Jorge da Silva Researcher, FLACSO–Brazil Hugo Früling Coordinator of the Citizen Security Area, CED–Chile Miriam Kornblith Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, Universidad Central de Venezuela Adrián Bonilla Academic Subdirector, FLACSO Ecuador Ernesto López Director of the Armed Forces and Society Research Program of the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina Juan Aníbal Barría Counselor at the Chilean Embassy of the Holy See. Since the beginning of the nineties, the notion of human security has become the focus of many discussions in the United Nations system, international organizations and governments of different regions, as well as in the academic and intellectual fields. Indeed, with the end of cold war, it was made aware that non–armed security threats were multiplying at international, regional, national and local levels. Many efforts, both theoretical and practical, have been deployed in order to identify the most suitable modalities to face these threats. Human security was born as an emerging concept at the beginning of XXI century, with its main objective being to place the person and his or her protection as the structuring axis of international peace. This concept is still under construction, as the result of the great variety of dimensions and priorities to be taken into account in order to achieve an integrated approach for action, which is able to respond to the number of insecurities faced daily by the most vulnerable sectors of the population. C a r i b b e a n Editors: Francisco Rojas Aravena – Moufida Goucha Authors Moufida Goucha Director of the Unit for Peace and the New Dimensions of Security, UNESCO Francisco Rojas Aravena Director, FLACSO–Chile Jorge Nef Professor, University of Guelph Canada Patricio Silva Professor, University of Leiden–Netherlands t h e Alejandra Liriano Coordinator of the International Relations Area, FLACSO Dominican Republic This book is a compilation of articles that arose as the outcome of the international seminar of experts on “Peace, Human Security and Conflicts Prevention in Latin America and The Caribbean”, organized by UNESCO and FLACSO–Chile. This meeting is part of a number of regional initiatives organized by UNESCO’s SECURIPAX network for the promotion of human security and peace. Hal Klepak Professor, Royal Military College of Canada Claudia F. Fuentes Researcher, FLACSO–Chile a n d Laura Chinchilla Former Minister of Public Security, Costa Rica Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace Hugo Palma Researcher, CEPEI–Peru Luis Guillermo Solís Director of the Conflict, Cooperation and Environmental Program, FUNPADEM–Costa Rica A m e r i c a Raúl Benitez Manaut Researcher, UNAM–Mexico L a t i n Juan Ramón Quintana Researcher, PIEB–Bolivia Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace Authors Arlene B. Tickner Director of the International Relations Center, Universidad de los Andes–Colombia Ann C. Mason Director of the Political Science Department, Universidad de los Andes–Colombia Bernardo Arévalo de León Coordinator of the Security Studies Area, FLACSO–Guatemala Juan Gabriel Tokatlian Director of Political Science and International Relations at the Department of Humanities of the Universidad de San Andrés, Argentina. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization HUMAN SECURITY, CONFLICT PREVENTION and PEACE in LATIN AMERICA and the CARIBBEAN Edited by Moufida Goucha and Francisco Rojas Aravena Compilation of articles of the expert meeting ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean’, organized by UNESCO and FLACSO-Chile Santiago, 26-27 November 2001 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 1 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace for Latin America and the Caribbean The ideas and opinions expressed in this publication by the participants in the UNESCO-FLACSO Expert Meeting on ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean’ are not necessarily those of UNESCO and FLACSO-Chile and do not commit these organizations. The designations employed throughout the publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO and FLACSOChile concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. None of the parts of this book, including the cover design, may be reproduced or copied in any way and by any means, whether electronic, mechanical, chemical, optical, or using photocopying techniques, without previous authorization from UNESCO. Any communication conerning this publication may be addressed to: Ms Moufida Goucha / Ms Claudia Maresia Division ofForesight, Philosophy and Human Sciences Social and Human Sciences Sector UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris, France Tel.: +33 - 1 4568 4554 / 55 Fax: +33 - 1 4568 5552 E-mail: peace&[email protected] Internet: http://www.unesco.org/securipax Mr Francisco Rojas Aravena / Ms Claudia Fuentes FLACSO-Chile Area of International Relations and Strategic Studies Av. Dag Hammarskjöld 3269 Tel.: +562 - 2900 200 Fax: +562 - 2900 270 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.flacso.cl 323.4 Goucha, Moufida; Rojas Aravena, Francisco, eds. F572 UNESCO; FLACSO-Chile. Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace for Latin America and the Caribbean Santiago, Chile, 2003 391 p. FLACSO Book Series ISBN: 956-205-176-5 HUMAN SECURITY / CITIZEN SECURITY / REGIONAL SECURITY / CONFLICT PREVENTION / REGIONAL CONFLICT / PEACE / CONFERENCE / LATIN AMERICA / CARIBBEAN © UNESCO 2003, Santiago, January 2003 (original in Spanish: © UNESCO-FLACSO/Chile) Registration No. 126.179. Reproduction prohibited - Edited by UNESCO. Cover design: Claudia Winther Graphics: Claudia Gutiérrez Grossi, FLACSO-Chile Translation : CETRADUC Production: Marcela Zamorano, FLACSO-Chile Printing: Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 2 25/04/2003, 12:54 CONTENTS PRESENTATION New Perspectives on Human Security in Latin America and the Caribbean Moufida Goucha Francisco Rojas Aravena 7 INTRODUCTION Human Security: Emerging Concept of Security in the Twenty-First Century Francisco Rojas Aravena 11 I. GLOBAL VISIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef 29 Human Security in an Age of Uncertainty: Reflections from Europe Patricio Silva 61 Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean - a View from North America Hal Klepak 71 Human Security Network: from Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes 83 II. REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SECURITY Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean Hugo Palma 103 Central America: Integration, Security and the Crisis in the Regional System Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera 115 The Andean Region Human Security Dynamic Arlene B. Tickner Ann C. Mason 127 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 3 25/04/2003, 12:54 III. HUMAN SECURITY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections on Building a Concept of Security in and for Democracy Bernardo Arévalo de León 141 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian 157 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity: Some Human Security Challenges in Bolivia Juan Ramón Quintana 183 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion. Challenges for Negotiations in the Twenty-First Century Raúl Benítez Manaut 209 IV. HUMAN SECURITY: CITIZEN SECURITY Citizen Security in Central America Laura Chinchilla 237 Human Security: Perceptions and Realities Alejandra V. Liriano 251 Human Security and Public Security: Global Issues and their Influence on Local Ones Jorge Da Silva 265 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling 281 V. THE HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA Human Security: Definition and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean Miriam Kornblith 317 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla 337 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 4 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Agenda: the Case of MERCOSUR Ernesto López 353 Chile and Human Security Juan Aníbal Barría 365 DOCUMENTS Human Security: People as the Main Beneficiaries of National and International Public Policies H.E. Ms María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela 381 Participants at the Expert Meeting on ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean’ 385 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 5 25/04/2003, 12:54 PRESENTATION NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN MOUFIDA GOUCHA 1 FRANCISCO ROJAS ARAVENA 2 Since the early 1990s, the concept of human security has been the focus of many debates in the United Nations system, in international organizations and governments of different regions, as well as in the academic and intellectual fields. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War, the world became aware of the multiplication of non-violent threats to security at the international, regional, national and local levels. A great deal of theoretical and practical effort has been made to identify the most suitable modalities to deal with these threats. The combined impact of using force within states, degradation of the environment, worsening of extreme poverty, spreading of pandemics, and exploitation of cultural and ethnic differences, promotes various types of conflict affecting a great number of people, generally the most vulnerable and unprotected sectors of the population. 1. Director, Peace and Human Security Programme, UNESCO. 2. Director, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO-Chile. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 7 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile At the heart of the United Nations, new guidelines for action opened with the Human Development Report 1994 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which focused on human security. These include the actions taken by UNESCO within the framework of its Interdisciplinary Project for the Promotion of a Culture of Peace, which became especially important in Latin America and the Caribbean, in Central America in particular, with the participation of governments, armed and security forces, non-governmental organizations and ombudsmen, among others. In other countries, such as Brazil, emphasis has been placed on mobilizing young people in favour of non-violence while also seeking the contribution of research agencies, thus giving a sound base to the actions undertaken. In November 2000, UNESCO convened an International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions in order to define a common agenda on the theme of human security and conflict prevention. One of the most important recommendations of that meeting was to invite UNESCO to promote regional approaches in order to define the most suitable needs and modalities of action, and to jointly promote human security and conflict prevention in each specific regional and cultural context. The latter was to be achieved by duly considering the guidelines of the main international initiatives on human security, especially those of the Canadian Government and the Human Security Network, as well as those of the United Nations Commission on Human Security. Within this framework, two Expert Meetings on peace, human security and conflict prevention have now been held at the regional level. The first was in Pretoria (South Africa) in July 2001, organized by UNESCO and the Institute for Security Studies. Contributions to this meeting, which include African perspectives on human security, have now been published. The second regional meeting was held in Santiago (Chile) in November 2001, organized by UNESCO and FLACSO-Chile and co-sponsored by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The papers submitted to the Santiago meeting are presented here, with their national, Latin American and Caribbean perspectives on the theme of human security. As the reader will understand, the concept of human security is still under construction, considering the number of priorities and dimensions to be taken into account in order to achieve integrated action able to respond to urgent and wide-ranging needs, particularly on behalf of the most unprotected sectors of the population. 