CHAPTER
11
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE : THE AMBUS H
AT GEMA S
ENERAL Percival had decided before the debacle at Slim River
G that the most he could hope to do pending the arrival of further
reinforcements at Singapore was to hold Johore . This would involve givin g
up three rich and well-developed areas—the State of Selangor (includin g
Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Federated Malay States), the State of Negr i
Sembilan, and the colony of Malacca—but he thought that Kuala Lumpu r
could be held until at least the middle of January . He intended that th e
III Indian Corps should withdraw slowly to a line in Johore stretching
from Batu Anam, north-west of Segamat, on the trunk road and railway ,
to Muar on the west coast, south of Malacca . It should then be responsible for the defence of western Johore, leaving the Australians in thei r
role as defenders of eastern Johore.
General Bennett, however, believing that he might soon be called upo n
for assistance on the western front, had instituted on 19th December a
series of reconnaissances along the line from Gemas to Muar . By 1st
January a plan had formed in his mind to obtain the release of his 22nd
Brigade from the Mersing-Jemaluang area and to use it to hold the enem y
near Gemas while counter-attacks were made by his 27th Brigade on th e
Japanese flank and rear in the vicinity of Tampin, on the main road nea r
the border of Malacca and Negri Sembilan . Although he realised tha t
further coastal landings were possible, he thought of these in terms o f
small parties, and considered that the enemy would prefer to press forwar d
as he was doing by the trunk road rather than attempt a major movemen t
by coastal roads, despite the fact that the coastal route Malacca-MuarBatu Pahat offered a short cut to Ayer Hitam, far to his rear . It wa s
therefore on the possibilities of action along the trunk road that hi s
mind was fixed .
It is not in the nature of retreat to inspire confidence ; and certainly
what had happened to the 11th Division between Jitra and Kuala Lumpur ,
with its series of failures, heavy losses, and progressive demoralisation ,
had not done so . While General Yamashita basked in the sunshine o f
success, Generals Percival and Heath might have reflected, as Hitler wa s
to do a year later, that "it is a thousand times easier to storm forwar d
with an army and gain victories, than to bring an army back in an orderl y
condition after a reverse or a defeat" . 1 (Later, perhaps, they might consol e
themselves with the thought that, because of the priority given to the wa r
against Germany, retreat in Malaya was in some part the price of the Allie d
Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 12 Dec 1942 .
1-6Jan1942
BENNETT AND PERCIVAL
19 9
successes which evoked that strangely chastened remark from the strutting
Fuehrer. )
To Bennett, concerned with the part which the A .I .F . was now to play
in the dangerously deteriorating situation, it seemed that the withdrawal s
in Malaya had been the outcome of faulty leadership . On 4th January he
proposed to Percival that upon withdrawal of the III Indian Corps int o
Johore, all forces in that State should come under Bennett's command ;
alternatively, that the A.I .F . be responsible for the west of the State, and
the Corps for the east . Percival rejected both proposals, on the ground s
that fusion of the Corps and the A .I .F . must lead to command and
administrative difficulties, and replacement of the 22nd Australian Brigad e
on the east coast by troops unfamiliar with the area would weaken the
defences of that area . He said that the only practical solution seemed t o
be to make the A .I .F. responsible, after the withdrawal, for the east o f
the State and the Corps for the west ; and at a conference next day he
issued orders embodying this principle, with the proviso that there mus t
be no withdrawal without his permission south of the line Endau 2 -Batu
Anam-Muar .
Bennett reported to Australia on 6th January that Heath's men were
tired and in most units lacking determination ; that "unless great change s
in outlook take place withdrawal will continue, exposing my left flank an d
ultimately creating impossible position for A .I .F." He continued that
he had therefore urged that his fresh and fit 22nd Brigade should b e
replaced in its existing position by an Indian brigade, and placed in th e
forefront of the fight in western Johore ; that the retiring units shoul d
occupy a supporting position, and the former "purely defensive attitude "
should be replaced by "strong counter-attack methods" . General Sturdee ,
who had received Bennett' s report, replied that while he felt it would b e
most unwise to attempt from Australia to influence dispositions in Johore ,
it was difficult to believe that when the enemy reached northern Johor e
he would not attempt concurrently landings in eastern Johore . These, h e
said, seemed likely to be pressed with even more determination, an d
would be actually closer to Singapore .
In global perspective, the misfortunes being suffered at the time b y
the defenders of Malaya were far more than counter-balanced by the
significance of a document signed by the representatives of 26 nations on
New Year's Day, 1942, as the outcome of the meetings between M r
Churchill and President Roosevelt in August and December 1941 . It was
a document which gave birth to the United Nations, pledged to the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter created at the August meeting ,
with the addition of religious freedom, and to united action against th e
Axis Powers. This great marriage of aims and action, precipitated b y
2
Later amended to Mersing.
200
1 Ja n
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour, was to have a tremendous effect no t
only upon the course of the war, but also upon world affairs thereafter . 3
Okn
Marianas
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AUSTRALIA
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It was of course in keeping with the more immediate purposes of th e
document that the setting up of a united command against Japan shoul d
proceed . The main architect of the A.B .D .A . Command organisation wa s
s The text of the document was :
A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada,,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala
Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama,
Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia.
The Governments signatory hereto ,
Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Join t
Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of th e
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dated August 14, 1941, known as th e
Atlantic Charter,
Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty ,
independence, and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their ow n
lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle agains t
savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, DECLARE :
(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, agains t
those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is
at war .
(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto, an d
not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies .
The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be ,
rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism .
Dec-Jan
DIRECTIVE TO WAVELL
20 1
the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Marshall . The
principal problem had been how to reconcile the varying national interest s
of those countries concerned—Britain, the United States, the Netherlands
East Indies and Australia—in such a command, and to allow of employment of their forces in such ways as would be acceptable to them . As ,
however, the United States was anxious to build up American forces i n
Australia for recovery of its power in East Asia, there existed a ready basi s
of agreement between these two countries . Britain ' s interests were involve d
primarily in the retention of Singapore and of control of the Indian Ocean ,
as well of course as in the defence of Australia ; while the Dutch sough t
to safeguard their East Indian possessions . Because of the importance
she attached to maintaining resistance by China, and the fact that th e
only practical supply line to that country was by the Burma Road, th e
United States sought the inclusion of Burma in the command .4 The British
representatives demurred on the ground that Burma had so recently bee n
transferred from the Far Eastern to Indian Command, and was dependen t
upon India for administration, reinforcements, and supplies . Finally it
was agreed that it should be included in the A .B .D .A . area for operational
purposes, though it would continue to be administered from India . Australia and New Zealand were excluded from the A .B .D .A . area in the firs t
directive, but, in response to a protest by Australia, it was agreed tha t
a naval force under the strategical direction of the Commander-in-Chief
of the United States Navy should operate in what would be known a s
the "Anzac Area", to include the eastern coast of Australia and th e
whole of New Zealand . Eventually (on 24th January) after representations by General Wavell and with Australia's concurrence, the A .B .D .A .
area was extended to include the portion of Australia north of a line fro m
the south-eastern corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria to Onslow on th e
west coast, thus including Darwin and as much elbow-room as was deeme d
necessary for its defence .
When formally assigning the command to Wavell on 29th December ,
Churchill cabled : "You are the only man who has the experience o f
handling so many different theatres at once, and you know we shall bac k
you up and see you have fair play . Everyone knows how dark and difficul t
the situation is . "5 The first directive, dated 3rd January, reached Wavel l
on the 4th . 6 It set out that the A .B .D .A . area had been constituted t o
comprise initially all land and sea areas, including the general regions o f
Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippine Islands ,
"At Washington I had found the extraordinary significance of China in American minds, eve n
at the top, strangely out of proportion . I was conscious of a standard of values which accorde d
China almost an equal fighting power with the British Empire, and rated the Chinese armie s
as a factor to be mentioned in the same breath as the armies of Russia . I told the Presiden t
how much I felt American opinion over-estimated the contribution which China could make t o
the general war . He differed strongly . There were five hundred million people in China . What
would happen if this enormous population developed in the same way as Japan had done i n
the last century and got hold of modern weapons? I replied that I was speaking of the presen t
war, which was quite enough to go on with for the time being . " (Churchill, The Second World
War, Vol IV, p . 119. )
5 " It was almost certain that he would have to bear a load of defeat in a scene of confusion . "—
Churchill, Vol III, p. 600 .
