one respect, with the
research undertaken on the subject of national stereotypes.
1. These monographs deal with the following countries: Australia, Austria, Egypt, France,
Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Mexico, N e w Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Switzerland,
Union of South Africa, and United Kingdom.
2 Monographs already published: in 1953: T h e Australian W a y of Life, edited by George
Caiger, and T h e South African W a y of Life. edited by G.H.Calpin; in 1954: T h e Brirish
W a y of Life. by K.B. SmeUie, and T h e Norwegian W a y of Life, by Frede Castberg, Heinemann. London. The following have also appeared in the ProfiI des nations series: L a confdddration helvdtique, by Denis de Rougemont (1953). L e Canada, edited by True Davidson
(1953). and L’Afrique du sud, edited by G.H.Calpin (1954), published by the Editions du
Rocher, Monaco.
3. See bibliography, no. 348, and also the two Australian studies, nos. 380 and 381. Professor A d a m Curle is at present preparing a volume dealing with all these studies and
showing the main conclusions to be drawn from them.
18
All the work described above relates to particular nations as
such. Certain forms of international life, however, also offer scope
for investigations concerning national character and the attitudes
which may result therefrom in cases where contacts between
nationals of different countries are frequent or indeed an organized
feature of life.
For this reason, great attention has been devoted, in the studies
undertaken by Unesco on the role and working of international conferences as factors in international co-operation,to the problem of
inter-personal or inter-group relations at various types of conferences or meetings. The investigations on what it has been agreed
to call the ‘technique of international conferences’ have been concerned essentially with various aspects of these conferences-such
as the conduct of discussions; problems of intra-conference
communication; cultural, ideological and psychological factors;
phenomena of official representation, etc.-and have taken advantage of the combined resources of several different social
sciences. The method employed has been that of pilot studies,
carried out by special teams of experts. As these studies were
experimental, their results have not been published in full; but the
main conclusions have been set forth in a document bearing the
title of The Technique of International Conferences, a progress
report on research problems and methods [338], and in an issue
of the International Social Science BuZletin surveying the work done
since 1948 and suggesting avenues of investigation which, in the
opinion of social scientists, might profitably be explored in the
future [646].
It may also be asked how far certain fundamental features of the
national character influence the course of international disputes and
their settlement. Unesco has recently undertaken investigations,
based on experiments conducted in individual countries in cases of
conflict between powerful social groups (such as labour disputes),
into factors and circumstances conducive to conciliation, compromise and mediation which might also have a decisive influence
in the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The main object
in such investigations, which have never previously been attempted,
must be to distinguish which of these factors derive from social
and cultural conditions and the institutions of the community
(permanent factors) and which are attributable to special circumstances and specific individual features. It is probable that-irrespective of the nature of the disagreement,or of the conflicting material
or moral interests-the readiness of negotiators to accept a compromise or to make concessions depends principally on their psychological type and religious or ideological convictions, and on the
conception of national honour, the influence of public opinion on
government decisions, etc., in the countries they represent. Discovery
19
of the respective influences of the various factors affecting the progress of conciliation procedure may perhaps enable the statesmen
of the future to overcome the psychological and cultural obstacles
to the peaceful settlement of international disputes.While we must
be careful to avoid undue optimism and to see that we do not
delude ourselves about the prospects of making immediate use of
the results of such studies, there are at least grounds for thinking
that the attempt is worth while. Accordingly, a group of politicians
and social scientists,meeting in Paris in February 1954 under the
auspices of the Quaker International Voluntary Service and the
New Hope Foundation,put forward a number of recommendations
which may provide useful guidance for Unesco’s investigations in
this field.
SOCIAL. PROBLEMS A N D TENSIONS
Whatever part the social sciences may in future play in cases where
there is a serious danger of international conflict, it must be admitted that so far-though not always by their own fault-they
have been unable to do more than make a few daring expeditions
into a field in which there is still, generally speaking, little scope,
if not for studies, at least for the solution of problems on a basis
of scientific data.
The immediate task of the social sciences-which, though modest,
will be of undoubted value-is to suggest appropriate solutions for
the problems arising in connexion with the relations between different social groups within States where such problems urgently
require attention. The preservation of social peace in these countries
may, incidentally,have an appreciable influence on the harmonious
development of international relations.
I. Among these problems, that of race is particularly important,in
view of the injustices and crimes recently committed in the name of
alleged racial superiority. As the Constitution of Unesco states,
‘the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made
possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity,
equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in
their place, through ignorance and prejudice,of the doctrine of the
inequality of men and races’. It is Unesco’s task to combat the
dangers of this ignorance and prejudice, in the light of the data
provided by modern science. When, in 1949,at the request of the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the General
Conference of Unesco recommended that scientific information on
race questions be circulated and that arrangements be made for
an educational campaign based on that information, it was found
20
that the prevailing confusion about the concept of race necessitated
a definition of the term which would secure approval from the
various scientific circles interested. A committee, consisting of
eight anthropologists and sociologists renowned throughout the
world, was convened by Unesco in 1950 and asked to draw up
such a definition. The ‘Statement on Race’ drafted by this committee [925]was then submitted for observations to a larger group
of specialists. Certain anthropologists and geneticists criticized the
way in which the strictly biological aspect of the question had been
treated; and a further meeting, held in September 1952, gave
leading representatives of these two branches of study an opportunity of comparing their views with those of their colleagues in the
social sciences,and of arriving at a revised statement,less categorical
than the first.l These two texts made it possible to clarify the
concept of race as understood by specialists studying it from different points of view,and thus to provide a sound and scientific basis
for Unesco’s work.
At the same time,Unesco asked specialists in various branches
of study to deal with the race problem, in a manner suitable for
the general public, from their own special points of view. The
series published by Unesco since 1950, under the title of The
Race Question in Modern Science, at present includes nine booklets of this type.a
It is still too early to attempt to assess the effect that these
booklets had had; but the large number of reprints which have had
to be made, and the fact that they have been brought out by private
publishers in countries where languages other than the working
languages of the Organization are spoken, seem to show that this
series has met a real need and has provided information of immediate value to groups and organizations which,in a large number
of countries, are fighting prejudices that condemn millions of individuals to humiliation and fear and that may give rise to serious
social conflicts.
The race question, moreover, is not a purely scientific problem.
The attitude adopted towards individuals belonging to another ethnic
group depends very largely on moral, philosophical or religious
considerations.Unesco has not overlooked this factor,which has a
preponderant influence on inter-race relations; and, since 1952, a
series of booklets under the general title of The Race Question and
Modern Thought has been published. These booklets are also intended for non-specialistreaders, and set out to define the attitude
1. See bibliography, no. 955, pp. 81-6, and no. 923 containing the text of the comments made
by 69 anthropologists and geneticists with the object of arriving at a scientific definition
of the concept of race.
2. See bibliography, nos. 140, 805. 820, 878, 879, 681, 906. 945. and: Arnold M. Rose, The
Roots of Prejudice.
21
of the major philosophical and religious movements towards,the
race problem. Three have already been published and others will
be brought out in 1955 and 1956 [806, 939, 9681. The conclusion
which emerges is that there is nothing, in the dogma or teachings
of the religions concerned, giving grounds for regarding racial discrimination as justified, and that the factors from which race prejudice springs must be sought elsewhere-i.e. in the organization of
society and in the circumstances attending the historical development of the peoples.
W h y is it that, in some cases, no serious tensions arise between
different ethnic groups living in the same country? Several teams
of anthropologists and sociologists commissioned by Unesco have
endeavoured to investigate this question by carrying out systematic
studies in four regions of Brazil which are regarded as representative
in this respect. The works entitled Race and Class in Rural
Brazil [969], by Charles Wagley, and Les e‘lites de couleur duns
une ville brtsilienne (Bahia) [768], by Thalbs de Azevedo,
endeavour to draw attention to the factors conducive to good
inter-racialrelations, by means of a detailed study of human relations in these regions. While the influence of the climate (which
seems to foster kindliness and easy-going enjoyment of life) must
not be overlooked, it seems clear that an important factor has been
the opening of educational opportunities for all without discrimination. The resulting social mobility, which is steadily increasing, is
accompanied by a lessening of race prejudice, especially-as in
Bahia-when the economic rivalries between different ethnic groups
are subdued by the extremely rapid rate of the country’s development and the enormous possibilities thus open to all social groups.
A similar study has been carried out in the French West Indies,
where circumstances are likewise conducive to good inter-racialrelations. In his book Contacts de civilisation en Guadeloupe et en Martinique, Michel Leiris investigates the reasons why social development in these territories has not given rise to serious tensions
between different ethnic gr0ups.l
W h e n prejudices are due in part to a particular fact, such as the
poverty or ignorance in which the majority of a given ethnic group
lives, appropriate forms of organization may to a large extent
remove them by affording the group better opportunities for intellectual and social advancement.
Morroe Berger’s book on racial equality and the law [16]
describes the role of law in the reduction of discrimination in the
United States of America and explains the part played in this respect
by the Federal Government, the states and cities, and voluntary
agencies. The author also analyses the influence that legislative
1. Published in 1955 by Unesco.
22
measures may have on human behaviour.In the light of this study,
it seems clear that this method produces constructive results,
especially when efforts are also made to remedy the practical
inequalities between different ethnic groups.
11. Item 5 in the tensions project provided for studies on ‘population
problems affecting international understanding, including the
cultural assimilation of immigrants’. The problem of migration,
which has become particularly acute as a result of the war and its
aftermath, has been approached from different standpoints by several organizations. The International Refugee Organization, now
replaced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and the Intergovernmental Committee for European
Migration, has dealt with the political aspect. The International
Labour Organisation deals with labour questions and the conditions of employment for immigrants. In view of Unesco’s responsibilities within the system of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies,Unesco was bound to concentrate on the sociological,
cultural, and psychological factors likely to facilitate the adaptation
of immigrants to the living conditions they encounter in the countries
in which they settle. The language and way of life of the inhabitants
may indeed prove an obstacle to good relations with the local population, unless suitable arrangements are made in time to facilitate
contacts and to make understanding on both sides easier.
In addition to the practical steps which have been taken-6y
Unesco in co-operation with the States concerned-to which no
more than a reference need be made in this context-two inquiries
have been carried out during the past three years. The first was
concerned with ‘cultural assimilation of immigrants’.Several monographs on experience in this respect in Australia, Belgium, France,
Brazil and Israel have been produced,dealing with the way in which
immigrants fit into their new environment,lhaving regard to the age
of the individuals concerned, ethnic, linguistic and professional
factors,and the characteristics of the urban or rural communities
in which they settle.The findings of a symposium on the psychology
of displaced persons and refugees have also been published by
H.B.M.Murphy under the title of Flight and Resettlement,a work
in which special attention is devoted to the various types of tension
arising out of forced emigration due to post-war political conditions [203].
Public opinion in the countries of immigration often tends to
regard immigrants as the only ones to benefit from the hospitality
1. S o m e of these monographs have been published separately: see bibliography, no. 1017
(Cabier 19: the French attitude, adaptation of Italians and Poles. Cahier 20; new material
on adaptation; Algerians, Italians and Poles-the social welfare service for emigrants), and
also nos. 989 and 999.
23
they are afforded, and to consider their admission as a concession
or a favour to individuals who merely represent an additional burden
to their new country. The second series of studies sponsored by
Unesco, with the co-operation of the International Sociological
Association and the International Economic Association, was
designed to draw attention to the constructive contribution made,
in various forms,by immigrants to the countries which have taken
them in. The importance of this contribution has naturally varied
from country to country, depending on the types of immigrants and
the period at which migration has taken place.In some cases,especially during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,migration has
brought about a large-scale increase in the labour force in underpopulated regions, while in others-particularly during the last 20
years-a great number of intellectuals, scholars and artists have,
by their presence, enriched the spiritual and cultural heritage of
their adoptive countries. Though the new information contributed
about tensions due to migration is merely incidental, the Unesco
survey,whose results are summed up in reports written by D.Handlin and BrinIey Thomas, is calculated to lessen the prejudice in
public opinion against the ‘parasitic immigrant’, by a practical
demonstration of the material and moral advantages that the receiving countries owe to their new citizens.l
111. The phenomena attending economic development and in particular, industrialization in hitherto underdeveloped regions often
produce tensions which in turn have serious repercussions on the
rate of economic progress in the States concerned.
At a time when technical assistance,organized under the United
Nations scheme or on a bilateral basis, has developed to an
unprecedented extent, the study of the human factors involved in
any swift and far-reaching change of economic organization calls
for continuing attention from the public authorities.
Here again, the basic problEm is one of adaptation which, if
distressing upheavals and dangers of serious disturbances in the
future are to be avoided,can be solved only by promoting the fullest
possible development of the peoples’ cultural values. In particular,
it is essential to ensure that individuals do not feel isolated in a
hostile environment, and that their ideas on home and family life
and their religious beliefs or convictions find a place in the new
societies which are coming into being. It is obvious, however, that
the development of material well-being does not automatically
ensure the preservation of these fundamental values.
1. The Positive Confribution by Immigrants, by Oscar Handlin and others, Unesco, 1955.
24
Four studies published by Unesco over the last two years deal
with the social implications of technological change from various
points of view.
One of them, The Community Factor in Modern Technology [253],by Jerome F. Scott and R.P.Lynton, setting forth
the findings of research work done in 12 European projects, seeks
to show the role of the community factor in industrial societies.
Starting from the fact that the social instincts of the human being
cause him to feel a primordial need for attachment to a group in
which he plays a part, whether passive (as a beneficiary of the
group’s communal activities) or active (as one making his own
special contribution to these activities), the authors draw two conclusions: ‘First,industry cannot ignore the need for community
satisfactions or expect them to be wholly supplied elsewhere;
industry is either part of a community or it disrupts it. Secondly,
industry cannot solve the problem alone, e.g.by “running” communities. Its contribution must be balanced by contributions from the
other aspects of life.’ Working on these two hypotheses, the
writers endeavour to prove them correct by a large number of
cogent examples drawn from actual experience.This book illustrates
particularly clearly how social psychology may guide those responsible for relations in industry, and so prevent or remove the
tensions which are liable to arise in large industrial undertakings.
Adaptation to living conditions in an industrial society is made
much easier when young people are prepared, by a satisfactory
educational system, for the part they will have to play in that
society. In 1950,Unesco convened a conference of educationists
from several countries-especially countries undergoing industrialization-to discuss the lines that education should follow in such
societies. The booklet published under the title of Education in a
Technological Society [283] describes present trends to be seen in
the organization or reform of educational systems,with regard both
to the general education provided for all pupils and to vocational
training. It gives an account, in particular, of the views expressed
by the specialists at the conference and of the recommendations
they made to Unesco for the modernization of education in the
light of the new needs of contemporary society.
The introduction of new techniques in regions where they were
previously unknown often encounters unforeseen resistance, which
causes surprise to people trained in the school of Western
rationalism and its scientific methods. Modern methods of increasing
production, which seem to be so highly recommended by their
efficiency, are not necessarily acceptable to a native population if
they conflict with its traditions or beliefs. If the innovations made
under national or international programmes for economic development are not to be rejected in a short time, the unreserved support
25
of those who will have to apply them must be secured. It is,
however, impossible to convince people unless we understand their
mentality, their habits, and the way they react; a knowledge of the
cultural values to which they subscribe is therefore essential.
The book on Cultural Patterns and Technical Change [189],
prepared by the World Federation for Mental Health and edited by
Margaret Mead, is mainly intended for the use of individualsexperts, policy-makers, specialists, technicians of all sorts, chiefs
of missions and teams, and members of ministries-who are immediately concerned, at any level, with purposive technological
change. It does not, however, offer panaceas or practical advice
which can be applied in every case. Its object is to show the types
of problem or difficulty that may be encountered during the execution of an economic development programme involving the introduction of new techniques,and the kind of question which needs
to be asked in regard to each culture,in each instance. One quotation will suffice to show the ideas underlying this work: ‘The descriptivesections of whole cultures have been prepared to give a sense
of what is meant by looking at a culture as a whole,and not at isolated successful and unsuccessful practices....The survey is not directed
toward policy making, but might be helpful to policy makers, not in
determining objectives but in giving them a picture of what can
happen to policy when it is translated into programmes and projects.
It makes no attempt to set up timetables for interdependent changes
in different fields-as between health and agriculture, for instance
-nor to deal with the very complex problems which are involved
in reducing the death rate while the birth rate remains high. But
it does provide materials showing how interdependent all changes
are, occurring as they must within a culture, each aspect of which
is inextricably related to every other, because they are embodied
in the organized sets of habits of the living human beings who
constitute that society.’l
Adopting the same line of approach,Morris E.Opler, in Social
Aspects of Technical Assistance in Operation [215], sums up the
experience acquired in this field by a group of experts, as revealed
at a conference organized in New York in 1953 under the auspices
of the United Nations and Unesco. This conference fully confirmed
the conclusions reached by Margaret Mead and her associates. It
brought out,however,one point regarding cultural factors-particularly important from the practical point of view-which must be
1. Op. cit., p. 14. The book comprises four sections dealing respectively with: 1. studies of
whole cultures (Burma, Greece, the Tiv of Nigeria, Palau, the Spanish-Americans of N e w
Mexico). 2. cross-cultural studies of aspects of technical change (agriculture, nutrition,
maternal and child care, public health, industrialization, fundamental education). 3. specific
mental health implications of technical change. 4. principles involved in developing mental
health during technical change.
26
taken into account in any project for modifying the technological
equipment of a society.This is the question of its institutional framework. As Opler emphasizes, the conference found that ‘when there
has not been a close association of “opposite numbers” or counterpart personnel, too many “orphan” institutions have been created
-institutions built so completely by foreign staffs that when the
outsiders leave they die because they do not belong to the nation
or to the culture which they are intended to serve. If a number of
experts from a Western coytry come together to an underdeveloped
land it is a temptation for them to organize and execute things in their
o w n way. They would do much better to make sure that they are
involving and making use of the governmental structure of the
country to which they have come and its administrative organization.’l Technical assistance programmes, incidentally,offer a particularly good opportunity for close co-operation between technicians or
administrators and social scientists. For this reason, Unesco and
the International Social Science Council-together with the International Research Office on the Social Implications of Technological
Change, which is working under their auspices-are seeking to
develop such co-operation by intensive exchange of information
about means of removing or confining the tensions due to rapid
changes in technological conditions in contemporary societies.2
NATIONAL. INVESTIGATIONS INTO SOCIAL TENSIONS
It is not always possible to study social tensions in relation to their
origins or to the particular conditions in which they arise. It is
sometimes necessary to adopt a global approach in order to discover
the exact significance of ethnic, cultural or technological problems
-and their economic or political implications-in complex situations which have a bearing on the balanced development of national
communities.
The investigations undertaken by Unesco in this respect, in close
consultation with the States concerned, have dealt with three
distinct cases.
In the case of India which, in 1950, requested Unesco to help in
organizing a large-scale survey on social tensions in that country,
the object was to apply the most up-to-datemethods of social science
to the study of an old society, divided into compartments by a
rigid system of castes and religious antagonisms, but rapidly
developing and undergoing far-reaching changes as a consequence
of the introduction of Western methods of production. Professor
1 op. cit., p. 61.
2. See also bibliography, nos. 2620 and b.
27
Gardner Murphy, who was commissioned by Unesco to organize
this survey,formed teams of research workers in several provinces,
with the help of the local universities, to investigate the various
types of social tension mentioned above. In his book, In the Minds
of M e n [378] where he describes the origins of this project, Gardner
Murphy examines in turn the various factors making for unity and
compartmentalization in Indian life and history, the main types
of tension in present-day India, and the factors which may be
instrumental in bringing into being a more closely integrated
society. Thanks to the substantial grants allocated to the project
by the Indian Government, the national teams of social scientists
were able to continue their investigations, without interruption,
from 1951 to 1953.l
In these studies considerable attention has been devoted to the
attitudes of the citizens towards the public authorities.This is understandable in view of the very keen interest which the Government
of India has taken in these investigations, but that interest is, in
itself, an encouraging sign,for it suggests that the social policy of
legislators and administrators will be increasingly based on the
results of work in the scientific field.
Like India, Israel is a new State which has recently achieved
independence and also has to face the problems involved in the
establishment of the institutions necessary to a modern State. But
whereas, in India, the crux of the problem is the readjustment of
social relations among sections of the native population, the distinctive feature of Israel's situation is mass immigration and the
formation of a society, which is itself new, out of heterogeneous
groups subscribing to the same ideals but often with neither language
nor traditions in common.
At the request of the Government of Israel, Unesco undertook
to organize a survey of the social tensions which had arisen out
of the special circumstances in which the State of Israel was set
up and the enormous growth of its population in the first few years
after it became independent. In carrying out this difficult undertaking, Unesco received unreserved support from the public
1. Interim accounts of some of the results of their work have been published, by the universities concerned, in the following papers: C. N. Vakil and Parin H.Cabinetmaker, Study
in Social Tensions: Bombay-a
study of fhe socio-economic condition and altitude of
displaced persons fowards governmenf policy and measures for fheir amelioration in the
Ulhasnogar and Kolwada camps, Bombay, University of Bombay, 1953 (multigraphed);
C. N. Vakil and associates, Study in Social Tensions: B o m b a y a n inquiry into the attitude
of the people towards Government measures and policies, regarding food, clothing and
housing, University of Bombay, 1953 (multigraphed); B. Kuppuswamy. A n Znvestigation of
Social Opinion in Madras Slate, Madras, Presidency College, 1952 (multigraphed); Kali
Prasad, Unesco Reporf o n C o m m u n a l Tensions (I. Hindu-Muslim. 11. Hindu-Muslim
Students), University of Lucknow, 1951 (multigraphed); Radhakamal Mukerjee (edited by)
A City in Transition-a survey of social problems of Lucknow, University of Lucknow,
1952.
28
authorities and from scientificcircles. The programme of investigations, drawn up by Professor Arvid Brodersen at Unesco’s request,
was carried out by the specially established Israeli Social Tensions
Research Project Committee, which was responsible, in particular,
for co-ordinating the work of several teams of Israeli researchworkers and specialists.
The investigations,which began in 1952 and continued throughout 1953, dealt with tensions appearing: (a) in the institutional
sphere; (b) in co-operative farming communities; (c) between
families with different national and cultural backgrounds in the
so-called ‘transitioncamps’ of immigrants;(d) between Jews and
Arabs living in the State of Israel;(e) between parents and children,
as a result of the speed of social changes; (f) between the various
groups of immigrants which are seeking to establish themselves in
a predominant position; and (g) as a result of technological developments.I
The main purpose was to bring such tensions to light in any
cases where they exist but are not immediately apparent; to assess
their gravity, both as regards their intensity and as regards the
number of individuals affected; and finally to discover which of the
factors to which they are attributable can be modified by suitable
action. These studies, as a whole, are analytical and descriptive
and do not generally include suggestions regarding practical means
of removing existing social tensions. A thorough knowledge of the
actual conditions of society,however, provides a sound foundation
for the measures to be taken, in the political sphere, by the competent State bodies.
The transition from a totalitarian system of government to a
democratic rCgime also gives rise to a number of tensions which
may, unless they are channelled and controlled, have serious repercussions on the future of international relations. Such tensions
are particularly dangerous when they arise in circumstances which
are conducive to social disintegration, in war-devastated countries
suffering from grave economic difficulties, when the bitterness of
military defeat is kept alive in individuals by the lowering of the
standard of living and the pressure of material anxieties. In two
countries, Germany and Japan, where the war resulted in a sharp
break with the past, Unesco has undertaken investigations dealing
more particularly with the attitudes of the young. In Germany,
under the auspices of the International Committee under the
1. The following studies were completed in 1953: 1. Alfred Bonne, ‘The Adjustment of
Oriental Immigrants to Industrial Employment in Israel. 2. S. N. Eisenstadt, Intergeneration Tensions in Israel. 3. S. N. Eisenstadt, ‘Patterns of Leadership and Social
Homogeneity in Israel and their Effects on the Social Tensions within it’. 4. Judith
T.Shuval, ‘Emerging Social Relations in a Heterogeneous Immigrants’ Community. These
manuscripts were summarized in the International Social Science Bullelin, Vol. VIII. no. 1.
29
chairmanship of Professor E. Tegen, a team of investigators led
by Knut Pipping worked, in 1950 and 1951, on a detailed survey
of the mentality of the young in the post-war period, indicating
the differences found in relation to age, sex, social standing and
standard of education. Making intensive use of the interview
technique, the investigators brought to light the main types of
attitudes towards institutions-in particular, the family and marriage, the professions, the public authorities and the various embodiments of State p0wer.I In Japan, a similar inquiry was carried
out by a French sociologist, Jean Stoetzel, director of the French
Institute of Public Opinion Research, and a Dutch expert on Japan,
Fritz Vos,working in close consultation with the Japanese Association of Cultural Science, whose membership includes representatives of the scientific circles interested, and the National Institute
of Public Opinion Research. The main purpose of the investigation
was to find answers to the following three questions: ‘What were
the attitudes of Japanese youth to foreigners? H o w did they comport themselves towards their country’s institutions? What were
their most important and significant personal characteristics? In
conducting the inquiries on these subjects, a number of different
methods were employed simultaneously: the most common was the
public opinion poll, using carefully selected samples of the population, and this was supplemented by two subsidiary studies more
particularly designed to reveal the personalities of the young people
by means of projection tests. In one case, the subjects were shown
pictures representing typical scenes of Japanese life, and were asked
to say what they thought about them; in another, a group of students
at the Sapporo University were asked to write ‘autobiographies of the
future’, showing how they imagined their future lives would proceed.
The opinion polls covered the whole population and their results
were analysed according to the age (four groups) and place of
residence (urban or rural) of the respondents; they provided
material for a comparison between the mentality of the young and
that of the older generation. The planning and execution of this
inquiry was described, with a systematic analysis of the results
of the polls and tests, in a work by Jean Stoetzel, published by
Unesco under the title of Without the Chrysanthemum and the
Sword [269].
The investigations for which Unesco has been directly responsible
are, however, only one side of the studies carried out on social relations and tensions in post-war Japan. From the beginning, a substantial section of the world of science in Japan had shown an interest in
the tensions project and in the recommendations formulated by a group
1. The results of this inquiry are described in the work published by Knut Pipping under the
title of Gesprache mit der deufschen Jugend [232].
30
of social scientists convened by Unesco in Paris during the summer
of 1949.l Starting from the idea that ‘while individual or local
tensions may sometimes be resolved, social tensions generally exist
in any type of normal society’,Kunio Odaka comes to the conclusion
that ‘so long as human communities and the co-existence of different groups are based upon two opposing principles, i.e. the
principles of co-operation and that of conflict, or, in other words,
the principles of compromise and tension, a community without
conflict or tension will be just as impossible as a community without
collaboration or compromise’.2 This was the idea underlying the
large-scale investigations undertaken, with the aid of the Ministry
of Education, by the Japanese Association of Cultural Science.
Over fifty social scientists spent nearly two years in carrying out a
detailed analysis of nine distinct groups of tensions: (a) tensions
in family life; (b) tensions within communities; (c) tensions between
coteries; (d) the problem of the ‘Eta’ outcasts: (e) racial tensions;
(f) tensions in religious life: (g) tensions in economic life; (h) ideological tensions; and (i) tensions among young people. These
studies, which were conducted under the leadership of Professor
Tomoo Otaka (chairman), Professor Kunio Odaka and Professor
Seiichi Izumi, were completed in 1952. Their results have been
published in Japan.
CONCLUSIONS
It would be quite impossible, in such a brief review of the progress
of the tensions project, to make a minute analysis of it from the
methodological point of view. W e have sought to give as full a
picture as possible, in general terms, of the work done either on the
direct responsibility of Unesco or on the initiative of those
scientific circles in differentcountries which have shown a desire to
play a part in the programme of research.
Moreover, whatever the scope of the work thus carried out,
and whatever its present or future influence on actual society, it
would seem to constitute the first really international recognition
of the place of the social sciences in the contemporary world and of
the possibilities they offer. The team research methods employed
both for the analysis of mass phenomena and for the investigation
in depth of smaller groups have been brought into general use. In
several cases, they have been tried out in countries where they had
never previously been known. Groups of investigators, often
specialists who have had different forms of training, have thus
1 . cf. p. 13 above.
2. Kunio Odaka. ‘What is Social Tension?’ (unpublished).
31
learnt,while approaching their problems from different standpoints,
to make full use of the resources of their respective branches of
study in the search for common solutions.
Again, Unesco’s investigations regarding social tensions have
done much to draw the attention of the public authorities to the
value of accurate and unbiased information about the structure of
societies and the factors making for their integration or disintegration. If it is to be of more immediate use to the public authorities,
it may well be necessary that work of this type should be taken
beyond the stage of description to the classification of types of
tensions, firstly, according to the danger they represent for the
national or international society and, secondly, according to the
possibilities of remedying them by legislative or administrative
action.The fact that,with very few exceptions, social scientists do
not yet think as statesmen,and that statesmen are slow in adopting
a scientific point of view, simply emphasizes the desirability of
their ‘getting together’ and co-operating more closely. The encouragement which has consistently beeD given to the tensions project
by several of Unesco’s Member States, and the studies carried out
in India, Israel, Japan and the German Federal Republic, are
evidence of the growing importance that governments attribute to
such investigations. The fact that, in these four countries, the
investigations have been continued and intensified after the Unesco
consultants have finished their work, shows that they meet a real
need. In this sphere,the international organization-Unesco, in the
case in point-is doing pioneer work. It is responsible for launching
action and giving encouragement to national scientific circles by
making it easier for them to acquaint themselves with the results
of work done in other countries.It should,however, be emphasized
that the Organization has not sufficient material resources to go
beyond the stage of pilot projects.
These projects,unless viewed solely as a prelude to wider undertakings, on a continuing basis, at the national level, may seem so
limited in scope as to be ludicrous. Nevertheless, in passing judgment on the work accomplished by Unesco in this field over a very
short period-less than six years-we ought to take account not
only of the results already achieved (which, all in all, are modest
enough) but also, and above all, of the new prospects thus opened
up for research, and of the impetus imparted to it, the effects of
which will become apparent only in the future.
32
CHAPTER I
THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CONFLICT
by
JESSIE BERNARD
This chapter, written originally at the request of the International
Sociological Association to serve as a working paper for its meetings
in LiBge in 1953, attempts to review recent research in the field of
codict as a basis for conceptual c1arification.l Its limitations, both
deliberate and unwitting, lead the author to make the following
apologia:
First of all, this chapter is not a treatise on the sociology of conflict, although it presents a great many data w h c h would doubtless
be pertinent to such an enterprise. If it were such a treatise, the
traditions of scholarship would have required at least a brief
historical introduction going back, let us say, to the Chinese opposition of Ying and Yang or to the Old Testament myth of Cain and
Abel, and continuing in summary fashion to include, at a minimum,
reference to Machiavelli and Hobbes, to the Social Darwinists, to
Marx, and so on. The apparatus of scholarship had to be eschewed
in the name of brevity.
Other limitations resulted from decisions that had. to be made
with regard to both scope and method. First of all, what should be
included in a survey of ‘current’research? H o w far back should one
go and still consider the work ‘current’?A more or less arbitrary,
though I hope flexible, criterion was used. Work within the last
five or six years was considered to be still current, and in some
cases even earlier work was included.
Next, what constitutes ‘research’? Textbooks embody a great
deal of research. Should they be included? In the United States
especially,textbooks on race relations and minority groups deal with
conflict implicitly or explicitly. For the most part textbooks have
not been included here, with a few exceptions, Should only research
1 In order to tailor the report to specifications,research in the field of family conflict, culture
conflict, crime, conflict of individuals with groups, ideological conflict, was not included.
The general pattern was set by the International Sociological Association, whose chief
interest in the assignment lay in industrial. ethnic and racial groups, and international
conflicts and in methods of mediating them. These interests set the boundaries for the
project.
33
which is specifically pointed toward conflict be included? That is,if
the work has only incidental reference to conflict should it therefore
be excluded? Should descriptive reports be included? Should
deductive studies without empirical data be included? E.C.Hughes
has pointed out that ‘socialscience appears to have a double burden
laid upon it. The one is to analyze the processes of human behaviour,
and especially of persistence and change thereof,in terms relatively
free of time and place. The other is to tell the news in such form
and perspective-quantitatively and comparatively-as to give clues
for the taking of those chances of which action consists’ [116].
Some research,that is, presents data which are intrinsically important;they are ‘news’in the sense in which Hughes uses the term.
Other research uses data merely to test hypotheses; the data
themselves are incidental. In the present project both kinds have
been included.A report on,let us say, agrarian protest in Southeast
Asia, for example, was considered to be research in conflict,
especially if it were analysed in terms of sociological concepts,but
even if it were not.
What, in the next place, is to be considered research in the
‘sociology’ of conflict? Should only work done by professional
sociologists be so considered? Or should the contributions of workers in cognate disciplines be included also? Since the purpose of the
study was to point up the contribution of sociology, the first alternative might seem preferable.But since so much work of the highest
order has been done by men who are in political science,in economics,in history-even in biology and in mathematics-it seemed
an unnecessary limitation to exclude their contributions on narrow
classificatory grounds.
The difficultiesinherent in delimiting the concept of ‘conflict’,
finally, are great, and it is almost impossible to distinguish the
inter-relationsof sociological phenomena. Conflict is not something
separate from organization; disintegration implies integration.
Inherent in the whole problem of conflict are such phenomena as
power, leadership, the tlite, control. Where does one draw the line
in a discussion of conflict per se? One looks in vain in classified
summaries of research or in bibliographies for specialized studies
on conflict as such. They are usually parts of other projects.
The test of the correctness of the answers I have given to the
four questions here raised-that is, What is current? What is
research? What is sociology? What is conflict?-will be found in
the project itself. Not everyone will agree that the answers are
correct. Some will object to the inclusion of certain projects on the
basis that they are not current,that they are not research,that they
are not sociology, that they are not about conflict. Others will
object because certain projects which they consider to be current,
to be research, to be sociology, and to be in the area of conflict
34
are not included. For errors of commission in this respect I make
no apologies; for errors of omission I take this means of expressing
regret.They were the result of wrong judgment or of ignorance.In
no case, I believe, has work been omitted from bias or prejudice.
Under the heading of ‘ignorance’must come the limitation characteristic of so much research in the United States. I refer to the
intellectual parochialism which results from lack of freedom in
foreign languages and from inaccessibility of so much foreignlanguage work. I would feel much more disturbed about this limitation if Unesco itself did not make up for this deficiency in its own
publications, Current Sociology, which includes an annual bibliography of sociological literature published in all parts of the world,
and International Political Science Abstracts, which abstracts articles
from periodicals from a great number of countries, including those
of Eastern Europe.Indeed,these periodicals should be considered as
companion-volumesto the present study.
The report was supposed to be critical. Rather than make a
critique of every project included, I have made the critique one
of background orientation and of assumptions and implications. At
the present time research techniques and sophisticationhave reached
a point where most of the fallacies and errors are no longer likely
to be technical but theoretical, results of underlying assumptions
rather than of method primarily. All kinds of methods have been
accepted in the screening process here-‘clinical’, historical, natural history,laboratory-experimental,observational,anthropological,
action,mathematical, inductive, and deductive. I have preferred to
be catholic rather than parochial in judging methods.
But I have been critical, perhaps overly so, of basic assumptions. I have been especially critical of the so-called ‘tension’
approach to the study of conflict;I may have been too uncritical
of the theory of games of strategy as a basis for the sociology of
conflict. If I have, I trust that the mores of science will lead m y
colleagues everywhere to set the balance right.
I. VARYING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONFLICT
Conflict has been variously conceived; and these varying conceptions have influenced the methodological approach to the problem
which has been used, the nature of the problems studied,the theory
invoked to interpret the data gathered,the implications for policy,
that is, for programmes suggested,and the general interpretation and
evaluation of violence or force. It seems important, therefore, at
the outset to sharpen up these differing conceptualizations before
35
we enter into any detailed discussion of the topic.W e may label the
several conceptualizations here to be distinguished as: the socialpsychological;the sociological;and the semanticist.
THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONFLICT
A N D ITS IMPLICATIONS
By far the most thoroughly exploited in the research literature is
the social-psychological conceptualization of conflict, which is in
terms primarily of individual mechanisms. Group conflict is conceived to be some simple or weighted additive function of individual
behaviour. Conflict thus conceptualized is seen as essentially nonrational,though not necessarily non-functional,in nature. Sometimes
emphasis is on what Ragnar Rommetveit has called the ‘personalitycentered’ model; sometimes it is on the ‘society-centered’model
[311, pp. 12-18]. But in either case, the approach is through the
individual, his attitudes, opinions, and behaviour patterns.
The study of conflict so conceived is by way of the individual;
the methods are statistical, clinical, experimental, or by use of
projective techniques and depth analysis of individual cases. The
kinds of problems which are dealt with are those of prejudice,
hatred, hostility, stereotypes, scapegoating, aggression, fighting,
quarrelling, violence. Indeed, it has even been suggested that the
term hate or hostility be used instead of prejudice [938].
The converse of conflict, so conceived, has also commanded a
great deal of attention, namely problems of morale, consensus,
‘altruistic love’, and ‘co-operation’,psychologically conceived. All
these phenomena are viewed as personality traits.
The theoretical orientation on which the social-psychological
conceptualization is based is currently referred to as ‘tension’
theory.Tension theory has been traced back to the work of Joseph
Breuer and Sigmund Freud, who, in the analysis of ‘Anna O.,,
introduced the ‘era of Tension or “Plumbing” Theories in which a
repressed memory or an unresolved emotional conflict was considered the basic core of neurotic behaviour’. [249]Since then, the
concept of tension has been broadened. The phenomena studied
are sometimes viewed as tensions within the individual which, from
time to time,eventuate into ‘open’conflict.That is, resentments and
frustrations,from whatever source, pile up within the individual
until, in effect, they explode in overt aggression of some kind-in
quarrelling,in fighting,in rioting,or what-have-you,as a means of
reducing the tension.
These tensions are not currently traced to inherited or instinctive
mechanisms; they are usually conceived as resulting from experiences in the socialization process, from the conditions of modem
36
life in industrialized societies, and from frustrations associated with
work. Psychoanalytic concepts are often incorporated into the
theoretical framework of this conceptualization of conflict.
So far as practical applications are concerned,the type of programme recommended is likely to involve some change in human
attitudes or motivation; the specific methods may vary from educational programmes to propaganda, from methods of alleviating
industrial dissatisfactions to cross-culturalcontacts, but essentially
they are attempts to change the way people think or feel. Violence
or interpersonal aggression is viewed as a method for reducing inner
tensions; it is seen as often fulfilling an important function in the
psychological economy of the individual, however non-rational or
irrational it may be. But it is not favoured by adherents of this
school of conflict; they would substitute other means of dealing
with, that is, ‘reducing’tensions.
The attitude of the researcher or action-promoteris often that the
prejudiced individual is in some way not well; the programme
recommended is one to promote mental health. There is, in effect,
a doctor-patientrelationship between the programme administrator
and the people the programme is aimed at. The emotional atmosphere is one, ostensibly of great good will;the philosophic orientation is one which, for the most part, ignores or denies the existence
of evil. If the proper methods could be found, conflict as conceived
by this school of thought could be minimized or obviated and good,
that is, harmonious, human relations would result.
In the form of the ‘tension’approach, this conceptualization of
conflict has been basic to the work sponsored by Unesc0.l W e
shall reserve comment and criticism of this school of thought for the
second chapter of this report, hastening at this point to present a
contrasting approach, namely by way of a sociological conceptualization.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The sociological conceptualization of conflict is in terms of the
relationship between or among systems. The term system is here
used instead of ‘group’because it is more inclusive and general; it
embraces any functional interaction pattern whether it be a pair of
human beings or a complex empire. This approach utilizes historical
or anthropological data, informants, statistical analysis, content
analysis of documents, and, currently, mathematical deduction.
1. This approach is examined by T. H. Pear in greater detail in Chapter 11.
37
Conflict is viewed as not necessarily non-rational; it is seen as
sometimes quite rational.
The problems which this type of orientation deals with are, for
example, those of: schism, secession, civil war, sect formation,
splinter parties, resistance movements, revolutions, reform movements, on the one hand and-because disintegration and integration
are so closely related-imperialism, conquest,subjugation,colonialism,growth of political, economic, and social integrations, on the
other.
Implicit in the sociological conceptualization of conflict is some
theory of cost. Conflict arises when there are incompatible or
mutually exclusive goals or aims or values espoused by human
beings [17]. Both may be desirable; but both cannot be pursued
simultaneously.If one is selected, it is at the expense of the other.
This sacrifice of one value for the sake of another is similar to
what economists call ‘opportunity costs’.It is embodied in the folk
saying that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. As related to
conflicts between in-group and out-group,George Lundberg has
recently stated the situatiqn as follows [888,p. 341:
The first step in a scientific approach to conflicts between in-group and outgroup is to recognize that it is hopelessly contradictory for any group (1)
to desire to maintain an exclusive group identity of any kind, and at the
same time (2) to expect no differential (discriminatory) behaviour toward
itself on the basis of precisely the exclusive identity sought. This basic consideration does not abolish either the fact of conflict or the desirability of
doing what may be done about it, through education, agitation, legislation, etc. Recognition of the basic nature of the problem, however, affords
the only sound basis for action. . . .l
The problem of minority groups,so viewed, is not one of ‘prejudice’
but one of mutually exclusive values espoused by human groups;
if one group wins its values, another loses those it espouses. One
set of values ‘costs’another set. Cost theories of conflict involve
incompatible values or goals.
The practical applications of research based on this approach
are likely to be cast in terms of strategy.What kinds of coalitions
or alliances should a group seek? Should it attack attitudes or behaviour?Gradualism or revolution?Conciliationor aggression?Legislation or education? These are among the applicational problems
which the sociological conceptualization of conflict deals with.
Violence is viewed as only one kind of strategy for dealing with
conflict. It may be advocated as a deliberate policy; it may even
1. Lundberg has somewhat oversimplified his statement. It is usually only the group on the
receiving end of discriminatory behaviour which cannot pursue both goals simultaneously.
An exclusive high-status group often receives the ‘discrimination’ of deference. There is,
for them, no conflict between exclusiveness and favourable discriminatory behaviour.
38
be fomented.But violence is not conceived in any sense as synonymous with conflict. Nor are hatred and hostility viewed as necessary
concomitants of conflict. Subjective hatred and hostility can exist
where there is no conflict, as here conceived; and, conversely,
conflict can exist without hatred; it can exist, in fact, among those
who love one another [17,Chap. 51.
Violence and aggression may be associated with conflict whether
or not it is conceived ‘social-psychologically’or sociologically.
They may tend to occupy a larger proportion of attention of those
who hold to the social-psychological conceptualization, although
this conclusion would require some validation.
To sum up briefly, the kinds of phenomena subsumed under the
two conceptualizations may or may not be the same, or even
associated. Both of these conceptualizations are important; both
have a contribution to make to our thinking.The social-psychological
conceptualization is likely to be useful in face-to-facesituations, in
the factory,in the club, in the school,in the church, in the family.
It is important for those who seek to minimize the interpersonal
bickerings, quarrellings, defiances, resistances, and other frictions
which interfere with the smooth functioning of day-to-day living.
But it is of less and perhaps even of negligible value in dealing
with such phenomena as war,industrial conflict abstractly conceived,
revolutions, sect formation, and schisms of all kinds. Modern warfare, for example, can scarcely be viewed as a sluice or vent for
individual aggressions. Disciplined warfare long ago succeeded
heroic combat. This transformation can be illustrated by the case
of the American Indian,who learned too late the superiority of the
former over the latter. By the time Crazy Horse had finally taught
his followers to fight as a disciplined army rather than to ‘count
coups’as individual warriors,their cause was already lost.A modern
war is a highly organized, disciplined enterprise;it probably creates
more tensions than it releases.
These limitations are by no means discounted by those who
deal with the social-psychological conceptualization. Thus Otto
Klineberg has pointed out that the problem remains ‘whether an
understanding of the bases of hostility in the individual can help
us in understanding group antagonisms’ [144,p. 2081.H e criticizes
the work of Clyde Kluckhohn and concludes that individual and
group aggression are interrelated but that ‘theassumption that they
are identical must be questioned‘, and that individual frustrations
and insecurities as explanations of war or group hostility have
only limited application.
In brief, if our interest lies mainly in personal violence and
aggression as nonrational, even irrational, ends in themselves, as
forms of venting hostilities, as tension-reducing mechanisms, then
we are faced with one set of theoretical problems and the social39
psychological conceptualization seems appropriate. But if w e are
interested primarily in the whole gamut of strategies for dealing with
groups or systems in conflict, then violence and aggression constitute
only one phase of a broader problem; they are viewed as often
highly rational, purposive, deliberate, used coldly, even without
hatred, a calculated choice based on policy or strategy. A modern
war is not, then, a blind, emotional outburst, the result of subjective
hatreds or hostilities; it is, rather, a matter of strategy which may
even be provoked, timed. Abel, on the basis of a study of 25 major
wars found that ‘in no case is the decision [to use war] precipitated
by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd behaviour, or other
irrational motivations’ [397, p. 8551. Hatred of the enemy may
even have to be cultivated. The same may be said of most strikes,
wildcat strikes excepted. Race rioting or pogroms or lynchings are
perhaps more likely to be ends in themselves rather than parts
of rational strategy, although it is conceivable that they may be
both.
THE SEMANTICIST CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Before proceeding with our discussion it is important to refer to one
school of thinkers who hold that conflict in the sense of mutually
incompatible values and goals does not exist. They do not deny that
c o d k t in the social-psychological sense-of interpersonal hatreds,
hostilities, aggressions, violence, for example-does exist. But they
insist that when it does, it is the result of verbal or conceptual
misunderstanding.The implication is, then, that if only w e could get
rid of misunderstandings, if w e could communicate adequately, conflict itself would disappear,or at least be greatly minimized.The archtype of conflict resulting from misunderstanding is that described in
the Tower of Babel myth. A breakdown in communication which
leads to misunderstanding results in the breakdown of the subtle
web of interaction which constitutes a social system, or it prevents
the integration of such a system. The basic philosophy of this point
of view is, essentially, that there is a fundamental harmony in the
universe; when quarrelling or fighting or wars take place they are
the result of some subjective error. The theory in its simplest and
most popular form has been stated as follows [1057,pp. 195,
196, 2071:
1. I am indebted to Mr.Stein Rokkan for the distinction between ‘semantic’ and ‘semanticist’
as applied to conceptualization of conflict. He distinguishes between ‘a semantic approach
to the study of conflicts-aiming
at a description of the ways in which communication
changes its referents under conflict and stress-and a semanticist approach which . . . start9
out from the assumption that all conflicts are “merely verbal” ’.
40
M a n y conflicts are due not to natural cussedness but to failures in evaluation.. .. Whatever improves ... and clarifies communication is sure to help
agreement. . . . Nearly every human quarrel is soaked in verbal delusions.
If they could be squeezed out, as one squeezes a sponge, many quarrels
would simply vanish.
This theory is an application to social life of a theory which was
developed primarily in the field of logic to correct what was considered the Aristotelian fallacy. This was the work of the so-called
Vienna Circle which arose in the mid-twenties. It stemmed from
the work of Ernst Mach in the nineteenth century and Hume in
the eighteenth. Logic and scientific method were its preoccupation.
Its proponents hoped, by removing all ambiguities from syntax and
definition, to solve the major philosophical problems which had
arisen from the inaccurate use of language. The movement was
known as logical positivism and the work which resulted, as
semantics.It attacked the Aristotelian basis of our thinking in terms
of polar categories. It believed that we should not think in terms
of either-or,or A and not-A,but rather in terms of more-less,in
terms,that is, of continua. As applied to logic,to purely intellectual
and scientific problems, there is no doubt that the logical positivists
made a profound contribution, and the discussion which follows
is meant in no way 'toreflect on the work of such men as Moritz
Schlick, Carnap, or Wittgenstein.
Only when some of their disciples came to assume that social
problems as well as philosophical problems were verbal rather than
objectively real did difficulties arise. W e shall, in the case of the
semanticist conceptualization, vary our procedure somewhat and
present our critique here rather than later, in order to dispose of
it once and for all before continuing with our discussion. Only two
criticisms of the semanticist approach will be presented, namely:
first, that mutually incompatible values do exist, and second, that
there is no unequivocal evidence that misunderstandings always lead
to conflict,while there is some evidence that misunderstanding sometimes obviates quarrels and hostilities.
I. W e pointed out above that conflict, sociologically conceived,
involves some kind of cost. Cost is inherent in the nature of conflict itself, for conflict exists when mutually incompatible values are
involved.One cannot travel and at the same time remain rooted in
the community. One cannot visit South America and Asia at the
same time.One cannot espouse an authoritarian and a permissive
policy of child rearing at the same time.One cannot have equality
of opportunity for all and special privilege for some at the same
time. One cannot pay the same money out in wages and in
dividends. The same land cannot be used for the grazing of herds
or flocks and for agriculture too. One cannot have legalized chattel
41
slavery and not have it at the same time. One cannot be married
and not-married at the same time. If one chooses alternative A,
one must sacrifice alternative B.A costs B.These are not semanticist
problems. No amount of verbal refinement can change the facts.
It is quite true that the alternatives may be viewed logically as end
points on a continuum;there may be ,pointsbetween them. Thus,
for example,one can stay 90 days in South America and 1 day in
Asia, or 89 days in South America and 2 in Asia. .. or 2 days in
South America and 89 in Asia, a kind of binomial curve conception
of the relationship.Or one can have N-1 units of protection and
1 unit of free trade, N-2 units of protection and 2 units of free
trade. .. or 1 unit of free trade and N-1 units of protection.
None of this denies the fact, however, that every unit of A costs a
unit of B.
The cost theory of conflict in no way passes judgment on the
incompatible values. One may be just as good as the other. It is
not necessarily a conflict of good and evil. It may be a conflict between two good things or between two bad ones [17,Chap. 51.
The point is merely that there exist in the world values so different
and so incompatible that if one is selected, the other must be
foregone to that degree.
It so happens that different people espouse these differing values.
They will doubtless consider the values they espouse as good and
those they reject as bad. Their interests may ,betied up intimately
with the values they espouse or reject.If one set of values is chosen
by the community or society or group or system rather than another,
they will suffer,or they will profit. No amount of clarification of
thinking will convince the agriculturist or the sheep or cattle grazer
that there are not conflicting uses of land.
To summarize: there do exist values which are incompatible,
mutually exclusive in the sense that they cannot both prevail at
the same time in any given system. Several kinds of strategy are
possible for groups with such differing and incompatible values:
(a) one group may withdraw from the system or be ejected from
it; lJ$ one group may impose its system on the other; (c) an
equilibrium may be established in which concessions are made, the
more ‘expendible’values of one group being exchanged for the
more ’expendible’values of the other; (d) values may be modified
so that coalescence is possible; or (e) the groups may assimilate
to one another, or one may absorb the other [17,Chap. 51.
It is useful to distinguish between the fact of the existence of
conflicting values and the fact of people in conflict. People who
hold to opposing values cannot live together so long as they espouse
them. If they wish to live together, one group or the other or both
must give up the conflicting values. They must find some other
value on which there is no conflict. The cost of doing this may be
42
greater to one group than to the other. But the original conflict of
values remains;the difference is that no one now espouses them. So
long as people do, however, the people will be in conflict,just as
the values are. A great deal of social life consists in finding ways to
reconcile people to modifying their values. Here is one of the areas
for social-psychologicalstudy.l
11. The second criticism of the semanticist position refers to the
relationship between misunderstandings and conflicts. Misunderstandings do, of course, exist, as well as conflicts. And misunderstandings may even lead to conflict.There is no denying this obvious
fact. Klineberg has summarized some of the misunderstandings
among members of different nationality and cultural groups which
lead to friction [144,pp. 21 ff.]. And perhaps everything should
be done to clear up those misunderstandings which interfere with
peaceful relations. But clearing up misunderstandings does not
necessarily eliminate conflict. It may, indeed, accentuate the conflict by making the issues clearer than they were before.’
Without denying the validity of the theory that misunderstandings
and blocks in communication may lead to hostilities and aggressions,
one can nevertheless point out that misunderstandings sometimes
create co-operationrather than block it; clearing up the misunderstanding clears up the issues in the conflict also.
W e know that misunderstanding may be used deliberately for the
purpose of promoting harmonious relationships. Shakespeare has
given us the amusing case of Benedict and Beatrice who were led
into one another’s arms by a little judicious use of deceit. A large
part of etiquette consists of deception or tactful ‘while lies’ for
reducing social friction. It would, however, take us beyond the
scope of the present critique to analyse all the uses of deceit,fraud,
ignorance, censorship, propaganda, and other techniques for promoting misunderstanding which have kept people co-operatingwhen
1. The parallel between the religious wars of the seventeenth century and the ideological conflicts of the present time is sometimes drawn in this connexion. The values of Catholicism
and of Protestantism as they relate to secular affairsremain in conflict. But the people
w h o espouse them have changed their strategies; they have re-arranged their relative stress
on different values, so that war and bloodshed seem worse than concessions in political
practice.
2. Edward U?. Barrett 15961 points out in this connexion that: ‘there has been such exaggerated nonsense to the effect that international understanding is a cure-all and a preventive of wars. Experience shows that understanding each other doesn’t necessarily mean
two nations will never fight each other. . . . The French and Germans understand each
other pretty well and yet have been at each other’s throats at frequent intervals. Again, the
most determined fighters against Soviet Communism have been West Berliners, who know
and understand Kremlin ways better than any other free Europeans. Professor Frederick Dunn
of Princeton likes to tell the story of a minor European monarch w h o was engaged in a boundary dispute with a neighbouring monarch. W h e n this monarch w a s urged by his neighbours
to try to settle the differences and misunderstandings, he replied that there were really no
differences or misunderstandings between them, that they both wanted exactly the same thing.
They understood each other perfectly.’ (p. 309).
43
a clearing up ofthe channels of communication would have led them
to revolt or at least to cease co-operating.
Klineberg, who has summarized and evaluated the work on
national stereotypes, faces up to the ethical connotations of misunderstandingswhich serve to obviate or mollify rather than to foster
hostilities.What should we do if the stereotypes which one people
have of another make for friendliness? Should we try to change
them? Yes, says Nineberg. H e is in favour of dispelling misunderstandings even when they are favourable stereotypes, on the
grounds that they represent a basically dangerous kind of thinking [144,pp. 214-151.
Of course,misunderstandings may lead to quarrels and aggressions
and even render the accommodation of conflict more difficult.
Semantic problems are real and of great proportions. But a
substantial amount of conflict remains even when all misunderstandings are cleared up. Clearing up misunderstandings may serve
a useful social function; it may eliminate some aggression. It is,
however, no obviator of conflict and in some cases may even
aggravate it.
One unanticipated,even undesired, effect of the semanticist denial
of conflict has been to lead those who accept it to withdraw from
actual conflicts,to refuse to ‘takesides’.They cannot make choices.
They are disarmed.Semanticism is, in effect,for them an escape.
So much, then, for the three conceptualizations of conflict and
their implications. Our concern will be mainly with the socialpsychological and the sociological conceptualizations. If we
accepted the semanticist point of view there would be nothing to
discuss. W e have included it here for the sake of completeness;but
further consideration does not seem called for.
DIFFERING EMPHASES ON THE SEVERAL ASPECTS
OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF CONFLICT
Since no form of social interaction is discrete, cut off from other
forms,it is impossible to break social behaviour or processes down
into separate and distinct entities, except analytically. Conflict as
a form of social interaction is but one phase of what Albion W.
Small once called the ‘on-going social process’. Social forms
coalesce; they break apart. Systems become integrated; they also
disintegrate? Conflict may or may not be involved in either aspect
1. There is no value-judgment implied by the terms integrate and disintegrate.The breaking down
of a system may merely release the sub-systems or elements of the system for a new integration. The disintegration of a system does not imply that the sub-systemswhich break apart
are destroyed: they are only tom from one context; they are in a position to reform in a
different context.
44
of the process. This integration-disintegrationcontinuum has been
variously conceived. Thus E. E. Eubank spoke of elimination,
subjugation, compromise, alliance, and integration; S. C. Dodd
likewise speaks of these processes. Ogburn and Nimkoff refer to
victory, compromise or co-ordinateaccommodation,toleration, conciliation and conversion. Leopold von Wiese distinguished differentiation, integration, destruction, and construction; differentiation included graduation,stratification,domination, and submission,
while integration included uniformization and super- and subordination.Jessie Bernard has elaborated a conaict continuum from elimination,through exploitation,equilibration, coalescence,to assimilation
in a large number of fields of conflict. At one end, social forms or
systems attempt to handle the incompatible differences in values
or goals by withdrawing, isolation,getting out of the system, or by
expelling, destroying, liquidating the differing groups. At the other
end, the social forms have become so similar in values or goals that
they no longer constitute separate systems; they have become
assimilated.In between we may have relationships of exploitation if
one party is more powerful than the other; equilibration if both
have about equal power; and coalescence if they have more in
common than in conflict.
A n adequate sociology of conflict must take account of both
the integrative and the disintegrative phases of the relationships
among systems. Sometimes students of sociology seem to be more
interested in one phase, sometimes in another. Robert A.Nisbet is
of the opinion that conservatives tend to emphasize the integrative
aspects of social processes;order rather than change seems important to them [212].To them the given social structure or integration
with all the non-rationalprops it rests on is a thing to be preserved.
The schismatic, the revolutionary,the agitator, the protester will
therefore be condemned.Conflict will be viewed as bad because by
challenging current values it destroys the social fabric. The conservative point of view is in effect a demand that those who pay for
the status quo continue to pay for it, and like it.
By way of contrast there was the radical strain of thought which
emphasized change,even change by way of revolution, if necessary.
In the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth
century, rational behaviour was stressed. It was hoped that man
would become emancipated from the bondage of the past. It was
the time of the economic man of Bentham, of the social contract.
Among those who hold to a radical ideology,sympathy will be on
the side of the underdog who ‘fightsfor his rights’.The disintegrative
aspects of conflict seem important to them; they are interested in
breaking down the system in order to free the disadvantaged from
the bondage of non-rationalcontrols.As soon as a radical movement
succeeds in breaking down an old system and reintegrating a new
45
one, however,its proponents may change their theoretical focus and
come to emphasize the stabilizing,non-rational,integrative aspects
of the social process. They become interested in order, not change.
Currently sociologists of the western countries seem to have been
more preoccupied with questions of organization than with questions of conflict. Don J. Hager; reviewing German sociology under
Hitler from 1933 to 1941, found that ‘much of the thematic
structure of these articles is typical of nationalistic revivals and
movements found in the history of Western civilization. In all
countries interest in national unity,racial history,national economy,
population analysis, and the like,had awakened’[468]. Non-rational
aspects of behaviour have been emphasized. The sociology of the
disintegrative aspects of conflict,of challenging values, has received
relatively little attention as such compared with, for example, the
attention devoted to a non-rational,integrative phenomenon like
culture [307].
There has, nevertheless,been accumulating a body of work which
constitutes a genuine if not systematic contribution to the sociology
of codict, which it is the purpose of the present report to summarize. Before we turn to this discussion, however, we shall consider in greater detail the social-psychological approach to conflict
in the currently popular form of ‘tension’theory.
11. THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH: ‘TENSION’
R E S E A R C H AND P R O G R A M M E S B A S E D UPON IT
INTRODUCTION
The individual or social-psychological conceptualization of conflict
in recent years has focused its attention primarily on what has come
to be known as ‘tension’phenomena. The ‘tension’approach differs
from the older instinctive approach in that individual tensions are
not assumed to be inherited or fixed in ‘human nature’ as the old
instincts of pugnacity or aggression were assumed to be, but are
viewed as acquired in the process of socialization and social interaction.The ‘tension’approach resembles the older approach in that
it seeks to interpret and ‘explain’collective and group behaviour in
terms of individual motivations. In freeing itself from the old
instinctive approach, it has freed itself from the criticisms which
inhered in the biological interpretation of collective and group
behaviour. In remaining identified with the individualistic interpretation of collective and group behaviour,it remains vulnerable to the
criticisms which have long been levelled against this point of view.
46
In our discussion here we shall begin with a brief statement of the
tension concept as it has developed in individual psychology,
proceed to a discussion of the pitfalls inherent in using the concept
for group or collective phenomena, and then review in a summary
way the programmes which have been based on the tension approach.
THE TENSION CONCEPT IN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY
The concept of tension in individual psychology, introduced by
Freud, as we saw above, was popularized by the late Kurt Lewin.
In individual psychology it is closely allied with motivation. Tensions
are conceived of as created by needs, by restrictions of space, of
free movement, or by other barriers [1097,p. 891.They are variously
identified with drives [208,p.-600],with mood [146,p. 1741,and
with instabilities within the psychological field [1097,p. 401.They
are identified also with conflict [1097,p. 1561.The essential characteristic of a tension is conceived to be that of leading to behaviour
designed to reduce it [146,p. 401.
Implicit or explicit in most tension theories is the assumption that
modern living conditions create so many tensions in individuals that
they are ready to release them in acts of overt violence. A great
fund of ‘free-floatingaggression’is posited as the result of the normal processes of socialization. W e must repress or mask our antisocial impulses. But, much aggression remains. Neurotic symptoms
may be one way to disguise our aggressions. Scapegoats may be
used to channel off hostilities.Leaders may even stimulate anxiety
in order to justify sacrifice of civil liberties.There comes, finally,
‘a time in most cultures when the quantity of repressed hostility
toward all those who control [us] has increased until the supply
of scapegoats will not suffice to handle it all, and the leaders sense
an increasing need to make a reality of the external threat so as to
take the pressure off. In such a situation war,or internal revolution,
eventually is likely to come’ [3, p. 621.
The concept of tensions doubtless has validity for the psychologist dealing with individual behaviour. It is a vivid term which
most people can appreciate intuitively and introspectively. For
almost everyone has felt tense, has been ‘under tension’,has felt
frustrations mounting up until they led to explosive behaviourfunctional even when non-rational-which gave relief. The tension
concept as related to motivation is on far safer ground than the
instinct concept which dominated social-psychological thinking in
the early years of this century. The difficulty arises only when the
concept of tensions is transferred from the realm of individual
psychology to that of inter-grouprelations.Then a host of problems
are injected. Two social psychologists,Krech and Crutchfield tell us
47
that ‘the tensions among nations take many forms-feelings of
hatred and aggressiveness, attacks in the press and on the radio,
diplomatic strife, persecution of other countries’ citizens, economic
conflict and sanctions, and, ultimately, war. War, it should be
emphasized, is only the last step in tensions’ [146, p. 5751. The
implication is that wars result from feelings of hatred and aggression.
It was on such a theoretical basis that the Unesco tension project
was built. Its purpose was ‘to encourage social scientists to focus
their attention and their research techniques on an understanding
of the development and perpetuation of attitudes which make for
national aggression and, on the basis of their findings, to recommend
ways and means of promoting attitudes that would increase international understanding’ [137, p. 71.l In most of the studies made as
part of this project, the approach was through individual attitudes.
W e do not wish to disparage this work-it is probably indispensable
for determining what are the ‘rules of the game’ in sociological
conflict-but merely to point out that it is based on the assumption
that group and collective behaviour can be interpreted or ‘explained’
in terms of individual psychological mechanisms, an assumption for
which no solid proof can be adduced; an assumption, in fact, which
the tension studies themselves throw doubt on.
Without challenging the value of the concept of tensions for individual psychology, w e turn now to a brief discussion of the concept as applied to intergroup behaviour.
THE CONCEPT OF ‘INTER-GROUP TENSION’
In view of the remarkable vogue of the concept ‘inter-grouptensions’
in the last decade, it is somewhat surprising to find so little attempt
to give it specific content. The term has crept into conventional
usage, but its precise meaning remains amorphous, equivocal, and
lacking in precision. It is variously identified with hostility, with
conflict, or with discrimination. Thus, for example, the Social
Science Research Council in 1945 set up a Committee on Techniques for Reducing Group Hostility, with three objectives, namely
[344, p. 51:
1. To make a preliminary survey of those techniques and procedures being
used by various action agencies concerned with reducing tensions and
conflicts among racial, cultural, and class groups in the United States.
2. To propose research aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of these techniques and procedures.
3. To consider social psychological theory and research bearing on the
problem of group conflict with a view to deriving from any promising
theory not n o w practically applied an action technique which might be
tested for its effectiveness in reducing hostility and resolving conflict.
1. See also the Introduction to this volume.
48
The implication here is that tensions, hostility, and conflict are interchangeable concepts. The body of the resulting report likewise
leaves this impression. The expression ‘reducing tensions’, ‘hostility
and conflict’, ‘discrimination and hostility’ seem to refer to ‘facets
of inter-group tensions’.Another statement in this report leaves the
impression that group hostility and group tensions are identical concepts [344, p. 51. Again, Donald Young in the same report
identifies tension with conflict and hostility [344,p. viii].
Only two serious efforts to give the term ‘inter-group tensions’
specific and precise formulation seem to have appeared, one by
S. C. Dodd and his student Kaare Svalastoga and one by Bjorn
Christiansen. Dodd has developed what he calls a tension or
equilibrium equation [67,p. 2651.His conceptualization is in terms
of desiring, wishing, hungering, striving. ‘Desire,as all inner motivation to behaviour...is the total inner states (including experience)
of the organism determining the response upon stimulation’ [67,
p. 2631.For a total group or system, tension is an additive phenomenon. Dodd illustrates tension from a number of fields. Thus,
for example: ‘For a political case of the theory, consider nationalism, the intense desire for the desideratum “national aggrandizement”. ... The tension of the nation towards this desideratum
varies directly with the number of people in the nation and with
the average intensity of their internationalistic desires’ [67,p. 2661.
H e applies his theory to education, to biology, to economics, and
to religion, concluding that there are only three ways to reduce
group tensions, namely: ‘increase the production of desiderata,
decrease desires, or, for desiderata that are scarce, decrease the
number of sharers’ [67,p. 2711.
In 1951, Dodd reported the results of a study on the spread of
‘interracial tensions’ among 1,044families in Seattle in a housing
project subsequent to the rape of a white w o m a n by a Negro [lo111.
His unit of measurement of tension was ‘one anti-Negro opinion
offered by one white respondent in reply to a non-directive question.
This is a primitive all-or-none tension, which is defined by our
tension theory as an index of intensity of desire per unit of the
desideratum lacked. The negative desideratum was the anti-Negro
opinion which being an all-or-noneunit had unit value if expressed.
Similarly, the intensity of desire was in all-or-none terms since
“intensity sufficient to utter the opinion to the interviewer” was
called “unit intensity” and non-utterance was caIled zero-intensity.
Hence every anti-Negroopinion uttered was a unit-intensityper unitopinion making a unit of tension’ (p. 283). H e measured the rate
of spread and subsidence of tension, so defined, and found that
although tension did subside, it did not quite return to its endemic
level and, among those who were living in the project at the time
of the rape, it remained considerably higher.
49
One of Dodd’s students, Kaare Svalastoga, applied his theory to
a study of internationalism in the state of Washington. O n the basis
of 522 replies to a questionnaire on internationalism he constructed
what he called an international tension index. ‘It is a measure of
the perceived discrepancy between certain states of affairs in the
international field as desired by a respondent and the states of
affairs desired by the government as estimated by the respondent,
weighted by the respondent’s own thermometer rating of his strength
of feeling on the issues covered’ [697, p. 321. Using this tension
index as an instrument for testing the hypothesis that a high degree
of tension is associated with tension-relieving behaviour, Svalastoga
reached no conclusive results and concluded that there were so
many tensions within individuals that their behaviour could be
accounted for only by reference to combinations of tensions and
not even the same set for different individuals [697,p. 361.
Christiansen wrestles with the problem of group tensions from
a theoretical point of view. H e recognizes the inadequacy of the
concept of tension and urges that it be clarified. H e questions the
value of introducing such concepts as needs, motives, wishes, and
group mind. H e recognizes that group tensions are not simple
additive phenomena, but he still feels that they can be gotten
at by way of some kind of weighted polling of individuals. His
most valuable contribution lies perhaps in his emphasis on the
threat component in the concept of tension. ‘It is the threatdimensions in the perceptions of international relations that justify
the use of such words and expressions as international tensions’
[311,p. 711. H e introduces from the work of N.R.F. Maier and
T.M. Newcomb on frustration the idea of frustration tolerance.
‘According to their point of view, tension might be characterized as
the degree of threat- vs goal-orientation,that dominates (determines)
the perceptual behaviour of individuals. ...B y thinking about (international) tensions as tolerance of threat, or if you prefer-a frustrational-tolerance, operating on a national level, it should be measurable in terms of national (or public) opinion’ (p. 75). H e
recognizes that nations are congeries or systems of sub-systems and
that therefore the usual kinds of mass polling will not be adequate.
H e stresses the necessity for a conceptual clarification of the concept
of tension and suggests ‘that both the perceptual aspects of threat
and the aspects of national sub-groups ought to be incorporated in
such a concept,if it is to be useful in description of conflicts between
nations’ (p. 77).
This brief rCsumC of the work on the concept of tensions shows
that where the concept of ‘inter-group’or ‘group tension’ seems
relevant, it is vague and amorphous;where it is precise and clearly
defined it leads to fairly sterile results. It seems as yet to have little
50
to offer to the sociologist’s analytical tool kit. Since this is such a
severe structure,it seems to call for more detailed consideration.
CRITIQUE OF THE ‘GROUP TENSION’ CONCEPT’
The iirst point in criticizing the concept of tensions as applied to
groups or to inter-group behaviour is the fuzziness of its definition.
A second criticism can also be dismissed briefly since there is a
voluminous literature on it going back at least a quarter of a
century. It is a questioning of the assumption, basic to the group
tension concept, that group and collective behaviour can be interpreted or explained in terms of individual motivations. Much-not
all-of the literature attacking the concept of ‘instinct’would apply
here. The controversy goes back even farther in the literature.’ It
is pertinent here, but to review it would go beyond the scope of
our project. W e merely point out that sociologists and cultural
anthropologists do not accept this assumption.
A third criticism may be stated as follows.So far as application to
sociological phenomena is concerned,the concept of group tensions
seems to be little more than a figure of speech. Tensions exist
within individuals. Do they exist actually, except figuratively, between groups? Can the ‘sum’,however weighted, of tensions in
individuals be said to constitute a ‘group’tension? The nearest
approach to an adequate theoretical answer to these questions would
seem to be by way of the work on suggestion.It is, to be sure, no
longer fashionable to use the concepts of suggestion and suggestibility in analysing collective behaviour. There may be good
reasons why their use has fallen into disrepute.They may have been
over-exploitedto name or describe rather than to explain behaviour.
Yet they are probably still useful when carefully delimited. The
results of C.L. Hull’s classic researches on hypnosis and suggestibility seem to be fruitfully applicable to the conceptualization of
1. In criticizing the tension approach to conflict, no omnibus criticism of the psychological
approach is intended. It would be a serious error to identify the tension approach with the
psychological one. As a matter of facl, the concept of cost, which is basic to the sociological
approach to conflict,has a psychological as well as a sociological aspect. Costs may be measurable with some degree of objectivity in terms of territory, trade, or privileges. But costs may
be subjective also, determinable only in terms of the values which people attach to aspects of
their systems which have to be sacrificed in order to achieve accommodation. The incompatible
aspect of the system m a y seem trivial to the outsider,even dysfunctional (for example, a custom
like suttee) but if great value is attached to it, the psychological costs of losing it m a y
be great. Costs may involve such things as ‘sovereignty’,‘freedom’,national ‘pride’,‘honour’,
‘face’. Cost, in brief, has a psychological as well as a strictly sociological aspect, as
economists have long since recognized in their theoretical wrestling with ‘utility’ and
‘disutility’.Any approach to conflict which ignored its psychological aspects or denied
them, would be incomplete and inadequate.
2. The reader will recognize this as the old problem of the relation between sociology and
psychology.
51
group tensions [117]. Individuals may be ‘set’ toward certain
specific goals by the people about them under conditions similar to
those of hypnosis. In like manner, many people may synchronously
be “set” or suggested toward certain goals by the usual methods
of suggestion. Once set toward these goals, they tend to realize them,
just as persons in post-hypnotic suggestion feel restless-‘tense’ or
‘under tension’-until they have realized the goals set for them
under hypnosis. A tension is created in them which can normally be
released only by achieving the goal or an acceptable substitute for it.
Sometimes such synchronous tensions are created and released in
a fairly short time and in a fairly direct manner, as in a pogrom,
for example, or a riot, or a lynching. Sometimes the tension is
released by a dousing in the cold water of a fire hose or by the
results of a tear bomb. Sometimes, however, the tension is created
over a long period of time and acts much like post-hypnotic suggestion, in which the subject remains restless, strained, and tense until
he carries out the suggestion made under hypnosis. Similarly there
are occasions when great masses of people are ‘set’toward, let us
say, a war or a strike or a riot. Tensions are created in thousands or
even millions of people which can be released only by carrying out
the suggestion. They can be made to clamour for a war or a riot or a
lynching. Newcomb, following F.H.Allport, views inter-group tension in essentially this light, that is, as social facilitation or a mutual
heightening of stimulation [209,1950, pp. 600-6011.
The concept of group tension might also be legitimately applied
perhaps to the synchronous tension of those playing a game or
of those watching the game. There is also tension in an audience
watching a good play or moving picture; whether this is group tension or not might be mooted. There is group tension as people
follow strategic plays in any kind of contest. In brief, w e might
legitimately speak of group tensions when large numbers of people
are being subjected to the same stimuli or suggestions at the same
time under conditions conducive to suggestibility.
But the conditions which must be present in order to set up
group tensions thus conceptualized do not seem to constitute the
usual ones for inter-group relations. As Svalastoga pointed out,
individuals are usually subject to numerous tensions at the same
time, nor are the same tensions present in all persons. In a sense
the individual tensions or sets of tensions may be said to tend to
cancel one another out. Unless created, synchronous tensions with
c o m m o n goals probably do not exist in the ordinary course of group
existence or inter-group relations. The synchronization of the
individual tensions of large masses of separate persons to make them
react as a unit against another similar unit is a feat of some
magnitude. It can be done, as w e well know. Mobs can be created
and incited. Mass hysterias ean be fomented. But it is not an easy
52
task. Mass inertia and mass apathy are more often complained of
than mass action. The third criticism, then, may be summed up by
saying that the phenomena of ‘group tension’ can probably be subsumed under the category of suggestion phenomena and that the
research data available from that area render unnecessary the
invoking of new concepts for which research data are lacking.
Closely related to the third criticism is the fourth, which helps
to explain why group tensions in the sense of synchronized tensions of many individuals is not more common, namely that most
people live in extremely restricted social and psychological worlds.
Cottrell and Eberhart, for example, reporting on American public
opinion on world affairs, found that less than three-fifths of the
people asked could give the name of the then Secretary of State,
although his name was daily in the press [725]. One-third gave
little thought to international problems. They allowed the government
to do the worrying. Naive, complacent, uninformed inertia was the
prevailing picture. W e are told, further, that [146,p. 5821:
Studies on international thinking of a cross section of the American public
made during the war by the Program Surveys Divison of the United States
Department of Agriculture clearly demonstrated that for large segments of
the population, the world outside the United States or even outside their
own immediate community was virtually nonexistent. Not only was there
a lack of emotional and motivational connection with anything beyond
these narrow borders, there was for large numbers of people only the haziest
conception of what lies beyond.
It is difficult to believe that the tensions of these individuals have
anything to do with the major conflicts among systems of our day.
A similar finding is reported by one of the Unesco tension studies
in Belgium. ‘Ofthe whole body of citizens, only a small fraction is
interested in international questions’ [718, p. 5521. International
policy was found to depend more on the political views of a few
people than on those of the mass of people.
It is sometimes argued in defence of the group tension approach
that the leaders who decide policy must reflect the tensions of their
constituents. This is a nice question. Do the policies reflect the
tensions or do the tensions reflect the policies? Are the tensions
created, manufactured, to support policies? At the present time
policy decisions are made farther and farther away from the
people themselves. W h e n political and industrial units were small,
local, and more or less autonomous, decisions with respect to policy
were made by people who were fairly close to the lives of those
intimately involved. As both industry and government have become
larger and more bureaucratized, these decisions are increasingly
made by people who act on information shared by very few. So
far as the man-in-the-streetis concerned, they are like the weather.
Wars and strikes may be decided upon with as little consultation as
53
that offered by a blizzard or a monsoon. To be sure, once the
decision is made, he will be wooed, since he must implement the
decision. As another Unesco tension study on stereotypes reports
[722,p. 5281:
There is limited evidence that national stereotypes are flexible over a period
of years; and thus that they m a y follow and rationalize, rather than precedz and determine, reaction to a certain nation. The tenor of the findings
as a whole is in the direction of minimizing the causative effect of either
favourable or unfavourable stereotypes in relations between nations, and
suggesting that they may not exist until objective events demand their
creation. Perhaps their important function is the wartime one of providing
a rationale within which men are able to kill, deceive and perform other
acts not sanctioned by the usual moral code.
The history of the last decade would tend to invalidate the tension
theory as related to inter-groupconflict. The realignment of political powers has had little relationship to national stereotypes or
prejudices or hostilities or individual attitudes of any kind. The
national stereotypes and attitudes have followed rather than
preceded the realignments. During World War 11, the American
citizen felt grateful toward the Russians; he felt the opposite
toward the Germans and the Japanese. Today his hostility is
directed toward the Russians; there is little animosity toward the
German and the Japanese. Americans have, at least for a generation,been, if anything,sentimentally warm in their attitudes toward
the Chinese.Today there is little of that.H o w have these subjective
tension phenomena affected international relations? The man-inthe-street does not know what to think of other nationality groups
until he is told what the power structure is and which groups
constitute threats and which do not. Our fourth criticism, then, is
that individual tensions seem to follow rather than to precede
changes in inter-grouprelations.
Our reference to threats just above,leads to our fifth criticism of
the group tension concept. Implicit in the group tension concept
is the assumption that the difficulty is ‘all in the mind’. The
implication is that one group feels threatened only because its
perception of the other group is incorrect. The assumption is that
hostilities are not based on actual threat but on false images or
stereotypes of the outgroup. Thus eight social scientists state [45;
p. 181:
. . . economic inequalities, insecurities, and frustrations create group and
national conflicts. All this is an important source of tensions which have
often led one group to see another group as a menace through the acceptance of false images and oversimplified solutions and by making people
susceptible to the scapegoating appeals of demagogues.
54
Such a statement makes little sense. If there are inequalities and
insecurities and frustrations, one group may actually be a threat
to another. The threat may be an objective fact, not merely the
result of a false image [304].Groups do constitute threats to one
another. They do often have incompatible and mutually exclusive
values, goals, and aims.The feeling of threat which the members
of groups have may be wholly justified; not to have such feelings
might be wholly unrealistic.In a sense this criticism of the tension
concept is the same as that previously made of the semanticist
approach. W e are not here in the presence of a misunderstanding;
we are in the presence of real conflict.
So much, then, for criticism of the tension concept as applied to
group and inter-group relations. W e repeat that these criticisms
are in no sense directed against the concept as applied to individual
behaviour, since that is not our concern here. Our point is that
the phenomena subsumed under the concept can be adequately
interpreted in terms of solid and substantial research in the field
of suggestion, that group tensions do not seem to be related in a
causal way to inter-group conflict,that they may follow rather than
precede it, and that the whole concept seems to imply that actual
threats do not exist. If the concept of inter-grouptension is of any
value to the sociologistit probably has a negative significance.Where
it is considered a bad thing, the conditions which foment it should
be controlled. Since group tensions in the sense of the synchronized
tensions of a large number of individuals is a created,even,perhaps,
a manufactured phenomenon, it would seem that the best way to
handle them would be, if possible, to prevent their creation in the
first place, or to provide a sanctioned way for their release.
RESEARCH ON PROGRAMMES BASED ON THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
OR TENSION APPROACH TO CONFLICT
If group tensions are conceived of as the result of such non-rational
phenomena as prejudice, hostile stereotypes, and frustrations of
one kind or another, then the policy for their removal must be
one of changing these attitudes. In general, then, the socialpsychological approach to conflict has designed its research to find
out how to change people, directly or indirectly-how they feel,
how they think, how they value. Programmes stemming from
research with this orientation have had to do with ways and means
for achieving this change in human beings, by education, by
propaganda, by group contacts, or even by psychotherapy. Proponents of this school of thought have been leaders in what is
known as action-research.The moral atmosphere has been one of a
patient, kindly teacher or doctor attempting to help a mistaken
55
if not an ill, patient.The general plan is to come up with recommendations which one group can freely-albeit, of course, in a
kindly manner-’impose’ on another; it hopes to show how one
group can change another willy-nilly.It is not usually contemplated
that the group to be changed will resist or fight back. A n effort
is made to avoid so-called boomerang effects. The changing group
conceives itself as doing something to another group. The changing
group assumes-usually rightly-that its ethical goals and aims are
superior to those of the people they are to change,whose prejudices
they are to minimize, whose misunderstandings they are to clear
up, whose stereotypes they are to break down.
In 1947three summaries or critiques ot the results of programmes
designed to reduce prejudice in the United States were published,
by Goodwin Watson [972], by Robin Williams, Jr. [344], and by
Arnold Rose [243].
In general, most of the agencies working in inter-group relations
aimed at attitude change rather than the use of legal force or
pressure. This is shown by the fact that in a study of 75 organizations in the field of race relations, 50 were found to deal with
education and only 12 to work through the courts or through
legislation.
ATTITUDE CHANGING: PREMISES
Williams has analysed the premises basic to the social-psychological
attack on the problem of inter-group conflict [344]:
One of the most obvious of these premises guiding strategy is, in its least
sophisticated formulation, ‘Give people the facts and prejudice will disappear.’
In this crude form the assumption is rarely made explicit, yet much intercultural activity is carried on as if the proposition were accepted. . . .
Insofar as it is assumed that presentation of facts will reduce inter-group
prejudice, a further premise is necessary: that prejudice is unrealistic, a
function of ignorance or of ‘distorted stereotypes’, of ‘false pictures in the
mind’, of ‘warped social perception’. For unless prejudices represent erroneous
information or ignorance, the presentation of cprrect facts can not be expected
to change hostile attitudes. . . .
In one sense the opposite of the viewpoint just mentioned is the doctrine
that group prejudices are subject to reduction or elimination only by changing ‘underlying interests’ or ‘needs’. . . .
A second basic assumption underlying a great variety of specific techniques may be presented in two opposing formulations: that action should
be directed toward (a) a direct change in values or attitudes, or (b) a change
in those aspects of the situation which are regarded as productive of existing
attitudes and behaviour. . . .
[A third basic assumption or premise is that] ‘contact brings friendliness’.
This is the extreme and unqualified phrasing of a general assumption manifest
in a great many current activities. The related but not completely homologous
proposition is that segregation increases the likelihood of inter-group tension
56
and hostility. . . . There is evidence that some kinds of contact sometimes
are followed by increased mutual understanding and friendliness, and that
the reverse is also true. There is a growing awareness that future action and
research must define the whole context of inter-group contacts more carefully in order to arrive at practically useful specifications.
There are in addition, finally,the assumptions that ‘(a) the experience of [inter-groupassociation] changes behaviour, and (b) there is
a transfer of the changed behaviour to other, more usual, types of
situation’ (p. 16). As Williams points out, none of these assumptions basic to programmes with a social-psychologicalorientation
has been unequivocally tested by research. In as much as the design
of programmes depends on the premises, one would have excepted
more concern with this problem.
CHANGING ATTITUDES: TECHNIQUES
Williams points out that there are basically only two techniques for
controlling inter-group relations, namely: one which operates on
the situation within which people must act, approaching attitude
changes by providing greater economic security, increasing job
opportunities for the underprivileged,or, in the most extreme case,
altering the whole social structure in a thorough-going,even communistic, way as, for example, in [344],[844];or one which works
directly on the values or attitudes of individuals. Of the two, the
second is commoner as a result of simple expediency;acting on the
first is usually impossible since the factors involved are so inaccessible.
Among the direct appeals commonly used are attempts to show
that differences in the characteristics of various groups are not
inevitable or biologically fixed; the minimization of differences in
values and behaviour and emphasis on elements common to both
parties; demonstration of the wide range of intra-group variation
to attack categoricalor stereotyped thinking;appeals to larger social,
religious, or legal values; emphasis on achievements and qualities
of the disliked group which are universally esteemed; linking
tolerance with persons who are prestige-symbols (pp. 18-19).
Williams summarizes the results of over fifty studies in the field
of attitude change, reporting that (pp. 27-32):
The weight of the evidence from published studies is that the stimuli tested
(school and college courses, specific propaganda, personal contacts, information, and general education) do result in or are accompanied by attitude
changes in a ‘positive’ direction. O n the other hand, nearly half of the
studies have found inconclusive results or no change in attitudes. No
important attitude changes in a negative (more prejudiced) direction have
been reported, although some boomerang effects were noted in a few
studies....
57
In the few experimental studies the following findings have been
reported:
1. Auditory stimuli are more effective than visual stimuli....
2. Speakers are more effective than printed matter....
3. ‘Emotional’appeals tend to be more effective than ‘logical’
appeals, but there are exceptions....
4. Oral propaganda is more effective in small groups than in large
audiences....
5. The effectiveness of propaganda tends to be greater when the
material is linked with prestige symbols.