'The directive appears as Appendix 2 to this volume .
202
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
5-81an
as were defined in an annexure ; and that Wavell had been designated
Supreme Commander of this area and of all armed forces therein of th e
A .B .D .A . governments, and of such forces in Australia as had been allotte d
by their governments for service in or support of the area .
The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for conduct of war i n
your area (continued the cabled directive) is not only in immediate future t o
maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take offensive at the earlies t
opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan . The firs t
essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest moment through employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should
be minimised . Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations fo r
the offensive .
General strategic policy will be therefore :
(a) to hold Malaya barrier defined as line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java ,
North Australia as basic defensive position of ABDA area and to operat e
sea, land and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of barrie r
in order to oppose Japanese southward advance ;
(b) to hold Burma and Australia as essential support positions for the are a
and Burma as essential to support of China and to defence of India ;
(c) to re-establish communications through Dutch East Indies with Luzon t o
support Philippines garrison;
(d) to maintain essential communications within the area .
Conditions common to the employment of Australian forces in overse a
theatres of war were embodied in the directive, to the extent that interference was to be avoided in the administrative processes of the forces o f
the governments concerned, and there might be free communication between the commanders of those forces and their respective governments ;
and each national component of a task force would normally operate unde r
its own commander and would not be subdivided into small units for
attachment to other components except in cases of urgent necessity .
It was decided that Wavell should report to a new British-America n
military committee consisting of the American Chiefs of Staff and th e
senior representatives in Washington of the three British Services . Thi s
body was named the Combined Chiefs of Staff .' '
Onerous though the task would be, and risky to his reputation as a
general, Wavell was not the kind of man to shirk it . Realising that it
involved a race against time, and anxious to gain a practical grasp o f
the situation which would face him, he left Delhi by air on 5th January ,
and reached Singapore early on the 7th . He hoped that the enemy could b e
delayed north of Johore till the end of January, allowing the 18th Divisio n
to reinforce the defence, and the I Australian Corps to be landed and t o
prepare a counter-offensive . He had in mind that the . Indian troops in
Malaya might then be withdrawn to reinforce the Netherlands East Indies .
When, however, Wavell visited the III Corps on 8th January, an d
assessed its condition after the Battle of Slim River, he promptly decide d
that it must be withdrawn to Johore for rest and reorganisation befor e
7
f
The alternative proposals for the higher direction of ABDA Command are set out in M . Matlof
and E . M . Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (1953), a volume in the
official series United States Army in World War II .
8-9 Jan
WAVELL ' S PLAN
20 3
again facing any major encounter with the enemy . He told Heath, whom
he thought tired, of this decision, and said that, though he should cove r
Kuala Lumpur as long as possible, he should not await a full-scale enem y
attack . After he had discussed the situation with Bennett, he decided t o
give the Australian commander the responsibility he sought, and laid down
next day the following plan for the defence of what remained of Malaya
in British hands :
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
III Indian Corps, after delaying the enemy north of Kuala Lumpur fo r
as long as possible [Wavell did not expect it to be longer than 11th January ]
to be withdrawn by rail and road into Johore, leaving sufficient mobile
rearguards to cover the demolition scheme .
The 8th Australian Division, leaving its 22nd Brigade Group in th e
Mersing area on the east coast, to move forthwith to the north-wester n
frontier of Johore and to prepare to fight a decisive battle on the genera l
line Segamat-Mount Ophir-mouth of Muar River. The 22nd Brigade Group
to join the remainder of the Australian division as soon as it could b e
relieved by troops from Singapore Island . [Wavell considered that this
could not be completed before the arrival of the 53rd Brigade. ]
The 9th Indian Division, to be made up from the freshest troops of th e
III Indian Corps and the 45th Indian Brigade, to be placed under Genera l
Bennett for use in the southern portion of the position allotted to th e
Australian division .
The Australian division as soon as possible to send forward mobil e
detachments to relieve the rearguards of III Indian Corps and to haras s
the enemy and delay him by demolitions .
III Indian Corps on withdrawal to take over responsibility for the eas t
and west coasts of Johore south of the road Mersing-Kluang-Batu Pahat ,
leaving Bennett free to fight the battle in north-west Johore . The Indian
Corps to rest and to refit the 11th Indian Division and to organise a
general reserve from reinforcements as they arrived.
The plan conceded the enemy a further southward advance of nearly
150 miles . Although it involved weakening the east coast defences, Wavel l
held that in view of the state of III Indian Corps, and since the well developed road systems in Selangor and Malacca made delaying tactics
difficult, a risk must be taken temporarily on the east coast, which wa s
not immediately threatened, for the sake of the west which was s o
threatened . He was confident that Bennett—although initially the force s
available to him for operations in north-western Johore would include only
one of the Australian brigades—would conduct "a very active defence " ,
and he still hoped that a counter-stroke could be delivered once the Australian Corps had arrived . He hoped also that expected air reinforcement s
would enable close support to be given to forward troops, and that small
naval craft would be able to cope with enemy attempts to land on th e
coast . Wavell ordered that work be begun on defences on the north sid e
of Singapore Island, where, he was concerned to find, "no defences ha d
been made or even planned in detail " ; and he received from Duff Cooper
"a gloomy account of the efficiency of the Civil Administration and th e
lack of cooperation between the civil and military " .
204
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
Jan1942
As a result of the creation of Wavell ' s new command, Duff Cooper's
position as Resident Minister now lapsed, and meetings of the Far Easter n
War Council were suspended pending decision whether it was to continu e
to function . It was decided on the 10th January that it should resume a s
"War Council, Singapore " , with its scope limited to the area under Malay a
Command and the administration of the Governor . As in fact it had
never operated in the wider sphere implied by its former title, and ha d
acted as a consultative rather than a directing body, this made littl e
difference to its activities .
On the initiative of the Chinese of Malaya, who thereby displayed a
refreshingly lively approach to the subject of civilian cooperation in th e
struggle, there had been formed a Chinese Mobilisation Council . Seeking
to avoid in Singapore a collapse of essential services such as had occurre d
in Penang, it was to be primarily concerned with maintaining a supply o f
labour . Delegates to the council included representatives of such widel y
diverse bodies as the Malayan Kuomintang (allied to the then ruling part y
in China) and the Malayan Communist Party . Its president was a leadin g
Malayan business man, Mr Tan Kah-kee .
The activities of the small British naval force remaining at Singapor e
had become confined almost wholly to protection of convoys, and Admira l
Layton had transferred with his staff to Batavia, leaving Rear-Admira l
Spooner 8 in local command .
At this time Mr Bowden sent to the Secretary of the Department o f
External Affairs, Colonel Hodgson—who referred it to the Minister, D r
Evatt—a letter containing penetrating comment on some of the men principally concerned in the conduct of affairs in Malaya . Of Mr Duff Coope r
he wrote that he was an able man but not a dominant one, and did no t
provide the War Council with the strong leadership that a body of tha t
sort should have . Brooke-Popham had shown "an extraordinary diffidenc e
of manner for a man in his position" and was "definitely too old for suc h
a post in wartime" . Pownall had become the outstanding man in th e
Council ; Percival appeared to be able but not a particularly strong personality ; Air Vice-Marshal Pulford was "very worried and greatly overworked" . The Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, appeared to Mr Bowden as
more ready at producing reasons for not doing things than for doing them ,
and in the Malayan civil service there seemed to be too much of the ol d
bureaucratic doctrine that action means to risk making blunders, an d
inaction means safety . '
e Vice-Adm E . J . Spooner, DSO ; RN. Comd HMS Repulse 1938-41 ; i/c Naval Establishments at
Singapore, 1941-42 . B . 22 Aug 1887. Died 15 Apr 1942.
V
Lt-Col W . R. Hodgson, CMG, OBE . (1st AIF : Lt 2 Fd Arty Bde .) Secretary Dept of External
Affrs 1935-45; Aust Minister to France 1945-48, Ambassador 1948-49 . B . Kingston, Vic, 2 2
May 1892.
1 Commenting on 12th January on the pending departure of Duff Cooper from Malaya, the Strait s
Times said that rightly or wrongly the public had regarded him as the last bulwark against
"that minute-paper mentality to which many of our present anxieties must be attributed " . Appealing for his retention, the paper said that alternatively a military governor of Singapore
Island should be appointed "to cut through that cumbrous procedure which is so hopelessl y
unsuited to the days in which we live . . . . 11
10 Ian
BAFFLING PROBLEMS
20 5
These opinions, hewn in the stress of the times, could hardly have don e
full justice to those concerned . They were none the less the opinions of an
able man, concerned for the welfare of his country, and anxious tha t
the gravity of the situation in Malaya should not be obscured in responsibl e
quarters in Australia by the veneer of Malayan official optimism .