William finds the results inadequate for decisions with respect
to policy. H e criticizes the research so far available on the grounds
that it is based on small samples, that it is based so largely
on school or college populations, and that there has not been
adequate provision for controls. Furthermore, the stimuli studied
have been of relatively brief duration. Outmoded measuring techniques have been used;and they refer too preponderantly to verbalizations in isolation from other behaviour (pp. 33-4).
Since Williams’ monograph was published, the results of the
work on mass communication done for the American army have
appeared 13681. These do not bear directly on the matter of intergroup relations, but they are pertinent with respect to what can be
expected from the mass media so far as acquisition of information
(good), change of attitude (not so good), and motivation (not good)
are concerned,
Although the quality of research dealing with inter-grouprelations
may have improved since Williams made his study, many of the
same errors continue to be made. A study published as recently
as 1951 shows the same confusion of basic concepts and methods
as those pointed out by Williams in 1947 [1002].
The use of public housing policy as a technique for changing
attitudes has been reported on recently,with equivocal results, so
far as policy is concerned. For example, there have been interesting
experiments aimed at the reduction of prejudice through housing
projects. William Form, reviewing studies on stratification in lowand middle-income housing areas, questions the general possibility
of bringing about neighbourly interaction and co-operative experience in a heterogeneous population and concludes that ‘thehope of
reducing tensions by planning a community of “balanced” or
“mixed” social composition is based on false reasoning’ [
1070,
p. 1231. Other researchers, on the other hand, come to directly
opposite conclusions. Marie Jahoda and Patricia West give the
results they secured in a study of the comparative effects on NegroWhite interpersonal relations of integrated and segregated public
housing projects. They found a net reduction of ‘tensions’in the
community resulting from ‘balanced’or ‘mixed’social composition
58
in the population [1029].And Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans
Collins came to similar conclusions,namely: that ‘from the point of
view of reducing prejudice and of creating harmonious democratic
inter-group relations, the net gain resulting from the integrated
projects is considerable;from the same point of view,the gain created
by the segregated bi-racialprojects is slight’ [lOlO]. They found that
individuals in integrated projects were less prejudiced and showed
greater improvement in their attitudes than those in segregated
projects. This difference they attribute to the social-psychological
effects of the two patterns of occupancy.
Henry Enoch Kagan has recently reported his experiences in
changing the attitudes of Christians toward Jews. H e found that
the informational approach in and of itself was not very effective,
but that the group method which ‘stimulatesChristians in a group
under authorized Christian religious influence to discuss directly
pro and con their attitude toward the Jew’ was effective and that
the changes produced in attitude tended to show greater permanency
[10311.
ACTION RESEARCH A N D GROUP DYNAMICS
Williams referred in his summary of types of action in current intergroup programmes to action research and community self surveys,
in which members of the community attempt to locate their own
prejudices and change them. These techniques developed under the
particular influence of Kurt Lewin who had been impressed by the
inadequacy of the usual survey-typestudy which was inert, sterile,
and for practical purposes usually futile. H e advocated what he
called ‘action-research.a comparative research on the conditions
and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading
to social action’ [1097, pp. 202-31.
Action-research requires well-trained personnel. A n experimental
workshop conducted to train community leaders in inter-grouprelations has been described by Ronald Lippitt [168]. As a result of the
training received in this workshop, most of the subjects reported
more time spent on inter-grouprelations when they returned to their
communities (p. 178).
In industrial relations it has been found that the psychological
and social costs to workers of charges in machinery or procedure
can be considerably reduced if the workers are allowed to participate
in planning for them [49]. ‘Participation’has become almost a fetish
in industrial relations today, as an antidote for hostilities among
workers [llOO].
Action-research has come to be identified with the work of the
Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan.
59
The centre, founded in 1945 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by Lewin, has made the reduction of conflict. psychologically conceived, its main interest:
Society’s skills in reducing inter-group conflicts are pitifully inadequate. . ..
M u c h more specific information is needed about forces producing inter-group
conflict or harmony and about the ways in which they may be controlled.. ..
Until w e can know concretely and finally the consequences flowing from
efforts to reduce inter-group conflict there is only slight hope that w e shall
hit upon effective courses of social action. To this end the Center together
with a variety of agencies have conducted research projects in close collaboration with action programs [48, pp. 14-15].
A collection of the most important work done by the centre has
just been published [49]. There is at the present time a danger that
the group-dynamics approach may take on the characteristics of a
cult and that uncritical enthusiasts m a y discredit it. There has
developed, indeed, a strong current of resentment toward it
among many people who feel that it is manipulative, cynical in
effect if not in intent, patronizing, and that it might even become
dangerous. As yet most of this criticism is expressed only orally;
it has not invaded the literature to any great extent, but it may
perhaps be expected to in the near future.
On the quite reasonable assumption that research has focused
too much on the evil person, the criminal, the prejudiced, the
hating, and the destructive, P. A. Sorokin has turned his attention
to studies of altruistic love and programmes for the altruization’ of
mankind [263]. H e has also established at Harvard University an
organization to prosecute research in this area.
PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION
Williams, whose work evaluating the research in reduction of intergroup ‘tensions’w e referred to above, later re-viewed the problems
of application of research to inter-group relations [3431. Although
he reports on the situation in the United States there is no reason
to doubt that similar problems exist elsewhere.
H e finds that the application of inter-group research in social
action involves barriers at four points, namely: (a) awareness or
lack of it by the research sociologist of the problems and needs
of those who apply his findings; (b) communication, or lack of it,
between researcher and user; (c) translation of research findings
into implications for strategy and tactics; and (d) the scientific
evaluation of the results of the application.
H e makes the point that practitioners or policy makers are often
ahead of the researcher. Research is likely to be too atomistic,static,
and sterile. H e refers also to the administrative anxiety which the
60
evaluation of a programme is likely to generate in the administrator
who may view evaluation as implicit criticism. H e makes clear
that the relationship between researcher and action-man is a twoway one; the researcher can learn from the action-man as well as
the other way round.
In actual life, research has sometimes been used to delay, forestall,
or even avoid change. It has been used to justify decisions already
reached. It can perform a function simply by explicating or clarifying a conflict. Williams suggests that we know little about the direct
effect of research itself on people; in some cases it may increase
the sense of threat to a group to have a race-relations survey undertaken in the community; in others it is known to have a mobilizing
and catalytic effect in the desired direction. H e suggests that w e
need research on the effects of research.
The reader who applies these comments to the international field
will find them very suggestive.
VIOLENCE
Most of the research dealing with programmes for improving
inter-group relations aims at the individual's behaviour before it
reaches the stage of violence. The hope is that the release or reduction of individual tensions can take place without violence.
There has been some study of the conditions which make for
violence and which therefore should be avoided if violence is to be
obviated. Lee and Humphrey made a careful study of the Detroit
race riots of 1943, comparing their findings with riots in Harlem
and Los Angeles. On the basis of their research they suggest programmes for preventing riots and also tell what should be done
once a riot is under way [877].
H.Otto Dahlke has also published a study of race and minority
riots [810]. H e compares the Kishinew riot of 1903 with the Detroit
riot of 1943 with respect to historical conditions, events leading to
the riot, duration of the riot, personnel of the riot-that is, the
rioters-organization of the riot, methods of control, and results.
Although he recognizes the tension or stress aspect of such outbursts, he sees also their strategic nature, that is, the use of violence
by middle-class persons as a method of removing competitors. This
study is extremely suggestive; but it presents no control or negative
case. Do the conditions which Dahlke analyses as likely to result in
violence ever exist without producing violence? D o they always
produce violence? Are they all necessary? Does violence occur where
they are not present? A more rigorously designed sequel to this
study would be illuminating.
6f
Lynchings have generally decreased in the United States, and
no recent research has appeared. Davie devotes a chapter to
lynchings and race riots in his study of the Negro [812]and Newcomb presents a vivid psychological description of a lynching [208,
pp. 596 ff]. Outbreaks of violence against Jews, especially among
teen-agers,are reported from time to time in the urban press, but
no systematic research has as yet focused this problem in either a
psychological or a sociological frame of reference. A great deal of
light could be cast on tensions by a careful study of ‘incidents’and
minor disturbances known to the police.As yet carefully documented
data are not available, although the materials could be found on the
police blotters of all cities.
EVALUATION
Perhaps the first impression one gets from a survey of the programme
of research based on the social-psychological approach to conflict
in the United States is the tremendous amount of idealism and
goodwill it seems to represent. Here are men apparently urgently
serious about hatreds, hostilities, prejudices, violence, and equally
serious about applying science to the problem of eliminating them.
They are hopeful that science may in time find a way to render
peace and love or altruism within the reach of men. They are men
of faith,liberals in the old tradition.
Actually,so far as the results of their work are concerned,it may
not be important that careful scientific procedure has found them
equivocal or difficult to apply. W e do not know what conditions
would be like if no one were interested or cared about inter-group
relations.It is, of course,important that research should not render
community relations worse. But even if we cannot demonstrate that
it improves them, this fact would not itself condemn it.
Perhaps after all the best way to view the great mass of work
on inter-grouprelations in the community is primarily as itself a
sociological phenomenon of great significance. What is important
is that in the United States there is not complete complacency about
inter-grouprelations; there are people who want to improve them.
Societies have functioned on an exploitative basis where certain
groups were required to bear an undue cost of the system in the
relation of slave to master or inferior to superior, and there was
little or no protest. It may be that such inequitable distribution of
the costs of any social system is inevitable in a heterogeneous
society. What is important is that large numbers of individuals and
groups in the United States protest them and attempt to change them
and invoke science, along with other techniques, to help them.
Viewed in this light,the evaluation of any single programme is not
62
especially significant.What needs evaluation is the total phenomenon
of-'scientific'-protest.
What would inter-group relations be like
if no one were concerned with them? What would they be like if
science were being as seriously invoked-as in Nazi Germany-in
behalf of racial hatreds? It has been argued that the most important
effect of propaganda is on the people who use it rather than on those
toward whom it is aimed. The same might conceivably be said
with respect to all techniques aimed at changing attitudes.
Since most of the programmes for improving inter-grouprelations
are carried on in the United States, our discussion of research
related to them has been limited to the United States.With suitable
modifications,however,the discussion could probably also be applied
to other countries and to international relations. Could it not be
said, for example, that the actual effectiveness of any specific
research project is of minor significance compared to the fact that
a body of idealistic men are engaged in the great, humane effort
to apply science to the betterment of the human lot?
111. RESEARCH BASED ON A SYSTEMATIC ORIENTATION
TOWARD CONFLICT
Research on conflict which is based on a systematic orientation
assumes that all social life consists of interaction within and between
social systems. The system may be a small group, even a pair, or
it may be a nation or an empire,or anything in between. It may be
a political party; it may be a denomination. It may be a work
group; it may be a factory. The sociology of conflict attempts to
describe, analyse,and explain how such systems fall apart or how
they are built up, but only when there is some cost involved in the
process.
The following logic is used in presenting our data. The most
theoretical work, that is, the work which is most general in its
application,is presented first. The data here are merely illustrative
of principles rather than significant in and of themselves. Much
of this work is deductive; some of it is mathematical. This
mathematical work is followed by reference to three experimental
studies in which, again,the data themselves are less significant than
the hypotheses tested. Reference will then be made to work dealing
with the building up of systems, that is, with the integration of
systems, as related to the emergence of areas of peace. Finally the
substantive contributions to a sociology of conflict will be referred
to. Here the data themselves are important-'news' in the sense
63
Hughes used the term-whether or not they are presented by the
researcher in terms of sociological that is, theoretical concepts.
MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF CONFLICT
The first work to be reported is among the most general. It is
offered by its author, Walter Firey, as a theory of schism, a theoretical model for measuring the conditions under which a system of
accommodated groups may fall apart and the conditions necessary
for its reintegration. H e carries through his analysis in terms of
fairly small, informal groups, especially in industry, but this is only
incidental;for his conceptual framework is general enough to include
all kinds of systems, even a world system [74].
On the basis of a set of premises and the deductions he makes
from them, Firey evolves the formula
U = -k(U-x)2*+C,
where U stands for utility, U the attainment of a given end, k and m
constants for any particular system, and C the point of maximized
utility. By setting up differing conditions, he arrives at models in
which separate curves tend to emerge out of the original single
curve. If the distance between the two curves remains within
certain limits, the sub-system will remain within the super-system.
But if the curves diverge too greatly, the sub-system will tend to
break off; the disadvantages or costs of remaining within the system
will be greater than the costs of schism. Sometimes the cost of
alliance, or remaining within the system, is borne by one system,
sometimes by the other. Firey is not interested in the methods used
in schism. That is, violence or war is not essential. Either may or
may not be involved. Nor need hate or hostility be involved.Firey’s
statement is independent of the content of the behaviour.
Firey applies his model to several kinds of real-life situations in
industrial plants in order to illustrate its applicability, with intriguing and stimulating results. The model could, as he says, be equally
well applied to the relationship of a colony to an empire, of a sect
to a denomination, of a minority group to a nation, or to any other
set of systems. Firey believes his model could be of practical value
to administrators or policy makers. The implication is that if they
recognize the signs of schism in time, concessions will be made to
reduce the costs of the sub-system’s continued relationship, or, if
this is impossible and schism is inevitable, at least the break might
be made without violence.
The great theoretical roadblock to the acceptance of Firey’s theory
-as to the acceptance of so many other mathematical models-is
64
the psychological basis-in this case the concept of ‘utility’-on
which it rests. Like ‘effort’or ‘satisfaction functions’ to be referred
to presently, it offers enormous difficulties of both a theoretical and
practical nature. What, exactly, is it? And how can it be measured?
Is it the opposite to ‘cost‘?Can it be objectively assessed?
Also in terms of costs, but from a somewhat different angle, is
the approach of George Kingsley Zipf through his ‘principle of
least effort’ [295, Chap. 101. This principle states that individuals
govern their behaviour in such a way as to minimize the probable
average rate of work. In the course of developing this theory over
a wide range of data, Zipf applies it to the size and location of
communities, finding that his ‘minimum equation’
P
P
P
P
P.Sn= - + - + - +...+1p
2 p
3 p
np
adequately describes rank-population distributions, where P .Sn
equals the total C population of the terrain, and where P is the
population of the largest community ..., and where the exponent
p equals l/q (p. 366). The equation says that in an integrated and
stable social system, the second largest community will be half as
large as the largest, the third largest will be one third as large, and
so on. W h e n the equation does not hold, as in the United States
from 1820 to 1860, according to Zipf, this is an indication that the
social system is splitting into separate systems. After the Civil War,
the reintegration of the South into the Union shows up in Zipf‘s
equation ‘as an ever greater approximation to rectilinearity’(p. 422).
Wars and revolutions, according to Zipf, are incidental to the
process of achieving the rectilinearity in population distribution
called for by the principles of least effort and as embodied in his
equation.
Zipf applies his theoretical system to an analysis of class conflicts also. H e believes that the tendency for men to exploit one
another when they can is inevitable.The strength of a given class and
hence its potential for rebellion is determined by its income. The
incentive to remain in any given system is proportional to the income
of the individual. The two magnitudes must be in an appropriate
relationship in order to have equilibrium. If classes are ranked from
the bottom up, the income of the individuals in each class should
be proportional to the rank of his class: the number of individuals
in a class should be inversely related to the square of its rank.
Equilibrium, concludes Zipf, is reached under these conditions and
rebellion is averted (Chapter 11).
Applying the same principle to international relations, Zipf finds
the ‘least work centre’ now to be in Germany rather than in England,
where it formerly was. In effect, Zipf‘s theory states that conflict
65
represents an effort to align production forces and factors in such
a way as to minimize human effort. ‘ W e shall view wars and
revolutions as potential equilibrating devices for effecting a more
stable equilibrium’ (p. 436).
So far as application is concerned, the implication of Zipf‘s work
is that the rational policy-makerwill work with his equations,rather
than against them; if he works against them, he will lose out.
Aside from the substantive criticisms which might be levelled
against Zipf‘s work-his theory of class conflict being far too simple,
for example, in the light of recent research in this area-the following methodological criticism has been made by Kenneth J. Arrow
[299. pp. 149-501:
Dr. Zipf‘s work does not constitute a properly developed mathematical
model. The fundamental postulates are nowhere stated explicitly; though
mathematical symbols and formulas are sprinkled rather freely through a
long work, the derivations involved are chiefly figures of speech and analogies,
rather than true mathematical deductions; in some cases, they are simply
wrong. Thus, as an attempt at a systematic social theory, Zipf‘s work can
only be regarded as a failure.
However, two empirical regularities do emerge which are highly suggestive and may prove promising for further research. [The two regularities
referred to are those discussed above.] . , .
Still another deductive approach to the sociology of conflict has
been made by Herbert A. Simon [259]. The system he is dealing
with is a social group whose behaviour can be characterized by
four variables, all functions of time, namely: (a) intensity of interaction as among members; (b) level of friendliness among the m e m bers (c) amount of activity carried on by members within the group;
and (d) the amount of activity imposed by the external environment,
that is, the external system. In addition, three sets of dynamic relationships among these variables are postulated: (a) the intensity of
interaction depends upon, and increases with, the level of friendliness and the amount of activity carried on within the group;
(b) the level of group friendliness will increase if the actual level of
interaction is higher than that ‘appropriate’ to the existing level
of friendliness; and (c) the amount of activity carried on by the
group will tend to increase if the actual level of friendliness is higher
than that ‘appropriate’to the existing amount of activity, and if the
amount of activity imposed externally is higher than the existing
amount of activity. Simon presents equations for all of these
postulates. H e then derives the conditions of equilibrium, of
stability, and then the method of what he calls comparative statics.
From his equations he finds conditions which indicate positive and
negative morale, the latter not unrelated to Durkheim’s anomie.
Under certain conditions, his equations indicate that groups will
dissolve. H e finds, further, that if a group has been dissolved by
66
reducing one of the parameters of his equation,it cannot necessarily
be restored by increasing the parameter once again.
Simon validates his work by reference to George Homans’ study
of The Human Group [lll], but in addition he applies his models
to clique formation,to ‘conflictof loyalties’, and to competition of
groups. H e feels that his model ‘offers an explanation for some of
the commonly observed phenomena relating to the stability and
dissolution of groups’ (p. 211).
An empirical researcher might wish to question some of Simon’s
postulates. It may be true, for example,that intensity of interaction
increases with the level of friendlinessin a group; might it not also
increase with the level of hostility in the group? Hostility is often,
if not necessarily, a concomitant of competition; competition has
been found greatly to accelerate the amount of activity,if not its
quality.
A mathematical biologist, Nicolas Rashevsky [331, 3321, has
been attempting in two books to build up a mathematical sociology,
including a sociology of conflict and of war. His aim is to interpret
neurobiological mechanisms of the central nervous system as revealed in group behaviour. In one sense his theory may be viewed as a
theory of an Clite. His theory is wholly general; it does not apply
to any specific system. H e posits two populations or systems, both
perhaps-and ‘passives’.The two sets
made up of ‘actives’-dlites,
of actives, or the two blites, are in conflict, and each attempts to
influence the other individuals in their respective populations or
systems to engage in the conflict also. Or there may be in each
population two active groups in conflict with one another, one
wishing to carry on the conflict, the other not wishing to. For
simplicity’s sake Rashevsky assumes only one active set of individuals in each population. H e derives the inequalities which must
be satisfied if both populations are to engage in conflict.The length
of the conflict is computed from the rate of destruction of the
members of the populations, or of their removal from combat. If
the rate of destruction of the active members of a population is
more rapid than that of the passive members, a point is reached
where ‘theactive group can no more influence the passive individuals
and make them continue to fight. The populations stop fighting,
become demoralized.... W e thus have a quantitative interpretation
for the “breakdown of morale”, which is usually a rather elusive
notion’([332] pp. 185-6).The population whose morale breaks down
first loses the conflict. As related to war, Rashevsky applies his
formulas to describe the rate of retreat, including in his variables
and constants such factors as amount of land involved,technical
equipment and productivity, natural resources, and changes in the
ratio of actives to passives. Differences in defensive capacity and
in striking power are also involved. The offensive is taken by
67
the population which is favoured in the mathematical inequality.
As an illustration of the kinds of situations which Rashevsky
attempts to reduce to mathematical formulae we cite the following
[331,pp. 218-1911
What looms ahead as a result of such studies is the possibility of describing
in mathematical term3 the following situation: Let n social groups with
initial populations Nol,
N02..
., Non settle at a given moment in n adjacent
areas of sizes, S,, S,. ..S,, characterized by coefficients k’, ka.. .kn, which
measures the fertility of soil and the mineral resources. Groups with initially
small values of Noi/S,will develop technical abilities more slowly. Since
those factors act to decrease d, the value of a will be less in such groups
after a time. If w e consider warlike interactions between the various groups,
w e will find that the incidence of wars favours a special class of military
rulers, w h o survive wars better than other individuals do. The ratio p=N,,/N,
of the military people will vary with time.. ..
Groups with small initial N,/Swill develop a higher a and a,. If a change
in behaviour pattern occurs, the new regime in such groups would be more
intolerant, according to equation 26. W e may have here the clue to understanding the different results of revolutions in different countries. A smaller
a at the moment of a revolution results in greater tolerance and more freedom.
In principle, all these relations can be described mathematically by developing further the theory outlined here. The different parameters may be
estimated by comparison with historical data.
Basically Rashevsky’s system rests on a cost theory of conflict,
although it is not identical to those already referred to. In pleading
for objectivity in analysing the conflict of systems-in this particular
instance capitalism versus socialism, but equally relevant for any
other conflict between systems-he points out that although the
group which profits from any particular social form tends to evaluate
it as superior and any other as inferior, actually such subjective
evaluations do not hold. It is always a question of superior for
whom, inferior for whom. ‘Fundamentally... any advantage to a
group of individuals results in some disadvantage to others’ [331.
p. 2351.
Since Rashevsky’s models are perfectly general, wholly independent of empirical data, it is impossible to make any substantive
critique.So far as method is concerned,he is, apparently,rigorously
correct. His ‘standards of mathematical rigour are high. The
methods used are drawn from the calculus and the theory of ordinary
linear differential equations, with a few tentative steps toward the
use of integral equations’ [299,p. 1491. The test of this work will
come in the stimulus it offers to others and in whatever application
can be made of it.
Another mathematically oriented approach is that of Anatol
Rappaport who, in a series of articles dealing mathematically with
1. T h e concept U refers to ‘actives’ as contrasted with ‘passives’. as described in the meceding
paragraph.
68
what he calls ‘satisfaction functions’ has explored the rewards of
co-operation between two individuals under given conditions of
sharing, of need, of output, and of initiative.In the course of his
analyses he derives an equation which he interprets as follows [383,
pp. 118-191:
The logarithmic terms of S, and S, represent the satisfaction of two ‘states’
arising from ‘security’ which each believes results from armaments. Hence
the satisfaction depends not only on the absolute amount of armaments
possessed but also on the excess of armaments over those of the neighbour.
Here, of course, the increased efforts of Y detract from the satisfaction of X.
The linear terms represent the detraction from satisfaction due to the burden
of taxation, etc., that is, the ‘effort’in producing the armaments. The amount
of armaments produced under these circumstances will be given by equation 16, and the resulting satisfactions will be less than they would be if
the ‘competitive term’ were not present, in spite of the fact that this term
vanishes at x = y , where ‘balance of power’ is achieved. It is interesting to
note that both competitors are losers.
This would seem to be a mathematical statement of the invidious
nature of all status phenomena; no matter how high one stands
absolutely, one still remains low as compared to another. Perhaps
Rappaport’s work applies more specifically to competitive situations
than to conflict,but it may be useful for both. An exploration of
his theory in relation to reference group theory would seem to be
in order. As in the case of other mathematical models, the perfectly
general nature of Rappaport’s models renders them independent of
empirical tests. The mathematical procedures seem rigorous and
correct.
Karl W. Deutsch [729] has contributed an interesting theory of
national assimilation and conflict based on the currently popular
cybernetic concepts of information and communication. H e suggests
that on the basis of numbers in nine population groups and six
rates of change, ‘theprobable developments towards either national
assimilation or national conflict in a given area’ can be calculated
(p. 102). The nine population groups are as follows. The total
population, P;the public, or socially mobilized population, M;the
unmobilized or underlying population, U;the assimilated population, A; the differentiated population, D;the mobilized and assimilated population, N;the mobilized but differentiated population,
W;the underlying assimilated population, Q;(for quiescent); and
the underlying differentiated population,R.The six rates of change
needed are: the natural rate of growth of the total population; the
rate of natural increase of the mobilized part of the population M;
the rate of entry of outsiders into M;the rate of natural population
increase for the assimilated population; the rate at which outsiders
are entering the assimilated group; and the rate of natural increase
of the differentiated population. H e documents his conclusions with
69
data dealing with Finland,Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia,India-Pakistan,
and Scotland.
The last of the mathematically oriented approaches to the sociology of conflict to be presented here is that of the British student
of inter-grouprelations, L. F. Richardson,who has classified and
illustrated from international behaviour, the probable reactions of
one group to a threat by another as: contempt,submission,negotiation followed by submission, negotiation followed by a bargain,
and retaliation. H e is particularly interested in the last-named,
which usually takes the form of an arms race toward war. Richardson begins with a concept borrowed from Gregory Bateson’s study
of the Iatmul tribe in N e w Guinea, called ‘schismogenesis’.which
means ‘themanner of formation of cleavages’. Schismogenesis may
be symmetrical or complementary, according as the behaviour
developed by the two sides is the same or complementary.An arms
race is a case of symmetrical schismogenesis. Basing his analysis
on the defence budgets of leading nations from 1909 to 1914,
Richardson evolves a set of equations for the rate of increase in
dY =lx .
arms expenditures,namely: dx = ky and dt
dt
H e then continues [235, pp. 229-301:
-
This is a mathematicai expression of the idea of permanent peace by allround total disarmament. Criticism of that idea will follow, but for the
present let us continue to study the meaning of equations 1 and 2. Suppose
that x and y being zero, the tranquility were disturbed by one of the nations
making some very slightly threatening gesture, so that y became slightly
positive. According to equation 1, x would then begin to grow. According
to equation 2 as soon as x had become positive, y would begin to grow
further. The larger x and y had become the faster would they increase.
Thus the system defined by equations 1 and 2 represents a possible equilibrium at the point where x and y are both zero, but this equilibrium is
unstable, because any slight deviation from it tends to increase. Stability
is not the same as equilibrium; for on the contrary stable and unstable are
adjectives qualifying equilibrium. Thus an equilibrium is said to be stable,
or to have stability, if a small disturbance tends to die away; whereas an
equilibrium is said to be unstable, or to have instability,if a small disturbance
tends to increase.
Richardson develops his statements to include a formula for disarmament by a victor-a formula used by physicists to describe
‘fading away’ phenomena, or by accountants to describe depreciation.’ To take account of these phenomena, Richardson amends
his equations to include another constant which gives a ‘fatigueand
expense coefficient’ or a ‘restraint coefficient’. These restraining
1. S. C. Dodd reports a similar fading away phenomenon in connexion with ‘tension’ in a
housing project [IOII].
70
influences may be sufficient to render the equilibrium stable, or they
may not. Richardson concludes that there is a theoretical possibility
of permanent peace by universal total disarmament,but to meet the
argument that ’grievances and ambitions would cause various groups
to acquire arms in order to assert their rights, or to domineer over
their unarmed neighbours’, he again amends his formulae by adding
another set of constants so that the formulae no longer indicate a
permanent condition. H e n o w has two straight lines in two planes;
if they intersect, a condition of equilibrium-stable or unstableis indicated at the point of intersection. This set of equations, the
author points out, does not take into account other than retaliatory
reactions to threats, that is: contempt, submission, negotiation, or
avoidance, since his theory ‘is restricted to the interaction of groups
which style themselves powers, which are proud of their so-called
sovereignty and independence, are proud of their armed might, and
are not exhausted by combat. This theory is not about victory and
defeat. In different circumstances k or 1 might be negative’ (p. 233).
Richardson proposes the concept ‘warfinpersal’ ‘war-iinance-persalary) as the best measure of a nation’s warlike preparations. On
its subjective side-moods, friendly or unfriendly, before a war-he
finds that the best equation to describe the way such moods behave
is one used in the theory of epidemics of disease, so that, ha argues,
‘eagerness for war can be regarded analogously as a mental disease
infected into those in a susceptible mood by those who already have
the disease in the opposing country’ [253,p. 2351.
The work of Deutsch and Richardson differs from that of some
of the other mathematical work here reported in that it is based on
empirical data; it is intended to be descriptive of the behaviour of
nations internally and externally. There is little attempt to ferret
out new relationships; nor is the mathematical basis in any way new.
The mathematical models of social conflict so far presented are
based on conventional, if difficult, mathematics, mainly on systems
of linear equations enlisted for ad hoc analyses. There is in process
of developing at the present time a radically different kind of
mathematical model, dependent more on combinatories a and matrix
algebra, but evolving its o w n mathematics as it proceeds. It may
be viewed as a method for measuring the costs of differing policies
or plans or strategies and thereby helping in selecting the best one.
It is called the theory of games of strategy [206,5171. Since w e shall
discuss it at some length in a later chapter, w e mention it here
merely for the sake of completeness.
1. Richardson refers to Ms theory of submissiveness, which appeared in the following publications: Atternalives to R e a r m a m e n f 15421. and in Psychomelrika, 1948. 13, pp. 147-74,
197-232.
2. Or combinatorial analysis. which deals with combinations, permutations, arrangements and
distributions.
71
Most of the mathematical models for the study of conflict derive
directly or indirectly from physics. In this sense they often seem
rigid and mechanical, even when they do fit life situations. Thus,
for example,when Simon went over his equations with Homans, on
whose work he was basing his model, Homans concluded ‘that the
mathematical treatment does not do violence to the meanings of his
verbal statements,but that the equations do not capture all of the
inter-relations he postulates-that they tell the truth, but not the
whole truth’ [259,p. 204 fn.]. This will probably always be true of
any equation.
Nevertheless, equations and especially formulas of inequalities
seem to constitute an appropriate language for conflict situations,
Inequalitiesmay, by varying parameters,pass through equalities and
then reverse themselves. This oscillation of position seems to constitute a reasonable model for many conflict situations, especially
in those where bargaining is involved.
To some students, especially to those who come to research by
way of empirical work, the currently increasingly popular postulational approach seems vaguely unsatisfying. It seems to begin
without sufficient empirical basis; it seems, in effect, to beg the
question. The postulates assume given conditions; the empirical
researcher would like proof that such conditions actually exist
generally. The deductive approach, however, aims at finding conditions which the empirical approach cannot locate with its method.
And ultimately the deductive approach tests itself by its ability to
‘explain’real-lifesituations.Still it must be granted that the deductive approach seems to assume that w e know more on the simple
descriptive level than perhaps we really do know. The relationships
assumed among given variables, again, strike some students as
unrealistic,or at any rate, as requiring more validation.
Perhaps most troubling is the assumption in mathematical models
that all the variables involved can be precisely measured and that
in the case of those referring to subjective phenomena-e.g., cost,
utility, satisfaction, ‘effort’,etc.-they are additive in nature. This
last-namzd difficulty haunts researchers in all the social sciences.
Perhaps the chief contribution of mathematical models may turn
out to be the stimulus they offer for the invention of techniques for
measuring the parameters involved. The measures needed may far
transcend those now available. Perhaps a totally new attack on the
problems of measurement is needed. It may be that we are in a rut
in our thinking, that present approaches-in terms of attitude
scales, ‘utils’ and the like-are inhibiting the emergence of better
1. ‘Utils’are statistical constructs devised for the measurement of ‘utility’ or ‘subjectivevalue’.
Since the chapter was originally written, there has developed a new approach to the measurement of ‘utility’or ‘subjective’value which goes under the name of Decision Theory. See:
72
ones. It has become so easy for good technicians to whip up new
instruments based on current assumptions that the invention of
better instruments may be prevented. Here as in so many other
fields, the good may be the enemy of the better. The problem is
especially acute in the sociology of conflict because here ‘cost’is
so often in terms of phenomena as yet unmeasurable. In this area
the work of the social-psychological school of conflict and that of
the sociological school can find a common problem to attack,
requiring all the skills and insights both can muster.
SOME EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF CONFLICT
Experiment in the field of conflict is a dangerous procedure. It is
one thing to observe and report on the fomenting of conflict by
others; it is quite another thing to create the conflictitself. In reallife situations conflicts are always being produced-‘experimentally’
in a non-scientific sense-but they are not scientifically set up or
controlled. Agents provocateurs make a profession of inducing
aggression. There is, no doubt, quite a ‘science’of conflict in this
sense available in the heads and reports of conspiratorial and resistance leaders. But the professional scientific literature offers little.
Only one controlled experiment in this field has, in fact, been
reported. Muzafer Sherif has presented some preliminary results of
an experiment on boys at a summer camp which showed that bitter
conflict among boys could be produced, and strong loyalty to new
groups developed, by separating them into rival groups [238]. The
significance of this experiment lies in part in the fact that goals
and values may be rendered incompatible artificially, that costs
may be introduced into a situation where none would necessarily
exist without outside intervention. Strategists have long known this
principle and used it. The agitator and the ‘trouble-maker’are pastmasters in the art of applying it. But this is the 6rst attempt to
observe it under controlled conditions.
In another study of boys at a summer camp, the development
of factionalism in small face-to-facegroups or systems was studied.
T w o of the seven hypotheses tested were: ‘Thelarge group will tend
to break into smaller factions’ and ‘Asfactions develop in the large
group, one or two persons will become spokesmen for these factions
and the discussion will be carried on between them’ [363,pp. 266-71.
This second hypothesis suggests Rashevsky’s ‘actives’and ‘passives’,
I. Bross. Design for Decision (New York, Macmillan. 1953); Ward Edwards, ‘The Theory
of Decision Making’, Psychological Bulletin, July 1954, XLI, pp. 380-417; L. J. Savage.
Foundarions of Sfatistics (New York, Wiley, 1954); S. A. Siegel, ‘A Method for Obtaining
an Ordered Metric Scale’, Psychomefrika, in press; and R. M.Thrall. C.H.Coombs, and
R. L. Davis, Decision Processes (New York, Wiley, 1954).
73
or,in fact,any &lite. Neither of these hypotheses was unequivocally
confirmed.This experiment,although dealing with factionalism,was
not truly a study of conflict since costs were not involved. Or,
perhaps, in the experimental conditions here set up, the costs of
remaining within the system were so insignificant that conflict could
hardly be said to exist.
Of tangential interest for a sociology of conflict, and primarily
observational in method rather than strictly speaking experimental.
is a study by John James of the size determinant in small group
interaction [369]. As a face-to-facegroup increases in size, the
potential number of interrelationships among members increases at
an exponential rate.' Individuals therefore tend to split themselves
into smaller units in which interrelationshipsare more manageable in
number. The implication of this study is that there may be characteristics inherent in group structure itself which facilitate the breakdown of systems when costs, and therefore conflicts, are involved.
It would not do,of course,to stretch this thin bit of evidence too far.
The work of students in the field of sociometry and of group
dynamics should be referred to in this connexion also. Little of it
is directly related to the sociology of conflict since there is usually
little if any cost involved. It is relevant mainly in the sense that
it shows how easily, even without cost elements present, natural
groupings tend to break down as a result of factors seemingly
inherent in interpersonal relations. The preconditions for conflict,
in brief, may be present in all groupings; it may take only the
interjection of cost elements to transform them into conflict groups.
STUDIES IN THE INTEGRATION OF SYSTEMS
In general the studies so far referred to have dealt primarily with
the breakdown of systems,although the integration of systems might
be inherent in their assumptions.In some of the work,provision is
made for shifting coalitions or alliances in the process of interaction,
that is,for the disintegration of one system and the reintegration of
the constituent sub-systemsinto new systems.And the whole concept
of equilibrium,basic especially to many of the mathematical models,
implies that systems may coalesce or integrate as well as break
apart or disintegrate.Indeed, it is one of the 'beauties' of mathematical models that they may make provision for such two-way
processes. On the whole, however, we have emphasized the break-
1. The formula, given by Kephart based on work by Bossard, for potential relationships is:
potential relationships=
74
3n -2n-1
~
-1.
down or schismatic rather than the integrative aspects of the work
so far presented.
There has been, nevertheless, a great interest in integration as
such in recent years. W e have already referred to Nisbet’s thesis that
current sociology has followed essentially the conservative tradition
of emphasis on organization-a phase of integration-rather than
the radical tradition of emphasis on social change, which is essentially a phase of disintegration, if not always of conflict. The costs
of any integrated system may be variously allocated. The totalitarian
system tends to throw the entire cost of its own integration on opposing sub-systems,either by liquidating them or by exploiting them.
Democratic systems find it impossible to use such methods to any
great extent; they depend on an assessment of the costs of their
integration fairly widely, if not uniformly, throughout all the subsystems involved.
Not all processes of integration and of disintegration of systems
come within the purview of the sociology of conflict; sometimes
they occur with little if any cost, and sometimes, with a mutual
gain. In the theory of games, for example, it is demonstrated that
some coalitions benefit both or all members, at the expense, of
course, of their mutual opponent. Even without a common enemy,
however, it is demonstrable that large consolidated units may be
more profitable to constituent members than many small, unintegrated units. The division of labour is based upon this fact. Conversely, systems may fall apart not because the cost of remaining
intact is great, but merely because there is no gain either way, so
that slight or even chance factors may lead to break-down.
The classical formulation of integration, perhaps, was that of
Oppenheimer who expounded the conflict or conquest theory of the
origin of the state. And many people have defended imperialism on
the grounds that empires broaden the area of peace. The Pax
Romana and the Pax Britannica, they argue, came as a result of
imperial integration. The same process of ‘empire’building, it has
been argued, is continuing so that eventually one world will emerge.
The question is, in their minds, must integration come by means
of force and violence and conquest, or can it come by some other
means?
No-Yong Park, for example, has pointed out that although white
men have succeeded in establishing peace among aborigines by substituting-with the use of brutal force-a reign of law and order,
they have failed with Asiatics and with themselves. The reason,
according to him, is that they have confused cause and effect.
Nationalism,militarism, economic rivalries, and other alleged causes
of war are the result of fears and uncertainties, rather than the
reverse [533]. G. S. Ghurye testifies to the importance of the problem by his reference to the integration of the backward peoples into
75
the larger society and economy with a minimum of disorganization
and exploitation.H e reviews the administrative and anthropological
literature dealing with aborigines and the processes, past and present, of incorporating them into larger systems, and concludes that
in the case of India,at any rate, the central problem of building a
unified nation is in how to integrate the tribal peoples [830]. A n
anthropological study which throws some light on the process of
spreading,let us say ‘theKing’s peace’ is that on the Kalingas by
R. F. Barton [771]. In this study the transition from kinship to
territorial organization-which Maine oncecharacterized as constituting a true revolution-can be viewed in detail. The book shows how
feuds and local warfare have been eliminated,how areas of peace
have been established,how the rule of law has been substituted for
the feud and other forms of violence. Processes which in Western
civilization have taken centuries to work themselves out have been
telescoped into a comparatively short time, so that they can be
studied as under a microscope.
Without distinguishing at between growth involving costs and
growth not involving costs,Hornell Hart has applied logistic curves
to data on the size of political areas and concludes that such curves
do indeed fit the data. H e accepts as given such phenomena as
conquests,rebellions,and other reshufflingsof governmental control.
But he pays no especial attention to the fact that some empires or
territorial expansions have been without conflict, as when the
American government purchased the Louisiana Territory. H e does,
however,recognize the disturbances which wars and crises introduce
into growth curves. Hart is primarily interested in determining
the fact of political integration and in describing it mathematically;
he is not interested in the processes by which this integration-with
or without conflict-takes place [365].
The processes of political integration themselves have been analysed by a historian, Crane Brinton, who finds only two such
processes, namely: imperialism and federalism. In the history of
Western society he h d s only a small number of the latter-the
Achaean and the Aeolian Leagues,Holland,Switzerland,the British
Most political integration,he conCommonwealth and the U.S.S.R.
cludes,has been achieved by some kind of imperialistic technique,
whether by violence or force of some other kind [611].The classic
example of national integration,Switzerland, has been analysed by
Kurt Mayer, who concludes that it is the demographic equilibrium
among the several language groups which helps to account for the
way Switzerland has managed to maintain its peaceful integration
[663].
One of the difficulties in studying the processes of integration lies
in the lack of indexes on the basis of which to measure them.Here
a number of American sociologists have been making noteworthy
76
contributions. Rudolf Heberle, for example, has demonstrated how
political behaviour as reflected in election returns can be used as
indexes of ‘social solidarity or disintegration’.Heberle hopes that
the kind of work he describes will lend itself not only to the theory
but also to the practice of integration,and he reminds us that such
giants as Saint Simon,Comte,and Lorenz Stein ‘conceivedthe new
science of society as an antidote against the poison of social disintegration which, in their opinion, had taken effect since the turn
of the eighteenth century’ [472]. This point of view on the part of
the giants reflected a conservative orientation.It decried the efforts
of those who were paying the costs of the new system to re-allocate
them in a manner less onerous to themselves.
Integration on a community-widelevel has also engaged the attention of sociologists.Werner S. Landecker has proposed four indexes
-cultural, normative, communicative, and functional-to be used
for measuring integration, and has discussed the structural setting
in which integration occurs [323, 3721.But perhaps the most careful
empirical study in this area is that of R. C. Angell on the moral
integration of cities [Ill. H e conceives moral integration as ‘the
degree to which the areas of possible friction or conflict within the
group are covered by a set of moral norms that are accepted and
implemented by all’. H e experimented with a variety of statistical
indexes as measures of moral integration thus conceived, and
emerged with one based on crime and welfare effort. H e then
applied this index to 43 large American cities and found moral
integration as measured by his index to be related to the (a) compatibility and (b) adequacy of moral norms and also to the (c) efficiency of the processes which made for such compatibility and
adequacy. Among the factors which he found made for (c), that
is, for efficiency of processes leading to comptability and adequacy of norms were: the rate of population mobility; the community-mindedness of churches and schools; and the quality of
the community’s leadership. Angell hopes that the leads he has
offered might be usefully applied to other than local community
areas. ‘ W emight expect that significant inferences could be made to
other large, heterogeneous groups, such as giant factories and
national states. It is even possible that our theory might prove
suggestive for research on problems of world order.’
Before w e leave the topic of integration as a phase of the sociology of conflict it may be pertinent to say a word about the associated concept of co-operation,which seems to have obstructed clear
thinking about inter-grouprelations.Jessie Bernard has pointed out
that:
. . . surely there is no concept in sociology more poorly conceived than this
one. I once asked Dr. Park . . . why his system of sociology had no
separate concept of co-operation in it. H e replied that all social life was
77
co-operative, all social organization was a co-operative system, biotic and
commensalistic behaviour was co-operative, the division of labour was cooperatwe, accommodation was co-operative (‘antagonistic co-operation’,
Sumner had labelled it, but co-operative nonetheless), assimilation, communication, conformity to mores, custom, etc., were all co-operative, as
was also the highly complex system known as Rochedale Co-operation, etc. . . . A n adequate concept of co-operation would have to include
all behaviour that contributed to c o m m o n goals. It would include a
large proportion of all sociological phenomena. For some, co-operation is
the alternative to conflict; for others, to competition. The problem of conceptualization has become further complicated with the arrival of anthropologists and psychologists in the field of group and inter-group behaviour.
The tendency of the latter is to view such behaviour subjectively, so that
co-operation becomes a personality trait-helpfulness, or a co-operative
attitude.’
Ashley-Montagu,who has tried to systematize the concept, has
succeeded only in confusing it even further [195]. H e identifies it
variously as simply living together in aggregates rather than in
isolation,as a personality trait associated with loving dependence,
and as conformity, sacrifice,frustration. The implication in a good
deal of the discussion of co-operationis that it is inherently good.
Yet there is no particular virtue in co-operationas such. W e must
always ask such questions as: W h o co-operateswith whom? For
what? Even, against whom? There can be the co-operation of the
slave and master. There can be the co-operation of thieves and
crooks and politicians. Conspiracy is co-operation;so is cheating.
W e do not consider it good when people co-operate with our
enemies. W e are not pleased when nations impose ‘co-operation’
on satellites. During a military occupation co-operation with the
conquering occupation forces is considered by patriots to be treasonable; resistance, not co-operation,is honoured. As a sociological
concept,certainly with any value connotations,co-operation is probably worse than useless; it may be misleading.
In evaluating co-operation there must always be an assessment
of the allocation of the costs involved. Are all parties sharing the
costs equally; that is, have all yielded the same amount in terms
of values and goals? Are some parties paying a disproportionate
share of the costs;have they had to give up more in terms of values
and goals than others? Are all parties gaining at the expense of a
common opponent? Or are there no costs involved at all? In the
latter case, the situation does not fall within the province of the
sociology of conflict.
Ashley-Montagu’s work has tended to revive the nineteenthcentury controversy with regard to Darwinian ‘strugglefor existence’
and Kropotkin’s ‘Mutualaid’.It is a fruitless controversy.
The opposite of co-operation is not conflict but anomie.
1. American Journol of Sociology, Nov. 1950, 56 (3). p. 283
78
SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF CONFLICT
In the studies so far discussed, the actual data used were relatively
unimportant. The emphasis for the most part was on fundamental
and general processes, the data being primarily illustrative. In addition,there have been analytical, descriptive,and explanatory studies
based on anthropological and historical data, as well as on contemporary observation. In them the data are themselves intrinsically
important. They are ‘news’in Hughes’ sense, as well as illustrations
of important sociological processes. W e can only give the barest
reference to most of these studies; the reader who wishes more
details may refer to the sources in the bibliography.
White Settlers and Native Peoples
A. Grenfell Price, studying the impact of white settlers on native
peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia, and N e w Zealand,
finds three stages, so far as the impact on the native peoples is
concerned, namely: (a) crude impact, resulting in a decline of the
native population; (b) reforms to help the natives, often, however,
ill conceived and producing as a result more harm than good; and
(c) a scientific attempt to bring natives into the culture stream [922].
He pleads for a humane policy. It is, of course, only when one
people has succeeded in eliminating another as a threat that a
generous policy is considered feasible: it is only when the vanquished group has borne almost the entire cost of an empire that
imperial policy can afford to indulge in humane policies.
The Far East
Perhaps the greatest single conflict occurring at the present time is
the breakdown of colonial empires. The stage is primarily the
Orient. Sociologists,both of the East and of the West, are watching
with a kind of fascinated interest the many forms which conflict
is now taking in the Orient. Maurice Zinkin, for example, gives us
a general picture of the revolutionary processes there taking place
[591]. J. H.Boeke deals, among other topics, with the village community in collision with capitalism [787]. Bruno Lasker has given
a careful picture of slavery, serfdom, peonage, debt bondage, and
compulsory public service in Southeast Asia [874]. Agrarian unrest
in Southeast Asia has been analysed by Erich H. Jacoby [1080].
Justus M.V a n Der Kroef has analysed for Indonesia the breakdown
of the indigenous social system and the restitutive processes n o w
taking place in reorganizing Indonesia on a nationalistic basis
[966]. Ralph Pieris and Bryce Ryan have given American sociologists
79
an analysis of a caste system not often presented in the literature,
namely that of Ceylon [917,9421.
China has become the focus for many students of conflict today.
Even before the rise of the Communist Party to leadership, the
conflictsrevealed by the Chinese revolution,by Chinese rebellions,by
agrarian unrest,and by the impact of Western civilization on Chinese
society had elicited a great deal of interest in both Chinese and Western sociologists.The Chinese Student Movement has been analysed
for Western sociologistsby Wen-HanKiang [486] who distinguishes
four phases: the Chinese Renaissance, the revolt against religion,
the nationalist revolution,and the united front. Marion J. Levy,Jr.,
has described what he calls the family revolution in modern China,
pointing out that industrialization is incompatible with the traditional kinship system which has served as the basis of solidarity;
and other bases for stability have not yet emerged [163]. Levy’s
thesis has been challenged by Morton H.Fried [86].
Ssu-Yu Teng analyses the causes of revolutions in China [569].
Shu-Ching Lee interprets the current scene in China as a form of
rural-urbanconflict. In his opinion the communists are trying to
foment and combine a red or urban,and a green,or peasant,movement in order to increase industrialization and bring about the rise
of a proletariat [1094].
An analysis of the backgrounds of the men who have led China
during the last generation has shown that although the West has
been responsible for furnishing the ideological background for the
modern revolutions in China, it has not been able to furnish
techniques for implementing the ideology it has offered;communism
seems to have been more successful in this respect [524].
The conflicts-Hindu-Muslim, Pakistan-India,aborigines-civilized,
India-GreatBritain, ideological,industrial,caste-in which India is
engaged are among the most dramatic of the present time. For this
reason India has become the centre for a series of Unesco studies.
For the most part, the analyses of conflict in India have therefore
been in terms of ‘tensions’[830]. The problem of incorporating the
aborigines has also received some attention [830]. And Gandhi
continues to elicit the interest of students of conflict because of the
perennial challenge of his theory of non-violence [378, 908,9261.
Europe and the Near East
Dinko Tomasic in a recent study in the field of political sociology
has presented an analysis of leadership in Eastern Europe in terms
of the cultural conditioning of personality [572]. H e has also made
a sociological analysis of Bolshevik ideology as related to Bolshevik
policy, tracing the relationship in an international context [571].
Hans Bernd Gisevius [460]has contributed a study of the opposition
80
to Hitler. One would have expected many sociological analyses of
resistance movements to have issued from the pens of European
scholars,but so far they have not appeared. Chester L.Hunt has
Hertzler’s thesis that dictatorships tend to pass through
tested J. 0.
certain stages by examining the German Protestant Church under
Hitler, and feels that he has verified it successfully [480].Theodore
Abel has introduced and analysed the concept of ‘democide’,that is,
extermination on the basis of any kind of social attribute, such as
age, culture, education,political affiliation,as well as on the basis
of race and religion [397].
A study of the emerging cleavages -racial, class, occupational,
and religious-in Israel has recently been published by Samuel
Koenig [869].
Africa
A recent study by Simon Davis, based on historical data, presents
evidence against the current view that race problems are relatively
new and modern phenomena. H e shows that contrary to the opinion
often expressed, ethnocentrism,miscegenation, discrimination, antiSemitism,riots,pogroms, and similar problems of inter-grouprelations existed in ancient Egypt [814].
South Africa is considered by most informed students to be one
of the most serious ‘tension’spots in the world today, and the
Mau-Mau riots of 1952-53,the resistance movement, and the policy
of Malan with respect to apartheid have tended to corroborate this
opinion. Eugene P.Dvorin has analysed the theory of apartheid,
which states that the peaceful co-existence of whites, blacks, and
Asiatics in South Africa depends on their being kept strictly and
effectively isolated from one another.
Most of the literature on colonial problems has been by members
of the imperial state. A recent study of the Sudan question is an
exception,being by an Egyptian,Mekki Abbas [395].
America
Lucio Mendieta y Nunez has summarized racial,cultural,and class
‘tensions’in Latin America, with special attention to Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru [901].The social anthropologist, Melvin
M.Tumin reports on the tensions and strains in the social structure
of Guatemala based on changing land tenure [959].
A mass of raw data for an analysis of the sociology of conflict in
Latin America is available in the publications of the several
agencies of the United Nations, such,for example,as the A d Hoc
Committee on Slavery, the Commission on Human Rights, SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
81
Minorities. The International Labour Organisation publishes its
Yearbook, which includes material on labour conflicts. The Secre-
tary-Generalof the Commission on Human Rights has reported on
the activities of the United Nations and of specialized agencies
with regard to economic, social,and cultural rights. Still in process
is the Unesco pilot investigation of contacts between races and
ethnic groups to determine the factors which are favourable or
unfavourable to harmonious relations in Brazil (by Rene Riveiro
in Recife; by Thales de Azevedo in Bahia,by Harry W.Hutchinson,
Ben Zimmerman, Marvin Harris, and Charles Wagley in rural
communities in the hinterland of Bahia). Dr. Oracy Nogueira
is including a study of race in his survey of the town of Itapetininga.
A study of the Indonesian minority in Surinam, Dutch Guiana,
shows that although there is no legal discrimination, the Indonesians have low status. By their own exclusiveness,however, they
seem to encourage non-legal discrimination [964].
United States and Canada: Race and Ethnic Group Conflict
There is probably no country in the world where there is more
research on conflict than in the United States. Race conflict, ethnic
group conflict, political conflict, economic conflict, and religious
conflict engage a large share of the attention of sociologists.
John B. Edlefsen has recently described a case of ‘enclavement’,
that is, of cultural and biological identity and continuation in a
situation of social interaction,referring to a Basque immigrant community in Idaho [822]. Acculturation has taken place without pre
judice or conflict; a sub-systemand a super-systemhave,apparently,
managed to co-existwithout cost to either one. Paul C.P.Siu has
suggested the concept of ‘thesoujourner’, a type of stranger, somewhat different from the marginal man. H e clings to his cultural
heritage and tends to live in isolation. His significance for a sociology of conflict lies in the fact that he is more likely than others to
be available as a fifth column recruit [1131].
Two masterly studies of the Negro in the United States, one
by E. Franklin Frazier [825] and one by Maurice Davie [812]
include both a historical and contemporary account of Negro-White
conflict. A bibliography on the Negro in the United States up to
1947 was published by H
i
l
l and Foreman [lo241 and a critique of
i
l
l [847]. Community studies in the
the periodical literature, by H
United States continue to document discrimination against the
Negro with monotonous regularity [861]. A ‘revolutionary’change
in the pronouncements of the Protestant Church with respect to the
Negro since World War I1 is reported by Frank S. Loescher [882];
and T.J. Harte has described the work of Catholic organizations
82
designed to promote Negro-White
race relations in the United States
[840’].
O n the basis of a comparison of Brazilian and United States
systems of race relations, TI W . Sprague concludes that exploitation
on a racial basis is a substitute, in effect, for exploitation on the
basis of other criteria [952]. Frank R. Westie reports that the
attitude of Whites toward Negroes varies according to class, there
being less distance between Whites and upper occupational groups
of Negroes. But the status of the white person was important also,
high status whites showing less distance than lower status whites
[1052]. People who are secure in their own status do not have to
lean on artificial status symbols for props. It may also be a matter
of competitive relationships. The upper class White person has less
competition from Negroes than the lower-class White person.
Some doubt is cast upon the validity of the usual analyses of
race conflict in the United States by a report on race relations in
Canada by Ruth Danenhower Wilson [979]. She points out that
there is the same pattern of discrimination in Canada as in the
United States without the conditions usually assigned to explain it.
The up-rooting of thousands of American citizens of Japanese
descent during World W a r TI on the grounds of military safety
was interpreted by some students as a strategic move in a domestic,
rather than international, conflict situation. Three studies of this
move may be mentioned here: Morton Grodzins’ analysis of the
political aspects [467], Dorothy Thomas’ study of the social-psychological aspects [956,9571;and Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer’s
study of some of the costs involved [27].
Although attacks on Jews have been in terms of systems-the
Jews being viewed as essentially subversive because of their religious
and/or cultural ties which constituted them a powerful systemthe defence against these attacks has been primarily in terms of
‘prejudice’. The B’nai B’rith periodically publishes cases of discrimination and attack, but the tremendous amount of research on
the subject has been for the most part based on a theory of prejudice. One study, by a journalist,however, rather than by a social
scientist, has viewed‘ it primarily in terms of systems, namely the
study of anti-Semitism by Carey McWilliams, who views it as a
‘mask for privilege’ [897].
Sectarianism and Religious Conflict
Because of the unique freedom from political control of religious
institutions, sectarianism has played a prominent role in the history
of religious organization in the United States and has therefore
engaged the interests of a number of American sociologists.
One recent study deals with the schisms or conflicts between
83
church and sect forms of religious organization in Canada from
1760 to 1900 [434].The author follows Troeltsch in viewing the
conflict between ‘forcesof order’ and ‘forcesof separation’ as basic
in religious development. The non-conflict,folk aspect of the sect
is emphasized in a recent study by E.D.C.Brewer [421].Walter
B.Rutland sees church-staterelations in the United States as ‘first
a problem of deeply conflicting religious viewpoints;and, second...
one of balancing relationships in a changing social order’ [545].
And John J. Kane, on the basis of a content analysis of one Protestant and one Catholic periodical for 1939, 1944,and 1949,reports
evidence of increasing tension between the two groups [485].
Although it is not by a sociologist nor even in terms of sociological concepts,the work of a skilled journalist,Paul Blanshard,
should perhaps be at least referred to here. In two volumes which
constitute what may be called political pamphlets in the grand
tradition he documents the bid of the Catholic Church for political
power and dissects the strategy and tactics it uses. H e makes it
clear that he is speaking of the church as a secular rather than as a
religious institution [416,4171.
Political Conflict
Although American sociologists have given lip-service to political
sociology in the sense of an analysis of political institutions or of
the state or of government as social institutions,unlike European
sociologists they have not,until quite recently,devoted their research
efforts to political sociology as a study of conflicts of power groups.
It was, in large measure, the influence of sociology which transformed political science from a study of formal documents into a
study of political behaviour and public opinion at the beginning of
the twentieth century. Thus many political scientists for over half
a century have been, in effect, political sociologists studying sectional, class, racial, and ethnic-group cleavages as revealed in
voting behaviour; or studying pressure groups as they shaped legislation and policy; or political parties as evidence of protest and
conflict. It is only recently that American sociologists have become
actively interested in research in this area.Outstanding among them
is Rudolf Heberle,whose volume on social movements has organized
a great deal of pertinent data on political protest [473].Heberle
finds that voting behaviour can be used as an index of profound
sociological processes. O n the basis of a study of written documents,
Sarah McCulloh Lemmon has analysed the strategy and tactics of
the so-called Dixiecrat Movement [494]. Thomas H. Grier has
studied social reform movements in the United States since 1865,
concluding that people tend to bear the costs of inequalities in a
social system a long time before they attempt to re-allocate them
84
[10741. T w o case studies of agrarian revolt in Canada, including,
in one, similar movements in the United States, have contributed
data for a sociology of political conflict. One is a study of protest
movements in the wheat belts of Canada, especially of the NonPartisan League [1127]; and the other is a study of agrarian socialism in Saskatchewan, pointing out that the farmer’s antagonism
against ‘business’was a class conflict rather than an expression of
political sectionalism [658].
When the conflicting political systems are national states themselves,rather than sub-systemswithin the nation,we enter the field of
international relations,where many disciplines have for many years
been working. Unesco publishes an annual bibliography of articles
in political science,International Political Science Abstracts, a large
proportion of which deal with conflict. War, imperialism, colonialism, economic warfare, international migration, international
arbitration, have all piled up impressive bibliographies. W e shall
refer here to only one analysis, namely the conflict between the
Soviet Union and the United States [726].The author,A. K.Davis,
finds the historical setting for this conflict in the industrializing
process itself. H e points out that similarities as well as differences
may produce rivalry and mutual anxiety; and he finds a great many
areas of similarity between Russia and the United States. H e then
invokes the currently fashionable tension theory to explain the
inter-systemconflict,in terms,that is, of internal hostility generated
by the socialization process in all systems.H e sees both the United
States and Russia as performing a scapegoat function,each for the
other.
Class Conflict and Industrial Conflict
Brief mention should be made here of one of the most interesting
developments in American sociology in the last generation, a
developmentin itself a sociologicalphenomenon of some significance
perhaps. The concept of ‘class’which was originally bound up with
the struggle for power has been almost completely emasculated and
sterilized of its conflict implications. ‘Class consciousness’ which
used to be a term denoting consciousness of the incidence of the
costs of modern industrial society has come to mean simply a recognition of status differentials. This change in conceptualization of
class from one involving power to one involving primarily prestige
was inaugurated by a social anthropologist, W.Lloyd Warner, and
his associates. Coming to the study of modern industrial society
with a research background in preliterate cultures in Africa,Warner
1. For a survey of Sociology and the Study of International Relations up to 1934, see the
monography of that title by L. L. Bernard and Jessie Bernard L7161.
85
viewed the structure of a m o d e m community in essentially static
terms. The research methods and techniques which were adequate
enough to lay bare the structure of a preliterate community were
not, however adequate to reveal the dynamic conflict aspects of a
highly industrialized community. As a result of the reorientation
of the concept of class, American sociologists have been, figuratively,
jumping around in confusion trying to find out just what has happened. A large literature has arisen attempting to clarify exactly
what the problem is [llll]. All the emotions which went with the
conflict-for-power conceptualization of class have had to be rechannelled. The Warner class-as-prestigeconceptualization-in terms
of who invites w h o m to dinner, who belongs to what clubs, who
lives where-is essentially trivial. Except for social climbers and
social snobs it has little emotional impact. But class in the strugglefor-power sense is explosive. Much of the impact of the Warner
school on American sociology may be ascribed perhaps in part to
a semantic confusion. W h e n Warner talks about social stratification
in class terms he is talking about one kind of thing; but to those
who interpret it in terms of the struggle-for-powerconcept of class,
it has profoundly disturbing implications, as though power relationships were becoming fixed and frozen. W e bring this point in
here to explain why the great literature on class in the United States
in recent years is not discussed in this report; it is not a contribution to a sociology of class conflict. It is, rather, a contribution to
organization in the conservative sense described by Nisbet as
referred to above.
Equally revolutionary has been the transformation of the study
of industrial relations from one of a conflict-for-powerto a study of
status relationships. Under the tutelage of Elton Mayo, there has
developed what has come to be known as the Harvard School of
industrial sociology. It is indicative of the point of view of this
school that it calls its research method a clinical approach. It views
the hostilities, resistances, sabotages, and other evidences of conflict as essentially abnormal, if not pathological. If the normal
principles of organization are recognized in the operation of the
factory these manifestations disappear. For basically there is a
harmony of interests between management and labour. Technical
efiiciency has been sought without regard to the natural groupings;
the results have been frustration, resentments, and resistant hostilities, the raw materials for revolutions [1102,pp. 116-171. This
1. See, for an elaboration of this point, 'Sociological Mirror for Cultural Anthropologists',
[2861.
2. T w o other 'schools' are also active and productive in this field: the Yale school, under
E. Wight Bakke, which tends to emphasize community factors, and the Chicago schodl.
under E. C. Hughes, which tends to think in terms of a sociology of work as such. rcgardless of its industrial setting.
86
is essentially the ‘tension’theory of conflict; it is noted here because
it must be contrasted with the sociological conceptualization in
terms of a struggle for power among systems.
One word with respect to the practical implications of the M a y o
school. The costs of modern industrialization are in terms of interpersonal human relationships and are borne most heavily by the
worker. If good human relations can be established by means of
applying proper principles of organization, then conflict-in the
‘tension’ sense-will be done away with. It is not a matter of one
class profiting at the expense of another; it is rather a matter of one
class paying an exorbitant price in terms of frustration for ignorance
on the part of the other. One of the principles of organization
involved is that of participation.W h e n workers are allowed to have
some say in the way their work is done, the result is better co-operation and increased productivity. W h e n channels of communication
are clear both up and down the line, misunderstandings which Iead
to conflict can be avoided.
The theoretical orientation of the Mayo or human-relations-inindustry school has been traced back to the influence of Durkheim,
whose basic preoccupation was with the nature and conditions of
solidarity [11 361. It has a great many of the earmarks of conservative social thought which Nisbet has delineated.’ A good deal of
criticism has for many years been levelled against this whole socialpsychological conceptualization of conflict in industry [1055, 1099,
1121, 11291. The critics accept all of the factual findings of its
research-Marx, himself, as a matter of fact, had pointed them out
long also-but they interpret these findings differently [1136,p. 1191.
The particular phenomena of impersonality,rationalization,k e d
status, industrial discipline, etc., are factory conditions which cause
conflict. But where do these particular factory conditions come
from and what causes them? The conflict-of-interestschool argues
that these conditions come from power distribution determined by
the institutions of capitalism. Hence it follows that no change in a
chronic state of conflict can be alleviated without a basic change in
power relationships.... W e may state the Marxian problem in this
fashion: how do economic power arrangements affect sociative and
dissociative processes in industrial life?
These differing interpretations of the phenomena of conflictwhich both the human-relations-in-industry and the conflict-ofinterest schooIs accept-have had important reverberations in strategy. According to the conflict-of-interestschool,espoused by unions,
the amelioration of the costs of m o d e m industrialism lies not so
much in concessions on the part of management in the form of
factory organization and kindly human relations and status protec.
1. See note, vane 45.
87
tion, as in the acquisition of power to force concessions by workers
through their own organization. Contrariwise, the strategy of the
human-relations-in-industryschool, espoused by management, has
served to prevent unionization in some plants. By making concessions to human needs in the work situation,hostilities and resentments which might have led to the formation of unions have been
dissipated. Unions have argued that if management recognizes the
union, the conflict-of-interestbetween worker and management is
mitigated and harmony of interests is stimulated [1103,p. 3561.
That the acceptance of a union does not automatically eliminate
conflict in the plant has been demonstrated in work reported by
Melville Dalton, who has shown that unofficial bargaining goes on
constantly in a plant between the grievance officer of the union and
the foreman [lo601 and that conflicts take place within the several
phases of management itself [10591.
Mention should also be made of the series of case studies sponsored by the National Planning Association on ‘causesof industrial
peace’in such diverse industries as pulp and paper,glass,chemicals,
clothing,steel,aircraft, and textiles [1106].The purpose was to find
out what conditions made for peaceful relations between management and worker. In general, mutual recognition and respect on
the part of both union and management, confidence in the integrity
of the other party, a ‘problem-centred’rather than a doctrinaire or
legalistic approach to bargaining were found to characterize good
industrial relations.
Thus, the substantive studies of current conflicts vary greatly in
point of view, objective,method, and theoretical assumptions.Some
aim simply at stating the facts as nearly as they can be determined
-to give the ‘news’; some attempt to organize the facts into a
systematic framework, psychological or historical; and some seek
to reduce the data to objective indexes which can then be analysed
and interpreted. There is little connexion between the substantive
studies and the deductive models presented above. Nor as yet has
any sociological formulation like the psychological formulation of
‘tension’been applied to see whether or not all manifestations of
conflict may be subsumed under a unitary set of principles.
IV.STRATEGY BASED ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO CONFLICT,AND THE THEORY OF GAMES
The sociological conceptualization of conflict takes for granted that
incompatible values or goals exist among different systems.It takes
for granted that costs are involved in conflict. Sometimes the costs
88
of any given social system seem to be borne disproportionately by
one sub-systemor set of sub-systems.Attempts to re-allocatecosts
may involve resistance from the system to which the costs are
shifted. Strategy from the sociological point of view involves the
minimization of the costs of achieving a goal against opposition.
The basic questions,then,which the parties in any conflict must ask
are these: what is the optimal strategy to follow to achieve certain
ends under certain given conditions? How much should w e aim
for? H o w much opposition should we expect? H o w much should
we settle for? What are the opposition’s weak points? What are its
strong points? What alliances or coalitions should we seek? What
strategies is the opposition likely to use? What is likely to be the
effect of our strategy on the opposition? Of the opposition’s on
us?. .. Wherever strategy is being discussed, answers to these
questions are being sought.
The research basic to answering such questions is no more satisfactory than that involved in mapping strategies for changing ‘human
nature’ reviewed above. Perhaps the best general statement of the
research problems involved is that presented in the volume called
The Policy Sciences [161],which might just as well have been called
‘the sciences of strategy’,since that, essentially,is what it is. For
basically strategy is a policy or plan of action, a rule of behaviour,
such,for example,as a policy of appeasement, a policy of militancy,
a policy of legal force,a policy of revolution,etc. Strategy based on
the sociological approach to conflict does not aim at changing
‘humannature’in the subjective sense; it may, and often does, aim
at changing behaviour. It may attempt to outwit or to bypass
‘human nature’.But it begins with people as they are.
In the United States strategic problems have engaged the attention
of some distinguished social scientists,but in the absence of adequate
research on which to base conclusions,the replies have sometimes
been equivocal. In spite of all the research summarized by Williams,
for example,there is as yet no clear-cutreply to such question as:
When should minority groups use a strategy of appeasement? When
of militancy? Should they fight for changes in laws 6rst or for
changes in the mores first? Similar uncertainties exist in other
conflict areas also.
In the first part of this chapter we shall discuss strategy as related
to race relations, religious group relations, industrial relations,
international relations, and also the strategic use of violence. W e
shall then turn to a brief consideration of the evaluation of strategy
in terms of the theory of games of strategy, since this theory seems
to offer a promising basis for a modem sociology of conflict.
89
STRATEGY IN RACE RELATIONS
Gunnar Myrdal’s study of Negroes in the United States [912] has
received wider recognition for its diagnosis of the racial situation
in the United States than for its principles of strategy. Yet it is
permeated throughout with strategic considerations. Especially in
Appendix 3 does he elaborate his strategic ‘principles of cumulation’, based on a theory of dynamic causation. All the factors
involved in the Negro’s status,he points out, are inextricably interrelated and interdependent;none is basic to the others. Thus ‘any
change in any one of these factors, independent of the way in
which it is brought about, will, by the aggregate weight of the
cumulative effects running back and forth between them all, start
the whole system moving in one direction or the other as the case
may be, with a speed depending upon the original push and the
functions of causal interrelation within the system’ (p. 1067).
Anything one can do to improve the Negro’s status will, by this
principle of cumulation, tend to work toward the improvement of
other factors. Myrdal is of the opinion that ‘a rational strategy in
the Negro problem ... assumes a theory of dynamic causation’
(p. 1070).
Foremost among American sociologists who have devoted attention to problems of strategy is R. M.MacIver [892],who accepts
Myrdal’s basic principle of cumulation,and concludes on the basis
of it that the concern of the policy-makeris that of securing changes
in one variable or another in a way that has most likelihood of relative persistence and one which can be maintained againsta downward
drag. H e recommends that emphasis should be placed on the economic, political, and educational fronts rather than on the social.
H e presents a two-fold strategic principle, namely, that points of
least resistance must be found and broken through and that the
longer a gain is held,the easier it becomes to hold it. His discussion
of strategy has been summarized by F.D.Freeman as follows [829]:
His suggestion is that a particular merit attaches to gains made in some
tangible fashion or that are of an institutional character. Advances most
likely to be sustained for a considerable time, and thus most likely to
secure the protection of usage and of the binding institutional forms in
which they are themselves embodied, are those of an economic or political
character. Institutional reforms are necessary to consolidate victory on any
front. . . . The policy-maker must ask . . . :(1) What are the factors most
susceptible to change? (2) What are the weakest points of resistance by the
opposing forces? (3) What is the ratio of probable results from immediate and direct action on the one hand and indirect and delayed action
on the other? (4) What are the agencies most likely to assure that gains
made will be retained sufficiently long for the establishment of new habituations and reconditionings of response? In his conclusion that a proper
strategy will seek out the weak points toward which policy-makers
m a y direct their attack, MacIver points to (1) the relatively little opposition
90
to increasing economic opportunity for Negroes, and (2) ideological weakness-a contradiction of valuations in the ‘moral dilemma’ sense.
The strategic questions raised by MacIver cannot yet be unequivocally answered by present research techniques. W e must still rely
very largely on insights and intuitions, hunches and unaided observations for replies.
As a result w e have widely differing strategic proposals, ranging
from those at one extreme based on psychoanalytic analyses to
those at the other, based on objective evaluation of legislative
action. As an example of the first w e cite that of Cornelius
L. Golightly, who, on the basis of an extensive review of psychoanalytically oriented literature, proposes the abolition of caste on
the grounds that it is a second-rate mechanism for ego satisfaction
rather than a first-rate one [837]. As an example of the other extreme
we refer to two recent studies of the results of antidiscriminatory
legislation, by Burma and by Berger.
John H.Burma [795] points out that the strategy of legislation is
aimed at the elimination of overt discrimination, not of prejudice.
H e counters the argument that antidiscriminatory legislation will
increase interpersonal conflict rather than diminish it by referring
to experience under state fair-employment practices laws and civil
rights laws: ‘ill feeling and misunderstanding have decreased, not
increased; and, while there have sometimes been repercussions of a
semi-violent nature, they have been of negligible importance in the
beginning and then decline. Strife, conflict, and ill feeling are more
closely related to tension and feelings of injustice and resentment
than to efforts toward equality,fairness,and justice’. A more detailed
and documented study of the same problem by Morroe Berger [I61
comes up with essentially the same results. Legislation may not
forbid attitudes, but it may and should forbid behaviour, on the
past of a public interest, which violates the civil rights of others.
Finally law itself becomes an educational force which changes
attitudes. Equality by statute has proved an effectivestrategy.
Joseph D.Lohman and Dietrich C.Reitzes also present evidence
that the strategy of aiming at objective behaviour rather than at
attitudes is effective [1036]. They point out that an individual’s
attitudes toward Negroes is not a unitary, consistent phenomenon.
It is specific to certain roles. A m a n might accept Negroes in his
union because in that situathn his role is defined for him by his
occupational interests; in another situation he might reject the
Negro, that is, as property holder. They cite evidence, both in
Washington and in Chicago, to show that proper indoctrination of
the police force in their duties as public officials rendered them
effective bulwarks against racial violence. In neither case were
their own subjective attitudes involved; they could have remained
91
prejudiced. The important thing was that they successfully projected
on potential perpetrators of violence the community’s insistence on
a policy of non-discrimination and in this role they succeeded in
preventing violence, Lohman is the author of a manual used by the
Chicago Police Department in training personnel [884].
Another type of study tending to validate the strategy of aiming
at behaviour rather than at attitude refers to the introduction of
Negro workers into a plant or factory. It has been found that if
workers are asked whether they will accept Negro workers they
may say no. But if Negro workers are introduced casually, as a
matter of course, there may be little opposition. In one study a
slightly different situation obtained. Negroes were already working
in the plant when Southern workers-so-called ‘hillbillies’-were
introduced. The question was, would they bring their prejudices
with them and thus change the plant atmosphere to conform to their
prejudices, or would they fall into line with the antidiscriminatory
policy? The answer was, they conformed. ‘When confronted with a
firm policy of non-discrimination... they tended to accept the
situation as defined by management. Yet this did not indicate a
radical change in the racial attitudes of the southern Whites, but
rather an accommodation to the exigencies of a specific situation
[1032].
Herman H.Long also criticizes the point of view which looks
upon prejudice as the ‘cause’of discrimination. Such a point of
view involves a strategy of re-education of human beings before
changes can be effected. In contrast is the point of view which
emphasizes the adventitious source of antipathetic group behaviour.
From the point of view of strategy,this second point of view seeks
to change the institutional framework rather than the inner mechanisms of the individual [886]. W e have already referred to Rommetveit’s contrast between ‘personality-centred‘models and ‘societycentred’models [54],which is also pertinent at this point.
One of the most critical tests of strategy in race relations began
in the United States in 1954.In that year the Supreme Court declared
that segregation in schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution in that it denied Negroes the equal protection of
the law. This was the boldest application ever made of the strategy
of legal force in race relations in the United States. At least two
Southern states had earlier threatened to abolish their public school
systems if the Court decided against segregation.Students of conflict
will watch the results of this strategy with great interest,not only
because of its humanitarian implications but also because of the
lessons in human relations which it can teach.
92
ANTI-SEMITISM AND STRATEGY
Tension theorists, especially within the last decade, have evolved
elaborate theories to explain hostility toward Jews in terms of
subjective mechanisms [948]. But anti-Semitism as a deliberate
strategy on the part of nationalistic politicians, has also been noted.
Florian Znaniecki, for example, points out the strategic considerations which led to a policy of discrimination in Poland,but reminds
us that deliberate genocide as a policy came later [982].
W h y did anti-Semitism emerge in many countries from the middle of the
nineteenth century on, culminating finally in the Nazi manifestations? For
modern anti-Semitism is distinct from medieval anti-Judaism, which was
rooted in religion. It is everywhere connected with the growth of modern
national solidarity and international struggle. A minority of Jews living
within a territory inhabited by another nationality came to be regarded
by the latter as unreliable or even dangerous. For their solidarity with other
Jews inhabiting foreign territories was considered stronger than their loyalty
to the nation in which they lived; and it always seemed possible that they
might ally themselves with foreign enemies if it was to their own advantage.
This was a c o m m o n argument against the Jews which was used by
nationalistic groups in most countries, from Russia to the United States. . . .
The most widely promulgated method was to weaken the Jews economically
and to exclude them from any politically or intellectually influential positions. Nationalists considered expulsion even more desirable whenever possible. . . . But, outside of a few small, non-educated and ruthless gangs, no
nationalistic group advocated the method of genocide until the Nazis came
to power.
The policy toward Jews in W.S.S.R.
has also been interpreted as a
strategic move [862].
In 1950 the National Community Relations Advisory Council,
representing a large number of Jewish community agencies,retained
MacIver to make a study of Jewish community relations work. In
May 1951, he presented the results of his study, including among
his recommendations a re-assessmentof strategy. H e felt that ‘the
need for a continuous process of thinking through the problems of
strategy prior to the making of programmes’ was of fundamental
importance and that meeting it should have first priority in the work
of the research personnel of Jewish agencies 18931. Throughout the
whole report he emphasized strategic problems, such as alliances
with other agencies and points of attack.
STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZED RELIGION
A n analysis of strategy in the field of religious institutions has
been made by J. Milton Yinger, as follows [587]. The church as an
institution is in conflict with secular institutions for control of
93
human behaviour, that is, for power. If it demands too much, it
may lose out; if it makes too many concessions, it loses also. It
must devise a strategy which steers between these two losing policies.
Following Troeltsch,Yinger points out the two characteristic policies
which result: ‘on the one hand, there is development and compromise, on the other, literal obedience and radicalism’ (p. 19).
The first is the church approach, the second, the sect approach.
Compromise or withdrawal is the strategic choice.That this strategic
problem is not unique to religious institutions is pointed out by
Howard E.Jensen,in his editorial note to Yinger’s study:
The significance of the study . . . is not limited to the field of the sociology
of religion, inasmuch as the same types of response are disclosed by nonreligious groups engaged in the struggle for power. . . . Similar intra-group
tensions have been developed within, and a similar strategy has been
employed by the American Negro minority in its organized efforts to secure
greater opportunities and improve status within the framework of our contemporary culture. The struggle for power as represented by feminism, the
labour movement, racial and cultural revivals, and other subordinate or
minority groups constitutes complexes of social phenomena, the future study
of which could well profit by the further application of the methods of
sociological analysis, to the development of which Dr.Yingen has here made
a significant contribution.
Appeasement or isolation. Gradualism, ameliorism, Fabianism,
reform; or revolution. Conciliation or aggression. These are words
which recur throughout all studies of conflict. Religious institutions
are no more immune to the problems of strategy which they represent than are economic or political institutions.
STRATEGY IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
In the field of industrialrelations one of the main strategic problems
of management has been whether to forestall unionization by
meeting every promised benefit by paternalism,by counselling programmes,or to accept unions and protect its interests in the processes of collective bargaining. W e have already referred to some of
the work in this area.
The strategy of violence in fighting unionization which the
LaFollette Senate Committee exposed in the 1930’s has practically
been abandoned in the North. But the ‘researches’or investigations
of another Senatorial Committee, published in April 1951, show
that it is still used in the South [1091].Kidnapping,threats,espionage,beatings, ‘back-to-work’
movements, ‘Citizens’Committees’,and
injunctions were all reported.
On the side of the union organizer strategy is also important.
One leader, John Steuben, with no pretensions to social science
objectivity,has scanned the history of strikes and the strategies that
94
have been used by management and shown how strike leaders
should deal with them by applying the principles of military strategy [1135].The first part of this book examines the relationship of
strikes to politics and ‘aneffort to apply lessons drawn from military
strategy to counteract the methods of actual warfare which have
been used by employers’. The second part is a manual on the
conduct of strikes; the third part analyses strike-breaking techniques; and the fourth part discusses the qualifications necessary
for effective strike leadership.
In the field of class conflict,so-called,as in the field of race relations, there has long been a split in thinking about strategy as
between gradualism, that is, piecemeal reform or ‘Fabianism’,and
revolution. Two recent studies have tended to corroborate the
Marxian notion of classes as interest-groups(as contrasted with the
notion of classes as status groups), but actual events have not shown
that the Marxist strategy of class struggle is a necessary concomitant.
Herman M. Case corroborated Richard Centers’ conclusion that
‘a person’s status and role with respect to the economic processes
of society imposes upon him certain attitudes,values, and interests
relating to his role and status in the political and economic sphere’;
that,in brief, social classes were indeed interest groups,‘butinterest
groups which appear to be behaving non-militantlyand non-violently
within a framework of capitalism’ [10561. The strategy of legislation and social reform rather than of revolution was being used.
Another analysis of strategy as related to class is that by Gerard
DeGrC, who points out that ‘the main role of the middle class...
would appear to be that of providing,because of its voting strength
and indeterminate political orientation,a battle ground to be fought
over by the major contending parties. It exists as a potential ally
which both parties are anxious to win over to their respective sides.
This... means that whether it consciously wishes to or not, and
possibly even in spite of itself, the middle class plays a mediating
role between the demands of the dominant class and those of the
working class’ [10621.
The literature of Marxism remains the great library of strategic
writings in the field of class conflict even today. T o enter into a
discussion of this tremendous repository would, however, involve
us in too long a digression.
STRATEGY IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
Rudolf Heberle has brought together the fruits of his experience in
both Europe and the United States in the field of what he calls
political sociology [473]. H e devotes two chapters to tactics and
strategy, one dealing with the general principles and one with the
95
strategy and tactics of communism and fascism.H e deals with such
tactical problems as political and direct action (the latter including
such activities as boycotts, sabotage, strikes, violence) and democratic procedure. H e analyses the conditions under which each of
these is likely to be used. H e discusses the nature and results of
revolutions. H e presents an illuminating analysis of communist
strategy and tactics in a foreign country.H e analyses the conditions
necessary for a successful coup d’e‘tat and the three problems that
must be met once power is seized, namely threat of attack from
abroad, opposition within the country, and dissent within the
political order itself. H e deals, finally, with the issue of ‘exceptionalism’ or ‘Titoism’.Although this book is published as a textbook
it is really more than this. One of the important contributions it
makes is the clear-cutpresentation of the actual processes of political conflict. This is the first time, it seems, that the theory and
practice of strategy have appeared in a textbook.
A more specialized study is an analysis of Russian strategy and
tactics by Philip Selznick [552]. It is based on historical records and
on the self-analyses of various members of the bolshevik tlite. H e
considers organizations and organizational practices to be weapons
‘when they are used by a power-seeking Clite in a manner unrestrained by the constitutional order of the arena within which the
contest takes place. In this usage, “weapon” is not meant to denote
any political tool, but one tom from its normal context and unacceptable to the community as a legitimate mode of action’ (p. 2).
Selznick analyses not only offensive, but also defensive strategies
and tactics of communism; and then discusses the problems of
counter-offence,including the role of intervening Clites, the denial
of legitimacy, and the denial of access (chap. 8). This is a neat
sociological dissection of the actual processes of conflict.
A political scientist, Bertram M.Gross, has recently published
a study of the process of legislation in which it is viewed as a power
struggle. Strategy and tactics of the process as it occurs in the
United States are analysed in detail [1076]. A study in political
conflict by V.0.
Key, Jr. also deals historically with such tactics as
restrictions on voting [866, pt. 51. Indeed, the political scientists
have paid a great deal more attention to matters of strategy than
have sociologists in the last generation.
STRATEGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
It is, of course,in the area of international relations that problems
of strategy become most self-conscious,dramatic,and intense. Here
the problem is not merely one of determining what strategy is best
for one’s own side, but also of determining what is the strategy of
96
one’s opponent. Just what does his behaviour mean? What strategy
is he using? Is this particular move a feint or is it genuine? Is he
trying to mislead us here in order to gain an advantage there? Is
this a genuine offer or is it phony? A great deal of secret research
goes on in the foreign service departments of all major powers
attempting to answer these questions.
T w o observers at first hand have reported on communist strategy
and tactics in Korea. Former Assistant Secretary of State, Edward
W. Barrett [596] has described and illustrated the strategic and
tactical problems involved in the war of ideas today. His book contains little theory, but is filled with concrete, specific facts which
could be drawn upon in any sociological analysis of conflict.
There have been some attempts to suggest strategies to use
against communism in order to obviate war. Selznick‘s suggestions
refer primarily to defence against communism within the United
States. But David Mitrany, on the basis of a careful analysis of the
policy of Marxism toward the peasant, proposes that one way to
combat communism would be to make it perfectly clear to peasants
everywhere that ‘the peasants of the world who turn towards communism in the hope that the land would be distributed are being
obviously misled’ [1104].
Hans Speier, who reviews war and militarism and political warfare [557] feels that propaganda should be substituted for warfare
to accomplish political ends. H e feels that the concept ‘psychological
warfare’ is ambiguous. After analysing the will to fight, he finds that
hostile action against foreign political and military Clites can be
taken by interfering with intelligence or information with respect to
both foreign and domestic strengths, intention, and/or obedience,
by interfering with estimates of consequences of alternative policies,
by interfering with the control by the political Clite of working and
fighting populations, and by interfering with communication with
these groups. H e lays down three rules for minimizing the risks
involved in deviant (treasonable?) behaviour in the enemy, so as to
induce it more readily, including a careful analysis of how to exploit
self-interest. The time perspective of any policy of an Cite will
depend on its history: an Clite recruited from the aristocracy, for
example, is likely to be governed by medium and long-range
objectives; an Clite which has risen to power from a state of
persecution, are not likely to plan far ahead. Policy objectives of
some kind are a prerequisite of political warfare. The distrust
among Clites in a hostile power may be exploited advantageously
where it exists, in effect playing one off against the other. H e
ends his discussion with an analysis of deception, its forms and
functions.