On the 10th Wavell flew to Batavia, where he met the principal officer s
who were to be on his staff . It was a strange turn of fortune that placed this
learned, high-principled old soldier again in chief command in the mai n
eastern theatre (which the Far East had now become in succession t o
the Middle East) . Despite the importance of the task assigned to him ,
it is doubtful whether Churchill ever had full confidence in him . Indeed,
he had not even met him until August 1940 ; and in July 1941 he had sent
him upstairs from Cairo to Delhi . Now Wavell faced even more bafflin g
problems than those the Middle East had presented in mid-1941 wit h
revolution in Iraq, Crete lost, a German force on the Egyptian frontier ,
and the likelihood that he would be asked to attack in Syria .
On Wavell's right, MacArthur's main Filipino-American army ha d
fallen back, as shown in Chapter 10, to a line across the neck of the
Bataan Peninsula . The Japanese had recently occupied not only British
North Borneo, but also Tarakan in Dutch Borneo, and Menado in th e
Celebes . Such British and Dutch naval forces as were available wer e
engaged chiefly in escorting supplies and reinforcements to Singapore .
There were only small American surface naval forces in the A .B .D .A .
Command, and Japanese planes had mastery in the air . Thus not only wa s
the enemy at the throat of communications with the Philippines, but there
was little to prevent him from occupying more island bases whence his
aircraft could attack Java and dominate the supply route to it from Australia. In Malaya the British forces might be driven back to Singapor e
Island . On Wavell's left, in Burma, the Japanese had not yet made a
major attack .
As Wavell's directive required, his staff included officers of the variou s
Services of four nations . The position of Commander-in-Chief, Far East ,
was to lapse, and Pownall, who had held it hardly long enough to gathe r
the reins, had flown from Singapore with him to become his Chief o f
Staff . The Deputy Commander-in-Chief was Lieut-General George H .
Brett of the American Army Air Force, until recently in command of th e
nucleus American forces in Australia . Admiral Hart (United States Navy )
was Chief of the Naval Staff, with Rear-Admiral Palliser (British Navy )
as his deputy . Major-General Brereton (United States Army Air Force )
was in command of the Allied air forces, pending the arrival of Air Marsha l
Sir Richard Peirse 2 (R .A .F .) . It seemed likely that Australia would soo n
be providing the largest military contingent in the combined force, an d
2 Air
Ch Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, KCB, DSO, AFC . Dep Chief of Air Staff 1937-40 ; AOCin-C Bomber Comd 1940-42, India 1942-43 ; Allied Air C-in-C SE Asia Comd 1943-44 . Regular
airman ; b. 1892 .
206
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
9-13 Jan
Wavell sought some Australian officers for inclusion in his staff . 3 The Allied
land forces under his direction were commanded by the following officers :
Java, Lieut-General H . ter Poorte n
Burma, Lieut-General T . J . Hutton 4
Malaya, Lieut-General A . E. Percival
Philippines, General D . MacArthur
Darwin, Major-General D . V . J . Blakey
Headquarters were to be in a hotel at Lembang, near Bandung, the
site of the Netherlands East Indies Army headquarters . At the first conferences of the Combined Staff, the Dutch and American officers urge d
the necessity of holding and reinforcing such forward air bases as survived
in Allied hands : Ambon, Kendari (Celebes), Samarinda (Dutch Borneo) ,
Sabang (Sumatra) . However, each had only a small garrison, and Wavel l
was unable to see how with his very limited resources he could afford t o
reinforce them . He therefore clung to his plan to concentrate on the line
Darwin-Timor-Java-southern Sumatra-Singapore .
Wavell had not yet formally assumed command because his headquarter s
had not been fully established, and he was not, in the words of his directive, "in position effectively [to] carry essential functions of suprem e
command" . 6 In the meantime, on 13th January, he flew to Singapore agai n
to visit his main sector in Malaya . There, on the morning of the 9th ,
Percival had issued orders to Bennett consequent upon those given b y
Wavell to him .
As supplemented on the 10th, Percival's orders provided that troop s
in Johore be divided into two forces . The force under Bennett, to b e
known as Westforce, would comprise :
9th Indian Division ;
A .I .F. less 22nd Brigade ;
45th Indian Brigade Group ;
2/Loyal Regiment (from Singapore Fortress) less one company ;
Artillery, engineer, and administrative units not included in formations ;
An Indian pioneer battalion.
Westforce was to hold north-west Johore, principally along the lin e
Batu Anam-Muar. The composition of the other main force—III India n
Corps—would be :
8 On 21st January Colonel Lloyd, until recently General Morshead's senior staff officer in Tobruk ,
was promoted major-general and appointed senior administrative officer. (Maj-Gen C . E . M .
Lloyd, CBE, VX4. DAAG 6 Div 1939-40 ; AQMG I Corps 1940 ; GSO1 9 Div 1941, HQ AI F
ME 1941-42 ; DSD LHQ 1942-43 ; AG LHQ 1943-45 . Regular soldier; of Melbourne ; b . Fremantle ,
WA, 2 Feb 1899 . Died 31 May 1956.) Wavell recorded in his dispatch that Lloyd did the job
most efficiently, and was "a staff officer of great quality" .
* Lt-Gen Sir Thomas Hutton, KCIE, CB, MC . CGS India 1941 ; GOC Burma 1942 ; Secretary Wa r
Resources and Reconstruction Committees of Council (India) 1942-44 ; Secretary Planning an d
Development Dept 1944-46. Regular soldier ; b . 27 Mar 1890 .
6 Maj-Gen D. V. J. Blake, VP7416 . (1914-18 : Maj AFC .) In charge Administration Southern
Comd 1939-41 ; Comdt 7 MD 1941-42. Regular soldier ; of Melbourne ; b. Harris Park, NSW ,
10 Nov 1887 .
"The official time and date of the opening of the ABDA Command were midday GMT on 1 5
January 1942.
a
40%P•' '
(Australian War Memorial )
Laying an Australian 25-pounder field gun, Malaya, January 1942 .
(Australian War Memorial )
Stretcher bearers attending a wounded Australian .
The Muar ferry crossing, looking south-east . The 45th Indian Brigade, on the left flank of
Westforce, was disposed along 24 miles of river front, with detachments forward of the river .
:ter,
(A ,stralian War ,llemnrial )
The rear 2-pounder gun of the 13th Battery, 2/4th Anti-Tank Regiment, in action ahead o f
Hakri on 18th January . From this position the forward and rear guns accounted for nin e
Japanese tanks .
8-11 Jan
NEW COMMANDERS
20 7
11th Indian Division ;
22nd Australian Brigade Group and attached troops, including 2/17th Dogr a
Battalion from Singapore Fortress, under Brigadier Taylor (to be known as
Eastforce) ;
Corps troops, inclusive of artillery, engineer and administrative units .
The III Indian Corps was to defend the remainder of Johore up t o
and including the line Endau (on the east coast) through Kluang t o
Batu Pahat on the west coast . Although the 11th Indian Division wa s
included in this force, it was to be placed in areas where it could b e
rested and reorganised, and the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was to b e
withdrawn direct to Singapore . The plan split the Australian division —
something which Percival hitherto had sought to avoid, and which Bennet t
accepted with reluctance, thinking perhaps that events might soon restor e
his 22nd Brigade to him .
On the ground that an Indian Army officer was now required to pull
together and establish confidence in what remained of the 11th Division ,
Brigadier Key was appointed to command it in place of Major-General
Paris . Brigadier Lay, having returned to duty, was given command of th e
8th Indian Infantry Brigade (9th Division) and Colonel Challen' replace d
Brigadier Moorhead in command of the 15th Brigade (11th Division) .
Percival impressed on Bennett that the new position must be held an d
declared that "if this position is lost, the battle of Singapore is lost " .
Percival' s ground forces on the peninsula amounted to three under-strengt h
divisions, including the weak 1 1 th Division . He expected to have th e
equivalent of one more division by the end of the month, and a numbe r
of reinforcements . It was almost impossible for the time being to give an y
effective air support to the infantry . On the other hand the Japanese wer e
now bombing targets, including Singapore Island, with increasing freedom ,
as well as supporting their forward troops . The seas around Malaya la y
open to the enemy .