A n interesting aspect of the study of strategy as related to policy
is suggested by the problem, what if the culture of a people forbids
97
the use of precisely the strategies and tactics necessary to use
against an enemy?
Strategy is the essence of non-violent conflict, or the so-called
cold war. It has many aspects, psychological as well as economic.
Perhaps the best research in these areas in the United States is
‘classified,’that is, unavailable because of security reasons. W e
refer,therefore,to only two works, one on psychological [161] and
one on economic,warfare [462].
THE STRATEGIC USE OF VIOLENCE
Those who hold to a tension theory of conflict look upon violence
as essentially a tension-reducing activity, functional perhaps but
non-rational. People engage in riots, lynchings, pogroms, street
brawls as a means of venting long pent-up hostilities and aggressions. Few theorists come right out and say that a modem war can
be explained so simply, although in general tensions are felt to be
involved somehow or other. At this point,however,we are concerned
with the use of violence not as a non-rationaltension-reducingform
of behaviour but as an element in strategy.For violence is one kmd
os strategy even for rational people.
In referring to Dahlke’s analysis of pogroms above,we noted that
some people encouraged,even when they did not themselves actually
instigate, such aggressions in order to eliminate competitors. And
there is considerable evidence that the deliberate provoking of
violence during a strike is common strategy on the part of management [1135]. The agent provocateur is a well recognized, if not
highly respected, functionary. Nor are the uses of war for strategic
purposes unknown in history [435, p. vii]:
Whether or not international war m a y ultimately go the way of armed
personal and corporate combat, it is still often able to bring results useful
to the rulers of peoples. W a r demands unity for an objective that takes
precedence over all peace-time problems. O n the one hand, in the name of
this unity, objections to radical alterations in the social structure may be
overcome. On the other hand, in the name of the same unity, harassed
politicians may find respite from embarrassing demands for social betterment. In either case, war may bring enhanced prestige and power to those
w h o guide the destinies of the rank and file.
The fomenting of external wars as a means of diverting hostilz
elements at home has been reported-always, of course, for the
enemy-in history. This theory is basic to the concept of the garrison state.
Wars can be produced at any time when they are really wanted
or needed for strategic purposes. For the conditions leading to war
are endemic.Border incidents can be created;the agent provocateur
98
is almost a professional, for international incidents as well as on
the picket line. Perhaps refraining from the use of war is as much
in need of ‘explanation’as the actual use of war itself.
The calculated,planned, wholly rational -in the sense of means
well adapted to ends-nature of the strategy of war has been freshly
documented in the case of Hitler. In a secret briefing of his commanders-in-chiefin 1939 he said:
One might accuse m e of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I s e
the fate of all beings. I did not organize the armed forces in order not to
strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Time is working for our
adversary. I shall strike and not capitulate!
Again, in 1937:
The history of all times-Roman Empire, British Empirehas proved that
every space expansion can be effected only by breaking resistance and taking
risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither in former times nor today
has space been found without an owner. The attacker always comes up
against the proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest
possible conquest can be made at lowest cost.
There may have been a time when the strategic use of war was
more acceptable than it is now. When international relations were
camed on by secret diplomacy;when the man-in-the-streetwas less
informed than today; then the strategy of war may have been more
lightly resorted to. It may still be used when it’canbe gotten away
with. In the United States,for example,it is alleged that Roosevelt
and his advisers had concluded fairly early during the last world
war that war with the Axis powers was inevitable;it was bound to
come sooner or later-as the captured Nazi documents show,indeed,
that it was-the question was, when? The strategic problem was,
then, not how can it be avoided, but how can it be most advantageously timed? [517, 5671.
So little applicable is the tension theory as related to war that
leaders must cajole their followers into it. And even when it is
resorted to, popular disapproval must be carefully avoided. Thus
in Directive No. 1, 11 March 1938, for the occupation of Austria,
Hitler makes it very clear that ‘the behaviour of the troops must
give the impression that we do not wish to wage war against our
brother nation. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall
be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful
entry welcomed by the population. Therefore, any provocation is
to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken
ruthlessly by force of arms’.
The use of mass extermination, or genocide, as a technique by
the Nazis has been reported on [488,7131. The remarkable thing
in this connexion seems to be the error in strategic judgement
99
which led the Nazis so flagrantly to disregard world opinion. For
whatever the practice may be, the moral atmosphere of the present
time decries the use of the strategy of violence. Clausewitz is often
quoted as saying that war was simply a continuation on the field
of battle of conflicts which diplomacy or non-violentstrategies had
failed to resolve. But there is less popular stomach for the use of
violence today; it is now looked upon as a failure in strategy rather
than as proper use of it. Proper strategy, it is sometimes argued,
would obviate recourse to violence.
THE THEORY OF GAMES OF STRATEGY AS THE BASIS FOR A MODERN
SOCIOLOGY OF CONFLICT
The theory of games of strategy is both a theoretical system throwing light on the nature of social organization and social conflict and
a technique for solving concrete and specific problems of a technical nature. It is based on a theorem first worked out by John von
Neumann in 1928 and since then elaborated by other mathematicians. As a theoretical system, it has been applied most
thoroughly to economic behaviour, especially by Oskar Morgenstern.
As a technical tool it has been applied to a great many kinds of
specific problems, especially military ones, such, for example, as
the optimal behaviour in an air duel. What is now needed is some
solid work by sociologists to render their data amenable to game
theory analysis. The present statement is about the theory rather
than a statement of the theory itself.'
The theory of games of strategy is a theory of rational behaviour;
in this respect it differentiates itself markedly from social-psychological theories which view conflict as non-rational behaviour. It
deals with people in interaction,that is,with people who must plan
their behaviour with reference to the behaviour of other people.
Every strategy, or rule of behaviour, must be evaluated in terms
of the expected behaviour of others. The theory of games does not
assume that one's opponents are necessarily attempting to injure
one-that would be a theory of paranoia-but only that they are
attempting to do the best they can,even at your expense.
A fundamental concept in the theory of games of strategy is that
of the payoff function.If player A does this and player B does that,
what will be the consequences for each one? The theory of games
of strategy is worked out best for two-personzero-sumgames,which
means that what player A wins, player B loses, and vice versa.
In parlour games the payoff function is specified by the rules of the
game or by the players themselves; they decide what it will be. But
1. For a fuller statement about the theory see the bibliography, no. 306.
100
for sociological ‘games’ the payoff function is determined by the
‘laws’of nature,including ‘human nature’. The ‘rules of the game’
are not human creations, but natural phenomena. If Nation A does
this and Nation B does that,what will be the consequences? What
will be the payoff? Which combination of strategies or rules of
behaviour will favour Nation A? which, Nation B? The determination of the payoff function €or socioIogica1 ‘games’is, of course, a
monumental research task.Until we know what the payoff function
for every combination of strategies of the players is, w e cannot
apply the theory of games.
But once the payoff function is known, it is tabulated in a payoff
matrix, as follows:
Player A
Strategy
Strategy
A-1
A-2
Player B
Strategy
Strategy
B-1
B-2
4
-8
0
-10
Note. Such a matrix is to be read as follows: If player A uses strategy A-1
and player B uses strategy B-1,player A will lose 8 points; if player A uses
strategy A-1 and player B uses strategy B-2,player A gains 4 points; if
player A uses strategy A-2 and player B uses strategy B-1,player A gains
nothing; if player A uses strategy A-2 and player B uses strategy B-2,
player A loses 10 points.
By convention,the matrix is read in terms of player A;player B’s
gains and losses are the same as player A’s, but with the signs
reversed. The number of strategies-here limited to two-may
be
infinite.For non-zero-sumgames-in which gains and losses do not
cancel one another-dummy players are introduced to absorb gains
and losses.
The problem for each player now is to select the strategy which
over the long run will net him the most, regardless of what his
opponent does. This is done by the so-calledminimax and maxmin
procedure. Player A finds the minimum gain he can make with any
strategy; he then selects the strategy which nets him the largest of
these minimum gains. Player B finds the minimum gains he can
hold Player A down to, and then selects the strategy which result
in the lowest of these minimums.
When a third player is introduced new theoretical problems
emerge. N o w coalitions or alliances tend to be formed. And the
distribution of gains among the members of the coalitions-imputations, so-called-looms up as a problem. Presumably players will
coalesce in a manner to make their gains optimal, since they are
rational. The distribution of gains-the imputation-must conform
to accepted standards of behaviour. Attempts to pay any one member of a coalition less than he could get in another coalition will
101
mean that he will desert the coalition, producing loss to the other
player in the coalition.
The application of game theory will probably come first in combination with statistics in problems of statistical inference. It may
take some time before it can be applied to sociological data. But
it is probably important for sociologiststo work with the mathematicians who are developing the theory, since the direction of mathematical research will doubtless be determined by the nature of the
models presented for its consideration.
In the meanwhile, all the dependable research that sociologists
and social psychologists can do may have to be harnessed. Just
what are the ‘laws’of social life? Of ‘human nature’? Just what is
the payoff function of certain combinations of strategy or behaviour
or policy? A great deal more will have to be known about the way
groups function before w e can supply the data necessary for application of the theory.The tension studies which Unesco has sponsored
may be part of the indispensable foundation for determining the
rules of the game and for computing payoff functions.
The chief criticisms of the theory of games of strategy as a basis
for a sociology of conflict, aside from those invoked in connexion
with our presentation of other mathematical models above, may
be summarized under three headings: (a) conceptual-technicaldifficulties; (b) practical difficulties; and (c) ethical difficulties. The
conceptual-technicaldifficultiescentre about the problems of determining and assessing costs, or payoffs. This as w e saw earlier, is
a psychological as well as a sociological problem. The practical
difficulties inhere in the overwhelming volume of computations
necessary to apply the theory even in relatively simple practical
situations-running into the millions and even billions and trillions.
The ethical difficultieslie in the apparently Machiavellian conception
of human nature implicit in the theory. The theory does, however,
leave room for ethcal considerations. For it assumes that when
several solutions in a strategic game are possible and equally good,
the one will be selected which conforms most closely to accepted
standards of conduct.
1. For a more extended discussion of these points see bibliography. no. 306, pp. 422-4.
102
V. RESEARCH ON TECHNIQUES IN SMALL
FACE-TO-FACE
GROUPS
The small face-to-facegroup is an area of research in which both
the social-psychological and the sociologicaI conceptualizations of
conflict meet. Here problems of techniques in interpersonal relations arise whether one is thinking in terms of individuals or in
terms of systems. So also do the several theories of conflict meet
here. Personal hostilities and aggressions are involved as well as
costs. Tension phenomena exist; strategy is involved.
The social-psychologicalconceptualization of conflict is especially
important in face-to-facesituations where there is a general desire
to reach agreement or consensus but where interpersonal hostilities and aggressions and ambivalences get in the way.A great many
policy decisions are hammered out in face-to-facegroups. Even in
a dictatorship decisions are presumably arrived at in consultation
with advisers. The study of decision making has therefore engaged
the attention of a number of researchers.There may be few if any
costs involved except perhaps in terms of ‘face’.Everyone wants
his ideas accepted and feels hurt or rejected or isolated if they are
not, although he loses nothing but ‘face’in the process. Here the
problems are those of getting people to work together harmoniously
and effectively even when they initially disagree with one another.
They are presumably like-mindedmen with common goals.Yet they
do not know how to work together without hurting one another,
quarrelling, wasting time, and getting into emotional jams. Here a
large research literature has evolved which we shallrefer to presently.
But the face-to-facegroup may also be an arena of conflict in the
sociological sense; that is, real costs may be involved as well as
interpersonal relationships. For often systems function through
individuals in face-to-facemeetings. Negotiating and bargaining
among systems take place through individual representatives in
face-to-facesituations.But the situations are wholly different from
those in which the problem is primarily one of arriving at a decision
where there is a common goal. Strategy is important here. Technique in such groups is of increasing significance since diplomacy,
negotiation,conferring are increasingly advocated as substitutes for
violence or war.
Two entirely different kinds of face-to-facesituations are being
dealt with in the two kinds of conflict we have referred to. There is
little justification for the hope sometimes expressed that techniques
which are effective in the first type will also work in the second.
Arriving at agreement or consensus is not at all the same thing as
negotiating a conflict.
W e shall present the materials under two headings,corresponding
103
to the different kinds of problems, one referring to techniques in
groups of the first kind where conflict, if it exists, occurs in the
social-psychological or tension sense and the other referring to
techniques in face-to-facegroups of the second kind where conflicts
in the sociological or cost sense are being waged, such as negotiating and bargaining and mediating.
ROADS TO AGREEMENT
The task of summarizing the current research in the United States
in the field of achieving agreement, especially in face-to-facegroups,
has been undertaken by Stuart A. Chase in a recent volume in
which he describes, analyses, and evaluates a number of techniques
used in reaching agreement, namely: the methods used by the
Quakers in arriving at consensus, the work done by the followers
of Kurt Lewin in group dynamics, other laboratory studies in smallgroup behaviour, and the work of great mediators of industrial
disputes [1057]. Since he has organized this material in an easily
understood fashion, w e shall follow his presentation here. We remind
ourselves here that for the most part the conceptualization of conflict basic to the work he reviews is of the social-psychologicaltype,
in terms of quarrelling or belligerency (pp. 2-3).
. . . to expect people to abandon their right to quarrel with the neighbours,
however high its price, is, of course, Utopian. But, the mounting cost of belligerency is causing thoughtful observers to look around for ways and means
to reduce it. Perhaps it is none too soon to take an inventory of those
techniques . . .which could be used to reduce the area of conflict and make
us less vulnerable to outbursts of our own belligerency. W h e n w e begin
to look, a surprising number of methods come to light.
W e are dealing, then, with belligerency, with personal animosity.
with hostilities, and not with conflict in the sense of costs. Chase
himself confuses the two kinds of conflict, but the reader should not.
First of all Chase describes and analyses the principles on which
Quakers conduct their meetings, including: unanimous decisions in
order to avoid a defeated minority nourishing grievances; the use
of silent periods; using the cooling-off technique when agreement
cannot be reached unanimously or when opposing factions begin to
form; participation by all members in order to pool experience;
going to meetings to listen, with an open mind; absence of leaders;
equality of status; dependence on facts rather than emotion; and
limiting the size of meetings. Quakers have found these principles
effective. They are limited, of course, in application. Quakers are
like-minded people, with similar cultural backgrounds. They have
been processed by religion to subdue their egos. They are sincere
in seeking solutions to common problems. The motivation to reach
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agreement is present. Wherever these conditions exist, the Quaker
pattern may be considered a suitable ‘model’.
Chase also summarizes the results from the research in group
dynamics. These researchers wish to know exactly how run-of-themill groups function, even when the optimum conditions are not
present. Groups of many kinds have been observed in both natural
and laboratory circumstances. In the United States-and the results
might be different in other cultures- it is reported that people seem
to function more efficiently when they are involved in setting up
the methods of achieving the goals they are aiming at. Rewards of
‘need satisfactions’seem to work better than punishments or ‘forced
need reduction’. Groups seem to work better when they select their
own leaders, deliberately or unconsciously. The structure of a group
may determine whether or not it can solve a common problem
successfully.
One technique that has attracted a considerable amount of attention is the use of ‘role taking‘. This is a method for helping people
understand one another and thus presumably obviating hostilities
and aggressions. The foreman who takes the role of the worker and
the worker who takes the role of the foreman come in time, it is
reported, to see one another’s point of view and thus find it easier
to accommodate differences. Of course, the same ability to take
another person’s point of view, to take his role, also makes it possible
to think up more ways of hurting him if one wants to. One can discover vulnerable areas and exploit them by this form of what Cooley
used to call ‘sympathetic introspection’.
Chase also summarizes the work which has been done over the
past 30 years in the study of conference techniques. The importance
of this area of research lies in the fact that a great deal of policy
is formulated in conferences. Important decisions are arrived at.
Differences must be reconciled: agreements must be reached. If this
policy and these decisions are to represent the best thinking of those
entrusted with their formulation it is important that the conference
be managed in the most effective manner possible. The number of
members, it has been found, should be about 10 to 15, not more
than 20. So-called ‘buzz groups’ of four or five sometimes help,
informality, within the bounds of good manners, helps. But there
should be no forced good fellowship. Consistency with respect to
the use of first or last names should be practised; if there is not.
cliques or the suspicion of cliques may arise. Some pointers include
a table where everyone can see all the others, with no special
chair for the leader, T w o hours seems to be as long as a session
should last. Ten-minute recesses may help in case of a deadlock. If
emotions begin to mount, it may be useful to postpone further
discussion. Consensus seems to be better than voting since a vote
splits the group into winners and losers. In the United States a
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democratic or permissive type of leader seems to be most successful.
Chase points out that at the present time many if not most international conferences violate the principles of group dynamics in
that delegates come instructed, so that free interaction is not possible. H e suggests that if all participants in international policy
formation were well grounded in the culture concept better success
in arriving at agreement could be expected.
So far as industrial peace is concerned, he finds that the research
adds up to: the improvement of morale, incentive,and co-operation
on the part of workers by means of increasing their participation
in decisions involving their work conditions. More flexible organization instead of the rigid chain of command up and down the line.
Teams of workers set up their own procedures for achieving goals
of their unit in the plant. This releases productive energy which
is frustrated when workers are simply given orders and expected
to execute them with no say-soon their own part.
Chase concludes his summary of the roads to agreement with the
following statement (p. 235):
In the course of our inquiry w e found many useful methods, rules, and suggestions to reduce conflict. Some of them kept coming back, like recurring
decimals, in situation after situation. I would like to underline five of them:
the principle of participation; the principle of group energy; the principle
of clearing communication lines; the principle of facts first; the principle
that agreement is much easier when people feel secure.
CRITIQUE OF WORK SUMMARIZED BY CHASE
Chase has performed a valuable service.His book should be widely
translated and read. Yet it cannot be accepted uncritically.W e shall
present only four criticisms here; others will doubtless occur to the
reader.
First of all, the model to which this research refers is one of
limited incidence. This fact in itself would not be damaging if the
researchers held clearly in focus the limitations of their model. It
does become dangerous when it is inferred that results for this
model are applicable to different models.
The techniques which have been shown to be successful in small
face-to-facegroups of like-mindedmen in our culture,eager,indeed
anxious,to solve their problems, are not necessarily transferable to
the formal structure of collective bargaining or of negotiation. The
research summarized by Chase is based on the above-described
model. It assumes that the parties wish to find a solution but do
not have techniques for doing so. Good will is assumed; know-how
or technique is the problem. It rests on the theory that conflict is
the result of lack of knowledge of ways of reaching agreement,that
‘our failure to perfect human relations results less from lack of
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trying than from not discovering how’ [161, p. vii]. This point of
view looks upon human beings as groping for some way to reach
agreement and failing because they do not know how. It presupposes
that men wish to achieve agreement or consensus but do not know
how to go about it. It assumes a willingness on the part of those
involved to do what is required to bring about a resolution of conflict. It concentrates, therefore, on applying the methods of science
to evolving ways of achieving this goal.
But none of this research is applicable to a model where the
good will is not present. The resolution of conflict is a problem of
motivation as well as of technique or know-how.Science can tell us
how m e n can achieve agreement or consensus. It cannot make m a n
want to. Science can tell us the conditions under which agreement or
consensus can be achieved. It cannot create these conditions. W e
are reminded of the psychiatrist-without doubt an apocryphal
character-who complained that he could cure his schizophrenic
patient if the patient would only co-operate. In a similar manner
Chase tells us w e could peaceably and even amiably settle our differences if only w e would co-operate.The illness of the schizophrenic
is precisely his inability to co-operatein the cure of his malady.
A second point is that although the cultural difficulties involved
in applying the findings of the research he presents do occur to
Chase, not a11 the implications do. The very techniques for reaching
agreement or consensus which he advocates with such persuasive
conviction are precisely those which others in a different culture
may vigorously reject. Stalin did, for example. The basic philosophy
underlying the methods described by Chase is precisely the opposite
to that which the Russian communists believe in. Stalin put himself
on record as opposed to what he called the ‘family and neighbour’
system for settling differences, the very system which Chase is
describing. Said Stalin [581, p. 2391:
If w e Bolshevists...eschew self-criticism for the sake of the peace-of-mind
of some of our comrades, is it not obvious that tremendous harm can result
for our cause? . . . If we, champions of the proletarian revolution, close our
eyes to our errors and settle matters in a familiar and convivial way by preserving silence as to our mutual mistakes and thus driving the festering ulcers
into the interior of our party organism, w h o will finally correct our shortcomings? Is it not obvious that w e shall then cease to be proletarian
revolutionaries,that w e shall probably go under if w e countenance a growth of
thin ‘family and neighbour’ system in the settlement of important matters?
At the opposite extreme is the method of arriving at decisions in
Japan, where the individual shrinks from assuming any responsibility
and tends to shift it to the leader. Whereas Chase tells us to avoid
voting, which tends to split a group into winners and losers, the
American Occupation in Japan felt that voting was a necessary
aspect of democratic group functioning.It worked on the assumption
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that cleavages should be brought out into the open rather than
submerged in unanimity [739].
. . . the actual fact is that any democracy must depend on majority decision.
This is neither a Western nor an Eastern concept; it is a general prerequisite
for any kind of democracy, organizational or political. Democracy is the
essence of compromise with the edge going to the majority. Japanese
unanimity of group decision is of course compromise in one sense, but too
often concessions are made by the majority to the will of the minority.
In brief, the results of research on group dynamics in the United
States may have only limited applicability,not only with respect to
the model, but also with respect to the cultural setting.
A third criticism of some of the work especially by the researchers
in group dynamics is that their whole approach is one of manipulating people. Many people resent the idea of having specialists
trained in techniques for manipulating group behaviour. They consider it not only humiliating to those who are thus manipulated but
also as potentially dangerous. It strikes others as somewhat arrogant
also.
And, finally, w e should not overlook the negative aspect of this,
as of all other, research.W e are, indeed, learning a great deal about
how men must act if they wish to solve problems together. But as
in the case of all scientific research, the results are two-edged
swords. T o show what must be done to arrive at agreement is
exactly the same as showing what must be done to block agreement.
To prevent consensus you do just the reverse of what you do to
achieve it. If you are interested in fomenting difficulties, you know
how to do it. If you wish to destroy solidarity, the weapons are
available to your hand. The communists have been cleverly applying
obstructional and divisive techniques for years. Breaking down consensus and fomenting hostilities have been important weapons in
their arsenal for a long time.
In spite of these limitations, however, the research in smallgroup behaviour is valuable. It is performing a function quite
unrelated to that of science building. In a highly competitive society
like that of the United States where status must be achieved, a
gathering of men is likely to become a contest in which each seeks
to magnify his own importance by playing down that of his fellows.
It is very much like the ‘counting coups’ of the Indian brave. O m
m a n tells expansively of his achievements; unless others can match
these achievements, they feel inferior. Or one m a n may deflate
another by responding with raised eyebrows to the recital of his
prowess. One m a n refers familiarly to the esoteric and specialized
work of another, with the implied judgment that anyone not familiar
with it is inferior. And so on. It is a battle of words for the most!
part; it may all be done in the most convivial manner, politely. But
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the result is to make people feel isolated, insecure, inferior. They
are inhibited from taking part. It is one of the functions performed
by the students of small group behaviour to counteract the competitive ‘counting coups’ atmosphere of such groups and to substitute
an atmosphere in which people will not attempt to make their
fellows feel insecure and inferior. It is, in a sense, an effort to
recapture some of the emotional warmth and security of the primary
group in groups which are ordinarily breeders of hostilities and
insecurities.
OTHER APPROACHES
One of the most important approaches to the study of how face-toface groups operate is the work done by Robert F. Bales [302]. By
ingenious laboratory devices he has studied a large number of
groups in action and has found that all face-to-faceinteraction can
be analysed in terms of 12 categories, including four which deal
with conflict axes. The 12 categories are: (a) the showing of solidarity, raising others’ status, giving help, rewarding; (b) the showing
of tension-release,joking, laughing, showing satisfaction; (c) agreeing, showing passive acceptance, understanding, concurring, complying; (d) giving suggestion, direction, implying autonomy for
others; (e) giving opinion, evaluation, analysis, expressing feeling,
wish; (f) giving orientation, information, repeating, clarifying, confirming; (g) asking for orientation, information, repetition, confirmation; (h) asking for opinion, evaluation, analysis, expression of
feeling; (i) asking for suggestion, direction, possible ways of action;
(j) disagreeing, showing passive rejection, formality, withholding
help; (k) showing tension, asking for help, withdrawing out of field;
and (1) showing antagonism, deflating others’ status, defending or
asserting self. Categories (a) and (1) constitute one kind of conflict
axis and (c) and (j) another.
A quite different approach to the problem of technique, assuming
desire to reach a satisfactory solution of conflicting claims, is that
of the mathematical theorists, also applicable in the area of sociological choices. The method is not limited to face-to-facegroups
but applies wherever individuals are allowed to express a preference.
Outstanding here is the work of Kenneth J. Arrow which work [12],
applies methods of symbolic logic ‘to the question whether a social
valuation of alternatives can be consistently derived from given,
partly conflicting, individual valuations’. H e is interested in finding
a rational group preference-for candidates, utilities, policies, or
what-have-you-on the basis of the preferences of the individual
members of the group. The method for obtaining such a group
preference he calls a social welfare function. H e imposes five con-
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ditions which he considers necessary for an acceptable social welfare
function or method for ascertaining group preference and finds that
none now exists which satisfies all the conditions. Goodman and
10731 have, however, challenged the plausibility of
Markowitz [
Arrow’s conditions;they lay down three conditions which must be
satisfied and they do find social welfare functions which meet them.
The work of Arrow is phrased in the language of symbolic logic,
but the implications for a sociology of conflict are clear. When
Arrow quotes Rousseau to the effect that ‘if the opposition of individual interests has rendered the establishmentof societies necessary,
it is the accord of these same interests which has rendered it possible’
[12,p. 821 or the economist F. W.Knight to the effect that ‘the
principle of majority rule must be taken ethically as a means of
ascertaining a real “general will”,not as a mechanism by which one
set of interests is made subservient to another set; political discussion must be assumed to represent a quest for an objectively ideal
or “best” policy, not a contest between interests’ (p. 85) w e see the
pertinence of the problems he is dealing with.
Arrow does not feel that he has found a satisfactory social welfare
function on the bases he rests his logic on. If the semanticists were
right, and there did actually exist some objective value on which
men only seemed to disagree about-such as a Kantian absolute or
some cultural value-then the problem of the social welfare function would take on a wholly different aspect. Now it would be a
matter of ‘discovering’the best policy,not of expressing individually
preferred values (pp. 85-86):
From the point of view of seeking a consensus of the moral imperative of
individuals, such consensus being assumed to exist, the problem of choosing
an electoral or other choice mechanism, or, more broadly, of choosing a
social structure, assumes an entirely different form from that discussed in. ..
this study. The essential problem becomes that of choosing our mechanisms
so as best to bring the pragmatic imperative into coincidence with the
moral. . . .
In this aspect, the case for democracy rests on the argument that free
discussion and expression of opinion are the most suitable techniques of
arriving at the moral imperative implicitly c o m m o n to all. Voting, from
this point of view, is not a device whereby each individual expresses his
1. ‘Condition 1 says, in effect, that as the environment varies and individual orderings remain
fixed, the different choices made shall bear a certain type of consistent relation to each other.
Conditions 2 and 3, on the other hand, suppose a fixed environment and say that, for certain
particular types of variation in individual values, the various choices made have a certain
type of consistence’(28). Condition 4 demands that the individuals be free to choose among
the alternatives available, that is, ‘the social welfare function is not to be imposed’ (39).
A n d Condition 5 states that ‘the social welfare function is not to be dictatorial’ (30).
Arrow concludes that ‘the method of majority decision is a social welfare function satisfying
Conditions 1-5 when there are only two alternatives altogether, but that this method does not
satisfy Condition 1 when there are more than two alternatives.The method of majority decision
does, however, satisfy Conditions 2-5 for any number of alternatives’ 112, p. 771.
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personal interests, but rather where each individual gives his opinion of the
general will.
This model has much in c o m m o n with the statistical problem of pooling
the opinions of a group of experts to arrive at a best judgment; here
individuals are considered experts at determining the moral imperative....
The analogy to the problem of pooling experts’ opinion is, of course,
incomplete; for, in the social welfare problem, the very method of pooling,
i.e., of social decision, m a y affectthe degree of expertness of individuals. ...
The very act of establishing a dictator or elite to decide on the social good
may lead to a distortion of the pragmatic from the moral imperative.
For a true conflict, then, Arrow’s approach is inadequate. The
implication of some social and even more economic theory in the
nineteenth century was that the interests of the total group could
best be served by the efforts of each individual to maximize his own
interests. In such a model, Arrow’s approach might be more
successful.
It might be safe to conclude from this brief rCsumC that when
people who share a cultural background genuinely wish to reach
agreement,techniques are little by little becoming available for them
to use in achieving their goal. Although w e have criticized the
limitations of the research here presented, it would be unfair not
to credit it with some genuine contributions to the important art of
working and living together harmoniously.
MEDIATION
Mediation is a special kind of accommodation. It occurs only when
(a) the issues are fairly clear; (b) the parties involved are selfconscious; (c) a decision is necessary for further functioning of the
system, that is, a crisis of some kind is involved (as contrasted with
more diffuse accommodation in reduction of prejudices, intercultural education, and similar processes). It may be between the parties involved or between their responsible representatives. It cannot
take place unless the parties can interact: some part of the process
must be face-to-face.It fdls therefore into the category of small
group research.
Mediation is probably most likely to occur between approximately
equal parties so far as power relationships are concerned. If there
is great inequality, the more powerful party will be in a position to
impose its will. Mediation tends, therefore, to be characteristic of
situations in which equals are in conflict.
Mediation is a profoundly moral process; it cannot successfully
take place unless both parties have faith in the integrity of the
mediator. Both parties, furthermore, must inhabit the same moral
universe, otherwise there will be no understanding. For success,
both parties must want a solution. Ideally there should be no further
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step on which the parties may depend in case of failure. In brief,
the incentives to achieving a solution must be great.
If mediation is viewed as the guidance of the interaction of a
problem-solving group, then all the research summarized at the
beginning of this section would be pertinent. If it is viewed as
dealing with a schismatic process, then one of the models referred
to in Section I11 may be useful; the researcher might help the
mediator if he could find the point on the curve where the intersection took place or he could work out the proper parameters for
an appropriate equation. If the mediation situation is viewed in the
light of the theory of games of strategy, the researcher might
approach the problem in terms of finding the combination of strategies which could be demonstrated to be optimal for both sides.
As a matter of fact, of course, the actual process of mediation is
an art. Some people seem to know intuitively what to do; they may
be helped by scientific research, but they seem to be able to sense
the correct thing to do. Nor would all the research in the world
make other persons successful as mediators. Part of the process of
mediation consists in reactions to the mediator himself as a person.
If he does not have the symbolic and intuitive significance required,
technique will be of little avail.
Stuart Chase has described the work of some of the great conciliators in American labour disputes. Cyrus Ching, head of the
Conciliation Service in the United States Government, is of the
opinion that successful conciliation, being an art, cannot be formulated into scientific rules. ‘You have to sense the situation, feel
it out, then you act. Every case is different. There are no set rules’
[1057,p. 1601. Some of the rule-of-thumb techniques Ching has
used are such things as occasionally misconstruing or questioning
the evidence, letting the parties blow off steam, sensing the strategic
moment to suggest a compromise, probing for places where emotion
can be made to give way. Another great conciliator,Charles T.Estes,
sometimes makes the contestants angry with him, so that they must
make common cause against him and be less angry with one another;
he develops communication among the contestants so that at least
they know what the issues are and what the facts are. Dwight Morrow, late ambassador from the United States to Mexico, served as
conciliator between the Catholic Church and the Mexican Government. H e got representatives to concede that ideological conciliation
was impossible; but on concrete, practical matters it was possible
to come to agreement.
Bales’ work has shown that in reaching a group decision certain
stages-of orientation, evaluation, and control-must be gone
through; none can be skipped. A group has its own natural history,
its own tempo, and its own pace. If it is hurried no good is accomplished since the missed stage must be gone through anyway and
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time may even be lost in going back to pick up the lost beat. Bales
has also allowed for ‘tension release’ as one of his categories for
studying small group interaction. A serious mediator could doubtless apply these findings.
A n important theoretical basis for successful mediation or
conciliation may lie in the concept of the looking-glass self.
Successful interaction depends on an accurate gauge of the impact
which our behaviour makes on others. People who are skilled in
foretelling how they will affect others can judge social situations
well. They may show good or poor judgement in the course of
behaviour they decide upon; but at any rate they choose it with their
eyes open. A good mediator may be one who successfully performs
the function of interpreting to people how they look to others,
interpreting their behaviour from the point of view of the opponent.
From an administrative and practical rather than from a theoretical point of view, Elmore Jackson has attempted to find out what
could be learned from mediation of industrial conflicts that could
be applied to mediation of international conflicts [1079]. His purpose was ‘to see if the experience in the two fields is sufficiently
similar for the United Nations to profit in some way from the more
extensive labour mediation experience’ (p. xiv). H e distinguishes
mediation from conciliation in that it is more active, even proposing
suggestions for settlement. H e summarizes the methods of handling
labour disputes in the United States, in Sweden, in Great Britain,
and in Russia. It discusses international disputes and areas of comparability between them and industrial disputes. H e concludes that:
1. Mediatory machinery must be adapted to the particular dispute.
2. Public debate may be useful in mobilizing public interest for
peaceful settlement, but if extended too long it may harden parties in their points of view.
3. Mediation should be properly timed, before the parties have
hardened or when they become conscious of the risks of failure.
4. There is great need for flexibility. Uninstructed single mediators
are best.
5. A reporting and recommending function is combined with
mediation, a commission may be better. It may even have to
be instructed.
Among the similarities in negotiation techniques which Jackson
finds are the following:
1. Techniques in getting agreement:
(a) Getting the parties together; perhaps the first time over
some non-controversial procedural problem;
(b) Building up confidence;
(c) Factual deflation;
(d) Raising doubts about positions already assumed;
(e) Alternate solutions: expanding the area of agreement,
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2. Cooling-off periods. These are of limited usefulness unless
mediation efforts continue.
3. Formal conclusion of agreements informally arrived at.
This emphasis on similarities between mediation in industrial conflicts and mediation in international conflicts is not at the expense of
a candid recognition of the differences.Jackson is under no illusions
with respect to the difficulties involved in applying techniques of one
problem area to another problem area. But he believes that no bit
of experience should be overlooked or ignored if it can help in
working out techniques for mediation in international conflicts.
NEGOTIATION
The reaction of people everywhere to the horrors of ‘hot war’, and
especially to those of atomic warfare and hydrogen-bomb warfare
has led to an eagerness for some substituteway of handling conflicting
interests. Parliamentary debate, as practised in the United Nations,
is one substitute.But this must be supplemented by a great deal of
bargaining, dickering, lobbying, and similar activities. Fundamentally some kind of negotiation between the conflicting parties must
take place.
The sociology of negotiation in face-to-facegroups-aside from
the theory of games of strategy-has not been exploited very fully
as yet. The one study available is of the experience of Americans
and Russians, and we shall base our discussion largely on it [728].
There was in the United States in the immediate post-war period
a strong desire that leaders of the West and of Russia meet in faceto-face sessions to work out harmoniously ways to settle differences.
A series of attempts to negotiate did not lead to constructive results.
The World Peace Foundation thereupon requested Raymond Dennett and Joseph E.Johnson to look into this matter. They assembled
the experiences of ten men who had participated in negotiations
with the Russians and these reports constitute almost the only
important source for a study of the processes of negotiation when
cultural backgrounds, orientation, interests, and philosophies are
radically different.
W e might perhaps visualize the situation in terms of game theory
as follows:
United States
Russia
Obstruct
Negotiate
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Quit the conference
and suffer onus of
failure
Continue to try to
negotiate
6
8
4
3
It is obvious from inspection that 4 constitutes the saddle-pointof
this payoff matrix. Russia was playing a pure strategy; so was the
United States.So long as the Americans could hold out against the
obstructing tactics of the Russians, they could hold the Russian
gains down to 4;so long as the Russians could obstruct,they could
keep American losses up to 4.For three years this ‘game’continued.
Then apparently the Americans decided to quit the game and get
out, even though this increased their loss to 6.
Philip E.Mosely attempts to summarize what was learned from
the experiences of the negotiations referred to above.
In addition to terminological and semantic difficulties,there were
real differences in interpretation of strategy and tactics (pp. 295-6):
The Western negotiator is usually able to envisage a series of minor shifts
in his o w n and other positions. H e is ‘pluralistic’ in his approach to a
solution, in the adjustments of democratic decision-making at home and
in seeking adjustments of interests and views among nations . . .
The Western representative tends to assume that a minor concession
here or there will facilitate achieving the c o m m o n aim of co-operative
action. H e does not necessarily look for an immediate quid pro quo for each
minor concession. At a later stage in the negotiation his partner will remember
the facilitating concession and will yield something in turn. T o him ‘good
will’is both a lubricant of the negotiating process and a valuable intangible
by-product. . . . The Soviet diplomat feels himself like a traveller by night
in the forest w h o must be constantly on the watch for the smallest sound or
sight of treachery. H e must be unceasingly on guard against his o w n human
tendency to ‘fall into complacency’ and thus to underestimate the dangers
which surround both him and the regime which he serves.
Mosely thinks that in addition to understanding the Russian
language, anyone who wishes to negotiate successfully with representatives of the Russian Government must understand the role of
the Soviet diplomat vis-&-vishis government.The Russian diplomat
must be able to function without the informal channels of communication which are so useful among Western diplomats. H e has
to adopt at the beginning a single clear position and hold to it
logically, through indefinite repetitions.
Perhaps some of the reasons why negotiations have not been
more fruitful between the West and the U.S.S.R.
may be attributed
to their differences in conceptualization of the conflict.The American negotiators may have approached the negotiating table with the
idea that this was a problem-solving situation, that it was an
attempt to reach agreement among men of good will with common
goals. The Russians,on the other hand,approached the negotiating
table convinced that ‘conflict is inherent in the development of
“capitalist” society,and cannot be wished out of existence by “subjective goodwill”’ (p. 302). They may not, in effect, have been
playing the same ‘game’.
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VI. SUMMARY
Current research in the field of inter-group conflict reveals two
quite different conceptualizations, one social-psychological and one
sociological. The first is in terms of individual mechanisms, currently those of ‘tensions’ rather than, as formerly, in terms of
inherited behaviour patterns or instincts. This concept of tension
has been taken over from individual psychology and applied to
groups, so that ‘group tensions’ is commonly used almost synonymously with group conflict. Little dehitive evidence has, however,
been adduced to show that ‘group tensions’, as either simple or as
weighted additive functions of individual tensions, can explain
inter-group relations. The second, or sociological, conceptualization
of conflict is in terms of systems with mutually incompatible goals
or values, so that accommodation involves cost of some kind or
other. Research in this area has been both formal, mathematical,
and deductive on the one hand, and substantive and descriptive, on
the other. In the area of research in face-to-facegroups, as in the
area of research on costs, both the social-psychological and the
sociological approaches to conflict find application.
What, then does it all add up to? What can w e conclude from
this array of research? From a research point of view perhaps the
first thing that strikes the student is the inadequacy of any singlepronged attack on the subject of conflict. Conflict is itself such a
complex phenomenon-even the problem of conceptualization is
complex-that neither a social-psychological nor a sociological
approach-nor an economic nor a political one, for that matteris adequate to cover the subject. It is a bias of the present writer to
see the subject in a sociological framework, with psychology-and
economics and political science-contributing specific data, on costs
or payoffs, for example, on incompatibility or complementaries, on
strategies,rules of the game. But any other approach which made it
possible for all the social science disciplines to contribute their
insights and techniques might equally well serve the basic purpose
of showing us the mechanisms and processes which, in their interwoven entirety, w e call conflict.
From a more practical or applicational point of view, the research
here reviewed reminds us again that no matter how good research
is, it cannot in and of itself be expected to eliminate or prevent
conflict. It can clarify the rules of the game so that w e know to
what degree it is inevitable or inherent in social living; it can help
to calculate costs and payoffs of strategies; it can show trends and
it can present data. But if some particular strategy-war, let us say,
or violence seems to one party in a conflict situation to be its best
bet, even with all the research data available with respect to the
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payoff, there is little likelihood that such a strategy will not be
used. Technology may make the payoff of war so exhorbitant that
it may cease to be judged good strategy in any situation; and socialscience research may demonstrate this fact. But research cannot
determine policy. It can, however, in spite of the difficulties Williams
has clarified, enlighten policy-makers, so that decisions are made
with the fullest possible knowledge.
This chapter has emphasized the sociological approach to conflict,
with only minor consideration of the psychological, except as it was
embodied in the tensions approach, and with no attention at all to
politico-historicalfactors. W e turn then, in the following chapter to
a discussion of the psychological approach to the study of conflict,
and then to a more focused study of war, within a political and
historical setting.
1. W h e n the Supreme Court was thinking through its decision on elementary school segregation in the United States, the research data which the previous decades had made availhble
were mobilized and submitted for its consideration. These data undoubtedly contributed to
the court’s decision.
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CHAPTER
I1
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF TENSIONS
AND CONFLICT
by
T. H. PEAR
Writing a report of this kind involves a difficult choice between
methods of exposition. The writer might refer to and comment upon
every publication on this subject known to him-a contribution in
some ways useful, but lacking in perspective. At the opposite
extreme, he might deal with publications which seem of general
interest or special importance, allowing some influence to personal
preferences. A third method, which risks falling between two stools,
would be to make statements, based on his own reading and discussion, about trends: this would expose him to criticism from
others who interpret the same material differently. The second
method is adopted here.
As I proceeded with this work, it became increasingly clear to m e
that, at present, my personal interest lies in conflicts which result in
war, rather than in conflicts in general, and that my belief that war is
a matter of very large groups made me sceptical concerning the light
which can be cast upon the problems of warfare today by the study
of small groups, except those of a special kind, referred to later.
It may seem that, in this chapter, too little attention is paid to the
suggestive researches in this field, but accounts of them are available
in the books cited, and in H u m a n Relations, Vol. 1, 1947, and
succeeding volumes.
I wish to thank, for their valuable help, Professor Gordon
W.Allport, Professor and Mrs.Muzafer Sherif and Dr. M.0.Wilson, Professor George A . Ferguson, Drs. Alex Inkeles, Daniel
J. Levinson and Arthur Gladstone. Dr. Gladstone has kept m e in
touch with current work by sending the Bulletins of the Research
Exchange on the Prevention of War. As many of the papers
reported there have not been printed, it is impracticable to refer to
them in detail, but their contents have been valuable.
The purpose of a psychological consideration of peace and war
is to discuss their effects, primarily, upon the experience and
behaviour of an individual person; secondarily, upon the behaviour
of groups of persons, and if there can be group-consciousness-still
a debatable question-upon the experience of the group.
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In one sense, the psychologist in his descriptions, gets nearer to
the facts of war than do many of his confrkres in other departments
of social science: in this he resembles the journalist, novelist and
playwright. It may be that ‘perspective’,whatever this term, borrowed from sight, may mean, is a luxury which the psychologist can
seldom afford. H e should deal, in a way which the sociologist, economist and historian can avoid, with the ‘crude and raw of experience’. Accordingly, while failing to please readers w h o prefer
the general to the particular, he risks charges of being long-winded
or ‘unscientific’on the part of those who, begging the question,
assert that science does not deal with individual cases. Yet, as
some recompense, he may interest readers who have experienced
the actualities of war, whether as combatants or civilians, adults or
children: in World W a r I1 the differences between these were
constantly blurred, and may hardly exist in any future war.
Like his colleagues in the social sciences, he is critical of concepts, often using them in senses narrower than the ordinary reader
might approve. H u m a n conflicts are not all inimical; ‘aggressiveness’
is a word which every day becomes more slippery when used by
politicians. Today, elections in this country are seldom really
‘fought’;even a Prime Minister has been heard to regret their sedateness. A stealthily dropped hydrogen bomb, or a false rumour
planted and circulated among people likely to believe it, are hardly
comparable as weapons to sword and lance used in the face of the
enemy.
W e must note the contrast between the nomothetic and idiographic aims of psychologists themselves; some aim only at discovering general laws, while others regard it as necessary to science
that the individual case shall be described and discussed in detail.
W h y do some chapters on war, written by psychologists, contain no
hint that persons, not nations, feel warlike or peacefully inclined?
H o w far is Freud’s view of war relevant to the factsof today? H o w far
does it, even if comparatively irrelevant, suggest ideas to psychologists who recognize and insist upon the importance of rational
and conscious as well as irrational and unconscious factors? What
psychologist believes the common assertion that ‘today nobody
wants war’? Is there a ‘moral equivalent’ of germ-warfare (no more
‘biological’than any other pattern of life) or ‘psychological warfare’, which an American psychologist, Morris Janowitz, as a result
of personal experience, states flatly is ‘neither psychological nor
warfare’?
While avoiding sterile arguments about ‘heredity’ and ‘environment’, the psychologist can assert that much sound work has been
done upon the influence of social environment, culture and education in the development of attitudes towards the facts of war and
peace, and upon prejudices, personal, local and national. About
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the complex problems classed under ‘national character’, so much
is now known that psychological treatments of this attractive subject
seem more cautious than any others.
M a n as a solitary animal is unknown: it is therefore not surprising that at last-it took a long time-the study of M a n in his
social relationships has been taken seriously. Here, as elsewhere,
there are specifically sociological and psychological problems; what
does it feel like to be one of an acting group, and how does a group,
as a group, conduct its special activities? At present workers in
these two fields tend to keep apart: this may be only an infantile
weakness in the development of the social sciences.
T o illustrate different techniques in studying large groups, an
excellent series of investigations into tensions between groups in
m o d e m India is discussed. Finally, since high level decisions, which
may be the most important factors in delaying, preventing or causing actual wars, are made by committees, a study of the behaviour
of an international committee is described showing how such
activity may be fruitful.
DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS
Tensions
The ‘Tensions Project’ of Unesco is discussed in the Introduction
to the present volume. There has been a shift from a negative
concept of tensions to a positive one, and to studies of positive
solutions of inter-group relations, i.e. from a pathology of society
to a study of social health.
Reading newspapers and listening to the radio, one continually
hears the words ‘tensions’ and ‘aggression’. Both until they are
examined may seem commonsense descriptions of facts.If a psychologist is to take the terms seriously, as he must, since they deal
with the expression of human experience, he finds them far from
unequivocal. Quincy Wright [586] has usefully examined the meaning of tensions,as the term has been applied in the physical sciences,
and its derivations in sociological and psychological studies. In
ordinary usage, tension means the act of stretching or the condition
of being stretched, and in mechanics, stress caused by pulling, or
the condition of a body when acted on by such stress. In physics,
tension means the constrained condition in the particles of bodies
arising from the action of antagonistic forces in which they tend to
return to their former state (elastic force), or the condition producing an electric current of high electro-motive force (difference of
potential). It also has the psychological and sociological significance
of mental strain or any strained relation, as between governments.
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Pierre Janet, early in this century, expounded his view of psychological tension [110] as being the force wnich synthesizes and
integrates the personality, and which, when the tension is low,
leads to neurasthenia or psychasthenia. This ‘whole’tension is a
normalizing factor; it is when tensions arise in and between particular fields of the personality that splits occur.
The tension concept, so far as it applies to individuals, was
perhaps, one might say, reintroduced by Freud and popularized by
Kurt Lewin (cf. M. R. Sapirstein [249]).
In psychiatry, as Gardner Murphy [202],observes, the concept of
tensions is often used to describe a state of suspense, uneasiness,
or readiness for violent action. Quincy Wright [586] discusses
whether tensions can be estimated or measured. His treatment
involves an analogy with electricity. Robert W . Angel1 (ibid.) has
criticized this, as leaning too hard upon an analogy. In reply, Wright
takes the usual line, that new ideas seldom appear unless suggested
by apparent similarities, and provided one discovers the point or
points at which the analogy, on being stretched, snaps, its use is
admissible.
Conflicts
Turning now to the concept of conflict, there seems to be much
less ambiguity in the popular use of the word, and the psychologist
can employ it for his specialized purposes. (Professor Jessie Bernard’s chapter deals with conflicts in this unequivocal sense.)
What is the relation between tension and conflict? There can
obviously be conflict with little tension, e.g. when one is playing a
competitive game for pure enjoyment with an opponent less skilled
than oneself. There can also (especially today) be tension, deliberately caused and maintained by technicar means, without actual
conflict: one of the main aims of the ‘cold war’ is to exacerbate tension in as many directions as possible, without causing, for the time
being at least, international conflict. But conflict may be intrapersonal, inter-personal, sectional, industrial, racial, international,
or-to change the angle of approach slightly-almost purely legal.
Aggressiveness and Aggression
This concept, which bulks so large in most m o d e m treatments
of conflict, will be dealt with rather fully. In some ways, the broad
concept of aggressiveness resembles that of sexuality-as this latter
term was used in the 1920’s.It was thought that objections to the
description of an action, thought or dream as motivated chiefly by
sex could be countered by asserting that any action which is different
from what it would have been, had it not been directed towards a
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person of the opposite sex, is fundamentally sexual. This description would presumably cover acts of courtesy between m a n and
woman. In one sense, this interpretation might be admissible, since
a m a n who without overt reasons speaks to a w o m a n who is a
complete stranger might be regarded as making a sexual advance.
Similarly,there may be a broad sense in which the concept of aggressiveness is admissible, though it seems more useful to speak of
acts of aggression rather than of a trait of aggressiveness, since facial
expression, manner of speech and gestures may be interpreted as
aggressive or non-aggressiveby differentpersons who know little (or
much) of the other person’s sub-culture-pattern.
Perhaps w e are justified in believing that the early use of the
word ‘aggress’meant literally ‘to take a step towards’ and that the
implication that the step was taken with intent to hurt or harm
came later (cf. Lydia Jackson [123]).
W a r and Warfare
The concepts of war (whether the semi-popular division into ‘hot’
and ‘cold’is justified seems doubtful) and of warfare are notoriously
slippery to handle, and the reader is referred to Raymond Aron’s
chapter for a discussion of what war means to the lawyer and
historian. That in our lives w e have learned by experience the
difference between the end of a war and the cessation of hostilities
is a fact worth mentioning. The concept of total war-abrogation
or ignoring of many of the rules of war, inclusion of women and
non-adults as combatants-makes it impossible for the social
psychologist to see a tidy picture anywhere in this sphere.
Warfare-the carrying on of war-is perhaps simple to understand, now that in its few remaining rules no holds are barred. Yet
the addition of psychological warfare-the activities comprised in
this branch are not easy to discover, for obvious reasons-may
make the psychologists conceptual task easier. The pen is not only
mightier than the sword, but n o w that swords are abolished except
for ceremonial reasons and pens have become more important, the
statement becomes a platitude.
The following questions are relevant in relation to war. What
are the facts of warfare today, so far as the ordinary citizen is
allowed to know them? What new developments are explicitly
announced (e.g. the hydrogen bomb, germs as weapons); what are
hinted at (e.g. the cobalt bomb)? Has the crude exchange of threats
developed into a more complex technique of negotiation by threats,
combined with apparently friendly concessions? What, in recent
years, have been the actual effects of threats on both sides? Finally,
how ought such knowledge as w e can obtain of these newish tech-
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niques to affect our attempts at a realistic psychological concept of
war and peace?
Does all warfare consist in fighting? Is not the word ‘fighting’
used today to cover any kind of contest? (cf. Ashley Montagu [197].
Pollard [679]). Complaints were heard of the sedateness of recent
British by-elections, at a time when journalists were using the
terms ‘campaign’ and ‘fighting’. Negotiations for higher wages are
often described as fights. In a fight, presumably, the intention is to
damage the opponent physically, yet if the phrase ‘cold war’ is
admissible, it is clear that the line is drawn at physical damage.
‘Cold war’ suggests (illegitimately) that real war is always hot, and
waged in anger. This is not true. Since the term ‘war’ is still
seriously used for any kind of conflict, the psychologist’s task is
made difficult.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
Does the psychologist, in studying conflicts and warfare, take too
little account of history and economics? The question is too simply
phrased, since the concepts of history, economics and psychology
are highly abstract.In all these disciplines there are wide differences
of approach, of treatment, of style. The apparently simple claim
that the historian presents facts in perspective, might prompt several
comments-all respectful-by psychologists, e.g. that to perform
this feat he needs an interval of time to separate him from the
happenings upon which he pronounces judgement. But how long?
Events move quickly nowadays. If a war were to begin n o w
(November 1954), can w e suppose that happenings in this year had
nothing to do with it? Yet what historian would or could get them
into perspective and publish a book on them in six months?
There are, too, perspectives and perspectives (cf. Emery Reves
[682], Pear [230]. Some may develop in the historian’s mind, not
only as the result of influences connected with his nationality-if
he has changed it, left his o w n country and disapproves of its present methods of government, his perspective is unlikely to be
simplified thereby-but also from his o w n peculiarities of personality
and character. (Recently, a broadcaster complained that German
historians today are giving a one-sidedly middle-class account of
world events.)
Since Freud’s demonstration of the powerful censoring forces
which exist in our minds, and the Gestalt psychologists’ insistence
that any mind, especially a complex one, has an itch to impose
patterns upon its experience, psychologists have been aware that
even to ‘give the gist’ of an article or book m a y involve the action
of mechanisms similar to those of the dream; symbolism, condensa-
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tion, displacement of affect,regard for presentability and secondary
elaboration [1681. Facts which may appear ‘obviously’significant to
a Tory or Labour-mindedhistorian-to say nothing of a Marxistmay be quite honestly omitted from a summary made by someone
of a different political persuasion. The Reith radio lectures by
Professor Arnold J. Toynbee were not approved by all British
historians, even if they appreciated that he was attempting to take
a Copernican view of conflicts and war.
A scholarly historian who is ‘sound’because he deals with documents-let us assume that his judgement of their authenticity is
also sound,and that he can detect if any significant ones have been
omitted by compilers-may be unhappy today, since important
events which helped to lead up.to, or postpone a war,may not be
documented. A rumour, for example, often founded upon some
fact, however slender (cf. F. C.Bartlett [13], G.W. Allport and
L.Postman [lo]), by the time it has passed from person to person
and has enlarged to dimensions that appear ludicrous to the
informed, but not to the simple mind, may have a powerful effect.
In one modem sense,a film is a document;yet a film can be faked,
and even if it is not, the process of cutting is itself a censorship,and
all films depicting atrocities contain scenes regarded by some people
as incredible or, in their context,misleading. Most important is the
fact that today there can be few historians with a sound knowledge
of today’s physics, chemistry,medicine and statistics;to say nothing
of sociology,anthropology and psychology.The reply that this does
not matter since the historian can understand the scientists’reports,
is inadmissible, for it is unlikely that he will see many of these,
especially the conflicting ones, and those in which action was or was
not advised. If an historian gets his day-to-dayfacts from the
radio, one may well ask ‘In which country?’; for the radio-commentator’s selection of news may be affected by his consideration
of his employers, or theirs of him.
The case would be different if a series of recent events leading
up to war were considered by a sociologically trained historian, or
an historically trained sociologist. One of the problems would be
to examine the assertion, sometimes made explicitly, more often
implicitly, that war is war, whenever or wherever it happens, has
happened or will happen, and that modern methods of waging it
alter the facts very little. Carthage, Hamburg, Hiroshima were all
destroyed; history repeats itself. This view ignores or evades the
important issues arising from the events which happen on the margin
of the destroyed area-it becomes wider with each new methodand the period over which the damage to human beings lasts:
medical men and scientists are still studying the results of the
Hiroshima explosion nearly twelve years ago. Despite attempts in
the press and by some politicians to play down the fact that the
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Bikini explosion test surprised scientists (we were repeatedly told
that they had the situation under control), it seems clear that, for
example, the direction and force of the wind for days after the
explosion could seldom be ‘according to plan’.
A view which the present writer cannot accept is that the political
forces, assumed to be supra-personal,which tend towards war are
the same in quality as they always were (a difficultassumption for
a social psychologist to accept) but new factors, e.g. new types of
bomb, germs or psychological attack, enter, and their influence can
be separately estimated, Anyone who has read the reasonable contentions of Gestalt psychology will h d this difficult to believe.
Bertrand Russell, in the Herman Ould Memorial Lecture on
4 M a y 1954 (Manchester Guardian, 5 M a y 1954), deplores what he
describes as the present tendency in history to emphasize the community and the society at the expense of the individual. Too little
attention has been paid of late to the individual, and too much to
the mass. If men are told over and over again that they are comm o n men, they will soon start to act as common men do. Heroes
should not be written about as the embodiment of social forces, but
treated as interesting figures in themselves.
This is relevant to the oft-disputed question, seldom put as simply
as this. In great issues, is the motivation of a single person significant? If so, can it be ascertained, otherwise than by guesswork,
when he is dead?
A psychologist might take up the extreme position that since it
is difficult enough to discover a person’s motives, conscious and
unconscious, even when he can speak and write and is accessible to
an inquirer, and if one accepts the hypotheses of the transformation
and functional autonomy of motives [SI, an attempt to reconstruct a
dead person’s motives may be a work of art, but is not a contribution to factual knowledge. Yet if it be granted that most high-level
decisions of moment are made for non-personal reasons (Mr.Stanley Baldwin’s revelation that he deliberately packed the Cabinet
with ex-Harrovians is perhaps an exception), it seems incontestible
that in the choice of m e n immediately below him, a leader may
express his own motives. In countries where there is a wide gap
between the rulers and the rest of the population w e must consider
who is to be taken as representing that nation; the nobility, the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, or the dominated majority. As I wrote
in M a y 1954, it was extremely hard to determine at that time what
the American nation was thinking about its future policy towards
Indo-China, let alone China. If its leaders were guided by what
the nation thought, how did they know themselves? (cf. Professor
Bernard’s chapter). In England, some political prophets declared
that Labour gains in the M a y municipal elections of 1954 made a
general election in the near future improbable, while others quoted
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the common saying that there is never any close connexion between
the significance of English municipal and national elections Failing
a general election,however,it is difficult to see how our leaders can
know what the nation thinks, except by studying opinion polls.
Nowhere in this chapter is there any intention of suggesting that
because the psychological aspects of the problems of war are considered important-by some, the most important of all-there are
psychologists who have formulated,still less solved,the chief problems. Yet, in World War I, problems of which the solution led to
the easier location of submarines were not difficult to formulate
and, to the surprise of some high-level administrators, involved
certain issues which had already been studied by psychologists.
THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS
Let us consider the attempts made to treat conflicts and war, in
terms of the causation,accumulation and release of tensions. Tensions may be intra-personal or extra-personal,and the mutual
relations between these two kinds have been studied by psychoanalysts and the Tavistock Group. Some psychoanalytically inclined
students of intra-grouptensions urge that any committee or congress
of psychologists desirous of reducing large-scale tensions in the
world must-or at least should-reduce or abolish as many as
possible of the tensions inside themselves or their group, before
trying to improve or heal others. O n one level this sounds like
uncommon common sense, as it might be in a small committee
entrusted with one specific and limited aim (say an appointment to
a post). Yet,considering the way in which recently certain dictators
nearly won a world war,in spite of tensions within their own minds
and in their immediate social vicinity, one may rightly view this
advice with caution.A highly integrated person,e.g a prime minister,
a general, a school headmaster,may have few interfering tensions
inside himself, but for that very reason may cause many in his staff.
The idea of tension, in spite of its hidden vagueness, is widespread.Let us therefore examine certain instances when it has been
used effectively: e.g.Hadley Cantril (ed.) Tensions that Cause Wars
[45]; D. Krech and R. S. Crutchfield’s Theory and Problems of
Social Psychology [146] and Gardner Murphy (ed.) In the Minds
of M e n [378], a book on the study of human behaviour and social
tension in India.
The views of Krech and Crutchfield deserve considering at length,
since they represent a fairly extreme psychological standpoint.To
explain them briefly is difficult,since their expression is itself condensed. In discussing international tensions (Chapter XV) they
maintain that one must seek to avoid three common errors.
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First, concentrating too exclusively on the problems of war:
tensions that exist in peace must be given at least equal consideration. ‘It can be argued that war is not necessarily the greatest of
all possible evils in the world.’ This was written in 1948, when it
was easier to distinguish warfare from vast ‘peace-time’experiments.
Today, for the average citizen, his semi-scientific notions of bombs
-hydrogen, cobalt, etc.-and of germs cloud any clear distinctions,
logical or ethical, between war and indiscriminate annihilation.
Anyone who doubts this might ask himself if the Japanese fishermen
who were seriously injured by the ‘peaceful’Bikini experimental
explosion in 1954 were suffering as the result of warfare. If so,
was this warfare cold?
There is, Krech and Crutchfield assert, no such thing as a good
war: war is never more than a stupid solution to international
tensions. They add that, with the advent of atomic warfare, it
becomes less and less defensible. Atomic weapons do not, and often
are not intended to, punish only those who ‘deserve’to be taught
the error of their ways, and any positive values that the ‘right’
side was fighting to protect may be obliterated by the bomb.
Secondly, too exclusive a concentration on conflicts between
nations, at the expense of attention to the individuals who make up
these nations. This mistake may lead to imputing to nations motives,
perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, that are in fact the motives,
perceptions, attitudes, behaviours of a very few individuals of these
nations. (This has been discussed by M. Ginsberg [92] and
G.W.Allport [5].)
This assertion raises the problem of the relations of sociology,
history and economics to psychology. H a d Hitler succeeded as a
house-painter in Austria, had Britain after Dunkirk not been led by
Churchill, had MacArthur not been recalled by Truman. . . these
may seem idle speculations to some historians, but not to others.
Even the belief that an effective child guidance clinic, if available
to Hitler in his childhood, might have altered the course of history,
is ludicrous only to those who are apprehensive at the possibility
of a similar set of questions applied to ‘here and how’ problems.
Thirdly, there is the common error of over-emphasis on war
as the expression of aggressive acts of the individual to be discussed
later.
The effective horizons of the psychological world of most
Americans, Chinese and Frenchmen-Krech and Crutchfield writeare still exceedingly narrow, not extended beyond the immediate
‘valley’ in which they live and work and die. Studies on ‘international thinking’ of a cross-section of the American people made
during the war, by the Program Surveys Division of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, clearly demonstrated that for large
sections of the population the world outside the United States, or
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even outside their o w n immediate community, was virtually nonexistent. Not only was there a lack of emotional and motivational
connexion with anything beyond these narrow borders, but large
numbers of people only had the haziest conception of what lies
beyond (cf. also various authors in As Others See Us [403] and
Emery Reves on ‘centrism’[682]).
These latter argue that to apply the hypothesis of ‘frustrationaggression’ as it operates in the individual, directly to the behaviour
of nations would be meaningless. It is not that the very activity of
war is itself tension-reductive; it is that the consequences of war
may sometimes be. More frequently, war simply sows the seeds of
future conflict and tensions. What is significant is the fact that in
some circumstances war is perceived (and one might add, conceived)
by the people of a country or by its leaders as the only available
way of resolving conflicts [71].
W h e n these authors discuss (p. 586) ‘international tensions and
the individual’, their sharp psychological focus (to some it may
seem bias) becomes clearest. The problem of international tension,
they say, ‘is ultimately a problem of the psychology of the individual’.
W a r is declared by and fought by individuals, peace and international unity are the products of the actions of individuals (cf. also
Allport [5], T . H . Pear [230]). This is not meant to deny the
critical significance of economic, political and other such factors in
international tensions. But ‘themanner in which these. ..influences
work is psychological, i.e. they become effective through and
channeled by the needs, perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of the
individual’.
It is not easy to expand this assertion without implying that other
views are ultimately (i.e. psychologically) contradicted. Topical
examples present themselves at the moment. Economists differ-at
least in their press and radio announcements-in their views on
whether Britain is rapidly approaching bankruptcy, yet presumably
they have access to the same facts. W h e n Britain went off the gold
standard, conflicting directions on the radio were given inside a few
days, and both messages were said to be based on economists’
advice. W e have been told by authoritative writers to save more,
yet the possibility of buyers’ strikes is often deplored. A n adviser to
a government told m e once, in May, that he had attended a committee to decide when the economic crisis should happen: it was
to be in the following September, when the maximum number of
people had spent their money on holidays. The changes of expressed
attitude by living political leaders may not always have corresponded
exactly to their own mental processes.
Economics has been taken here as the illustration of a subject in
which there is much neglect of psychological factors,particularly perhaps of those influencing some leading economist (cf. W.McDougall
128
[175]). But at present there is another obvious example, the acute
dissension among political experts as to the future use of the
H bomb. Is it so dreadful that nobody ‘in his senses’ would use
it, since he knows that retaliation would be swift? One may ask
whether, and at that time from 1935 to the day of his death,
Hitler was ‘in his senses’. Since the use or non-use of the bomb
ultimately depends upon psychological factors such as confidence
or fear,what reason have we to suppose that politicians and military
experts have any special knowledge or training enabling them to
handle these? (This is not to suggest that at present psychologists
have it, but is meant as a reminder of the importance of the psychological point of view.)
Bernard, in the first chapter, discusses the view that the leaders
who decide policy must reflect the tensions of their constituents and
concludes ‘therealignment of political powers has had little relationship to national stereotypes or prejudices or hostilities or individual
attitudes of any kind’, and that national stereotypes and attitudes
have followed rather than preceded the alignments. Individual
tensions seem also to follow rather than to precede changes in intergroup relations.
This author believes that ‘implicitin the group-tensionconcept is
the assumption that the difficulty is all in the mind’.
I a m not convinced that in this description of the assumption,
‘all’is justified.As I. Cohen has pointed out, it is difficult to discuss
this problem without getting involved in questions about solipsism,
and, one might add, metaphysical ideas of subjective and objective
reality. Twenty years ago, the North Sea ‘threatened’ (and this
was an objective fact) 60 homes in a Norfolk town. Expert opinions
differed concerning the imminence of the objective threat, and
nothing was done. Later, by purely psychological methods of pressure, the authorities concerned were induced to build a sea wall.
In the disastrous floods of February 1952 this sea wall held. Was
the objective threat of erosion more important than the ‘subjective’
threat of public censure? That communism ‘threatens’the Western
Powers seems undoubted: but how can one decide the degree of
objectivity or subjectivity of the threat? Views are various both
here and in the U.S.A.
Bernard writes ‘Group conflict is conceived to be some simple
or weighted additive function of individual behaviour’. I do not
think it ought to be so conceived,and a m impressed by G.W.Allport’s theory that when human motives are simultaneously excited,
they tend to fuse and in that process to be transformed (cf. the
motives which may be aroused in military life: joy in danger,
delight in fame,increase in social and sexual status). There is, too,
a fusion of very different motives in many atomic scientists.Furthermore, these motives may become functionally autonomous. An
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historian may be strongly motivated by hatred of another nation,by
patriotism, or by both. After years of success he may find it easier
for him to continue writing in his idiosyncratic style than to change
it.
‘Conflict’,Bernard says,‘is viewed (by the conceptualizingsociologist) as not necessarily non-rational:it is seen as sometimes quite
rational‘.Perhaps here a distinction should be made between nonrational behaviour, e.g. deciding between alternatives by tossing a
coin, irrational (destroying valuable property), and rational (taking
out an insurance policy). A helpful book at this point is M . Ginsberg’s Reason and Unreason in Society [92].
THE FREUDIAN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF MAN
Sooner or later, in any discussion of conflicts and war, one’s
personal attitude towards the doctrines of human instincts, and
towards the opposed views ‘You can’t change human nature’ and
‘There is nothing in life so malleable as human nature’, becomes
obvious. The last two wars have demonstrated beyond cavil that
human behaviour can be changed. The comment is sometimes made,
‘Butin so doing,you repress instincts which must and will find their
way out indirectly, damaging the individual, his society, or both’.
This is a sweeping assumption. Its truth depends in part upon
what is meant by human instinct-a question which has been
frequently discussed (L.L.Bernard [20],C.S. Myers et al. [911],
Pear [230]).Few professional psychologists choose to read an article
with ‘human nature’ in its title, for they have suffered from too
many essays, epigrammatic and dull, on the nature of human
nature. Sherif and Sherif [258] write:
Probably no other explanation for social tensions and conflict, for strife
and war, or for man’s behaviour generally has been so convenient and
frequently called upon as “human nature”. A n d this “human nature” is
seen as predominantly selfish or altruistic, aggressive and competitive or
co-operative, evil or good, depending largely on the interests and values of
the parties in the debate. At the height of British imperialism, Herbert Spencer emphasized the aggressive impulses of m a n to come out on top in the
struggle for survival. Kropotkin saw fundamental human impulses toward
co-operation. Today lovers of peace, builders of war, statesmen, military
men, politicians, representatives of this group or that group see in human
nature basic impulses in the direction of their conclusions concerning social
problems.
In the Sherifs’ book, particular attention is paid to an approach
‘so fashionable and influential within academic circles that it is
important in the whole area of group relations, and is sometimes
assumed, without full awareness, by investigators in various areas’.
This is Freud‘s psychoanalytic approach, promulgated in a period
130
in which explanations of human relations by psychologists and social
philosophers were generally advanced in terms of instincts. The
Sherifs say, ‘Within psychology today there is a healthy trend of
turning to biologists for the keys to “human nature” or the basic
impulses of man’ .
Not all psychologists, even those who have abandoned the beliefs
in human ‘instincts’ as promulgated by McDougall [174] and
Trotter [758],are yet convinced that ‘biologists’will give them the
right keys, especially if the biologists who proffer such keys have
avoided the study of human beings, concentrating on the rat (often
of a special kind) or the pigeon. Exactly why certain biologistswho, as their title suggests, study life-should dislike so intensely
the ‘odour of humanity’ (cf. Trotter [758]), when human beings are
the only form of life they know from the inside, cannot be discussed
here. As G.W.Allport has emphasized, love between the sexes in
sophisticated human society (the Kinsey report has merely skirmished on the perimeter of the subject) is so idiosyncratic, so bound up
with images, habits, customs and sanctions, often religious, that any
study, however painstaking and detailed, of the mating technique of
rats may give little help.
In his earlier work, Freud saw aggression as a response to frustration of impulses, then conceived as still more basic. Later, he
posited an ‘innate, independent, instinctual disposition of man’
towards aggression. Still later, he developed the notion of two
classes of instinct; Eros, or the sexual instinct, and a death instinct,
the task of which is to lead organic matter back into the inorganic
state. This was criticized by W.McDougall in Psychoanalysis and
Social Psychology, and some of Freud‘s followers felt themselves
compelled to diverge from him at this point.
It is impossible to summarize any of Freud’s views in the space
available without doing them an injustice; but here are some outstanding features. Society was conceived as the individual’s inevitable enemy. (Might one comment that though Freud did not like
society, Adler did, and Jung does.) Conscience was thought of as
essentially ‘dread of society’. In a group, the individual is brought
under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of
his unconscious instincts. The apparently new characteristics which
he then displays are, in fact, manifestations of the unconscious, in
which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition.
Freud saw a group’s solidarity as directly traceable to Eros, ‘who
holds together everything in the world’. But (to quote Sherlf) ‘this
Eros, whose powers were considered so great as to be central in
Freud’s earlier work, turns out not to be so powerful when threatened
by “a powerful measure of desire for aggression”. .. part of the
instinctual endowment’, ‘The existence of this tendency towards
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aggression makes it necessary for culture to institute its high
demands.’ ‘Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through this primary hostility of m e n towards one another’
[258].
Thus the ultimate reason for the existence of culture-and its
greatest threat-is seen to lie in man’s innate destructiveness. Group
conflicts and war are seen as outbursts of irresponsible aggressive
instincts. ‘Itis not surprising that neither Freud nor those who follow
him closely today, like Glover [461],can see much hope for the
elimination of group conflicts or war, or, in their terminology, for
any victory of the life instinct over instincts of aggression and death’.
I have ventured to suggest elsewhere that Freud’s one-sided
pessimistic view of society is related to the fact that he wrote in a
particular social setting.
It is fair to speculate, as Dr. John Cohen does in his unusually
penetrating analysis of aggressiveness in relation to warfare, that
inferences are possible from the fact that Freud developed his later
ideas of human aggressiveness and hatred during the most depressing
time in Vienna. H e never rose mentally above the sub-culturepattern in which he lived, and as Professor D . W. Harding [lo51
suggests, Freud’s ideas on government were not far removed from
Hitler’s. Writers like Christopher Cauldwell, Karen Horney and
Erich F r o m m have made this point. It is time that social psychologists defined their attitude towards such criticism of what by some
Freudians seem to be regarded as axioms, and in doing so,
assessed the significance of the possibility that, at least for a short
time, they may expect professional advancement in a society which
puts hatred and malice before friendliness, dominance before cooperation. Until recently almost all doctors made their living from
disease and disability, not from health, yet the concept of social
medicine is rapidly developing.
It is in no sense derogatory to the memory of a very great m a n
to mention that Freud had little first-hand experience of various
types of society. H e close to stay in Vienna, and to travel little; he
lived before the present generation of social anthropologists. While
he may have analysed correctly the unusual social pattern in which
he lived and his personal reactions to it (yet nobody analysed him),
the criticism still holds that it would have been interesting to see if
his theories ‘worked’ in a Lancashire coal-mine or on the floor
of the London Stock Exchange (cf. Holt).
Hypotheses, in Freud’s psychology and in other schemes that
assume innate impulses of aggression, dominance and competition
are challenged on many sides. The evidence is assembled by Sherif.
Firstly, comparative ethnological evidence, e.g. by Margaret Mead
and others [189],indicates that aggression and competition are not
found as predominant or approved modes of response in some
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cultures. This evidence would tend to indicate that competitiveness,
aggressiveness, rivalry, sadism are not the basic instincts Freud
assumed. If they were and had simply been successfully repressed by
the societies in question, Freudian theory would anticipate a host
of unbalances and complexes as a consequence. Such complexes
due to thwarting of aggressive impulses are not found in a consistent
way.
Developmental material reveals that such impulses for competition, rivalry and aggression in a consistent sense are not revealed
until after the acquisition of some notion of the self and its more
fundamental relations with other objects and persons. Further, there
is wide variation in amount or degree of such behaviour by children
growing up in different sub-units of one culture. A few examples
will clarify this point. Following the study of Greenberg [362],
a series of unpublished studies at the University of Oklahoma
indicate clearly that competitiveness with other children is seldom
found among 2-3 1/2 year-olds and commonly found among 5-6 1 /2
year-olds. Further, while 2-3 1 /2 year-old children from different
sodo-economic and ethnic backgrounds were very similar in their
reactions in the situations observed, differences were found among
groups of the older children. Those children from a university kindergarten were more consistently competitive than children from
other, less favoured backgrounds. While aggressive reactions of a
sort can certainly be observed in newborn infants under certain
circumstances, w e can scarcely speak of their diffused responses in
the same breath as those in adult social life. In this regard, says
Sherif, ‘we are well advised to heed the caution of Himmelweit [366]
and Pear [224]not to stretch the meaning of aggression to include
almost any attempts to get attention or to alter another’s line of
action’. In terms of aggression in social groups, Lois Murphy has
found that the appearance of aggressive acts in pre-school groups is
positively correlated with the appearance of sympathetic behaviour,
and this relationship is conceived in terms of development and
elaboration of the self system [202].Certainly the bulk of evidence
in child psychology indicates no need for positing an innate human
tendency toward aggression as a basic instinct.
Secondly, studies of human groups and of collective situations
point to the fundamental error of assuming that differences in man’s
behaviour in group situations are due simply to lifting repression
from instincts. In group situations, qualitatively new characteristics
of behaviour appear; they may be evil, lofty, or in between. They
can be understood, not in terms of any one individual or of all the
individuals outside the group, but in terms of the group structure
and the by-product of group interaction, such as social norms,
values and traditions.
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Thirdly, the trend of research and experimental evidence in the
formation of attitudes,development of the ego, and experience and
behaviour in group situations is opposed to the notion of conscience
as merely dread of society, and to any sharp division between the
individual and the group. The central theme of conscience is not
only the prohibitions, but also the values and imperatives of the
social groups to which the individual relates himself.
Fourthly,society does not consist simply of relations and prohibitions designed to control or to inhibit instinctual impulses.It consists
also of positive values which the individual acquires in the image
of his society,or of his group within the society. They provide new
goals and aspirations which may not exist initially in his biological
make-up.
While no person in his right mind would deny the importance of hunger,
sex, thirst and other biogenic motives, or the importance of socially determined (sociogenic) motives in group relations, the explanation of social
phenomena solely on the basis of either or both is bound to be one-sided.
Eysenck has made this point as follows: ‘In their excitement about the
discovery of the powers of “emotions” over “intellect”, many psychologists
have gone to extremes, portraying the “man in the street” as the mere
plaything of uncontrollable unconscious forces which cannot in any way
be influenced by reason. Such a view is no less contrary to fact than the
previous over-estimation of rationalistic influences. What is needed is a
more realistic appraisal of the relative importance of these two factors in
each individual case!’ [70, p. 641.
THE APPEAL OF WAR TO THE INDIVIDUAL
James’s essay on the Moral Equivalent of War [125] stimulated
Dr. J. C.Flugel to consider its relevance to problems of our time
in three books [78,79,2301. His latest contribution was in 1950.
Dr. Flugel valuably re-examines and discusses, especially in Chapter 19 of M a n , Morals and Society, the appeal of war. ‘We may
reasonably hope that’ (in lessening the chances of war) ‘psychological knowledge will be more effective than lamentation,exhortation, or moral indignation. Whether psychological knowledge will
prove any more effective than religion or ethics in dealing with the
more grandiose immoralities of nations is still an open question. At
any rate, we can but try.’
He summarizes the psychological appeal of war under four main
headings:
Adventure. Four sub-divisions are made, some closely inter-connected:
1. War opens up unknown possibilities and opportunities. Many
of us retain throughout life some of that zest for a life that is
less settled and secure, which all but the most timid of us had
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in youth, and which has been so successfully exploited by the
boy scout movement (totalitarian rCgimes suppress boy scouts).
2. Unpredictable events may make a bigger call upon our bodily
and mental powers than is demanded by the everyday routine
of peace. In war w e may each and all be called upon to perform some noble or heroic deed.
3. The possibility of risk and danger is increased. Fear, in low
or moderate intensities, can be pleasant.
4. The appeal of war has something in c o m m o n with the motives
that lead to sacrifice or asceticism. Such motives may have an
element of reasonableness, but the ‘need for punishment’ is
apt to drive us far beyond the bounds of reason, and make
suffering appear a self-sufficient end. It is largely to this tendency
that the appeal is made when w e are asked to believe that guns
are in themselves better things than butter. It is at bottom the
same tendency as that which makes the British public school
m a n feel that somehow football and foxhunting are nobler
sports than tennis because they involve a greater risk of injury.
Social unity. Five factors are distinguished, though they may fuse
with each other.
W a r gives all the members of a nation a greatly increased
number of thoughts, interests, emotions and purposes in common. Since in war the common purpose applies to the whole
nation, it is as members of their nation that individuals feel
themselves knit together in a mighty fellowship.
Simultaneously, another factor comes into Operation: a great
increase in the vividness and power of the idea of the nation
itself. Unless a society or organization can be shown to play
its part in this total national scheme of values, it ceases to
make any strong appeal to us, and, as Professor D.W.Harding
has shown [1051,mutually competing associations are compelled
to reconcile many of their differences and to make it appear at
least that their activities are all in some way contributing to the
national effort.
The greater sense of national unity is powerfully reinforced by
the substitution of a sense of co-operation for one of competition
between the individuals, groups, and classes of a nation.
Closely allied with the last-mentioned factor is the increased
satisfaction of the ‘need to be needed’ that war provides. A n d
the preparation for war has so far proved the most effective (and,
it might be added, the laziest) means of providing jobs for
all.
Underlying all these there is one great psychological factor at
work: war (in psychoanalytic terms) makes the activities of
the individual more ego-syntonic: it reduces the tension between
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the ego and the super-ego and tends to raise the ego to the
level of the super-ego. Participation in a great collective enterprise, strenuous and dangerous exertion, identification with a
greater social whole, the substitution of co-operation for competition, the sense that one is really needed-dl these produce
a satisfying mixture of humility and happy pride, in which the
individual is willing to sacrifice himself in the service of his
country. It is this element which makes war, in spite of its
horrors, cruelties and crudities, seem noble and uplifting, and
makes so many peace-time activities seem in comparison trivial
and insignificant.
Freedom from individual worries and restrictions.
1. The great common concern, even the great common danger;
drives out our individual anxieties, because they appear relatively unimportant and because w e have less time and energy
to think about them. This is a general factor, to which can be
added three others:
2. The lessened economic worry resulting from greater security of
employment.
3. The lessened anxiety-partly financial and partly connected with
prestige-concerning social ‘face’ and class-distinctions. A n d
this in turn, has freed us from many small conventions and
taboos that w e are glad to throw aside and forget, now that
we have the opportunity.Service in the forces, with its opportunities for both sexes, within a wide age-range, of obtaining commissions and promotion, may, however, bring in a complicated
temporary class-distinction,which can raise special problems
when peace comes. This subject has been treated by playwrights
and novelists, but as yet has received little attention from psychologists. I have referred to it in English Social Diflerences
[223].
4. The result of honourable suffering may be the relaxation of
super-ego control. Because of our sacrifices, our anxieties, our
danger, and the general sense of urgency, w e feel that w e are
justified in enjoying with a good conscience such pleasures as
may be within our reach. This tendency will not always bear
the test of closer moral scrutiny, but it constitutes one of the
subtler, though none the less significant, aspects of the manifold
appeals of war.
Aggression.
1. War, above all, provides an outlet for moralized aggression,
and psychoanalysts have been inclined to see in the unsatisfied
aggression of the individual the ultimate source of the strange
and sinister appeal of war (cf. E.Glover 14611,E.F.M.Durbin
136
and J. Bowlby 14481, Mark A. M a y [185]). In war, aggression
is socially approved, even socially demanded, and the individual
is therefore willing and even eager to make use of it.
Flugel adds ‘ H o w far this theory really takes us is a matter
of discussion’. But that it has some considerable degree of truth
can hardly be doubted. In war w e all acquire, in so far as
our behaviour towards the enemy is concerned, what in other
circumstances might legitimately be called a criminal super-ego.
As a means of doing evil and of feeling good while doing it,
war is without a parallel. The element of moral justification is
increased by two further closely related factors:
2. The general direction of aggression towards the enemy, who in
wartime is apt to become something of a universal scapegoat,
enables us to be relatively free of aggression towards the other
members of our o w n group. (To understand, even in part, the
attacks made on each other by prominent members of our
two chief political parties in 1954, it must be remembered that
from 1939 to 1945 little antagonism was allowed to appear
publicly, and often it did not arise.)
3. In his role of scapegoat, the enemy serves us as an object
upon which w e can project our own vices, especially our vice
of aggression.
As Flugel shows, the attempts to combat war have been along two
main lines, moral and political. A third would seem to be no less
important, i.e., the attempt to provide the advantages that may
accrue from war, otherwise than through the destructive process of
war itself. This corresponds in the main to the provision of what
William James has called a moral equivalent of war.
THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR
Attitudes towards warfare are even today widely different, varying
between poles. Some students of war believe it is wholly evil, that
there has never been, or ever can be, a ‘good’ war; others that
war is necessary, even at times beneficial. It is not m y intention
to discuss this complex problem in detail, but only to comment upon
current beliefs. Of these, the most famous is probably the belief
in the moral equivalent of war.
Before considering this phrase, over half a century old, it is
wise to weigh the significance of considerations unlikely to have
occurred to James when he wrote. Presumably he had no experience of fighting as a soldier. (Even today, the psychology of warfare,
i.e., the experiences of fighting, is often discussed in articles by
medical practitioners who, though they share hardships with the
Combatants, are usually honoured by the enemy, and if captured,
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may be actually welcomed and given work in their official capacity.)
In the subject index of the 689 pages of James’ Principles of
Psychology [126] ‘war’does not appear, nor does ‘fighting’.It is
hardly necessary to mention-for psychologists-that ‘aggressiveness’
is also absent.
Though James’s essay came late in his career, the following
developments in warfare were unknown when he wrote: submarines,
poison gas, tanks, airships and aeroplanes as bomb-droppers, landmines, flame-throwers and napalm. All these, with a stretch of
imagination, might be regarded as intended for use against combatants who are in uniforms recognized as such by their enemies
and entitled in law either to hit back or to surrender. But the
sinking of hospital ships, the indiscriminate attacks upon civilians
and combatants, the use of atom and hydrogen bombs, and germs
-all these have been or may be used with no pretence that the
only persons to be harmed are combatants. W a r is now taken out of
the hands of military men. There are, too, devices which do not
harm the enemy physically: camouflage, ‘psychological’ warfare,
propaganda, the deliberate ‘news-leak‘, the ‘trial balloon’, the
‘planted’story (cf. M.L.Farber [452]). All over the world, medical
men are now caught in this web of social relations; e.g., at the
moment, British doctors are unable to learn the findings of Japanese
doctors on the injuries to fishermen after the ‘peaceful’explosion of
the Bikini bomb. In the results of future attacks the bracing effect
of warfare upon the individual will be hard to trace if he is killed
inadvertently and without warning, or suffers for months or years.