While these plans were being made, the Japanese were building their strengt h
in Malaya . The 21st Regiment of the 5th Division landed at Singora on 8th January
and the Guards Division, having been relieved of its duties in Thailand, had its 5th
Regiment in Ipoh . Preparations were being made to land at Endau towards th e
end of January the portion of the 18th Division which as yet had not been employe d
in Malaya, and at the same time the Anambas Islands, off the east coast o f
Malaya, were to be occupied so that they might be used as an advanced naval base.
The principal immediate danger to the safe withdrawal of III India n
Corps to Johore, however, was presented by the Japanese 4th Guards
Regiment . The main body of this regiment crossed the Sungei Selango r
unopposed on the night of 9th-10th January, and forced its way to Kiang .
There it captured the bridge over the Sungei Kiang held by the Jat-Punja b
Battalion of the 15th Brigade, and forced its withdrawal to Batu Tiea b y
1 a .m . on 11th January . The battalion, reduced to about 200 all ranks ,
was then embussed and moved southward through Kajang, on the trun k
* Brig B. S . Challen . 2 Punjab Regt ; AQMG III Indian Corps 1941 ; Comd 15 Indian Bde 1942 .
Regular soldier; b. 17 Jan 1897 .
208
10-11 la n
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
road . Concurrently, the II/4th Battalion of the Guards Division had been
moved by sea to near Port Swettenham, at the mouth of the Sungei Kiang ,
and landed unopposed on the afternoon of the 10th . It then set out for
Kajang, hoping to come on to the flank of the 11th Indian Division . I n
Tg . Mali m
Knala Selangor
Rawang
G•
Kapar
Batu Tiga
Telo k
Datok
Sepang
W
Bat u
Anam
Port Dic k
Jasin
this endeavour it was too late, for the British Battalion, acting as th e
rearguard of the 11th Division, had withdrawn from Kuala Lumpur at
4 .30 a .m . on the 11th, and the division was clear of Kajang when th e
Guards battalion arrived there that evening .
For days past, smoke had billowed up at Kuala Lumpur from great
quantities of stores which could not be moved because of the swift collapse
10-14 Jan
THE GREAT WITHDRAWAL
20 9
at Slim River. Even so, much was left to the enemy . The southward mov e
from the city had begun on the morning of Saturday, 10th January .
All Saturday and Sunday, all day and all night, the great withdrawal continue d
(wrote a war correspondent who witnessed it) . An interminable convoy, compose d
of all manner of vehicles, began to roll south : large lorries filled with British troop s
so dog-tired that they slept in spite of bumps and jolts ; civilian motor-cars commandeered by the military and hastily camouflaged by being spattered with mud ;
lorries bearing the names of half the rubber estates in Malaya; dispatch-riders dartin g
in and out of the traffic on their motor-bicycles ; eleven steam rollers . . . which had
steamed all the way down from Kedah and Perak ; two fire-engines also making thei r
way south ; enormous tin-dredges towed by Diesel tractors . . . so broad that the y
took up most of the road, and so heavy that their treads curled up the tarre d
surface ; low trollies towing sticks of heavy aerial bombs saved from the norther n
airfields for further use ; private motor-cars, from Austins to Rolls Royces, carryin g
Local Defence Volunteers, A.R .P . wardens, police officials ; camouflaged staff car s
through whose windows one caught a glimpse of red tabs and hatbands ; Red Cross
ambulances, ordnance vans, trucks fitted with cranes and lathes and all equipmen t
needed for field repairs. . . .
In the villages and towns along the route Malays and Chinese and Indians stoo d
in silent little groups . . . . Neither pleasure nor malice nor sympathy were to b e
seen in their impassive countenances . . . . War was a phenomenon completely strang e
to these pacific, indolent, happy people . And now they saw the white tuans [masters] ,
who had always been in Malaya since they could first remember, heading south . . . .$
The white tuans had indeed been humbled . Not only were they givin g
up great military, commercial, and personal possessions ; they were bein g
forced to leave behind them millions of Asians whom they were pledge d
to protect . It was a bitter moment, relieved only by hope of ultimat e
victory .
Enemy troops entered Kuala Lumpur at 8 p .m . on 11th January, thus
completing the first phase of the Japanese plan for the conquest of Malaya .
Preparing for the next, and establishing control in the capital, the invader s
paused, and the 11th Division moved without further fighting to successiv e
positions in its withdrawal to Johore . No longer able to enter the trun k
road at Kuala Kubu, the 9th Indian Division withdrew southward throug h
Bentong and Bahau, and on the 13th reached the Segamat area, wher e
it came under Bennett's command .
It is naturally disturbing to learn that the Japanese have been able to overru n
the whole of Malaya except Johore (cabled the Australian Prime Minister to M r
Churchill on the 11th), and that the Commander-in-Chief considers that certain risk s
have to be accepted even now in carrying on his plan for the defence of this limited
area .
It is observed that the 8th Australian Division is to be given the task of fightin g
the decisive battle. . . . I urge on you that nothing be left undone to reinforc e
Malaya to the greatest degree possible in accordance with my earlier representation s
and your intentions . I am particularly concerned in regard to air strength . . . .
To this Churchill replied on the 14th
I do not see how any one could expect Malaya to be defended once the Japanes e
obtained the command of the sea and while we are fighting for our lives agains t
8
Ian Morrison, Malayan Postscript, pp . 104-5 . Morrison, whose Australian-born father was th e
famous "Chinese " Morrison, had become correspondent in Malaya for The Times of London .
210
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
10-13 Ia n
Germany and Italy. The only vital point is Singapore Fortress and its essential
hinterland . Personally, my anxiety has been lest in fighting rearguard actions dow n
;he peninsula to gain time we should dissipate the force required for the prolonge d
defence of Singapore . . . . Some may think it would have been better to have com e
back quicker with less loss. . . . Everything is being done to reinforce Singapor e
and the hinterland . . . .
Faced with the great challenge to the A .I.F . and to himself in the
Westforce plan, Bennett briskly set about his task . As approved in principle by Percival, the crossings over the Sungei Muar and Sungei Segama t
in the vicinity of Segamat were to be secured strongly against all forms o f
attack. Bennett directed that, westward of these, localities were to be hel d
at focal points, with striking forces available to prevent the enemy fro m
moving around the flanks . An ambush force and road-block were to b e
placed along the main road west of Gemas, on which it was expected that
the principal enemy force would converge . Believing that the Japanes e
would not stand up to resolute blows, Bennett wanted to ensure that the y
were hit hard when they first encountered the A .I .F. In the coastal area
to the west the 45th Indian Brigade Group 9 would cover the main coas t
road at Muar, south of the river, with detachments and patrols along th e
river to Lenga, about 25 miles inland . Discussing the plan with General
Barstow, commander of the 9th Indian Division, Bennett "told him definitely that there would be no withdrawal . He said that was all right, bu t
if the troops could not stand, a withdrawal would be forced on us . "
Bennett "reiterated that there would be no withdrawal" . Barstow "accepte d
the decision and immediately set to work to pass on the determination t o
his brigadiers" . 1
Bennett impressed on Brigadier Maxwell (27th Brigade) and his battalion commanders that "fixed defensive positions were dangerous, and tha t
a fluid defence with as many men as possible for counter-attack was
sounder" . 2 He expounded these tactics also to Brigadier Duncan, 3 commander of the 45th Indian Brigade . As the 27th Brigade was disposed o n
13th January in the Segamat sector, the foremost position, on the trun k
road three miles west of Gemas, was occupied by the 2/30th Australia n
Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Galleghan) with Major Ball's 4 battery of th e
2/15th Field Regiment, and the 16th Anti-Tank Battery (less a troop )
under command . The role of the battalion was to act as a shock-absorber
at the first contact with the enemy, inflict as many casualties as possible ,
and hold its ground for at least 24 hours before falling back on the mai n
positions . The 2/26th Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Boyes), with the 29th
Field Battery under command, was on the Paya Lang Estate, north of th e
trunk road, and between Gemas and Batu Anam . Behind the 2/26th
''this brigade, mobilised in Aug 1941, was one of the three brigades of the 17th Indian Division .
It had embarked from India in December for Burma and been diverted to Malaya .
1 H . G . Bennett, Why Singapore Fell, p. 102 .
' Bennett, p . 106.