Any future war will have few rules, and they will probably depend
upon the researches of scientists.Ships used to pick up survivors of
their attacks; the aeroplane, dropping bombs, cannot. Since conscription is now almost world-wide, there can be few simple
recruiting appeals. Those for civil defense, at the moment, urge
that the probable effects of the H bomb have been exaggerated, that
one alone would not destroy England, though, if properly placed,
six might paralyse London and five any of the larger cities. Justifiably, recruiting appeals emphasize the fact that any fringe-areawould
contain many people, still alive, for w h o m remedial work would
be possible. But since it seems unlikely that the average politician’s
exhortations will carry more weight than those of articulate scientists, who publicly disagree on important points, the effect of
appeals, as against orders, is hard to predict. James could not have
been expected to see so far into the future; then, it is justifiable to
preface, and even to interrupt his account by this reminder of
present-day conditions, emphasized by first-rank scientists like
Dr.E.D.Adrian in his ‘PresidentialAddress to the British Association for the Advancement of Science’.l
I. Nature, 4 September 1954.
138
A n impressive fact which any student of war must respect, however neutrally he may try to regard it, is that, as James pointed
out, most reflective apologies for war are framed religiously. ‘It is
a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the vanquished as well as
to the victor’ (later writers, like Sir Norman Angel1 and certain
economists, now put a different construction on this idea). ‘It is
absolute good,’ we are told, ‘for it is human nature at its most
dynamic’.
The following paragraph. quoted here out of its context, is meant
to express the militarist’s view, not James’s own:
Its ‘horrors’ are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative
supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zoophily,
of ‘consumers’leagues’ and ‘associated charities’, of industrialism unlimited
and feminism unabashed. N o scorn, no hardness, no valour any more: fie
upon such a cattle-yard of a planet!
James then writes of the dignity acquired by ‘all the qualities’ of
a man ‘whenhe knows that the service of the collectivity that owns
him needs them’. If proud of the collectivity,his own pride rises
in proportion (but what if he becomes ashamed or resentful of his
collectivity? James could hardly have foreseen the ‘resistance’,
‘collaboration’and ‘co-operation’movements of World War I1 in
many countries). ‘Nocollectivity is like an army for nourishing
such pride, but it has to be confessed that the only sentiment
which the image of pacific cosmopolitan industrialism is capable of
arousing in countless worthy breasts is shame at the idea of belonging to such a collectivity.’ (Had he been living at that time,
Dr.R. H.Thouless [277] might have applied his censure of
‘emotionalterms’ to the phrase ‘worthy breasts’).
‘Men are proud of belonging to a conquering nation.’ (It was
easier then to regard a nation as conquering,than it is today.)
James now turns his argument in a perhaps unexpected direction.
H e suggests that with time,education and enough suggestion,aspects
of a man’s country other than the conquering one might be regarded
with similarly effective feelings of pride. H e proposes that, instead
of military conscription,the whole youthful population should be
enlisted against nature. The ‘military ideals’ of hardihood and
discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people.
There follows a list of the hard, dangerous,unpleasant but socially
desirable jobs that youth, regardless of birth or wealth,would carry
out ‘to get the childishness knocked out of them and to come back
into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas.They would
have done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against
nature; they would tread the earth more proudly; the women would
value them more highly,they would be better fathers and teachers of
the following generation’.
139
In the present article, to discuss-even to quote-this eloquent
appeal, may seem to some readers unscientific (‘science must be
objective’). It may be replied that a social psychologist cannot
ignore the fact that a belief in some value underlies most or all
significant actions, and since such beliefs vary at different times
and in different places, the reasons for changes of attitude are to
be sought in many quarters. As for objectivity, often an admirable
ideal, a claim to be objective in studying human affairs is sometimes
the observer’s excuse for being ‘shy’or not getting ‘involved’(cf.
M.Sherif [238, 2571, H . Cantril [45].In the long run, the attitude
of non-involvement has certain disadvantages for a psychologist.
Since James’s last articles are almost contemporaneous with the
first publications of the psychoanalysts, it is unprofitable to speculate
what his attitude might have been toward the concept of a reservoir
of human aggressiveness in each individual, and the extended concept that this relatively undifferentiated form of energy could be
channelled without altering its quality, as water might if pumped
along pipes of similar material. However, the ‘same’ water, if
channelled in soft rock or sand, might cease to be the same-but
perhaps one cannot fairly oppose one analogy by another.
In a personal communication to m e (8 December 1950), Professor
Gordon W . Allport mentioned that he was growing more sceptical
both of the idea of ‘channelling’aggression and of William James’s
concept (at least in any simple form) of the moral equivalent of
war. ‘Aggressionis a habit-a life-style:if you channel it one way
you have more and more to channel.’
Here, I imagine,Allport might point out that an aggressive motive,
even if it could ever be conceived as relatively pure, when aroused in
conjunction with another motive, becomes fused with it, so that
both are transformed into something new. A ‘naturally’aggressive
boy, let us say, is encouraged to learn to box, and succeeds brilliantly. If then, he becomes a professional, and earns big money,
the economic motive enters. H e will be admired by some women,
especially those who are sexually excited by watching contests of
violence. H e may be temporarily welcomed by ‘society’. H e may
write, or supply material for, articles in the Press. By now the
principle of ‘functional autonomy’ may assert itself; he finds it
harder to stop than to go on, and if success makes him ‘go soft’,
the end of his career will soon come.
However, is a professional boxer, or indeed any one who boxes
regularly, less aggressive than the average man? Eysenck discusses
this in his chapter ‘War and Aggressiveness’ [70]. Stagner [264]
showed that students who evinced aggressive attitudes in one direction also tended to show them in others. All instances and expressions of aggressiveness showed positive correlations. Eysenck [70,
2301 reported a consistent tendency for persons aggressive in one
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context to be aggressive in another. H e concluded that aggressive
attitudes tend to be general, extending over large areas of belief;
that no evidence has been found in favour of-and much againstthe sublimation type of theory, and that work in the genesis of
aggressive attitudes is inconclusive because it is restricted to a single
culture-pattern. Flugel [78] writes that the study of individual
aggressiveness, or of individual satisfactions found in war, must be
supplemented by the study of war as essentially a conflict between
large human groups.
In the present writer’s opinion, these lines of argument would
apply in examining the replies of some psychoanalysts to the
objection that they put forward a onesided aggression-theory of
modern war. T o quote Flugel (footnote p. 310).
The vast majority of the activities of modern war do not seem particularly
suitable as channels of aggression. The reply to this is clearly that the end
justifies and inspires the means, and that aggression through displacement
or conditioning can find some considerable degree of expression through
‘war work’ of any kind, though the home-front workers recognize that it
would be emotionally more satisfying to ‘have a smack’at the enemy themselves instead of having to do it vicariously through the fighting forms.
This, I think, is true of many but not of all war-workers; I have
commented on this view elsewhere [224].M a n y conscripted persons
were happy in their work in the Pay Corps, the NAAFI, and
factories, for reasons unconnected with aggression. After the
cessation of hostilities, some were anxious to continue their work
in the forces, in pensions, in control commissions, which took them
abroad and yet increased their interest and status. They may have
had no intention to injure an ex-enemy, already beaten. The acid
stories about occupation forces which appeared in the New Yorker
soon after 1945 were not without foundation. One might find little
opposition today to the expressed view that in peace time the regular
soldier is working out desires which have little to do with
aggressiveness.
THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF KURT HAHN
English, American and some German readers might interpose here
with the reminder that the famous educator Kurt Hahn has provided
for youth many of the opportunities which James desiderated for
training youths to be courageous and self-sacrificing.Until Professor
Rex Knight told me, I did not know that Mr.Hahn had recently
examined, in the light of James’s essay, his own system, devised
and carried out while he was unaware of James’s views. Mr. Hahn
has very kindly lent m e several reports, and as a result of
141
correspondence and conversation with him I a m able to provide
the following information:
First, the educational establishments at Salem, Baden, Germany,
and Gordonstoun, Scotland, must be briefly described. Salem was
founded in 1919-20.In 1914 Dr. Hahn had left Oxford University
with one dominant idea; to found a school in Germany, modelled
on the great English public schools. These seemed to him to imbue
their boys with confidence in effort, modesty in success, grace in
defeat, fairness in anger, clear judgement, even in the bitterness of
wounded pride, readiness for service at all times. In 1950, however,
he no longer believes in the value of isolated adolescent communities.
Salem met with disastrous misfortunes. In 1919 a communist
plan to kidnap the founder, Prince M a x of Baden, the last Imperial
Chancellor, was foiled; in 1923, there was a plot to murder the
headmaster, Mr. Hahn. In 1933 he was arrested, saved through
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald’s intervention, and came to England. H e
was urged to demonstrate the Salem system in this country, and
started in 1933-34 with three boys.
James recommended conscription for the young adult; Hahn
introduced voluntary service for the adolescent. The two are
by no means incompatible and may be complementary. The
Gordonstoun Coastguard Service was founded in 1935. Its National
Fire Service followed in 1940. Both are active service organizations
and, in the eyes of the boys, superior in status to the two pre-service
organizations in Gordonstoun-the A r m y Cadet Force and the Sea
Cadets.
These are some developments: (a) Seamanship for all. Training
under sail goes on winter and summer on the Moray Firth, and
there are holiday excursions to Norway, Cape Wrath, Wales.
(b) A Vocational Department is attached.(c) A modified Dalton plan
of studies is operated. (d) Religion is consistently impregnated in
the life of the school. (e) The relevant development of the Salem
system in Gordonstoun is the deinsulation of the school and the
building up of its service to and beyond the district in which it is
located.
The ‘Outward Bound’ Sea School was founded in 1941 by
Lawrence Holt and Kurt Hahn. Its programme consists of seamanship under sail, athletics, training for expeditions, active citizenship
inside the community. This is a short-term school; the boys come
for four extremely strenuous weeks.
Clearly, many of William James’s wishes have been carried out
admirably by these systems.
142
CULTURAL A N D ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AnITUDES TOWARDS W A R
The present writer has expressed the opinion that psychologistsought
to examine or extend the idea in Dr.Ruth Benedict’s Patterns of
Culture [15], that war itself ‘is a social theme that may or may not
be used in any culture’ (p. 30). If so, to what extent may not even
recent psychological, sociological and anthropological attempts to
explain war be already out of date? For example, current radio
broadcasts and books discussing the events which, in the Crimean
War,preceded the famous Charge of the Light Brigade, give the
general public a knowledge of the personal antipathies at the time
between high-rankingofficers,indeed,of their military incompetence;
yet,today,complicating,even decisive,factors in war may be scientific. One or two men, not six hundred, are necessary to drop an
atom bomb, the success of which may depend chiefly upon the work
of physicists and meteorologists distant from the area of the
explosion.
Since there are culture-patternswhich are not dominated by the
idea of the ‘naturalness’of war, can we study them with profit?
About twenty years have elapsed since the culture-patternconcept
was promulgated: by now it has taken more complicated forms.
For purposes of exposition, accept Clyde Kluckhohn’s distinctions
between explicit and implicit culture and between patterns and
configurations (these are Sapir’s ‘unconscioussystems of meaning’
and Benedict’s ‘unconsciouscanons of choice’;though ‘minimally
aware’ or ‘unverbalized’seem better terms than ‘unconscious’).
It is psychologically significant that most writers find war a
subject more interesting, profitable and famemaking than peace.
There is even a tendency, perhaps less obvious since 1945, to
suggest that peace is boring and ignoble. Peace is certainly difficult
to define, and the subtle introduction of the slippery phrase ‘cold
war’has not made this task easier.But the late Dr. L.F.Richardson
suggested, as a criterion of a peaceful attitude vis-&vis another
group, ‘proved readiness to co-operate’.
War themes appear to be a powerful vested interest, since for
centuries it has been possible to make a profession of writing about
warfare and since, after every war, the leaders issue memoirs,
avidly read even by the late enemy. Writing about peace is less
esteemed,less popular,less lucrative and more difficult.These facts,
of war news in press and radio,deter
together with the ‘playing-up’
the spread of thinking about peace.
Quincy Wright thinks that in explaining war, little should be
expected from studies of the statistics of populations, commerce,
finance and armaments,or of the technicalities of law and procedure.
These matters affect war by their effect upon opinion, and opinion
143
is moved by such vague symbols that no precise correlation with
the results of refined statistical analyses is to be expected.
The present writer, considering the questions which an anthropologist, studying the English community, might ask, suggests some
which, in at least the English culture-pattern, bear on war and
peace. (a) What are the chief methods of habit formation in schools,
primary, secondary and public? (b) What social and financial values
are attached to rewards for prowess in war and peace respectively?
(c) What is considered to be the degree of individual responsibility
for one’s conduct in peace and war respectively? (d) What are the
attitudes towards authority and property in the different social
classes and economic strata in Engand? Note the willingness shown
in the last 15 years to conscript life, but not property. Yet a
personal attitude towards property depends only in part upon whether one is rich or poor.
Criticizing a widespread method of writing history, Emery
Reves [682] asserts, ‘A picture of the world, pieced together like
a mosaic from its various national components, is a picture that
never and in no circumstances can have any relation to reality,
unless w e deny that such a thing as reality exists. The world and
history cannot be as they appear to the different nations, unless
w e disavow objectivity, reason and scientific methods of research’.
Like H . J. Eysenck and Hilde Himmelweit in Psychological
Factors of Peace and War [230],criticize the concept of aggressiveness and its use in attempting to account for the outbreak and
methods of waging modern war.
Eysenck surveys studies of social attitudes, so far as they illuminate questions of war and aggressiveness. H e holds that ultimately
all causative influences must find themselves reflected in the
individual attitudes towards war and personal aggressiveness, built
up by social pressure, by teaching and propaganda, by personal
concept, by childhood experience, by parental emotional conditioning and the thousand-and-oneagencies which determine our outlook.
H e regards the experimental study of these attitudes as an important contribution to the investigation of war and peace. It is admitted
that social attitude measurement deals with conscious ideas,
opinions, emotions and sentiments; it does not claim to uncover
the secret processes of the unconscious mind. But with many other
psychologists he deprecates an exclusive insistence on unconscious
motivation. His chapter is technical and quotes numerous investigations, which do not all point in the same direction. A few selections
may be made here.
Attitudes towards certain aspects of the problems of war, e.g.,
to the question whether another great war is thought likely in the
near future, are shown to be related to social class or to political
affiliation. The question arises: Are there certain persistent all-
144
embracing groupings of attitudes to which isolated opinion-statements can be related? For example, in a questionnaire certain
statements were made, some in favour of, some against war,
e.g.: ‘Certain issues are so vital for a nation that war is preferable
to submission’; ‘Under no circumstances can war ever be justified‘; ‘War brings out in people virtues which in peace
lie undetected’. The answerers were asked to indicate whether they
agreed strongly, agreed, felt neutrally, disagreed, or disagreed
strongly,A factorial study of the intercorrelations between the eight
items disclosed the existence of a strong factor of militarism or
war-mindedness, which accounted for 38 per cent of the variance.
The study demonstrated that different statements dealing with
attitudes towards war display a certain amount of functional unity.
In his investigations, Eysenck claims to have demonstrated that
two factors, which he terms ‘radicalism-conservatism’and ‘toughminded-tender-mindedness’,are primary social attitude factors, and
that other attitudes are closely related to them. His use of these
terms has been criticized by students of social history and psychology (e.g. see Cyril Burt [42]), but the questions asked and the
answers on which the conclusions are based did not use these terms,
which appear only in the discussion of results.
What then, Eysenck asks, are the policies which, according to
expert social psychologists, are likely to make a recurrence of war
less probable? A sample of 52 American social psychologists, an
authoritative cross-section of the whole group, was questioned in
considerable detail by Stagner [265]: ‘They were unanimous concerning the need for both political and economic internationalism.
They endorsed a democratically organized league with sovereignty
above that of nations on specific issues. They advocated a “reasonable” rather than a “vengeful” peace. They favoured an end to
“white imperialism”. The chief obstacles to durable peace (in the
American scene) were perceived as: economic nationalism; absence
of loyalty to an international government; and fascist indoctrination
of the Axis peoples.’
Eysenck writes that w e need to know the degree to which warmindedness is determined by sex, age, education, social class, rural
and urban residence, job satisfaction,work-history and other factors
suggested as causative agents in the genesis of this attitude. Is it
true that frustration in the field of employment, family life, or
ambition, leads to aggression? Is boredom a factor in middle class
bellicosity? What factors lead to ‘sublimation’of aggressive tendencies, and to open expression of them? H o w are verbal expression
and actual behaviour related?
The need is for single, clearly stated, verifiable hypotheses, supplemented by suitable methodologically adequate investigations.
The relation of personality to conflict has been studied in detail
145
by Madeline Kerr [865]who applied the investigatory methods of
social psychology to inhabitants of Jamaica. Here the situation ‘of
a former oppressed people now trying to work out new ways of
living’ is complicated by the fact that ‘one group of people has
from historical times claimed to be irrevocably superior to the
other’. The groups live alongside each other but not together. In
this investigation such problems as illegitimacy were studied, not
in isolation, but in the context of the community as a whole.
Kerr describes birth customs, child training, weaning, toilet training, moral and sex training, children’s work and play, child-parent
attitudes, the school, sex and marriage, class and colour, religion,
folklore, politics and the Jamaican personality.
There are, she claims, five major social situations in Jamaica,
giving rise to tensions, which in turn reflect on the personalitydevelopment of individuals. These situations are: dichotomy of
concepts over parental roles, lack of patterned learning in childhood,
difficulties over colour, reliance on magic and slavery traditions.
Each of these situations will produce specific configurations of
attitudes in the individual. This way of looking at the relation between culture and personality enables one to forego rather strained
attempts to make rigid correlations between, for example, specific
aspects of child training and personality traits.
Projection techniques; Rorschach, Lowenfeld Mosaic, and a projection test devised by Kerr especially for Negro children were
used.
In general, the tensions caused by economic frustration, colourprejudice and wrong methods in education produce social conditions
of economic and psychological insecurity, doubt concerning rolefunction and encouragement of magical beliefs. These conditions
produce a basic personality of an unintegrated type. The culture
conflict is such that personality configurations are not clustered
round any particular focus, or even distinct foci. The result is
haphazardness in the person, reflected in the social institutions.
W h e n a m a n moves from the peasant to the middle class he steps
from one culture-pattern to another: this is probably impossible
without extreme tension. In the middle class he has to adopt another
family system, with a different ideology.
In Psychological Factors of Peace and W a r [230]Kerr suggests
that it is misleading to think of the personality as a unit. The
individual seldom behaves or thinks consistently. If the personality
is visualized as a configuration, the relation between personality and
culture becomes easier to deduce.
School teaching in Jamaica should be reorganized, with the aboIition of repetitive learning and its replacement by teaching which
would help the child to understand and not merely to quote. The
children should be given the mental equipment to fight against
146
magical beliefs.Only when it is understood clearly that sick children
or cows are cured by medicine and not by miracles will this aim be
achieved. More Jamaican botany and Caribbean history should be
taught.The children are often taught by people who are themselves
so insecure in the ‘class-cum-colour’
snobbery that they dare not
discuss the Island’spast history.The pupils pick up this feeling;thus
the insecurity is perpetuated. In choosing officials to be sent from
England,the value of genuine liking for West Indians, as contrasted
with cold but well-regulatedcorrectness,cannot be over-emphasized.
PREJUDICE
Obviously much conflict between groups is due to prejudice-a
subject studied in great detail by psychologists and sociologists.
Most of these have dealt with attitudes which in the Church of
England catechism are termed ‘envy, hatred, malice and uncharitableness’, and little attention has been paid to attitudes of
friendliness, co-operation and goodwill (cf. Ian Suttie’s concept
of the ‘taboo on tenderness’ [274]). The tendency among many
intellectuals to decry ‘sentiment’,the attempts of some (not all)
psychoanalysts to explain ‘life’ and ‘love’in terms of death and
hatred, the studies of personality by psychoanalysers and factor
analysers, valuable but limited in practical usefulness, and by
doctors who, to do them justice, can hardly be expected in view
of their training and practice to have an extensive knowledge of
healthy, happy lives-all these distract attention1 from the happier
aspects of human existence. (Hamlet and Kierkegaard were not
typical Danes.)
The study of the happy and healthily prejudiced person has been
neglected. A mother is often favourably prejudiced towards her
child, an ‘old boy’ towards his school. Such attitudes are normal,
though they may cause unhappiness, even abnormality, in those
who are neglected or unfairly treated. If these statements sound
platitudinous, they are nevertheless important. Some books on
psychology and sociology seem so remote from actual life that the
statement and examination of a few platitudes may not be unacceptable-especially to the man in the street.
Professor Gordon W . Allport’s recent volume, The Nature of
Prejudice [5], offers an extensive bibliography. Since it is based
upon 10 years’research and exhibits an almost encyclopaedic knowledge of the work of others, it may fittingly be used here. It
vindicates,if this were necessary,one social psychologist’sapproach
1. Recent studies at Harvard under Professor Sorokin are an exception.
147
to the probleins of hatred and conflict, without neglecting their
sociological, legal and economic aspects.
During WorlJ War 11,while serving on the American Emergency
Committee in Psychology, Professor Allport became interested in
problems of national morale. Great dangers, he saw, lay in the
prejudices and antagonisms felt by many Americans against their
fellow-citizens.However,most of the examples with which the book
is generously illustrated are by no means strange to the British
reader. In the preface,the following important points are made:
Our deficit in social knowledge seems to render void at every step our
progress in physical knowledge. The surplus in wealth accumulating to
the human race through applied science is virtually cancelled by the costs
of armaments and war. Gainr in medical science are widely negated by
the poverty that results from war, and from the trade barriers erected largely
by hatred and fear.
Rivalries and hatreds between groups are nothing new. What is new is
the fact that technology has brought these groups too close together lfor
comfort. W e have not yet learned h o w to adjust to our new mental and
moral proximity. Yet the situation is not without its hopeful features. Chief
among these is the simple fact that human nature on the whole seems to
prefer the sight of kindliness and friendliness to the sight of cruelty. Cruelty is not a favoured human trait. Even the top Nazis w h o were tried at
Nuremberg pretended that they knew nothing about the inhuman practices
in the concentration camps. So long as there is this sense of moral dilemma,
there is hope that it may somehow be resolved and that hate-free values
m a y be brought to prevail.
Especially encouraging is the fact that in recent years m e n in large
numbers have become convinced that scientific intelligence may help us
solve the conflict. M e n are saying: ‘Let us make an objective study of conflict in culture and industry, between people of different colour and race;
let us seek out the roots of prejudice and find concrete means of implementing man’s affiliative values. Within the last decade or two there has been
more solid and enlightening study in this area than in all previous centuries
combined.’
Science, it has been falsely assumed, should concern itself with
material progress, leaving human nature and social relationships to
an unguided moral sense.W e know that technical advance by itself
creates more problems than it solves (cf. Margaret Mead [
1891,
Georges Friedmann [87]).
In the next few pages we will follow Allport’s line of argument.
‘Itis easier,some one has said,to smash an atom than a prejudice.’
When we speak of prejudice,we are likely to think of race prejudice.
This is an unfortunate association of ideas, for throughout human
history prejudice has had little to do with races. The concept of race
is scarcely a century old. For the most part prejudice and persecution have rested on other grounds; often on religion. Reasons are
given why the race-concept became so popular. Religion had lost
most of its zeal for proselytising, and therewith its value for designating group membership; ‘race’had an immediate,visible mark, and
148
the fiction of racial inferiority became, so it seemed, an irrefutable
justification for prejudice.
Allport, anticipating criticism from economists, anthropologists,
sociologists and others, asks whether he himself does not betray a
psychological bias. H e replies by asserting his belief that ‘it is only
within the nexus of personality that we find the effective operation
of historical,cultural and economic factors’.Unless mores somehow
enter the fibre of individual lives they are not effective agents, for
it is only individuals who can feel antagonism and practice discrimination.
As usual, definitions are important here. ‘Prejudice’originally
meant a precedent; a judgement based on previous decisions and
experiences. Later (in English) it signified a judgement, premature
or hasty, formed before examination and consideration of the facts.
At present the term has an emotional flavour of favourableness or
unfavourableness that accompanies such a priori and unsupported
judgements. Yet this leads to ambiguity,for obviously we can be
prejudiced in favour of another person. (A Harvard man is likely
to be well received in the English Cambridge.)
Yet the prejudices studied by psychologists seem to have been
almost invariably negative, though this may be partly due to the
tilt towards medicine that psychology received after 1910. ‘Falling
in love’, an obvious stimulant of prejudice, is as interesting as the
process of developing hatred, but it is less often psychologically
studied. If it were, the student would be exposed to ‘humorous’
comment; and this, in England, is a deterrent more powerful than
overt opposition.
Allport’s narrower working definition: ‘Prejudice is thinking ill
of others without sufficient warrant’, suffices as a starting point.
The differences between a prejudgement and a prejudice is that
prejudgements become prejudices only if they are not reversible
when exposed to new knowledge. Moreover, we tend to become
emotional when one of our prejudices is threatened with contradiction.
It is important to distinguish attitudes from beliefs. Certain programmes of action designed to reduce prejudice may succeed in
altering beliefs, but not attitudes.
Prejudice is largely due to the process of categorization, a basis
for the normal prejudgement necessary to orderly living. ‘Amind
perpetually open will be a mind perpetually vacant’ (Bertrand
Russell). W e hear little today about love-prejudice-‘the tendency
to over-generalize our categories of attachment and affection’,
because ‘prejudices of this sort create no social problem’. (One
might comment that many forms of favouritism create social problems).
To the familiar concepts of ‘in-group’and ‘out-group’has been
149
added that of ‘referencegroups’.Sherif and Sherif define reference
groups as ‘thosegroups to which the individual relates himself as
a part,or to which he aspires to relate himself psychologically’ [258].
A reference-groupis an in-groupof which the individual wishes to be
a member. Certain persons,e.g.,some Negroes, have marginal roles
in the community, with the haunting consequences of insecurity,
conflict and irritation. Some individuals, through necessity or by
choice, are continually comparing themselves with groups which
for them are not in-groups.It would seem that such tensions are
related to international tensions; note, for example, how Hitler
made scapegoats of the Jews.
A n important question is whether loyalty to an in-group automatically implies disloyalty, hostility or other forms of negativism
toward out-groups.Allport concludes that concentric loyalties need
not clash; those that do are almost invariably of identical scope,
e.g.,those of a bigamist, or of a traitor. But concentric loyalties
take time to develop, and often fail completely to do so. In an
investigation Jean Piaget and Weil discovered the young Swiss
children’s resistance to the idea that one loyalty can be included
within another (‘Are you Swiss? No, I’m Genevese’).
In such investigations, studies of opinions and attitudes play a
considerable part. Within recent years the method of public opinion
polling has become extended across national boundaries. One may
therefore compare the views of representative samples of different
nations on a number of matters; political issues, religious views,
proposed roads to peace. There is, of course, a danger that people
of different cultural backgrounds will not perceive in the same
light the questions asked. Translations of questions from one
language to another often change their meaning, and consequently
the replies. Gillespie [90]introduced a variant on this method,
collecting two documents from a large sample of youth in 10 nations.
One called for an autobiography of the future, ‘My Life from now
until the year A. D. 2000’.The other was a uniform questionnaire,
asking for answers to fifty or more direct questions.
The results show that there are clear national differences.
American youth, for example, are far more preoccupied with their
own personal lives, and less interested in politics and social developments, than the youth of many other nations. Closest to the
Americans (among the countries studied) stand the New Zealanders.
Yet, unlike American, youth New Zealand youth see their own
destiny as bound up with careers in the civil service, as probable
employees of the State. American youth, by and large, seem
oblivious of their dependence on, and possible contributions to, the
national life. Public and international affairs concern them relatively
little.
150
Comparative study of official ideologies, from doctrinal literature,
seems likely to be fruitful. In Allport’s book the official beliefs of
communists and Americans are usefully set forth, naturally with the
warning that such doctrines do not always correspond to their
adherents’actual views or practices.
NATIONAL CHARACTER
It is not easy to decide how much space should be given to the
numerous discussions and investigations of national character. Both
words are often vaguely used. The concept of a nation is not easy
to formulate precisely, as Hamilton Fyfe has shown [456]. The
U.S.A.
is a nation, so, for purposes of war, is Great Britain. Yet
inside Great Britain are ‘nationalist’movements e.g. in Scotland
and Wales, regarded by some Scots and Welshmen with enthusiasm,
by others with suspicion, amusement or contempt. F e w writers
today can be always certain whether in a particular sentence they
should use ‘British’or ‘English’. A recent book for Americans,
Meet the British [469]might more fittingly have been called Meet
the English.
Regarding the word ‘character’,I can only record here m y continued surprise that so many psychologists use ‘personality’to cover
both personality and character. The justification often offered,
usually by American psychologists, that ‘character’has a moral connotation and therefore is outside the psychologist’s realm, seems
questionable, since conduct, whether considered moral or immoral,
is surely a subject for psychological consideration,and the degree of
integration of a character can be considered independently of its
situation by any moralist (cf.A . F.Shand [255]W.McDougall[174],
P.McKellar [177],T.H.Pear [225].
A n actor, in a single performance, may impersonate a dozen different individuals (one English radio-impersonatordoes it, by voice
alone, in two sentences), but this may give little accurate information
about his own character. Attributes like charm, urbanity, brusquerie,
may be merely superficial, literally ‘put on’, or may be correctly
interpreted by some percipients as pointing to deeper traits of ‘real‘
character. The charm of many Viennese before 1939 was often
differently interpreted by visitors from other countries. Some
regarded it as ‘superficial’,yet justifiable as such; a personality trait?
Others (including some Germans) would cite it as an indication of
lack of ‘roots’;a character trait.
Whether one is justified or not in attributing a character to a whole
nation, this is often done, especially in war-time. Yet Hamilton
Fyfe [456],a wzr correspondent who had served on many fronts,
wrote The Zlusion of National Character. It is easy to recall the
151
zoologicalterms,usually uncomplimentary,which have been applied
to different nations-a wolf, a butcher-bird, a jackal, a chicken:
used in a propaganda speech in war-time,such symbols are accepted,
and acted upon, by millions. Yet since few adjectives can be faithfully translated from one language to another,a comparison between
nations, unless the comparer knows several languages well,may be
misleading. To translate into some other languages ‘aggressive’,
which nowadays in English ‘covers’hearty friendliness, energetic
salesmanship,carefully guarded secret research,or the overt marching of troops into a foreign country, may not be easy. ‘Sporting’
offers similar difficulties; yet whole nations have been called
aggressive or sportbig.
To maintain this caution when faced by extensive records of
investigation into national character may seem perverse, yet
scepticism may be defended by quotations from an article ‘National
Character: the Study of Modal Personality and Socio-Cultural
Systems’, by A. Inkeles and D. L. Levinson, which now forms
Chapter 26 of a book [121]:
The study of national character has become firmly established as an area
of anthropological interest. The picture is quite different in the realm of
psychology. Extraordinarily few psychologists have shown interest in the
study of national character, and the attitude generally manifested toward
the relevant work done in other disciplines has been predominantly cold if
not hostile.
The authors suggest reasons. Until recently psychologists were concerned less with the influence of social factors in human psychology than with the psychological sub-stratum underlying social
behaviour. The majority of academic experimental and animal
psychologists who were concerned with learning, perception, and
other psychological processes per se studied how the organism
learns or perceives,without regard to social content or setting, and
largely without concern for individual or group differences.Indeed,
a prime objective was ‘to control’, which often meant, in effect,
to rule out social influences of consideration in the search for
universal principles governing individual behaviour. Much of the
social psychologist’s energy during the twenties and early thirties
was concentrated on attacking generalizations about the psychology
of groups. Such generalizations were associated with race theory,
and were opposed as being unscientific stereotypes,involving wholesale projections of one’s values on to other groups, or as a rationalization of one’s own social structure (Klineberg [
1421, Murphy
[2021).
Since ‘mostof the recent statements on national character revealed
the strong influence of Freudian or neo-Freudiantheory, indeed its
virtual monopoly of the psvchological aspects of the field’.. . ‘most
social psychologists’were ‘discouragedfrom taking an active interest
in its study’. But since the late thirties, personality theory and
clinical methods have grown in importance and acceptance,and the
social situation has been introduced into experimental work as a
crucial variable. These shifts contribute to forming a climate of
opinion in which the shifting of modal personality patterns is
recognized as a legitimate concern of psychologists.
The above authors continue: ‘Perhaps the main thread running
through the various definitions of national character is that it
refers to characteristics that are common or standardized in a given
society’ (cf. R. Linton’s concept of national character as modal
personality structure [166, 1671; there may be several modes).
Frequency of appearance is here the criterion. Contrasted with this
is A. Kardiner’s concept of basic personality structure; ‘basic’
referring to the socio-culturalmatrix rather than to that which is
‘deepest’in the person. E.Fromm [89] adopts a similar approach in
his concept of social character,of which the primary criterion is not
its frequency but rather its ‘requiredness’by the social organization.
If ‘nationalcharacter’refers to modes of a distributionof individual
personality variants, its study would seem to require the psychological investigation of adequately large and representative
samples of persons, studied individually; but most assessments of
national character have been based largely on the analysis of collective policies and products, rituals,institutionalstructures,folklore,
media of mass-communicationand the like.
National character refers primarily to common traits in adult psychology, but its study demands starting from infancy and studying
development through all pre-adult age levels. Any workable concepts should ‘accommodate the sub-cultural variations in socioeconomic class, geo-socialregion,ethnic group and the like,which
appear to exist in all modern nations’. (It might be remarked that
in England to use the concept ‘socio-economicclass’begs a question
-to what extent in this country do class and economic strata now
run parallel? [223]).
A consequence of the limited use of personality-theory is that
many descriptions of national character are superficial and incomplete. For example Goldfrank [94] describes Pueblo Indian
personality primarily in terms of gross behavioural traits such as
‘fearful’and ‘argumentative’,without regard for personal meanings and more central cognitive motivational characteristics. In
contrast,Hallowell [1041 who analysed the Salteaux Indians shows
that their disposition to aggression is important, but productive of
moral conffict,and that it is expressed ‘overtlybut indirectly in the
form of suspiciousness,extreme concern with sorcery and the like’.
(Whether this ‘aggressiveness’can be fairly called observed or
inferred seems an open question.) Yet as the authors say (p. 34)
‘aggressivenessis not a single variable’.
153
The lack of a standardized analyhc scheme (this defect is in part
due to the ‘clinical-idiosyncratic’mode of analysis commonly used)
means that there is no rigorous test for the occurrence of omissions
and distortions of analysis. A standardized analytic scheme can add
to the technical rigour and theoretical value of an investigation,but
premature standardization may seriously impair the flexibility and
inclusiveness of analysis, and at its worst lead to rigorous measurement, without concern for the theoretical meaning or functional
significance of the variables measured.
The general theory of authoritarian versus equalitarian personality
syndromes has been used as a context for several psychological
analyses of relations to authority, e.g., F r o m m [88], Erikson [69],
Dicks and Levy [444],Mead [187,1881, Adorno et al. [2].
Clearly, the individual’s concept of himself is relevant to this
greater question. W e need to know which facets are unconscious,
which conscious, how they are regarded (with pride, resignation,
guilt or casual acceptance), what the person thinks he is, what he
would like to be, and what he expects, eagerly or anxiously, to
become. W e should also know about his bases for maintaining inner
equilibrium and his major forms of anxiety, his primary dilemmas
or conflicts, and ways of dealing with them.
Increasing attention should be given to problems of sample size
and composition. Most of the psychological research on national
populations based on the study of individuals has utilized such oddly
composed samples that it is often unclear to what parent population,
if any, the simple characteristics have reference.
Moreover, w e need greater psychological training of social
scientists and ‘social’ training of psychologists. Too many social
scientists are still prone to make up their psychology, e.g., about
‘the family’, the money incentive’, as they go along. Many psychologists being trained today have too little instruction in interviewing and in observation of social behaviour. The ‘test-situation’is
often extremely artificial (cf. C.Burt [42]) and training in carrying
out tests may not abolish or even greatly diminish some testers’
‘shyness’ and gaucherie in everyday life. Most studies of national
character are weak in that they have seriously neglected the role
played in the formation of modal personality by the political system,
patterns of economic organization, media of mass communication, etc. (The work of Dicks [444] is an exception.) ‘The massive
economic and political institutional complexes that loom so large in
modern industrial society have been relatively neglected .’
H.V. Dicks’ [444]study of German prisoners of war is probably
the best example of using together methods derived from the
clinical interview, psychoanalysis and social anthropology. The
research throws valuable light on the connexions between character
structure and political ideology. Tthe study was carried out on a
154
’
random sample of German prisoners of war passing through a
British collecting centre. They were subjected to prolonged interviews according to a schedule. This allowed a ‘personalityprofile’ to
be drawn up. It was then compared with the political ideology of
the same m a n as ascertained by another interviewer. Finally, this
comparison was subjected to a test of statistical significance.
A broad picture of the general recurring peculiarities of German
mental behaviour became apparent. ‘Nothing in this paper must be
taken to imply that the economic and historico-politicalfield forces
are in any way underrated.’
A less technical account is given by Dicks [445] in Chapter 9
of Psychological Factors of Peace and War. This study, as he points
out, was made before those described in The Authoritarian Personality (a volume in the series Studies in Prejudice) by T.W.Adorno,
Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D.J. Levinson and R.Nevitt Sanford [2].
His methods have much in common with those figuring in this
book. It is impossible here to summarize its valuable material,
reported in 990 pages with tables and diagrams. It has been extensively reviewed, and the opinion has been expressed, e.g. by
J. M.Masling [182],that ‘the concept of the authoritarian personality may be a valuable heuristic tool, but only if it can be divorced
as much as possible from value-judgements’.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS IN THE FORMATION OF ATTITUDES
It may be difficult for the reader of a report like the present one
to imagine what his attitude towards war and peace would be were
he cut off-not through illness-for a month from all printed matter
reporting on current events, and all radio and television programmes.
Except in wartime, one’s information, true or false, about the
friendly or unfriendly attitude of foreign countries inevitably comes
chiefly through press, radio (including television) and cinema.
The newspapers are therefore largely responsible for building up
stereotypes, where they exist; but as yet there have been few really
psychological investigations of their influence. Material for such a
study is available in a series As Others See Us (1954, Zurich,
International Press Institute).
Volume I, Britain, U.S.A.,
Germany, India. Six Studies in Press
Relations, concerns a study which attempted to find out how
well or badly foreign reports were presenting to the newspaper
reader a comprehensive and coherent picture of other countries.
Twenty-two foreign correspondents in 10 countries were asked to
contribute reports of their impressions of the way in which their
native country was being portrayed in the press of the country
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where they were stationed. The articles were sent for comment to
editors in the countries concerned.
This volume contains reports on the United Kingdom; three
give pictures of Britain in the newspapers of the United States, the
German Federal Republic and India, as seen by British correspondents stationed there, and three show how an American,
a German and an Indian correspondent in London see their country
portrayed in the British press. The other volumes will give similar
‘two-way’looks as regards U.S.A.,
France, West Germany and
India.
The writers were also asked to express an opinion on questions
raised by the portrayal-whether it was accurate,complete,balanced
and whether the news was sufficiently interpreted.
The contributor was helped by a file of cuttings of all references
to the subject in the press he was studying,taken over one month,a
statistical sheet showing the kinds of news, and their amounts.
printed in a typical sample of newspapers over a period of
four separate weeks, and a composite picture made up from the
cuttings. The dates of this material varied slightly from country
to country, but they all fell within the period October 1952 to
February 1953.
A.H.Falkner, United States correspondent of the London Daily
Telegraph, discusses ‘The United Kingdom in the United States
Press’. H e asks: ‘What sort of mental image of Britain is created
in the mind of the average American reader?’ H e examined
105 newspapers of various types issued during the periods selected
for study,and answers that most of the emphasis is not on politics,
economics or foreign policy, but on ‘human interest’,especially the
Royal Family.Not only Sir Winston Churchill,but people in society,
writers, actors and actresses, scientists and musicians, are so well
known in the U.S.A.that their names always make news.
As a news source, Britain is a veritable forty-ninth state. Both
countries are deeply interested in the other’s social experiments and
variations on the theme of democracy. The picture in newspapers
which depend almost entirely on the ‘wire services’ and tend to
blue-pencileven extracts from these, is sketchy,episodic, not very
enlightening. A Utah editor comments that American newspaper
editors and the British Information Services should urgently request
that the wire services provide for more accurate reporting; that it
is almost impossible for the American public to get a true focus on
the English picture without being intimately acquainted with the
English background. ‘If I were in New York City and someone
handed m e a home-townpaper and asked “IS this what your home
town is like?” I would have to say “No”.From the paper, a stranger
would get the idea that m y town is only a place of automobile
accidents, drowning, marriages, city commission meetings, etc.’
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A Massachusetts editor comments: ‘One great trouble many
Americans face is the belief that everyone overseas ought to think
and react exactly as we do. Americans have a hard time trying to
understand why the British or the Germans or the French think as
they do.The great need is for understanding by Americans of people
the world over, and the major organization to provide this understanding is the press of the U.S.A.
In this role we are often lamentably weak.’
The coverage of American news in the British press, as seen by
an American correspondent stationed in London, is dealt with
by Joseph Newman, London correspondent of the New York H e r d d
Tribune.
News is relative, particularly to the region where it is being
published, and your perspective is determined a good deal by
where you happen to be at the moment. The perspective of American and British newspapers is and must be different, just as the
perspective of newspapers in two different parts of the USA.or
of Britain is different. Accuracy, as distinct from perspective, is
also relative. Moreover correct perspective and accuracy (if they
refer to an ‘accurate picture’ of a country) may be matters of
opinion.
It is not unusual to find the entire outside world, including the
U.S.A.,
compressed into but one or two columns of some British
newspapers. Britain’s supply of newsprint is, however, at present
limited. Publishers do their best with 6 to 12 pages daily (two
British newspapers occasionally go to 14 pages). It is difficult to
believe that this starvation diet of foreign news over a period of so
many years has not had unfortunate consequences for the majority
of newspaper readers in Britain.
British (morning national) newspapers ‘can be divided into three
groups: good, fair and frightful’; the last-named contain only the
faintest suggestion of foreign news. Newman considers T h e Times
and the Manchester Guardian to be the two best daily newspapers
in Britain. Readers of these two newspapers are receiving a report
on the U.S.A.
as good as or better than that which American
readers are receiving about Britain.But these newspapers are among
the smallest, judged by circulation.
In commenting on this (particularly valuable features of this
publication by the International Press Institute, Zurich are comments on comments), the editor of a London Sunday paper asserts
that the majority of the British population gets its news from the
BBC and not from the Press. No country in the world receives half
the coverage given America on the BBC.In Alistair Cooke’s weekly
‘letters’and the commentaries by Joseph Harsh and Clifford Uttley
are the basic source of British news about America.
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(The present writer would comment that Alistair Cook, English
by birth, has developed a special style of ‘reporting’with American
and English features. Sometimes his subject is American politics;
often it is the aspects in which American habits-e.g. the use of
the ‘deepfreeze’4iffer from British. At times,as when he devoted
15 minutes to a minute description of President Eisenhower’s troutfishing,it was difficultnot to interpret this as comment on the President’s apparent aloofness from serious current problems. Harsh
and Uttley give more solemn comments,usually on politics.)
‘TheAmerican press ... contains far more news of all sorts than
the British press, (but) the American does not necessarily read
more ... the “starvation diet” of Britain is eaten more hungrily.’
The Korean War was very ill-reported in the British press, but
that was partly because it was an American affair. The Burma
campaign was reported badly in the American press because it
was largely a British war. This is not an excuse but an explanation.
A Scottish paper’s editor comments that some non-London
papers,not included in this survey,regularly give considerable space
to news and comments about the U.S.A.
R.H.C.Steed, chief Bonn correspondent of the London Daily
Telegraph, discussed the West German press coverage of British
news. Britain is represented as a unique stronghold of moderation,
respect for human values and supremely mature democratic institutions. Great emphasis is given to the role played by tradition in
British life, with due respect to its ancient dignity but with special
popular interest in its more colourful,romantic, even quaint manifestations.In this picture of world affairs, Britain is still a Great
Power ... But is she able to assert this claim? Has she the military
and economic power to maintain her world position? The German
press is more attracted by exciting reports of clashes,troop movements and crises overseas than by Britain’s efforts to establish a
new economic basis of power at home. Steed considers that by
any standards the coverage of Britain in the West German press is
admirably comprehensive. There is, however, an insufficiently
penetrating account of Britain’s new approach to economic problems and to her significant cultural efflorescence; and the only distortion of which he complains is the over-emphasison traditional
and familiar aspects-the Britain presented to the reader is too
much what the reader would like it to be. There is insufficient
emphasis on the widespread suspicion of Germany by the British
public; not enough reminders that ... the behaviour of the bulk of
the German people under Hitler has not been entirely forgotten or
exonerated.
About 25 per cent of all news about Britain concerns foreign relations, reflecting interest in such subjects as ‘Can Britain hold her
remaining overseas resources, bases and communications?’, the
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balance between association with Europe and loyalties and ties to
the Commonwealth,Britain as a stabilizing force in Europe and a
restraining influence on the U.S.A.
Human interest and tradition come only a little way behind
foreign affairs.Only the major British outbursts of criticism against
Germany are given any prominence, but on the whole are reported
with most notable restraint. Recognition of Britain’s importance as
a world influence is evident from the frequent reference to British
views on outside affairs, such as the resignation of Mr. Trygve Lie
from the Unired Nations, statements by President Eisenhower and
Malenkov, and the attack on Laos. A deep respect for the integrity
of British justice and administration is reflected in several reports.
Treatment of items is on the whole impressively objective,sober,
painstaking and free from unreasonable bias. Insufficient interest is
shown in news bearing on the questions: Are any fundamental
changes taking place in Britain? H o w is she to maintain her status
as a world power? German readers have little idea of the sustained
intensity of the British export drive and its effects on British dayto-day life.
A n inadequate account is given of the intense cultural activity in
Britain; especially in London, and particularly with regard to the
theatre and publishing. British dignity, self-discipline,resolution
are adequately, even flatteringly represented, but elegance, wit,
initiative are not projected into the mirror, and Steed considers
these qualities to be highly significant of the post-war mood of a
changing Britain. They may express either decadence or virility;
that question the shrewd foreign observer can probably answer
better than the native. The report speaks of aspects of Britain,
represented in the German Press,carefully chosen to fit the readers’
simple, often escapist, and largely out-of-datepreconceptions about
the British. Real understanding between peoples can be based only
on a true, which must inevitably be a changing, picture.
‘Germany in the British Press’ is discussed by Carl Wehner,
London correspondent of the Frankfurter Rundschau and Kolnische Rundschau. H e says that from 1945 to 1948 coverage was
predominantly from Germany. Only after 1948 was there more on
Germany. The turning point came when the coalition of the wartime allies disintegrated. The Russian blockade of Berlin and the
Allied airlift once more made developments in Germany more
interesting. From that time onwards, the citizen of Berlin himself
and his experiences all became part of the story of Berlin.
At this time there was nothing to report about German foreign
policy;it did not exist.For some time,British and Allied journalists
had to obtain official permits. Their freedom of movement among
Germans was somewhat limited. Obliged to observe a special code
of behaviour towards the enemy population, the foreign journalists,
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in the uniforms of war correspondents, always remained a little
isolated as they went about gathering impressions. The supreme
importance of everything connected with winding up the war made
it imperative for them to remain in constant touch with their own
press officers, because no German sources were available. Such
conditions tempted them to generalize. After the war, the work of
British and Allied journalists had begun in concentration and death
camps. The idea of retributive justice took root. Its preponderance
was particularly apparent in the scanty coverage given to the
expulsion of nine million Germans from Eastern and South-Eastem
Europe. The same thing applied to the beginning of the hunger
period in Germany.
Since the proclamation of the Federal Republic, however, the
reporting of German events in the British press has become more
normal. The British correspondent is now able to use German
sources. The conditions of work are back to peace-time standards,
though the shortage of space in the Bridsh press means that saturation-point is easily reached.N o w and again,he remarks,one might
perhaps expect, but does not find, a cultural picture of Germany
in the three leading British daily newspapers.
Upon this, the editor of a Lancashire evening paper comments
that if there is lack of interest in Britain in Germany’s economic
affairs, more deplorably still,there has also been since the war too
little interest in the economic problems of Britain herself. ... It is
probably true that German economic affairs will receive wider
notice only if extremes occur-that is to say, if either the German
economy flounders, and distress and unemployment follow, or the
German economy prospers so greatly that it constitutes a threat to
our own foreign and domestic trade.
The accounts of the United Kingdom in the Indian press and of
India in the British press are similarly reviewed,with comments by
Indian and British editors respectively.
Reports of the above articles are here given in detail because
they are unique; even if they were not, it is unlikely that many
sociologists and psychologists would have seen them. Unfortunately,
no data are available with which to assess the statement (quoted
on page 157) that the majority of the British population gets its
news from the BBC,not from the press. This is probable; the BBC
news at 6,7, 9 and 10 p.m.,7 and 8 a.m.,issued almost always
without ‘views’or ‘angle’,and bearing the well-deserved prestige
of war-time,has been heard by millions whose morning papers may
contain little more than a ‘write-up’of events known beforehand to
the reader,who may have discussed them at his leisure the evening
before, without the benefit of a leading article. There is said to be
a doubt in Fleet Street whether editorials exert as much influence
as they did before the days of radio. A comparative statement
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about this would be welcome from Americans who can choose
their radio-source of news from a number of competing stations,
and for w h o m there is no ‘national’newspaper; also from dwellers
on the Continent of Europe.
APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION
A problem which recurs frequently when considering the psychology
of conflicts and war is the relation of the individual to the various
groups of which he is a member, momentarily for a longer period.
or permanently. With many illustrations, Herbert Blumer [10551
expresses the view that contemporary social psychologists, in formulating their theories and schemes of research, do not respect
sufficiently the nature of group life. Most of their concepts of the
human group are not formed through careful empirical study of
human associations, but are primarily projections of notions or
schemes derived from other sources.
The premise of social psychology is that group life is the setting
within which individual experience takes place, and exerts a decisive
influence on such experience. Social psychology must, therefore,
have a reasonably true picture of human association at its point of
departure. Yet, instead of developing, through empirical observation, a scheme of the nature of human association, most social
psychologists import their schemes, manufacture them in accordance with some pre-established concept, or operate unwittingly with
schemes dictated by their methods of study.
T o support this assertion, Blumer outlines five ways by which
social psychologists arrive at schemes for representing human
association:
1. Having a given idea as to the psychological make-up of the
human being, and then constructing a picture of the human
group that will conform to this idea. An early instance was the
doctrine of instincts. Group life was conceived as merely compounded of such instincts (the present writer would not regard
‘merely compounded’ as a fair description). A contemporary
instance is the current doctrine of attitudes. The view presumes,
says Blumer, that a human being consists of an organization of
attitudes, and the life of the human group must consist of an
interaction of the attitudes taken up by the constituent members.
Other instances are the concepts of human group life as
organized in terms of psychoanalytic factors, or as a network
of stimulus-response relations; the view that public opinion is
a summation of individual opinions, and group life an expression of individual motives. The concept of human association
as a compound of the psychological make-up of the participating
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individuals becomes an obstacle to the study of such association.
A notable way of arriving at a guiding image of human association is to use an analogical construct;for example,the human
group is conceived as formed in the pattern of an organism,
functioning as an entity guiding the behaviour of its sub-groups
and ultimately of the individual members. Group life used to
be conceived as a ‘group mind’, endowed with the functional
characteristics of the individual mind.
More common today is the unwitting employment of analogy,
in forming a concept of the human group,usually in the service
of some metaphysical or methodological scheme,e.g.a mechanism operating in orderly and regularized fashion;or a statistical
aggregate operating on a basis of probability,or (influenced by
Gestalt philosophy) a total system seeking to achieve or to
maintain a state of equilibrium.
All such models are patterned after those in the natural
sciences or organized in accordance with some philosophical
concept.They do not result from the empirical study of human
association,but are importations.
A concept of the human group is developed on the basis of
speculative reflection; e.g.,society is ‘general will’,‘power’,or
‘consensus’.Political philosophers, more than social psychologists, tend to use such concepts.
Concepts are reached, especially by anthropologists and sociologists, through empirical studies of human groups. Such concepts centre round ‘culture’,‘social structure’ and ‘roleplaying’.
There is a concept of the human group as having a system of
ways of living which antedate the infant or newcomer, must
be acquired by him, and shape his conduct and personal
organization.
Blum; points out that the concepts of culture, social structure and
role-playinghave been derived not from the study of human associates, as an on-going process of what happens between interacting
people,but from the study of products of human association. These
concepts were formed by comparing groups’ ways of living,observing relationships, or noting the differentiated positions or parts
taken by individuals in the context of the group. What seem,superficially,‘to be empirically derived concepts of the nature of human
association are not derived from the study of association as such.
The Sherifs’ [258] views (pp. 193 f) of the nature of human
association may be outlined thus:
1. Human association should be viewed in its most fundamental
form; that of two human beings interacting upon each other.
2. The most important feature of human association is that the
participants take each other into account, not merely at the
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point of initial contact, but throughout the period of interaction.
3. The two individuals are brought into a relation of subject to
subject, not of object to object or even of subject to object.
Each person has to view the other’s conduct in some degree
from the other’s standpoint.
4. This transaction (the word is used in this special sense) is built
up in the process of its occurrence; continuing in a movement
of definition and re-definition of one another’s action.
5. Yet human life is usually stable and regular; because of controls
that enter into the development of a transaction.
6. The participant interacts not only with the other person but
with himself.
7. The participants are required by necessity to inhibit tendencies
to act.
Blumer is therefore critical of the view that group conduct is to be
understood and predicted in terms of attitudes of the individual.
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO THE STUDY
OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION
Clearly research activities into relations between groups must be
interdisciplinary.During the last three decades there has been a
great deal of elbow-rubbing between psychologists, sociologists,
ethnologists and other social scientists. For the universalizing of
human institutions and groupings, and the attitudes taken up to
these by the psychologist, in the image of his own microcosm, do
not square with the facts; while universalizing, on the basis of
crude hedonistic generalizations by the general run of economists
and philosophers of the last few centuries, is simplistic psychologizing.
Attempts to exchange views-attempts to be regarded as early
in the history of social science by biologists, psychiatrists, psychologists,sociologists,anthropologists and representatives of policy
makers-are critizised by the Sherifs from two angles: (a) the outcome,on the whole,is simply the juxtaposition of specialists’views,
with little or no attempt at integration,and (b) it has often been
assumed that the contributions represent ‘the’psychological, sociological,biological or psychiatric approach,and not the view of the
contributor himself or of his school.
This point can be illustrated by the traditional dichotomy of
‘psychological’versus ‘sociological’approaches;the traditional belief
-erroneous of course-is that ‘the’psychologist is the apologist of
the individualistic point of view, ‘the’sociologist of the culturalenvironmental standpoint. Yet if w e merely ask, in reference
163
to a particular problem, how far ‘individual’ psychology (the
term used in the old and bad sense) will take us and at what
point sociological material and ideas are a necessary supplement,
the step taken leads to a muddled eclecticism. ‘“Psychological”
and “sociological” signify two different levels of approach, necessitating their appropriate units of treatment and consequently their
appropriate conceptual tools.’
With the notion of levels in mind, w e can check the findings
obtained on our level with those obtained at other levels of approach
to the same or similar topics. If it is valid, a generalization reached
on some topic at one level is not contradicted, and in fact is
supported, by valid generalization reached at another level of
analysis. The sociologist’s finding that collective action of a group
has properties peculiar to itself should be (and is) verified by the
psychologist’s findings, in his more detailed and elaborate analysis,
concerning the unique experience and behaviour of the individual
member participating in the group activity.
Let us next consider work upon the relations between groups.
Groups in Harmony and Tension, by Muzafer and Carolyn
W. Sherif [258], attempts a recent ‘integration of studies on intergroup relations.’ Reports of researches into these have been numerous since the publication of the journal H u m a n Relations jointly
by the Tavistock Institute for H u m a n Relations, London, and the
Research Center for Group Dynamics, A n n Arbor, Michigan,U.S.A.
Whether tensions between specialized groups in, say, industrial
life are closely related to tensions which cause wars (cf. Cantril
[45]) is still an open question.
Chapter I of the Sherifs’ book begins [258]:
Relations between social groups, expressed in states of war and peace,
conflict and harmony, domination and slavery, business transaction and
loot, have always been consequential matters in human affairs. The history
books largely consist of records of events concerning intergroup relations,
not infrequently selectively chosen and selectively evaluated in the hands
of their compilers as influenced by their respective partisan identifications.
But today, it will be hardly an exaggerated statement to say that the
balance ef the fate of the human race hangs primarily on the course of
developments in the area of intergroup relations on both national and international levels. The momentous events in human history of the last decades,
and particularly the great changes brought about during and as a consequence of the recent war, have created an unprecedented state of disequilibrium and flux in the relationships of social groups. Modern means of
transportation and communication and other modern technological developments have made countries and even the world too small for the isolated
existence and functioning of social units-whether they are small or largeno matter h o w distant or self-sufficient these groups might have been
previously. In this general world setting, no human grouping can function
as a closed system today; no human grouping, no matter h o w weak or
powerful, has an independent existence today. This state of affairs is ever
bringing all social units into closer and closer functional relationship.
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Increasing interdependence is the tendency both within nations and between
nations. In many quarters of the world today (both academic and more
practical), there is rapidly increasing concern over the vital and frequently
grim problems of intergroup relations. The concern is an inevitable product
of this widespread situation.
In order that w e may be thinking about at least similar things throughout our discussion, a characterization of our main terms is in order. A
group may be characterized as a social unit (1) which consists of a number
of individuals who, at a given time, stand in more or less definite interdependent status and role relationships to one another, and (2) which explicitly
or implicitly possesses a set of values or norms of its o w n regulating the
behaviour of individual members at least in matters of consequence to the
group.
SOCIAL TENSIONS IN INDIA: AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY
Gardner Murphy’s In the Minds of M e n ; the Study of Human
Behaviour and Social Tensions in India [378], published in 1953, is
based on social scientists’ Unesco studies conducted at the request
of the Government of India. In one sense, the title is a challenge
to the views of some sociologists.
The first Indian Government, under Pandit Nehru. ‘found itself
confronted with urgent problems: mass killing and riots had
occurred between Hindus and Muslims; there were millions of
destitute refugees, and untouchables were challenging the caste
system’. The Government, therefore, ‘requested Unesco aid, not in
terms of alms, medicines or foods, but through social scientists
studying the minds and emotions of the people’.
Professor Gardner Murphy, with collaborating teams of Indian
psychiatrists, psychologists, economists and sociologists, attempted
to discover the roots of conflict. In reply to the ever-recumng
question ‘Are not all these difficulties basically economic?’ he points
out that there are countless instances in which the psychological
attributes of human beings prevent the rational economic operations
which classical economics tells us ‘should’occur. The organic wholeness of human personality makes that clich6, ‘the economic factor’,
absurd. All over the world there is huge economic waste through
psychological failure, as well as psychological failure through
economic waste.
Chapter 3 discusses ‘village life as a source of security and
solidarity’. For at least 2,000 years, the village, as an economic
and cultural unit, has represented the basis of Indian life, and the
family system provides protection; but here ’the family’ means the
joint family-a household of persons comprising the sons of a
given pair of parents, their wives, children and unmarried sisters,
and all those (e.g.aged parents) dependent upon them; the eldest of
these sons is ordinarily the head of the family, and everywhere in
India the eldest male cames an enormously important burden.
165
Somewhat similar systems are found in China and Japan, and in
Greek and Roman family life. The industrialized Western societies,
however, have in general forgotten them.
The attitude towards women and children, intimately related to
this matter of family closeness, is discussed. ‘A woman is in the
first instance a mother, who holds to herself all those who share
not only in the tissue of her body, but in the blood of the group
of which she is the symbol....Children are not individuals only
...(they) are the stuff of one’s being. The continuity of Indian life,
without which one’s own momentary existence is meaningless, is
conceived naturally in terms of fruitfulness, the health, welfare,
reproductive capacity, long life of all the individuals who issue
from one’s own body.’
In India there has been no articulate resistance in villages or
cities to the idea of family limitation.The Indian family,however,
even when limited, would be large. Family limitation generally
means a decrease from perhaps eight or nine births down to five
or four. The ‘rhythm’method is being taught (see page 172 of the
present chapter). The Indian will not automatically accept, without
further thought,the reduction of the number of children in and for
itself. Moreover, he is not prepared to give up the closeness of
contact with those children whom he has.
The idea of caste is so complex and often so over-simplified‘by
non-Indianswho speak and write about it that brief mention of it
here is likely to meet with criticism, especially as the following
lines are only a summary of Gardner Murphy’s longer summary.
The caste system secures a place for everyone. No one knows
the exact origin of Indian caste. The so-called‘Aryan’invaders,the
creators of the magnificent Vedic hymns, were a vigorous and
dominant people. As they had come into India from the North
West and established themselves,they of course regarded themselves
as superior to the native population. Their own social stratification
and that of the native population gradually evolved into the caste
rigidities which we know.
The caste system has never been completely rigid. It was based
originally upon the social class distinctions within the conquering
Aryan group and upon the differentiation of occupation or function
among the conquerors, the conquered, and that later hierarchical
structure in which conquerors and conquered were integrated.
The time came when the economic life of the village depended
upon the fixity of the occupational distinctions and upon the transmission from father to son of the special tasks, skills and responsibilities which marked caste status.
The status of castes which enjoy a specially favourable or unfavourable position in the hierarchy is changing. The Brahmins,
for example, have been undergoing much economic pressure in
166
regions through the loss of land and the necessity of migrating to
the cities in search of work. Among the Brahmin caste are variations
of status. For instance, those who deal with the funeral activities
along the banks of the Ganges are looked down upon by the
village Brahmins, whose functions are priestly in the traditional
sense, involving largely the ceremonial contacts with the deities.
Caste life is discussed as it affects exchange of economic functions, arrangement of marriage (our Western conception of ‘child
marriage’ is too simple and throws the whole picture into false
perspective), mutual support, religious beliefs and behaviour.
Whatever our personal views may be about the value to psychology
of the concepts of tension, frustration and aggression (one’s critical
attitude is often based upon a suspicion that differences in culturepattern have not been sufficiently taken into account), there is no
doubt that detailed study by an outsider anxious to share, so far
as possible, the inner life of the community studied, will be valuable, even necessary, to anyone who tries to assess the importance
of tensions in that community. Lois Barclay Murphy, wife of
Professor Murphy, visited over thirty schools, orphanages and
other institutions for children, and spent some time-from a few
hours to over a week each-in over thirty homes, at many social
levels, from the home of a farmer to homes of professors and
factory owners. She also visited villages along the East Coast and
scattered over the provinces of North Central India.
From her survey of the life and needs of the Indian children,the
following features emerge. They are the friendliest children she
has ever seen; they trust people; they have more than just passive
friendliness;they are ingenious in finding ways of getting acquainted
with anyone who does not speak their language; perceptive and
intuitively quick to understand how to make a genuine contact and
establish a relationship. Crying is so taken for granted in the
children of the Western world, that to support her negative observation she quotes an experienced observer of children to the effect
that during a whole year in India she never heard a baby cry.
Since they are put to the breast as soon as they get restless, they
have little chance to practice ‘crying for what they want’.
They are also responsible, taking care of each other, moving
about in mixed age-groups,as well as leading the flocks of goats,
sheep, cows and buffalo that one sees on the roads and in the
fields. N o feeling seems to exist that it is unmasculine for boys or
men to carry or care for babies or young children.
Through an interpreter, they love to ask questions. These traits
were seen in children up to the age of 8 or 9. The adolescents,
however, did not appear to Mrs. Murphy so trusting, spontaneous
and friendly.‘We heard complaints from professional and political
leaders about the lack of initiative and leadership in young
167
people; though in university groups, when encouraged, w e found
the kind of zest and energy expected in the U.S.A.Indian children
do not have the stimulus to problem-solving or the practice
in competitive thinking and planning that would match the
spontaneity and capacity for relationships with people, which w e
saw so often.’
What kinds of early experiences, she asks, might be related to
these strengths and weaknesses (in our eyes), and what might be the
background of these experiences? Indian children in the villages
still grow up in the large joint family, where the marrid sons and
unmarried daughters have rooms or apartments in the house of
their parents; children feel accepted by, and at home with, a large
number of people. But the feeling of trust and acceptance is probably due to much more than this; they are given a comfortable
start in life which would contribute to confidence in being able to
count on people. Infants are nursed for two years or longer; there
is little systematic toilet-training;infants and young children are
not left at home but accompany the family on visits, even to the
movies; they are not shut out or isolated. The small child is rarely
exposed to new experiences without the support of a trusted person.
A n official of the Ministry of Education in the central government
in N e w Delhi said: ‘You bring up your children, w e live with
ours.’
Since an enormous proportion of the population has no property,
little children are not subjected to the anxious, tense ‘no-no’s’that
are heard dozens of times a day in our middle class families. Thus
they are not exposed to so much frustration, pressure from adults.
conflict with authority; anger and aggression are not stimulated;
there is little or no evidence of the ‘resistance’, temper tantrums,
and hitting back at the world common among our children two to
four years old. Consequently, aggression has no chance of being
patterned and shaped as it is with us. W e expect a child to use
physical expressions of aggression until the age of four, and
gradually to substitute verbal methods of standing up for his
rights, getting what he wants, or ‘letting off steam’. Nor does the
older Indian child go-as our children do-through the stages of
learning ‘fairness’in group play, good sportsmanship, how to ‘fight
like a man’ without using unfair methods-biting, scratching,
punching in vulnerable parts of the body.
Aggression is not elicited, nor it is patterned within limits as it
is with us. With us there are extremes of juvenile delinquency,
crime, rage, violence, at one end of the scale, and outlets for
aggressive activity like baseball and competitive sports at the other
end. When aggression is aroused in Indian adults it may burst out
in prominent chaotic ways, because of the lack of the long, slow
experiences of patterning that w e know.
168
Yet the joint family, which gives so much security, such a firm
basis of emotional strength and trust, can become very coercive
and limiting to the adolescent and young adult. It is still quite
general to expect young people to accept an arranged marriage
and to fit into the jobs dictated by caste. The frustration for many
is intense and bitter, and generates conflicts, solved in some cases
by stolid resignation, in others by a struggle for independence
attended by suffering rarely experienced even in the most acute
struggles of our own adolescents.
What connexions may there be between these aspects of child
development and the social tensions w e shall be discussing? W e
must consider the following possibilities:
1. The role of dependence in accentuating the sense of need, of
expectation, of being cared for. This is fostered at a deep level
by the long period of infancy and, until comparatively recently,
was further accentuated by the governmental system under
British rule; thus the tendency exists to find it deeply frustrating and probably confusing when problems are not taken care
of by some authority.
2. The role of caste structure in accentuating the sense of ‘right
to have’, status, property, etc. and the reliance on a fixed order.
3. The role of early freedom from frustration in the later absence
of habits controlling aggression.
4. The role of lack during childhood of opportunities for groupthinking and planning, in causing the later lack of methods of
resolving conflicts between -groups.
The conclus~onsof this chapter are that the children-who-used-tobe, India’s adults of today, grew up under a hierarchical authoritative system where the dominance of the British was at least a
shadow in the background, and the caste system and joint family
gave the design for living, the pattern and shape of things. Without
this authority and this pattern, individuals might easily be ‘at sea’.
rudderless, lost, even disintegrated. And panicked by failure in
satisfying basic needs to be cared for, and by deep beliefs ‘because
I a m a member of ... caste I have a right to ...’,by the flood of
feelings that attended the struggles of independence and partition,
they gave way to primitive violent aggressive impulses. They were
without the resources of values (civil rights ideals deeply rooted)
and of techniques (group discussion) to deal with these feelings.
Mrs. Murphy reminds us that it will be important to keep a
sharp eye on the values already lost in the process of modernizing
India, or which may be lost if we do not attend to ways in which
they can be encouraged while new values are being developed.
The rise of tensions is dealt with in a special chapter in Gardner
Murphy’s book. Some of its chief points, based on a Unesco research
by Professor R. K. Mukerjee [908] in 1950, will ‘date’, for much
169
has happened in India since then. But it may be helpful to cite
some headings in this chapter, and to add comments.
The Divided Village
The term ‘village’ is used in the Census of India to describe a
settlement of less than 5,000 people, and is often loosely used to
include also small ‘towns’,as w e should call them, with a population of several thousand and even up to 20,000.Using the term in
the larger sense, w e find that there are about 60,000 villages in
India. Even today it is common to fmd only a footpath connecting
adjacent villages. The typical mentality of the mass of people is
the rural mentality of the pre-motor-car era of American and
European civilization, when communications were poor. Into this
relatively isolated village life there has come recently the means
of communication which goes with the spread of newspaperreading habits. The death of Gandhi apparently reached most of
the people of India within a few hours.
This fact is very important as regards social cohesion and social
hostility. The channels of communication are along the lines of
language, community (religion) and caste. Since the Muslim is
independent of the Hindu press, stories concerned with HinduMuslim strife assume two essentially different forms, one circulated
through Hindu and the other through Muslim sources.
Huge importance attaches in India to the few great cities, always
the centres of culture and progress. For a hundred years they have
been fundamental nerve centres in the military, economic and political unification of India. They have usually been the focal points
where movement towards either unification or dissension has been
accomplished. The great riots in Calcutta in 1946 had a typical
effect in crystallizing Hindu-Muslim hostility. The new, in almost
every type of institutional practice, makes its appearance first in
the cities. The movement of the village population into the cities,
in response to industrial opportunities or economic forces which
have driven them off the land, makes for the most rapid social
change, and for bitterness, hostility and inter-group tension.
The caste system, too, has played a role in setting the stage for
m o d e m tensions. Status or prestige are naturally distinctions which
follow from the fact of caste; but the acceptance or rejection of
members of other castes may be defined by ‘social distance’-the
concept of Bogardus [988], developed in this connexion by Professor Mukerjee. Social distance between castes is represented not
only by non-intermarriage or the refusal to allow others a seat at
the same table, but by numerous other types of restriction,described
in detail. ‘Untouchability’is a matter of degree. Mukerjee’s study
reveals a scale of social avoidance (from small to large social dis170
tance) varying from avoidance of sitting on a common floor to
avoidance of any kind of physical contact. A fundamental sign
of exclusion relates to the use of the water supply. A scavenger,
whose requirements for personal hygiene may be the greatest of
all, is sometimes compelled to satisfy his need for water from a
stagnant pool or even a drain, or he may have to share the filthy
and contaminated water with cattle. (The above is a report of the
1950 situation. The 1950 Constitution forbids such exclusion, and
the whole pattern is due for a change.)
This traditional situation can be maintained as long as economic
specialization exists at the village level; as long as each castegroup has a clear idea of its position, and is not altogether
frustrated in that position, and as long as disturbing practices and
ideas are not introduced from outside. But this last condition can
no longer be maintained in modem India.
Today caste is a major source of tension in India, and there is
every reason to believe that in the next ten or twenty years it will
become more and more so. In general, the entire struggle of the
lower castes to improve their lot has led to virtually the same
position with which we are familiar in Europe and the United
States. The privileged groups feel that these people ‘do not know
their place’; ‘these upstarts’ are demanding things which are ‘too
good for them’.The tensions are essentially tensions arising between
those who demand the rapid and dramatic improvement in their
lot and those who find that too much is being demanded, too fast.
Murphy discusses the barrier of language, the partition of India
and its aftermath,the role of the British, the Hindu-Muslim riots,
the plight of the refugees trapped by partition, and the ‘black
market’ (a phrase with a psychological meaning differentfrom that
common in the West). H e notes that the control of cloth has
practically abolished the black market; an illustration of the fluid
character of generalizations about modem India.
In Chapter 6,‘The Crumbling Patterns of Social Distance’,the
way in which the caste system contributes to current social tensions
is discussed, in the light of Unesco studies. Its main points are
indicated here. Its purpose is to show where a specific quest for
facts may clarify details, give better perspective, ahd introduce
quantitative measurements of the degree of inter-caste tension or
of the effectiveness of conciliatory moves. ‘The lower castes seem
somewhat dissatisfied with their present position, social and economic. They are becoming aware that their situation is not inevitable. They know they have powerful friends. Very few Harijans
(Untouchables) are found in schools or colleges (just as there are
comparatively few Negroes in American colleges); here and there
a few are found, either mixed with other children or in their own
special schools or colleges.’ 0-n pages 215 ff. the situation of the
171
Harijans is compared with that which faced American Negroes at
the time the book was written. The cities as social levellers are
discussed: Obvious social changes are related to the fact that
workers of all castes may be found carrying out the same operation
in the mill. Industrial jobs do not ‘fit’ caste categories. Students,
too, move against the caste-system and, as everywhere else in the
world, small children are without prejudice.
To investigate ‘social distance’ the Bogardus Scale [988] was
used. About 20 per cent of the students were prepared to admit to
kinship by m a m a g e with any of the eight groups named in the
scale, while nearly 60 per cent were willing to take food with any
of the groups in their own dining rooms. (‘Inter-dining’in a hotel
or restaurant is a different matter.)
One prominent form of social tension in India is the struggle of
castes to improve their relative status; urbanization and education
tend to weaken the rigidity of the caste system; changes in attitude
occur more rapidly than changes in behaviour, but change in
attitude has already set going new policies in both the central and
state governments, which are already exerting their own individuaI
pressure to undermine caste prerogatives.
Other important subjects discussed in this book are: the insecurity
of the Muslims, the frustration of the refugees, hostilities and hopes
of textile workers, Indian compared with American prejudice, and
the prospects of social health.
Family Planning in India
Since for centuries many writers have emphasized the connexion
between war and over-population (cf. Flugel), and even today one
hears the complacent remark that, after all, war partially solves
the problems of the pressure of population (though the amazing
assertion that it is ‘Nature’s pruning hook‘ seems out of favour),
it is justifiable to give details of recent family planning in India.
They are taken from an article by Taya Zinkin in the Manchester
Guardian, 23 January 1954,
The Government of India Planning Commission has allocated
€400,000 for work in family planning. Pilot experiments are being
conducted, one in an urban middle-class centre in N e w Delhi, the
other-‘far more relevant to general Indian conditions’-in the
state of Mysore, at Ramnagaram, a small rural town admistering
fourteen villages with a total population of 8,000.Population study
had already been carried out, and in 1936 a Rockefeller Foundation Health Unit was created there, so that the villagers are familiar
with midwives and doctors. But it is difficult to get illiterate,
superstitious people to co-operate in the furtherance of their o w n
aims. They say ‘Our houses are full of people; the children no
172
longer die, and the old go on living.’ This was demonstrably due
to the activities of the health unit.
First, the research workers, who in order to conform to the
social pattern had to pretend to be married, befriended the villagers;
this was not easy. The women researchers established social relations with the village women, and the men researchers with the
husbands. If a husband and wife both agree that they wish to
wait two years before their next child, they are registered, followed
up, and taught the ‘rhythm method‘, based on the woman’s fertility cycle.
Out of the 941 couples with wives under 40, in 712 cases both
husband and wife were keen on the plan; in addition, another 5 per
cent of husbands alone were keen. The rhythm method, which
consists simply in avoiding union during those days when conception is most likely to occur, was selected because it costs nothing,
offends no religious feeling in India, requires no skill, and conforms to Hindu social patterns and Gandhian preachings; selfcontrol is a virtue which brings Nirvana nearer.
There is one great difficulty: an illiterate people does not use
calendars. Dr. Abraham Stone, the American specialist on family
planning, suggested that the women be given beads, one for each
day, and one colour for each period of her cycle. There follows
in the article an interesting list of the obstacles encountered, but
on the whole this ingenious device worked. ‘Ramnagaram’is only
a pilot project in which attitudes are surveyed, methods evolved
and information gathered, but it suggests possibilities. Failures and
set-backs can be analysed in the ways common among all scientific
workers.
THE STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS
During 1954, many thoughtful persons must have asked themselves: ‘What is the use of high level conferences between the representatives of hostile states? H o w much can we, the voters, ever
know about the members’ behaviour and experiences? D o they
behave and feel like us, when we attend conferences of a lowlier
kind? And if there are relevant resemblances, can w e learn from
our own experiences, recorded and interpreted by psychologists
especially interested in these problems?’
There have been numerous attempts to evaluate the techniques
of discussion, and references will be found in the journal H u m a n
Relations. A n especially useful article with the title of this section,
by Professor John Cohen, appeared in Occupational PsychoZogy [58]. H e asks many pertinent questions, e.g.: “By what criteria
can we judge of the effectiveness of a committee or conference?
173
The external criterion, assessing the effect of a conference on the
outside world must be distinguished from an internal criterion,
which evaluates a meeting by determining the effects on the
participants. In many committee procedures it is tacitly assumed
that the members, before they part must agree. Such an assumption
may lead to a compulsion to agree; so differences tend to be
glossed over or buried, and this makes it hard to exert the effort
necessary to understand,intellectually and emotionally,what someone else in the committee is trying to say. The ruison d’gtre of a
group lies in the variation among its members: this should be
carefully embodied in the collective product.
Cohen remarks on a ‘culture-bound’factor in some countries;
the tendency to reject some new suggestion merely because it is
new. It has been said that in England one must never do anything
for the first time, or to put it more politely and vaguely, one must
at all costs avoid creating precedents. There is reason to suppose
that people may be taught to develop a greater receptivity to
innovatory suggestions. This objective might be embodied in the
principle: Always look for the merits of a suggestion before saying
what is wrong with it.
In homogeneous groups too much emotion tends to be generated
in disputes over professional or technical minutiae. It is even
possible that up to a point effectiveness increases as the group
becomes professionally more heterogeneous.
The role of chairman, and relationships among members, are
discussed. In the absence of any liking for a person, it is exceedingly hard to understand his point of view; it is difficult even to
want to understand him. As mutual liking grows between members,
they become more ready to express and explore new ideas.
In determining the order of speakers, the rigidity of control by
the chairman necessary for working out the logical implications of
a series of propositions, should be relaxed if the order of speakers,
partly under the chairman’s control, seems a more important
factor.
Different phases in the growth of a committee’s cohesion are
discussed. Those actually noted by Cohen are briefly stated:
1. Lack of spontaneity, displays of defensiveness and frequent
signs of latent hostility towards the chairman.
2. More open hostility and indifference to new members joining
the group at this stage.
3. Emergence of spontaneity among the ‘in-group’and a tendency
to trust new members as an ‘out-group.’
4. More intense and productive attitude; the chairman may confidently take part without giving the impression of obtruding
himself. Greater tolerance of differences of viewpoint.
174
5. The group turns to the practical task of preparing its report.
(Not all members are ready for this, intellectually or
emotionally.)
It may seem a long way from such a study of an international
committee to speculation about the activities of a Nine-Power
Conference and Professor W.J. H.Sprott’s paper on ‘The Policy
Makers’ [558] is not warmly encouraging. Yet the purpose of the
present chapter is to give some idea of the directions of psychological studies.
CONCLUSION
W e may now sum up this chapter, indicating where psychology
stands in relation to problems of peace and war. There are serious
sins of omission to record. Only recently have writers of textbooks
of social psychology even mentioned war. Some have been content
to discuss how, when a war has ‘broken out’ (a phrase suggesting
that modem wars can still be likened to pestilences, ‘visitations’
for which M a n used not to be responsible, though his ingenious
spreading of the rabbit disease myxomatosis should warn us of
possibly similar action against human beings in any future war
[437]) psychologists can help to wage it.
There has been a tendency, for which teachers of history in
schools and universities, newspaper proprietors and the BBC are
partly responsible,to consider war as intrinsically more interesting
than peace-though in World War I at least boredom was a common experience-and to ignore many accounts of modern war as
experienced by people who performed non-exciting,relatively safe
but indispensable duties. In extenuation, those concerned in the
business of spreading knowledge-factual or fictional-about wars
may urge that it is easier to find people who will write and speak
about wars than about important events which depend on conditions of peace.
The popularity of the concepts of personal and national aggressiveness, especially among aggressive people, tends to overshadow
the great number of non-aggressive activities necessary to the
waging of modern war, and the attribution by both sides in a
quarrel of ‘aggressiveness’to actions which may or may not be
‘objectively’regarded as aggressive. Not unnaturally,overt preparation for war is called attack by one side, defence by the other.
Only a hint, and that inadequate,can be given of the differences
between the approaches of the sociologist, historian and psychologist to the problems of sonflicts and war. There are many
writers who claim one of these labels,not always with the approval
of recognized ‘professionals’.Some idea of these different approaches
175
can be obtained by comparing the present chapter with those of
Professors Bernard and Aron.
In these three chapters, the question of the role of the individual
in international tensions is discussed in ways which illustrate the
importance of different angles of treatment.
The development of attitudes towards war and the factors chiefly
responsible for them-in particular, education and the Press-are
treated in detail. The ways in which human beings associate and
the social tensions arising therefrom are discussed, with special
reference to tensions in m o d e m India.
Since not only the m a n in the street but some social scientists
as well may be responsible for certain false prophecies concerning
the reaction of primitive or relatively ‘simple’people to new ideas
and inventions (the West Indies, Israel and India afford striking
examples), space has been given to an account of one attempt (and
scientists find that studies of partial successes are usually profitable) to introduce birth control into Indian villages.
Towards certain innovations, ‘simple’peoples may have few deeplying objections, since, from an early age, there has been no
indoctrination against the new idea. Sophisticated people may have
more inhibitions than they are aware of, and may be particularly
sensitive to propaganda appealing to their intellectual or cultural
vanity, as well as to patriotic sentiments.
Writers on sociological and psychological matters, have urged
that, since high-level policy makers, in deciding whether to wage
war with or without a previous declaration,may or may not consult
the nation’s wishes-if indeed they can know them-studies of
committees and conferences-especially international committees,
tend in a desirable direction.-For this reason a study of such a
committee has been included.
176
C H A P T E R I11
CONFLICT AND W A R FROM THE
VIEWPOINT OF HISTORICAL
SOCIOLOGY
bY
RAYMONDh
ON
A large number of studies have been undertaken at the instigation
of Unesco or suggested to independent research-workers by the
‘tensions’project. No one would dream of denying the value of
these studies, nor is there any question of formulating a valuejudgement on the numerous and widely varying works produced.
I shall merely note two facts about which there can scarcely be
any doubt: (a) The works published have had little bearing on
practical contemporary analysis of the international tensions which
are liable to cause wars, but instead, as the years have passed, the
field covered by the heading of ‘tensions’has extended,becoming ever
wider and less clearly defined; attention has been concentrated on
such phenomena as the relations between town and country, and
the repercussions of technological advances, or of the introduction
of industrial civilization, in the so-called underdeveloped countries
or others whose culture is not derived from the West. No one would
deny the importance of these phenomena; but their bearing on
international tensions and wars is, to say the least, indirect.
(b) Seven years after the project was approved, w e are further than
ever from unanimous agreement on the concepts and methods to
be used.
I do not propose, in this context, to go over again in detail the
discussion of concepts contained in the two preceeding studies in
this book. I merely wish to draw attention to some of the reasons
-which seem to m e to be fundamental-that prevent us from
proceeding directly from the general question of tensions to the
particular question of modern war.
I leave it to the psychologists to determine whether, and how far,
the concept of ‘tension’, as used in their branch of study, has been
precisely defined or is capable of such definition. Psychoanalysts at
all events might link it up with other concepts such as drive,
repression or censorship. Even if the concept is considered to be
rather amorphous or of little value, we can form a general idea of
the phenomena to which it refers or applies.
177
,
But when w e turn from the tensions within the individual psyche
to the tensions within groups or between groups, we have not
merely to face the difficulty of giving exact definitions; w e no
longer know, even in broad general terms, what w e are talking
about. If we consider a simple group-such as a class in a secondary
school, a company or section in the army-we may, at a pinch,
trace out social tensions by observing the tensions (in the psychological sense) within the minds of the individuals making up
the group. Failure in leadership on the part of the teacher or the
lieutenant is externalized in his own anxiety and the dissatisfaction
of the pupils or soldiers. But this method of diagnosing social
tensions from individual tensions cannot be generally applied. Any
form of organized life entails certain tensions in the minds of
individuals. In order to discover what tensions there may be, in
the sociological sense of the term, it would be necessary to determine which are inseparable from the institutional structure and
which are due to the personalities inserted into that structure. It
would be necessary to make a distinction between what is due to
the individuals filling the various roles in society and what is due
to those roles themselves. Institutional tensions show in individual
tensions, but w e cannot diagnose and define the former by studying
the latter.
Tension between individuals is a quite different concept from
the tension within the individual's mind brought to light by the
psychoanalyst. The latter, no doubt, often tends to explain tensions
between individuals by tensions within individuals. Aggressiveness
is due to frustration. Whatever may be the value of this theorywhich I a m neither capable nor desirous of assessing-it would be
difficult to say that competition, rivalry and conflict between
individuals are not normal phenomena, either from the standpoint
of psychology or from that of sociology. A psychologically normal
individual is quite likely to be hostile to certain of his fellows, either
because he disapproves of their conduct or because he finds himself in conflict with them for the possession of certain goods or the
attainment of certain values. It would therefore still be necessary to
distinguish, in psychological terms, conflict between normal individuals from conflict between individuals who are aggressive as
a result of frustration. It is by no means certain that such a
distinction is easy, even as a concept, but there can be no doubt
that in the practical field it is quasi-impossible.
Even if it were feasible to make this distinction in the psychological sphere, it would not be possible to do so in the sociological
sphere. What is normal or pathological in psychology does not
correspond exactly with what is normal or pathological in sociology.
A movement which is the symptom of a social crisis does not
necessarily have neurotic subjects at its head or in its ranks. In a
178
stable social structure, a normal protest movement may be led or
supported by neurotics. One might almost be tempted to say that
for most social rebels to be neurotic is evidence of sociological
normality, while for ‘normal’ individuals to support revolutionary
extremism is evidence of social pathology. Speaking generally, I
would simply reiterate that intra-individualtensions do not entirely
explain the question of inter-individual tension.
If we do not start from the former type of tension in order tu
define the latter, w e move insensibly from the idea of tension to
that of struggle or conflict, or to still more indeterminate concepts
such as crisis or upheaval. It is self-evident for example, that the
introduction of Western technology into Iran, equatorial Africa or
the Japan of 1860 must disturb the habitual ways of life and
produce a clash between traditions, traditional habits of thought,
and present-day life. In such a case w e may speak of tensions,
but w e cannot know exactly what particular phenomena are covered
by this term. It is obvious that individuals suffer from more ‘internal
conflicts’ when their society is undergoing rapid changes. It is also
probable that conflicts between individual members of small and
large groups, and conflicts between the groups within the society
as a whole, will be more frequent and more acute when different
and often incompatible systems of ideas and relationships are
juxtaposed in a society’s institutions and in men’s minds. But such
a use of the term ‘tension’would be of little use, for it would be
applicable to too many heterogeneous phenomena.
Are w e then to choose conflict rather than tension as our first
concept? There is no reason why w e should not find a definition of
conflict-‘opposition between groups and individuals for the possession of goods which are in short supply or the attainment of
mutually incompatible values’-which would cover at once conflicts
governed by rules (as in sports and games), anarchical conflicts
(riots and brawls), and civil and international wars. In this case,
the term would cover an enormous sector of inter-individual or
inter-group relations and would leave out only the other half of
communal life, namely phenomena of co-operation. Even so, it
must be added that co-operation between individuals and groups
entails an element of competition, and that this itself enters into
conflicts in the widest sense of the term.
I have no intention of challenging the justification for trying to
define very general terms such as ‘conflict’ and to classify the
phenomena of conflict among other social phenomena, or for
attempting to compare the various forms of conflict and to gain a
better understanding of some through others. But if the object of
the investigation is to gain an understanding of tensions which are
liable to cause wars, the natural method is not to begin with the
psychology of frustration or aggressiveness, or with the sociology of
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conflicts between employers and employed (or between town and
country) as a means of understanding the wars of the twentieth century and removing the factors which caused them. Even studies
which, in themselves, might be instructive-such as those of national stereotypes-are likely to prove misleading when they are
isolated from the historical context. The stereotype of Russia in
American public opinion may, in 1942, have been the result of
events; it may have changed as a consequence of the development
of the situation from 1942 to 1952; and it may at no time have had
any real influence on the decisions of statesmen. O n the other hand,
the stereotype of Germany in the French mind, developed through
longer experience, may in 1939 have been a factor conducive to the
acceptance of war, and in 1954 a factor militating against the
Atlantic policy. Studies on the causative influence of a given set of
circumstances cannot be divorced from an analysis of the various
components of the diplomatic complex.
In other words, if w e wish to discover the tensions which lead to
war we must not assume at the outset that wars begin in the minds of
men or that war is simply a species of tension and conflict; w e must
not analyse the individual influence of a given cause in isolation
(for such analysis is impossible the moment w e cease to take into
account the whole practical situation); w e must begin with the
specific phenomenon of war as w e know it in modern societies, and
as history has illustrated it for us on so many occasions throughout
the centuries.
ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMATIC COMPLEXES
Let us consider the definition of war formulated by Professor
Malinowski,and quoted by Professor Pear: ‘Armed conflict between
two independent political units, by means of organized military
forces, in the pursuit of a tribal or national policy.‘
It would be easy to criticize such a definition by pointing out that
the various features mentioned are not always found together and
that, as a result, the classification of certain cases may be difficult.
A civil war is not conducted by two ‘independent political units’,
yet often involves clashes between two ‘organized military forces’.
Does it come under the heading of war? If we answer in the negative, it may be pointed out that two political units may be independent at the beginning but not at the end of a conflict. The conflict between Prussia and Hanover in Bismarck‘s time was a war
between independent units, but if it had occurred again after the
formation of the German Empire it would have been a civil war.
W a s the invasion of Georgia by the armies of the Soviet Union in
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1921, for the purpose of doing away with the Menshevik rdgime, a
war or a civil war?
Such objections seem to m e to be, at one and the same time,
legitimate and unimportant. In the actual life of societies there are
always doubtful, marginal cases. The definition describes, so to
speak, the ‘perfect’phenomenon. The typical war involves conflicting independent political units; but within empires or federations it
is sometimes difficult to say at once whether units are independent
or not. In the same way, does the concept of ‘organized military
forces’, which is clearly enough defined if w e have in mind the
Wehrmacht or the French Army in 1914 or 1939, apply to the
Forces francaises de l’intkrieur in 1943 or the Viet-Minh People’s
Army in 1944? From the point of view of international law, were
members of the Forces francaises de l’intkieur, or of the Free
French Forces, francs-tireursor not? D o the facts of political life
always coincide with the legal definitions? The sociological concept
of organized forces depends on the facts, not on the definition.
In other words, the marginal cases which may or may not involve
independent political units or organized military forces do not
invalidate the definition quoted, but are simply fresh evidence of
the graduation always found in social phenomena. O n the borderline, civil war and international war merge together, as do the clash
of armies and guerrilla warfare. W e must not overlook this area of
doubt on the borderline-we shall take account of it in the course
of the explanations that follow-but it does not make it impossible
for us to begin by considering the phenomenon in the ‘perfect’state.
War so defined is an integral part of the relations between political units. These units are not, at various times, continually in a
state of war, but those who are responsible for directing the affairs
of states have the possibility of war constantly in their minds.
Diplomacy and warfare are historically inseparable, since statesmen
have always regarded war as the last resort of diplomacy. Starting
from this obvious observation, we can begin to study the system
of relations between States. Understanding of this system may not
enable us to determine the reasons why diplomacy is accompanied
by war and what changes would have to be made to see that
diplomacy should not imply war, but it will at least help us to
explain the machinery of the diplomatic system and the machinery
of war by reference to one another.
As warfare is the last resort of diplomacy, the statesmen who
take decisions or the sociologists who interpret those decisions must,
when analysing a ’situation, begin by determining three factors:
What is the area of diplomatic relations? What is the disposition
of power within that area? What is the method of warfare which is
more or less clearly in the minds of statesmen when they estimate
the importance of positions or relations? These three factors
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together represent the aspect of international policy which, for certain statesmen, is the only consideration, or rather which is said by
certain political scientists to be the sole consideration of statesmen.
In practice, three other factors come into play, which together
represent the ideological aspect of international relations: T o what
extent do the contending States recognize one another, so that the
issue at stake is the frontiers and not the very existence of the States
themselves? What bearing does domestic policy have on the decisions of statesmen? H o w do statesmen understand peace, war and
inter-Staterelations?
The six questions formulated above can easily be elucidated by
historical examples. The area of diplomatic relations for Talleyrand
or Bismarck, William I1 or DelcassC, scarcely extended beyond the
boundaries of the old world. The European States reached out
across the seas and might take up the Eastern or Far Eastern question, but they hardly expected non-European States to play an
important part in the event of a general conflict in Europe. Japan
and the United States of America had no place in the area of
diplomatic relations in 1913; but they had in 1939 and, still more
clearly, in 1954.
In 1913 the principal powers were associated by alliances which
could be denounced, so as to preserve a sort of balance between
them. Several of them belonged to the same category, so that
alliances were concluded on a relatively equal footing. Today, the
concentration of military power in the hands of two States has
brought into being two camps, each of which has a leader. The
present characteristic of the balance of power is that it is bipolar,
instead of being a balance among several States of the same
category.
The sue of States and the size of the area of diplomatic relations
are obviously influenced by the technique of warfare, which alters
the value of distances and of so-called strategic positions. In this
respect, the factor which is considered to be novel is the danger of
total annihilation that would be involved in an atomic war. The
novelty is not so great as it is said to be, since the wars of the past
(in ancient Greek and R o m a n times, for example) in practice
entailed the danger of total destruction for the vanquished. The
only difference is that the trial might, almost simultaneously, wipe
out both belligerents.
The connexion between these first three considerations is clearthey might be defined as the boundaries, the disposition and the resources of power-and the connexion between the next three is no
less clear. In 1910 the great European powers recognized one
another’s right to existence and, until the first gun was fired, had
no idea of overthrowing any particular form of government, or any
individual government, as being unlawful or as being a danger to
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the European balance or to world peace. The 1914 war gradually
became an ideological Eonilict as the Allies set themselves the object
‘freeing’ the national groups in the Austro-Hungarian Empireand therefore of destroying the dual monarchy-and of instituting
democracy in Germany on the ground that autocracy endangered
peace. There are therefore many varieties of non-recognition:
Prussia did not recognize the sovereignty of Hanover when Bismarck
was striving to build up the German Empire; the Allies ceased to
recognize William I1 when they no longer wished to treat with him;
they ceased to recognize Austria-Hungary when they proclaimed
that an independent Hungary and an independent Czechoslovakia
were ideologically acceptable to them and in line with their war aims;
the Europeans did not recognize the tribes or kingdoms of Africa
when they made them into colonies or protectorates, the West
does not accord legal recognition to the People’s Republics of North
Korea or East Germany; they do not recognize the Communist
regimes in Eastern Europe as legitimate and, if total war were to
break out, they would inevitably be led to make the destruction
of Communism one of their aims, just as the Soviet bloc would
introduce a system of government modelled on its o w n into the
countries that it conquered.
A State may thus be denied recognition in many different circumstances-when the population is considered by the conqueror
to be unworthy of independence; when the conqueror aims at
subjecting the conquered to his dominion; or finally when the
belligerents each think that their respective systems of government
and ideologies are incompatible and, in the name of world peace
or the trend of history, seek to eradicate the enemy’s system of
government and ideology.
Light may be thrown on this question of non-recognition by two
sorts of studies-that of the nature of communities and the influence
of the various forces within each nation on the conduct of diplomacy, and that of the conception held by statesmen of the functions
of foreign policy. The leaders of the Soviet Union might secretly
negotiate the pact with Hitler and secure its acceptance by a docile
public opinion but, in peace-time, the leaders of a parliamentary
democracy could not do so. The leaders of the Soviet Union view
conflicts with other States against the conceptual background of a
particular doctrine, and their conduct is a compromise between the
logic of the system and historical expediency. Talleyrand or Bismarck regarded alliances and breaches, hostilities and negotiations
as the normal course of affairs, and sought to achieve certain objects
by a combination of force and ruse, armed might and negotiation.
Woodrow Wilson was against secret diplomacy and warfare on
principle and thought that lasting peace, and possibly universal
peace, could be achieved by spreading democracy throughout the
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world. The leaders of the Soviet Union probably believe that peace
would be certain if all States were Communist States. There can
scarcely be any doubt that they attribute imperialism to the
inconsistencies of monopolistic capitalism and consider it to be
inevitable at a certain stage of historical development.
If w e wish to conceptualize the facts of international politics by
reference to the situation-decision antithesis, the ‘situation’ will
cover not only the relations of forces within a certain diplomatic
area with reference to a certain technique of warfare, but also the
type of government, the forms of pressure to which the policymakers are subjected, and the opposition or compatibility of the
systems of government and ideologies involved. With regard to the
policy-makers, it would be a mistake to regard their decisions as
representing no more than calculations designed to secure a balance,
or to suppose that such decisions do not change, as between different
systems of government, because national interests remain the same.
The outlook on the world, the system d values, and the strategical
and tactical standards adopted by the ruling groups influence the
conduct of statesmen.
Because of its effect on the psychology of rulers and people, and
because of the inevitable clashes between rCgimes subscribing to
opposing principles, ideology is a factor to be reckoned with in
international relations. It may be desirable, as the ‘realist’ school
asserts, that diplomats should open their eyes to the facts and
accept the enduring rivalry of States as the essence of the international system. In eras when the gods worshipped by the peoples
cannot be set together in the same Pantheon, neither scholars nor
politicians can do away with ideology and revert to the wisdom of
realistic compromise.Ideological situations can no more be moulded
at will than geographical formations or armaments. T o ask the
Soviet leaders to act as if they did not believe in Marxism, or to
ask the Western leaders to regard the present occupants of the
Kremlin simply as the spokesmen of eternal Russia, is to ask the
former to deny their very selves and the latter to shut their eyes to
some of the facts. This does not mean that realistic compromises
between the two parties are impossible; it does mean that neither
party can-and perhaps it is not desirable that either shouldstrive to forget the factors which have brought them into opposition.
THE INTER-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH
The foregoing conceptual framework, which needs further analysis
(under each of the six headings, subsidiary questions should be
formulated to elucidate the various types of situations), is designed
solely to give shape to the studies which are already being carried
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out, not so much by sociologists as by historians or political
scientists. Some people refuse to see the connexion between this
analysis of historical complexes and the psychological, psychoanalytical and sociological studies of tensions. It is m y purpose,
however, to show that no psychological, psycho-analytical or sociological study of international conflicts can produce really informative
results until the examples considered are viewed against the background of a real political complex.
Take,for example, the attempts made to explain the foreign policy
of a country by cultural anthropology’s method of global community
analysis. In an extreme, caricatured form, such attempts would lead
to explaining the Russian attitude by the effects of a certain way
of swaddling infants. Diplomatic aggressiveness, without military
aggression, would be regarded as a consequence of the Russian
mentality. This example, which is a rough-and-ready summary of
a method of study which is rough-and-ready in itself, does not mean
that the whole school must be condemned; that school is liable to
base its work on false premises, even when it is cautious enough
to make the error less immediately apparent.
The investigation of the cultural basis of a certain foreign policy
in a given community comes under our headings five and six. The
policy-makers do their thinking with reference to a certain system
of values, a conception of their community and of the world which
reflects the special individuality of the nation. It is perfectly legitimate-indeed it is necessary-to determine. in each set of circumstances and in each country, the ideological system to which
the policy-makers subscribe and the influences, in the form of
tradition and public opinion, to which they are subjected. But just
as the exponents of the balance of power theory distort the facts of
international politics when they regard all Heads of States as Talleyrands or Bismarcks, calculating the balance of strength anew
each day, so the cultural anthropologist who proceeds more or less
directly from the culture pattern and the psycho-analytical interpretation of that pattern to the conduct of diplomacy falls into
error. Historical comparisons may enable us to discover certain
features common to the foreign policy of a certain country at
various periods, provided that the country in qQestion preserves its
own particular characteristics; such common features are probably
matters of general approach and attitude and do not really determine
the content of decisions, which latter are always, at least partially,
dictated by the balance of power.
Let us take one of the most cogent illustrations of the value of
cultural anthropology’s contribution to the understanding of international politics-studies on Japan. All observers have been struck
by the sudden, overnight, volte-face in Japan after the Emperor’s
decision to agree to unconditional surrender. The people who were
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fanatically committed to the war, who had borne the most terrible
bombardment with a sort of heroic resignation, and who had displayed the most violent xenophobia, welcomed the fair giants from
the sea with bows and smiles. It would be improper to regard this
as an extreme form of opportunism, a going-over to the winning
side, or an abjuration. Even the most superficial, even the least
cultivated of observers felt that the Japanese people were conforming
to the same standards, were espousing the same values, alike in
their warlike fanaticism and in their reception of the undesired
guests; that obedience to the Emperor was the justification for and
the inspiration of the two apparently conflicting lines of conduct.
Absolute pacificism might tomorrow reflect the same community of
culture as the belligerency of today: if Japan is not to be foremost
among the military nations, let it become the leader of the movement
towards a peaceful civilization.
The cultural pattern of Japan did not necessarily change when her
policy moved from the isolation and segregation typical of the
Tolugawa Shogunate period to the Westernization of the Meiji era.
The latter trend was introduced by a group of m e n who subscribed
to the same values ana acted in accordance with the same rules as
the other members of the noble class; but, faced with the threat of
Western domination, they realized that Japan could preserve her
independence only by learning from the barbarians the secret of
their power. The decision to follow Western lines cannot be fully
explained if w e leave out of account the country’s social structure
and the modes of thought common among the ordinary people and
the governing class. In essentials, however, this decision was of the
type which M a x Weber describes as zweckrational: given the situation, and admitting the object in view (the preservation of national
independence), the decision taken was logical.
The subsequent period of Japanese imperialism which began in
1895 indubitably requires a global interpretation in the light of
the structure of Japanese society, its ways of thought, and the
attitudes of the common people and the governing class. But cultural
anthropology’s interpretation is at least as liable to be wrong as
that of any other branch of study.H o w did the Japanese regard their
conquests? Were they anxious to show their superiority or to secure
for themselves sources of food supplies and markets for their
industrial products? W a s the main cause the growth of the population, or the desire to become a first-class power? I have no intention
of answering these questions here; but I simply wish to show that,
immediately w e come to questions of causality, w e must inevitably
consider the partial investigation (referring to one or other of our
six categories) against the whole background of the situation.
Statesmen trained up under another system would possibly not
have taken advantage of the circumstances-confusion in China,
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the temporary weakness of the Soviet Union, the low level of
armaments in the United States of America, and the decline of
Great Britain-in the way the Japanese leaders did in the period
between the two wars. But it would be a mistake to overlook the
fact that, if the circumstances had been different, the same attitude
on the part of statesmen would have led to quite different action.
The various groups making up the governing class were doubtful
about the best way of exploiting the circumstances. The plans of
the army, the navy and industry, of the officers drawn from the old
governing class, of the officers drawn from the peasant classes, etc.
were inspired or coloured by the collective interests, real or supposed, of their respective groups; but all those plans also represented
arbitrary judgements on the chances and dangers of a particular
undertaking. A whole series of intermediate factors and ancillary
causes have to be taken into account between the cultural individuality of Japan and the actual policy followed.
These comments are so obvious that they would hardly be worth
making, were it not that the partitioning of studies and the absence
of a theory of international politics cause certain specialists to overlook them.
Obvious and commonplace as they are, these remarks open the
way to two more general conclusions. All psychological, psychoanalytical and anthropological studies on the foreign-policydetermining factors rooted in communities themselves are, at least
in complex civilizations and in modern times, complementary to
political study proper. W h e n divorced from the latter, they cannot
provide material for any statement of cause and effect. In a certain
sense, this assertion simply represents the application, to a concrete
case, of M a x Weber’s idea that the historian begins by applying the
zweckrational scheme and introduces other factors to account for
the ends selected and for any deviations in the methods employed.
T o begin with, a certain policy is considered against the background
of the whole complex of forces, and the methods, the objects and
indeed the instruments of that policy are explained by reference to
internal factors and to the general situation. Any study confined to
one or other type of explanation is incomplete, but limitation to
the first type (internal factors) is more dangerous than limitation
to the second.
Explanation by reference to the general situation is superficial
but not essentially false; it in fact links up an historical event with
historical circumstances. Explanation by internal factors, on the
other hand, is often liable to lead to the explanation of an event at a
certain date by circumstances, also drawn from history, which were
in existence before the phenomenon to be explained and which
continued after it. The cultural pattern is more enduring than an
aggressive or pacific, imperialistic or defensive, foreign policy.
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Moreover, if w e confine ourselves to psychological or psychoanalytical studies, w e risk taking something which is simply an
effect to be a cause. In order to discover whether national stereotypes
are influential in determining the decisions of policy-makers or
merely reflect those decisions after the lapse of a few months or
years, it would be necessary to follow out the changes in such
stereotypes as events, propaganda and diplomatic circumstances
develop.
In the same way, it is extremely difficult for the psychologist to
determine whether and to what extent the expectation of war is
a factor liable to cause war. It is not impossible to investigate this
question in a given case. It can be shown with some plausibility that,
in a given country at a certain time, the conviction that war was
inevitable has helped to bring it about (by inducing those responsible
for affairs to take certain decisions). The expectation of war, however, was also brought into being by real and not imaginary facts.
If w e c o n h e ourselves to the psychological approach, how can w e
avoid confusing cause and effect, taking the expectation of war for
the cause when that expectation simply ensues from the existence of
insoluble conflicts between States and from a well-founded feeling
that the nations, or those who govern them, are preparing to settle
these conflicts by a resort to arms? There is no evidence, incidentally, that ‘expectation of war’, as a secondary cause, may not have
been of only slight importance in certain circumstances (e.g.
before 1939), though of considerable importance in 1910-14.
From 1936-37 onwards, any intelligent observer could see that,
for a number of objectively observable causes, a European war was
likely in the coming years; events confirmed that expectation, and
anyone who had attempted to safeguard peace by removing the
expectation of war would have laboured in vain, for he would have
done nothing to change either Hitler or the reactions of the French,
the British and the Russians to Hitler’s proceedings.
This second example brings us on to the second sort of conclusion
which may be drawn from such analysis: any steps recommended for
‘improving international understanding’ which are based on an
abstract study of one of the many factors involved are liable, in a
real historical situation, to produce results the opposite of those
desired.
Let us suppose that the anthropologist regards the strict discipline
of the drives inseparable from the Japanese culture-pattern as the
source of the nations aggressiveness or of the sudden outbursts of
violence on the part of individual Japanese. Let us suppose that
the high regard accorded to obedience, and the cult of heroic values,
are taken to be one of the causes of militarism and that this in
its turn is held to be one of the main causes of the imperialism which
led to the war against China in 1895, to Pearl Harbour, and to
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the surrender. The occupying Americans will seek to change the
cultural pattern, to ‘emancipate’women, to reduce the constraints
on spontaneous individual development, to do away with the ‘divine’
character of the Emperor, to challenge heroic values, etc. Japan,
having been more or less Americanized, will be appreciably less
‘military’or ‘militaristic’if the process of Americanization has been
effective. Japan might not have provoked the 1939 war if it had
previously undergone that same process (it is difficult to be sure that
the situation would not have encouraged beveq a less militaristic
people to aggression: the situation was enough, in 1940,to produce
aggression on the part of the Italian people, who were very far
from militaristic in spite of their form of government). But a people
may be instrumental in causing a particular war by weakness as
well as by strength, by passivity as well as by inordinate violence.
So long as statesmen think in terms of power relations, a power
vacuum is as dangerous to peace as overwhelming power. If Japan or
Germany, having been ‘democratized’,were to continue to assert
that they would not defend themselves by armed force, would such
absolute pacifism be conducive to peace or to war? The least that
can be said is that the reply, either way, would be open to dispute
among scientists.
W e may accept as an hypothesis that the anthropologist is capable
of drawing attention to those changes in the psychological and
social structure of the community which would render it less hostile
to the outside world, more ready for conciliation, and less convinced
of the superiority of the military virtues over the civic virtues.
Obviously the anthropologist cannot foresee the historical consequences of such a conversion: since the militarism of yesterday’s
aggressor was dangerous only in the context of a given past situation,
the ‘civilization’ of that aggressor may, in the circumstances of
tomorrow, be either a good thing or a bad thing. Generally speaking, such conversions are more likely than not to be inopportune.
Efforts are made to convert the vanquished when he is already at
least temporarily harmless because of his defeat, while what is
necessary is to ‘convert’ one or other of the victors. It is easier
to take effective steps against the war of yesterday than against
that of tom0rrow.l
The same idea might again be expressed as follows: in the course
of history there have been few great powers who have been able
or willing to call a halt. The attitudes of the peoples, the passions
of the masses, the political system, and population pressure have
exerted their influence on the conduct of foreign affairs. The
I. Needless to say, this observation also is not of general apphcation. There are plenty of
examples of ‘militaristic’countries which, having once failed. have, after a short interval,
emberked anew on a course of aggression.
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phenomena of international relations are global phenomena reflecting both the body and the soul, the material equipment and the
values of the community. But, at least in modern times,l the disposition of forces aspect is so obviously a sigmficant factor in international politics that any attempt to influence intra-community
factors without reference to the whole diplomatic complex would be
bound to produce unforeseeable consequences.
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY
Political scientists have a tendency to simplify in two respects, both
of which are dangerous. The first simplification is that of the
historical school, which would end by describing the vicissitudes of
international relations without explaining them; while the second is
that of the ‘realist’school, which tends to hypostasize the States and
their so-called national interests, to attribute to those interests a
sort of patency or permanence, and to regard events as reflecting
nothing but the calculation of power and the compromise necessary
to achieve a balance.
The mere story of events teaches us nothing unless it is given
form and meaning by reference to concepts; unless it entails an
effort to distinguish the essential from the subsidiary, and deep-lying
trends from accidents; and unless it seeks to compare the means,
differing from age to age, by which international relations and wars
are conducted. The realistic simplification is liable to distort the real
psychology of the rulers, and to lead to neglect of certain factors
which are sometimes of decisive importance, such as the influence
of systems of government and ideologies on the conduct of diplomatic affairs and the character of conflicts or wars. The function
of the system of headings I have sketched in above is to rule out
such simplifications and to substitute for them the various forms
of study which are actually being conducted or which are possible.
Sociology, psychology, anthropology and psycho-analysis do not
take the place of political science; they make it possible to fill in the
skeleton outline drawn, but left partially blank, by the latter.
Let us for example consider the fifth and sixth headings-the
influence of domestic policy on the foreign policy of States, and
the view that the rulers take of foreign policy. All branches of
social study can play their part in clarifying these questions. If, for
instance, we were seeking to clarify the present situation,w e should
begin by investigating the question of how decisions concerning
I. In one sense, this aspect was more obvious in the past, as the whole community stood in
danger of extermination in the event of defeat; but there were no complex calculations of
relative strengths or of balance involved-only an elementary struggle for life.
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foreign policy are taken in a particular country and under a particular system of government (e.g. in the United States of America).
Naturally w e should not confine ourselves to elucidating the constitutional rules, but should seek to understand the real office and
the real infiuence of the President, his advisers,the National Security
Council, the armed forces, the press, public opinion-or at least
what goes by that name-and so on. This type of study is within
the sphere of poIitical science (or political sociology, for the name
matters little); it is obviously easier to carry out in a democratic
country than in authoritarian or totalitarian countries (it was only
afterwards that w e learnt how decisions were taken in the Third
Reich). The information it furnishes gives us only part of the
picture and may not remain true indefinitely. The part played by
the President in the United States of America changes with the
individuals who hold that office. The more concrete and the more
detailed the study, the more likelihood there is of arriving at the
truth,but the truth arrived at may be made up of so many unrelated
particles as to be useless for practical purposes.
W h e n w e consider the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, two
types of investigation come to mind. An attempt might be made to
analyse the process by which decisions are reached, the relations
between the various authorities (What influence, if any, is exercised
by the military? What individual influence is exercised by a particular member of the Politburo or the Praesidium?). This type of
analysis, as applied to contemporary phenomena in the Soviet
Union, is more or less useless because w e have so little information
to go on. On the other hand, w e can make an analysis of the system
of thought and action characteristic of the Communists since 1917.
W e can discover this system by studying the writings of Communists
and their conduct and, as a result of this analysis, w e can predict
with a reasonable probability of accuracy how the leaders of the
Soviet Union will act in given circumstances (specialists explained
in advance, for instance, why the leaders of the Soviet Union would
immediately reject the Marshall Plan offer, why they would not
attempt an invasion of Western Europe at a time when that part
of the continent was completely disarmed, etc.). As prediction has
always been regarded as one of the tests of success in science, the
studies which make such prediction possible must be admitted to
have some scientific value.
Could similar studies be undertaken on other countries? The
results would doubtless not be exactly similar, because American
statesmen do not follow so rigid a doctrine as Soviet statesmen.
There is no common doctrine to which the whole American political
class subscribes;there are schools with different ideas about the part
to be played by the United States (in the Soviet Union, the most
that can be said is that there are ‘trends’within the Bolshevik party,
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but these trends are always subordinate to the same body of doctrine). The result is that the world is uncertain about the main lines
of the United States’ foreign policy. In 1914 the Americans were
scarcely expected to intervene in 1917;in 1939, the Germans feared
they might intervene, the French and the British hoped that they
would, but neither side was sure. A less important decision, such
as the American intervention in Korea, was probably a surprise to
the members of governments most directly concerned.
The degree of predictability in a country’s foreign policy is a
matter of fact which can be objectively observed. This fact, in its
turn, requires explanation. Investigations may follow two different
lines: Is the fact attributable to the special characteristics of the
nation or to its system of government? T o what extent is it attributable to the nation and to what extent to democracy? It is impossible
to answer these questions without having recourse to the most
distinctive method of historical sociology-comparative study. A
comparison may be made of the way in which foreign policy is
determined in the United States of America or Great Britain, of the
differing parts played by Congress and Parliament, and of the influence of the press. In the same way, w e may show-or at least attempt to show-the specialconditions imposed in the conduct of foreign
policy by a democratic form of government (the poli‘cy-makers
probably have less tactical freedom). Lastly, an investigation may
be made, on the basis of past history, into the conceptions of
national interest of which w e hear so much. Is it true that national
interest is always the same, however the form of government may
change? T o what extent is Soviet diplomacy, in the long run, similar
to that conducted by Czarist Russia or to that which would have
been conducted by a democratic Russia? The method of historical
comparison can and must be used to test the correctness of the
theories advanced to explain phenomena by reference to geography,
population or economics.
There are diplomatic traditions in all countries, allegedly based
upon the lessons of history. O n analysis, these lessons turn out to
represent no more than the relative permanence, or the repetition,
of certain typical groupings of powers. O n the assumption that w e
have a diplomatic field of given scope and that the same States
remain in this field, certain situations are obviously bound to recur.
France will seek the support of the power situated to the east of
the neighbouring, rival power and so the tradition of the pincer
alliance grows up. In a balance of power policy, this tradition is
good only if several conditions are fulfilled. The diplomatic field
must not be altered (when Europe becomes part of a world-wide
field, the constants of yesterday cease to be applicable); the strength
of the principal parties must remain approximately the same (if the
eastern country becomes as strong, by itself, as all the others
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together, the pincer alliance is undesirable for the very reasons
which previously commended it. Rules of caution based on experience are often dangerous,because they are formulated without any
exact definition of the conditions in which they are applicable.
The same criticism applies to allegedly scientific general propositions. Most general statements about the factors determining foreign
policy are mistaken for two reasons: they tend to establish ‘causes’
where, at most, there are trends, and they do not take account
of all the factors involved but exaggerate the influence of those that
are considered.
Let us take,for example,the geographical determinants of foreign
policy. The usual clichCs about the ‘need for an outlet to the open
seas’ or the ‘mastery of the seas and the balance in Europe in
relation to an insular position’ sum up certain contingent factors.
The importance that the Russian leaders attribute to free access to
the sea depends on strategic considerations which alter with changes
in the methods of warfare, and on the importance accorded to the
problems of war as compared with those of peace. Czarist Russia
was much more concerned about Constantinople and the Dardanelles than Soviet Russia (the former secured undertakings in 1915,
the latter asked for no such undertakings during the hostilities
of 1941-45).
There would be no difficulty in showing that the fact of being
an island presents a country with various possibilities,among which
the peoples make different choices for a variety of reasons; they
may isolate themselves in their island and take no interest in the
rest of the world;they may achieve supremacy by leaving the peoples
of the continent to fight among themselves or to preserve a balance;
they may seek to conquer positions on the continent, or they may
embark on conquests beyond the seas; each of these four attitudes,
in turn, has been adopted by Japan and Great Britain. The first
was the attitude adopted by Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate
(there is no equivalent in British history since the formation of the
United Kingdom): the second has been the attitude of Great Britain
during modern times (the position in Asia made it impossible for
Japan); the third was the attitude of England at the time of the
Hundred Years W a r and of Japan after 1931;and the last,combined
with the second,has been the attitude of Great Britain in modern
times, and, combined with the third, that of Japan in the twentieth
century.
In more abstract terms, it may be said that geographical factors
explain certain relatively enduring features of each country’ssituation
in the diplomatic field and, consequently, in the pattern of power
relations and military might. The development of military technique
brings about changes in this situation: by 1954, Great Britain was
closer to the Continent than it had ever been before. Moreover,
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the geographical position indirectly influences a country’s foreign
policy to the extent that it is instrumental in determining ways of
thought and political systems.The institutions of the Russian State,
and the Russian mentality (whatever that term may mean exactly),
are partly attributable to the influence of the enormous tract of
country, without definite boundaries or visible lines of demarcation,
which has gradually been conquered and organized by the Russian
people. The influence of geographical circumstances also comes
under our fifth heading.
Similary,when we seek to determine the influence of the ‘economic factor’,we shall find that it comes under our first set of headings, as one of the causes of change in the technique of warfare,
the relative strength of the parties (since economic progress or
decline entails an increase or a decrease in the strength of the
nations), or change in the area of diplomatic relations, whose
possible size is partly determined by the availablemeans of transport.
From another point of view, efforts can and should be made to
discover how far the economic system and, more precisely, those
in charge of the economy, influence the conduct of diplomacy.
General propositions must therefore, at all events, be checked
against experience.
The method of historical comparison is simple enough in theory
but complicated in practice. In theory, it is a question of drawing
attention to both similarities and differences between two given
situations;this calls for a conceptual system by which to recognize
the principal determinants.A strict comparison between the conduct
of foreign policy in Great Britain and the United States of America,
for example,presupposes a knowledge of the main factors exerting
an influence in both countries. But such a knowledge must be based
on study of the facts quite as much as on theory.W e must therefore
turn constantly from study of the facts to structural analysis or
investigation of the principal determinants,and vice versa.
No comparison can cover the whole field: in other words, we
always seek to determine the consequences of a particular phenomenon, such as the existence of a certain pattern in the relative
strengths of countries. What are the effectsof a bipolar structure?
To what extent do we find the same developments in the Peloponnesian War and in the present conflict between the Soviet bloc
and the free world? Or again,to what extent do we find similarities
between periods in which the wars between States have been of
a religious or ideological character?
The danger of such comparisons-and, still more, of the conclusions that we may claim to draw from them-is that the similarities are found only in certain features and the differences are so
considerablethat we cannot hope for more than a moderate prospect
of being right in our forecasts or in the advice we give. There are
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cases in which two great coalitions have engaged in a war to the
death, and others in which they have resigned themselves to coexistence on a more or less warlike footing. There have been
centuries in which wars of religion have ended in compromise
peaces, obliging men holding apparently incompatible convictions
or fanatical beliefs to tolerate one another within the boundaries
of the States, and at the same time defining the regions or nations
in which one or other doctrine has triumphed. Analogies are ready
to hand, but the question is whether the differences do not reduce
the value of the analogies.
Apart from the reservations inseparable from the fact that comparisons are incomplete, there is another difficulty connected with
the determination of the best level at which to conduct research.
Let us suppose that we wish to discover the influence exercised
by population pressure on the foreign policy of States. Historians
are prone to say that Japanese imperialism was, if not caused,
at least aggravated by the small space available and the growth of
the population-an opinion which at first sight appears reasonable.
But India is today suffering quite as much from over-population
without displaying the slightest inclination for aggression or the
least belligerency. This does not mean that it is false to say that
there is a annexion between population stresses and aggressiveness
(or warlike tendencies). The contrast between Japan and India
suggests that we should investigate the circumstances in which the
growth of the population, or the increase in the number of young
men, helps to increase the aggressiveness of nations.
In 1931 unemployment led Germany to rearm but did not have
the same effect in the United States of America where, at the same
date, there were millions of unemployed workers. Japan seems to
have been incited by the rapid growth of its population to seek
markets or sources of supply beyond its borders, while India is not
embarking on the same course. There are too many differences
between India and Japan for us to be able to state precisely what
has, in one case,caused bellicosity,and,in the other,pacifism. The
first stage in the investigation must be to consider the differing
conduct of the leaders: during this century, the Japanese leaders
have encouraged the increase of the population, while the Indian
leaders are seeking to spread birth control.The former were thinking
in terms of numbers and power, the latter are primarily concerned
-or claim to be primarily concerned-with the living conditions of
the common people.Neither unemployment nor over-populationleads
directly to a policy of aggression; the essential intermediate term is
a certain way of thinking or acting in the governing class.
It this way of thinking in the small governing group itself an
almost inevitable consequence of psycho-socialphenomena attributable to over-population?I cannot give a dogmatic answer: in certain
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cases there are no signs of the sort of effervescence which seems
to seize hold on the governing class, but a general review of the
past would be necessary to confirm or refute the reality of the
effects of over-population.Such a review should perhaps give a
‘bird’s-eyepicture’ of the whole of a certain period. If too much
attention is devoted to the detail of events, it is obvious that the
effects of a continuing cause will escape the observer. Population
phenomena are among those which generally escape the historian’s
grasp because they are not apparent to anyone who is following
men’s acts and deeds from day to day. Overall comparisons between
periods are possibly necessary to bring out the part played by such
continuing factors.
What is the logical way to approach the problem of causality?
In the first place, it seems to me, we may look for the immediate
or sufficient cause of a particular war in population phenomena.
In most cases, the demographic cause, assuming that there is such
a cause, is not the only one, but is reinforced or weakened by the
psychology of the leaders and the people,as expressed in a particular
manner in a given historical situation. The wars which seem to be
directly due to demographic factors are the variety in which colonies
are founded by men who no longer have the necessary resources for
life in their country of origin.
Secondly,we may compare the foreign policy of a nation at times
when its population has been very large in relation to its resources
with the foreign policy of that same nation at times when it is less
so. This type of comparison will give us results which may be
somewhat doubtful for, on the assumption that over-populated
countries pursue more aggressive policies than under-populated
countries-which seems often to be the case-the state of affairs
can be explained quite as well by reference to the general situation
and calculations regarding the balance of power as by reference
to the demographic position.
Again, we may consider a particular period of history as a whole
-a given century in a given civilization-and gauge the frequency
of wars and the mode of international relations by reference to
population pressure. It is possible-indeed probable according to
certain studies, though the truth of the conclusions drawn is not
yet proved-that wars are more frequent in periods of overpopulation and less frequent in periods of relative depopulation but,
in this case, it would seem that wars in the strict sense should be
considered in conjunction with civil wars and manifestations of
violence. It would appear that manifestations of violence increase
in periods of over-population,and the increased frequency of war
often coincides with increased frequency of civil conflict. If this
is so,however, the periods when there have been great wars might
coincide with periods of domestic upheaval,either moral or political.
I96
Such upheavals are sometimes,but not inevitably, a consequence of
over-population. Over-population would therefore be one of the
possible causes, but not the only possible cause, of a ‘high incidence
of war’.
Finally, w e may wonder whether the removal of over-population
may not be an essential (but not sufficient) condition for peace in
international relations. So long as there is over-population in any
part of the world, will not war have a function to fulfil, and will
it not be found in the guise of civil war if international war becomes
impossible through the establishment of a world State?
These, in summary outline, are the questions that history may
be asked to answer about a cause such as the demographic cause.
Beyond a doubt, it would be a good thing if w e could avoid these
manifold investigations and comparisons and bring to light relationships which would represent something more than mere trends.
This complexity in investigation and uncertainty in results could be
overcome only if there were enormous and comparatively independent units, in whose evolution w e could find evidence of
regularity in the repetition of phenomena at comparable periods of
development. In other words, if there were entities, known as
civilizations or cultures, which could be compared and which would
display typical stages of development, comparison would be made
simpler and would be more exact. As Spengler would say, civilization would be compared with civilization, the R o m e of the
Caesars with the Western world of the twentieth century, or the
period of upheaval in ancient times with our own.
But are Toynbee’s 23 civilizations intellectual concepts or real
things? H o w far are they intellectual concepts and how far realities?
It has not yet been proved that these comprehensive units are
realities and, for the time being, political science cannot decree that
there is one level, and one only, on which comparisons can be made.
TENSIONS, CONFLICTS, VIOLENCE, W A R
The fundamental propositions that I have sought to suggest in the
preceeding pages might be formulated in the following terms. The
approach to the scientific study of wars must be by way of the study
of foreign policy or, if it is preferred, the study of relations between
tribal or national units. Judging by history, these relations have
always (or, at least, in the vast majority of cases) been marked by
the possibility of war. In the higher civilizations, the conduct of
diplomacy has always implied the possibility of recourse to war as
a normal and legitimate means of settling conflicts.
The study of a particular war necessitates analysis of all the
different features of diplomatic complexes. B y means of sociology,
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w e may draw up the list of questions to be answered by analysis of
the diplomatic complex. I have drawn up a first list of such questions, but each one of them would have to be subdivided into subsidiary questions (e.g. the question concerning the technique of
warfare would entail consideration of weapons, military systems,
the theory of warfare, etc.).
The combined application, to a given complex, of the investigations conducted in the various branches of study at least has the
advantage of avoiding the simplification and distortion to which
specialists are often inclined. This combined application also results
in two sorts of explanation: explanation by the psychological or
social mechanisms to which the whole phenomenon is attributable,
and explanation by the causes discovered by comparing different
situations in history. Historical comparison is the main method
which has been used in the attempt to discover, not the circumstances which have been conducive to the outbreak of one
particular war, but the circumstances to which the frequency,
duration and extent of wars are attributable, the circumstances
which incline a particular nation to a given policy, and, it may be,
the circumstances which render resort to war inevitable in international relations.
Is there no connexion between this approach and that whose
starting-point is the concept of tension or the concept of conflict?
In the foregoing pages, I have mentioned that the sociological
study of wars seeks to establish whether, and to what extent, the
tensions within the political units involved in a conflict are responsible for a certain form of conduct (namely, an imperialistic
conduct) of diplomacy. In this sense, the study of tensions converges
with the historical sociological study of war, but it represents only
a limited sector of that study.
The relation between the general theory of conflict and the study
of wars from the standpoint of historical sociology is more interesting. There can be no doubt that, if conflict is defined as ‘the struggle
between two social groups for the possession of certain goods in
short supply or the attainment of mutually incompatible values’,
war is a species of conflict, a species distinguished by several
characteristic features: the groups engaged in the conflict are independent units, the means used are regular armies, and the object
may be the outright destruction of the adversary. But how does an
analysis of wars based on the concept of conflict assist us?
It is conceivable that the theory of conflict should lead to a theory
of strategy or of ‘agonistic conduct’. The theory of games, which
has enormous ramifications and gives both sociologists and philosophers much matter for thought, will probably permit of the
reform, or the enrichment, of strategy. The rational reconstruction
of man’s conduct of games-or the theory of games-provides new
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patterns which are closer to actual life and more helpful than the
pztterns of economic theory. But it is doubtful whether conflicts
between nations can, for the time being, be treated mathematically.
There are no rules of the game which are certain to be observed
when two political units are at loggerheads. The stake is not clearly
defined, since it is seldom known exactly what the stake is.
Civilizations,which have never been able to eliminate the violence
of war, have done something to reduce its dangers when they have
established in advance, in comparatively precise terms, what the
stake of a conflict is. The rational calculation of chances, the choice
between a fight to the death and a compromise, entail the victor’s
renunciation of the ultimate possibilities opened up by victorya renunciation which, in turn, entails the acceptance by the
vanquished of certain consequences of defeat before he has exhausted all the opportunities inherent in the continuation of the
struggle.
Warfare between political units comes midway between a game
and total violence, sometimes being closer to a regular institution,
and sometimes to a primal convulsion. In the higher civilizations,
the pendulum can be seen to swing now towards the regulation and
limitation of warfare, now towards the unbridled release of violence.
This release, incidentally, does not necessarily represent a return
to primitive barbarism. In this sense, the so-called primitive tribes
are seldom barbaric and the bitterest conflicts are sometimes those
in which the stake is noblest, since what is at issue is not food or
economic advantage but power and ideas. W h e n Athens and Sparta
were struggling for hegemony, the war dragged on inordinately, and
any means were used.
The definition of war as a form of conflict should not obscure its
special features, but, on the contrary, should bring them out more
clearly. W a r is a conflict which is settled by force and which is
always liable to sweep away the rules (based on law or agreement)
by which it is governed. At certain periods, each belligerent knows
more or less what means his adversary proposes to employ and
what will be the consequences of defeat. But the customs or laws of
war rest on an uncertain and precarious foundation, and the efficacy
of a new process may shatter traditions. Sometimes the discovery
of a new weapon, and sometimes the magnitude of the stake, incites
belligerents to overstep the boundaries or violate the ‘laws’.War
is never entirely a social violence, but neither can it ever be regarded
as permanently subject to the ‘rule of law’.
It might be said that the conflicts which involve resort to violence
within a community do not differ from armed conflicts between
political units. This objection would be true in the sense that, in
retrospect, in relation to an enlarged unit, a foreign war becomes
a civil war, just as, in the case of the break-up of a larger corn-
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munity, a rebellion or a civil war gradually becomes a war between
States. Wars do not only set duly constituted States in opposition
to one another, but mark stages in the process by which States are
formed or broken.
Nevertheless, it is a feature of the conflicts covered by the heading of war that they are essentially divorced from social integration,
in so far as the opposing parties are communities which desire to
be sovereign (or, in other words, to decide for themselves what they
want and what they do) and which propose to resolve their conflict
by resort to force. Conflicts within a community are governed by
law or custom; the use of physical violence is prohibited, or permitted only to the State, in order to prevent individuals or groups
from resorting to violence themselves. Even if-in strikes, for
example-violence nevertheless breaks out, or even if public
opinion regards a certain use of violence as natural or permissible,
it is still narrowly limited. If violence goes beyond the limits set, the
community breaks up.
O n the other hand, the extension of violence in the relations
between communities, far from shattering those communities, often
tends to strengthen them. In the least complex societies, departure
for a war is sometimes accompanied by a sort of mass exaltation
comparable to that found in religious ceremonies; the tribe realizes
its unity and sweeps away divisions and distinctions to set itself, as
one man, against the enemy tribe. Even in complex and allegedly
peaceful societies, such as European society in the early twentieth
century, such phenomena are not unknown. Witnesses still remember the unanimity of France (or Germany) in August 1914.
War, as a conflict, is therefore not distinguished only by involving
the use of organized violence; war is a form of violence which
forges, as well as destroys, social ties. It strengthens the cohesion
of the societies in conflict, at least so long as violence does not go
beyond a certain point, so long as the structure or very existence
of the communities is not at stake in the war. In 1914, there was
the maximum degree of cohesion; in 1917, in all the belligerent
countries, the forces of disruption were becoming the stronger.
Imperialistic wars pave the way for new units; national wars keep
existing units in being, or lay the foundations for the recognition of
nations which are not yet independent.
This connexion between warfare and organized violence, on the
one hand and the creation, strengthening or dissolution of political
units, on the other, shows us once more why historical sociology
is more useful and more instructive, as applied to the study of
war, than any form of abstract sociology. The social function of
wars can be revealed only by an historical study. The continuance
of war is usually explained by the fact that political units are still
in a ‘stage of nature’. Until recently, international law never ruled
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out war. War was not, in itself, contrary to international order;
recourse to war was one of the prerogatives of sovereignty. Those
who dreamed of abolishing war advocated either international
legislation to outlaw war or the establishment of a supranational
State which would deprive national sovereignties of the prerogative
of opting for peace or war. The first proposal, however, came up
against the fact that legislation (or so-called legislation) which
cannot be enforced is ineffectual,while the second encountered the
difficultyof establishing a sovereign world power capable of keeping sovereign national or imperial powers in check.W e must assume
either that men, for fear of war,are prepared to recognize a world
sovereignty with which they would have scarcely any contact, or
that adequate forces should impose this world sovereignty. (Could
such a universal empire come into being, however, by any means
other than organized violence, and would it not be liable to break
up under the strain of disruptive forces?)
In other words, if we take as our starting-point a very general
concept, such as conflict,we come back to the method of approach
suggested in the preceding pages. The rationalization of agonistic
conduct may perhaps lead to new developments in thought and
strategic theory, but the definition of the conflicts known as wars
immediately brings us back to the relations between sovereign States,
to the formation and dissolution of polltical units-in fact, to those
phenomena whose mechanisms can and should be analysed by
sociology but which the latter must first observe in the forms in
which history presents them, and compare, as between different
periods or different civilizations,in order to determine the different
types and possibly, in the end, to trace out common features and
underlying causes.
PEACE AND WAR
The so-called‘tensionsproject’was inspired by the desire to help in
abating conflicts liable to provoke wars. So far, the studies undertaken have not led to the development of a method of ‘treating’war
which can be said to be founded on science.The statement on wars,
signed by a group of social scientists and published in a work
brought out by Unesco, is ambiguous and the comments annexed
to it are contradictory;the reasons for doubt are easy enough to
understand.
As all the civilizations known to us have had wars,the latter seem
to be connected with certain characteristics, not necessarily of
human nature as investigated by the psychologist, but of the nature
of communities. Every specialist, after concentrating on particular
aspects of the historical sequence leading up to a given war or to
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frequent wars, is naturally inclined to think that removal of the
factor whose influence he has been studying would result in the
prevention of war. But the fact that-the sociologists have not yet
made an exhaustive list of such factors, and still more that sociology
has not arrived at a unanimously accepted theory of civilization
without war, means that any advice given can be based, at best,
only on probabilities,and must generally be ambiguous and doubtful.
Here again, historical sociology seems to m e to offer the only
middle course between moral platitudinizing (‘if only the nations
knew one another better,... if only education were developed and
every people were taught to rid themselves of their prejudices and
to see others as they really are’, ...etc.) and conservative cynicism
(‘there have always been wars, and so what else is to be expected’).
Since the end of the last world war, there have been wars in the
usual sense (between Israel and the Arab countries, and in Korea),
and wars which were semi-civil and semi-international (in China and
Indo-China). There is no reason to ask ourselves whether wars will
occur in future; it is a fact that, at this moment of writing, wars are
in progress. O n the other hand, the idea of ‘cold war’ introduces
an element of confusion because it seems to suggest that the Soviet
Union and the United States of America-or the Soviet camp and
the camp of the so-called democratic or capitalistic nations-are
at war, which is not in fact the case. There is conflict between these
two powers or groups of powers. This conflict is more acute than the
ordinary rivalry of nations in time of peace, and involves the use
of certain methods which at other junctures in the past were used
only in time of war; but it is by no means tantamount to a war
in the traditional sense of the term. Nowhere are the American and
Russian armies actually at strife.
The use of our six main headings would be helpful in an analysis
of the present situation: the area of diplomatic relations covers at
least the Americas, Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa;
there is a bipolar balance; military technique is undergoing rapid
changes, and includes conventional armaments (those used in the
last conflict), weapons of mass destruction and guerrilla warfare; a
large number of peoples are gaining independence and setting up
States which are internationally recognized, but the most powerful
States deny the legitimacy of the ideological foundations of their
respective regimes; the relations between domestic policy and diplomacy vary from country to country, but the two extremes are to
be found in the Soviet Union, where the government has the
maximum influence on public opinion, and in the United States of
America, where the forces which help to shape public opinion are
legion and often at variance; lastly, in both cases, foreign policy
combines the pursuit of power and the espousal of an ideology, but
the general lines of international relations are no easier to under-
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stand, because nationalistic slogans so often accompany imperialistic
expansion, and the desire to spread an ideology is so often inconsistent with the use of the classic methods of diplomacy.
It would be possible to h d precedents in the past for the greater
number of these factors, the most novel of which is probably the
existence of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, when
w e consider all the factors together, the present situation clearly
stands alone. Historical comparisons might well provide suggestions
for dealing with certain of its aspects (When and how have empires
existed side by side? W h e n and in what circumstances have ideological conflicts been smoothed over? etc.), but these suggestions
would always involve the element of uncertainty inseparable from
the fact that the combination of all the series of factors involved
is unique.
The object, by this line of approach, would be not to do away
with all war, but to seek to avoid a particular war which appears
to be a possibility. I do not suggest that historical sociology could
say with certainty what ought to be done in order to ensure that
World W a r I11 does not break out in the next few years or decades.
I simply say that only historical sociology-and not partial analyses
or abstract theories-can state the problem in the form in which
statesmen have to face it. Only a sociologist using the historical
method could become the Adviser of the Prince.
If the Prince or his Adviser cherished loftier ambitions and dreamt
of establishing peace in the world for ever, they would have fist
to diagnose the fundamental causes, bound up with the very
structure of the known civilizations, which have made lasting and
universal peace impossible. I do not believe that this task is
scientifically hopeless, but I a m less confident that, on this point,
science is encouraging. I fear that the conversion which communities
would have to undergo if they were never again to resort to
organized violence is hardly regarded by science as imminent or
indeed, in the long run, as likely.
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C H A P T E R IV
DISCOVERING PATHS TO PEACE
by
ROBERTC. ANGELL
Social scientists,following the line of reasoning of natural scientists,
have generally assumed thet if they discovered the causes of wars,
they would be taking the first step toward their elimination. In the
world of physical objects, if one finds out that the mixture of two
chemicals will always produce an explosion,the simplest course for
avoiding explosions is not to bring the two chemicals together. In
the social world it is not always so easy as this.Often the tendencies
that bring on conflicts and wars are so deep that little can be done
to eliminate them. The sense of nationality, for instance, which
is certainly an important factor in modern wars, cannot soon be
rooted out, and attempts to do so may even strengthen it. The social
engineer is not in the position of the experimental natural scientist
who can introduce or remove his causal factors at will.
Rather than to recommend that influences be subtracted, it is
usually more effective for the socia1 scientist to determine what
new elements, when added, will make a different causal codiguration.This is analogous to the chemist’sintroducing a third ingredient
which neutralizes the explosive tendency of the two original ingredients when mixed. Thus in our large cities it is far easier to
add new opportunities and new forms of group life for potentially
delinquent children than it is to eliminate slums,improve the family
standards among marginal elements of the population, and shut off
the influence of gangs of adult criminals.
This is particularly true when the problem is one of conflict, for
then what is clearly needed is a more inclusive set of relations that
will bring the contending elements into a single social system.
Among nations one may iind all kinds of reasons for frictions and
disagreements-population pressures; competition for natural resources, trade and strategic territory; religious and ideological differences,and the like-but so long as there is no identification with
one another’s interests there is little hope that these factors will be
I. I a m indebted to my colleague, Professor Werner S. Landecker, for his thoughtful criticism
of this manuscript.
204
obviated even if clearly pointed out. The only credible hope is
that the sense of identification across national boundaries can be
made to grow by encouraging appropriate interrelationships. Until
that day, nations will go on feeling that it is worth risking war to
gain advantage in the struggle to realize national interests.
The traditional view of the matter, and the one that appears to be
shared by T. H. Pear and Raymond Aron, is that peace is the
absence of war, that if the causes of war are taken away, what
will be left will be peace. The view here suggested is a more positive
one.It assumes that States which are in interaction will enjoy peace
only if they are parts of a social system that embraces them. The
roots of peace are therefore not mainly in the absence of stimuli to
conflict-for States will always have mutually incompatible interests
-but in the development of a social system that makes possible
the accommodation of those interests.l The Latin word from which
peace ultimately comes means to make an agreement, and, though
this gives rise to too formal a conception,it does suggest the positive
character of peace.
This sociological view of peace needs to be sharply distinguished
from what Jessie Bernard terms in her monograph a sociological
view of conflict. She sees States as involved in a rational struggle
with one another, their policies and their decisions resting on a
reckoning of gain versus cost. Hence she feels that the theory of
games is a promising guide for research.The only hope of avoiding
war is that no situation will arise in which any State will feel
that war is, to use her words, ‘its best bet’. She is assuming that
national social systems will remain of paramount importance. She
does not foresee the possibility that the level of organization in the
world may be raised, so to speak, so that a more inclusive social
system comes to incorporate the national States. Her position is
perhaps a sound one for a theory of conflict. But presumably we
are not interested in a theory of conflict per se. W e are interested in
it mainly to understand how to avoid the most serious type of
conflict-war. The ability to predict the calculated risk which a
particular State will take next does not carry us far toward peace.
It is just to the degree that the present rules of the game are superseded by a different set of rules that we may find peace. The
growth of those rules is the most important thing in the world today.
And sociologists are experts on how new social structure evolves.
As a psychologist, Professor Pear could hardly be expected to
conceptualize the problem in this manner. Since he is forced by the
canons of his discipline to look to persons and changes in persons
1. This view is implicit in most of the discussions reported in The World Community,Quincy
Wright. ed. [7121, in much of the research reviewed by Van Wagenen 17591 and in the
review of action programmes by Snyder.
205
for his generalizations,he would not conceive the principal cause
of conflict and war as the absence of a wider social system.Although
some social psychologists, notably Mead [186] and Cooley [64],
have managed to deal with the problem in terms of the self-an
ever-widening self corresponding to larger and larger social systems
-this line of thought is not included in Professor Pear’s essay.
Preoccupied as he is with tension, conflict, aggression, and war,
he has not been led to develop the social psychology of positive
peace.
Although M.Aron does not find the approach of either Mrs. Bernard or Professor Pear acceptable to him, he is little closer than
they to the position taken here. H e is impressed by the potential
contribution of an historical sociology to the understanding of war.
H e believes that broad generalizations are less rewarding than
careful interpretation of the forces and attitudes being brought to
bear in a particular field of diplomatic action. This view does make
possible,though the author does not bring this out, a consideration
of the existent network of positive relations among States, of the
incipient signs, so to speak,of a larger, still embryonic social system.
But M.Aron is too realistic a political commentator to lay much
stress on what undoubtedly seems to him impotent connective tissue,
not structural beginnings on a new level of organization.
Reluctance to accept the perspectives of m y colleagues does not
imply a belief that the sorts of study which they believe fruitful
will not in fact be so. Quite the contrary. O n any subject so complicated and so fateful as war we need to explore many different
approaches. Certainly the lines of work which they review and
suggest are and will be of great significance. Undoubtedly some of
the causes of war are amenable to efforts directed to their elimination. What is here set forth is not an alternative to their points of
view. The strong appeal for another line of attack is merely an
effortto complement what they have written.
This explicit statement of orientation makes it clear that there will
be no attempt here to summarize the contributions of the other
authors or even to compare the types of research which they have
suggested with that we shall suggest. The writer does not feel
competent to make a general statement on ‘wherethe social sciences
should go from here’with respect to research on war and peace. H e
merely wishes to fit his ideas into the joint mosaic.
What has been largely neglected in the other papers and what
will therefore be emphasized in this one is the planning of research
that will speed the development of a larger social system-one that
will include present national states as functioning parts. Those who,
like the late H.G.Wells, visualize [580] the creation of a world
society through the extinction of national societies are surely flying
in the face of hard realities.Nationalism is very deeply entrenched.
206
The social system which is painfully coming to birth will grow out
of national states, but their structures will not be annihilated in the
process.
No one can say exactly what the new system will be like because
there has never been an occasion for just such a system before.
From our knowledge of other social systems, however, we can
forecast some of its characteristics.Because of the extreme heterogeneity of the parts that must go into its make-up,it will initially
be held together by a minimum of ties. These ties will have to be
consonant with, if not based upon, some value consensus in the
field of international morality. Without some common notions of
justice,no matter how vague,upon which to build a legal order,no
large social system can be held together.Because there will be many
strong pressures operating upon the whole from the parts, the
system will have to be flexible if it is not to break down. One can
predict that it will grow into something very different from what
it is in the early stages.
The building of such an inclusive social system is obviously a
tremendous-some would say a hopeless-task. There appear to be
two initial processes that must be fostered.One is the development
of a co-operative web of relationships across national boundaries
that can serve to support the erection of more complex social
structure. The other is the cultivation of a group of leaders in all
the principal nations who are devoted to the building of the more inclusive system.Given these two essentials,thesystem should gradually
take form. The role of social science research at the present stage
is to show the way in furthering these two processes. W e need to
know how best to weave the web of relations and how to obtain a set
of leaders with attitudes of responsibility toward the embryonic
world system.
The phrase ‘aweb of relations across national boundaries’seems
a clear idea at first glance,but it proves ambiguous when scrutinized
closely. Are the transient contacts of travellers’ relationships indicated? Does ‘web’imply two-wayinfluence? Does a web of relations
within a national society toward relations with other societies-the
U.S.National Commission for Unesco, for instance-qualify as
a portion of the intersocietal’ web?
Such questions only serve to show that there is a central area to
the web, and that it bas fringes which shade off into atomistic interaction on the one hand and into intra-national social structure
on the other. Since a start has to be made somewhere, it seems
1 We will use the word intersocietal when w e wish to draw attention to relations among
groups in different societies. ‘International’ is not quite adequate because it suggests relations between political entities. ‘Intercultural’is also inadequate because it m a y apply to
relations between ethnic stocks within a society.
207
reasonable to undertake research at the heart of the matter rather
than in the fringe areas. W e shall therefore consider investigating
only relations that are definitely intersocietal and that represent
real ties.
With respect to this focal area, three possibilities lie before us.
W e can study analogous situations in the past-the development of
federations, for instance-and learn lessons for the present. W e can
study present tentative developments in the weaving of the intersocietal web and evaluate them. Or w e can actually experiment with
programmes calculated to achieve the goal, and measure their
success.
A good deal of research on analogous situations has already been
done. The best known, and perhaps the broadest in coverage, is
the study by Crane Brinton, embodied in his volume, From Many
One [6111. H e not only passes in review historical instances of
successful federation but draws a number of important generalizations regarding factors in success and failure. Landecker’s unpublished doctoral dissertation [1481, carefully tests a limited
number of hypotheses in terms of the experience of the German confederation, the United States, and the League of Nations. The whole
subject is canvassed in a recent symposium [733]. Though such
research will certainly continue to be most suggestive, one may
raise the question whether the present world situation is analogous
enough to previous ones to make intensive research of this kind
worth while. Three characteristics of the present problem make the
situation a unique conjuncture: the needed new system must be
global; the present power distribution is bi-polar, rather than multinuclear; and the opposing blocs have atomic weapons at their
disposal. Will not the elements that must be woven into the larger
web of life be strongly affected by these characteristics?
If, on the one hand, the study of past situations does not promise
sufficient relevance, an experimental approach, on the other, is not
likely to be given sufficiently free rein. True experiments require a
disinterested attitude. In the field of international relations the stakes
are too high for any government to take such an attitude or to
allow its nationals to do so. Suppose, for instance, that a group of
American universities decided that they would like to test the effect
on international relations of the attendance at their institutions of
foreign students. They might arrange in pairs the countries that send
students to the United States the countries in each closely matched
on relevant characteristics, assign one member of each pair to
group A and the other to group B by random selection, and then
admit to their institutions for a period of five years only students
from group A, excluding those from group B. At the end of that
time, by studying relations with the countries in group A as
compared with the relations with those in group B, conclusions
208
might be drawn concerning the value of foreign study for international good will.Is it likely that the United States or any other
government would allow this to be done? In addition to the certainty
of offending some foreign nations, there is the possibility that a
large reservoir of good will,in the absence of the experiment, might
have been built up in the countries in group B during the five years.
It seems almost certain that governments would allow experiments of
this kind only when they were sure that the effects would be trivial;
and such experiments would, of course,be worthless.
Critical investigation of the existing tentative developmentstoward
a more inclusive social system seems more promising than either
analogous or experimental research. By drawing appropriate data
from the current situation,relevance is guaranteed; and by dealing
with what is already there rather than by artificially putting it there,
the displeasure of governments js avoided.
A large assumption underlies the belief in the fruitfulness of
this kind of research, one that needs to be made crystal-clear so
that its plausibility may be critically examined. The assumption,
derived from Cooley’s theory of the tentative process of social
life [65],is simply that the present social system is already pregnant
with the future, that the first intimations of what will ultimately
prevail are there to be detected if we are sufficiently clever. This
theory does not presume that all that now exists will last, but
rather that a process of selection will operate, eliminating that
which is unfit to the task,retaining that which is fit.
If this assumption is valid for intersocietal structure, it means
that the ingredients of the larger social system which will bring
peace to the world are already there. They need to be discovered
and fostered.The role of the social scientist is to quicken the slow,
natural processes of trial and error by conducting evaluative
research.If he can set up clear criteria of the successful functioning
of a world social system,he should be able to determine scientifically which tendencies, movements, and programmes are bringing us
nearer to such a system and which are not. Then men of goodwill,
in and out of governments,will have a guide for their efforts.
The setting of clear criteria by which to distinguish the promising
from the unpromising intersocietalrelationships is no easy task.Are
we to assume that the degree of mutual understanding of peoples is
the best measuring stick? Or should it be identification with the
United Nations? Or the amount of common culture? One must have
a theory of a system in action in order to determine whether the
movement is toward such a system or not.Here we can for guidance
draw upon the accumulated results of previous social research.
The yardstick which seems theoretically appropriate is the degree
of compatibility of the norms which the various national societies
tend to project outward to serve as controls for the more inclusive
209
social system. Thus the gulf between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States today could be measured by the incompatibility of the norms
in terms of which each would set up a world 0rder.I Changes in
degree of compatibility over short time-spans would, however, be
very difficult to measure. A n d even if this obstacle were surmounted,
it would be impossible to assign causal significance to a particular
set of intersocietal relations-say membership of Americans and
Russians in international scientific groups-because many other
factors would be operating simultaneously. W e need measures which
are not divorced, by intervening influences,from the relationship w e
wish to study.
It is this very weakness that makes inappropriate for our purposes
any of the 14 tests of integration discussed by Karl W.Deutsch in
his fascinating monograph, Political Community at the International
Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement [354]. Most
of his tests spring from communication theory and involve societies
as collectivities. The changes in types and rates of interaction between the total membership of societies are the results of so many
causes that these changes could hardly be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of any particular piece of intersocietal machinery.
It would seem highly desirable for evaluation purposes to find
some datum which is known to be related to intersocietal normative
compatibility but which is close to the relations that need to be
studied. Attitudes along the hostility-friendship continuum appear
to meet this prescription fairly satisfactorily. The persons involved
in any relationship can be studied for their attitudes before and after
their participation in it. Such attitudes are easily obtained by well
established research procedures. Since attraction to other participants is known to be positively related to the degree of agreement
on norms in small groups [72], w e may postulate, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that one will roughly vary with the
other in larger systems. This means that w e can use attitudes along
the hostility-friendship continuum as measures of the tendency to
accommodation among the norms projected outward by the nations
to w h o m the participants belong.
The oldest, and still the most widespread, type of intersocietal
relation is trade. Later developments in the economic sector have
added international banking and foreign investment. Together these
activities bring hundreds of thousands of persons in various national
societies into more or less regular contact with one another. Many
economists as well as many laymen have assumed that these contacts constitute the royal road to a peaceful world. The argument
1. This idea of the compatibility of norms projected outward by national societies to cover
intersocietal relations will be labelled 'intersocietal normative compatibility'.
210
has sometimes been the indirect one that trade tends to prevent war
by fostering the accommodation of national norms. But more usually
it has been the direct one that parties to an economic transaction
have a vested interest in its fulfilment and in the initiation of other,
similar transactions. Since war interrupts these economic relations,
the more people engaged in them, the more war will be opposed.
This optimistic theory has been sadly weakened by the events
of recent history. What may be good for individual traders or
financiers within a nation is not necessarily good for others in the
same nation or for the nation as a whole. An American manufacturer of watches does not like to see fellow Americans saving
money by importing Swiss watches, nor is he rendered betterdisposed to the Swiss people thereby. The people of the United
States as a whole did not like the trading of scrap iron to Japan in
1940 and 1941 (andultimatelythey stoppedit), thoughsomeAmerican
business men were eager to continue it. Moreover, what is profitable
and mutually integrating for peoples A and B may bring them both
to swords’ points with people C. German trade with South America
was deeply resented by both Britain and the United States before
World W a r 11. The permutations and combinations become even
more involved when foreign investment is considered.
Presumably it would be possible to do research that would throw
light upon the conditions under which various sorts of economic
relations lead ultimately to peace or war. A n d such research might
have much theoretical significance. But would it, in the present
state of the world, have any practical value? W h e n States are
still concerned above all with national security and when the
procurement of strategic mineral and other resources is so vital
to that security, they are not likely to let the probabilities of
ultimately peaceful effects influence policy in the field of international economics. Immediate strategic considerations will be
determinative.Hence research results on the tendencies of particular
economic relations toward friendliness or the opposite would lie
unusd
International migration is in much the same position as international trade and finance. The results for intersocietal normative
compatibility are sometimes good and sometimes bad. The Scandinavian immigration to the United States has on the whole tended
to produce cordial feelings toward the people of Sweden, Norway
and Denmark. The Oriental immigration to California has not had
a similar result. Again, research could throw light on causes. But
is it likely that the findings would be weighed heavily in the balance
when immigration policies are being determined by Congress? The
principles discovered would always seem speculative to hard-headed
legislators. The pressures from their constituents would certainly
be far more persuasive.
211
International economic relations and migration make us aware of
a general principle that perhaps should be explicitly stated: social
science research is likely to have practical results only when the
objective in the service of which the findings can be instrumental
is one to which powerful groups will give support. W e have seen
that peace-in-the-long-run
is not such an objective for those who
set controls for international trade, finance, and migration. The
day may come when this objective will be paramount for these
national policy-makers.In the meantime, and in view of the limited
social science research funds available, our efforts had better be
turned toward other, more promising, projects.
A n important category of relations is constituted of those generated by study or work abroad. Sociologically, this category involves
the temporary projection of persons from one national social system
into a different one. The reason that this may have great significance
for the development of the embryonic world social system is that some
members of each society may feel the pull of the way of life of the
other. If this occurs, they can comprehend the need for accommodation between their own and other social systems. The visitors
are much more likely than the hosts to gain this appreciationbecause
they see the foreign culture as an organized whole. They come
to understand the social logic, so to speak, of the strange ways
of their hosts. Unless very large groups of foreigners from the
same country are involved-as in the case of military units stationed
abroad-the nationals of the host country are not similarly enlightened because they see only individual representatives, not a
social system in operation.W e shall be mainly concerned,therefore,
with the influence of work and study abroad on the visitors rather
than the hosts. Since, however, a relationship is always two-sided,
we can assume that any situations which make the visitors betterdisposed toward the hosts will tend to produce reciprocal attitudes.
The fact of the matter is that a sojourn abroad is by no means
always conducive to greater friendship and tolerance. Under some
conditions it is; under others it has an opposite effect.To learn what
the differentiating factors are, therefore, becomes of great scientific
interest.
There are perhaps five chief categories of work abroad; as
members of diplomatic and consular services, as members of allied
military units stationed on foreign soil, as members of technical
assistance teams sponsored by individual States or the United
Nations, as representatives of business firms, and as seasonal
labourers. The first four categories would clearly come within the
stated principle that research is worth doing if powerful groups
would pay attention to the results. Although the interest of those in
charge of such services is to have their personnel well thought of
in the foreign country, they realize the reciprocal nature of friend212
liness,and appreciate that research which demonstrates under what
conditions their own personnel become friendly with the hosts will
at the same time be demonstrating the conditions under which the
hosts obtain a good impression of the visitors. They therefore would
have real reason to study the research findings and give weight to
them in setting policies. That they would probably do so is indicated
by the fact that already there has been much concern about relations
with the host population on the part of both military and civilian
officials, and business leaders. Training programmes as well as
arrangements on the job would probably be affected.
The fifth category, seasonal labourers, are a marginal group
economically, have few powerful friends, and receive little if any
training from their own countries before going abroad. Even if
research discovered what the important factors are in producing
friendly or hostile relations with the population of the host country,
it is not at all certain that the findings would be applied. There is,
however,the possibility-and this has been exemplified in the case of
Mexican seasonal labourers coming to the United States-that the
negotiations of the two governments involved might be affected by
research evidence.
In the case of study abroad,it would be mainly staff members of
institutions attended by foreign students who would use research
results for improving international relations. Though members of
college and universities faculties are not usually powerful figures
in the society at large,they have considerable authority in their own
institutions, and in that sense the situation is promising. They are
generally favowable toward international co-operation and could
help to make the experience of the foreign students one which would
promote goodwill. When students are sent by governments or other
sponsors,these too could be expected to utilize the findings.
Some research on study abroad has already been done, most
notably by the Institute for International Education in the United
States [262].Much has been learned about the selection and briefing of the students in the first place, about their reception in the
United States, and about the types of programmes at the colleges
and universities which produce the greatest degree of friendliness
and appreciation.
Since World W a r I1 the U.S. Government has sponsored short
visits to the United States by teams of occupational specialists of
all kinds.This programme represents more than travel and less than
study abroad in the usual sense. Such groups have been extremely
various-mayors and city managers, high business executives,
professional men, workers in particular industries, and farmers.
Attempts have been made to evaluate this type of experience not
only from the standpoint of technical broadening, but from that of
internationalfriendship and co-operation.
213
Situations of work or study abroad lend themselves rather readily
to research. If increasingly friendly attitudes are taken as the
criterion of success, several designs suggest themselves.The simplest
is to test the visiting persons on their attitudes toward the host
country before, or at the time of, their entry and again at the time
of,or after, their return home. This has been the design most used
to date. A somewhat more difficult task would be to test residents
of their home communities at the time of their departure and again
several years after their return. This might obtain a better measure
of the real meaning of the experience for international relations
since it would get at broader effects. An obvious weakness in both
types of investigation is that many other influences connected with
international affairs are playing on both the persons involved
and on their home communities during the period of foreign
residence.
Thus no conclusions could be drawn about the effect of work or
study abroad unless the findings were confirmed in a number of
independent investigations. A third type of investigation is to
compare changes in friendship scores of matched persons who have
undergone differenttypes of work or study experience. One might
for instance,determine whether students from Latin America coming
to France develop a more favourable attitude to their hosts if they
are attending the University of Paris or if they are attending one
of the provincial universities.This research design has the advantage
that it does control broad influences that might be operating to
affect attitudes toward the host country because all the students
would be equally subject to these influences.If,for instance, France
were to become embroiled with Spain during the period of study,
this would affect Latin American students at Strasbourg and Bordeaux as well as those at Paris.Their differences in attitudes toward
France should therefore reflect chiefly the impact of one local
situation as against another.
Earlier we stated that it is more feasible to do research on the
attitudes of the visitors than on the attitudes of the host popuration.
Where there are large numbers of visitors involved, however, so
that a real impact is made upon communities in the host country,
investigations of changes in local attitudes become possible. The
three situations that seem particularly suitable are where allied
troops are stationed in or near a host community, where seasonal
labourers are concentrated in a particular area, or where many
foreign students are found in a single university.The research design
that seems most appropriate in all of these is community comparisons. If troops or seasonal labourers or students are known to
be coming for the first time to a particular community,then studies
before their arrival and after a considerable period of residence
would be in order. This might happen in the case of troops and
214
labourers but is unlikely to happen in the case of students because
universities have always had foreign students-only their numbers
change. A n alternative design is to compare communities in which
the foreign groups are found with communities without such groups
but similar in all other respects. This is again a comparison hard
to realize for students.In both designs attitudes of random samples
of the host populations, or of any segments of them, toward the
foreigners and their culture could be compared to revealtheinfluence
of the presence of the visitors. Such studies do not run the risk,
therefore,of being opposed by governments fearful of being accused
of using foreign students as guinea pigs.
A quite different field for research, and also a promising one, is
that defined by the activities of intersocietal non-governmental
organizations.There are hundreds of such organizations in the fields
of religion, the arts, education, law,medicine, science, commerce
and industry, the co-operative movement, labour and sports. The
number of people in the world thus linked across national boundaries is incalculable. The World Council of Churches alone
represents 1K)millions. The International Federation of Free Trade
Unions has a membership in its constituent organizations of some
50 millions.The common sense assumption is that all thesebodies are
helping to create international friendshipan assumption that hardly
seems tenable when one remembers the riots which have occurred
in connexion with international football and ice hockey matches.
In any case there are certainly great differentials in the degree to
which they foster good will among peoples, and it is here that
research might be of great help. Evaluation of the activities of these
non-governmental organizations could reveal successes and failures,
showing what lines of present effort are most worthy of support
and what changes are indicated in connexion with the less successful
activities.
Research on non-governmental organization presents more problems of control than does research on work or study abroad because
participation in a non-governmentalorganization is a farlessinclusive
experience. A stay abroad constitutes a concentrated influence likely to have strong effects,whereas the influence of membership in an
intersocietal organization may be overlaid by many other forces
playing on the person. It is therefore essential to estimate effects
by closely controlled comparisons.
Three types of comparison seem worth while. In each of them
changes over a specified period in the friendliness scores of the
participants toward members of other nationalities might be used
as the criterion of success. One could compare: (a) members of
international non-governmental organizations with non-members;
(b) members of one type of organization with another-scientific
societies vs. sporting groups, for instance; (c) participants in one
21.5
type of programme within an organization with participants in
another type within the same organization. Since the comparisons
would not involve the absolute level of friendliness but the amount
of change over a period of time, the difficulty of self-selection is
largely overcome. Even though members of intersocietal organizations are different types of people from non-members, even
though members of one type of organization are originally different
from members of other types, even though those who take part in
one kind of activity are in the first place unlike those who take part
in another in the same society,it is possible to measure the effect
of the various participations. The greatest degree of favourable
change, no matter what the absolute level of attitude, indicates the
most successful kind of participation. A n illustration of the third
sub-type of research might be to compare the changes in attitude
of all the members of a particular association who do not attend an
international conference in the specified period with the changes in
attitude of all those who do. The socio-psychologicaltheory is well
established that personal contacts are more effective in changing
attitudes than are distant contacts. It would be important to test
this theory with particular reference to attitudes toward members
of other nationalities.
This type of research seems especially promising because one
of the major objectives of intersocietal non-governmental organizations is the cultivation of global goodwill. They should therefore
not only be interested in research findings but might be persuaded
to undertake research themselves, or at the very least help support
it. And once the findings are available they would be likely to
apply them in making policy decisions. They are not handicapped
to the same degree as intergovernmental organizations by fears that
national advantages may be lost by a change of policy.
Indeed one of the most hopeful things about intersocietal nongovernmental organizations is that they give opportunity for leadership to those who have a sincere desire to help create a world
system. The importance of such groups is emphasized by a recent
investigation.Though the research concerned intracommunity rather
than intersocietal relations,one of the findings has at least ostensible
relevance [256].Association with other members of the community
was found to be linked to consensus on community norms, but
only to the degree that persons identified with the community sociopyschologically. If they did not identify with the community,then
increased association was not reflected in increased consensus.
Translated to the international scene,this would seem to indicate
the necessity of having definite groups with which to identify if
mutual normative accommodation is to take place. Organizations,
then,should be effective where travel and mass communication are
not.
216
A third major opportunity for research on the web of relations
among peoples is afforded by the United Nations and its Specialized
Agencies. These institutions,set up by agreement among the great
majority of States,have been functioning for almost ten years (the
International Labour Organisation for 35 years). If a world social
system is ever to be realized it would seem that these institutions are
likely to play a major part in its development.The political controls
and the technical services that now operate through these institutions
are indispensable aspects of any viable world system.
It is apparent that research should not be directed at the overall
effectiveness of the United Nations-the morning newspapers can
tell us whether there is war or peace-but at the effectiveness of
particular parts of the programmes of the several institutions in
the system. Each of these parts needs to be seen in the light of its
contribution to intersocietal normative accommodation Evaluation
is rarely suggested in terms of this ultimate objective. Rather, questions are raised concerning the efficiency in the attainment of limited
objectives-how fast is Unesco doing away with illiteracy?l Is the
World Health Organization reducing the number and seriousness of
epidemics around the globe? Has the International Civil Aviation
Organization lessened the number of fatal accidents on international
routes? Is the welfare of the peoples for whom the Trusteeship
Council has responsibility improving? It is possible that, all these
limited objectives are being attained but that there is no basic
convergence occurring on the norms by which intersocietalrelations
should be controlled.
In carrying out the kind of evaluation here suggested we would
not be forced, as in the areas previously explored, to rely solely
on attitudes of friendliness or hostility toward other peoples to
measure success or failure. Since the United Nations and its
satellites are the most tangible elements now in existence of the
coming world social system, improvement in attitudes toward these
institutions is itself a good criterion. If the Economic and Social
Councilis looked upon with greater and greater favour around the
world, this alone would indicate that it is strengthening the web.
The most practicable course would seem to be for the various
Specialized Agencies and the Technical Assistance unit in the United
Nations itself to attempt to discover the influence of these programmes and projects on the prestige of the United Nations system.
In order to control the effectof world events which might conceal
the influence of these programmes and projects, studies could be
made in matched areas of the same country,in only one of which a
UN activity was going forward,The differential shift in public atti1. An evaluation of the suitability of the methods employed by Unesco rather than of its
results has been made by D u n n 14471.
217
tudes between the matched areas should measure the influence of the
project. It would be of added interest to study the attitudes toward
other nationalities at the same time. This would enable us to learn
the degree to which approval of the United Nations carries with
it approval of-theother nations within that organization.
A fascinating investigation would be one that attempts to measure
the effect of United Nations agencies, not directly on the people of
the world, but indirectly through the members of their own
secretariats.The first step would be to determine the effect on the
international civil servants themselves.Since a secretariat is a little
world of its own,coming into one is like entering another country.
The research designs could therefore be much like those suggested
for investigating work and study abroad. The second stage would
be to learn whether changes in secretariat members’ attitudes have
any effect in their home communities. One might guess that the
influence is slight because secretariat members often remain so long
in their positions and return to their homeland so rarely. It would
be interesting,however, to have evidence on the subject.
A suggestion that has frequently been made, and that would not
entail the use of the criteria we have worked with so far, is the
study by the United Nations of its own meditation experience.Here
the criterion of success is the actual settlement of the issue. Careful
study might reveal that certain features differentiate the successful
cases from the unsuccessful ones. These features would include the
types of situationsin which mediation was attempted and the procedures employed.The aim would be to discover whether any general
principles seem to be at work. One scholar-Elmore Jackson-has
already seen the possibilities of this kind of research [320].
It will be recalled that we have envisaged two initial processes in
the building of a world social system-the development of a complex
web of relations across national boundaries and the cultivation of
a group of leaders devoted to the objective. W e have explored
certain contributions that social research can make to furthering the
first of these. W e now turn to the question of what social research
can do to help foster the second.
A word of explanation is in order concerning the limitation to
leaders. W h y not explore the contribution that research can make
to the creating of favourable attitudes in the broad publics of all
nations?
Certainly it is desirable that a favourable climate of opinion be
created everywhere for a world social system.’ But in so complex
and difficult a task it is well to establish priorities. In the short
run it seems preferable to concentrate on the members of elites,
1. Professor Pear’s sections on ‘Prejudices’and ‘Peace,W a r and Culture Patterns’ are relevant
here. Research on education and mass communication is also discussed by Angell [7141.
218
since they are potentially most influential in setting policy, especially
in the area of foreign affairs. This is the area in which the m a n in
the street is least competent and in which, therefore, he leans most
heavily on better informed persons for guidance. Hence the initial
step is to foster the development of as many national leaders as
possible who have a sense of responsibility toward the emerging
world system. If w e can obtain a growing cadre of such leaders,
they will find enough support in the dread of war among the
common people all over the world to enable them to operate successfully.
As used here, Clites are not comprised of the well-born, the
aristocratic elements in a social class sense, but of those potentially
influential in the determination of national policy. Beside the elected
political leaders and the higher echelons of the civil service, w e
include executives of large business firms,the holders of important
positions in the fields of mass communication and education,
successful doctors, ministers, lawyers, engineers and scientists. If
there is one common factor in modern Clites, it is breadth of experience. Their members ‘get around’. They are well informed. Not
all members of Clites become leaders of public opinion, but
they constitute the reservoir from which leaders are drawn. If w e
are to have a greater degree of world-responsibility in the leadership of modern nations, it is the training and selection of these Clites
that must be influenced.
Jn order to further the development of world-responsible leadership,w e need to have three types of information.First,it is desirable
to know what the present situation is. Studies of the information and
attitudes on international matters of members of Clites in many
countries would yield these data. Second, w e need to find out what
factors in the career patterns of Llite members differentiate the
internationally-minded from the others. Third, the process of social
selection needs to be carefully scrutinized to determine how a sense
of world-responsibility could become more of an asset in achieving
tlite status.
Research on the information and attitudes of Clite members poses
no new or difficult problems. The membership in political, communications, and other 6lites might have to be defined differently
in each country but similar processes of sampling and interviewing
could be employed in all. O n the information side one would like to
know such things as how well they understand the similarities and
differences between their own and other cultures, how much they
know about the current foreign policy questions of their own nation,
and how complete is their knowledge of the United Nations and its
problems?
Research on attitudes of tlite members should prove even more
significant. M. Aron, in discussing his sixth point, emphasizes the
219
importance of the ideologies of policy makers. W e would want to
know whether members of &lites have an isolationist or internationalist attitude, whether they are trusting or distrustful of
particular other nations, whether they are confident or discouraged
about the United Nations, whether they are bellicose or pacific.
Perhaps central to the whole attitude-complex is whether or not
these potential leaders have a real respect for other cultures or not.
If they do, they are bound to be more tolerant, more patient, in
dealings with other nations, and therefore more likely to foster the
growth of a social system that can include a multiplicity of peoples.
An interesting example of this sort of research has been reported
in Symbols of Znrernntionnlism by Ithiel Pool [749]. On the assurnption that the newspapers having the greatest prestige in each of
several countries reflected the attitudes of the policy-makers there,
the editorial content was analysed for attitudes of each nation
toward others, and toward agencies of international co-operation.
In so far as it is feasible to investigate the information and
attitudes of high political leaders (this could be done only indirectly
in most countries), the sort of research described by Mrs. Bernard
based on the theory of games is possible. Such research results would
have other uses, however, than for a theory of conflict. They could
be employed, as pointed out by Barrington Morre [747] and
Angel1 [7151, to increase co-operationamong nations by providing
greater understanding of the leaders of one country on the part of
leaders in another. Thus those who were interested in changing the
rules of the game by giving greater weight to standards of international justice would have guidance for their efforts.