' Brig H. C . Duncan. Comd 45 Indian Inf Bde 1941-42 . Regular soldier ; b. 19 Aug 1895 . Killed
in action 20 Jan 1942.
Mal A . F . Ball, ED, NX 12309; 2/15 Fd Regt . Bank officer; of Strathfield, NSW ; b . Woollahra,
NSW, 16 Oct 1906.
10-13 Jan
WESTFORCE
21 1
DEPLOYED
was the 2/29th Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Robertson), at Buloh Kasap ,
between Batu Anam and Segamat . Headquarters of the 27th Australia n
Brigade and of the 2/ 15th Field Regiment were near Segamat, an d
advanced headquarters of Westforce at Labis, south-east of Segamat . Unit s
of the 9th Indian Division were allotted various responsibilities fro m
Segamat to Batu Anam, and westward of the main road to guard approaches through Jementah, on a road from Malacca and the west coast .
Their dispositions were : 8th Indian Brigade : 1/13th Frontier Force Rifle s
A M4
5 Japanese Di v
'''''IBatu Ana m
OETRO S
ESTAT E
?r-a s
S
Ayer Kunin g
Buloh Kasa p
Mai n
Westforce
Sag a
*e*ndk
5
at
s
Tenan g
•Jementa h
Labis
Mt.Ophir
Japanese
Guards Div
eng a
16! 5 Regt
Guards
Grise k
Malacca
45
4 Guards Regt
'S. Ma
Indian
Bde
Panther
orak
Kesang
m
Sir pang Jera m
3
Muar
\
( Yang Peng ~
s
,$
Pen g
Parit SulongPayong
Bt Peland o
Batu Pahat
MILES 10
5
0
10'
20 .
3,0 MEL
The Westforce front, 14th January 1942
astride the road west of Batu Anam ; 2/10th Baluch between Batu Ana m
and Buloh Kasap ; 3/17th Dogras, Segamat . 22nd Indian Brigade : 5/11th
Sikhs near bridge over Sungei Muar four miles west of Segamat on th e
road to Jementah ; 2/ 18th Garhwals about the junction of the roads Bat u
Anam to Jementah and Segamat to Jementah ; 2/12th Frontier Forc e
Regiment, between the Garhwals and the Sikhs . The 2/Loyals, in reserve ,
were responsible for the local defence of Segamat . The 29th Australia n
Field Battery was placed in the area occupied by the 1/13th Frontie r
Force Rifles . Other Indian units were supported by Royal Artillery units .
212
12-131an
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
The ambush was a device which Bennett had for long discussed with
his commanders pursuant to his belief that resolute aggressive actio n
might check the Japanese advance, and perhaps disrupt their plans . He
saw in the situation now facing him means of putting it into practice ,
though on a smaller scale than originally had been contemplated. It wa s
expected that the III Indian Corps would make a clean break away fro m
the enemy, who would be unopposed for thirty miles . Bridges along th e
road would be left intact to heighten the impression of helter-skelte r
retreat, and tempt the Japanese to become over-confident and careles s
as they continued their advance . High hopes were entertained of wha t
could be done by the 2/30th Battalion, forged and toughened by strenuou s
training and severe discipline, when it encountered the enemy in suc h
circumstances. The battalion area was closely reconnoitred,° and the spo t
chosen for the ambush consisted of a length of the main road leading a t
-
Mortar s
o Vickers Cun
o Anti-Tank gun
\Q Coy . Position
2 MILES
2/30th Battalion dispositions, 14th January
this point to a wooden bridge over a small river—the Gemencheh—abou t
seven miles west of Gemas . Dense jungle grew on both sides of the road
for about 500 yards, including a cutting, twelve feet high and forty yard s
long, which ended within 60 yards of the bridge, giving way to low scru b
offering little or no concealment . On the far side of the bridge the roa d
ran in a straight line for about 250 yards with open ground on either side .
Percival, who visited the spot with Bennett, considered that it was too fa r
in advance of where the main stand was to be made, near the Paya Lan g
Estate, but Bennett upheld the choice .
As Galleghan disposed his forces, positions forward of battalion head quarters, extending from north of the road to the railway line, wer e
° In the event only one bridge—a steel and concrete structure at Pondai—was demolished .
° Maxwell had lived for two or three months at Segamat ; and h's brother Arthur, now a liaison
officer with the A.I.F ., had a plantation near by at Ayer Kuning .
13-14 Ian
AMBUSH POSITION
21 3
occupied by "C" Company (Captain Lamacraft 7 ), on the right, with responsibility for establishing a road-block ahead of its positions, "A"
Company (Major Anderson$ ) in the centre, and "D" Company (Captai n
Melville3 ) on the left . "B" Company (Captain Duffy 1 ), entrusted with
the task of manning the Gemencheh ambush, three miles ahead, took u p
its position amid teeming rain on 13th January while Japanese plane s
droned overhead to bomb and machine-gun rearward targets . Lieutenant
Head's 2 platoon lined the cutting with company headquarters near by .
Platoons commanded by Lieutenants Geikie 3 and Jones 4 were in echelo n
along the road . Rear headquarters were established close to a track know n
as Quarry road, along which the company was to withdraw after takin g
maximum toll of the enemy . Galleghan was insistent in putting into practic e
his belief that the use of transport in the battle area should be kept t o
a minimum .
To prevent Japanese troops not caught in the ambush from attemptin g
a flanking movement, two sections of Head's platoon were posted o n
opposite sides of the road where they could cover both the road and th e
flats beside it . A small holding force was given the task of securing th e
junction of the road with Quarry road . This force comprised headquarter s
details under Warrant-Officer Gordon, 5 the company sergeant-major, o n
the right and a detachment of Jones' platoon on the left, under Sergeant
Garner . 6 Two signal lines were laid, one to battalion headquarters an d
one to the supporting battery, which was to fire on enemy troops following those who had been caught in the ambush . ? On his way to th e
ambush position Duffy had noticed the artillery signal wire lying conspicuously beside the road . The N.C .O . in charge of the truck from which th e
line was being laid undertook to send a party on foot to camouflag e
it after it had been laid. Galleghan, inspecting the position soon after
first light on the 14th, also noticed the wire and gave instructions fo r
its concealment . Wireless telegraph equipment was not provided . Engineers
of the 2/ 12th Field Company prepared the bridge for demolition . All
transport and carriers were sent to B Echelon except one truck for eac h
7 Capt A . M . Lamacraft, ED, NX34738 ; 2/30 Bn. Company secretary ; of West Chatswood, NSW ;
b . Glebe, NSW, 13 Jul 1908 .
s Maj R. H . Anderson, ED, NX70435 ; 2/30 Bn. Salesman ; of Greenwich, NSW ; b. Stanmore,
NSW, 19 Mar 1908 .
Lt-Col W. S . Melville, NX34711 . 2/30 Bn 1940-42 ; CO 11 Bn 1943-45 . Solicitor; of Inverell,
NSW ; b. Kogarah, NSW, 10 Jul 1911 .
I Lt-Col D. J . Duffy, MC, ED, NX34792 ; 2/30 Bn . Staff supervisor; of Rockdale, NSW; b. Sydney,
30 Apr 1910.
9 Lt H. Head, NX70439 ; 2/30 Bn. Clerk; of Mudgee, NSW; b. Scone, NSW, 30 Jun 1915 .
3 1..t N. B . C. Geikie, NX32594 ; 2/30 Bn. Wool valuer ; of Darling Point, NSW; b. Sandgate,
Qld, 20 Jan 1919 .
Maj F. A . Jones, EM, NX70513 ; 2/30 Bn . Journalist ; of Casino, NSW ; b. Maclean, NSW, 24
Mar 1917 .
" W02 V. M . I . Gordon, NGX33 ; 2/30 Bn . Barman ; of Bowen Hills, Qld ; b . Melbourne, 1 8
Oct 1906 .
Sgt D . F . Gamer, NX36285 ; 2/30 Bn. Ironmonger ; of Narrandera, NSW ; b. Fairfield, Vic,
6 Sep 1911 .
7 The signallers with 2/30 Bn ran short of wire as they were linking the battalion 's various
positions, so they stopped an Indian signals truck as it was withdrawing into Johore and too k
the length they needed . "Who shall I say took the wire? " asked the Indian sergeant. "Colonel
Ned Kelly, of Australia," said Galleghan, who was near by .
214
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
13-14 Ja n
company, two ammunition trucks with Intelligence, two carriers an d
signals trucks, and Galleghan' s car .
The 27th Brigade was now ready for its first experience under fire .
Withdrawal of the III Indian Corps was completed on the night of 13th14th January . As all wheeled transport had to pass through Segamat thi s
became a dangerous bottleneck, but, surprisingly and fortunately, enem y
planes failed to take advantage of it .
Galleghan told his commanders and staff on the eve of battle : "The
reputation not only of the A.I .F . in Malaya, but of Australia, is in th e
hands of this unit ." Soon after 10 a .m . on the 14th he passed on to hi s
companies the code word "Switch " , indicating that control of the fron t
had passed from Heath to Bennett . Thus the men were braced for battl e
when, shortly before 4 p .m ., a few Japanese on bicycles rounded th e
bend near the Gemencheh bridge . Soon a column of blithely chattering
Japanese push cyclists, riding five or six abreast, was streaming over th e
bridge . They resembled a picnic party rather than part of an advancin g
army, except that they carried arms . Reporting by telephone to battalio n
headquarters that the cyclists were moving through, Duffy found that the
voice at the other end of the line reached him only faintly . Sounds alon g
the road forward of his position suggested that motor transport, wit h
perhaps the main body of the enemy convoy, was following . He therefore
let from 200 to 300 of the cyclists pass, to be dealt with by troops i n
the rear . As it happened, only three motor cyclists appeared, followed b y
several hundred more push cyclists . When these were tightly packed int o
the ambush, and on the bridge, and it seemed to Duffy that the head of th e
column would have reached the Quarry road position, he gave the orde r
for the bridge to be blown .
The charge hurled timber, bicycles and bodies skyward in a deadly
blast . Almost simultaneously, Duffy's three platoons hurled grenade s
among the enemy and swept them with fire from Bren guns, Tommy
guns and rifles. The din was so great that when Duffy ordered artiller y
fire the artillery forward observation officer thought his battery ' s gun s
were firing . Both he and Duffy soon found, however, that their signa l
lines back from the ambush position had gone dead—cut, it was believed ,
by Japanese who had discovered them at the crucial moment in th e
artillery fire plan . In the absence of wireless telegraph equipment 8 ther e
remained no means whereby the artillery could be given the signal to fir e
as had been planned on to the enemy troops and transport which it wa s
assumed would bank up on the far side of the bridge .
Battalion headquarters, straining their ears for the sound of the bridg e
being blown, heard nothing they could rely upon as a signal that th e
action had commenced, and that would indicate when and where artiller y
fire was required . On the other hand, they knew that premature or wrongl y
6
Wireless telegraph had been found to be unreliable in the Malayan jungle, and it was suspecte d
in some quarters that it gave the enemy means of pin-pointing positions . It might nevertheless
have served to convey a message to the artillery after the bridge had been blown, had ther e
been a set with the company .
14 Jan
WITHDRAWAL SOUTHWARD
21 5
directed fire might be disastrous . Thus the Australians were now threatene d
by the "fog of battle" that had hampered the III Corps throughout it s
long withdrawal from the north .
But there was no frustration of Duffy 's men in their immediate task .
The ambush had caught the Japanese completely by surprise . Their rifle s
and automatic guns were strapped to their cycles, and there was littl e
opportunity to use either their bayonets or their grenades . The best hope
of those who had survived the onslaught lay in pretending to be dead . In
twenty minutes it was all over . Of the sight across the river, Duffy related :
" . . . the entire 300 yards of road was thickly covered with dead an d
dying men—the result of blast when the bridge was blown up and th e
deadly fire of our Bren guns, specially told off to attend to the sectio n
on the far side of the bridge . "9 Undoubtedly the first encounter with
the Australians had been costly to the enemy .
Duffy now ordered withdrawal, especially as so many Japanese had bee n
let through the ambush before the action commenced . In the withdrawa l
Head and some of his platoon became engaged with these Japanese, wh o
had turned back . He shot an enemy officer, but was himself wounde d
and had to be supported by Sergeant Doolan l to the rendezvous at Quarry
road . Geikie, who with his platoon also encountered the enemy, led severa l
successful bayonet attacks and he too was wounded, but not badly .
Gordon's and Garner's parties, after fighting fiercely, joined company head quarters in the jungle near Quarry road . Jones' platoon also withdrew ,
fighting a rearguard action .
As it appeared that the Japanese were in strength on the trunk road ,
Duffy led his company in single file through the jungle in an attempt to
move round the enemy's flank . He did not discover until 5 .15 that
contact had been lost between the party immediately following him an d
the rest of the company . With Duffy were Captain Kearney, '- his second-incommand ; Sergeant Garner and his party from Jones ' platoon ; approximately one section from each of Geikie ' s and Head's platoons ; the Forward
Artillery Observation Officer and his party ; and the engineers group— a
total of thirty-eight . All three platoon commanders were with the others ,
who therefore would not be short of leaders in finding their way .
Hearing Japanese near by, but deciding against attack in the circumstances, Duffy headed south, towards the railway line . Soon after the party
moved off wild firing broke out and continued for about fifteen minutes .
The party formed a circle and went to ground, but although they wer e
not seen by the Japanese, Lance-Sergeant Nagle,3 the company orderly
room sergeant, was killed by the fire and one man was wounded . In th e
course of their further endeavours to rejoin their battalion the party cam e
9
A . W. Penfold, W . C. Bayliss, and K . E. Crispin, Galleghan 's Greyhounds, The Story of the
2/30th Australian Infantry Battalion (1949), p. 89 .
Sgt A . A . Doolan, NX36597 ; 2/30 Bn . Shop assistant ; of Stawell, Vic ; b . Baan Baa, NSW,
23 Dec 1907 . Died while prisoner 9 Nov 1943 .
8 Capt P. D . Kearney, NX70437 ; 2/30 Bn . Traveller ; of Cremorne, NSW ; b. Cremorne, 25 Jul 1917.
s L-Sgt A. G. Nagle, NX7951 ; 2/30 Bn . School teacher ; of Bellingen, NSW ; b . Cowra, NSW, 2 2
Aug 1909. Killed in action 14 Jan 1942 .
216
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
14-16 Jan
under fire of artillery where it was shelling the enemy ; but with th e
exception of a patrol led by Garner, they reported to battalion headquarter s
at noon on 16th January .
Jones, with the rearguard, followed Geikie's platoon from the ambus h
position ; and both thought they were following Duffy . They were in fact
following Head, who had continued the original eastward movemen t
through the jungle with a group including part of 12 Platoon, and wa s
unaware of the presence of the others . When the pain he was suffering
compelled Head to give up the lead, Doolan took over and brought th e
column out of the jungle next morning . It was then discovered that Jone s
and Geikie were part of the column, and Jones took charge . Two attack s
by parties of Japanese were beaten off, the latter one by the rearguar d
comprising two sections of Jones' platoon under Corporal Huntley . 4 Of
these men, six were missing when the column reached the battalion perimeter during the morning . 5 "We'll pin them down—you get back," they
had said .
Garner's patrol, which had been sent by Duffy to warn battalion head quarters of his party ' s approach, comprised Garner, Lance-Corporal Hann 6
and Private Noble .' In an encounter with a Japanese patrol Noble kille d
three of its members with his machine-gun . He and Garner reached brigad e
headquarters on 16th January but Hann, who became separated from the m
by jumping into a river when he was fired upon, was captured and imprisoned in a hut . Released by a Tamil—of whom many were employe d
at the time in Malaya—he donned a turban and other Indian clothing
and made his way to the house of a second Tamil, who gave him foo d
and cigarettes . With two other Tamils as guides, Hann set off again an d
eventually met an Australian patrol, hurriedly pulled off his turban, an d
was recognised .
Tension at battalion headquarters naturally had increased as it wa s
realised that the signal lines to Duffy's company had been cut, and tha t
action of some kind probably was in progress . Patrols were sent out to
endeavour to restore communications . The patrols became involved in
several clashes with enemy troops and one, led by Lance-Corporal Heckendorf, 8 was cut off but rejoined the battalion later with valuable informatio n
obtained behind the enemy lines . It was discovered that the Japanes e
were in control of the Gemencheh ambush area (where they restored th e
4 Cpl N. L . S . Huntley, NX27854 ; 2/30 Bn . Station manager; of Hay and Booligal, NSW ; b.
Summer Hill, NSW, 14 Aug 1908 .