If research on information and attitudes were to be carried out
on a wide scale there would be established an important bench
mark for later studies. If and when an important event took place
on the international scene-such as a disarmament conferencethe amount of change which this precipitates in the attitudes of
Blites around the world could be measured. And even if no dramatic
events of this kind took place it would be significant to measure the
drift of world sentiment every five years or so.
Research of this kind is also a necessary preliminary to our
second type-the study of factorsin career patterns that are related
to international-mindedness.One the attitudes of large samples of
6lite members are known,investigators could proceed to the design
of studies that would get at causes.
The simplest design would be to divide the members of &lites
sampled in any particular country according to the degree of their
feeling of world-responsibility.By suitable interviews and study of
records one could then test hypotheses regarding causal influences.
One might find that certain types of family background, schooling,
travel,work experience,church membership,voluntary group partici220
pation and the like were correlated with attitudes favourable toward
internationalco-operation.If the general sociology theory that actual
participation on some common project knits people together is
correct, one might expect that persons who had been directly or
indirectly involved in the web of intersocietal relations would show
the higher degree of world-mindedness.
The findings of such investigations might or might not offer
practical goals to those interested in working toward a more peaceful
world. If, for instance, it were demonstrated that either family
background or membership in certain religious denominations was
of crucial importance in determining attitudes toward other nations,
this would be discouraging from the standpoint of one seeking to
increase international-mindednessof Clite groups. Among the most
difficult of all groups to alter from the outside is the family; and
one could hardly hope to change either the character of religious
bodies or the number of persons attached to one as against another.
O n the other hand,findings that certain types of schooling or certain
types of travel were predisposing toward attitudes of international
friendship would be encouraging.These are types of experience that
could be affected by the concerted efforts of interested persons.
Teachers in all countries are likely to be well disposed toward
peace. If they had scientific evidence that certain types of curricula or
certain types of extra-curricularactivities tended to produce worldminded leaders in the next generation, they could, and probably
would, use such evidence effectively.
The third type of research-that dealing with the process of
selection of Clite members-must be approached more tentatively.
It is clear that this is an important matter, but it is not so clear
exactly what we need to know about it.
Perhaps the best introduction to this field is to see it through
the eyes of an enthusiast for this type of research. He would point
out that in each generation a process of selection is carried out by
which some persons are accorded positions of power and influence
while others become hewers of wood and drawers of water. Partly
through educational examinations,partly through ratings of efficiency
on jobs, partly through the social approval of their fellows, partly
through pecuniary advantage, ‘pull’,and even coercion, some
persons are selected for Clite status and some are not. The way
to obtain leaders who will have attitudes of international cooperation,he would say,is to make these selective processes function
so as to give weight to such attitudes. There are enough people of
the right kind in the populations of all nations now; all that needs
to be done is to see to it that they are raised to Clite status. Since
leaders are largely drawn from the Clites, the nations will then be
equipped with leadership that will be oriented toward a world social
system.
221
This is an appealing picture, but it is socially na’ive.Nothing is
more fundamentally built into the social structure of a society than
its selective machinery. M a n y other aspects of life are geared in
with it. To change the working of this machinery is to affect them
as well. Moves to tinker with it will therefore be sharply resisted by
all sorts of vested interests.
Does this mean that the approach to leadership attitudes through
selection processes is completely unpromising? Would m e n of goodwill be butting their heads against a stone wall? Such conclusions
are certainly unduly pessimistic. There is no such thing as an immoveable body in the social world. But it would seem to be the part
of wisdom to employ research imaginatively to explore the dimensions of the problem and determine what might or might not be
accomplished.
The general picture in the more developed societies is one of
increasing bureaucratization. This means that m e n are no longer
chiefly attaining 6lite status through an unstructured competitive
struggle;they are being accorded such status by elaborate mechanisms of selection. Built into these mechanisms are many gatekeepers-educators who give tests, personnel directors in factories
and stores, bureau heads in government departments, administrators
in school systems, officers in labour unions, and so on ad infinitum.
The first task of social research, to the degree that it has not already
been done, is to develop a clear chart of these mechanisms. W e
need to know who has how much selective control at what points.
A second task, for the investigator motivated toward ‘one world’,
is to discover which of these gate-keepers are already internationallyminded. The principle stated earlier-that research is likely to have
practical results only if powerful people will implement the findings
-is important here. W h e n the gate-keepers are found who are
sympathetic to the cause, research results of two kinds could be
channeled to them: (a) findings which show the distribution of international information and attitudes among present members of
6lites; and (b) findings which indicate the importance of the gatekeepers themselves as selective agents. Once they realize how far
present Clites fall short in terms of international-mindedness,and
once they realize their own power in the situation, they should be
motivated to act. Their doing so would mean that more weight
would be given to a sense of world responsibility in the making of
future selections. No doubt it would take a long time for the
results of such channeling of research results to have much effect,
but it is one promising approach to the problem.
The paths to peace are numerous. Many of them are easily discerned.
Because historians have been particularly concerned with political
events, every educated person knows that intelligent diplomacy,
222
fulfillment of treaty obligations, and national self-restraintin foreign
policy help to avoid wars. The bearing, however, for good or ill,
of many factors and circumstances not so often observed and commented upon, not so intelligible to common sense, has remained
unexplored. It is the function of the research scientist to perceive
such gaps in our knowledge and to seek to fill them. H e must draw
upon existing theory to project plausible hypotheses and then gather
the facts that will test their validity. If he is successful in this
scientific quest, he finds new regularities of relationship which can be
added to the growing organum of social science.
The assumption throughout this paper has been that peace is
something positive, that is must be achieved through efforts to build
a more inclusive social system in the world. This same positive
emphasis pertains to the application of research findings. The cause
is too important to let such findings lie gathering dust on scholarly
shelves.
Time was, and not so long ago, that such neglect was very
likely to occur. Social scientists traditionally have felt that their
obligations ceased when their findings were published. They have
thought it was the responsibility of some scientific middleman like
Stuart Chase or some worker in applied fields like social work and
labour relations to dig out their research results and make some use
of them. Happily, that day seems to be passing. More and more
social scientists are choosing problems for investigation that have
both a scientific and a human significance.Although they lean over
backward to maintain objectivity during the course of the research,
they do not lose their human involvement. W h e n all the evidence
is in, they exert themselves to obtain the application of their findings in good causes.
In the present case it will not be hard to locate potential consumers
of research findings. There are literally thousands of persons in the
world who are eager to participate in the building of the larger
social system and who are in key positions to do so. Once identified,
all that is needed is to channel the social scientist’s knowledge to
them in such form that they can put it to work. They are disposed to
act in a world-responsible manner; what they need is guidance.
W e started with the statement that the world’s problem can be
put in terms of the mutually incompatible interests of national
states. W e conclude on an equally simple note. One of the great
hopes of the world is to discover through social science how to build
a more inclusive social system within which States can peacefully
co-operate.
223
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60. COMFORT,
A. Authority and delinquency in the modern State. London,
Kegan Paul, 1950, xii + 112 p.
Conflicts of power in modern culture, see 41.
63. Congrts de Litge 1953. organized by the International Sociological
Association (collection of papers: roneoed).
During the second part of its session, the Congress dealt with
inter-group conflicts: 1. Inter-group conflicts and their solution. 2. International conflicts and their solution. 3. Industrial conflicts and their
solution. 4. Racial conflicts and their solution.
See 18, 28, 43, 80, 127, 216, 240, 301, 308, 314, 476, 483, 535, 558;
655, 715, 747, 760, 803, 909, 1000; 1115, 1058, 1061, 1065, 1077, 1078,
1082, 1084, 1087, llO& 1113, 1119, 1128, 1141.
64. COOLEY,C. H. H u m a n nature and the social order. N e w York,
Scribner’s, 1922, 2nd ed.
65. -. Social process. N e w York, Scribner’s, 1918.
CRUTCHFIELD,
R. S., see 146.
J. F.;HARPER,
R. A. Problems of American society: value$
66. CUBER,
in conflict. N e w York, Henry Holt, 1951, rev. ed., 496 p.
The authors’ principal aim is to express the main data in the
social field in general terms of ‘values’.They choose the United States
of America as a field of study and analyse the problems peculiar to
that country: national education, divorce, criminality, racial and
caste prejudices, governmental conflicts, etc. In conclusion, they
endeavour to define some general ‘values’likely to attenuate conflicts
in American society.
67. DODD, S. C. Dimensions of society. N e w York, Macmillan, 1942,
ix + 944 p.
229
68. DOOB,
L. W. ‘The strategics of psychological warfare’, Publ. Opin.
Quart. 1949-50 vol. 13 p. 635-44.
69. ERIKSON,
E. H. ‘Growth and crisis of the healthy personality’, in:
Senn, M . J. E.,ed. Symposium on the healthy personality. N e w York,
Macy, 1950.
70. EYSENCK,
H.J. ‘War and aggressiveness: a survey of social attitude
studies’, in: 230, p. 49-81.
The author considers that ‘the experimental study of the origin,
growth and structure of individual attitudes towards war, and of
personal aggressiveness, represents an important contribution by social
psychology to the investigation of the complex phenomena of war
and peace’. H e explains that he deals solely with conscious ideas,
opinions, emotions and sentiments, and not with the secret processes of the ‘unconscious’and the ‘id‘. The attitudes measured are
communicated verbally, due allowance being made for the risk of
falsification which this process involves. Lastly, these studies deal with
relatively large-scale investigations, and can, therefore, be somewhat
superficial.
There follows an analysis of the concept of aggressiveness and the
‘frustration-aggression’theory, together with an account of the conclusions reached as a result of studies on this subject undertaken by
various Anglo-Saxons. The author then refers to experimental surveys
conducted by a number of people, particularly Ross Stagner (cf.
1. SOC. Psychol. 1942, 15 and 16), w h o worked out questionnaires for
the measurement of attitude, based on the techniques of Thurstone
and Likert. These questionnaires were initially submitted, as a first
experiment, to a selection of well-educated people and then, after
being improved and simplified, were distributed to a far larger group
of people, widely sampled, so as to represent the whole of the
American public. The conclusion is that there undoubtedly exists
an eminently measurable ‘war-mindedness’,which is in close correlation with a number of personality traits, childhood or adolescent
experiences, education, emotional family background, etc., and is, of
course, intimately connected with socio-professional status (income,
position in the social scale, etc.). There is a close relationship between ‘war-mindedness’ and opinions on such questions as capital
punishment, birth control, abortion, religion and anti-Semitism.
A very full bibliography.
71. FARBER,
M. ‘The armageddon complex: dynamics of opinion’. Publ.
Opin. Quart. 1951, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 217-24.
72. FESTINGER,
L.;SCHACHTER,S.; BACK,K. Social pressures in informal
groups. N e w York, Harper, 1950, x + 240 p.
73. FINKELSTEIN,
B. ‘Die Psychologie der isolierten Gruppe’ (The psychology of the isolated group), Schweiz. Z.Psychol. 1948, vol. 7,p. 46-64.
[See also 39-41.1
W. ‘Informal organization and the theory of schism’, Amer.
74. FIREY.
sociol. R. 1948, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 15-24.
Mathematical analysis of ‘schism’,a basic process of which intergroup conflicts are but a ‘sub-process’.
75. FLEWELLING,
R. T. Conflict and conciliation of cultures. Stockton
(California), College of the Pacific Press, 1951, x + 36 p.
The sole causes of world conflicts are the contradictions between
the different ideologies. Agreement and reconciliation on the mental
and spiritual plane are possible, but only with the help of religionsince what our contemporary world needs is not so much ‘physical’
revolution as a revolution of ‘understanding’.
230
76. FLOWERMAN,
S. H. ‘Portrait of the authoritarian man’, T h e N e w
York Times Magazine, April 1950, vol. 23.
77. -. ‘The use OF propaganda to reduce prejudice: a refutation’, Int.
J. Opin. Aft. Res. (Mexico) 1949, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 99-108.
78. FLUGEL,J. C. M a n , morals and society. London, Duckworth, 1945,
328 p. Reprint, Penguin Books 1955.
79. -. ‘Some neglected aspects of world integration’, in: 230, p. 111-38.
The collapse of the Fascist systems in 1945 marked the final disappearance of a long line of thinkers who, ever since ancient times,
had represented war as a noble undertaking. Nowadays, war is no
longer defended by anyone. Despite this fact-and perhaps because
of it-the feeling of the inevitability of war seems to be increasing;
or it might be truer to say that, since war no longer receives any
ideological support from humanity, there is a growing tendency to
consider it as an unavoidable calamity, visited upon mankind by
some outside force. Without fully sharing this pessimistic view, the
author merely remarks that many people though regarding war as
an evil have come to think of it, if not as unavoidable, at least as
preferable to domination by an alien race or the imposition of what
seems to them an intolerable political r6gime.
The author then takes the most c o m m o n suggestions for the prevention of war and divides them into three main groups, as follows:
(a) the moral and religious approach; (b) the political approach; (c)
the psychological approach.
The first approach has been adopted throughout the centuries. T h e
second approach, also very old, has come increasingly to the fore
in the present age. The third, the psychological approach is more
specifically modern; it brings out the importance of the stimuli towards
war, and of the material satisfactions which war, despite its evils,
procures. The three approaches are, in actual fact, more or less
complementary.
The author then makes a series of extremely enlightening critical
remarks about each of these ‘approaches’,and about the programmes
and activities of the great contemporary international organizations
such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and Unesco. H e
concludes by suggesting a number of long-term objectives.
80. FOUILHE,P. ‘Le rBle de la presse enfantine dans l’apprentissage
aux situations conflictuelles’, paper submitted to the Second World
Congress of Sociology, LiBge, 1953, section 11, part 4, 4 p. [See 63.1
81. FREEMAN,E. M. ‘The pattern of pressure’, Sociol. SOC. Res. 1953,
vol. 37, no. 3, p. 182-8.
FRENKEL-BRLJNSWIK,
E.,see 2.
82. FREUD,A. ‘Notes on aggression’, Bidl. Menninger Clinic 1949, vol. 13,
p. 143-51.
83. FREUD,A.; HARTMANN,
H.;KRIS,
E. T h e psychoanalytic study of
the child. N e w York, International Univ. Press, 1949, 493 p.
84. FREUD,S. Civilization and its discontents. London, Hogarth Press,
1949, 144 p.
85. FREYRE,
G. ‘Internationalizing social science’, in 45, p. 139-65.
86. FRIED,
M. H. ‘Family revolution in China’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1949,
vol. 55, no. 3, p. 306-7.
87. FRIEDMANN,
G. ‘The social consequences of technical progress’, Inf.
SOC. Sci. Bull. 1952, vol. 4, no. 2.
88. FROMM,E. Autoritat und Familie (Authority and Family). Miinchen,
Beck, 1938.
89. -. ‘Psychoanalytic characterology and its application to the under-
23 1
standing of culture’, in: Sargent, S. S.; Smith, M. W. Culture and
personality. N e w York, Viking Fund, 1949, p. 1-12.
90. GILLESPIE,
J. M. Unpublished investigation cited in 5.
91. GILLIN,
J. L.; GILLIN,
J. P. Cultural sociology. N e w York, Macmillan
Co., 1948, 844 p.
See, in particular, Chapters 24 and 25, ‘Dissociative processes’
(p. 587-642). Study of types of disagreement between sexes, generations,
people belonging to opposite parties, communities, etc. The authors
consider the causes and outward signs of these disagreements, and
also the consequences of the tension which they create.
92. GINSBERG,
M . Reason and unreason in society. London, Longmans
Green, 1947, 2nd ed., vii + 328 p.
93. GITTLER,
J. B. ‘ M a n and his prejudices’, Sci. Mon. (N.Y.), 1949, vol. 69,
p. 43-7.
The formation of prejudices and their transmission from parents
to children.
94. GOLDFRANK,
E. ‘Socialization, personality and the structure of Pueblo
society’, Amer. Anthrop. 1945 vol. 47, p. 516-39.
L. M. Collective measures against aggression. N e w York,
95. GOODRICH,
Columbia Univ. Press, 1953.
96. GRAVES,
M. ‘The language barrier to international understanding’,
Ann. Amer. acad. polit, SOC. Sci. 1947, no. 250, p. 12-16.
97. GREWEL,
F. ‘Agressie en agressief karakter’ (Aggression and the
aggressive character), Ned. Tijdschr. Psychol. 1950, vol. 5, p. 39-75.
98. GRIFF~H,
C. R. ‘The cost of prejudice in education’, Purdue Univ.
Stud. higher Educ. 1951, no. 69, p. 58-64.
99. GULLVAG,
I. ed. Krieg, Aggresjon og Personlighet (War, aggression
and personality). Symposium-Sommer Universitet, Oslo, 1955. Institute
for Social Research (Oslo),1953, 124 p. roneoed.
Includes an introduction to studies on group conflicts (p. 1-13). It is
divided into four main parts: I. Tiller: W a r and the problem of
psychological aggression (see 278). 11. Aggression and personality
(studies on: group conflicts and machinery for the adaptation of
personality; passionate anxiety for freedom; the authoritarian personality; the book by Ackermann and Jahoda on anti-Semitism and
emotional disorder). 111. Situationism. IV. Topological theories.
Bibliographies.
R. H.Critique of Hornell Hart’s ‘Social science and the
100. GUNDLACH,
atomic crisis’, Psychol. Bull. 1950, vol. 47, p. 509-12.
G. ‘A sociological analysis of international tensions’,
101. GURVITCH,
in: 45, p. 243-56.
In the first part the author analyses the different types of social
tension (within-group intergroup and international). H e then deals
with factors conducive to such tensions; national egotism and egocentricity, the existence and utilization of rationalized propaganda, and
the real interests of nations. Lastly, he suggests certain methods of
relieving international tension.
R. B. ed. Psychodrama and sociodrama in American educa102. HAAS,
rion. With an introduction by 3. L.Moreno. N e w York, Beacon House,
1949, xii + 251 p.
103. HALL,
D. M. T h e dynamics of group discussion: a handbook for
discussion leaders. Danville, Ill., Interstate Printers and Publishers,
1950, 66 p.
Discussion of problems relating to groups and group dynamics.
104. HALLOWELL,
A. I. ‘Cultural factors in the structuralization of perception’, in: Rohrer, J. H.;Sherif, M. Social psychology ut the
crossroads. N e w York, Harper, 1951, p. 165-95.
232
105. HARDING,
D . W. ‘Aggression in nature and society’, Brit. J. med.
Psycho/. 1949, no. 22, p. 161-5.
106. HARDING,
G. F. ‘A plea for an anthropological approach to the
study of personality’, H u m . Organiz. 1953, vol. 12, no. 3, p. 13-16.
HARPER,
R. A., see 66.
107. HART,
H.‘Social science and the atomic crisis’, J. SOC. Issues 1949,
suppl. 2.
108. HARTLEY,
E. L. Problems in prejudice. N e w York, King’s Crown
Press, 1946, x + 124 p.
[See also 209.1
109. HARTLEY,
E. L.;HARTLEY,
R. E. Fundamentals of social psychology.
N e w York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.
See particularly: Chap. 21; ‘Ethnic attitudes’ (p. 686-719); Chap. 22:
‘Modifying ethnic attitudes’ (p. 720-40).
HARTMANN,
H.,see 83.
G. W . W h a t people are: a study of normal young men.
110. HEATH,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1946, xvi + 141 p., 4 pl.
HERRFAHRDT,
H., see 476.
G.C. T h e hzrman group. N e w York, Harcourt Brace, 1950,
111. HOMANS,
484 p.
112. HORKHEIMER,
M. ‘Sociological background of the psychoanalytical
approach’, in: 948.
113. HORNEY,
K. ‘La valeur de la vengeance’, Psyche‘ 1951, vol. 6, no. 1,
p. 159-66,no. 2, p. 239-48.
Causes and results of vengeance. Different types of desire for
vengeance, which is nearly always a form of obsession.
E. v. DER. ‘Over de sociaal-psychologische achtergrond van
114. HORST,
de oorlog’ (The social-psychological background of war), Ned. Tijdschr.
Psycho/. 1950, vol. 5, p. 1-19.
Discussion of the question: ‘ W h y war?’ with references to letters
of Einstein and Freud. The conclusion is that war is the result of
a desire, not for destruction, but for power.
P. Th. ‘De psychologie van het vredesverlangen’
115. HUGENHOLTZ,
(Psychology of the desire for peace), Ned. Tijdschr. Psychol. 1950,
vol. 5, p. 19-39.
Analyses the different forms of desire for peace.
E. G. ‘The sociological study of work’, Amer. J. Social.
116. HUGHES,
1952, vol. 57, no. 5, p. 423-4.
117. HULL,
C. L. Hypnosis and suggestibility: an experimental approach.
N e w York, Century, 1933.
118. HUTCHINS,
R. M. ‘The high cost of prejudice’, Phylon 1951, vol. 12,
no. 2, p. 101-5.
119. IBRAHIM, Z. ‘Psychological basis of peace’, Egypt. 1. Psychol. 1949,
vol. 5, no. 1, p. 49-64.
120. ICHHEISER, J. ‘Misunderstanding in human relations. A study in false
social perception’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1949, vol. 55, no. 2, part 2,
70 p. + bibliography.
Brief but very comprehensive article. Cf.the comments by L. Wiese,
in 288.
[See also 319.1
D.J. ‘National character: the study of model
121. INKELES,A.;LEVINSON,
personality and socio-cultural systems’ in: Lindzey, G. ed. H a n d book of social psychology. Cambriige, Mass., Addison-Wesley Co.,
1954.
122. IRION, F. C. Public opinion and propaganda. N e w York, Thomas
Y. Crowell, 1950, 782 p.
233
Study of the elements which determine and constitute public
opinion.
123. JACKSON, L. Aggression and its interpretation. London, Methuen,
1954, 231 p.
124. JAHODA, M. ‘Consistency and inconsistency in inter-group relations’,
J. SOC. Issues 1949, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 4-11.
125. JAMES, W. ‘Moral equivalent of war’ reproduced in Memoirs and
studies. London, Longmans Green, 1917.
126. -. T h e principles of psychology. N e w York, Henry Holt, 1890,
2 vols.
JANOWITZ, M.,see 23.
127. JOHNSON,W.‘Social science research and intergroup relations agencies’,
paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, LiBge.
1953, section 11, part 1, 14 p. [See 63.1
J. G.;NEWCOMB,
T. M. ‘Psychological tech128. JOHNSON, W.;MILLER,
niques for maintaining peace’. Univ.Chicago Rd Table 1950, no. 635,
18 p.
Difficulties of international communications. Solutions suggested
for the maintenance of peace.
129. JONES, E. T h e life and work of Sigmund Freud, N e w York, Basic
Books, 1953, vol. 1.
130. KATZ,D. ‘Psychological barriers to communication’, Ann. Amer.
Acad. polit. SOC. Sei. 1947, no. 250, p. 17-25.
Need for a study of the functions of vocabulary, and an effort to
find symbols that are as little misleading as possible.
131. -. ‘Social psychology and group processes’, Annu. R. Psycho?. 1951,
vol. 2, P. 137-72.
Review of literature published in 1949-50 on groups and their
problems (interactions, conflicts, etc.).
S. H . ‘Prejudice as a sociopsychiatric responsibility’.
132. KAUFMAN,
Amer. J. Psychiar. 1947, no. 104, p. 44-7.
133. KEITER,
F. ‘ Z u m Problem des Volkscharakters’ (The problem of
national character), Kolner Z.Soziol. 1952-53,vol. 5, nos. 2-3,p. 285-97.
134. KER,W. A. ‘Psychology of the free competition of ideas’, J. SOC.
PsychoZ. 1950, vol. 31, p. 261-9.
In freedom, the main factors are ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘freed o m of ideas’, but that does not mean indulging in popular prejudices
and superstitions.
135. KERR,
M.‘Personality and attitudes towards warfare’,in: 230, p. 83-90.
Starting with the very sound idea that the old controversy: ‘Is war
engendered by psychological or economic factors?’ should be dismissed once and for all, the author endeavours to list the different
theories on personality put forward by various schools or trends of
philosophy, and then to consider these different suggestions in relation to the two complicated problems raised by the outbreak of war:
(a) what is there in the psychological make-up of people which
allows or forces them to acquiesce in their o w n destruction? (b) h o w
do people make the adjustments of personality which enable them
to oope with the upheavals in social relationships during wartime?
The different theories on personality are of two main types: (a) those
which regard personality as a unit, which must be dealt with as a
whole and no single element of which can be studied separately;
and (b) those which consider that personality is made up of a variety
of traits, impulses and other elements which constitute the sum total
of a person’s individuality.
The author then examines the theory that personality can be explained by ‘role assimilation’, by imitation of culture patterns and
234
stereotypes, behaviour patterns due to external influences, and
environment; also the theory that personality is determined by the
predominance of the internal ‘matrix of identity’, which is conceived
and moulded in the course of prenatal existence, childhood and family
and adolescent life, and is at the root of all forms of adaptative
behaviour, whether good or bad; and finally a whole series of Freudian
and post-Freudian explanations of personality-primitive complexes
not properly overcome, the ‘thanatos’ instinct, etc.-and the entire
frustration-aggression movement led by Dollard and his assistants.
136. KIRLE,
R. E. M . Aspmia. London, Kegan Paul, 1932, 141 p.
G. W . ed. World tension-the psychopathology of inter137. KISKER,
national relations. N e w York, Prentice Hall, 1951, xi + 324 p.
A collection in 22 chapters, of articles by Jones, Kisker, Klineberg,
Murphy, Wineberg, etc. Historical background of world tensions,
based on a separate analysis of each country (France, Germany,
Australia, Denmark, etc.), and laying great emphasis on the importance of languages and communication as factors in the settlement
and understanding of conflicts, even those in the field of culture.
0.Etats de tension et compre‘hension internationale. Paris,
138. KLINEBERG,
Unesco, Librairie de MCdicis 1951, 264 p. [French edition of 144.1
139. . ‘National characteristics and international relations’, A m e r J.
Psychiat. 1951, vol. 107, p. 661-6.
Importance of mutual knowledge among nations.
140. -. Race and psychology. Paris, Unesco, 1951, 40 p.
Comparison between the capacities of various racial groups.
141. ‘The scientific study of national stereotypes’, Znt. SOC. scb. Bull.
1951, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 505-15.
Provisional conclusion: stereotypes are dangerous-there may be
some truth in them, but they may also be completely misleading. They
are ‘learnt’. National stereotypes vary with time and are influenced
by economic and political conditions.
142. -. Social psychology. N e w York, Henry Holt, 1954, rev. ed., 578 p.
The main feature of the revised edition is a new chapter entitled
‘Psychology and international relations’ (chap. 20, p. 549-61).
143. -. ‘Social psychology since the war’, in: Bayer, ed. Philosophie.
Paris, Hermann, 1950, p. 113-20.
144. -. Tensions affecting international understanding. N e w York, Social
Science Research Council, 1950, xi + 227 p.
The author deals with relationships between ‘personality and
nationality’ (chap. 2) and then goes on to speak of national stereotypes,
showing h o w much they handicap our understanding of other peoples
(p. 147-9). The last two chapters (4 and 5) concern the pliancy of
attitudes; the author examines the underlying causes of attitudes, the
factors which change them (p. 162-98) and the influences which make
them become rigid. H e then deals at length with the different aspects
of the theory of the relationship between frustration and aggression
(p. 223-53). In his recapitulation and conclusion, he endeavours to
determine ways of controlling tensions so that they do not jeopardize
international understanding.
This book gives a general account of research undertaken or planned,
and of the methods currently used.
145. KRACAUER,
S. ‘National images: national types as Hollywood presents
them’, Publ. Opin. Quart. 1949, no. 13, g-53-72.
KRAMER,
B. M.,see 9.
146. KRECH,
D.; CRUTCHFIELD, R. S. Theory and problems of socid
psychology. N e w York, M c G r a w Hill,1948, xv + 639 p.
So far as tensions are concerned, see especially: (a) In the chapter
-
235
on the dynamics of behaviour, p. 40-4 and 50-70: psychological
analysis of tensions in an individual-their effects and reduction
(b) The chapter on the genesis and transformation of beliefs and
attitudes, p. 175-204. (c) Methods of public opinion surveys and
their social importance, p. 306-611. (d) Group dynamics, p. 394-400.
(e) The whole of the third part on prejudices, industrial conflicts
and international tensions, p. 443-622.
KRIS
,.E.,see 83.
C. ‘What contribution can philosophy make to world under147. KRUSE,
standing?’, Phil. R. 1948, vol. 57, p. 307-29.
W.S. ‘Integration and organization in federal aggregates’.
148. LANDECKER,
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, A n n Arbor, University of Michigan, 1947.
R. T. Sociology. N e w York and London, M c G r a w Hill,
149. LAPIERRE,
1946, 572 p.
Handbook in which the author first of all defines the fields of sociology. H e then gives a detailed account of the sociological components of
world phenomena; this leads him to refer to the great problems of
ethnography, racial prejudices, war and peace, which are at the root
of all conflicts. H e draws attention to the growing importance of
sociology as a possible means, in his opinion, of reducing all such
conflicts. See in particular: ‘Part IV, Social differentiation: the nature
and consequences of differences between social groups’ (p. 401-540).
H.D.‘Propaganda and mass insecurity’, Psychiatry 1950,
150. LASSWELL,
vol. 13, p. 283-99.
Propaganda, if wrongly employed, is purely destructive in its
effect.
[See also 161, 491.1
H. D.;LEITES,
N. Language of politics, studies in quan151. LASSWELL,
titative semantics. N e w York, G. W. Stewart Publishers Inc., 1943,
400 p.
A composite work. After emphasizing the importance of language
in all social activities and particularly in the political field, it endeavours to sh_w that quantitative analyses of political speeches would
facilitate the study of politics. Different methods of verifying the
validity of this argument are suggested by each author. The third
part of the work, containing a report on the application of such
methods, is particularly interesting in connexion with interactions in
the field of international political changes.
F.;SILVERT,K.H.‘A theory of stereotypes’, Soc. Forces
152. LAVIOLETIE,
1951, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 257-62.
153. LAWS,F. ed. M a d e for millions. London, Contact Press, 1947, xxvi
+ 116 p.
154. LEE,A. M. ‘Can the individual protect himself against propaganda
not in his interest?’, Soc. Forces 1950, vol. 29, p. 56-61.
155. -. ‘A sociological discussion of consistency and inconsistency in intergroup relations’, J. SOC. Issues 1949, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 12-18.
156. -. ‘The press in the control of inter-group tensions’, in: 1001, p. 14451.
After analysing the factors which influence the attitude of the
reader, the author describes ways of using the press to improve
intergroup relations.
157. -. ‘Some prerequisites to international opinion surveying’, Int. 1.
Opin. Att. Res. (Mexico) 1948, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 54-62.
N. The operational code of the Politburo. N e w York, Rand
158. LEITES,
Corporation, M c G r a w Hill, 1951, xv + 100 p.
236
159. -. ‘Interaction: the Third International on its change of policy’,
in: 151, p. 238-333.
This article consists of a study of the ‘symbols’ of the Third
(Communist) International in relation to the evolution of practical
symbols.
N.;POOL,I. DE S. ‘Interaction: the response of Communist
160. LEITES,
propaganda to frustration’, in: 151, p. 334-81.
Study of the various methods used in Communist propaganda to
arouse a response in critical situations.
D.;LASSWELL,
H. D. T h e policy sciences: recent develop161. LERNER,
ments in scope and method. PaIo Alto, Stanford University Press,
1951, xiv + 344 p.
The role of social scientists in the finding of solutions to the
practical problems connected with man’s influence on his surroundings and vice versa. Possibility of working out a policy in this
respect in the field of international relations. See especially the
chapters dealing-although only in a general way-with methodology,
and those relating to the study of national character and the concept of culture.
S.‘The structure of world order in terms or regional functional
162. LESTER,
organizations’, Soc. Forces 1950, vol. 29, no. 1, p. 52.
Today, regionalism is a dynamic reality. It plays a part of prime
importance in sociologicaJ investigation, and contributes towaids the
establishment of world peace.
LEVINSON,
D.J., see 2, 121.
163. LEVY,M. J. T h e family revolution in modern China. Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1949, %vi + 390 p.
LEWIN,K.,see 1097.
164. LINDEMANN,E. ‘Individual hostility and group integration’, Hum.
Organiz. 1949, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 5-9.
The contention here is that hostility is due to external factors,
rather than to mere frustration. Such hostility may be expressed outright, where a group disintegrates. It is likely to become less intense
if the subject is incorporated in another group.
A. R.; STRAUSS,A. L. Social psychology. N e w York,
165. LINDESMITH,
Dryden Press, 1949, xvi + 549 p.
The aim of this book is to show the effect, on the behaviour of
an individual, of his consciousness of belonging to a group.
166. LINTON,R. ‘Problems of status personality’, in: Sargent, S. S.
Smith, M.W.Culture and personality. N e w York, Viking Fund, 1949,
p. 163-73.
167. -. ‘The concept of national character’;in: Stanton, A. M.,Perry, S. E.
Personality and political crisis. Chicago, Free Press, 1951.
, Training in community relations. N e w York, Harper,
168. L I P P ~R.
1949, xiv + 286 p.
This book provides an example of ‘action research’, based on the
work of K. Lewin. It is a report on experiments in which close cooperation between social scientists and social practitioners made it
possible to tackle the problems of the tensions which become evident
in certain social situations. A n experimental ‘training workshop’ for the
study of racial prejudices was organized with the aim (partly theoretical
and partly practical) of determining the best methods of imparting
to individuals and groups the qualities required if they are to
understand the nature of intergroup conflicts and play a useful role
in social life.
The workshop was divided into discussion groups, each headed
by a leader. The activities of the groups were observed by social
237
psychologists, who noticed that there were alternate periods of tension
and of very real understanding.
These tensions were due to three different group problems:
(a) frustration linked with the determination of the group’s tasks;
(b) frustration born of problems arising in the execution of those
tasks; (c) rupture due to inter-personal tensions between members
of the group. A study of these situations revealed the fact that elimination of the tension, through education, depended upon fulfilment of
the following three conditions: possibility of expressing the tension;
possibility of arriving at an understanding of the crisis; possibility
of overcoming the crisis by solving the problem concerned.
See criticism of Main, T. F.,Mead, M.,and Simey, T. S., in Hum.
Relat. 1950, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 201-14.
169. LOWINGER,
A. ‘Tension,distance and history: a psycho-social speculation’, I. SOC. Psychol. 1950, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 311-15.
170. LQWRY,S. Co-operation, tolerance and prejudice; a contribution to
social and medical psychology. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1948, xiv + 318 p.
Analysis of the concept of prejudice, by an author with Freudian
leanings.
LYNTON,R. P.,see 253.
H.‘Collaboration between social work and the social sciences’,
171. MAAS,
SOC. Wk. 1950, vol. 31, p. 104-9.
Draws attention to the need for collaboration between ‘social
workers’ and ‘scientists’ with a view to restoring order in the
modern world.
J. M. T h e modification of international attitudes; a New
172. MCCREARY,
Zealand study. Wellington, Victoria Univ. College; Unesco; 1952.
(Publications in psychology, no. 2).
E. G. E n e m y personnel in the US..1942-46, a study
173. MCCURTAIN,
of social conflict and accommodation. Washington, Univ. St. Louis,
thesis.
W.Zntroduction to social psychology. London, Methuen,
174. MCDOUGALL,
1916, 10th ed.
175. -. Keynes’ system of economics. London, Kegan Paul, World Chaos,
0.p.
MACIVER,
R. M. see 39-41.
W . J. ‘Group decision makes democracy work’, Relig.
176. MCKEACHIE,
E ~ u c .1951, vol. 46, p. 90-1.
177. MCKELLAR,
P. Textbook of h u m a n psychology. London, Cohen and
West, 1952, xii + 384 p.
178. MACKENZIE,
M. ‘Is there a national neurosis?’, Sociol. R. 1952,
vol. 49, no. 6, p. 93-106.
J. C. L. Zntroduction to the theory of games. N e w York,
179. MCKINSEY,
M c G r a w Hill, 1952, 371 p.
N. R. Frustration: the study of behaviour without a goal.
180. MAIER,
London, M c G r a w Hill, 1949, 264 p.
181. MARROW,
A. J. Living without hate: scientific approaches lo h u m a n
relations. N e w York, Harper, 1951, 269 p.
An attempt to prove that, if prejudices did not exist, the world
could live in perfect harmony. Proposed methods of abolishing
prejudices.
J. M . ‘ H o w neurotic is the authoritarian?’, 1. abnorm. SOC.
182. MASLING
Psychol. 1954, vol. 49, no. 2, p. 316-18.
A. H.‘The instinctoid nature of basic needs’, J. Personality
183. MASLOW,
1954, vol. 22, no. 3, p. 326-41.
238
184. MAUCORPS,
P. Psychologie des mouvements sociaux. Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1950, 128 p.
Chap. I: ‘Psychological bases of social behaviour’. Chap. 11: ‘Beliefs
and attitudes’.
185. MAY,M. A. ‘The foundation of personality’, in: Achilles, P. S. ed.
Psychology at work. N e w York, McGraw Hill,1932.
G.H.Mind, self and society. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press,
186. MEAD,
1934.
M. A n d keep your powder dry. New York, Morrow, 1943.
187. MEAD,
188. -. ‘Sex and temperament’, in: Three primitive societies. New York,
Morrow, 1935.
189. -. ed. Cultural patterns and technical change. Paris, Unesco, 1953
(Tensions and technology series), 350 p.
190. MEAD,
M.,METRAUX,
R. T h e study of culiure ar a distance. Chicago
Univ. Press, 1953, 480 p.
191. MENNINGER,
W. C. ‘Tensions in family life’, PastoraI Psychol. 1953,
vol. 4,no. 33, p. 11-18.
METRAUX.
R.,see 190.
MILLER,
J. G.,see 128.
N. E. ‘Frustration-andaggression’, in: 209, p. 257 et seq.
192. MILLER,
Chapter on the different reactions against frustration. The most
common reaction-i.e. hostility-is studied in both adults and children
from the standpoint of its social consequences, emphasis being laid
on the efforts made by children to guard against their possible
failures.
193. MILLS,
T. M. ‘Power relations in three person groups’, Amer. sociol.
R. 1953, vol. 18, no. 4, p. 351-7.
194. MINDER,
R. ‘Mythes et complexes agressifs dans 1’Allemagne moderne’,
Psyche‘ 1948, vol. 2, p. 783-94.
Study of the extent to which German aggressiveness is due to the
influences of Germanic mythology.
M. F. A. Darwin: competition and co-operation. New
195. MONTAGU,
York, Schuman, 1951, 148 p.
196. -. Natural superiority of women. New York, Macmillan, 1953, 205 p.
197. -. On being human. New York, Schuman, 1950, 127 p.
198. -. ‘The origin and nature of social life and the biological basis of
co-operation’,in: 263.
199. MOORE,
W. E.;TUMIN,
M. M. ‘Some social functions of ignorance’,
Amer. sociol. R. 1949, vol. 14, no. 6, p. 787-95.
0.‘Die Theorie der Spiele und des wirtschaftlichen
200. MORGENSTERN,
Verhaltens’ (The theory of games and economic behaviour), Jb. Soz.
Wiss. 1950, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 112-39.
Brief account of the theory developed by the author and Neumann
(see 206).
201. -. ‘The theory of games’, Scientific American M a y 1949, p. 22-25,
illus.
Account, for the general reader, of the theory of games and strategy.
[see 206.1
MUKERJEE,
R., see 908.
G. H u m a n nature and enduring peace. New York, Reynal
202. MURPHY,
& Hitchcock, 1945, xi + 475 p.
See in particular: ‘The psychologists’ manifesto’.
The author does not propose any ways of solving certain contentious questions, but raises the fundamental issue of the dynamics
of human behaviour, with all the possibilities and difficulties of cooperation inherent in them. Part I-‘The impulse of war’-describes
the situation as G . Murphy sees it. The next two parts-‘The
239
obstaclcs to peace’ and ‘A positive programme’-have as their subject
articles by 53 authors specializing in many very different fields. The
last part-‘World order is attainable’-sums up the discussion.
203. MURPHY,
H . B. M . Flight and resettlement. Paris, Unesco, 1955.
204. MYRDAL, G.‘Psychological impediments to effective international cooperation’, J. SOC. Issues (Supplement series), no. 6.
204a.‘National stereotypes and international understanding’, Znt. SOC. Sci.
Bull. 1951, vol. 3, no. 3.
See 141, 382, 457, 718, 722, 734, 737.
H. ‘The strategy of expecting the worst’, Soc. Res. 1952,
205. NEISSER,
vol. 19, no. 3, p. 346-63.
Critical review of the book by Neurnann and Morgenstern (see 206).
206. NEUMANN,
J. VON; MORGENSTERN,
0.Theory of games and economic
behaviour. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1947, xviii + 641 p.
The aim of this book is twofold: first, to give an exact definition
of what can constitute ‘rational’ behaviour by an individual w h o
encounters a ‘hostile’force on his route; second, to study the special
problem of a coalition in cases where there are more than two
belligerents. The authors are particularly concerned to establish h o w
far the parallel between the strategy of games and that of social
behaviour is justified. They therefore proceed to a series of sociological studies, from which they finally deduce that the parallel is
not necessarily valid.
207. NEWCOMB,
T. M. Personality and social change. N e w York, Dryden
Press, 1953, 225 p.
208. -. Social psychology. N e w York, Dryden Press, 1950, 690 p.
See chap. 16, p. 572-615, on ‘Group conflicts’.
[See also 128.1
T.M.;HARTLEY,
E. L.et al. Readings in social psychology.
209. NEWCOMB,
N e w York, Henry Holt, 1947, 688 p.
See especially: 192, 850, 988, 993, 998, 1006, 1041; 1046.
E. ‘Individuality and community’, Phil. phenom. Res. 1949,
210. NICOL,
vol. 9, p. 531-7.
Advances the theory that a personality is always the outcome of
a dialectical process of responding positively or negatively to the
community to which the person concerned belongs.
211. NIEBUHR,
R. Moral m a n and immoral society. A study in ethics and
politics, London, Scribners, 1933.
212. NISBET,
R. A. ‘Conservatism and sociology’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1952,
vol. 58, no. 2, p. 167-75.
213. OBRDLIK,
J. A. ‘Gallows humor. A sociological phenomenon’, Amer.
J. Sociol. 1942, vol. 47, no. 5, p. 715-16.
214. ODUM,H.W.Understanding society-the principles of dynamic sociology. N e w York, Macmillan Co., 1947, p. 750.
A sociological handbook in which the author, after studying the
structure of society with its inherent problems and conflicts, advocates,
from the methodological standpoint, a form of dynamic sociology.
215. OPLER,
M.E.Social aspects of technical assistance in operation. Paris,
Unesco, 1954 (Tensions and technology series, no. 4).
216. ORTIZ,H. G. ‘Problernas generales acerca de 10s conflictos entre
grupos y su solucion’, paper submitted to the Second World Congress
of Sociology, LiBge, 1953, section 11, part 1, 6 p. [See 63.1
217. OWEN,Th. v.; STEMMERMANN,M . G . ‘Aggressive behavior’, Ment.
Hyg., N.Y.1949, vol. 33, p. 436-42.
The various types of aggressive behaviour and their causes.
218. PALMER,F. C. ‘The death instinct in Western man’, Hibbert I. 1953,
vol. 51, no. 4.
240
T. ‘Certain primary sources and patterns of aggression in
219. PARSONS,
the social structure of the western world’, in Essays in sociological
theory pure and applied. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1945, p. 251-74.
220. -. T h e social system. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1951, 576 p.
221. PARSONS,T.; SHILS,E. A. Toward a general theory of action. C a m bridge, Harvard Unlv. Press, 1952, 506 p.
222. -. Working papers in the theory of action. Glencoe, The Free Press,
1953, 269 p.
223. PEAR,T. H. English socia? diflerences. London, Allen and Unwin,
1955.
224. -. ‘Peace war and cultural patterns, in: 230, p. 21-45.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Dr. Ruth Benedict’s idea
that ‘war . . . is a social theme that m a y or m a y not be used in any
culture‘. The author reviews all the explanatory theories, more or less
based on the existence of a reservoir of aggressiveness in human nature
and national groups; after criticizing, in particular, the mass of
Freudian theory, he finally opts for a ‘culturistic’conception of warlike motives; these, he thinks, can easily be changed, particularly
by the rulers of a country. The concept of ‘culture patterns’ which he
accepts, subject to classification and clarification of the numerous
elements composing it, seems to him to provide workers for peace
with a useful tool of investigation.
225. -. ‘Personality in its cultural contexts’, Bull. John Rylands Literary
1946, vol. 30, p. 22.
226. -. ’The place of the psychologist in the community’, Rationalist
annual. London, Watts, 1954, p. 23-30.
227. -. ‘Psychological implications of the culture patterns theory’, Bull.
John RyIands Literary 1945, vol. 30, no. 19, p. 26.
228. -. Remembering and forgetling.Longon, Methuen, 1922, xii + 242 p.
229. -. ‘The social psychology of everyday life’, in: Mace, C. A.,
Vernon, P. E. eds. Current trends in British psychology. London,
Methuen, 1953.
230. PEAR,T. H. ed. Psychological factors of peace and war. Contributions by Allport, G. W.,Cohen, J., Dicks, H. V., Eysenck, H. J.,
Flugel, J. C.,Himmelweit, H.,
Kerr, M.,
Pear, T.H.,
Richardson, L.F.
London, Hutchinson and Co., 1950, 262 p.
See: 59, 70, 79, 135, 224, 235, 296, 333, 366, 445.
231. PFISTER,
0.‘War and peace as a psycho-analytic problem’, Znt. I.
Psycho-Anal. 1950, vol. 31, p. 150-1.
Application of the Freudian Eros and Thanatos theory to the
problems of war and peace.
232. PIPPING,
K.Gespriiche mil der deutschen Jugend (Talks with German
youth). Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard Forlag, 1954.
POOL, I. DE s.,see 160.
POSTMAN,L.,see 10.
233. PRIBRAM,
K. Conflicting patterns of thought. Washington, Public
Affairs Press, 1949, viii + 176 p.
The author sets out to analyse four types of thought-universalist,
organicist, nominalist and dialectic-and thereafter to determine the
social, political and economic consequences of each. H e argues that
lack of understanding between the nations is probably due more to
differences in ways of thought than to differences of language.
234. REIMANN,
M. ‘How children become prejudiced’, Commentary 1951,
vol. 2, P. 88-94.
The growth of prejudice in children, considered from a sociological
and psychological angle.
235. RICHARDSON,
L. F. ‘Threats and security’, in: 230, p. 219-35.
24.1
The phenomenology of ‘arms races’ in the past. The phenomenon
of so-called ‘schismogenesis’, expressed as an equation to assess,
mathematically, the close relationship between fear and threat, and
vice versa in arms races. Armaments budgets from 1910 to 1914 as
an additional test confirming the algebraic theory.
I. ‘Psychodynamic notes’, in: 45, p. 167-208.
236. RICKMAN,
RIEMER,R.,see 27.
D. ‘Some observations concerning marginality’, Phylon
237. RIESMAN,
1951, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 113-27.
238. ROHRER,I.; SHERIF,M. Social psychology at the crossroads. N e w
York, Harper, 1951, viii + 437 p.
Study of the problems posed by the conduct of the individual in
his relations with other m e n and groups in a world of increasingly
complex structure.
239. ROSCA,A. ‘Influenta grupului asupra activitatii mintale’ (The group
influence on mental activities), Rev. Psihol. (Cluj Rumania), 1948,
no. 2, p. 23-35.
240. ROSE,A. M. ‘Group conflict and its mediation’, paper submitted to
the Second World Congress of Sociology, Libge, 1953, section 11,
part 1, 15 p. [See 63.1
A description of the main types of inter-group conflict and of
the techniques which can be used to find a solution for them; discussion of the principal theories purporting to explain the mechanisms
of aggressive behaviour; rapid survey of the social conditions which
make a conflict possible, and of the corresponding opportunities for
mediation. Bibliographical data in the notes.
241. -. ‘Inter-group anxieties in a mass society’, Phylon 1951, vol. 12,
no. 4, p. 305-18.
The evolution of racial prejudices and intergroup antagonism within
a society.
242. -. ‘The problem of a mass society’, Antioch. R. 1950, vol. 10, p. 37894.
243. -. Studies in reduction of prejudice. American Council of Race Relations, 1947, 118 p. roneoed.
244. ROSE,A. M.;ROSE,C. E. ‘Intergroup conflict and its mediation’,
Int. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1954, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 25-43.
A n account of the measures advocated by 50 sociologists or psychologists, representing all parts of the world, for settling international
labour, racial and cultural conflicts.
M. ‘Indoctrination for minority group membership and
245. ROSENBAUM,
its relationship to social acceptability’, Microfilm A bstr. 1948, vol. 2,
no. 1, p. 168-70.
246. ROSENB-,
J. F. ‘Replication of “Some roots of prejudice” ’,
J. Abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1949, vol. 44, no. 4, p. 470-89.
A n attempt to verify the hypothesis that certain racial prejudices
are merely due to the stereotyped idea that some groups have of
others (a hvuothesis in fact effectively established). See Allport and
Krameri 9.
247. SAENGER.G. T h e social psychology of
Achieving inter. prejudice.
.
cultural ‘understanding and- co-operaiion in a democracy. N e w York,
Harpers, 1953, xv + 304 p.
A n ordered presentation of the results of work and research carried
out over the last quarter century with regard to prejudice and discrimination against racial and ethnic groups in the United States of
America and the effect of this state of affairs on the majority of
the population as well as on its ‘minorities’.Part 2 discusses the causes
of prejudice and discrimination. The physical and mental differences
I _
242
exhibited by the various ethnic groups play a preponderant part in
the perpetuation of the prejudice towards certain of those groups.
The author seeks to show that differences of intellect, personality and
culture are in no sense innate but result from the living conditions
of the group concerned and from interaction between hostile groups.
This consideration leads him to study the economic, social and psychological factors which, in the United States of America, determine
the relations between majority and minority groups. His contention
is that the true causes of prejudice and discrimination must be
sought primarily in the economic and social structure of society, and
in the psychological needs of certain types of personality.
Part 3 reviews what has already been done in the fight against
prejudice and discrimination and puts forward recommendations and
advice as to what remains to be done. T w o main courses of action are
advocated: an attack on prejudices, by means of propaganda, reeducation and more extensive contacts between groups; and direct
legislative action against discrimination and segregation, without
attempting beforehand to eliminate the prejudices.
248. SAGER,C. J. ‘The concept of aggression in modern psychiatry’, Ment.
HIth (Baltimore) 19.52, vol. 36, p. 210-19.
SANFORD,R. N..see 2.
249. SAPIRSTEIN,
M. R. Emotional security. London. Rider and Co., 1948,
xi + 291 p:
G.Conflitti psicosociali e conflitti di gruppo. (Psychological
250. SARFATTI,
conflict and group conflict). Roma, Edizioni del Lamo. 1952, viii
+ 106 D.
S. S. ‘Stereotypesand the newspapers’, in: 209, p. 558 et seq.
251. SARGEG,
A n article on the stereotypes used by newspapers, and the effects
of these stereotypes on their readers.
SCHACHTER. s., See 72:
B. Father Land-A study of authoritarianism in the G e r m a n
252. SCHAFFNER,
family. N e w York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1948, xii + 203 p.
253. SCOTT,J. F:; LYNTON,R. F. T h e community factor in modern technology. Paris, Unesco, 1925 (Tensions and technology, series, no. 2).
R. ‘The sexual basis of social prejudice’, Psychoanal. R.
254. SEIDENBERG,
1952, vol. 39, p. 90-5.
255. SHAND,A. F. The foundations of character. N e w York, Macmillan,
1920, 2nd ed.
256. SHAPIRO.‘The formulation and verification of a theory of primary
social integration.’ Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornel1 Univ.,
1954.
SHERIF,C.,see 258.
257. SHERIF,M. ‘The problem of inconsistency in intergroup relations’,
J. SOC. Issues 1949, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 32-1.
Definition of the problem, and indication of its exact importance.
[See also 238.1
258. SHERIF,M.;SHERIF,C. Groups in harmony and tension. A n integration of studies in intergroup relations. N e w York, Harper 1953, 316 p.
Opens with a critical review of the various methods and techniques used in the study of intergroup relations; stresses the need
to arrive at an ‘integrative’ theory based on experimental research.
Postulating (in succession to Durkheim) the existence of collective
situations and attitudes, the authors underline the part played by
structures and by the social standards and values of every type of
human conduct. At the personal level, changes of role, and conflicts,
are explainable in terms of the multiplicity of ‘reference groups’ to
which the subject belongs. At the collective level, traditional attitudes
243
and stereotypes establish a scale of social distances between groups.
This scale governs the modes of relations, in co-operation and bonflict alike.
The main problem is therefore that of the origin and modification
of collective attitudes. As a contribution towards an answer, the two
final chapters describe a remarkable experiment carried out in a
children’s colony; the psycho-social processes are studied under three
main heads: (a) situations involving collective motivations and aims;
(b) emergence of collective standards and values leading to the formation of the ‘reference group’ and a feeling of ‘our lot’,in spontaneous
opposition to the ‘outgroup’ in competition; (c) phenomena of collective perception (distortions) and antagonistic stereotyping.
SHILS,E. A.. see 221-2.
SILVERT.
K.H..see 152.
259. &ON,
H. A. ‘A formal theory of interaction in social groups’,
Amer. Sociol. R. 1952, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 202-11.
260. SINGER, K. ‘The resolution of conflict’, Soc. Res. 1949, vol. 16, no. 2,
p. 230-45.
Analysis of the notion of conflict; solutions envisaged in terms of
four philosophies.
261. SJOBERG,
G. ‘Strategy and social power: some preliminary formulations’, Sthwest SOC. Sci. Quart. 1953, vol. 33, no. 4, p. 297-308.
262. SMITH, M. B.; CASAGRANDE,
J. B. ‘The cross-cultural education proiects: a urogram reuort’,Social Science Research Council items. Sept.
i953, n o 3; p. 26-j2.
262a. ‘Social implications of technical change (The)’, Znt. SOC. Sci. BuZf.
1952, vol. 4, no. 2.
262R ‘Social implications of technical advance’, Curr. Sociol. 1953, vol. 1,
no. 4.
263. SOROKIN, P. A. ed. Explorations in altruistic love and behavior.
Boston Beacon Press, 1950, viii + 353 p.
See especially 198.
264. STAGNER, R. ‘Studies of aggressive social attitudes: I. Measurements
and interrelation of selected attitudes’, J. SOC. Psychol. 1944, no. 20,
p. 109-20.
265. -. ‘Opinion of psychologists on peace planning’, J. Psychol. 1945,
no. 19, p. 13-16.
266. STEIN,S. I. ‘The major cause of warfare--emotional incompetency;
the emotional or mvchoaenic factor of behavioral control’, J. nerv.
ment. Dis. 1950,
112; p. 66-74.
STEMMERMANN, M. G.,see 217.
267. STEPHENSON, R. M. ‘Conflicts and control functions of humor’, Amer.
I. Sociol. 1951, vol. 56, no. 6, p. 569-74.
Seeks to prove the hypothesis that jokes with a ‘race’ theme do
not increase hostility, but rather do something towards sbating
aggressiveness.
269. STOETZEL, J. Jeunesse sans chrysanthbme ni sabre. Paris, Plon-Unesco,
1954. (In English: Without the chrysanthemum and the sword. New
York, Columbia Univ. Press-Unesco, 1955.)
270. STONE,R. ‘The theory of games’, Econ. 1. 1948, vol. 58, p. 185-201.
J. ‘Role conflict and personality’, Amer. J.
271. STOUFFER,S. A.; TOBY,
Sociol. 1951, vol. 56, no. 5, p. 395-406.
STRAUSS, A. L.,see 165.
272. SULLIVAN, H. S. ‘Tensions interpersonal and international’, in: 45.
p. 79-138.
International tensions arise because of disequilibrium in individuals
no.-
244
and conflicts between individuals. It would therefore seem necessary
to apply psychiatry on clear-cut and systematic lines.
273. SUMMERS,R. E. ed. America’s weapons of psychological warfare.
N e w York, H. W. Wilson, 1951, vi + 206 p.
274. SUTTIE,I. D. T h e origins of love and hate. London, Kegan Paul,
1935, xvi + 275 p.
275. TABA,
H.;WILSON,
H. E. ‘Intergroup education through the school
curriculum’, Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC. Sci. 1949, no. 262, p. 19-25.
Tensions et conflits, Etudes de psychologie sociale. see 46.
Tensiorts that cause wars, see 45.
276. THOMPSON,
C. ’Cultural conflicts of w o m e n in our society’, Samiksa
(J. Indian psychol. Soc.) 1949, vol. 3, p. 125-34.
277. THOULESS,
R. H. Straight and crooked thinking. London, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1930, 283 p.
278. TILLER,
0.‘Krigen og det psykologiske aggresjonsproblemet’ (Wars
and the psychological problem of aggression), in: 99, p. 13-34.
A bibliographical and critical study of the relationship between
aggression and frustration in individuals and in groups, and of the
other mechanism3 (projection, repression, etc.) liable to lead to the
creation of stereotypes and aggressive attitudes.
279. TINASHEFF,
N. S. ‘The basic conflict of our age. A sociological
diagnosis’. Thoueht 1949. vol. 24. no. 35.-D.
.617-36.
TOBY,J.,-see 271.
H . G.:YARROW.
M. R. They learn what they live: prejudice
280. TRAGER,
in young children. N e w York, Harper, 1952, xvii + 392 p.
An exposure of the prejudices current, through ignorance or lack
of understanding, among schoolchildren.
TUMIN,M. M.,see 199.
281. ULKEN,
H. Z.‘Les tensions sociales et les relations interculturelles’,
Sosyolojie Dergisi (Istanbul) 1952, vol. 7, p. 109-21.
282. UNESCO. ‘Unesco conference on world tensions; an international
multidisciplined group’, Psychiatry 1948, vol. 11, p. 231-3.
The conditions for international understanding, and the causes
of tensions.
Education in technological society. Paris, 1952 (Tensions
283. UNESCO.
and technology series, no. 1).
284. VOLKART,
E. H . Social behavior and personality. Contributions of
W.I. T h o m a s to theory and sociaI research. N e w York, Social Science
Research Council, 1951, 338 p.
Social disorganization can be defined as ‘a decrease of the influence
of existing social rules of behaviour upon individual members of
the group’ (p. 234). It does not necessarily involve the demoralization
of the individual.
In the world of today, the repressive injunctions of social morality
are less and less accepted. The decline of the primary groups, the
extremes of wealth and poverty, and the lack of any new form of
social control lead to greater individualization of conduct, more
particularly in sexual behaviour.
285. WALTER,
P. A. T h e social sciences-a problem approach. N e w York,
D.v. Nostrand Co., 1949, 360 p.
A study and definition of the social sciences from the two angles
of practice and history. In the first, the descriptiye part of the book,
the author defines the several domains of these sciences. In the second
part, he deals with the major social problems and social (i.e. racial,
political, psychological etc.) conflicts. The third and last part considers
the social sciences’ precise potentialities for action, and their limitations.
245
286. WARNER, W . L. ‘Sociological mirror for cultural anthropologists’,
Amer. Anthrop. 1949, vol. 51, no. 4, p. 671-7.
287. WHITE,
L. V. ‘Preventing war versus peace making’, Bull. Wld Fed.
rnent. Hlth 1949, vol. 1, no. 6, p. 16-21.
Our concern to protect ourselves, which culminates in wars, prevents
our having a sound understanding of the problem of peace.
L. v. ‘MisversMndnissein zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen’
288. WIESE,
(Misunderstandings in human relations), Kiilner Z.Soziol. 1949, vol. 3,
p. 345-53.
A n article inspired by Ichheiser’s paper of this title. The author
indicates his agreement with that paper on almost all points. See 120.
289. -. ‘Studien iiber das Vorurteil’ (Studies on prejudice), Kolner Z.
Soziol. 1950-51, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 214-21.
A discussion of Adorno’s T h e authoritarian personality [see 21.
The writer likes the research methods used, but criticizes certain of
the concepts.
290. WIJNGAARDEN,
H. R. Enige beschouwingen over de conflictuologie
(Some considerations on the study of conflict). Groningen, J. B. Walters, 1951, 20 p.
WILSON,
H.E.,see 275.
L. ‘International tensions as objects of social investigation’,
291. WIRTH,
in monograph. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949.
292. WOODARD,
I. W. ‘Some implications from our present knowledge
concerning prejudice’, Amer. sociol. R. 1946, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 344-86.
293. WRIGHT,
S. ‘Social tensions’, Humanist 1948, vol. 8, p. 21-2.
‘Tension’ as a source, not of conflict, but of progress.
YARROW,
M . R., see 280.
ZANDER,
A., see 49.
294. ZAWADZKI,
B. ‘Limitation of the scapegoat theory of prejudice’,
J. abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1948, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 127-41.
G. K. H u m a n behavior and the principle of least effort: an
295. ZIPP,
introduction to h u m a n ecology. Boston, Addison-Wesley, 1949, xi
+ 573 p.
Methodological Studies
296. ALLPORT,
G.W . ‘Guide lines for research in international co-operation’,
in: 230, p. 141-57.
Recommendations regarding the need for the public authorities in
America and other countries to place more trust in the social scientist.
The author advocates the establishment of an international social
science, just as ‘international’as, so far, the exact sciences, which
are ‘cumulative’for all nations playing a part in modern civilization.
Thousands of highly qualified physicists have co-operated, on the
national level, in the production of atomic energy for destructive
purposes. The controlling of its destructive use, and the development
of its beneficent potentialities, will require the international collaboration of many highly qualified experts.
Ten major aims are enumerated on which social scientists of all
countries should concentrate their research. These are almost identical
with Unesco’s. but in regard to each Allport makes a number of
suggestions, such as the need to invent emotional symbols (not merely
intellectual ones) designed to represent the great international
organizations: flags,hymns, various songs, and a whole new type of
‘folklore’.
246
T h e resolution of iniergroup tensions: a critical appraisal ot
methods. N e w York, National Conference of Christians and Jews,
297. -.
1952, 48 p.
298. ANGELL,
R. C. ‘Unesco and social research’, Amer. sociol. R. 1950,
vol. 15, p. 282-7.
299. ARROW,K. ‘Mathematical models in the social sciences’, in: 161,
p. 120-54.
Begins with a brief analysis of the utility of mathematical reasoning. The author examines, in turn, certain models; assessment of the
individual interest as against the collective interest, where he defends
a theory of relations between ‘total quantities’; the principle of
rationality, defined as a choice between possibilities logically deduced
and compared with the tastes of the individual. A third section deals
with the theory of games. A n appendix is devoted to Rashevsky’s
theory and Zipf‘s reflections on the principle of the ‘least effort’.
300. BAIN, R. ‘Action research and group dynamics’, Soc. Forces 1951,
vol. 30, no. 1, p. 1-10.
Group dynamics; a study of their functioning must be based on a
critical examination of the methods and aims envisaged, on an analysis
of the values proposed. In this way it is possible accurately to
measure group functioning and structure.
301. BALDRICH,A. ‘Los conflictos entre grupos’, paper submitted to the
Second World Congress of Sociology, LiBge,
- 1953, section 11, part 1,
1 1 p. [See 63.1
302. BALES.R. F. Interaction process analysis. A method for the siudy of
small groups. Boston, Addison Wesley, 1950, 203 p.
303. BAY,C.‘The theoretical preparation of a research project on nationalist
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304. BERNARD,J. ‘The conceptualization of intergroup relations with
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The author outlines his concept of a conflict between two groups
as a form of incompatibility between two values.
305. -. ‘Scientists and the paradox of power’, Soc. Forces 1952, vol. 31,
no. 1, p. 14-20.
306. -. ‘The theory of games of strategy as a modern sociology of conflict’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1954, vol. 59, no. 5, p. 411-24.
The theory of games of strategy explained by six fundamental concepts: rational behaviour, strategy, the pay-off matrix or function,
rules of the game, coalitions, alliances and imputations, and, lastly,
the solution.
307. -. ‘Where is the modern sociology of conflict?’, Amer. J. Sociol.
1950, vol. 56, no. 1, p. 11-16.
Points out h o w far the sociology of conflict lags behind cultural
sociology. Stresses the need, despite certain difficulties, for the
establishment of an ‘Institute of Conflict Analysis’.
308. BLUHDORN,R. ‘Remarks on the scientific approach to some sociological problems involved in international relations’, paper submitted
to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Libge, 1953, section 11,
part 2, 7 p. [See 63.1
309. BOURGIN,G. ‘La mithode sociologique des sondages de l’opinion
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310. CAPLOW,
SOC. Res. 1950, vol. 34, no. 4, p. 267-72.
E.;HYMAN,
H.;ROMMETVEIT,
R. Cross-national social
311. CHRISTIANSEN,
research. Oslo, Institute for Social Research, 1951, 80 p. roneoed.
Preliminary reports on the problems of tensions: frustration, perception of menace, aggressive conduct. Includes a bibliography.
-
__
247
Contrihution to the first international seminar on comparative social
research. Group experiments and studies of attitudes observed in
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312. COLEMAN,
J. S. ‘ A n expository analysis of some of Rashevsky’s
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COOK.S. W . see 321. 334.
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313. DEUTSCH,
the understanding of inconsistencies’. J. SOC. Issues 1949, vol. 5,
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The important role played, in conflicts, by incomprehension or
ignorance of a given situation.
[See also 321.1
S. C. ‘The logarithmic relation of social distance and intensity’,
314. DODD,
paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, LiBge,
1953, section 11, part 4, 8 p. [See 63,]
315. - ‘A verifiable hypothesis of human tensions: an international
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Theory of tensions. Need for research in this field, which should
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316. DORSEY,
hostility, with specific application to the problem of racial prejudice’,
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0.J. ‘An experimental approach to the study of status
317. HARVEY,
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318. HOFFSTAETTER,
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HYMAN,
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320. JACKSON, E. Meeting of minds. N e w York, M c G r a w Hill, 1952.
M.:COOK,S. W. ed. Research methods in
321. JAHODA, M.;DEUTSCH,
social relations with special reference to prejudice. N e w York, Dryden
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The object of these two volumes is to describe the problems and
methods of research in the field of social relations, with special
reference to the connexion between research and its practical application. For this reason most of the examples mentioned are taken from
studies on prejudices and intergroup tensions.
The first volume examines in detail the conduct of psychological
research according to the following model: formulation of the problem, planning of the research, establishment of the data and methods
utilized (data collection techniques), analysis and interpretation, conclusions and possible applications. The last chapter deals with the
relations between research and theory. Technical appendixes contain
examples of research already carried out, especially the analysis of
a study on prejudices and discrimination.
The second volume is entirely devoted to a technical description of
research methods and methodological problems.
248
322. KEPHART,
W. M. ‘A quantitative analysis of intragroup relationships’,
Amer. J. Sociol. 1950, vol. 55, no. 6, p. 544-9.
KRONENBERGER,
L.,see 326.
323. LANDECKER,
W. S. ‘Integration and group structure: an area for
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LAZARSFELD,
P. F.,see 328.
LEE,M.,see 327.
324. LEVINE,
A. J. ‘Varied approaches to intolerance’, Jewish F o r u m 1948,
Jan.-April,p. 2-8.
Without hoping for a re-education of adults, the author is convinced that, by developing a spirit of disciplined and intelligent
scepticism, it is possible to check the growth of prejudices among
children.
325. LIPPIT,
R.; RADKE,M. ‘Newtrends in the investigation of prejudice’,
in: 1001, p. 167-76.
The nature of prejudice, and its genesis. Method of research.
J. T.KRONENBERGER.
L. ‘Motion pictures, the theater and
326. MCMANUS,
race relations’, in: 1001, p. 152-8.
The authors review films and plays dealing with race questions,
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mass communication media are not used systematically.
327. MCMURRY,
R. E.;LEE,M. T h e cultural approach: another way in
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1947, xi + 280 p.
328. MERTON,
R. K.;LAZARSFELD,
P. F., ed. Continuities in social research:
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Free Press, 1950, 256 p.
329. MORENO,
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1953.
330. -. Psychodrama and the psychopathology of interpersonal relations.
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Psychodrama and sociodrama constitute a new individual and collective psychosocial therapy: individuals or groups are confronted
with a dramatic situation and invited to react and express themselves
spontaneously with a view to revealing their basic aspirations. Such a
process, Moreno thinks, will lead to the development and improvement
of interpersonal and intergroup relations.
OPLER,
M.E.,see 339.
RADKE,M.,see 325.
N. Mathematical biology of social behavior. Chicago,
331. RASHEVSKY,
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951, xi + 256 p.
The author shows how the mathematical method can be applied
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332. -. Mathematical theory and h u m a n relations, an approach to a
mathematical biology of social phenomena. Bloomington, Indiana,
Principia Press, 1947, 202 p.
L. F. ‘Statistics of fatal quarrels’, in: 230, p. 237-56.
333. RZCHARDSON,
ROMMETVEIT, R.,see 311.
334. SELLTITZ, C.;COOK,S. W. ‘Can research in sooial sciences be both
socially useful and scientifically meaningful’, Amer. sociol. R. 1948,
vol. 12, no. 4, p. 454-9.
335. SIMMEL, G . Conflict. Glencoe, Free Press, 1954. Republication of a
methodological work.
336. STAR,S. A. A n index of social tension. Glencoe, Free Press, 1954.
337. STOUFFER,S. A. ‘An analysis of conflicting social norms’, Amer.
sociol. R. 1949, vol. 14, no. 6, p. 707-17.
249
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
334.
Tllustratec an empirical method of studying obligations, with particular refence to role obligations which conflict.
UNESCO.
T h e technique of international conferences. Paris, 1951
(SS/3).
VICKERY,
W.E.;OPLER,
M. E. ‘A redefinition of prejudice for purposes of social science research’, Hum. Relat. 1947, vol. l, no. 4,
p. 419-28.
WATSON,
G. ‘The problem of evaluation’, in: 1001, p. 177-82.
Need for the systematization and improvement of research programmes.
WEIDER,
G,S. ‘A comparative study of the relative effectiveness of
two methods of teaching; a thirty-hour course in psychology in
modifying attitudes associated with racial, religious and ethnic prejudice’, Dissert. Abstr. 1952, vol. 12, 162 p.
WILLIAMS,
F. W. ‘Psychological warfare and strategic intelligence
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Psychology in the world emergency. Pittsburg, Univ. Press, 1952,
198 p.
WILLIAMS,
R. M. jr. ‘Applications of research to practice in intergroup relations’, Amer. sociol. R. 1953, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 78-83.
-. T h e reduction of inter-group tensions: a summary of research
on problems of ethnic, racial and religious group relations. N e w York,
Social Science Research Council, 1947, xi + 153 p.
In this report, the author reviews the different techniques designed
to reduce hostility and resolve interracial and intercultural conflicts.
H e considers that co-operation between groups would be the best
way to solve existing tensions; he analyses the postulates governing
programmes of action, and suggests putting them to the test. This
work is a memorandum, as it were, of the research to be undertaken
in the matter of intergroup tensions.
Experimental Studies and Monographs
345. ANIKEFF,
A. M. ‘Reciprocal empathy: mutual understanding among
conflict groups’. Purdue Univ.Stud. higher Educ. 1951, vol. 17, p. 1-48.
Inquiry conducted by 100 students into mutual understanding as
depending on sex, religion, race, socio-economic level, and rural
or urban residence.
346. BARKLAY,K. L. ‘Attitudes of civilian females toward war’, J. SOC.
Psychol. 1953-,vol. 38, p. 241-52.
347. BAY, Ch.; GULLVAG,
I.; OFSTAD,
H.;TONNESEN,
H. Nationalism. A
study of identification with people and power. Oslo, Institute for
Social Research, 1950, 74 p,
Definition of varying degrees of nationalism. Hypotheses regarding
possible factors of variation. Index showing the interviewing and
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348. BERNOT,L.;BLANCARD,R. Nouville: un village franpzis. Paris, Univ.
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BEITELHEEM,B.; JANOWITZ, M.,see 23.
349. BLAIN,D. ‘Group activities for world peace’, Neuropsychiatry 1952,
vol. 2, p. 63-73.
BLANCARD,
R.,see 348.
350. BUHLER,C. ‘National differences in “world test” projection patterns’,
J. projective Techn. 1952, vol. 16, p. 42-55.
351. BURROW, M. L. ‘A content analysis of intergroup humour’, Amer.
sociol. R. 1950, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 88-9.
Humour as a technique for solving conflicts.
352. CENERS,R. ‘An effective classroom demonstration of stereotypes’,
J. SOC. Psycho[. 1951, vol. 34, p. 41-6.
CHARWAT,
W. A.,see 361.
COULES,
J., see 389.
A. ‘Observations sur l’agressivitk de nos enfants en internat’,
353. DELVAUX,
R. belge Psychol. Pddagogie 1950, vol. 12, p. 155-68.
Aggressivity due to a protest against a new way of life, an inferiority
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K.W.Political community at the international level: prob354. DEUTSCH,
lems of definition and measurement. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press,
1953.
EMERY,
F. E.,see 380.
ENGSTROM,
W.,see 379.
355. ‘Interim report on the tensions project conducted by the Department
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Adopting Bogardus’ scale of social distances, New Zealand studies,
on a sample of 1,000 subjects, the degree of antipathy towards
members of other national groups.
EYSENCK,
N. J., see 70.
356. FRENCKEL-BRUNSWIK,
E. ‘A study of prejudice in children’, Hum.
Relat. 1947, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 295-306.
Influence of the type of education and behaviour of parents on
the attitude of children towards different social problems. Democratic
education at school and at home results in a better social adjustment
of children and, as a result of satisfactory identification with society,
promotes international understanding.
E.; HAVEL,
J. ‘Prejudice in the interviews of
357. FRWCKEL-BRUNSWIK,
children’, J. genet. Psychol. 1953, vol. 82, p. 91-136.
H . A. A study of the expression of hostility in everyday pro358. GRACE,
fessional and international verbal situations. Results of test. Ph.D.
thesis, Columbia Univ. (privately published), 1949, 64 p.
359. -. ‘Hostility,communication and international tension’,J. SOC. Psychol.
1951, vol. 34, no. 1, p. 31-40.
Hostility and its consequences as regards international relations.
360. GRACE,
I-I. A.;NEUHAUS,
J. C. ‘Information and social distance as
prediction of hostility toward nations’, J. abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1952,
vol. 47, no. 2, p. 540-5.
Description of investigation methods employed for three years to
establish the causes of n priori hostile attitudes towards other nations.
361. GRAHAM,
F. K.;CHARWAT,
W. A.; HOMG,A. S.; WEITZ,
P. C.
‘Aggression as a function of the attack and the attacker’, J. abnorm.
SOC. Psychol. 1951, vol. 46, no. 4, p. 512-20.
P. J. ‘Competition in children: an experimental study’,
362. GREENBERG
Amer. I. Psychol. 1932, no. 44, p. 221-48.
GULLVAG,
I., see 347.
HAMMOND,
S. B.,see 381.
A. P. ‘A study of interaction and consensus in different-sized
363. HARE,
groups’, Amer. sociol. R. 1952, vol. 17, no. 3, p. 261-7.
364. HART,
H. ‘Depression,war and logistic trends’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1946,
vol. 52, no. 1, p. 112-22.
Statistical study carried out to verify the hypothesis that human
culture advances by sudden bounds and that sociological phenomena
should be regarded as space-time functions.
251
H. ‘The logistic growth of political areas’, Soc. Forces 1948,
365. HART,
vol. 26, no. 4, p. 396-408.
H. ‘Frustration and aggression. A review of recent
366. HIMMELWEIT,
experimental work’, in: 230, p. 160-91.
Survey of theoretical and experimental work on the frustrationaggressivity complex, conducted up to 1949. Although it does not
raise directly the problem of war and its causes, this article is a
starting point, a guide and reference work (see the very full bibliography included) for anyone wishing to criticize or study more
thoroughly the ‘psychologist’theory of war. In view of its special
importance, Frusfration. T h e study of behavior without a goal
by Maier Norman (see 180) is dealt with in an additional note.
T. ‘Etsocialt og paedagogisk experiment: Tyskland’ (A socio367. HIND,
pedagogical experiment in Germany), Soc. Tss. 1951, no. 1, p. 1-36.
Report on an experiment conducted by the Danish Red Cross at
Wolfsburg, Brunswick, Germany, in the readjustment of young Germans to democratic life, through inter-European community existence
and active methods in education.
HONIO,
A. S.,see 361.
C. T.;LUMSDAINE,
A. A.; SHEFFIELD, F. D. Experiments
368. HOVLAND,
Princeton Univ. Press, 1949
in mas communication. Princeton, N.J.,
(Studies in social psychology in World W a r ZZ), vol. 3, 345 p,
A series of inquiries conducted among groups of soldiers to
determine the exact effect of propaganda films and other forms of
mass communication. These inquiries began at the time of Pearl
Harbour.
369. JAMES, J. ‘A preliminary study of the size determinant in small group
interaction’, Amer. sociol. R. 1951, vol. 16, no. 4, p. 474-7.
JANOWITZ, M.,see 23.
370. JOHNSON, G. B. ‘The relationship existing between bilingualism and
racial attitudes’, J. educ. Psychol. 1951, vol. 42, no. 6, p. 357-65.
371. KUBO,Y. ‘A study of A-bomb sufferers’ behavior in Hiroshima’, lap.
J. Psycho2. 1952, vol. 22, p. 103-10.
372. LANDECKER,
W . S. ‘Types of integration and their measurement’,
Amer. I. Sociol. 1951, vol. 56, no. 4, p. 332-40.
LEIGH.R. D.,see 390.
373. LENTZ,T. F. ‘Report on a survey of social scientists conducted by
the attitude research laboratory’, Znt. J. Opin. Art. Res. (Mexico)
1950, vol. 4, p. 97-102.
374. LINDZEY,G.;ROGOLSKY,
S. ‘Prejudice and identification of minority
group membership’, 1. SOC. Psychol. 1950, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 37-53.
Identification, from photos, of Jews and non-Jews. Results vary
according to prejudice.
L I P P IR.,
~ , see 168.
LUMSDAINE,
A. A.,see 368.
D.V.;WAYNE,
I. ‘German and American traits reflected
375. MCGRANAHAM,
in popular drama’, Hum. Relat. 1947, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 429-55.
MACLEAN,
M.,see 379.
C. DE et al. ‘The experimental study of small groups’.
376. MONCHAUX,
1954 (unpublished report of investigation conducted in University
College, London, 1952-53).
377. MORSH,
J. E.;SMITH, M. E. ‘Judgment of prejudice before, during
and after World War 11’, J. SOC. Psychol. 1953, vol. 38. no. 1, p. 31-7.
378. MURPHY,
G.In the minds of men. T h e study of h u m a n behavior and
social tensions in India. N e w York, Basic Books, Inc., 1953, kiv
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252
Report on Unesco studies conducted by a team of Hindu sociologists under the leadership of Professor Murphy.
379. NAFZINGER,
R. 0.;MACLEAN,
M.;ENGSTROM,
W. ‘Who reads what
in newspapers?’, Znt. J. Ogin.Act. Res. (Mexico) 1951, vol. 5, p. 519-40.
NEUHAUS,
J. 0.see 360.
0.A.;EMERY,
F. E. Social structure and personality in an
380. OESER,
Australian rural community. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954.
381. OESER,
0.A.; HAMMOND,
S. B. Social structure and personality in
an Australian city. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954.
OFSTAD,
H.,see 347.
M. A. ‘Development in children of the idea of
382. PIAGETJ.; WEIL,
homeland and of relations with other countries’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull.
1951, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 561-78.
Inquiry conducted among children from 5 to 15 years of age, living
in Geneva. The feeling and even the idea of their o w n homeland are
not the first or one of the earliest elements in the child’s make-up, but
emerge at a relatively late stage. Before achieving intellectual and
emotional awareness of their own country, children are obliged to
make a considerable effort in the way of ‘decentring’(in respect of
their lives and of their cantons) and of co-ordination (with outlooks
other than their own).
T w o conclusions emerge from this inquiry. (a) Children’s discovery
of their homeland, and their understanding of other countries, are
achieved by a process of transition from ‘egocentrism’to the establishment of ‘reciprocity’relations. (b) This gradual evolution is constantly
subject to setbacks, the general pattern of which is the re-emergence
of broader or sociocentric forms of ‘egocentrism’at each new stage of
the evolutionary process or as a reaction to each new conflict.
A. ‘Forms of output distribution between two individuals
383. RAPPAPORT,
motivated by a satisfaction function’, Bull math. Biophys. 1947, vol. 9,
p. 109-22.
384. RICHARDSON,
L. F. ‘The persistence of national hatred and the
changeability of its objects’, Brit. 1. med. Psychol. 1949, vol. 22, p. 166-8.
385. RILEY,J. W.jr.; SCHRAMM,W.T h e reds take a city. Brunswick, N.J.,
Rutgers Univ. Press. 1951, xvi + 210 p.
ROGOLSKY,
S.,see 374.
M. ‘Prejudice, concreteness of thinking and reification of
386. ROKEACH,
thinking’, J. A b n o r m . SOC. Psychol. 1951, vol. 46, no. 1, p. 83-91.
Description of an inquiry conducted to verify whether the attitude
of individuals with strong racial prejudices is expressed in concrete
form, and whether the attitude of unprejudiced individuals translates
itself into a formulation of abstract principles applied to each of the
groups.
387. ROKEACH,
M.‘Prejudice and rigidity in children’, Amer. Psychol. 1948,
vol. 3.
ROSENBLITH,
J. F.,see 246.
388. ROTTITER,
J. B.;WICKENS,
D.‘The consistency and generality of ratings
of “social aggressiveness” made from observation of role-playing
situations’,J. cons. Psychol. 1948, vol. 12, p. 234-9.
SCHRAMM,W.,see 385.
SHEFFIELD,
F. D.,see 368.
SMITH, M. E..see 377.
J. W.;COULES,
J. ‘The role of communication in the reduc389. THIBAUT,
tion of interpersonal hostility’, J. Abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1952, vol. 47,
no. 9, v. 770-7.
Description of an experiment tending to show that an open response
to hostile provocation reduces aggressive tension in the aggressor.
253
TONNESEN.
H..see 347.
WAYNE,
I.. see 375.
WEIL,
M. A.,see 382.
WEITZ,
P. C..see 361.
390. WHITE,
L.;LEIGH,R. D . Peoples speaking to peoples: a report o n
international mass communication from the Commission on Freedom
of the Press. Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press, 1946, ix + 121 p.
WICKENS.
D.,see 388.
391. ZELIGS,
R. ‘Children’s concepts and stereotypes of Norwegian, Jew,
Scot, Canadian, Swedish and American Indian’, 3. educ. Res. 1952,
vol. 45, p. 349-60.
Results of two inquiries conducted in 1931 and 1944 respectively,
according to the same methods.
392. -. ‘Children’s concepts and stereotypes of Pole, Irishman, Finn, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Dane, Czechoslovakian, Hindu and Filipino’,I.genet.
PsychoI. 1950, vol. 77, no. 1, p. 73-93.
393. -. ‘Children’s intergroup attitudes’, I. genet. Psychol. 1948, vol. 72,
p. 101-9.
Influence of political events on the reactions of children towards
different countries.
394. -. ‘Nationalities children would choose if they could not be Americans’, J. genet. Psychol. 1951, vol. 79, no. 1, p. 55-68.
Children show a preference for countries whose social life they have
studied in geography lessons.
11. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY OF W A R ; NATIONAL CHARACTER A N D NATIONAL STEREOTYPES; POLITICAL,
IDEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL ANTAGONISMS
395. ABBAS,
M . T h e Sudan question: the dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian
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396. ABEGG,L. Ostasien denkt anders: Versuch einer Analyse des westostlichen Gegensatzes (East Asia’s thinking is different: attempt at
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
254
analysis of the East-West conflict). Ziirich, Atlantis Verlag, 1949,
425 p.
ABEL,T. ‘The element of decisions in the pattern of war’, Amer.
sociol. R. 1941, vol. 6, no. 6, p. 853-9.
Analysis of war strategies, based on a study of 25 great wars,
showing that the decision to declare war never springs from emotional
or sentimental tensions, or from beliefs or otlier irrational motives.
ALBERTINI,
L. T h e origins of the war of 1914. Translated and edited
by S. M. Massey, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1952-53. Maps.
ALTER,L. ‘Die biirgerliche Politokonomie als Instrument der Kriegsbrandstifter’ (Bourgeois political economy as a weapon of the warmongers), Sovietwissensch. Gesellsch. A bt. 1950, vol. 1, p, 27-46.
‘American culture and personality’, J. SOC. Issues 1951, vol. 7, no. 4,
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ARENDT,
H.T h e origins of totalitarianism. N e w York, Harcourt Brace,
1951, xv + 477 p.
First part: totalitarianism; second part: imperialism; third part: antiSemitism.
ARON,R. Les guerres en chaine. Paris, Gallimard, 1951, 503 p.