°The missing men were : L-Cpl C. F. Mulligan (of Paddington, NSW), Ptes F . G . Collett (of
South Hurstville, NSW), J . R . Bland (of Rose Bay, NSW), T. C . Trevor (of Seaforth, NSW) ,
E. W . Sams (of Forbes, NSW), and J. R . Cochrane (of Brookvale, NSW) .
° L-Cpl I . G . Hann, NX25741 ; 2/30 Bn. Barman ; of Moree, NSW; b. Moree, 9 May 1917 . DIe d
while prisoner of war, 18 Feb 1945.
7 Pte J . A. Noble, NX37430 ; 2/30 Bn. Labourer ; of Geurie, NSW ; b. Dubbo, NSW, 27 Apr 1914 .
° Sgt E . E. Heckendorf, NX36791 ; 2/30 Bn. Station hand ; of Lockhart, NSW; b. Lockhart, 1 1
Apr 1910.
15 Jan
TANKS WRECKED
21 7
bridge for traffic within six hours of its having been blown up 9 ) and
were advancing in force, with tanks, towards the battalion's main position .
Preceded by a storm of machine-gun fire, two Japanese tanks appeare d
soon after 9 a .m. on 15th January near the road-block in front of Lama craft ' s company, but turned tail under assault by anti-tank guns . Nex t
came three tanks—two medium and one light—which fired along the road .
Armour-piercing shells either passed through or ricochetted off them, bu t
when high-explosive shells also were used the first tank was set ablaze ,
the second one was disabled, and the third towed it away . The blazing
tank served as a screen for three more tanks which then appeared, soo n
followed by another . The tanks, and machine-guns dismounted from tw o
of them, were quickly sending a stream of fire along the road . This was
supplemented by fire from mortars and machine-guns brought up b y
Japanese infantry, but the Australian mortar and anti-tank fire was s o
effective that the first of the four tanks was hit, the second disabled, th e
third set on fire, and the fourth wrecked by a mortar bomb which explode d
after entering its turret . Artillery now opened fire on the troops in th e
Japanese rear . The Japanese still pressed forward along the road and
commenced flanking movements, but the combined effect of the Australia n
artillery and infantry fire was too much for them . The assault was ove r
within an hour, at heavy cost to the enemy . It was during the ensuin g
lull that Jones ' party rejoined the battalion, with its stimulating news of th e
success of the Gemencheh ambush .
To Galleghan, with the information now available to him, this seeme d
to be the time for an attack which he had planned . Melville's compan y
was chosen to advance on a hill occupied by the Japanese about 1,00 0
yards from the company 's position, hold it if possible till dusk, and the n
return . As reports flowed in to battalion headquarters it was realised tha t
the Japanese were massing much more quickly than had been thought
likely . Their use of tanks, so soon after the Gemencheh bridge had bee n
blown, added to the danger that the battalion would be overpowered o r
cut off if it attempted to hold on to its advanced position . It was accordingly decided that a plan for the battalion ' s withdrawal behind the Sungei
Gemas should be put into effect that evening .
The struggle was not only between ground forces, with the Australian s
outnumbered : taking advantage of their command of the air, Japanes e
planes were bombing Gemas, and suddenly dive bombers pounded battalion headquarters . Except at the command post, no trenches had bee n
dug, and the men could only lie on the ground as the bombs explode d
around them . A divisional signals wireless truck attached to the battalion
was destroyed, but from it emerged an unscathed signaller holding a
broken buzzer key . l
The speed with which the Japanese repaired the bridge was attributed to there being a sawmil l
near by, from which ready-cut timber was available . The work could, of course, have bee n
hampered and perhaps made impossible by artillery fire but for the failure of the signals fro m
the ambush area and consequent uncertainty at battalion headquarters as to what had happene d
and the whereabouts of Duffy's company .
I Suspecting that the Japanese had been able to locate battalion headquarters by the wireles s
signals from it, Galleghan abandoned use of radio telegraphy for short-distance communications .
9
218
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
15 Ian
The dive bombers next attacked in the area held by Anderson 's company, apparently seeking to destroy anti-tank guns and 25-pounders, bu t
without success :
At fifteen minutes to one o'clock a great cry went up from the platoon on m y
left, and there on the flank was "Don" Company advancing in open formatio n
across the clearing . It was magnificent to see them, each man in place, with hi s
rifle held high across his body, walking forward as if on a training exercise . . . . We
had prepared for this for two years, and as we others watched we yelled and roare d
with excitement to see "Don" Company doing its job so well . 2
While Melville was leading his men forward a report was received that
the Japanese were only 300 yards ahead of the start-line . It was by then
too late to change the plan, and the company was soon under heavy fir e
from ground and air . Although the supporting artillery fire was landing too
far behind the Japanese, the company pushed them back and inflicte d
heavy casualties on them . Melville was soon wounded, but directed his
men until they were out of range of his voice, when Captain Morrison 3
took command .
Thick undergrowth hampered the advance of Lieutenants Parry's 4 an d
Donohue's 5 platoons on the left flank and gave the Japanese ideal cover .
Privates Dever,° Hilton ? and Williams $ of Parry's platoon, using bakelit e
grenades and then their bayonets, captured two Japanese guns an d
destroyed their crews . Private Beattie, 9 racing towards a Japanese machine gun which was holding up Lieutenant Hendy's' platoon on the right flank ,
was killed within twenty yards of the gun . The platoon was temporaril y
surprised by fire from Japanese perched in rubber trees around them ,
but it was not until the men came under cross-fire and were confronte d
by several tanks that their attack was halted and they withdrew . When
they met Parry's platoon it was making headway, but as the tanks no w
were a serious threat Morrison ordered the company to return to it s
former position .
In carrying out a supporting attack by Anderson ' s company Lieutenant
Clarke's 2 platoon had been forced to ground . Lieutenant Booth, 3 corn 2 Sgt S. F. Arneil, of Anderson's company, in Stand To, Jan-Feb 1954 .
2 Capt R . H . K . Morrison, NX12519 ; 2/30 Bn. Bank officer ; of Mosman, NSW ; b . Summer Hill,
NSW, I Mar 1916.
• Lt K . W. Parry, NX12541 ; 2/30 Bn. Bank officer; of Cremorne, NSW ; b . Orange, NSW, 5 Jan
1922.
Capt K . G . C. Donohue, NX70451 ; 2/30 Bn . Circulation manager ; of Randwick, NSW ; b.
Sydney, 26 May 1919. Died 20 Oct 1950 .
Pte L . C. Dever, NX46711 ; 2/30 Bn . Station hand ; of Greta, NSW ; b. Rix's Creek, NSW,
1 Mar 1912.
' Pte E. P . Hilton, NX37604; 2/30 Bn. Labourer ; of Glen Innes, NSW; b . Tenterfield, NSW,
27 Mar 1922 .
e Pte D. H. Williams, NX36593 ; 2/30 Bn . Labourer ; of Leeton, NSW ; b. Cootamundra, NSW,
11 Apr 1902 . Missing presumed died 11 Feb 1942.
a Pte R. G. Beattie, NX47652 ; 2/30 Bn. Labourer; of Greta, NSW; b . Noonan Flat, NSW, 6
Jul 1913 . Killed in action 15 Jan 1942 .
1 Lt L. F. G . Hendy, NX70443 ; 2/30 Bn . Steel salesman; of Edgecliff, NSW ; b . Strathfield, NSW ,
21 Apr 1918 .
n Lt G . R . Clarke, NX70442; 2/30 Bn. Bank officer ; of Concord, NSW ; b . Waverley, NSW, 14
Nov 1917 .
2 Lt L . H. Booth, NX70440 ; 2/30 Bn. Pay clerk ; of Coogee, NSW; b. Coogee, 16 Apr 1919 .
15 Ian
TANKS WITHDRAW
21 9
manding a platoon which gave covering fire, had been wounded and tw o
sections of Booth's platoon led by the company's second-in-command ,
Lieutenant Boss, 4 had also encountered tanks . Both these sections ha d
therefore returned to their original positions, but not before there ha d
been some very spirited action .
Two-thirds of the way to our goal (wrote a section leader) the machine-gu n
fire, though still badly aimed, suddenly increased . "Don" Company having no w
withdrawn to the left, all the Japanese fire-power available was concentrated o n
our front . Behind us the second-in-command of our company brought up anothe r
platoon which traversed the Japanese front from the right of the road and stoppe d
some of the barrage. At the same time the sounds of tanks moving up to confront
us could be clearly heard . . . . Not hearing the order to withdraw being shoute d
by the platoon commander at the rear, we kept moving forward, and forty yard s
from the fence across the front, came upon four men of "Don" Company, three o f
them wounded, with a little red-haired fellow lying guard over them . They ha d
all been caught on the fence, which was high and thick at this point . It was obviou s
to us then that we would have to return . 5
Directed by Major Ball, a troop of guns of the 30th Battery, whic h
had been placed forward of Anderson ' s company, was firing over ope n
sights while these withdrawals were occurring, and probably was responsible for keeping the Japanese tanks in check .
The counter-attack appeared to have surprised the Japanese and t o
have forestalled an attack by them . One of the most notable of man y
individual acts arising from the engagement was performed by Corpora l
Abbotts .° Although himself badly wounded in the chest during an attac k
on a machine-gun post, he carried a wounded man back to the aid post .
Other air attacks were made during the morning, on battalion headquarters and company areas . Early in the afternoon, to the accompanimen t
of heavy mortar fire and a final air attack, tanks moved against Lama craft's company . As another signal line had been cut, the company could
not ask battalion headquarters for mortar fire, and the tanks were protected by trees from the anti-tank guns ; but they were spiritedly attacked
with hand grenades and bullets from the cover of trees and logs in th e
course of a running fight. Lieutenant Clemens, 7 shot through the heart ,
was the first of the battalion ' s officers to be killed in the campaign . Th e
fire from the tanks was wild and largely ineffective, and they withdrew .
Valuable aid to the infantrymen had been given throughout the da y
by the mortars under Captain Howells, 8 whose three sections, acting on
information from the forward companies and from Private Reid 9 of th e
mortar platoon from his observation post in a tree, had been remarkabl y
* Capt J . A . Boss, NX12540 ; 2/30 Bn. Clerk; of Sydney ; b. Sydney, 16 Jun 1918.
6 Sgt S. F . Arneil in Stand To, Jan-Feb 1954 .
6 Sgt F. Abbotts, NX46176 ; 2/30 Bn . Timber carrier ; of Taree, NSW ; b. Birmingham, England ,
23 Aug 1901 .
7 Lt P . W . Clemens, NX32588; 2/30 Bn. Public servant; of Canberra ; b. Melbourne, 9 Jun 1919.
Killed in action 15 Jan 1942.
8 Capt E . R . Howells, NX12535 ; 2/30 Bn . Bank officer; of Sydney ; b. Narrogin, WA, 17 Jan 1914.
6 Pte K . S. Reid, NX50207 ; 2/30 Bn . Salesman ; of Croydon, NSW ; b. Stanmore, NSW, 7 Ja n
1920. Died while prisoner of war 30 Sep 1943 .
220
AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE
14-15 Ja n
accurate. The medical officer, Captain Taylor,' and his men had worke d
bravely in rescuing the wounded under fire . The Red Cross symbol o n
the ambulances brought forward for the purpose was respected by th e
Japanese .
Owing to the rapidly mounting strength of the Japanese on the immediate front, the battalion began to withdraw in mid-afternoon . Although
they were being fired at by a Japanese tank over open sights, and wer e
also under heavy mortar fire, Bren carriers under Captain Tompson 2 persisted, until they were ordered to withdraw, in attempts to pull out anti tank guns . They then picked up other weapons, walking wounded, an d
a section of Lamacraft's company, on their way back to Gemas . Heavy
mud had bogged anti-tank and field guns, and only one—a 25-pounderwas saved . Most of the trucks in the area were got out, several (carryin g
ammunition) under fire . Driver Pearce 3 was killed when a cannon shell
hit his truck, but Warrant-Officer Schofield`' kept the vehicle under control .
Galleghan ordered Melville, Booth and three others, all wounded, into hi s
car and himself moved on foot, accompanied by his Intelligence officer ,
Lieutenant Eaton, 5 with Lamacraft's company, which was the last out .
The car was fired on from the air and one of its occupants was again hit .
Melville maintained pressure on the man's severed artery while Booth ,
wounded in one leg, stood on the running board to maintain a lookou t
for planes.
In the two days ' action the battalion's casualties were one officer an d
sixteen other ranks killed, nine men missing and four officers and fifty-on e
others wounded . The battalion had taken heavy toll of the enemy, and
although the withdrawal took place in daylight, a clean break was made .
The behaviour of the Australians under intense fire did great credit t o
them and to their training.
Japanese losses in the 35-day advance to Kuala Lumpur had bee n
light . They had captured big quantities of material and a large number o f
prisoners . The 5th Division was tired, however, and was therefore give n
a few days' rest . What was known as the Mukaide Force was thereupon
organised to come forward as the spearhead of the advance along th e
trunk road . It consisted of the 1st Tank Regiment with an infantry battalion and machine-gun and artillery support . Unable to overcome th e
resistance of the Australians and having suffered heavy casualties, it wa s
brought on 15th January under command of the 9th Brigade which threw
additional strength—evidently the 11th Infantry Regiment—into the battle .
Further to force the issue the 21st Brigade (21st and 42nd Regiments )
' Capt J . L . Taylor, MC, NX70453 ; RMO 2/30 Bn . Medical practitioner ; of Roseville, NSW ; b.
Sydney, 28 Mar 1914.
+ Capt R . C . Tompson, NX12542 ; 2/30 Bn . Bank officer ; of Manly, NSW; b . Manly, 8 Dec 1913 .
Dvr T . F. Pearce, NX47566 ; 2/30 Bn. Labourer; of Rappville, NSW ; b. Lismore, NSW, 29
Jul 1917 . Killed in action 15 Jan 1942 .
2 W02 P . A . Schofield, NX27012 ; 2/30 Bn . Bank clerk ; of Manly, NSW ; b. Werris Creek, NSW,
1 May 1907 .
5 U R. W . Eaton, MBE, NX70758 ; 2/30 Bn. Shipping clerk ; of Mosman, NSW; b. Lismore ,
NSW, 26 May 1918.
1-14 Jan
REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE
22 1
were detoured by a southern road leading to the left flank and rear of th e
27th Australian Brigade . These moves were testimony to the blows struc k
by the Australian 2/30th Battalion in the role to which it had been assigned
of checking the enemy at the trunk road approach to the Westforce positions in Johore.
Enemy aircraft had continued throughout the first fortnight of Januar y
to support Japanese ground forces both directly and indirectly . Though
the effect on the morale of insufficiently trained troops in the defendin g
forces was severe, they had caused few casualties and little material dam age, and had missed big opportunities, such as the withdrawal throug h
Segamat, of delivering what might have been shattering blows . Raids on
Singapore Island, particularly on Tengah airfield west of the trunk roa d
into the city, had been intensified . The defending aircraft, inferior in both
numbers and performance, had been employed mainly in protection of th e
island, patrols of the sea approaches to eastern Malaya and norther n
Sumatra, a raid on railway yards and shipping at Singora on 7th January ,
and attacks on the airfields at Ipoh, Sungei Patani, and Kuantan i n
Japanese possession . British hopes that sufficient time would be gaine d
to deploy reinforcements in Johore had been stimulated by the saf e
arrival on 13th January of a convoy of large American vessels bringin g
the 53rd British Infantry Brigade Group of the 18th British Division ,
the British 6th Heavy and 35th Light Anti-aircraft Regiments, the 85th
British Anti-tank Regiment, and fifty-one Hurricane fighter aircraft . A
swarm of Japanese aircraft appeared as the convoy neared Singapore, bu t
stormy weather had closed in, giving the ships far more protection tha n
the aircraft at the disposal of Malaya Command could supply . The Britis h
brigade group which included three battalions—2/Cambridgeshire ,
5/Norfolk, and 6/Norfolk—135th Field Regiment and 287th Fiel d
Company, was without its transport or its guns, which were following in
another convoy . These needs had therefore to be met from local resources .
Percival hoped to use the 53rd Brigade, if time permitted, to release th e
22nd Australian Brigade for Bennett ' s command ; but having been at se a
for eleven weeks, the 53rd Brigade was not considered to be fit fo r
immediate employment . Arrival of the Hurricanes was hailed in som e
q„arterc__as_ the beginning of the end of Japanese air supremacy . The
machines were, however, in crates, and accompanied by only twenty-fou r
pilots, and these lacked experience of Malayan conditions . Time was needed
for assembling and conditioning the aircraft and giving experience to th e
pilots .