The very title of this book suggests a pessimistic answer to the
burning question: ‘Can a third world war be avoided?’ The author
presents a picture of the present-day world divided into two opposing
blocs. In this polemical work by the sociologist, Raymond Aron,
there are chapters on the changes that have taken place in cornmunism, the evolution of the labour movement and the development
of different forms of national socialism. There are also whole chapters
dealing with the origin, development and typology of the great wars
that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century and the
first half of the twentieth century, from the point of view of sociological history or historical sociology; these illustrate the philosophical
ideas worked out by the author, before the last world war, in his
Introduction d une philosophie de l’histoire, which may be siummed
up as follows: we must realize that, in the past, the future was just
as uncertain as it is today. This shows the importance ascribed.
by the author to the free will, the choice exercised by rulers; in his
view, nothing was ever predestined. H e is opposed to any unilateral
explanation of war; it is useless to single out a particular factor,
whether economic, psychological or demographic; wars are caused
by the interaction of all such factors, inextricably bound up with one
another.
403. As others see us (Britain. US.,Germany, India). Six studies. Pr&
relations. Brooke, C. ed. London, Long, 1952, 224 p.
See authors of articles: 453, 522, 559, 578.
404. Asian nationalism and the West. A symposium bused on documents
and reports of the second conference. Holland, W. L. ed. Institute
of Pacific Relation:, N e w York, Macmillan, 1953, viii + 449 p.
405. Asian relations. Holland, W. L. ed. Report of the proceedings and
documentation of the first Asian relations conference, N e w Delhi,
March-April 1947. N e w York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948.
314 p.
406. BABOULENE,J. ‘L‘Europe contre les attentismes’, Esprir Mar. 1951,
p. 393-403.
407. BARRON,J. B.; WADDAMS,
H . M. C o m m u n i s m and the churches: a
documentation. London. S. C. M . Press Ltd., 1950, 104 p.
A n attempt to define the communist attitude towards the churches
in the different people’s democracies.
408. BASSO,L.‘Analyse de la troisitme force’,Cah. int. 1949,no. 6,p. 5-12.
409. -. ‘Lutte contre la auerre. Lutte Dour la libertt’. Cah. inf. 1949.
no. 5, p. 5-14.
Analvsis of the nature of the oolitical forces which might give rise
to a third world war, with a h e w to defining the atgtudd to be
adopted by Marxists in the face of suoh an event.
410. -. ‘Le mouvement ouvrier et la guerre’, Cah. inf. 1949, no. 1, p. 6880.
Through a doctrinal and historical analysis, this article lays down
the principles which should guide the labour movement vis-&vis
imperialist warfare.
411. BEHANAN,K. I. ‘Cultural diversity and world peace’ in: Dennis, W.
Current trends in social psychology. Pittsburg, Univ. of Pittsburg Press,
1951, p. 50-70.
I. ‘Les expressions symboliques dans la psychologie
412. BELIN-MILLERON,
collective des crises politiques’,Cah. int. Sociol. 1951, no. 10, p. 158-61.
413. BERA,M . A. ‘Rapports entre peuples: France-Ecosse’, Annales 1950,
vol. 5, p. 37-42.
414. BERCHER,L. Orient-Occident’, Annie polit. &con. 1951, vol. 24,
no. 102, p. 212-51, no. 103, p. 337-52.
-
255
Analysis of the divergences between East and West and ways of
overcoming them.
BERNARD,J., see 19.
415. BIITEL, K.Der aggressive Charakter der imperialistischen Paktsysterne.
Eine Dokumentation iiber die Anfange neuer Kriegsvorbereitungen
sei! 1952 (The aggressive character of the imperialist pact system.
Dooumentation regarding the beginning of new preparations for war
since 1952). Berlin, V. V. N.Verlag, 1952, 39 p.
416. BLANSHARD,
P.American freedom and Catholic power. Boston, Beacon
Press, 1949, 350 p.
417. -. C o m m u n i s m , democracy and Catholic power. London, Cape,
1952, 340 p.
BONAPARTE,
M..see 31.
418. BOULD~G,
K. E. The organizational revolution. A study in the ethics
of economic organization. N e w York, Harper, 1953, xxxiv + 286 p.
The present period, in which a large number of new organizations
and systems have grown up, may be said to be one of ‘organizational
revolution’. The fist part of the work examines the causes and effects
of this revolution; the second describes different kinds of organization.
There is also a study of communism and of national democracy.
419. BOURGNON,E. ‘La Suisse dans le aonflit idkologique contemporain’,
Potit. e‘tr. 1952, vol. 17, no. 6, p. 477-98.
420. BOUTHOUL,G. Les guerres: e‘le‘ments de pole‘mologie. Paris, Payot.
1951, 522 p.
Part 1: Methods of a sociology of war. Traditional obstacles to an
objective study. Part 2: History of doctrines and opinions relating to
wars, from antiquity to the present day. Part 3: Morphology of war.
W a r among animals. W a r among primitive peoples. Part 4: Technical
factors in war. Evolution. General sociological influence of warfare.
Part 5: Economic aspects of war. Economic preparations for war.
Economic effects. Economic theories which endeavour to explain
wars. Part 6: Demographic factors in war. Demographic effects. Interpretations and hypotheses. Limitations of the demographic explanation. Main historical aspects. Theory of the demographic-economic
balance. ‘Demographic relaxation’. Part 7: Psychological factors in
war. W a r regarded as sacred. W a r regarded as a ‘festivity’.War
regarded as a sport. Death rites. The combatant. The leader. The
spirit of sacrifice, etc. Forms of pacifism. Part 8: The presumed causes
of war. Historical typology. Political motivation and typology. Legal
interpretations. Ideological and demographic peace plans. Disarmament plans. Part 9: Intervals at which wars occur.
The author mainly supports a demographic theory (demographic
pressure: bellidose impetus: aggression: demographic relaxations: demographic restoration).
See also 547.
BOWLBY,J., see 448.
421. BREWER,E. D.C. ‘Sect and church in Methodism’, Soc. Forces 1952,
vol. 30, no. 4, p. 408.
422. BRINTON,C. T h e anatomy of revolution. N e w York, Prentice Hall,
1952, xi + 324 p.
Revised edition of a previous work, historical study, from the
sociological angle, of the English, American, French and Russian
revolutions. Suggests, but without pressing the point, an analogy
between ‘fever’ and revolution. Bibliography on the sociology of
revolutions.
423. BROGAN,D . W. T h e price of revolution. London, Hamish Hamilton,
1951, viii + 280 p.
256
This work sets out to explain the present-day world in terms of the
concept of ‘revolution’. It draws attention to the lessons to be learnt
from past revolutions. These lessons, according to the author, would
make it possible to avoid a third world war, which would be another
kind of revolution. Particular attention is paid to the situation of the
United States of America in the world.
BROOKE,C. ed., 403.
BUCHANAN,W.,see 427.
424. BURNHAM,I. T h e coming defeat of communism. Lsndon, Cape, 1950,
286 p.
425. -. T h e struggle for the world. N e w York, John Day Co., 1947, 248 p.
In this study the author assesses the likelihood of peace in a world
governed by several imperialistic systems.
426. BUTLER,Sir H. Peace of power. London, Faber and Faber, 1947,
269 p.
Analysis of international antagonisms, which, in the author’s view,
are mainly antagonisms between liberal and authoritarian civilizations.
CANTFUL,
H.,see 45, 46.
H.; BUCHANAN,W . H o w nations see each other: a study in
427. CANTRIL,
public opinion. Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1953, 220 p.
Report on a public opinion poll, covering eight countries, carried
out under the auspices of Unesco in order to study the reciprocity
of national perceptions and attitudes: stereotypes, hostility, co-operation, general ideological patterns. Results relating to 35 items.
G.‘L’Europeet les Europtens’, Esprit December 1952, p. 995428. CASALIS,
1004.
1. Europe divided. 2. Rending asunder or mediation. 3. Relation between the various forces. 4. What w n the Europeans do?
H. ‘Le problkme idtologique des guerres capitalistes en
429. CHAMBRE,
U.R.S.S.’,
Vie intell. M a y 1953, vol. 24, p. 58-68.
430. CHAMPENOIS,
J. Le peuple russe et la guerre. Paris, Julliard, 1947,
268 p.
Some historical details concerning the German occupation of Russia.
The crisis of the German army; opinions with regard to the allies.
431. CHANDRASEKHAR,
S. ‘Population problems and international tensions’,
Int. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1949, vol. 1, no. 1-2, p. 54-63.
M. ‘Quelques rtflexions sur la guerre et la paix’, Psych6
432. CHOISY,
1949, vol. 4, p. 64-79.
The present crisis is due to the fact that m a n is not adapted to
the social conditions which he himself has brought about.
433. CLARK,
J. M. ‘Employment policy in a divided world’, Soc Res. 1950,
vol. 17, no. 2, p. 157-67.
434. CLARK,
S. D.Church and sect in Canada. Toronto, Univ. of Toronto
Press, 1948, xiii + 458 p.
435. CLARKSON,
J. D.;COCHRAN,
T. C. W a r as n social institution; the
historian’s perspective. N e w York, Columbia Univ. Pres< 1941, xvii
+ 333 p. (pub. for the American Historical Association).
436. CLAUDE,
H. D e la crise tconomique d la gzierre mondiale. Paris,
Ocia, 1945, 257 p.
COCHRAN,
T. C..see 435.
COMBAUX,
E.,see 513.
C. ‘A modest proposal’, Punch 13 Oct. 1954, p. 472-3.
437. COCKBUXN,
438. Cox, I. ‘Imperialist development schemes’, Communist R. July 1952,
p. 195-203.
The schemes for economic development are intended to prevent
the underdeveloped countries from achieving political independence.
257
439. ‘Crise ou gperre’, Cah. int. 1952, no. 38, p. 15-34.
1. Structure of a capitalist war economy: U S A . ; 2. The threat
of crisis. 3. The case of Western Europe.
440. Curtis, L. World revolution in the cause of peace. Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1949, 167 p.
The part played by revolutions in the cause of peace. Detailed
description of the American revolution of 1787 and the present
world revolution, together with their immediate and long-term results,
the changes to which they have given rise and their influence pn
world equilibrium.
441. -. World war, its cause and cure. London, Oxford Univ. Press,
H.Milford, 1945, 274 p.
DANGERFIELD,
R.,see 462.
442. DAY,
H.Non-violence et action directe. Paris, Penske et Action, 1948,
16 p.
443‘ DICKS,
H.V. ‘Observations on contemporary Russian behavior’,H u m .
Relat. 1952, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 111-17.
444. -. ‘Personality traits and National Socialist ideology’, H u m . Relat.
1950, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 111-54.
445. -. ‘Some psychological studies of the German character’, in: 230.
p. 194-218.
In this study, Dicks begins by discussing various elements in the
notion of ‘national character’. Frequent reference is made to G.Gorer,
the British author of the essay T h e American. The notion of ‘basic
personality’ according to Kardiner, is also analysed. There follows a
detailed study of the ‘motivations of German behaviour’. The classio
and irrefutable data of psycho-analysis are invoked in determining
the influence, on the adult population, of the main features of German
education and of the role and position of w o m e n (wives and mothers).
The author then cautiously refers to regional and provincial differences in the German temperament, with the object of arriving at a
general explanation of the Nationalist Socialist phenomenon.
Account is also taken of historical, geographical and economic
factors. A description follows of running opinion surveys made during the war, on random samples of German prisoners, for the purpose
of ascertaining the apparent components of Nazi fanaticism and arriving at a classification of the different temperaments. In these surveys
prominence was given to biographies and personal interviews, which
brought out the fundamental importance of the historical and economic environment in which the persons concerned were born and
grew up. Lastly, there are useful reflections on the lessons to be learnt
from these studies in connexion with present or future tensions in a
civilized world over which hangs the threat of complete de-civilization.
DINGWALL,
E. J., see 815.
446. DOMENACH,
J. M. ‘La combativit6 ouvrihre’, Esprit July-Aug. 1951,
vol. 19, nos. 7-8, p. 184-96.
F. S. War and rhe minds of men. N e w York, Harper, 1950,
447. DUNN,
xvi + 115 p.
Discusses the theory that wars begin in the ‘minds of men’. The
propaganda techniques based on this theory. Efforts made by the
United Nations to revive the sense of human freedoms.
E. F. M.;BOWLBY, J. ‘Personal aggressiveness and war’,
448. DURBIN,
W a r and democracy. London, Kegan Paul, 1938.
J. ‘La crise du Plan Marshall‘, Cah. int. 1949, no. 9-10,p. 23449. DURET,
36.
450. -. ‘Echanges internationaux et politique amkricaine’, Cah. int. 1949,
no. 1, p. 37-62.
258
A n analysis of the economic policy of the United States of America,
intended to show that it is a threat to world peace.
451. FADDEJEW,
G.D.Marksizm-leninizm o vojach spravedlych i nespravedlych (Der Marximus-Leninismus iiber gerechte und ungerechte Kriege)
(The Marxist-Leninist theory concerning just and unjust wars).
Translated by H.Weiller. Berlin, Dietz, 1953, 44 p.
452. FARBER,
M . L. 'English and American: a study in national character',
3. Psychol. 1951. vol. 32; p. 241-9.
453. FAULKNER,
A. H. 'The United Kingdom in the United States press',
in: 403.
B. C. Les Iondements the'oriques de la guerre et de la paix
454. FRIEDL,
Suivi des Cahiers de Le'nine sur Clausewitz. Paris, ed.
en U.R.S.S.
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455. FULLER,I. F. C. L'influence de l'armement sur l'histoire des guerres
me'diques 13 la seconde guerre mondiale. L'rige de la bravoure. E d g e
de la poudre. L'cige de la vapeur. L'rige du pe'trole. L'cige de I'knergie
atomique. Paris, Payot, 1948, 239 p.
456. FYFE,H. T h e illusion of national character. London, Watts & CO.,
1946, vii + 157 p.
457. GADOFFRE,
G . 'French national images and the problem of national
stereotypes', Znt. sic. Sci. Bull. 1951, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 579-87.
Set of images of different type and origin superimposed one on
the other: 1. Primordial images, very few in number, occurring in
almost all civilizations in various forms. 2. National figures (such
as Joan of Arc, Andreas Hofer, William Tell), whose character and
legends are based on, or influenced by, primordial images, and which
have finally assumed the role of occasional symbols in the life of
national communities. 3. Abstract symbols such as Liberty (first
incarnation of Marianne), Germania or Britannia. 4. Symbolic images
such as the Marianne of the Third Republic, John Bull and Uncle
Sam, midway between the abstract symbols on which they are sometimes based (as in the case of Marianne) and the stereotype proper.
Unlike abstract symbols, these symbolic images are imbued with a
certain ambivalent emotional significance, which explains the fascination they exercise on their compatriots but which, at the same time,
condemns them to deteriorate very rapidly outside the boundaries of
their o w n country into over-simplified and malevolent stereotypes.
G. M . Nuremberg diary. N e w York, Farrar, Straus, 1947;
458. GILBERT,
London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948, xii + 288 p.
459. -. T h e psychology of dictatorship based on an examination of the
leaders of Nazi Germany. N e w York, Ronald Press, 1950, 327 p.
460. GISEVIUS,
H. B. To the bitter end. Translated from the German b y
R. and C1. Winston. Cambridge, Riverside Press, 1947, xv + 632 p.
461. GLOVER,
E. War. sadism and pacifism. London, George Allen, Unwin,
1947, 292 p.
This is an enlarged edition of essays by an eminent psychologist,
first published in 1933. The principles on which Dr. Glover based
his original arguments were not altered by the actual outbreak of
war and he has extended the scope of the essays by adding 10 chapters based on 'clinical and sociological researches on the causes of
war and on methods of war prevention.'
462. GORDEN,
D. L.; DANGERFIELD,
R. T h e hidden weapon. N e w York,
Harper, 1947, xii + 238 p.
463. GORER,
G. T h e American people: a study in national character. N e w
York, Norton, 1948, 246 p.
The author sets out to study American society from the practical,
psychological and social points of view. His reflections therefore
259
range from the average American’s fear of not being sufhciently
intelligent, to the influence exercised by recent immigrants on the
psychology of Americans, and to the predominating influence of the
child in the U S A .
See also 0.Klineberg’s remarks on this work in 144.
G.‘The concept of national character’, Sci. N e w s (Harmonds464. GORER,
worth), 1950, vol. 18, p. 104-22.
465. GORER,
G.; RICKMAN,
J. The people of Great Russia: a psychological
study. New York, Chanticleer, 1950, 236 p.
466. GRAVEN,
J. ‘Les crimes contre l’humanitc?, Recueil des cours de
1‘Acade‘mie de droit international. Paris, 1950, vol. 76, no. 1, p. 427605.
Historical and legal study of crimes against humanity.
GRIFFIN,
J., see 542.
467. GRODZU~S,
M. Americans betrayed: politics and the Japanese evacuation. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949, xvii + 444 p.
D.5. ‘German sociology under Hitler 1933-1941’,Soc. Forces
468. HAGER,
1949, vol. 28, no. 1, p. 6-19.
E.;ROETTER,
C.; THOMAS,
H.Meet the British. London, New469. HAHN,
man, Neane, 1953, 132 p.
470. HARCOURT,
R. d’. C o m m e n t traiter l‘dllemagne. Paris, Tallandier,
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The point of view of Swiss pastors with regard to the psychological and moral aspects of the attitude to be adopted towards
post-war Germany.
A. T. Bomber oflensive. London, Collins, 1947, 288 p.
471. HARRIS,
472. HEBWLE,
R. ‘On political ecology’, Soc. Forces 1952, vol. 31, no. 1,
p. 1-9.
473. -. Social movements: an introduction to political sociology. New
York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951, xiii + 478 p.
474. HEIDEN,
K. ‘The Germans on our side: what are they like today’
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E. ‘The West and the East’, Soc. Res. 1949, vol. 16, no. 1,
475. HEIMANN,
p. 45-69.
Analysis of the points of difference between East and West. History
of how these conflicts arose. Possible ways of solving them.
476. HERRFAHRDT,
H. ‘Die Bedeutung des Ausgleichs von Gruppengegensatzen fur das Staatsleben der Gegenwart’ (The importance, for
present-day political life, of ironing out intergroup differences),
paper presented to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Litge,
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HOLLAND,
W.L., see 404. 405.
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477. HORWIMER,
The study of fascism reveals the process and importance of the
phenomenon of identification, to which regard must be had if peace
is to be re-established with Germany.
478. Hsu, F. L. K. Americans and Chinese: two ways of life. New York,
H. Schuman, 1953, 460 p.
Chapter 16 of this work (p. 401) describes the American view of,
and reaction to, communism.
R. 0. Georges Sorel-prophet without honor. A study
479. HUMPHREY,
in anti-intellectualism. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1951, 246 p.
One of two recent studies on Sorel, reviving interest in the theory
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480. H m , C. L. ‘The life cycle of dictatorship as seen in treatment of
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481. Imperialismus (Der). Quelle der Aggression und der Annexionskriege
260
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482. ‘International tensions in the Middle East’, Proc. Acrid. polit. Sci.
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Three parts: ‘Economy and racial questions’; ‘Problems of political forces and stability’; ‘The Middle East and world peace’.
483. JANNE, H. ‘Le rBle de la mtfiance mutuelle dans l’inttgration institutionnelle des Etats-Unis sous l’empire de la ntcessitk’, paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Liege, 1953, section 11, part 1, 4 p. [See 63.1
484. JUNG, C. G. Aufsutze zur Zeitgeschichte (Essays on contemporary
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Present-day problems and conflicts, from the angle of group psychoanalysis.
485. KANE,
J. J. ‘Protestant-Catholic tensions’, Amerc. sociol. R . 1951,
vol. 16, no. 4, p. 663-72.
KAPLAN,
A.,see 492.
W . H . T h e Chinese student movement. N e w York, King’s
486. KIANG,
Crown Press, 1948, x + 176 p.
487. KLAUS,
C. Germany. N e w York, World Tension, 1951.
488. KOGON,E. Theory and practice of hell: the German concentration
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490. LASKI,H. Re‘flexions sur la re‘volution de notre temps. Paris, Le
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Present contradiction between the political sovereignty of the
masses and the economic sovereignty of the privileged class-a contradiction between the structure of capitalist society and the forces
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and overcome the contradictions.
H. D. T h e political writings. Glencoe, The Free Press,
491. LASSWELL,
1951, 528 p.
Collection of three essays on political science. In the first, entitled
‘Psycho-pathological politics’, the author emphasizes the close and
active association that should exist between psycho-pathology and
politics. The ‘politics of prevention’ are regarded as an excellent
outlet for man’s constructive powers. In the second essay entitled
‘Politics: w h o gets what, when, how?’ Lasswell sets out to show
that political conduct depends first and foremost on the conduct of
the individual in society. Hence the need for a psychological study
of politics. The last essay ‘Democratic character’ warns against the
danger of separating the ‘ideal’ and the ‘material’ in human conduct.
These two concepts are closely bound up with one another-a fact
that should be taken into account in modern political science.
H. D.;KAPLAN,
A. Power and society. A framework for
492. LASSWELL,
political inquiry. London, Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1952, xxiv + 295 p.
A work designed to establish the basic concepts and hypotheses
of ‘political science’ as against ‘politics’. The author upholds the
theory that ‘science’and ‘politics’ are not unrelated and that ‘theory’
and ‘practice’ must not be divorced from each other.
LAVERGNE,
B., see 875.
493. LEITES,
N. Operational code of the Politburo. N e w York, M c G r a w
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Documentation on Soviet strategy.
261
494. LBMMON,S. M c C . ‘The ideology of the “Dixiecrat movement” ’,
Soc. Forces 1951, vol. 30, no. 1, p. 162-71.
495. LENIN,V. I. Sozialismus und Krieg (Socialism and war). Berlin,
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LERNER,
D.;LASSWELL,
H . D.,see 161.
D.;POOL,I. de S.; SCHUELER, G. K. T h e Nazi klite. Stan496. LERNER,
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497. LETELLIER,
A . Les causes des guerres avec I‘Allemagne. Paris, Charles Lavauzelle, 1945, 149 p.
Historical study describing the origin of movements for the unification of Europe.
498. LEWIN,H. S., ‘Hitler youth and the boy scouts of America’, H u m .
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499. LIU,S. T. Infernationalismus und Nationalismus (Internationalism
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K.;THOMSON,
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502. LUCCHINI,
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503. LUZAREV,
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504. MCCORMICK,
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Psychological reflections on the Bolshevist and National Socialist
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506. MCKEON,
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Thirty-four sociologists discuss the controversial concept of
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507. MANNHEIM,
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50%. MARBOTT,
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Difference of moral beliefs as an explanation of present political
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509. MARITAIN,
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510. MARK,M. ‘Nationalism versus Communism in South-East Asia’,
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262
munism that will assume a national character unless it is opposed
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511. MAURER,
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513. MISCHE,
F. 0.;COMBAUX,
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Attempt to determine the points of friction (this part of the work
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514. MONNEROT,
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516. MOORE,
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Analysis of the aims and strategy of Soviet politics.
517. MORGENSTERN,
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521. NAESS,
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Carefully documented study of the leaders of Chinese parties from
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525. NORTHROP,
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263
with Russia and the United States of America; the Far East as
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527. NUMELIN,
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528. OFSTAD,
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529. OGBURN,
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531. ORMESSON,
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Diplomat’s views on the German problem immediately after the
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532. PADOVER,S. K. ‘America and Europe: mutual misunderstandings’,
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Analysis of misunderstandings dividing America and Europe. They
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533. PARK,No-Yong. T h e white man’s peace: an oriental view of our
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534. PERROTTI,
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535. PIPPING,
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[See 63.1
POOL,I. de S.,see 496.
536. POSSONY, S. T. A century of conflict. Chicago, Regnery, 1953, xx +
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Work recounting the origins of Marxist theories in relation to the
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Socio-political and historical analysis which throws new light on
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[See also 562.1
537. QUINT,
H.H.T h e forging of American socialism: origins of the modern
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538. RAO,C. R. Culture conflicts: cause and cure. Paroda, Padmaja Publications, 1946, 100 p.
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539. RATTENBACH,
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The extension of modern wars. The cold war. Evolution towards
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540. REISCHAUER,
E. 0.T h e United States and Japan. Cambridge, Harvard
Univ. Press, 1950, xvii + 357 p.
Four parts, dealing respectively with: (a) the history of relations
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occupation and post-war problems.
541. RESHETAR,
J. S. Jr. T h e Ukrainian revolution 1917-1920: a study in
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542. RICHARDSON,
L. F.; GRIFFIN,
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R O E ~ E RC,
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N. L. ‘Sovetskaja Rossija i kapitalistizeskie gosudarstva
543. ROOBINSTEIN,
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544. RUSSEL,
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Economic competition, which could possibly be solved by co-operation.
545. RUTLAND,W. B. ‘Church-State relations in America: status and
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navii (Aggravation of Anglo-American differences in Scandinavia),
1952,
in: Questions d’iconornie (Acadtmie des sciences de l’U.R.S.S.),
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547. SCHOLZ, K. ‘Bemerkungen zu G. Bouthoul’s “Les guerres” ’ (Remarks
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[See 420.1
SCHUELER,G. K.,see 496.
548. SCHWARZENBERGER,
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In foreign policy, war is merely pressure carried to the extreme.
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549. -. ‘Peace and war in international society. 11: International institutions and the problem of peace and war’, Int. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1950,
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The author discusses the influence of international judicial, legislative, governmental and administrative institutions on war and
peace in an international society.
550. -. ‘Peace and war in international society. 111: Peace and war under
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A study of international institutions such as the League of Nations
and the United Nations, and of the prerequisites for peace in an
international community.
551. SEELY, C. S. Philosophy and the ideological conflict. N e w York,
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Ideological conflict between the capitalist and communist worlds.
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Study of the part played by organizations and organizational
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553. SIEGFRIED,A. ‘La psychologie des relations anglo-allemandes’.
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554. SILBENER,
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555. SOUKHOMLINE,V. ‘Origines et dessous de la guerre de CorBe’, Cah.
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Historical survey of the events that shaped Soviet and American
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557. SPEIER,H. Social order and the risks of war. N e w York, Stewart,
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Series of articles written over a period of 20 years, and for the
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558. SPROTT,W.J. H.‘The policy makers’, paper submitted to_the Second
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--
63.11
Essay on the parts played by those w h o ‘shape’policy and on the
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559. STEED,R. H. C. ‘On coverage of British news in the West German
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National stereotypes and international understanding; see 268.
F. Capitalism and socialism on trial. London, V. Gol560. STERNBERG,
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Study of the rise of capitalism, its conquests and crises. Rise of
socialism, Their tensions against the background of the two world
wars. The future of socialism in Europe. The contribution it may
make to world peace.
561. -. The end of a revolution. Soviet Russia from revolution to reaction. N e w York, John Day, 1953, 191 p.
R.; POSSONY,S. T. International relations in the age
562. STRAUSZ-HUPE,
of the conflict between democracy and dictatorship. N e w York,
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563. SUZUKI,I. ‘Senso ni kansuru nisan no Jinruigaku-teki Kosatsu’ (Some
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564. SWEEZY,P. M. ‘L’Bconomie americaine et la menace de guerre’, Cah.
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568. TCHEPRAKOV,
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569. TENG,Ssu-Yu. N e w light on the history of the Taiping rebellion.
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570. TENNENBAUM,
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THOMAS,
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571. TOMASIC,
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572. -. Personality and culture in Eastern Europe. N e w York, Stewart,
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574. VAN DER HORSTL. ‘ D e sociaal-psychologische achtergronden van de
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The totalitarian as opposed to the Christian concept of man.
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575. VOTOLINE,
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WADDANS,
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576. WARBURG,
J. P. Germany: key to peace. Cambridge, Harvard Univ.
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577. WEHBERG, H.Krieg und Eroberung im Wandel des Volkerrechts (War
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578. WEHNER,
C. ‘Germany in the British press’, in: 403.
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579. WELWN,
York, M c G r a w Hill, 1947, xi + 301 p.
580. WELLS,
H. G.T h e new world order. N e w York, Knopf, 1940.
581. WERNER,
M. D. ed. Stalin’s K a m p f . N e w York, Howell, Soskin,
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582. WILLIAMS,
W. A. American-Russian relations. N e w York, Rinehart
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Attempt to prove that the differences between Russia and the
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Q. ‘The importance of the study of international tensions.
583. WRIGHT,
Meaning of social tension’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1950, vol. 2, no. 1,
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After defining social tension and showing h o w it should be studied,
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584. WRIGHT,
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The characteristics of war. Prevention and winning of wars. Conflict and contradiction. Conflict and tension. Conflict and competition.
Conflict and co-operation. Types of conflict. Tendencies of conflict.
Conflict by coercion or persuasion. Settlement of conflicts. Conflicts
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585. -. ‘Some reflections on war and peace’, Amer. J. Psychiat. 1950,
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586. -. A study of war. Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press, 1942, 2 vol.,
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Broad study, conducted between 1926 and 1941, summing up the
work of several dozen research workers in all disciplines. An
exhaustive study of all theories relating to the ‘phenomenon of war’
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J. M. Religion in the strugg7e for power: a study in the
587. YINGER,
sociology of religion. Durham, Duke Univ. Press, 1946, xiv + 275 p.
The author investigates the extent to which the religious ideal
determines the structure of religious groups, and discusses three
points of tension: (a) The conflict between the purity of a religious
ideal and the power groups existing in every society. (b) The formation-in order to ease tension-of small communities and sects that
refuse to compromise. (c) The social aspect of choice. The compromise accepted by the rich but refused by the poor. Constant interaction of worldly and religious interests.A few examples from history.
The influence of the churches on the social order; their efforts to
attenuate injustice and brutality, but their caution with regard to
changes of structure.
588. ZABRISKIE,
E. H. American-Russian rivalry in the Far East. Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1946, vii + 226 p.
E. Die K a m p a g n e gegen die Remilitarisierung in Deutsch589. ZANDER,
land (The campaign against remilitarization in Germany). London,
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590. ZIFF,
W. B. T w o worlds: a realistic approach to the problem of
keeping the peace. N e w York, Harper, 1946, 365 p.
591. ZINKIN,
M.Asia and the West. N e w York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951.
The author explains why, in his opinion, the only way whereby
two-thirds of the world’s population can escape from the communist
orbit is for Western free enterprise and capital to win the respect of
Asia. A few pages of comment on Eastern industry.
F. Modern nationalities. A sociological study. Urbana,
592. ZNANIECKI,
Univ. of Illinois Press, 1952, xvi + 196 p.
Remarkably concise work, in which the author attempts to trace
the origins of societies with a national culture. to list the important
factors in their mutual relations, and to indicate the sources of conflict which may arise between them, together with the means of
reducing such conflicts so that some form of culture may appear. If
the author’s hypotheses prove true, the obvious inference is that
Unesco is the most important of the international organizations.
G. P. ‘Aggressija amerikanskogo imperializma v Koree.
593. ZODOROJNI,
Poruganie meidunarodnogo prava’ (American imperialistic aggression
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FEDERALISM;
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594. ADRIAN,
A. H.;BEALES,A. C. F. La bataille de la paix. Les chances
du fe‘de‘ralisrne.Paris, Ed. du Monde Nouveau, 1947 (Cornrnunaute‘
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595. AZCARATE, P. de. League of Nations and national minorities. N e w
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Report submitted by the former Director of the Administrative
and Minorities Section of the League of Nations on the problems
of minorities in Europe. The solution he proposes is the compilation
of a list of the rights of minorities.
596. BARRET, E. W. Truth is our weapon. N e w York, Funk Wagnalls Co.,
1953, xviii + 355 p.
597. ‘Bataille de la paix’, Cah. M o n d e nouv. 1947, vol. 3, no. 6, 318 p.
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H o w to make it possible to organize peace.
598. BAUER, J. M a k e the U N . effective for peace. N e w York, Richard
R. Smith, 1952, 160 p.
Having regard to the world situation with the two leading powers
strongly armed, Bauer proposes an original peace plan involving the
adoption of a charter which would prohibit all aggression, prevent
the manufacture of armaments and establish an international force
which would itself be responsible for inspecting the territories of
Member States.
BEALES, A. C. F.,see 594.
599. BEBLER, A. ‘The bases of peace’, Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC. Sci.
July 1952, p. 91-6.
The origin of our present international crises is not to be sought
in the differences of ideology and social structure between States.
600. BEGLINGER, J. F. Les conditions tconorniques de la paix. Preface by
Professor Piatier. Paris, Librairie GBntrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1951 (Collection de la nouvelle e‘cole de Lausanne), 268 p.
601. BENDA,J. ‘Pour un gouvernement mondial. Le probltme de la paix
et les nations’ Fontaine 1946, vol. 51, p. 611-26.
In order to end war it is necessary, not to forfeit national identity,
but to place the interests of mankind above the interests of the
individual or nation.
602. BENOITDE LAPAILLONE,
J. de. L’unite‘ mondiale: essai sur les fe‘dkralismes et les irnoe‘rialismes mondiaux d E‘e‘ooque
contemporaine.
~Marseille, Univ. d’Aix, 1949.
603. BERNHEIM, E. ‘Pour crter une mentalit6 europtenne’, Soc. Belge Et.
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604. BERNIS,G.de. ‘L’unitB internationale est-elle possible?’, Esprit April
1952, p. 630-57.
The part played by international student organizations in the
building of peace.
605. BOIS,J. ‘Anatomie de la paix (E.Reves)’, Christ. SOC. 1947, vol. 55,
p. 149-53.
A study of the work by E. Reves. Peace is compromised by the
uncontrolled authority which national States aim at exercising.
606. BONNEFOUS, E. L’ide‘e europe‘enne et sa rialisation. Paris, Ed. du
Grand SiBcle, 1950, 360 p.
History of the idea of European unity and of the attempts to
translate it into fact. Need for putting an end to the division into
blocs. Economic and demographical survey. Several annexes.
607. BONNET,H. ‘Human rights are basic to success of United Nations’,
Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC. Sci. 1946, vol. 243, p. 6-7.
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608. ‘Bor’ba za mir i trudovye pobedy sovetskogo naroda’ (The Soviet
people’s fight for peace and for successes on the labour front),
Bull. Acad. Sci. U.R.S.S.(Economics and L a w Section), 1951, vol. 3,
p. 161-71.
609. Bosc, R. ‘Pax Christi, Pie XI1 et la guerre froide’, Etudes 1952,
vol. 275, no. 12, p. 360-71.
610. BRAMSON,A. ‘Rozbrojenie jako warunek wspolpraci miedzynarodowej’
(Disarmament as a prerequisite for international co-oper_ation), Ann.
Dr. int. (Poland) 1949, p. 73-85.
611. BRINTON,C. F r o m many one. T h e process of political integralion
and the problem of world government. Cambridge, Harvard Univ.
Press. 1948. vi + 126 D.
BRITTAIN, V., see 615.
612. BRUGEL, J. W . ‘Sicherung des Friedens durch Ausgestaltung des Volkerrechts. Die Arbeiten der Volkerrechtskommission der Vereinten
Nationen’ (The safeguarding of peace through the development of
international law. The activities of the International L a w Commission
of the United Nations), Europa Archiv 1952, p. 5-135.
H. G.‘The sociology of international relations’, Amer, sociol.
613. CALLIS,
R. 1947, vol. 12, no. 3, p. 323-34.
Study of the institutional structures of present-day nations, with
special reference to the problems of mutual assimilation and integration into a society forming a whole.
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENTFOR INTERNATIQNAL PEACE,see 673.
W. F. ‘Education and international order’,
614. CAM, W. G.;MURRA,
R. educ. Res. 1949, vol. 19, p. 57-76.
G.; BRITTAW,V.; HODGES,
S. Above all nations. London,
615. CATLIN,
Gollancz, 1945, 87 p.
616. CHASE,S. ‘Der W e g z u m Weltmenschen’ (Towards supra-national
man), Amer. Rundschau 1949-50, vol. 6, p. 3-13.
Anthropology can teach us respect for other countries and thus
lead to the establishment of a truly cosmopolitan outlook.
617. CHAUMONT,
C.L a se‘curite‘des Etats et la skurite‘ du monde. Preface
by Fouques-Duparc. Paris, Librairie Gtntrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1948, 158 p.
618. CORMAN,
L. L a non-violence duns la conduite des peuples et duns la
conduite de soi-&me. Paris, Delamain et Boutellan, 1949, 189 p.
619. CORREA,
J. E. L a paz internacional. Accidn de Ledn XI11 y sus succesores. Argentina, author, 1950, 24 p.
620. COULET,
P. L’Eglise et la paix. Paris, Action Populaire, Editions
Spes, 1950, 224 p.
Christianity and peace; peace in the city; peace in the social order;
peace in business; peace among the peoples.
P. M. L’EgZise est pour la paix. Textes des papes groupis.
621. CRAN,
Preface by R. P. Bigo. Paris, Ed. Pax Christi, 1952, 64 p.
The articles are grouped under four main headings: ways and
means of negotiation; how to stop the armaments race; peace and
economic relations; responsibility of the peoples. As stated in the
preface, the basic idea underlying the teaching of the Church is to
reawaken, in the nations, an awareness of their c o m m o n membership
of humanity.
622. DAUR,
R. W a r u m eigentlich? Ein Gesprach uber Krieg, Frieden und
unsere heutige Aufgabe (What is it all about? A talk about war, peace
and our task today). Stuttgart, Klotz, 1953, 32 p.
623. DAVIS,
J. Peace, war, and you. New York, Henry Schuman, 1952,
282 p.
270
624. DEGRE,
G. ‘Freedom and social structure’, Amer. sociol. R. 1946,
vol. 11, no. 5, p. 529-36.
625. Disarmament question, 1945-53 (The). London, Central Office of
Information, 1953, 27 p.
Study of the question in the light of new weapons, treaties, and the
political and psychological atmosphere in the different countries.
A disarmament plan is put forward.
626. DOMENACH,
J. M.;FRAISE,P. ‘De la peur ?i la coexistence’, Esprit
1951, no. 3, p. 333-43.
627. EAGLETON,
C. ‘The pacific settlement of disputes under the Charter’,
Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC. Sci. July 1946, p. 24-9.
628. EBBINGHAUS, J. ‘Uber die Idee der Toleranz. Eine staatsrechtliche
und religions-philosophischeUntersuchung. (The idea of tolerance. A n
inquiry from the standpoint of constitutional law, religion and philosophy), Archiv Phil. 1950, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 1-34.
629. EMMANUEL,
F. ‘Le pacifisme des forts’, Esprit Jan. 1949, p. 162-80.
Revision of pacifism, according to the example of individuals,
groups and popular movements that have worked for the establishment of peace.
FRAISSE,
P.,see 626.
F. ‘Peut-on faire la paix par la magie?’, Esprit Feb. 1949,
630. FRANCOIS,
p. 197-214.
H. ‘A propos du bilinguisme mondial’, M o n d e nouv. 1952,
631. FRENAY,
vol. 8, no. 59, p. 52-5.
Draft resolution, produced by the National Assembly’s Foreign
AEairs Commission, for a governmental agreement on the compulsory
teaching of English and French.
632. FRENZEL,R. Die Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (The United
Nations). Die Notwendigkeit ihrer Umwandlung aus einem Instrument
der Kriegspolitik Amerikas in ein wichtiges Organ der Aufrechterhalrung des Friedens und der internationalen Sicherheit. Berlin, Verlag der Nation, 1953, 48 p. (Schriften der Hochschule fiir nationale
Politik, 6).
As the subtitle indicates, the thesis here is the need for making
the United Nations into a vital organ for the maintenance of peace
and international security, instead of an instrument of United States
policy.
L. ‘Suwerennosc a karta Narodow Zjednoczonych’ (Sove633. GELBERG,
reignty and the United Nations Charter), in: Panstwo Pruwo 1950,
vol. 49, p. 14-23.
Critical study of the United Nations Charter.
G.Aprts la guerre, la paix totale. Paris, Ed. Mtdicis, 1945,
634. GOZARD,
120 p.
Part I: Study of the essential prerequisites for the effective operation of international organizations (disarmament, settlement of the
minorities problem, regional agreements, elimination of the totalitarian spirit, etc.) Part 11: Study of the organizations working for
peace.
635. Guerre et paix. D e la coexistence des blocs d une communaute‘ internationale. 40e semaine sociale de France, Pau, 1953. Gabalda, Paris,
Edition de la Chronique Sociale, 1953, 400 p.
Verbatim report of some twenty speeches by university people,
lawyers and philosophers, members of the regular and secular clergy,
and politicians. The semaines sociales do not conceal their Catholic
complexion; it appears most plainly when the speaker attempts to
demonstrate the basic concern of the Church and the Vatican for
international peace at the end of the nineteenth and the first half of
271
the twenticth century; it is sometimes more diffimlt to disccrn when
Father Big0 talks of the material and ideological causes of our
present chaos, and especially when Father Delos outlines the general
principles of a ‘sociology of modern war’ 2nd studies the theory of
the ‘just war’. This later theory occupies a central place in these
discussions.
636. HAGEMANN,
M . ‘Rechtssoziologische Probleme der Friedenssicherung
durch internationale Organisationen’ (Legal and sociological problems in the enforcement of peace through international organizations), Arch. d. VSlkerrechts 1948, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 302-30.
637. HEAD,
A. H. Pattern of peace. London, Conservative and Unionist
Central Office, 1951, 31 p.
638. HEISE,
C. E., Der W e g zum Weltfrieden. Demokratische Gedanken
uber Frieden U. Menschenrecht (The way to world peace. Democratic
reflections on peace and human rights). Wien, A. F. Goeth, 1947,
35 p.
639. HERMLIN,
S. Die Sache des Friedens. Aufsatze und Berichte (The
cause of peace. Essays and reports). Berlin, Verlag Volk und Welt,
1953, 397 p.
640. HESNARD,
A. ‘La morale Bducative traditionnelle retarde la citoyennet6 mondiale’. Psyche‘ 1948. nos. 23-24, D. 997-1000.
HODGES,
S., see 615.
641. HULA,
E. ‘Four years of the United Nations’, Soc. Res. 1949, vol, 16,
no. 4, p. 395-415.
A. G. ‘International organisations and conferences. Notes of
642. HUTH,
our observer’, Soc. Res. 1950, vol. 17, no. 4, p. 498-511.
J. N . ‘The United Nations and the peaceful adjustment of
643. HYDE,
disputes’, Proc. Acad. polit. Sei. 1953, vol. 25;no. 2, p. 80-9.
644. JOYCE, J. A. World in the making: fhe story of international cooperation. New York, Henry Schuman Inc., 1953, 159 p.
645. JUNGER, E. L a paix. Translated from the German by B. and A. Petitjean. Paris, La Table Ronde, 1948, 257 p.
The psychological prerequisites for the establishment of peace.
W. ‘The Gandhian way’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1953, vol. 5, no. 2,
646. KABIR,
p. 397-416.
Study of the contribution of Gandhian concepts and methods
towards the removal of national and international tensions by thinkers of various countries, assembled at N e w Delhi from 5 to
17 January 1953.
647. K a m p f um den Frieden (Der). Eirz neuer Weltkrieg oder eine
neue Ordnung? Mit Beitragen von: (The battle for peace. A new
world war or a new order? With contributions from:) A. C.F. Beales,
L. de Broglie, G. Brugmans, A. Marc, A. de la Pradelle, A. Evans,
A. Gafenco, J. Leclercq, F. A. Kranet, L. Ledermann, W. Gurian,
R. Dautry, W. Ropke, F. de Menthon, A. D. Toledano, W . Rappard.
Koblenz, Historisch-politischer Verlag, 1948, 186 p.
Plea for European federalism as the only way of safeguarding
peace. One chapter deals with the origin and development of tensions
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
E. T h e law of freedom as the remedy for war and poverty.
648. KORNER,
Introduction by A . Amonn. Translated from the German by
H. L. Farnell. London, Norgate, 1951, 2 vol.
J. ‘Faire la paix’, Esprit Mar. 1951, p. 326-32.
649. LACROIX,
1. Rejection of preventive war. 2. Rejection of opportunities for
war. 3. Accomplishment of a revolutionary task.
,
272
_
P. ‘Problkmes de paix et problkmes de civilisation’, Econ.
650. LAURAC,
et H u m a n . 1952, vol. 2, no. 74, p. 71-8.
East-West tensions. The chances of peace and of the elimination
of poverty.
651. LEBRUNKERIS,
G. ‘La crise des organisations internationales’, Chron.
SOC. France Mar.-June 1953, p. 224-33.
The author shows h o w no international organization can fulfil its
object unless it endeavours to put an end to two types of conflict-the conflict between two great powers, and the conflict between
countries at varying stages of economic development.
652. LENTZ,T.F. ‘The attitudes of world citizenship’, 1. SOC. Psychol. 1950,
vol. 32, p. 207-14.
653. LEONTIEV, B. L. ‘Bor’ba za mir, moguEie dviienie sovremennosti’
(The peace campaign, a powerful movement in the world of today),
Questions philosophiques 1950, vol. 1, p. 21-34.
654. LEVI, W. Fundamentals of world organization. Minneapolis, Univ.
of Minnesota Press, 1950, x +234 p.
The author discusses the present problems of mankind and concludes that a very definite type of world organization is required,
especially at the international level. Realizing that the basic problem
is the current inability of the peoples to achieve this type of organization, he stresses the need for first drawing up a programme that would
remedy this handicap from the political, economic and practical
standpoints.
655. LEVY,W. ‘The peaceful solution of international conflicts’, paper
submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Likge, 1953,
section 11, part 2, 8 p. [See 63.1
656. LIEN,A. J. ‘The road to a world state’, Soc. Sci. 1951, vol. 30, no. 3,
p. 83-6.
657. LILIENTHAL, A. M. Which way to world government. N e w York,
Foreign Policy Association, 1950, 66 p.
658. LIPSET,
S. M. Agrarian socialism: the cooperative commonwealth
federation in Saskatchewan. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1950,
xvii + 350 p.
659. LONG, W . ‘The philosophical bases of peace’, Personalist 1946, vol 21,
p. 16-28.
660. LUTAUD,0.‘Apprendre la coexistence’, Christ. SOC. 1952, vol. 60,
nos. 5-6, p. 262-4.
661. MANACORDA, G. ‘La storia e la pace’, Societd 1951, vol. 7, no. 4,
p. 663-9.
Comments on the international seminar on history teaching and
international understanding, organized by Unesco at Skvres.
662. MANGONE, G. J. T h e idea and practice of world government, N e w
York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951, xiv + 278 p.
K. ‘Cultural pluralism and linguistic equilibrium in Switzer663. MAYER,
land’ (descriptive study), Amer. sociol. R. 1951, vol. 16, no. 2,
p. 157-63.
664. MAYER
DE ZULLEN,
D. Por la paz del mundo. Lima, Emp. Editors,
1950 ( L a cronica y variedades SA.), 5 p.
665. MAYEUX, M . R. Organisation supranationale de la paix. Contribution
ci I’e‘tude de la penske pontificale aux xrxe et x x e siPcles. Paris, Editions OuvriBres, 1949, 272 p.
666. MILHAUD,
E. Sur la ligne de partage des temps. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, 320 p.
According to the author himself, this work is designed to be a
‘summing-up’or ‘settlement of accounts’. It is a detailed political
study of the period from 1914 to the present day. The author condemns
273
the weaknesses of treaties and international organizations, and considers that the world can be saved and all tensions reduced only
by building up an all-powerful,really high-principled United Nations.
667. MONPIED,
E.;ZALESKI,
E.Bibliographie fe‘de‘raliste.Paris, Union Ftdtraliste Universitaire, 1950-51, multigraphite, 3 fasc. No. 1 : ‘640 ouvrages choisis’. N o . 2: ‘Articles et documents publits dans les pbiodiques parus en France de nov. 45 L Oct. 1950’. Avant-propos
d’A. Marc. No. 3: ‘Federalist bibliography. Articles and documents
published in British periodicals 1945-51’.
668. MOOR, E. W a s konnen wir heute fur den Frieden tun? (What can w e
do for peace today?) Zurich, Pazifistische Biicherstube, 1951, 15 p.
669. MORICE, L. Vers I‘Empire du Monde. Paris, Calmann-Ltvy, 1947,
215 p.
The author deduces from the laws of history that a lasting peace
will soon be established.
670. MOUNIER, E. ‘Les 6poques du pacifisme’, Esprit Feb. 1949, p. 181-96.
The requirements of true pacifism, ideologically and technically;
the frequent tendency to separate these two aspects. Positive pacifism
and political action.
MURRA,
W. F., see 614.
H. T. M a h a t m a Gandhi; peaceful revolutionary. N e w
671. MUZUMDAR,
York, Scribner’s 1952, xi + 127 p.
672. NASH,V. T h e world must be governed. N e w York, Harper, 1949,
206 p.
The author is a convinced federalist and believes in the possibility
of federal world government.
673. ‘National programs of international cultural relations’, Int. Conciliation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), June 1950.
674. NETTLAU,
M.L a paz mundial y las condiciones de si1 realizacidn. Montevideo, Humanidad, 1950, 72 p.
675. NISBET,
R. A. T h e search for community: a study in the ethics of
order and freedom. N e w York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1953, ix + 303 p.
Condemns the disintegration of modern society, owing to excessive
centralization, and bases his hypothesis on an historical study of the
question. Concludes that freedom is bound up with the diversity of
cultures, regional ‘plurality’and, above all, the separation of powers.
676. NOACK,
V. Die Sicherung des Friedens durch Neutralisierung Deutschlands und seine ausgleichende weltwirtschaftliche Aufgabe. (The neutralization of Germany as a safeguard for peace. Germany as a
balancing factor in world economy). Koln, SchaEstein, 1948, 43 p.
677. PAGE,K. N o w is the time to prevent a third world war. California,
Los Habra, 1946, 123 p.
678. Pie XI1 et la paix internationale 1939-1950.Paris, Spes. Action populaire, 1951, 32 p.
The Pope’s statements in the face of events.
[PIE XII, see also 7041.
679. POLLARD,
F. E. Democracy and the Quaker method. London, Bannisdale Press, 1949, 160 p.
680. PORDEA,G. A. ‘La defense de la paix. Reflexions sur la crise des
Nations Unies et sur les conditions generales d’existence des organismes de stcurit6 sociale’, R. Dr. int. (Gendve) July-Sept. 1952,
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H. 1st Friede noch moglich? Die Verantwortung der
681. RAUSCHNING,
Macht (Is Deace still possible? The responsibility of power). Heidelberg, Vowhckel, 1953, 331 p.
682. REVES,E. T h e anatomy of peace. N e w York, Harper, 1945, 275 p.
274
683. REYMOND, A. ‘Le respect des cultures, conditions de paix’, Et. phil.
1948, vol. 3, p. 189-96.
A. H.‘Can social scientists prevent war? Quart. R. 1954,
684. RICHMOND,
no. 600, p. 255-68.
685. RICEUR,P. ‘L‘homme non violent et sa prtsence b l’histoire’, Esprit
Feb. 1949, p. 224-34.
686. -. ‘Pour la coexistence pacifique des civilisations’, Esprit Mar. 1951,
p. 408-19.
The easing of East-West tensions by a process of educating public
opinion to recognize the causes of the present unrest, viz. a ‘crusading
spirit’ and the pushing of claims based on historical arguments. Task
of decomposing the blocs. Necessary tension and collaboration between ‘non-violent resistance’ and ‘progressist violence’.
687. RIVIERE,
J. P. Medida politica del hombre. Argentina, ed. El Atenco,
1948, 250 p.
688. -. ‘Sociologia de la communidad internacional’, Dincim. SOC. 1951,
vol. 1, no. 1, p. 11-12.
689. ROMULO, C. P. ‘Human rights as a condition of peace in the Far
East’, Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC. Sci. 1946, no. 243, p. 8-10.
690. SAINT-JEAN,L. ‘L’organisation de la paix et le principe ftdtratif‘,
Cah. M o n d e nouv. 1946, vol. 2, p. 122-34.
691. SALOMON, A. L’0.N.U. et la paix (ThBse). Paris. Editions Internationales, 1948, 204 p.
Critical study of Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter.
SALV‘IN,M.,see 695.
692. SARAGAT, G. Zl prob2ema della pace, Roma, Chillemi, 195(?), 46 p.
R. ‘A propos de I’assemblte des peuples’, Esprit Feb. 1949,
693. SARRAZAC,
p. 235-41.
H. I. Die Idee des ewigen Friedens. Ein uberblick
694. SCHLOCHAUER,
ii ber Entwicklung und Gestaltung des Friedenssicherungsgedankensauf
der Grundlage einer Quellenauswahl (The idea of eternal peace. Survey, based on source material, of the origin and growth of the idea
of safeguarding peace). Bonn, Rohrscheid, 1953, 236 p.
695. SHOTWELL, J. T.; SALVIN, M. Lessons on security and disarmament
from the history of the League of Nations. N e w York, King’s Crown
Press, 1949, 149 p.
696. SIMONS,H.‘Transcending the cold war’, Soc. Res. 1950, vol. 17, no. 2,
p. 143-56.
697. SVALASIWGA, K. Report on internationalism. Seattle, Washington,
Public Opinion Laboratory, 1950, 82 p. (roneo).
‘Ways to peace’, Div. Life (India) 1951, vol. 13,
698. TAN-YTJN-SHAN.
no. 5, p. 104-8.
The remedies for war, as indicated by all the great religions.
N. ‘National interests and world peace’, Ann. Amer. Acnd.
699. THOMAS,
polit. SOC. Sci. 1952, no. 282, p. 72-6.
The mission of the United States of America as defined by the
leader of the American Socialist Party.
700. TORRES,
J. M.Cordero. ‘Communidad internacional y monopolis mundial‘, Dinn’m.SOC. 1953, vol. 3, no. 32, p. 38.
701. TROCHE, A. ‘Les tPches actuelles de I’Eglise pour la paix’, Christ. SOC.
1947, vol. 55, p. 256-77.
Necessity, and pitfalls, of Christian pacifism.
R. V. Nationalismus und Volkerfriede.Eine poli702. UNGERN-STERNBERG,
fisch moralische Besinnung (Nationalism and world peace. Political and moral considerations.) Offenbach, Bollwerk-Verlag, 195(?),
320 p.
275
703. VAN MACHELEN,
F. ‘De Verenigde Naties en het begrip internationale
solidariteit’ (The United Nations and the concept of international
solidarity), Cuttuurleven 1952, vol. 19, no. 5, p. 279-83.
704. Vers un droit de la paix selon S.S. Pie XII. Recueil classe‘ des textes
pontificaux sur la paix. Lyon, Ed. de la Chronique Sociale de France,
1954, 64 p.
A. ‘Meidunarodnoe pravo i meidunarodnaja organizacija’
705. VICHINSKY,
(International law and international organization), Sov. Gos. Pravo
1948, vol. 1, p. 1-24.
Criticism of the United Nations’ work, and exposition of Russian
views.
706. VILLOT, A. ‘Fkdkration ou confkdtration europkenne’, A g e nouv.
1949, vol. 33, p. 40-7.
Need for a European confederation that will make allowance for
national divergencies.
H. A. Toward world peace. N e w York, Reynal & Hitch707. WALLACE,
cock, 1948, 121 p.
708. W a s wollen wir Christen tun? Stimmen deutscher Pfarrer zum K a m p f
fur die Erhaltung des Weltfriedens (What shall w e Christians do?
Plea of the German clergy for the maintenance of world peace).
Sachsen, Landes-FriedenskomiteeSachsen, 1950, 16 p.
709. WEST,
R. ‘Fixed laws of the mind and their control in the interests
of peace’, Synthbse 1947, vol. 6, p. 176-82.
710. -. Psychology and world order. London, Penguin Books, 1945, 125 p.
711. WRIGHT,
Q. ‘Law and international relations’, Proc. Amer. phil. Soc.
1951, vol. 95, no. 5, p. 490-503.
712. -, ed. T h e world community. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948,
x + 323 p.
Composite work containing a sociological discussion of a few basic
problems. Historical and practical study of relations between the
individual and States, with special reference to the question of international relations. Contributions from L. Wirth, M. Mead, K. Boulding, R. Angell, H. Lasswell, P. Potter.
ZALESKI,
E.,see 667.
METHODOLOGICAL, EXPERIMENTAL AND MONOGRAPHIC STUDIES
713. ABEL,T. ‘The sociology of concentration camps’, Soc. Forces 1951,
vol. 30, no. 2, p. 150-5.
The interest aroused in the sociological field by this question. Survival as a result of social factors.
713a. ‘Aggressive nationalism and international understanding’, Int. SOC. Sci.
Bull. 1949, vol. 1, no. 3-4, p. 155-61.
Prcsentation of a composite work analysing world tensions. After
affirming that war is not the result of human nature, the authors set
forth the factors which encourage aggressive nationalism. A scientific
study of the facts would make it possible to reduce the number of
these conflicts.
R. C.‘Sociology and the world crises’, Amer. sociol. R. 1951,
714. ANGELL,
vol. 16, no. 6, p. 749-57.
715. -. ‘Sociological research into the problem of world order’, paper
submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Li&ge, 1953,
section 11, part 2, 10 p. [See 63.1
As others see us, see 403.
716. BERNARD,L. L.; BERNARD,J. Sociology and the study of international
Washington Univ. Press, 1934.
relations (up to 1934). St. Louis, MO.,
276
B.; JANOWITZ, M. ‘Reactions to Fascist propaganda’,
717. BETTELHEIM,
Amer. Psychol. 1949, vol. 4, p. 259 (abstr.).
[See also 23.1
718. BIE,P. de. ‘Certain psychological aspects of Benelux’, Znt. SOC. Sci.
Bull. 1951, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 540-52.
In so far as international policy is conditioned ky the human factor,
it depends far more on the political views and actions of a small
number of individuals than on the masses. It is the leaders and
moulders of public opinion that must be reached.
Survey carried out in 1948, among Belgian students at the higher
education level, in order to ascertain the influence of cultural affiliations-Flemish, Walloon, Bruxellois. Contacts with Dutchmen.
719. -. ‘Representation du B6nClux’, Bull. Inst. Rech. &on. SOC. 1951,
vol. 17, no. 7, p. 637-710.
Results of a sarvey-the conditions for international co-operation
-based on the Benelux example. The importance of the psychological
conditions. H o w to arouse public interest in international problems.
The methods to be adopted. The article considers in turn: I. The
history of the efforts towards rapprochement. 11. Opinions and atti-tudes in Belgium with regard to Benelux, according to the public
opinion polls of the Inter-University Institute of Economic and
Social Information. 111. The inquiry at the higher education level
concerning Benelux. IV. Research carried out among schoolchildren.
720. BLACK,D.;NEWING,
R. A. Committee decisions with complementary
valuation. London, William Hodge, 1951, vii + 59 p.
The execution of a decision according to the ‘simple majority’
rule.
721. BLAU, P. M. ‘Orientation of college students toward international
relations’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1953, vol. 59, p. 205-14.
BOASSON,
Ch., see 762.
722. BUCHANAN, W.‘Stereotypes and tensions as revealed by Unesco international poll’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1951, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 515-28.
The author concludes that national stereotypes are flexible and
may foIlow and rationalize, rather than precede and determine,
reaction to a certain nation. Introduction to the work by Cantril and
Buchanan (J. Bernard).
CANTRIL,
H.;BUCHANAN,W.,see 427.
723. COBB,
J. W.‘Personal familiarity and variations in stereotypes regarding Japanese’, Sociol. SOC. Res. 1949, vol. 33, no. 6, p. 441-8.
The stereotypes of Japanese suggested to a group of Americar?
students.
J. ‘The study of committees and conferences’,Occup. Psycho?.
724. COHEN,
1952, vol. 26, p. 70-7.
725. COTTRELL,
L. S. Jr. American opinion on world aflairs. Princeton,
Princeton Univ. Press, 1948, xii + 152 p.
COTTRELL,
W. F., see 762.
A. K. ‘Conflict between major social systems: the Soviet726. DAVIS,
American case’, Soc. Forces 1951, vol. 30, no. 1, p. 29-36.
A n analysis of the tensions between two different social systems
(American and Soviet) is a matter both for history and for sociology
History describes two different processes of industrialization: sociology must analyse the processes of interaction and the overall
conduct characterizing this conflict.
727. -. ‘Some sources of American hostility to Russia’, Amer. J. Soc.
vol. 53, no. 2, p. 174-200.
728. DENNETT,
R.; JOHNSON, J. E., ed. Negotiating with Russians. N e w
York, World Peace Foundation, 1951, xi + 310 p.
277
A series of 10 reports of interviews with Russians, illustrating the
way in which Russo-American negotiations are carried out on either
side. These negotiations bear on problems of many different types:
control of atomic energy, situation in the Balkans, relations between
East and West, displaced persons, etc.
K.W. Nationalism and social communication. New York,
729. DEUTSCH,
Published jointly by The Technology Press of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and J. Wiley and Sons, Inc.; and London,
Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 292 p.
Attempt at an application of the mathematical methods of cybernetics to sociology, and particularly to the problem of nationalism,
in view of the fact that the automata of cybernetics provide a highgrade model of dynamic equilibrium. The basic concepts of cybernetics (information, transmission, complementariness, efficiency) are
applied to socio-psychological processes.
730. DOMBROSE,
L. A.; LEVINSON,D. J. ‘Ideological “militancy” and
“pacifism” in democratic individuals’, J. SOC. Psychol. 1950, vol. 32,
p. 101-13.
EBERHART,
S.,see 725.
731. European beliefs regarding the US.: a survey under the direction
of Henry Lee Munson. C o m m o n Council for American Unity, N e w
York, 1949, 134 p.
M. L. ‘The problem of national character’, J. Psycho/. 1950,
732. FARBER,
vol. 30, no. 2, p. 307-17.
733. ‘Federalism: problems and methods’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1952, vol. 4,
no. 1.
M. D. ‘An experiment in international attituc!es research’,
734. GRAHAM,
Int. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1951, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 529-39.
Public opinion poll carried out in Great Britain on Americans:
1. The American with w h o m one has been in contact. 2. The typical
American, 3. The Americans as a people. 4. Value-judgements concerning the United States as a nation and as a world power. Original
research methods.
GULLVAG,
I., see 762.
H. ‘Social science and the atomic crisis’, J. SOC. Issues 1949,
735. HART,
(Supplement series no. 2), p. 4-29.
736. IISAGER, H.‘An evaluation of an attempt to form international attitudes’, J. SOC. Psychol. 1949, vol. 30, p. 207-16.
The author endeavours to estimate the exact importance of the
results produced by three months of international culture on students
of 13 different nationalities.
TENEN,
C. ‘Attitudes toward other peoples’, Znf.
737. JAMES, H. E. 0.;
SOC. Sci. Bull. 1951, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 553-61.
1. Analysis of the attitudes adopted toward foreigners by a number
of boys and girls from 1 1 to 15 years of age. 2. Experiments in the
changing of attitudes, carried out on some sixty boys and girls
aged 13. Examples of interviews in classes before and after the visit
of two African teachers.
[See also 1030.1
JANOWITZ, M.,see 717.
JOHNSON, J., see 728.
P.; LEITES,
N. ‘Some psychological hypotheses on Nazi
738. KECSKEMETI,
Germany’, J. SOC. Psychol. 1948, vols. 27, 28, p. 241-70 and p. 141-64.
F. H. ‘Decision-making in Japan’, Soc. Forces 1951,
739. KERLINGER,
vol. 30, no. 1, p. 36-41.
A study of how decisions are made by individuals in Japan. The
author first examines the question from a general standpoint, but
278
soon confines himself to the political problem, drawing attention to
the reasons which lead the Japanese to become members of groups
with democratic or, alternatively, anti-democratic tendencies.
740. KIRK,G. T h e study of international relations in American colleges
and universities. N e w York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1947,
113 p.
741. LASSWELL,
H. D. T h e world revolution of our time. A f m m e w o r k
for basic policy research. Palo Alto, Stanford Univ. Press, 1951,
vi + 66 p.
A tentative study of the ‘contemporary revolution’. The methods
used for this study are examined in detail. The last part of the
work seeks to indicate h o w these methods of investigation could be
employed in future years in the context of international relations.
LEITES,
N.,see 738.
742. LENTZ,T. F. ‘Do social scientists regard science as a potential tool
for peace?, Znt. J. Opin. Attit. Res. (Mexico) 1950, no. 4, p. 264-6.
LEVINSON,
D.J., see 730.
J. Strategy in poker, business and war. N e w York,
743. MACDONALD,
Norton, 1950, 128 p.
744. MACIVER,
R. M. Civilization and group relationship. N e w York,
Harpers, 1945, 177 p.
This work consists of 13 articles on different social prejudices
which are frequently to be found in American society. The author
concludes that the greatest danger threatening the modern world is
the ‘exclusivism’of one group in regard to another.
P. ‘On the dynamics of power: a case study’, Sthwest. SOC.
745. MEADOWS,
Sci. Quart. 1953, vol. 33, no. 4, p. 309-18.
746. MINTZ,
A. ‘Re-examinations of correlations between lynchings and
economic indices’, J. abnorm. SOC. Psychof. 1946, vol. 41, no. 4_,
p. 154-60.
747. MOORE,
B. ‘Notes toward a theory of international relations’, paper
submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Libge, 1953,
section 11, part 2, 8 p. [See 63.1
Plan for an analysis of the behaviour of those w h o ‘make’ international policy.
MUNSON,
H.L.,ed., see 731.
748. MURRAY,
R. W.Sociology for a democratic society. N e w York, Appleton, Century Crofts, 1950, 407 p.
A detailed study of m a n can help sociology to establish a wellbalanced democratic world.
MYRDAL,
G.,see 204.
NEWING,
R. A., see 720.
749. POOL,I. de S. Symbols of internationalism. Stanford, Stanford Univ.
Press, 1952 (Hoover Znstitute studies. series C: Symbols), 73 p.
In this booklet, based on leading articles published in important
newspapers, Ithiel de Sola Pool studies the tenor of the articles ob
foreign policy, so as to form an idea of public opinion with regard
to international relations. The balance of power and world trends
are described, by recourse to the new techniques of content analysis.
The author is thus in a position to draw up a working balance sheet
of international relations, with an exact knowledge of the importance
of the conflicts between the different countries.
750. POWELL,C. F. ‘Scientists and world tension’, Sci. and Soc. 1952:
vol. 16, no. 4, p. 289-95.
Considers the problem of the attitude which scientists should adopt
in the face of world tension.
279
751. QUEENER,
L. ‘The development of internationalist attitudes’, I. SOC.
Psychol. 1949, vol. 29, p. 221-35, 237-52.
1. Hypotheses and verification: describes and discusses the concepts
of ‘role’ and ‘prestige’.Suggests combining these two concepts in the
single one of ‘attitude’. 2. Attitude and prestige: report of a survey
carried out to determine whether the nationalist or internationalist
attitude adopted by a given individual depends, or does not depend,
on emotion.
J. W.,Jr.; SOHRAMM,W.‘Communication in sovietized States,
752. RILEY,
as demonstrated in Korea’, Amer. sociol. R. 1951, vol. 16, no. 6.
Study of the sovietization methods employed in North Korea.
753. ROGGE,
H . ‘Friedenswissenschaft-eine Aufgabe unserer Zeit’ (Science
of peace-a task for our time), Soz. Welt 1950, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 37-45.
Need for offsettingthe ‘sciences of war’ with a ‘science of peace’,
which would be an applied science studying, not only the problems of
war and peace, but those connected with psychological, inter-group
and social tensions. Historical outline-possibility of establishing and
teaching this science.
J. W. ‘Are psychologists unpatriotic?’ Amer. Psychol. 1954,
754. RUSSEL,
vol. 9, no. 5, p. 201.
SCHRAMM,W.,see 752.
755. SMITH,G.H.‘Attitudes toward Soviet Russia. I: The standardization
of a scale and some distributions of scores. 11: Beliefs, values and
other characteristics of Pro-Russian and Anti-Russian groups’, J. SOC.
Psychol. 1946, vol. 23, p. 3-16, 17-33.
756. SVALASTOGA,K. ‘Factors associated with belief in permanent peace’,
Int. J. Opin. Att. Res. (Mexico) 1951, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 391-6.
757. Systematic survey of treaties for the pacific settlement of international disputes, 1928-1949.Lake Success, United Nations, 1948, ix +
1,201 p.
TENEN,
C.,see 737.
758. TROTTITER, W.Instincts of the herd in peace and war, 1914-1919.Edited
by R. W . Chapman. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1953, xvi + 219 p.
N e w edition of an old but classical work devoted to the study
of conflict, from a psychological angle. Subjective approach.
UNITEDNATIONS,
see 757.
R. W. Research in the international organization
759. VAN WAGENEN,
field. S o m e notes on a possible focus. Princeton, Center for Research
on World Political Institutions, 1952, 78 p.
760. WOLFF,
K . H.‘Preliminary study of the German ideology concerning
paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Socithe U.S.A.’,
ology, Litge, 1953, section 11, part 2, 47 p. [See 63.1
Account of an important study of the German ideology concerning
the United States of America, carried out at the Social Research
Institute of Frankfurt University.
761. WRIGHT, Q. T h e relevance of research to the problems of peace.
Prizewinning paper in a contest set by the Institute for Social Research
in Oslo in 1952 for the best contribution fo an analysis of research
priorities in action for international peace. Amsterdam, North-Holland Pub. Co., 1954, 296 p.
Q.; C O ~ E L L
W.
, F.;BOASSON,Ch. Research for peace.
762. WRIGHT,
With the collaboration of I. Gullvag. Institute for Social Research,
Oslo, Amsterdam, North-Holland Pub. Co., 1954, 310 p.
1. H o w can science assist the cause of world peace? 2. What basic
research can promote international peace? 3. What questions, in
action for peace, should receive priority?
280
763. ZAJONC,
R. B. ‘Aggressive attitudes of the “stranger” as a function of
conformity pressures’, Hum. Relat. 1952, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 205.
Description of a survey tending to show that the frustration felt
by a stranger not yet assimilated by the group in which he finds
himself is externalized in an aggressive attitude towards that group.
764. ZELENY, L. D . ‘Selection of the unprejudiced’, Sociometry 1947, vol. 10,
p. 396-401.
Sociometric test of the degree of prejudice existing in a given
college. The indices of prejudices range from -32 to +68, and the
indices of an attitude of sympathy from -63 to + 100.
111. RACIAL C O N F L I C T S . C O L O N I A L I S M
GENERAL STUDIES
765. ACKERMAN,
N. W.;JAHODA,
M. Anti-Semitism and emotional disorder: a psychoanalytic interpretation. N e w York, Harper, 1950,
xiv + 135 p.
The authors propose tackling anti-Semitism as though it were an
illness, for in their opinion it is simply one of the many symptoms
of a serious disease within society. Thus their detailed study of
anti-Semitism is undertaken from a triple standpoint-practical,
psychological and pathological. They analyse the causes of this
prejudice, such as anxiety, confused thinking regarding the notion
of ‘self‘, conformity behaviour, aggressiveness and its results, which
mostly consist of various types of social conflicts. N. W. Ackerman
and Marie Jahoda conclude by denouncing the danger which antiSemitism represents for a civilized nation; they consider it is now
intolerable that true scientists should take no interest in ethical values
and moral judgements.
766. ALEXANDROF,
B. ‘Bor’ba naroda Kenija za zemliu i svobodu’ (The
struggle of the people of Kenya for their land and liberty), in
Ouestions de‘conomie (AcadCmie des Sciences de 1’U.R.S.S.)
1953,
Vol. 8, p. 110-20.
Description of the conflict between the people of Kenya and the
English.
ALLPORT,
F. H.,see 907.
767. APTHEKER,
H.Negro slave revolts. N e w York, Columbia Univ. Press,
1943, 409 p.
Historical study.
ATELSEK,
F.,see 937.
T. de. Les e‘lites de couleur duns une ville brdsilienne.
768. AZEVEDO,
Paris, Unesco, 1953-54 (Collection Race et socie‘te‘, nos. 1 et 2).
769. BALANDIER,
G. ‘La situation coloniale: approche thkorique’, Cah.
int. Sociol. 1951, vol. 11, p. 44-79.
A n analysis of the colonial situation, showing its artificial nature,
the pseudo-reasons invoked to justify it, and the crisis to which it
gives rise. The author endeavours to estimate the contributions of
sociology and social psychology as applied to colonial and colonized
communities.
770. BARNES,E. W. ‘The mixing of races and social decay’, Eugen. R.
1949, vol. 41, p. 11-16.
The mixing of races is inevitable. The different cultures lose their
281
originality. Necessity for social progress in order to achieve a proper
balance.
771. BARTON,R. F. T h e Kalingas: their institutions and custom faw.
Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949, xiii + 275 p.
772. BARUK, H. ‘Le psicosi di odio antisemitico negli alienati saggio
di psicofisiologia: Introduzione ad uno studio della scienza della pace’,
G.Psichiat. Neuropat. 1951, vol. 79, no. 1, p. 5-13.
773. -. ‘Le probkme psychologique et psychopathologique de l’antiskmitisme’, Bull. Gr. Et. Psychol. Univ. Paris 1952, vol. 4, p. 80-6.
174. BASTIDE, R. ‘The Negro in Latin America’, Int. SOC. Sei. Bull. 1952,
vol. 4, no. 3, p. 435-42.
The author emphasizes the usefulness of educating the younger
generations of Negroes, in order to adapt the Negroes to the civilization of the white peoples.
E. ‘Race relations in the Pacific’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull.
775. BEAGLEHOLE,
1950, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 489-96.
A study of racial prejudice in the Pacific, as an outcome of social
evolution in that part of the world; the prejudice is due to the fact
that minority groups make no effort to improve their s?atus in the
community.
776. BERACHA, S. L e mythe du racisme. Paris, La Bruybre, 1945, 375 p.
Essays in social philosophy.
771. BERNDT, R.; BERNDT, C. F r o m black to white in South Australia.
Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952, 313 p.
778. BERNSTEIN,P. F. Jew-hate as a sociological problem. N e w York,
Philosophical Library, 1951, 300 p.
Anti-Semitism: result of inter-group aggressiveness. not of a rninority question. Solution: establishment of a Jewish State.
779. BERRY,B. Race relations. T h e interaction of ethnic and racial groups.
Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1951, xii + 487 p.
Contents: Prejudice and its causes. Behaviour in the matter of race
relations. Conflict and expulsion. Assimilation and segregation. Stratification and domination.
The interaction of technical and racial factors. Main example: the
United States of America. The author also makes a secondary reference to India, Hawaii, Europe etc., in order to show the widespread
existence of the problem and the marked similarity of the examples
adduced. Given the present state of our knowledge, he rejects all
special theories on race relations, it being hardly possible tQ trace
the general outlines of their development.
B. ‘The dynamism of anti-Semitism in Gentile and Jew’,
780. BETTELHEIM,
J. abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1947, vol. 42, no. 2, p. 153-68.
B.; JANOWITZ, M. ‘Ethnic tolerance: a function of social
781. BETTELHEIM,
and personal control‘, Amer. J. Sociol. 1950, vol. 55, no. 6, p. 137-45.
Article showing that racial stereotypes are simply manifestations of
self-defence.
J. ‘Cultural and economic factors in Panama race relations’,
782. BIESANZ,
Amer. sociol. R. 1949, vol. 14, no. 6, p. 772-9.
J.; SMITH,L. M. ‘Race relations in Panama and the Canal
783. BIESANZ,
Zone’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1951, vol. 57, no. 1, p. 7-14.
According to the authors, race discrimination is encouraged in
Panama and the Canal Zone, and is the expression of basic values of
formalism; it is weakened by the extension of freedom to all groups
in the community.
784. BIRNIE,
C. M. ‘Race and politics in Georgia and South Carolina’,
Phylon 1952, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 236 et seq.
282
785.
785.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
A study of the race policy of the states cf Georgia and South
Carolina.
BLACK,P. ‘Racial prejudice and socio-cultural contexts’, Phylon 1950,
vol. 11, no. 2, p. 156-8.
BLOMKVIST,E. E. ‘Diskriminacija Irokezov v Soedinennykh Statakh
Ameriki’ (Discrimination against the Iroquois in the United States of
America), Sov. Etnogr. 1951, no. 2, p. 115-39.
BOEKE.J. H. Interests of the voiceless Far Eat. Leiden, Univ. Pers
Leiden; 1948, 92 p.
BOGARDUS,E. S. ‘Reducing racial tensions’, Sociol. SOC. Res. 1950,
vol. 35, no. 1, p. 50-7.
This article deals with the factors that determine racial tensions.
Solutions envisaged for the reduction of these tensions.
BOYD, W. M. ‘Southern politics 1948-1952’, Phylon 1952, p. 266
et seq.
BROWN. I. C. Race relations in a democracy. N e w York, Harper,
1949, viii + 205 p.
BROWN, F. J.; ROUCEK,
J. S. O n e America. T h e history, contributions
and present problems of racial and national minorities. N e w York,
Prentice Hall, 1945, 717 p.
In this new edition, the author points out that the war partially
modified the distribution of minority groups, and that many barriers
previously separating these groups have consequently disappeared.
BROWN, W. H. ‘Attitudes toward the education of Negroes’, Phylon
1952, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 153 et seq.
Study of the attitudes adopted in the United States towards the
education of Negroes (mixed or reserved schools).
BULLOCK,H. A. ‘Racial attitudes and the employment of Negroes’,
Amer. J. Sociol. 1951, vol. 56, no. 5, p. 448-57.
Study of the economic conditions in which the Negroes find themselves. Possibilities of work, wages, etc.
BURMA,J. H.‘Humor as a technique in race conflict’, Amer. sociol. R.
1946, vol. 11, no. 6, p. 710-11.
-. ‘Race relations and antidiscriminatory legislation’, Amer. J.
Social. 1951, vol. 56, no. 5, p. 416-23.
A study of the various attempts to introduce laws against racial
discrimination in the United States of America. T h e encouraging
results of these attempts should be a spur to further effort.
[See also 992.1
796. BURNS, A. Colour prejudice, with particular reference to the relationshiD between Whites and NeProes. London. Allen and Unwin.
,
~~
1948, i64 p.
797. BYRNES.R. F. Anti-Semitism in modern France. Vol. Z: T h e Drologue
to the ’Dreyfus affair.N e w Brunswick, Rutgers. Univ. Press, 19”50,
348 p.
R. K. ‘The American national Government and the race prob798. CARR,
lem’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1950, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 497-505.
A study of the practical difficulties confronting the United States
Government, which in theory condemns racial prejudice but is
obliged, by these very difficulties, to adopt measures of segregation.
N. ‘International co-oaeration in Africa’. Soc. Res.
799. CHUKWUEMEKA.
1951, vol. 18, no. 1.
800. CLARK,
K. B. ‘Racial prejudice among American minorities’, Znt. SOC.
Sri. Bull. 1950, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 506-13.
A study of racial prejudices among minority groups in the U.S.A.
The split they cause in the American community. Proposed solutions.
283
801. CLARK,
T. C.;PERLMAN,
P. B. Prejudice and property: an historic
brief against racial covenants. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1948,
104 p.
This booklet seeks to establish whether laws which prevent a
citizen from inhabiting certain localities because of his colour or
beliefs are to be recommended.
802. CLINCHY,
E. R. Intergroup relations centers. New York, Farrar,
Straus, Co. 1949, 54 p.
A booklet which suggests certain means of controlling racial prejudice constructively. The author also indicates the analogy which
might exist between the physical and the social sciences.
803. COLLINS,
S. ‘The social implications of mixed marriages in British
society’, paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology,
Likge, 1953, section 11, part 4, 3 p. [See 63.1
The opposition of British society to ethnic groups is neither consistent nor clearly structured; intergroup relations are often considered in terms of personal rather than of group relations. The role
of the Englishwoman as intermediary and in aiding social adaptation
and assimilation is one of the fundamental factors in intergroup
relations in England.
804. -. ‘The social position of white and “half-caste” women in colored
groupings in Britain’, Amer. sociol. R. 1951, vol. 16, no. 6, p. 796-802.
805. COMAS,
J. Racial myths. Paris, Unesco, 1951, 52 p.
806. CONGAR,
Y. M, J. T h e Catholic church and the race question. Paris,
Unesco, 1953 (The race question and modern thought series), 64 p.
807. COOKE,
W. H. Peoples of the Southwest: patterns of freedom and
prejudice. New York, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 1951,
35 p.
808. Cox, 0.C. Caste, class and race: a study in social dynamics. N e w
York, Doubleday, 1948, xxxviii + 624 p.
809. CULVER,
D. W. Negro segregation in the Methodist Church. N e w
Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1953, x + 218 p.
H.0.‘Race and minority riots. A study in the typology of
810. DAHLKE,
violence’, Soc. Forces vol. 30, no. 4, p. 419-25.
B. Report on Southern Africa. New York, British Book
811. DAVIDSON,
Center, 1952, 285 p.
M. Negroes in American society. N e w York, M c G r a w Hill,
812. DAVIE,
1949, ix + 542 p.
813. DAVIES,
H. ‘Race-tensions in South Africa’, Hibbert 1. Jan. 1951,
p. 118-27.
S. Race relations in Ancient Egypt; Greek, Egyptian, Hebrew,
814. DAVIS,
R o m a n . London, Methuen, 1951, xii + 176 p.
DICKSON,
L., see 888.
E. J. Racial pride and prejudice. London, Watts Co.,
815. DINGWALL,
1946, x + 246 p.
A study of racial prejudices in general. One whole chapter is
devoted to anti-Semitism,and another to colour prejudice; while the
remaining chapters are more concerned with ‘inter-nations’prejudices.
DOBZHANSKY,
T.,see 821.
D. M. ‘ N o place for race prejudice’, Amer. J. Nurs. 1953,
816. DODSON,
vol. 53, p. 164-6.
The integration of Negro nurses into organizations, services and
schools.
817. DOLLARD,
J. Caste and class in a southern town. New York, Harper,
1949, xvi + 502 p.
Republication of an original work published in 1937.
818. DUBIEF,
H. ‘Le nto-colonialisme socialiste’, Cah. int. 19.50, no. 17,
p. 53-64.
819. D u Bois, W . E. B. Color and democracy: colonies and peace. N e w
York, Harcourt, Brace Co.,1945, 143 p.
820. D u m , L. C. Race and biology. Paris, Unesco, 1951, 48 p.
821. DUNN,
L. C.; DOBZHANSKY,
Th. Heredity, race and society. New
York, Mentor Books, 1949 (The new American library of world
literature), 115 p.
Critical analysis of the ‘heredity and environment’ question. Consequences for inter-group relations.
J. B. ‘Enclavement among Southwest Idaho Basques’, Soc.
822. EDLEFSEN,
Forces 1950, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 155-8.
H. J. ‘The psychology of anti-Semitism’, Ninekenth Cen823. EYSENCK,
tury 1948, vol. 144, p. 277-84.
A study of the factors which lead members of a group to adopt an
anti-Semitic attitude.
824. FINEBERG,
S. A. Punishment without crime: what you can d o about
prejudice. N e w York, Doubleday, 1949, 337 p.
825. FRAZIER,
E. F. T h e Negro in the United States. N e w York, Macmillan, 1949, xxxi + 767 p.
In this work, E. Franklin Frazier deals with all aspects of the
Negro problem in the United States. H e subjects it to detailed study
from the historical and practical standpoints. The living conditions
of the Negroes and their relations with the Whites are described at
length.
The work is divided into five separate parts. The first part is
concerned with the history of the Negroes during the period of
slavery (p. 1-98). The second mentions, and endeavours to explain,
the conflicts which arose between Negroes and Whites after the Civil
W a r (p. 103-64). The third part describes in detail the social life
of the Negroes; the fourth gives a broad outline of their intellectual
activities (p. 164-409), followed by references to the fact that they
do not enjoy the same social or educational opportunities as the
Whites, particularly in the South (p. 429). The fifth part examines
the practical consequence of these problems. In conclusion, the
authors considers the prospects of integrating the Negro into American society.
826. -. ‘Race contacts and the social structure’, Amer. sociol. R. Feb.
1949, p. 1-11.
827. -. ‘Sociological theory and race relations’, Amer. sociol. R. June
1947, p. 265-71.
The author considers the respect ‘ve attitudes of Fitzhugh, Ward,
S. Gissines, Cooley, Small, Ross, Thomas and Park.
828. FREEDMAN,
M. ‘Race against time’, Phylon 1953, fourth quarter,
p. 401-9.
A study of the evolution of the ‘race’ concept during the last few
centuries. The conflicts arising from it.
829. FREEMAN,
F. D.‘Theory and strategy of action in race relations’, Soc.
Forces 1951, vol. 30, no. 1, p. 77-87.
The author reviews the efforts, of a practical and theoretical nature,
which have been made during the past 50 years with a view to
improving race relations. What the author calls a ‘structural’point of
view consists in envisaging the problem from the angle of inter-group
adaptations, within a given social structure in full process of evolution.
830. GHURYE,
G. S. T h e aboriginesso-called-and their future. Poona,
India, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1943, 232 p.
285
H. 0.Twilight in South Africa. N e w York, Philosophical
631. GIBBS,
Library, 1951.
C. E. ‘Collective behaviour in race relations’,Amer. sociol. R.
832. GLICK,
June 1948, p. 287-94.
Analysis of certain aspects of the theory of ‘collective behaviour’,
with reference to some important changes of attitude in the matter
of race relations.
C. I. ‘Eurasian racialism’, Phylon 1951, vol, 12, no. 1,
833. GLICKSBERG,
p. 13-19.
834. -. ‘Racial attitudes in “From Here to Eternity”, Phyfon 1953, vol 4,
p. 384-9.
835. -. ‘Science and the race problem’, Phyfon 1951, vol. 12, no. 4,
p. 319-27.
N . I. T h e roots of prejudice against the Negro in rhe
836. GOLDSTEIN,
US. Boston, Univ. Press, 1948, ix + 213 p.
Posthumous work, in which the author describes the position of
the Negro in the U.S.A.H e endeavours to explain the existence of
racial prejudice by ascribing it to the mental processes of the Whites,
to the stereotyped ideas they have formed about the Negroes, to
the yoke of the latters’ slave past which the Negroes have not yet
completely thrown off, and finally to strictly economic reasons.
C. L. ‘Race, values and guilt’, Soc. Forces 1949, vol. 25,
837. GOLIGHTLY,
no. 2, p. 125-39.
The Whites abolish castes with a view rather to personal satisfaction than to the safeguarding of a fundamental value. Important
review of psycho-analytical literature.
J. ‘ A n examination of theories of race prejudice’, Soc. Res.
838. GRAEBER,
1953, vol. 20, no. 3, p. 267-81,
E. T.,Jr. ‘Race prejudice and Negro-White relations in the
839. HALL,
army’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1947, vol. 52, no. 4, p. 401-9.
840. HARTE,
T. J. Catholic organizations promoting Negro-White race
relations in the United States. Washington, Catholic Univ. Press,
1947, xiv + 173 p.
J. ‘Problems of race in S. Africa’, Listener 1951, vol. 46.
841. HATCH.
no. 1188, p. 956-7.
842. -. ‘South Africa and the colour question: partnership or conflict’,
Listener 1951, vol. 45, no. 1141, p. 45-6.
843. HATT,P. ‘Class and ethic attitudes’, Amer. sociol. R. 1948, vol. 13,
p. 36-43.
H. Negro liberation. N e w York, International Publishers,
841. HAYWOOD,
1948, 246 p.
Study of the Negro problem in the United States and particularly
in the South. T h e author proposes a number of solutions-mostly
economic-which have been worked upon by several experts on the
Negro question, such as Myrdal and Stevens, and discusses the
possibility of establishing a Negro state.
E. Handbook on race relations in South Africa. N e w
845. HELLMANN,
York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1949, xii + 778 p.
A work of popularization.
F. ‘Racialism as a social factor’, Social R. 1948, vol. 40,
846. HERTZ,
no. 10, p. 123-33.
M. C. ‘Negroes in the United States: a critique of periodical
847. HILL,
literature’, Soc. Forces 1947, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 218-23.
HILLER,
M.,see 943.
J. S. ‘Changing structures of white-negro relations in the
848. HIMES,
South’, Phylon 1951, vol. 12, no. 3, p. 227-38.
286
See, in particular, the paragraph on the disorganization of the
traditional racial structure.
849. HODSON,
H. V. ‘Racial problems in the Commonwealth’, Listener
1951, vol. 45, no. 1143, p. 123-4.
E. L. ‘Development of attitude towards Negroes’, in: 209
850. HOROWITZ,
p. 507 et seq.
851. HUGHES,
E. C. ‘Queries concerning industry and society poiring out
of study of ethnic relations in industry’, Amer. sociol. R. 1949, no. 211,
220 p.
E. C.; HUGHES,
H. M. Where people meet: racial and
852. HUGHES,
ethnic frontiers. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1952, 204 p.
853. ‘Human problems in the changing South’,I. SOC. Issues 1954, vol. 10,
no. 1, p. 1-48 (special issue).
N . D. ‘Race, caste and class in Colombia’, Phylon 1952,
854. HUMPHREY,
vol. 13, no. 2, p. 161 et seq.
[See also 877.1
J. L. ‘Eliminating discrimination’, Phylon 1950, vol. 11, no. 2,
855. HUPP,
p. 151-5.
856. HUSZAR,
G. B. Anatomy of racial intolerance. N e w York, Wilson,
1946, 283 p.
857. IRIBARNE,F. ‘Manuel de rams y racism0 en Norteamerica’, Dinrim.
SOC. 1952, vol. 2, no. 20, p. 25-7.
JAHODA, M.,see 765.
JANOWITZ, M.,see 781.
858. JOHNSON, C. S. Pufferns of negro segregafion. N e w York, Harper,
1943, xxii + 332 p.
JOHNSON, G.B., see 370.
859. JONASSEN, C. T. ‘Some historical bases of racism in North Western
Europe’, Soc. Forces 1951, vol. 30, no. 2, p. 155-61.
The author shows that racism has attained a damaging degree of
virulence in certain countries of north-west Europe owing to the
combination of a racist tradition which had penetrated the popular
classes and a series of situations and circumstances which enabled
that tradition to externalize itself. Wherever this combination has
been present (Germany), racism has dominated. Wherever it has
been absent (Sweden), racism has not appeared.
860. KARDINER,
A.; OVESEY,
L. The marks of oppression: a psychosocial study of the American Negro. N e w York, W.W.Norton, 1951,
xvii + 396 p.
This work is concerned less with the processes of the racial
conflict, and still less with the means of remedying it, than with its
psychological consequences. The authors deal with the question of
discrimination mainly when describing the Negro’s social environment (I, 3). They then, applying the principle of basic personality,
consider 25 cases of N e w York Negroes of various categories, with
the aid of the Rorschach test and analytical procedures. The predominant feature which emerges is the Negro’s contempt for his
fellow-Negroes (acquired culturally and through family experience),
which engenders fear and aggressiveness, or alternatively passivity.
Class inequalities interweave with racial inequalities, but it is the
latters’ influence that is regarded as paramount.
A. ‘Community services and the Negro’, Soc. Forces 1948,
861. KATONA,
vol. 26, no. 4, p. 442-50.
862. K A ~ S O FL.
F ,O., ‘Review of S. M. Schwarz: “The Jews in the
Soviet Union” ’, Soc. Forces M a y 1952, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 479-80.
863. KATZ,M. K. ‘A hypothesis on anti-negro prejudice’, Amer. J. Sociol.
1947, vol. 53, no. 2, p. 100-4.
287
The author endeavours to determine the precise measure of racial
prejudice among the pupils of a college, and considers its possible
consequences.
864. KAVANAUGH,
J. ed. T h e Quaker approach to contemporary problems.
N e w York, Putnam, 1953, xi + 243 p.
865. KERR,
M.Personality and conflict in Jamaica. Liverpool, Univ. Press,
1952, xii + 221 p.
866. KEY,V. 0.Southern politics in state and nation. N e w York, Knopf,
1949, xxvi + 616 p.
Social and political position of the southern states of the United
States of America. The Negro problem, extremely serious in this
region, is dealt with in detail, as well as the legislation which
endeavours to resolve it. M u c h place is assigned to a description of
interracial relations. Methods of reducing the tensions inherent in
these relations are considered.
867. KINZER,
R. T h e negro in American business. T h e conflict between
separatism and integration. N e w York, Greenberg, 1950, 320 p.
0.‘Race differences: the present position of the prob868. KLINEBERG,
lem’, Bull. W l d Fed. ment. Hth 1951, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 3-11.
A n y policy based on racism is unjustified. In each ethnic group,
intelligence and mental capacities are, in degree, the same.
[See also 140.1
869. KOENIG,
S. ‘Immigrant and culture conflict in Israel’, Soc. Forces
1952, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 144-8.
N . S. ‘Ilim Goruyle vikciligin bu giinkii durumu’ (The
870. KOSEMIHAL,
present position of racial relations from the scientific standpoint),
Yeni Zstanbu? 1952, vol. 3, no. 910, p. 2.
871. Krizis kolonial’noj sistemy: nacional‘no-osvoboditel‘naja bor’ba narodov vostotnoj Azii (The crisis of the colonial system. The fight for
the national liberation of the peoples of the Far East). Moskva,
Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1945, XI + 292 p.
872. KUPER,
L. ‘The background to passive resistance. South Africa. 1953’,
Brit. J. Sociol. 1953, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 243-56.
K. M. Segregation in Washington. Chicago, National C o m 873. LANDIS,
mittee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital, 1948, 91 p.
An account of the effects of segregation in Washington, with special
emphasis on the disadvantages of such segregation.
874. LASKER,
B. H u m a n bondage in South East Asia. Chapel Hill,Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 1950, 406 p.
B. U n e re‘volution duns la politique coloniale de la France.
875. LAVERGNE,
L e problbme de I’Afrique du Nord. Paris, Librairie Mercure, 1948,
220 p.
A study of the problem from the historical, economic, practical and
political angles.
M. I. ‘Anglo-amerikanskijrasizm i narody Azii’ (Anglo876. LAZAREV,
American racism and the peodes of Asia), Sov. Gos. Pravo Feb. 1951,
no. 2, p. 70-3.
877. LEE,A. M.;HUMPHREY,
N. D. Race riot. N e w York, Dryden Press,
1943, xi + 143 p.
878. LEIRIS,
M.Race and culture. Paris, Unesco, 1951 (The race question
and modern science series).
According to the author, racial differences are simply differences
of civilization.
C. Race and history. Paris, Unesco, 1952 (The race
819. LEVI-STRAUSS,
question and modern science series).
Progress depends on the diversity and number of cultures with
which one is in contact.
- -
288
E. ‘Mittelalterliche Uberlieferungen und Antisemitismus’
880. LEIFMANN,
Psyche Heidel., 1951, vol. 5, p. 481-96.
The psychological problem of anti-Semitism which, according to
Freud and Jung, is the recurrence of a primitive stage of development.
881. LITTLE,K. L. Race and society. Paris, Unesco, 1952-53, 56 p.
F. S. ‘Pronouncements of the Protestant church with re882. LOESCHER,
spect to the Negro since World W a r 11, Soc. Forces 1947, vol. 26,
no. 2, p. 197-201.
883. LOGAN,R. W. T h e Negro and the post-war world, a primer. Washington. The Minorities Publishers, 1946, 99 p.
The author studies the position, since the last world war, of the
Negro in the United States of America from the psychological, economic and practical standpoints. M u c h consideration is given to the
stereotyped ideas of the Whites concerning the Negroes, and vice
versa. The author envisages the possibility of a ‘black peril’ similar
to the ‘yellow peril’.
884. LOHMAN,J. D. T h e police and minority groups. Chicago, Chicago
Park District, 1947.
885. LONG,H. H. ‘Cultural and racial tensions’, J. Negro Educ. 1952,
no. 21, p. 8-19.
886. -. ‘Race prejudice and social change’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1951, vol. 57,
no. 1, p. 15-19.
After recalling the causes of racial prejudice, this article outlines
a ‘strategy’ of interracial relations.
887. -. ‘Race restrictive housing covenants and social control’, Sociol.
SOC. Res. 1949, vol. 33, no. 5, p. 355-61.
The author endeavours to show that the segregation of the Negroes
prevents the neutralization of racial conflicts.
G. A.; DICKSON,
L. ‘Selective association among ethnic
888. LUNDBERG,
groups in a high school population’, Amer. sociol. R. 1952, vol. 17,
no. 1, p. 23-35.
889. MCCARY,
J. ‘Reactions to frustration by some cultural and racial
groups, Personality 1951, no. 1, p. 84-102.
890. MACCRONE,
I. D.,‘The interlocking of racial and religious attitudes’,
Proc. S. Afr. psychol. Assn. 1950, no. 1, p. 16-18.
891. MCDONAGH,
E. C.;RICHARDS,
E. S. Ethnic relations in the US.N e w
York, Appleton Century Crofts, 1953, xiv + 408 p.
1st part: Understanding of ethnic relations. 2nd part: Analysis of
ethnic relations. 3rd part: Improvement of ethnic relations.
M c DIONALD,L. R.,see 937.
892. MACIVER, R. M. T h e more perfect union: a program for the control
of inter-group discrimination in the United States. N e w York, Macmillan, 1948, vii + 311 p.
The author’s object is to list the means of reducing social, religious
and ethnic discrimination. Three main ideas emerge: the important
part that sociology could play in solving practical problems; the
need for distinguishing between a study of strategy or therapy and
a study of causes; and a need to distinguish between racial discrimination and racial prejudice. After assessing the position as
regards intergroup tensions in the United States of America, the
the author develops a theory of ‘patterns of causality’-plying special
attention to the nation of the ‘vicious circle’, which is responsible for
the maintenance of the caste system. In conclusion, he discusses some
of Myrdal’s ideas.
893. -. Report on the Jewish cornrnunity relations agencies. N e w York,
National Community Relations Advisory Board, 1951.
289
R. M. ed. Discrimination and national welfare. N e w York,
894. MACIVER,
Harper, 1949, 135 p.
See, in particular, 902.
895. MCLEAN, H. V. ‘Psychodynamic factors in racial relations’, in: 1001,
p. 159-66.
A psychological and analytical approach to the problem. Important
factor: fear of ‘biological integration’.
896. MCWILLIAMS, C. Brothers under the skin. Boston, Little, Brown,
1951, 364 p.
Republication of an article which appeared for the first time in
1943.
897. -. A mask for privilege: anti-Semitism.Boston, Little, Brown, 1948,
xiii + 299 p.
898. MANNONI,
0.Psychologie de la colonisation. Paris, Le Seuil, 1950,
251 p. (FrontiBre ouverte series.)
A n analysis, in terms of psychology (and not in terms of economics
or political action), of the relations existing between the Europeans
(colonizers) and the native populations within the framework of the
‘colonial situation’.
F. L.,‘A note on anti-minority remarks: a problem for
899. MARCUSE,
action research, 1. abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1951, vol. 46, no. 4, p. 603.
P. W. Rehearsal for destruction: a study of polirical nnti900. MASSING,
senzitism in imperial Germany. N e w York, Harper, 1949, xxiii +
341 p.
The history of anti-Semitism in Germany.
Y N ~ E zL.
,‘Social and cultural tensions in Latin America’,
901. MENDIETA
Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1951, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 442-51.
A study of racial tensions in the different Latin American countries.
Solutions envisaged, in each, on the economic, political and cultural
planes.
R. K. ‘Discrimination and the American creed‘, in: 894,
902. MERTON,
p. 103-10.
Type classification, distinguishing between: (a) individuals w h o
betray no racial prejudice and engage in no form of discrimination;
(b) individuals w h o betray no racial prejudice but who do engage in
discrimination; (c) individuals w h o betray a racial prejudice but
engage in no form of discrimination; (d) individuals w h o betray a
racial prejudice and do engage in discrimination.
A. ‘Unesco and the racial problem’, Znt. SOC. Sci. Bull.
903. METRAUX,
1950, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 384-90.
904. MONTAGU,
M . F. A. Man’s most dangerous myth: the fallacy of race.
New York, 1952, xxiii + 362 p.
905. -. ‘Some psychodynamic factors in race prejudice’, J. SOC. Psychol.
1949, vol. 30, p. 175-87.
The author holds that racial prejudices are an integral part of
human personality; the less advanced the individual’s ‘social maturity’,
the stronger his racial prejudices will be.
906. MORANT,
G. M. The significance of racial differences.Paris, Unesco,
1952, 48 p.
907. MORSE,
N. C.; ALLPORT, F. H. ‘The causation of anti-Semitism’,
J. Psychol. 1952, no. 34, p. 197-233.
908. MUKERJEE,
R. Zntercaste tensions, a survey under the auspices of
Unesco. Lucknow, Univ. of Lucknow Press, 1951, 108 p. roneoed.
A study of intercaste conflicts in India. These conflicts, although
less virulent in the towns, exist in all regions of the country. The
author frankly admits that it will be particularly difficult to reduce
290
them, owing to the influence of traditions which even the minority
groups cannot throw off.
909. -. ‘Inter-group conflicts in India’, paper submitted to the Second
World Congress of Sociology, Litge, 1953, section 11, part 4, 12 p.
[See 63.1
Reierring to the intermingling of caste system and class structure,
the author analyses the main types of intercaste tension, and the
influence of the new equalitarian theories. He deals, in particular,
with the displacement of Hindus from Pakistan, industrial problems,
moral and cultural methods of action, and research with regard to
the latters’ social efficacy.
910. MURPHY,
G. ‘Social tensions in India’, Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC.
Sci. 1951, no. 276, p. 35-42.
[See also 378, 926.1
C.S. ed. Attitudes to minority groups. London, Wolsey, N e w 911. MYERS,
man, 1946, 61 p.
912. MYRDAL,
G.A n American dilemma: the Negro problem and American
democracy. N e w York, Harper, 1944, lix + 1,483 p.
A large part of this work describes the living conditions and customs
of the Negroes, and the attitude of the Whites towards them. The
author discusses fairly fully the question of racial prejudice in the
United States of America and, after setting forth the various elements
of this ‘dilemma’, considers what solutions are possible. The work is
based on abundant documentation.
913. NANVATI,
M.B.;VAKIL,
C.N. Group prejudice in India: a symposium.
Bombay, Vora & Co., 1951, 223 p.
This book was published before the Unesco surveys; it shows the
growing anxiety of India in face of its many tensions between races,
castes, regions, etc.
914. Negro people in America (The). New York, International publishers,
1946, 80 p.
NISHIMOTO,
R. S., see 957.
OVESEY,
L.,see 860.
915. PAPUCHIS,
A. Tanksley. ‘Social distance patterns between and among
negro and white residents of an urban transition area’. Vanderbilt
Univ. A hstracts of theses 1947-48,Nashville, Tenn. Bull. Vanderbilt
Univ.. no. 11. Abstract of M.A. thesis.
R. Israel between East and West: a study in h u m a n relations.
916. PATAI,
Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1953, xiv +
348 p.
After a study of the Eastern and Western populations of Palestine
from the historical and practical angles, the author points out that
‘Eastern’ Israeli culture tends to become assimilated with ‘Western’
Israeli culture, while retaining a certain individuality of its own,
particularly on the artistic plane. The author deplores the fanaticism
of the ‘Easterners’in the matter of religion.
PERLMAN,P. B.,see 803.
R. ‘Caste, ethos, and social equilibrium’, Soc. Forces 1952,
917. PIERIS,
vol. 30, no. 4, p. 409-15.
D. ‘Race prejudice as revealed in the study of racial situa918. PIERSON,
tions’, Int. SOC. Sci. Bull. 1950, vol. 2, no. 4, 467-78.
A study of racial prejudice in Brazil, with particular reference to
what distinguishes it from that existing in the U S A . The possibilities
of this prejudice decreasing are considered.
919. PLEKHOV,V. I. ‘Bor’ba N . G. CerniEevskogo protiv rasizma’
(N.G.Chernichevsky’s fight against racism), Vopr. Filos. 1951, no. 6,
p. 80-90.
291
920. POLIAKOV,
L. Bre‘viaire de la haine
-
le Ill” Reich et les juifs. Paris,
Calmann-Levy, 1951, xv + 386 p.
921. PRATTIS,
P. L., ‘Race relations and the Negro press’, Phylon 1953,
no. 4, p. 373-83.
922. PRICE,
A. G.White settlers and native peoples. Cambridge, Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1950, 232 p.
923. Race concept (The). Paris, Unesco, 1953 (The race question in modern
science series), 106 p.
924. Race: prejudice and discrimination. N e w York, Univ. of Minnesota
Press, 1954, xiii + 603 p.
925. Race question (The). Paris, Unesco, 1950 (Unesco and its programme,
111).
926. RAM,P.; MURPHY,
G. ‘Recent investigations of Hindu-Muslim relations in India’, H u m . Organiz. 1952, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 13-22.
927. RAMOS,A. ‘The question of races and the democratic world’, In!. SOC.
Sci. BuIZ. 1949, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 9-14.
Contribution of anthropology to the historical study of the relations
between races and to the solution of racial conflicts.
928. RECORD,
W.T h e Negro and the Communist party. Chapel Hill,Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 1951, x + 340 p.
929. REICHMANN,
E. G. Hostages of civilization: the social sources of
national socialist antisemitism. Boston, Beacon Press, 1951, 281 p.
RICHARDS,
E. S., see 891.
930. RICHMOND,
A. H. ‘Economic insecurity and stereotypes as factors in
colour prejudice’, Sociol. R. 1950, vol. 42, no. 8, p. 147-67.
931. -. Racial relations. London, Penguin Books (not yet published).
932. ROPER,
E. ‘Discrimination in industry: extravagant injustice’, Industr.
Lab. Relat. R. 1952, vol. 5, no. 4, p. 584-92.
933. ROSE,A. T h e Negro in America. N e w York, Harper, 1948, xvii +’
325 p.
934. ROSE,A. M. ‘Antisemitism’s root in city hatred’, Commentary VI
Oct. 1948.
935. -. The Negro’s morals. Group identification and protest. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1949, ix f 153 p.
936. -. ed. Race prejudice and discrimination: readings in inter-group
relations in the U.S.N e w York, Knopf, 1951, 605 p,
that of a national,
The ‘minority’problem (generally) in the U.S.A.:
religious or racial group (relatively endogamic) which, despite the
principles of equality and assimilation characteristic of American
democracy, is the object of hostile prejudices and discrimination.
problems in U.S.A.’-is devoted to a
The first part-‘Minority
description of the various conflicts that arise. Mention may be made
of chap. 2, ‘Three centuries of disfrimination against the Negro’
(W.E. Burghardt du Bois); chap. 3, Origins of anti-Semitism in the
U.S.’ (0.and M. Handlin); chap. 8, ‘The conflict of the dominant
religion’ (H.E. Fey, J. B. Sheerin, A. Johnson and F. H.Yost).
The second part contains an analysis of the discrimination practised. Noteworthy are: chap. 16, ‘Ethnic behavior in industry’ (0.
Collins); chap. 18, ‘Expulsion of a minority group’ (D.S. Thomas,
R. S. Nishimoto); chap. 21, ‘The Negro in the political life of the
U.S.A.’
(R.J. Bunche). The third part is concerned more particularly
with the internal psychology of the minority groups.
The fourth part examines the causes of the prejudices themselves.
Here w e may mention: chap. 45: ‘The psychology of race prejudice’
(N.I. Thomas); chap. 46: ‘Psychodynamic factors in racial relations’
(H.V. McLean); chap. 47: ‘A study of prejudice in children’
(E.Frenkel-Brunswick); chap. 48: ‘A personality type associated with
292
prejudice’ (J. Himeloch); chap. 49: ‘Anti-Semitism’s root in city
hatred’ (A. M . Rose); chap. 50: ‘A social psychological factor’
(R. K. Merton); chap. 51: ‘Majority and minority Americans: an
analysis of magazine fiction’ (A.Berelson, P. J. Salter).
The fifth part, ‘Proposed techniques for eliminating minority problems’ is extremely eclectic, the solutions suggested ranging from legal
ones (A.M. Rose) to essentially psycho-analytical ones (G.W.Allport).
[See also 240-4.1
937. ROSE,A. M.;ATELSEK,
F. 5.; MCDONALD,
L. R.‘Neighborhood reactions to isolated negro residents: an alternative to invasion and
succession’, Amer. sociol. R. 1953, vol. 18, no. 5, p. 497-507.
938. ROSE,A. M.;ROSE,C. America divided. N e w York, Knopf, 1948,
xi + 342 p.
939. ROTH, L.Jewish thought as a factor in civilization. Paris, Unesco, 1954
(The race question in modern thought series).
ROUCEK,J. S. see 791.
940. ROWAN,C.T. South of freedom. N e w York, Knopf. 1952. vji + 250 p,
941. RUCHAMES, L. Race. jobs and politics: the story of FEPC. N e w York,
Columbia Univ. Press, 1953, x + 255 p.
942. RYAN, B. Caste in modern Ceylon. Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1953, 382 p.
943. SABISTON,
D.;HILLER, M. Toward better racial relations. N e w York,
Woman’s Press, 1949, viii + 190 p.
Report on the improvement of interracial relations, following on a
study by J. 0.Bell and Wilkins: Znterracial practices in community
YWCA’s (1944).
Contribution of psycho-analysis to the understanding of the racial
944. SALZY, P. ‘L’idke de race et la psychanalyse’, Psych6 1950, no. 5,
p. 254-65.
Contribution of psycho-analysis to the understanding of the racial
idea.
945. SHAPIRO, H.L. Race mixture. Paris, Unesco, 1954 (The race question
and modern science series).
946. SHEPPARD, H. L. ‘The Negro merchant: a study of Negro anti-Semitism’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1947, vol. 53, no. 2, p. 96-9.
A n analysis of the commercial rivalry between White and Negro
merchants. Given the particular ethnic character of these merchants,
the conflict is due to anti-Semitism.
947. SIEGEL, M. ‘Race attitudes in Puerto Rico’, Phylon 1953, no. 2,
p. 163-78.
948. SIMMEL, E. ed. Anti-Semitism, a social disease. N e w York, International Univ. Press, 1946, xxvii + 147 p.
In this composite work on the problem of anti-Semitism,an historical and practical analysis of the question precedes an attempt to
give an objective explanation of the phenomenon’s causes. The authors
then consider the consequences of the racial prejudice, which are
often tragic on the human plane and are disastrous from the social
and economic standpoint. The last chapter warns us of the danger
overhanging the free peoples that allow themselves to be influenced
by anti-Semitic prejudice. The authors of this work-M. Horkheimer,
B. Berliner, W.Orr,T.W . Adorno, and Allport-are nearly all experts
on the question.
949. SIMPSON,G. E.; YINGER, J. M. Racial and cultural minorities: an
analysis of prejudice and discrimination. N e w York, Harper, 1953,
x + 713 p.
293
1. Causes and consequences of prejudice. 2. Minorities in social
structures. 3. Demographic prejudice-judgment-values.
950. SKERPAN, A. ‘Aspects of Soviet anti-Semitism’, Antioch. R. 1952,
vol. 12, no. 3, p. 287-328.
A n historical account of manifestations of anti-Semitism since
1919. Persistence of anti-Semitism, despite legal measures.
SMITH, L. M., see 783.
951. SPOERL,
D . T.‘Der ydischer stereotyp-die ydische persehnlickkeit auf
der ydischer forurteil’ (The Yiddish stereotype-the Yiddish personality
and anti-Semitism), Yivo Bleter 1950, vol. 34, p. 49-58.
T. W. ‘The rivalry of intolerances in race relations’, Soc.
952. SPRAGUE,
Forces 1949, vol. 28, NO.1, p. 68-76.
The author notes what he considers to be the factors in American
sociology that encourage or check discrimination against the American
Negroes.
953. STIBBE,
P. ‘Le grand rCveil de 1’Afrique Noire’, Cha. int. 1950, no. 13,
p. 37-60.
954. TALBERT, R. H. ‘Race relations in the U.S. Army: an example of
integration’, Soc. Forces 1950, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 317-22.
955. TEAD,
D. W h a t is race? Pans, Unesco, 1952, 87 p.
956. THOMAS,
D.S. T h e salvage. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1953,
xi + 637 p.
957. THOMAS,
D. S.; NISHIMOTO, R. S. T h e spoilage. Berkeley, Univ. of
California Press, 1946, xx + 388 p.
958. TUMIN,
M.M.Caste in a peasant society-a case study in the dynamics
of caste. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1952, xiii + 300 p.
Report of a survey, conducted by questionnaire, carried out some
ten years ago with regard to the Indians and the Spanish-speaking
Ladinos of the village of San Luis Jilotepeque.
959. -. ‘The dynamics of cultural discontinuity in a peasant society’, Soc.
Forces 1950, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 135-41.
960. TURNER, R. H.‘The relative position of the Negro male in the labor
force of large American cities’, Amer. sociol. R . 1951, vol. 16, no. 4,
p. 524-9.
UNESCO,
see 923, 925.
961. VAJIL’,I. M. ‘Rasovaja discriminacija v Avstralija’, (Race discrimination in Australia), Sov. Gos. Pravo 1951, no. 8, p. 80-4.
VAKIL, C. N.,see 913.
962. VALLOIS, H.V. ‘Race et racisrne; les declarations de I’Unesco sur La
race’, L’Anthropologie 1952. p. 291-304.
963. VAN DER KROEF,
J. M. ‘The Eurasian minority in Indonesia’, Amer.
Sociol. R . 1953, vol. 18, p. 484-93.
964. -. ‘The Indonesian minority in Surinam’, Amer. sociol. R . 1951,
vol. 16, no. 4.
965. -. ‘Social conflict and minority aspirations in Indonesia’, Amer. J.
Sociol. 1950, vol. 55, no. 5.
966. -. ‘Society and culture in Indonesian nationalism’, Amer. J. Socio?.
1952, vol. 58, no. 1, p. 11-24.
967. VISHNIAK, M. A n international convention against antisemitism.
Research Institute of the Jewish Labor Committee, 1946, viii + 135 p.
968. VISSER’T
HOOFT, W . A. T h e ecumenical movement and the racial
problem. Paris, Unesco, 1954 (The race question in modern though!
series).
969. WAGLEY, C. ed. Race and class in rural Brazil. Paris, Unesco, 1952,
160 p.
Sociological study (as part of Unesco’s tensions programme) of the
rural population of Brazil. effected by four persons. The latter describe
294
the living conditions and customs of the Brazilian peasants. This
study reveals that Brazilian rural society is organized on very ‘nineteenth century’ principles, being divided into classes, each with strong
prejudices that are directed more against the other classes than against
other races.
P. A. F. Race and culture relations. N e w York, M c G r a w
970. WALTER,
Hill, 1952, xi + 482 p.
A treatise on sociology.
W. ‘Die biirgerliche Wissenschaft im Dienste der kolo971. WASSILJEWA,
nialen Ausplunderung und Unterjochung’ (Bourgeois science in the
service of colonial plundering and subjugation), Sovietwissensch.Gesellsch. Abt. 1953, vol. 5-6, p. 933-48.
G. Action for unity: what America is doing to push back
972. WATSON,
racial and religious barriers. N e w York, Harper, 1947, xi + 165 p.
973. WEAVER,
R. C. Negro labor, a national problem. N e w York, Harcourt
Brace, 1945, 329 p.
A n historical and practical analysis of the problem of Negro labour
in the U S A . The author describes the efforts made to reduce racial
discrimination and, in conclusion, indicates the results they are likely
to produce.
974. WECKLER,
J. E.; HALL,
T. E. The policy and minority groups: a
programme to prevent disorder and to improve relations between
different racial, religious and national groups. Chicago, The Inter-
national City Manager’s Association, 1944, 20 p.
975. WEGMANN,
B. Die europaische und atlantische Gemeinschaft in der
Ost-West-Spannung (The European and Atlantic community and EastWest tension), Bonn, Bundeszentrale fur Heimatdienst, 1953, 56 p.
C. ‘Perspective in racial theory’, Sociol. SOC. Res. 1950,
976. WHITMAN,
vol. 34, no. 5, p. 360-4.
Discussion of three hypotheses-put forward by 0. C. Cox,
R. E. Park, and W. L. Warner-concerning the racial theory.
977. W ~ E M O RI.EC.
, ‘An uncontrolled experiment in race relations’,
J. Educ. Sociol. 1949, no. 22, p. 590-7.
Observations made of a Japanese community in America and of
Negroes living in a state of racial segregation.
978. WILKERSON,
J. B. Interracial programs of student YWCA’s (Young
Women’s Christian Association). N e w York, Woman’s Press, 1948,
159 n.
W I L L I ~ MM.,
S ,Jr.~ ~
See. 344.
R. D.‘Note on Negro-White relations in Canada’,Soc. Forces
979. WILSON,
1949, vol. 28, no. 1.
L. ‘Problems and orientations of research in race relations
980. WIRTH,
in the U.S.’,
Brit. J. Sociol. 1950, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 117-25.
A descriptive assessment of the racial situation in the U S A .
YINGER,
J. M.,see 949.
981. ZELIGS,
R. ‘Your child’s good-will depends on you’, J. Negro Educ.
1951, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 132-8.
The racial prejudices of children depend on the attitude of their
parents.
F.‘Review of Joseph Fennenbaum: “Underground: the story
982. ZNANIECKI,
of a people” ’, Amer. J. SocioI. 1952, vol. 58, no. 1, p. 112.
295
MLTHODOLOGICAL, EXPERIMENTAL AND MONOGRAPHIC STUDIES
ACKISS.
T. D.,see 1023.
B. W . ‘The interaction of ethnic groups: a case study of
983. AGINSKY,
Indians and Whites’, Amer. sociol. R. 1949,vol. 14,no. 2,p. 288-93.
ALLPORT,
G. W.,
see 1001.
ALLPORT,
F. H.,see 1042.
984. AMERMAN,
H. E. ‘Race relations research in the field of education’,
Invent. Res. rac. cult. Relat. 1953,vol. 5, no. 2-3,p. 147-67.
BERG, W.,see 1037.
E. D.;BURDICK, H.‘Studies of group tensions:
985. BIRD,C.;MONACHESI,
986.
987.
988.
989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
994.
995.
996.
296
the effect of parental discouragement of play activities upon the
attitude of white children towards negroes’, Child Developm. 1952,
no. 23, p. 295-306.
-.
‘Infiltration and the attitudes of white and negro parents and
children’, I. abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1952, vol. 47, no. 3, p. 688-99.
Survey on the existence of racial prejudice among members of
families of all races in two districts of Minneapolis. The results of
the survey show that this prejudice-which is stronger against the
Negroes than against the Jews, although it is not really of an
aggressive nature-exists, particularly among the children.
BIXLER,R. H. ‘ H o w G. S. became a scapegoater’, J. abnorm. SOC.
Psychol. 1948,vol. 43,no. 2,p. 230-2.
BOGARDUS,E. ‘The measurement of social distance’, in: 209, p. 503
et seq.
BORRIE,W. D. Italians and Germans in Australia. Melbourne, F. W.
Cheshire ed., 1954.
BRADBURY,W. C. ‘Evaluation of research in race relations’, Invent.
Res. rac. cult. Relat. 1953,vol. 5, no. 2-3,p. 99-140.
BROOKOVER,W. B.; HOLLAND,
J. B. ‘An inquiry into the meaning of
minority group attitude expressions’, Amer. sociol. R. 1952, vol. 17,
no. 2, p. 196-202.
Discussion of a survey designed to reveal the apparent contradictions in the attitudes of groups towards minorities.
BURMA,J. H. ‘An analysis of the present Negro press’, Soc. Forces
1947, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 172-80.
The Negro press is an organ of protest and political action, as well
as one of information.
CAMPBELL,
A. ‘Factors associated with attitudes towards Jews’, in:
202, p. 518 et seq.
CAMPBELL,
D. T.;MCCANDLESS,
B. R. ‘Ethnocentrism, xenophobia
and personality’, Hum. Relat. 1951, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 185-92.
A statistical study. Utilization of the Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson
and Stanford questionnaire and of another scale of measurement constructed and standardized independently and concerning, especially,
the problem of racial attitudes.
CHEIN,
I.; HURWITZ,
J. ‘A study of minority group membership: the
reactions of Jewish boys to various aspects of being Jewish’, Amer.
Psychol. 1949,no. 4,p. 260-1,abstract.
[CHEIN,
I., see also 995, 1009.1
CITRON,
A. F.; CHEIN, I.; HARDING,
J. ‘Anti-minority remarks: a
oroblem for action research’. 1. abnorm. SOC. Psvchol. 1950. vol. 45.
Lo. 1, p. 99-126.
Reaction of a population to a description of anti-Semitic manifestations.
[CITRON,
A. F., also see 996, 1022.1
997. CLARK,
K. B., CLARK,
M.P. ‘Emotional factors in racial identification
and preference in Negro children’, J. Negro Educ. 1950, vol. 19, no. 3,
p. 341-51.
When the child first becomes conscious of racial differences. Result
of the ‘colouring test’.
998. CLARK,
M. P.; CLARK,
K. B. ‘Racial identification and preference in
Negro children’, in: 209, p. 169 et seq.
R.; VOSSE-SMAL, E.; MENON,
P. L‘assimilation culturelle
999. CLEMENS,
des immigrants en Belgigue. Liege, Vaillant-Carmanne, 1953.
1000. CLEMENT,
P. ‘Attitudes de la population de Vienne en France vis-&-vis
de groupes raciaux et culturels diffkrents’, paper submitted to the
Second World Congress of Sociology, Liege, 1953, section 11, part 4,
5 p. [See 63.1
A survey, mainly in the form of a questionnaire, carried out
among adults and schoolchildren. The oldest of the schoolchildren,
and the youngest of the adults are the best disposed towards
foreigners. The foreigners against w h o m they are most prejudiced
are those most remote from them in space (i.e. those least known to
them). Positive correlation between the geographical mobility of the
inhabitants of Vienne and their benevolence towards foreigners. Intermarriage is strongly condemned by 90 per cent of those questioned,
and co-operation is desired in so far as it does not give rise to
competition.
CLJNCHY,
E. R.,see 802.
COLLINS,
M., see 1010.
1001. ‘Controlling group prejudice’, Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC. Sci. 1946,
no. 244, vii + 182 p.
See in particular: 156, 325, 326, 340, 895.
1002. COOK,L. A. College programs in intergroup relations. N e w York,
American Council on Education, 1950, xvii + 365 p.
1003. -. ed. Inter-group relations in teacher education. Washington, Amencan Council on Education, 1951, xvii + 365 p.
1004. COOK,S. W.;HOGREFE,
R.;SELLTITZ, C. ‘The selection of problems
for research in the field of inter-group relations: a case study’, Amer.
Psychol. 1949, no. 4, p. 254.
T. C. ‘White stereotypes in fiction by Negroes’, Phylon
1005. COTHRAN,
1950, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 246-51.
CROWN,
S., see 1014.
1006. DAVIS,
A. ‘The class system of the white class’, in: 209, p. 467 et seq.
H. E. On getting into college: a study of discrimination in
1007. DAVIS,
college admissions. Washington, American Council on Education,
1949, xi + 99 p.
1008. DEUTSCE,
M. ‘Problems and progress of research in housing in its
bearing upon race relations’, Invent. Res. rac. cult. Relat. 1953, vol. 5,
no. 3, p. 65-95.
[See also 1012.1
1009. DEUTSCH,
M.;CHEW,I. ‘The psychological effect of enforced segregation. A survey of social science opinion’, I. Psychol. 1948, no. 26.
1010. DETJTSCH,
M.;COLLINS,M. Interracial housing: a psychological
evaluation of a social experiment. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota
Press, 1951, xvi + 173 p.
The survey compares interracial attitudes and relations in two
types of urban dwelling-those in which White and Negro lodgers
are housed together, and those in which they are housed separately.
The method consists in interviewing numerous women and children.
The results show that, when there is no segregation, friendly and
neighbourly relations are much more frequent; attitudes towards
297
Negro fellow-lodgers,and even towards Negroes in general, are better
-quite irrespective of the other social characteristics of the persons
concerned (political opinions, education, religion, etc.). These facts
underline the importance of oecological and spatial factors in the
attenuating of interracial prejudices and tensions. However, the transformation of ‘residential models’ presupposes certain socio-political
conditions: it must be possible to bring about actual proximity and
the sharing of the rights and duties attaching to it, which would be
difficult to e4ect in the Southern States. The authors, after wisely
recalling that psycho-sociology, like the other sciences, supplies
methods and not objectives, conclude by rejecting Sumner’s theory
that ‘Stateways can change folkways’.
S. C.,‘A measured wave of interracial tension’, Soc. Forces
1011. DODD,
1951, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 281-9.
The extension of a conflict between Negroes and Whites apropos
of a given incident.
1012. EVANS,
M. C.; DEUTSCH,
M. ‘A study of inter-group relations in
un-segregated interracial housing projects’, Amer. Psychol. 1949, no. 4,
260 p.
R. I. ‘Personal values as factors in anti-Semitism’,J. abnorm.
1013. EVANS,
SOC. Psychol. 1952, vol. 47, no. 4, p. 749-56.
1014. EYSENCK,
H. J.; CROWN,S. ‘National stereotypes: an experimental
and methodological study’, Int. J. Opin. Ati. Res. (Mexico) 1948,
vol. 2, no. 1, p. 26-39.
FLOWERMAN,
S., see 1050.
FOREMAN,
P.,see 1024.
1015. GILBERT,
A. R. ‘Inter-ethnictensions and mediation’, paper submitted
to the Second World Congress of Sociology, LiBge, 1953, section 11,
part 1, 16 p. [See 63.1
Plan for a campaign to diminish tensions between several racial groups.
J. P. ‘“Race” relations without conflict: a Guatemalan town’,
1016. GILLIN,
Amer. J. Sociol. 1948, vol. 53, no. 5, p. 337-43.
1017. GIRARD,
A.; STOETZEL,I. Franqais et immigre‘s. Paris (Cahiers de
I’lnsiitui naiional d’e‘tudes de‘mographiques, 1953, no. 19; 1954, no. 20).
R. M. ‘Problems and emotional difficulties of Negro children
1018. GOFF,
due to race, I. Negro Educ. 1950, vol. 19, p. 152-8.
M. E. Race awareness in young children. Cambridge,
1019. GOODMAN,
Mass., Addison Wesley Press, 1952, 280 p.
1020. GORDON,
M. W. ‘Race patterns and prejudice in Puerto Rico’, Amer.
sociol. R. April 1949, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 294-301.
1021. GRINGAUZ,
S. ‘Some methodological problems in the study of the
Ghetto’, Jewish SOC. Stud. 1950, no. 12, p. 65-72.
J.; CITRON,
A. F.; KING,E. ‘An experimental study of
1022. HARDING,
answers to anti-Negro remarks’,J. SOC. Psychol. 1953, vol. 37, p. 3-17.
Account of an inquiry carried out among several groups with
regard to an incident of an anti-Negro nature.
[HARDING,
J., see also 996.1
1023. HILL,
M. C.;ACKISS,
T. D. “‘The insight interview” approach to
race relations’, J. SOC. Psychol. 1945, vol. 21, p. 197-208.
M. C.; FOREMAN,P. The Negro in the United Stales, a
1024. HILL,
bibliography. Stillwater, Okla., The Research Foundation of Oklah o m a Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1947, 24 p.
J. ‘Tolerance and personality needs: a study of the
1025. HIMELHOCH,
liberalization of ethnic attitudes among minority group college students’,
Amer. sociol. R. 1950, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 79-88.
HOGREFE,
R.,see 1004.
HOLLAND,
J. B., see 991.
298
1026. HUGHES,
E. C. ‘The knitting of racial groups in industry’, Amer.
sociol. R. Oct. 1946, vol. 11, no. 5, p. 512-19.
Survey carried out in the industrial world, tending to show that
the White workers’ resistance to the granting of equality to the
Negro workers is theoretical rather than factual.
HURWITZ.
J.. see 995.
1027. Inter-group relations in teaching materials: a survey and appraisal.
I
,
Report of the Committee on the study of teaching materials in intergroup relations. Washington, D.C.,American Council on Education,
1949, viii 4-231 p.
A series of documents on the interracial and inter-group problems
that arise in the United States of America. The cases of the Negroes,
the Jews and the immigrants are dealt with.
1028. IRELAND, R. ‘An exploratory study of minority group membership’,
J. Negro Educ. 1951, no. 20, p. 164-8.
Study of racial discrimination among Negroes.
P. S. ‘Race relations in public housing’, J. SOC.
1029. JAHODA, M.;WEST,
Issues 1951, vol. 7, nos. 1-2, p. 132-9.
TENEN,
C. T h e reacher was black; an experiment in
1030. JAMES, T. E. 0.;
international understanding. London, Heinemann, 1953, 120 p.
Study of the effects which contact with Negro teachers has upon
the racial stereotypes and attitudes of schoolchildren.
[See also 737.1
H.E. Changing the attitude of Christian toward Jew: a psy1031. KAGAN,
chological approach through religion. N e w York, Columbia Univ.
Press, 1952, xvi + 155 p.
KATZ,
M. K.,see 863.
L. M. ‘The effects of soutliern white workers on race rela1032. KILLIAN,
tions in northern plants’, Amer. sociol. R. 1952, vol. 17, no. 3.
p. 327-31.
Survey by means of interviews: contacts determine, not a modification of ‘patterns’,but, at the most, an adaptation to a given situation.
KING,
E.,see 1022.
B.; WILKINS,
C.;YARROW,
P. R. ‘Verbal attitudes and overt
1033. KUTNER,
behavior involving racial prejudice’, J. abnorn. SOC. Psychol. 1952,
vol. 47, no. 3, p. 649-52.
1034. LEE,F. F. ‘The race relations pattern areas of behavior in a small
N e w England town’, Amer. sociol. R. 1954, no. 2, p. 138-43.
A survey carried out in a small N e w England town with a view to
determining the place assigned to Negroes in social life.
D .T.;SANFORD,R. N. ‘Scale for the measurement of
1035. LEVINSON,
anti-Semitism’, J. Psychol. 1946, no. 17, p. 339-70.
Questionnaire and statistical results.
LINDZEY,
G.;ROGOLSKY,
S.,see 374.
1036. LOHMAN,J. D.;REITZES,D. C. ‘Note on race relations in mass
society’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1952, vol. 58, no. 3, p. 240-6.
Research designed to show that, in modern society, the individual’s
racial attitude is determined by wages or salary, working conditions,
property and business transactions.
1037. LUND,F. H.;BERG,W. ‘Identifiability of nationality characteristics’,
J. SOC. Psychol. 1946, vol. 24, p. 77-83.
A survey carried out with a view to determining whether the
characteristics of a given race can or cannot be easily perceived by
members of another race.
MCCANDLESS,
B. R.,see 994.
299
1038. MACCRONE,
I. D. ‘Reaction to domination in a colour-caste society:
a preliminary study of the race attitudes of a dominated group’,
J. SOC. Psychol. 1947, vol. 26, p. 69-98.
1039. -. ‘Some factorial determinants affecting the racial anxiety aggression
syndrome in European subjects’, Proc. S. Afr. psychol. Assn 1951,
no. 2, p. 16.
1040. MACKENZIE,
B. K. ‘The importance of contact in determining attitudes
toward Negroes’, J. abnorm. SOC. Psychol. 1948, vol. 43, no. 4,
p. 417-41.
Relations between Negroes and Whites have improved since the
end of the last world war, possibly owing to their many contacts
during the war.
E. ‘Skin colour judgements of Negro college students’, in:
1041. MARKS,
209, p. 116-21.
MENON,
P.,see 999.
MONACHESI,
E. D.,see 985, 986.
1042. MORSE,
N. C.;ALLPORT,
F. H. ‘Anti-Semitism:a study of its causaf
factors and other associated variables’, Amer. Psychol. 1949, no. 4,
p. 261, abstract.
I. A. ‘Certain content of prejudices against Negroes among
1043. MUHYI,
white children at different ages’, Dissert. Abstr. 1952, vol. 12,
p. 385-6.
P. H.‘Some personality and social factors related to changes
1044. MUSSEN,
in children’s attitudes towards Negroes’, J. abnorm. SOC. Psychol.
1950, vol. 45, no. 3, p. 423-41.
I. ‘Minority group contacts and social distance’, Phylon
1045. NEPRASH,
1953, no. 2, p. 207-12.
A study of interracial contacts, with the help of tests. Results.
This study relates mainly to Negroes.
J. R.;SIMS, V. M.‘Attitude towards the Negro of Northern
1046. PATRICK,
and Southern college students’, in: 209, p. 358 et seq.
This study takes into account the intellectual level and sex of the
individuals concerned, as well as the geographical region to whicli
they belong.
1047. ‘Prejudice in “Seaside”. A report of an action-research project’,
Hum. Relat. vol. 1, no. 1, 1947, p. 98-120.
Study on the tensions between three ethnic groups-Jews, Italians
and Negroes-in a residential suburb of a large town in the east of
the United States of America. A study of the stereotypes and prejudices of these three groups with regard to one another confirms the
theory that the aggressiveness of a community is generally directed
against those groups which the pattern of prejudice within that community renders the most vulnerable.
REITZES,
D. C.,see 1036.
A. H.Colour prejudice in Britain. A study of West Indian
1048. RICHMOND,
workers in Liverpool, 1941-1951.London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1954.
1049. ROBINSON,D.;ROHDE,S. ‘Two experiments with an anti-Semitism
poll’, J. abnorin. SOC. Psychol. 1946, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 136-44.
Have the results of a survey on anti-Semitism varied according as
the investigators did or did not appear to be of Semitic origin?
ROGOLSKY,
S., see 374.
ROHDE,S., see 1049.
1050. SAENGER, G.;FLOWERMAN,S. ‘Stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes’,
Hum. Relat. 1954, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 217-38.
1051. SAENGER, G.;SHULMAN, H.M.‘Some factors determining intercultural
behavior and attitudes of members of different ethnic groups in
mixed neighborhoods, J. Psychol. 1948, no. 25, p. 365-80.
A study based on questionnaires.
SANFORD, R. N., see 1035.
SELLTITZ, C.,see 1004.
SHULMAN,H. M.,see 1051.
SIMS,V. M.,see 1046.
STOETZEL, I., see 1017.
TWEN,C.,see 1030.
VOSSE-SMAL,
E.,see 999.
WEST, P. S., see 1029.
1052. WESTIE, F. R. ‘Negro-White status differentials and social distance’,
Amer. sociol. R. 1952, vol. 17, no. 5, p. 550-8.
A n experimental study with the aid of attitude scales.
WILKINS,
C., see 1033.
YARROW, P. R., see 1033.
IV. INDUSTRIAL AND A G R A R I A N CONFLICTS:
CLASS PROBLEMS
1053. BASSO,
L. ‘Pour l’unit6 ouvribre’, Cah.int. 1949,no. 1, p. 5-16.
1054. BATOURINSKY, D. A. 0 Iikvidacii protivopoloinosti meidii gorodom i
derevnej v C.C.C.R.
(On the suppression of the conflict between town
Moskva, Ed. Pravda, 1949, 32 p.
and country in the U.S.S.R.).
Conflict between town and country during the capitalist period.
Relations between them after the October Revolution, and methods
used in order to put an end to the conflict. Its elimination during the
five-year plans and during the subsequent period of transition from
socialism to communism. Present methods used in the same sense,
considered in relation to problems of the economy and moral and
political unity of the U.S.S.R.
1055. BLUMER, H.‘Sociological theory in industrial relations’, Amer. sociol.
R. 1947, vol. 12, no. 3, p. 271-8.
The author considers the research methods employed by modern
sociologists in the field of industrial relations, and the reasons for
the failure of some of these methods.
1056. CASE, H. M. ‘An independent test of the interest-group theory of
social class’, Amer. sociol. R. 1952, vol. 17, no. 6, p. 750-5.
1057. CHASE, S. Roads io agreement. N e w York, Harper, 1951, xiii + 250 p.
A brief study of the roots of conflicts. Assessment of methods for
diminishing social conflicts-mainly with regard to small groups and
industrial relations. Techniques specially studied: role playing, semantics, ‘buzz-session’,permissive leadership. . . . The author also discusses more empirical methods-the intuitive strategy of traditional
human relations employed by those who, without any scientific plan,
endeavour to put an end to conflicts (cf. the chapter entitled ‘Conciliators and arbitrers’). Democratic action among all concerned is
recommended as a means of eliminating social conflicts, since it
enables small groups to act and permits of better adaptation on the
part of individuals.
10%. CROZIER, M. ‘Le mouvement des “relations humaines” et l’Ctude
objective des rapports entre patrons et ouvriers’, paper submitted to
1. In so far as they concern the study of conflicts in general.
301
the Second World Congress of Sociology, Likge, 1953, section 11,
part 3, 7 p. [See 63.1
M. ‘Conflicts between staff and line managers’, A m e r . sociol.
1059. DALTON,
R. 1950, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 342-51.
1060. -. ‘Unofficialunion-management relations’, Amer. sociol. R . 1950,
vol. 15, no. 5, p. 611-19.
1061. DAMPIERRE,
E. de. ‘Une usine rurale’, paper submitted to the Second
World Congress of Sociology, Libge, 1953, section 11, part 3, 12 p.
[See 63.1
In a factory, in the centre of a village which was studied with the
help of Unesco, there are conflicts: (a) between generations; (b) between the maintenance personnel and the manufacturing personnel.
1062. DE GRE,G. ‘Ideology and class consciousness in the middle class’,
Soc. Forces 1950, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 173-9.
1063. D o u c ~ ,A. Histoire d u n conflit de travail (Grands Magasins Bruxellois, Oct., De‘c. 1950). Bruxelles, Librairie Encycloptdique, 1951, 34 p.
1064. DUBIN,
R. ‘Constructive aspects of industrial conflict’, in: 1090,
p. 37-47.
1065. -. ‘Industrial conflict and its institutionalization’, paper submitted to
the Second World Congress of Sociology, LiBge, 1953, section 11,
part. 3, 8 p. [See 63.1
Definition of the concepts of ‘conflict‘ and ‘disorder’, in relation
to the fundamental principles of American democracy. ‘Disorder’in
the industrial field does not denote the same thing for the worker as
for the management. Collective bargaining provides a point of contact;
it institutionalizes the conflict, and organizes the social evolution of
the enterprise and of industrial society as a whole.
1066. -. ‘Review of causes of industrial peace’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1950,
vol. 55, no. 4, p. 426-8.
E. D. ‘Social tensions themes in folk tales of the Lenge,
1067. EARTHY,
Portuguese East Africa, in: Transactions of the 15th International
Congress of Socio?ogy. Publication of the Faculty of Arts of Istanbul
University, 1952, no. 2, p. 264-7.
L. ‘The price of union responsibility’, Proceedings of the
1068. FISHER,
74th Annual Meeting, National Conference of Social W o r k N e w York,
Columbia Univ. Press, 1947, p. 103-13.
Deals with the relations between employers and employees and the
reasons for the conflicts between them. Would the solution not be to
subject the trade unions and workers’ organizations to police regulations? Yet such political action goes far beyond purely industrial
bounds. Need for social action based on mutual understanding.
K. ‘Some international aspects of the strike move1069. FORCHHEIMER,
ment’, Bull. Oxford Univ. Inst. Stat. Jan. 1948.
1070. FORM,W. ‘Stratification in low and middle income housing areas’,
I. SOC. Issues 1951, vol. 7, nos. 1 & 2, p. 109-37.
1071. GIBBS,
M. Feudal order. N e w York, Schuman, 1953.
G.E. 0 preodolenij klassovyh razliEii meZdu raboEim;
1072. GLEIZERMANN,
i krest’janami v C.C.C.R.(Overcoming of the class differences between
Moskva, Ed. Pravda, 1950,
workers and peasants in the U.S.S.R.)
35 p.
L. A.;MARKOWITZ,
H. ‘Social welfare functions based on
1073. GOODMAN,
individual rankings’, Amer. .I. Sociol. 1952, vol. 58, no. 3, p. 257-62.
1074. GRIER,
T. H. American social reform movements since 1865. N e w
York, Prentice Hall, 1949, ix + 313 p.
C.T. ‘De menskundige bedrijfsvoering als onderdeel van
1875. GROOTHOFF,
het kolenmijnbedrijf‘ (Humane management in the coal-mining
industry), De Zngenieur 1952, no. 31.
302
B. M. T h e legislative struggle: a study in social combat.
1076. GROSS,
N e w York, M c G r a w Hill, 1953.
Legislation considered as an arm in combat-strategy and tactics.
J. ‘Social tensions in the relationship of the farmer and
1077. HAVEMAN,
farm labourer in an agricultural district of Northern Holland’, paper
submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Likge, 1953,
section 11, part 3, 1 1 p. [See 63.1
The role of economic competition and profit in the dissolution of
the traditional ties between the farmer and the farm labourer since
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Organized co-operation
between the employers’ associations and the trade unions makes it
possible to avoid strikes, which were very numerous at the beginning
of the twentieth century; but it has not established a really good,
atmosphere so far as employer-employee relations in agriculture are
concerned.
1078. HORION,
P. ‘La solution des conflits industriels en Belgique’, paper
submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Liege, 1953,
section 11, part 3, 12 p. [See 63.1
1879. JACKSON, E. Meeting of minds: a way to peace through mediation.
With special contributions by Carl Christian Schmidt and Sir Frederick
W. Leggett. Foreword by Paul-Henri Spaak. N e w York, M c G r a w
Hill, 1952, xxii + 200 p.
This somewhat prolix study endeavours to show h o w far experience
gained in settling industrial disputes can contribute to the settling of
international ones. The experience most likely to help in international
disputes would seem likely to come from large-scale industrial disputes affecting the national welfare, e.g. those concerning fuel, transport, armaments, etc. But the extent to which the international
community possesses political and legal institutions comparable to
those in a national community, for the settlement of disputes, is
obviously limited.
1080. JACOBY, E. H. Agrarian unrest in South East Asia. N e w York,
Columbia Univ. Press, 1949, xvii + 287 p.
1081. JOSHI, P. S. Struggle for equality. Bombay, Kitabs, 1951, xiii + 304 p.
1082. KAHN-FREUND, 0.‘Inter-group conflicts and their settlement’, paper
submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Li&e, 1953,
section 11, part 3, 37 p. [See 63.1
Industrial conflict problems considered in their general aspects
(conflict as a factor in the forming of groups and inter-group relations) and legal and institutional aspects: evolution of norms and
standards under the influence of collective bargaining and State
legislation; the role of group autonomy and State legislation in the
solving of conflicts; the intervention of ‘outsiders ’and permanent
institutions. Numerous international references are given at the end
of the article.
1083. KARSH, B.; SEIDUN, J.; LILIENTHAL, D. M. ‘The union organizer
and his tactics: a case study’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1953, vol. 59, no. 2,
p. 113-22.
C. ‘Industrial conflict and its tactical and strategical media1084. KERR,
tion’, paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology,
Liege, 1953, section 11, part 3, 14 p. [See 63.1
Contrary to the general belief, industrial conflicts play a useful
and necessary part in democratic societies. Even those of a violent
nature could probably not, and should not, be completely eliminated.
‘Tactical’ mediation (intervention by a third party in a conflict that
has already begun) contributes very little to their solution. ‘Strategic’
mediation-i.e. intervention before the beginning of the conflict, with
303
a view to improving relations between the parties concerncd--can bc
effectivein reducing the tensions. But this is conditioned by: (a) the
effective incorporation of workers and employers in the society;
(b) the stability of the society; (c) ideological compatibility; (d) the
secure and responsive relationship of leaders to members; (e) the
dispersion of (i.e. different outlets for) grievances; (f) the acceptance,
in conflicts, of certain ‘rules of the game’. Nevertheless, ‘strategic’
mediation can render the conflicts less destructive.
1085. KERR,
C.; SIEGEL,
A. T h e isolated mass and the integrated individual
-an
international analysis of the inter-industry propensity to strike.
Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1951.
1086. KNOWLES,
K. J. C.Strikes-a study in industrial conflict,with special
reference to British experience between 1911-1947. Oxford, Blackwell,
1947, xv + 330 p.
Strikes are only one of the symptoms of an industrial malaise, and
if they, rather than absenteeism, have been studied, it is because there
are greater documentation facilities in their case.
Part I: historical and legal background: evolution of the attitudes
of the government, the employers and the trade unions themselves
with regard to strikes. Their declining importance, compared with
the increasing part played by arbitration procedures.
Part 2: causes and consequences of strikes. Attempt, with the help
of statistics, to identify the motivating factors (economic, general or
specific: relations with trade unions, season of the year, etc.; factors
peculiar to each region and each industry). The author endeavours
to establish the proportion of strikers to the total industrial population, with a view to comparing regions and industries and assessing
what he describes as ‘strike-proneness’.
H e emphasizes that strikes have, not merely immediate causes, but
deeper ones inherent in the worker’s social condition. The workers’
increasing ability to make themselves heard politically makes for the
limitation and control of strikes. If this ability were lost, would not
certain strikes take on, once more, the aspect of a rebellion?
1087. -. ‘“Strike-proneness” and its determinants’, paper submitted to the
Second World Congress of Sociology, LiBge, 1953, section 11, part 3,
21 p. [63.]
Strikes are only one sign, among others, of industrial tension.
Their statistical study involves many difficulties, but leads to interesting conclusions concerning ‘strike-proneness’according to industries
and geographical regions. The data provided by the author relate
mainly to Great Britain.
The author considers the main determinants (immediate, intermediate, and remote) of ‘strike-proneness’ and their evolution
in Great Britain since the beginning of the century: decrease in
the number of strikes with a reformist and revolutionary tendency;
increase in the movements directed by the working masse.? against
their trade union leaders and the governments whose instruments the
latter have become. This evolution can only be understood in the
light of the political, economic and social changes that have taken
place in British society as a whole.
1088. KOIVISTO,
W. A. ‘Value, theory and fact in industrial sociology’,
Amer. J. Sociol. 1953, vol. 58, no. 6, p. 564-72.
Analysis of conflicting values.
1089. KORNHAUSER,
A. ‘Human motivations underlying industrial conflicts’,
in: 1090, p. 62-85.
A.; DUBIN,
R.; ROSS,A. M.,ed. Industrial conflict.
1090. KORNHAWSER,
N e w York, Toronto, London, M c G r a w Hill, 1954, 552 p.
304
1091.
1092.
1093.
1094.
This important study was carried out from the historical and
practical angles. The different solutions put forward have been based
on the results of a serious analysis of characteristic industrial conditions in the U.S.A.and certain European countries, such as
Germany, Sweden and Russia. The last part of the work seeks to
define the aspect that industrial conflicts might assume in the future.
See, in particular, 1064, 1089.
Labor-management relations in the Southern textile industry. U.S.
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Washington, D.C.,
1951, 176 p.
‘Labor relations and the public’, Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. SOC. Sci.
1946, no. 248, p. 1-316
A series of articles on social conflicts.
LEE,A. M.;LEE,E. B. Social problems in America: a source book.
N e w York, Henry Holt, 1949, 744 p.
A composite work, in which a number of university professors discuss
social problems in the U.S.A.from the ethnic, racial and hierarchical
standpoints. They describe at length the conflicts, and their results,
which these problems provoke. A considerable part of the book is
devoted to the Negro question. See, in particular, Chap. 24: ‘Riots
and wars’ (p. 635-70).
LEE,Shu-C. ‘Agrarianism and social upheaval in China’, Amer. J.
Sociol. 1951, vol. 56, no. 6, p. 511-18.
A. H.H u m a n relations in a changing world-observations
1095. LEIGHTON,
on the use of the social sciences. N e w York, Dutton & Co., 1949,
354 p.
The background for this book is the ‘rebirth’ of Hiroshima; and
the basic material for it was supplied by the Foreign Morale Division
of the Office of W a r Information, which studied the variations in
the ‘morale’ (from the personal and military angles) of Japanese
prisoners and incorporated the results in the ‘Post-WarReport’. What
w e there have are not abstractions, but reasoned judgments based on
a series of very careful observations. Sociologists have endeavoured
to ensure that such results shall be taken into account on the political
plane, but the politicians are impervious to such considerations and
methods. Even the sociologist, once he has become a politician,
shows himself incapable of introducing the use of the social sciences
into political life and conduct, as he, in his turn, becomes ‘practical’
and ‘realistic’. Leighton would welcome the establishment of a
permanent body, similar to the Foreign Morale Division, which would
be able to deal with national and international problems under more
favourable circumstances. A better balance should be secured between
scientific and moral values, especially with regard to the three
following points: ‘the selection of the problem to be investigated, the
limitation of human and other materials that may be used, and
discrimination as to what may be done with the results....’
E. ‘Social tensions in the Middle East’, Ann. Amer. Acad.
1096. LENGYEL,
polit. SOC. Sci. 1951, no. 276, p. 28-34.
1097. LEWIN,K. Resolving social conflicts-selected papers on group
dynamics. N e w York, Harper, 1948, xviii + 230 p.
LILIElNTHAL, D. M.: See 1083.
1098. LOVELL,H . G. ‘The pressure lever in mediation’, Indust. Lab.
Relat. R. 1952, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 20-30.
O n the basis of detailed analyses of two cases, the author concludes
that skill in human relations is not an important factor in negotiations, probably because it is so widespread. H e finds that ‘emotional
factors are relatively unimportant’. A conventionalized form of inter-
305
action, as in a game of poker, intended to produce an effect, is the
usual practice. The negotiators were bound by the decisions of their
organizations, which were often contrary to their own points ot
view. The mediator’s functions seem to be (a) to make direct efforts
to persuade; (b) to be a confidential mediator; (c) to control the
degree of persuasion used.
L o w , I. 0..see 1143.
LUNT,P. S., see 1143.
1099. L m , R. S. ‘Review of T. N. Whitehead: “Leadership in a free
society’”, Polit. Sci. Quart. 1937, vol. 52, no. 4, p. 590-2.
LYSGAARD,
S., see 1121.
MCDONAGH,
E.,see 1107.
N. R. Principles of h u m a n relations; applications to manage1100. MAIER,
ment N e w York, Wiley, 1952, ix + 474 p.
This work is centered upon the problems of communication and
leadership in industry; but it also contains a great deal of data on
the general problems of human relations within groups. The author
particularly emphasizes ‘group decisions’, a method intended to
encourage participation by all members of the group and to eliminate
their hostility or apathy with regard to social changes. A detailed
description of the different methods of discussion designed to overcome certain types of individual or collective resistance. Complementary data on ‘role playing’ and ‘counselling’.
MARKOWITZ,
H.,see 1073.
A. I. ‘Prejudice and scientific method in labor relations’,
1101. MARROW,
Indust. Lab. Relat. R . 1952, vol. 5, no. 4, p. 593-8.
A study on the existence of prejudices of all kinds, and their
consequences; h o w to suppress them.
1102. MAYO,
E. T h e social problems of an industrial civilization. Andover,
The Andover Press, 1945, vol. 17, 150 p.
E. M a y o proceeds from the idea that technical and scientific
progress has not been accompanied by similar progress in man’s social
competence. The result is the break-up of old-established w m munities, and the conversion of modern society into a chaotic medley
of conflicting groups. This society lives on out-of-date economic
principles, based on the conception of individuals acting logically in
their o w n personal interest, which would finally have to be countered
by an all-powerful State. The author sees no necessity for this, and
refers to several surveys in the field of industrial sociology (e.g. that
involving the Western Electric Co. at Hawthorne). H e shows that
(a) the workers are not moved solely by their personal interest; (b) the
methods of ‘counselling’ can reduce tensions considerably; (c) there
are spontaneous informal groups which must be taken into account.
It is possible, and necessary, to study the tensions afflicting society,
and secure, in a scientific way, co-operation between the various
groups, by training impartial observers sufficiently free from the
emotional attitudes which provoke conflicts between these groups.
H. A.; MONTGOMERY,
R. S. Organized labor. N e w York,
1103. MILLIS,
M c G r a w Hill, 1945, xiii + 930 p.
D. M a r x against the peasant. Chapel Hill, Univ. North
1104. MITRANY,
Carolina Press, 1951, 348 p.
MONTGOMERY.
R. S., see 1103.
1105. MOORE,
W. E. ‘Current issues in industrial sooiology’, Amer. sociol.
R. 1947, vol. 12, no. 6, p. 651-7.
The implicit consequences of m o d e m sociological research.
PLANNINGASSOCIATION.
The causes of peace under collec1106. NATIONAL
tive bargaining. Washington, 1948 53.
-
306
1107. NORDSKOG,
J. E.;MCDONAGH,
E.;VINCENT,
M . Analysing social problems. N e w York, Dryden Press, 1950, 818 p.
Suggested means of remedying the world’s present state of disorganization.
K.‘Industrial workers’ identification with union and manage1108. ODAKA,
ment in postwar Japan’, paper submitted to the Second World Congress
of Sociology, Littge, 1953, section 11, part 3, 22 p. [See 63.1
Results of a survey carried out in two Japanese enterprisesrespectively employing 15,000 and 2,700 wage-earners-on these wageearners’ identification with union and management. Marked frequency
of (a) positive identifications with union and management; (b) neutral
attitudes adopted by the workers. The survey shows the weakness of
the view that identification with the management is linked with
hostility towards the trade union, and vice versa. Considerable
methodological and statistical information.
1109. ODEGARD, $3. ‘ O n socialgruppers psykologi belyst ved deres sinnssykehyppighet’ (The psychology of social groups illustrated by the
frequency of mental diseases), Nord. Psykol. forhandl. no. 23, p. 108.
F. J. ‘Unofficial strike’, Sociol. R. 1951,
1110, PATERSON, T. T.;WILIETT,
vol. 43, no. 4, p. 51-94.
A detailed description of a strike in a coal mine in Scotland,
analysed in terms of stress and conflict.
1111. PPAUTZ, H. ‘The current literature on social stratification: critique
and bibliography’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1953, vol. 58, no. 4, p. 391-418.
1112. PIGORS, P. ‘Communication in industry: a cure of conflict?’, Zndust.
Lab. Relat. R. 1953, vol. 6, no. 4, p. 491-509.
The author anaIyses the theory that mutual understanding created
by repeated ‘rapprochements’would bring about a solution of social
conflicts.
1113. PIRKER, Th. ‘Problems of industrial conflicts and their mediation’,
paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Litge,
1953, section 11, part 3, 5 p. [See 63.1
Tensions in the great iron and steel concerns are due to the
privileged status enjoyed by their wage-earners as compared with
those of other industries in the same region, their antiquated structure,
and the obstacles they place in the way of the recruitment and
promotion of young workers.
1114. PONCE, A. Educacidn y lucha de clases. Argentina, Ed. Iglesias y
Matera, 1950, 3rd ed., 299 p.
1115. R A B U F F E ~ ,L. E. Conciliacidn social. Argentina, Ed. Victoria, 1951,
123 p.
1116. ROSE,A. M . T h e international cohesion of a labor union. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1952, xx + 209 p.
1117. -. Union solidarity. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1952.
Ross, A. M., see 1090.
1118. Roux, R. ‘La RBvolution franFaise et l’idte de lutte des classes’,
R. Hist. icon. SOC. 1951, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 252-19.
Historical study. The growth of the modern concept of the class
struggle, seen in the light of the events and legislation of the
revolutionary period.
1119. SAKSENA,R. N. ‘An analysis of labour tensions in India’, paper
submitted to the Second Congress of Sociology, Libge, 1953, section IT,
part 3, 13 p. [See 63.1
History of trade unionism in India. The general and specific causes
of industrial conflicts, and the legislative remedies adopted, are
also analysed.
307
SAYLES,L. R.;STRAUSS, G.T h e local union: its place in the industrial
plant. New York, Harper, 1953, xv + 269 p.
L.;LYSGAARD,
S. ‘“Deficiency” and “conflict” in industrial
1121. SCHNEIDER,
sociology’, Amer. J. Econ. Sociol. 1952, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 46-91.
H.G.‘Group conflict and social reform’, 1. SOC. Psychol.
1122. SCHRICKEL,
1120.
1945, vol. 21, p. 187-96.
The usefulness of social reform, the obstacles, and the possible
means of effecting it.
1123. SCHWEINITZ,
K. de, Jr.; THOMPSON,
K. W.M a n and modern society:
conflict and choice in the industria? era. N e w York, Henry Holt, 1953,
xii + 849 p.
1124. SEELING, 0.Die sozialen Spannungen der Gegenwart (The social
tensions of the m o d e m world). Miinchen, Isarverlag, 1951, 20 p.
1125. SEIDMAN, J. American labor from defense to reconversion. Chicago,
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953, ix + 307 p.
[See also 1083.1
1126. SHARP, I. G. Industrial conciliation and arbifration in Great Britain.
London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1950, part, 1, 466 p.
1127. SHARP, P. F. T h e agrarian revolt in Western Canada; a survey showing American parallels. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1948,
ix + 204 p.
1128. SHEPPARD, H. L. ‘Approaches to conflict in American industrial
sociology’,paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology,
Likge, 1953, section 11, part 3, 24 p. [See 63.1
The writer outlines the thinking of American sociologists on
industrial relations as it was before the birth of industrial sociology
proper, and goes on to discuss, successively, the ideas of Wilbert
Moore (Industrial relations and the social order) and of the ‘human
relations’ school (Mayo, White). H e then presents the conclusions
which industrial sociology can draw from the research carried out on
the international plane by two pairs of economists, Kerr and Siege1
and Ross and Irwin-that the integration of workers and trade unions
into the general framework of society tends to reduce the number of
strikes. H e follows this with a summary of the views, on industrial
co-operation and collective bargaining, of those sociologists w h o
regard conflicts of values and the ‘social movement’ as the basic
research material for industrial sociology.
1129. -. ‘The treatment of unions in managerial sociology’, A m e r . sociol.
R. 1949. vol. 14. no. 2. v. 310-13.
SIEGEL~
A.,see 1085.
1130. SIMEY,T. S. Welfare and planning in the West Zndies. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946, xi + 267 p.
1131. SIU. P. C. P. ‘The soiourner’, Amer. J. Sociol. 1952, vol. 58, no. 1,
p. 34-44.
1132. SORENSEN, R. C. ‘The concept of conflict in industrial sociology’,
Soc. Forces 1951, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 263-7.
1133. SPINDLER, G . P. Mifunternehmertum. Vom K h s e n k a m p f z u m sozialen A usgleich (Entrepreneurs’ action for social equality-from class
struggle to social equality). Liineburg, Kinau, 1951, 118 p.
1134. SPINLEY,
B. M.T h e deprived and ihe privileged. London, Kegan Paul,
1953, vii + 208 p.
SROLE,L.,see 1143.
1135. STEUBEN,J. Strike strategy. N e w York, Gaer Associates, 1950,320 p.
A n attempt to verify the hypothesis that strikes are conducted with
the same strategy as that used in war.
1136. STONE, R. C. ‘Conflicting approaches to the study of worker-manager
relations’, Soc. Forces 1952, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 117-24.
__
’
308
The ‘conflict of interests’ theory as a basis for the study of
worker-manager relations.
STRAWS, G. see 1120.
A. Unity and diversity in European labor-an introduction
1137. STURMTHAL,
to contemporary labor movements. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1953,237 p.
1138. SZALAI,A. ‘Social tensions and social changes: a Marxist analysis’,
in: 45, p. 23-41.
Tensions which are not necessarily bad, can in any case be resolved
only by a complete transformation of the economic structure of the
various countries.
1139. TAWNEY,
R. H. Equaliry. London, Allen & Unwin, 1952, 4th ed..
285 p.
A fourth, revised edition of this writer’s study on incomes and
business in England. The conclusion reached is that the losses suffered
by one class have been more than offset by the benefits accruing
to another. Equality has not involved loss of freedom.
C.C. T h e farmer’s movement 1620-1920.N e w York, A m e n 1140. TAYLOR,
can Book Co., 1953, 519 p.
1141. TEIWAEFF,
F. ‘Scandinavian co-operation: an example of regionalistic
integration’, paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, Liege, 1953, section 11, part 2, 5 p. [See 63.1
THOMPSON,
K. W.,see 1123.
U.S.SENATE COMMITTEE
ON LABORA N D PUBLICWELFARE,
see 1091.
VJNCEKT, M. see 1107.
P. Les relations entre patrons et ouvriers dans I’Angleterre
1142. WALINE,
d’aujourd’hui.With a preface by AndrB Siegfried. Paris, RiviBre 1948,
(Bibliothkque des sciences politiques et sociales), 304 p.
The development of social relations is determined by employers
and unions, the State increasingly taking on the role of mediator.
W . L.; LUNT,P. S.; Low, J. 0.;SROLE,L. Yankee city
1143. WARNER,
Yale University Press. Vol. I: T h e social
series. N e w Haven, U.S.A.,
life of a modern community. 1941, 460 p. Vol. 11: T h e status system
of a modern community. 1942, 246 p. Vol. 111: T h e social systems
of American ethnic groups. 1945, 320 p. Vol. IV: T h e social system
of the modern factory. T h e strike, a social analysis. 1947, 248 p.
Vol. V : American symbol systems.
The writers take an average N e w England town, which they call
‘Yankee City’, and identify the antitheses and tensions between the
groups (defined by them as ‘classes’) in such an urban community,
in the economic, cultural, institutional, ethnic and political aspects
of its social life. Volume I deals with economic and symbolic
behaviour and attitudes and the characteristics of the different social
strata. Volume I1 discusses the relationship between the positions
filled by individuals in the various social strata, and the antitheses
arising therefrom. Volume 111, on ethnic groups, shows h o w such
groups, while preserving their original cultural traditions, undergo
changes which integrate them into the life of the American cornmunity. Volume IV seeks to describe ‘inter-stratum’relations and
conflicts within the actual factory or business (strikes, etc.).
WEAVER,
R. C.,see 973.
W. F. Pattern for industrial peace. N e w York, Harper, 1951,
1144. WHYTE,
ix -!245 p.
Analysis of a specific case (a 500-hand factory) but one of wider
application. Industrial relations are substantially improved by a
transformation of the effective contacts between the two sides, pari
passu with a transformation of the symbols. Importance of ‘mutual
feelings’.
309
WILIH-I,
F. J., see 1110.
G.W.Causes of industrial peace under collective bargaining.
1145. ZINKE,
Minnequa Plant of Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation and two
locals of United Steelworkers of America (case study No. 9).
Washington, National Planning Association, 1951, xvi + 95 p.
APPENDIX
By the time of going to press it had not been possible to secure, in
regular bibliographical form, the following titles of items submitted at the
meetings of the American Sociological Society, Urbana, Illinois, in September 1954. Readers interested can obtain further information from the
authors.
1146. BENNET,J. W. ‘The interaction of Americans and Japanese: a preliminary analysis of cultural misunderstanding.’ Ohio State University.
1147. BERNARD,J. ‘Notes on international tensions.’ Pennsylvania State
University.
1148. BLOOD, R. 0. ‘Discriminations without prejudice.’ University of
Michigan.
T. ‘Unit disorganization and internal conflict in large-scale
1149. CAPLOW,
organizations.’ University of Minnesota.
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3 10
LIST O F A B B R E V I A T E D T I T L E S
Acta Psychologica (Amsterdam)
Age Nouveau
American Anthropologist
American Journal of Economics and Sociology
American Journal of Nursing
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry
American Journal of Psychiatry
American Journal of Psychology
American Journal of Sociology
American Psychologist
Amerikanische Rundschau
American Sociological Review
Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science
Annales de Droit International (Poland)
AnnCe Politique et ficonomique
Annual Review of Psychology
(Stanford Univ.)
Antioch R.
Antioch review (U.S.A.)
Archiv Phil.
Archiv fur Philosophie
Archiv Volkerrechts
Archiv des Volkerrechts
Brit. J. med. Psychol.
British Journal of Medical Psychology
Brit. J. Sociol.
British Journal of Sociology
Bull. Acad. Sci. U.R.S.S.’ Bulletin de I’Acad6mie des Sciences
de 1’U.R.S.S.
Bulletin du Groupe #Etudes Psychologiques
Bull. Gr. Et. psychol.
Univ. Paris
de I’Universite de Paris
Bull. Inst. Rech. icon. SOC. Bulletin de l’Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales
Bull. John Rylands Library Bulletin of the John Rvlands Librarv
- (Man.
chester)
Bull. math. Biophys.
Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics (Chicago)
Bull. Menninger Clin.
Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic
(Topeka, Kans.)
Bull. Oxford Univ. Inst.
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of
Star.
Statistics
Bull. Wld Fed. ment. Hlth Bulletin of the World Federation for Mental
Health (London)
Bulletin of Vanderbilt University
Bull. Vanderbilt Univ.
Acra psycho?.
.4ge nouv.
Amer. Anthrop.
Amer. J. Econ. Sociol.
Amer. 1. Nurs.
Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.
Amer. 1. Psychiat.
Amer. 1. Psychol.
Amer. J. Sociol.
Amer. Psychol.
Amer. Rundschau
Amer. sociol. R.
A n n . Amer. Acad. polit.
SOC. Sci.
A n n . Dr. int. (Poland)
Anne‘e polit. kcon.
Annu. R. Psychol.
1. The above title has erroneously been used in the bibliography in place of the transliterated
litle which is lzvestija Akademii N a u k S.S.S.R.
311
Cah. int.
Cah. int. Sociol.
Cah. M o n d e nouv.
Child Developm.
Christ. SOC.
Chron. SOC. France
Communist R.
Curr. Sociol.
Dinim. SOC.
Dissertation A bstr.
Div. Life
Econ. J.
Econ. et H u m a n .
Egypt. J. Psychol.
Et. phil.
Eugen. R.
G.Psichiat. Neuropat.
Hibbert J.
H u m . Organiz.
H u m . Relat.
Indust. Lab. Relat. R.
Int. Conciliation
Int. J. Opin. Art. Res.
Int. J. Psycho-Anal.
Int. SOC. Sei. Bull.
Int. Z.1ndiv.-Psychol.
Invent. Res. rac. cult.
Relat.
Jb. soz.-Wiss.
Jap. I. Psychol.
Jewish SOC. Stud.
I. abnorm. SOC. Psychol.
J. cons. Psychol.
I. educ. Psychol.
J. educ. Sociol.
J. educ. Res.
J. genet. Psychol.
1. Negro Educ.
J. nerv. ment. Dis.
J. Personality
J. projective Techn.
J. Psychol.
J. SOC. Issues
J. SOC. Psychol.
Kolner Z. Soziol.
Ment. Hlth.
3 12
Cahiers Tnternationaux (Paris)
Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie (Paris)
Cahiers du Monde Nouveau
Child Development (Baltimore)
Christianisme Social
Chronique Sociale de France
Communist Review (London)
Current Sociology (Paris)
DinBmica Social (Buenos Aires)
Dissertation Abstracts (Ann Arbor)
Divine Life (India)
Economic Journal (London)
Economie et Humanisme
Egyptian Journal of Psychology
Etudes Philosophiques
Eugenics Review (London)
Giornale di Psichiatria e di Neuropatologia
Hibbert Journal (London, Boston)
H u m a n Organization (New York)
H u m a n Relations (London)
Industrial and Labour Relations Review
(Ithaca, N.Y.)
International Conciliation (New York)
International Journal of Opinion and Attitude
Research (Mexico)
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis
(London)
International Social Science Bulletin (Paris)
Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Individualpsychologie
Inventory of Research in Racial and Cultural
Relations (Chicago)
Jahrbuch fur Sozialwissenschaft
Japanese Journal of Psychology
Jewish Social Studies ( N e w York)
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
( N e w York)
Journal of Consulting Psychology (Colorado
Springs)
Journal of Educational Psychology (Baltimore)
Journal of Educational Sociology (New York)
Journal of Educational Research (Bloomington,
U.S.A.)
Journal of Genetic Psychology (Provincetown,
Mass.)
Journal of Negro Education (Washington)
Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases (New
York)
Journal of Personality (Durham, N.C.)
Journal of Projective Technique (U.S.A.)
Journal of Psychology (Worcester, Mass.)
Journal of Social Issues (New York)
Journal of Social Psychology (Provincetown,
Mass.)
Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Koln)
Mental Health (Baltimore)
Ment. Hyg.
M o n d e nouv.
Cah. int. Sociol.
Ned. Tijdschr. Psychol.
Ned. Tijdschr. Psychol. en
Haar Grensgebiete
Nord. psykol. Forhandl.
Occup. Psychol.
Pastoral Psychol.
Phil. phenom. Res.
Phil. R.
Polit. Ctr.
Polit. Sci. Quart.
Proc. Acad. polit. Sei.
Proc. Amer. phil. Soc.
Proc. S. Afr. psychol. Assn
Psychoanal. R .
Psychol. Bull.
Psychol. Rundschau
Publ. Opin. Quart.
Purdue Univ. Stud. higher
Educ.
Quart. R .
R . belge Psychol. Pedagogie
R . Dr. in!.
R. educ. Res.
R . Estud. polit.
R . Hist. Ccon. SOC.
Rev. Psihol.
R . Psychol. Peuples
Relig. Educ.
Schweiz. Z. Psychol.
Sei. and Soc.
Sei. Mon.
Sei. N e w s
Soc. belge Et. Expans.
Soc. Forces
Soc. Res.
Soc. sei.
Soc. Tss.
Soc. W k J.
Sociol. R .
Sociol. SOC. Res.
Sov. Gos. Pravo
Sov. Etnogr.
Sovietwissensch.-Gesellsch.
A bt.
Sot. Welt
Srhwest. SOC. Sci. Quart.
Univ. Chicago rd Table
Mental Hygiene (New York)
Monde Nouveau-Paru
Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie (Paris)
Nederlandsch Tijdschrift voor Psychologie
Nederlandse Tijdschrift voor Psychologie en
haar Grensgebiete
Nordisk psykologm~teForhandlung
Occupational Psychology (London)
Pastoral Psychology (New York)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
(Buffalo)
Philosophical Review (Boston)
Politique Gtrangbre
Political Science Quarterly ( N e w York)
Proceedings of the Academy of Political
Science (New York)
Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society
Proceedings of the South African Psychological
Association
Psychoanalytic Review (New York)
Psychological Bulletin (Lancaster, Pa.)
Psychologische Rundschau
Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton, N.J.)
Purdue University Studies in Higher Education
Quarterly Review (London)
Revue Belge de Psychologie et de Ptdagogie
Revue de Droit International, de Sciences
Diplomatiques et Politiques (Geneva)
Review of Educational Research (Washington)
Revista de Estudios Politicos (Madrid)
Revue $Histoire ficonomique et Sociale
Revista de Psihologie (Cluj, Rumania)
Revue de Psychologie des Peuples
Religious Education (U.S.A.)
Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und
ihre Anwendungen
Science and Society (New York)
Scientific Monthly (New York)
Science News (Harmondsworth)
Socittd Belge d’fitudes et d’Expansion
Social Forces (Chapel Hill,N.C.)
Social Research (New York)
Social Science (Philadelphia, Pa.)
Socialt Tidsskrift
Social W o r k Journal (London)
Sociological Review (London)
Sociology and Social Research (Los Angeles)
Sovetskoe Gosudarshro i Pravo (Moscow)
Sovietskaja Etnografija (Moscow)
Sovietwissenschaftliche-Gesellschaft Naturwissenschaftliche Abteilung (Berlin, W.8)
Soziale Welt
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (Natchitoches, La.)
University of Chicago Round Table
313
West polit. Quart.
Vie Intellectuelle
Voprosy Filosofii (Akademija Nauk S.S.S.R.,
Moskva)
Western Political Quarterly (Salt Lake City,
W l d R.
World Review (London)
Vie intell.
Vopr. Filos.
Utah)
314