8 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 8 25/04/2003, 12:54 Presentation. New Perspectives... Moufida Goucha / Francisco Rojas Aravena The specific links between the promotion of human security, the prevention of conflict and action in favour of human rights and democracy should also be clearly established. Courses of action in these different fields often follow a very different political, economic and social logic, and perhaps the time has come to create a forum for more effective interaction among them, especially in the area of preparing coherent policies, the implementation of which requires the cooperation of all social actors without exception. Another essential aspect is the need for a long-term perspective on the processes that may lead to the emergence of new non-violent threats to peace and security. This perspective would require a more active and joint contribution from the social and human sciences and the natural sciences, particularly regarding the interactions between environmental degradation and worsening poverty and destitution. On the basis of the results of the Santiago Expert Meeting, UNESCO will undertake a new phase of action in 2002–2003 – the preparation of a regional framework for the promotion of human security in order to incorporate a number of factors, such as the ethical foundations of human security, human rights, cultural diversity and the different perceptions of security at the regional, national and, especially, local levels, in order to move towards the protection of the most vulnerable sectors of the population. This framework will be prepared in collaboration with the research agencies most active in the field of promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the first place with FLACSOChile, as well as with experts in human rights, international relationships and international security in this region. Another Expert Meeting is scheduled for March 2003, whose mission will be the formulation of a regional framework proposal to be further discussed at a regional conference to be held in Mexico in mid 2003. This regional framework will be accompanied by a long-term plan of action consistent with UNESCO’s Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007, in which the promotion of human security plays a major role. Another action along these lines will be launched in 2003 for Africa, on the basis of the results of the UNESCO/Institute for Security Studies Expert Meeting in Pretoria. Once again the need to ensure a greater exchange of useful experiences and information among the different regions should be emphasized, as in many cases similar problems are to be faced, despite historical differences and varying levels of economic and social development. In this respect, UNESCO’s SecuriPax network (www.unesco.org/securipax) is called upon to 9 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 9 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile strengthen networking between different agencies, especially research and training institutions on peace and human security, around a common agenda. We sincerely thank the authors of the papers included here, as well as all participants at the Santiago meeting – the high quality of whose presentations has made possible this publication – for their active participation in the debates, which allowed a number of recommendations to be made. I would like to express special thanks to Claudia Maresia and Claudia Fuentes of UNESCO and FLACSOChile, respectively, for their efforts in organizing the meeting and all the follow-up work it demanded. We also hope that the ensemble of current activities helps the promotion of human security as one of the continent’s priorities, especially in meeting the most urgent needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean. Santiago/Paris, 30 January 2003 10 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 10 25/04/2003, 12:54 INTRODUCTION HUMAN SECURITY: EMERGING CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FRANCISCO ROJAS ARAVENA At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Latin America shows significant weaknesses in coping with the consequences of the process of globalization. Instability in the region has increased, and that has a significant effect on most of the population. Even though the main classical security issues have been overcome in the region and Latin America has not made any substantial contribution to global instability, the region is far from having policies that promote people’s security, human security. Moreover, the intra-national nature of conflicts increases the vulnerabilities of millions of Latin Americans. The search for a common security concept in the region is a basic challenge for the Rio Group, for the Organization of American States (OAS) and its Committee on Hemispheric Security and for all the region’s states in the twenty-first century. Civil society organizations and academic institutions, such as FLACSO, can play an important role in this task. The twenty-first century is witnessing the emergence of new transnational actors and of non-state actors with large capacities for global action. This is an important change in international relations and in the primacy of the interaction between the various actors. The Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 11 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile twenty-first century also shows more strongly than in previous eras the need to solve the problems of millions of human beings who are being adversely affected by enormous, growing insecurities in political, economic, social, health, personal and cultural fields. A significant part of the world population experiences tremendous vulnerability in an unfair system with increasing regional and global interdependence. The consequences are that (in)security is global, even though its manifestations may differ from region to region and country to country.1 A core concern is to progress towards the construction of a new global order capable of placing humanity at the centre of the planetary system, and for states, which continue to be the actors with the greatest relative power, to be able to efficiently guarantee their security and contribute to overcoming the vulnerabilities and difficulties of hundreds of millions of people in acceding to progress and development. The end of the Cold War and the process of globalization have led to increased opportunities for cooperation in the international system and in various regions. The communications revolution, the new wave of democracies around the world and globalization have contributed to the universalizing values and principles stipulated in the Human Rights Charter. Promotion of, and respect for, this Charter requires increased association and more cooperation.2 An approach to global politics from a perspective of human interest, as developed by Mel Gurtov, allows one to compare value matrices. This value distinction originates from different theoretical points of view.3 The realist theory looks at international problems and stresses conflict, which means that cooperation between the different actors is not properly gauged. Transnational ‘corporate-globalist’ views stress economic aspects and the hegemony of a capitalist model of production and division of labour. Even though these ‘rules of the game’ establish overall preservation, they are seen to be a zero-sum game compared with other values. In both cases, in the absence of any shared values, both realism and the corporate-globalist approach stress competitiveness as the basis for constant conflict and rivalry. 1. Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1999. 2. On globalization, see Ulrich Beck ¿Qué es la globalización? Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 1998; Clóvis Brigagão and Gilberto Rodrigues, Globalização a olho N.U. o mundo conectado, São Paulo, Editora Moderna, 1998; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘Power and interdependence in the information age’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, 1998, pp. 81–94; Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Globalización, América Latina y la diplomacia de cumbres, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 1998. 3. Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 12 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 12 25/04/2003, 12:54 Introduction. Human Security: Emerging... Francisco Rojas Aravena When one looks at the world from a new perspective with a global humanist projection, the values stressed are different. The need for a more holistic approach means asking the core question: Who speaks for the planet? Based on this question, one looks for other angles in international relations, which means thinking about relations in the international system as a people-related issue.4 This approach means that one can relate different problems to new priorities. The main priority is necessarily peace. This is directly associated with social aspects and economic justice, political justice, human governance and common responsibility for a balanced environment. All the above is expressed with varying, often alternative emphasis keyed to the values that one wants to achieve. Table 1 compares the main values promoted by those who support the theories set forth above. Table 1 Alternative values in main theories Realism Corporate globalism Global humanism Institutional Negotiation Influence Mission Control Access Hierarchy Influence Consumption Accountability Management Equal opportunities Decentralization Regulations Systems of Capitalism alliances Hegemony Global culture National mission Interdependence Structure Basic needs Protectionism Intervention Laissez-faire Integration Interdependence Egalitarian international regimes ‘One world’ International rights Maintenance of system Power blocks Maintenance of system Liberal order Transformation of system Global order Source: Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest, pp. 25–6, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 4. In his Millennium Report, the UN Secretary-General seeks to recover the role of representative of the people for the UN and speaks of ‘we the people of the United Nations’. 13 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 13 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Conditions currently exist to form an international coalition of states and civil society organizations to support and promote projects aimed at establishing greater security for people and their performance as the core of international security. The United Nations is encouraging this point of view, basically by improving new international law that seeks to guarantee peace and governance and foster positive incentives. In this regard, we would like to stress the point of view set forth at the Lysøen meeting of the Human Security Network: ‘An innovative international approach will be needed to address the source of insecurity, remedy the symptoms and prevent the recurrence of threats which affect the daily lives of millions of people.’5 The goal set by the UN in terms of security is a world free from fear. Achieving this entails recognizing a new set of international circumstances typified by less weight given to inter-state conflicts and more weight to intra-state conflicts. The Millennium Report of the General Assembly, drawn up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, We the Peoples,6 stresses that more than 5 million people died in this type of internal war in the 1990s. There were also mass migrations, refugees, destruction of infrastructure and alterations to the environment. All this violates the basic human rights of millions of people and makes it hard to create conditions for peace – as a primary right – as the foundation for building a better world. UN analyses indicate that conflicts are more frequent in regions with poor countries, so the challenge of protecting more vulnerable populations is even greater. The above poses a global, and also regional, dilemma regarding the most suitable mechanisms for achieving stability and peace and fostering cooperation. Even though one cannot completely disallow intervention, it has shown that, in most cases, it is not the best option for settling conflicts. The same is true of the system of sanctions. In this framework, operations for maintaining and imposing peace must be reviewed. In the type of conflict that emerges as the most relevant at the start of the twenty-first century, control of small arms becomes just as important as control of nuclear weapons. All this marks a change in the perspective of the main international actors regarding situations of tension and conflict and, on a more general level, security concepts. 5. Chairman’s Summary, ‘A Perspective on Human Security’, Lysøen, Norway, 20 May 1999. 6. Millennium Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (www.un.org/). 14 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 14 25/04/2003, 12:54 Introduction. Human Security: Emerging... Francisco Rojas Aravena The international system has changed dramatically in less than a decade. Not only did the disappearance of the Soviet Union definitively mark this change, but there were also substantial changes that accumulated over time and are expressed with particular strength in the post-Cold War context. The number of state actors participating in the institutionalized international system has multiplied by at least a factor of four since the United Nations was set up in 1945. Other actors with increasingly more influence on international relations, not just international agencies capable of changing their surroundings, but a series of transnational forces expressed with particular strength in transnational companies and non-government organizations (NGOs), began to emerge. Communications improvements, technological revolution and globalization speeded up these changes. This is mainly expressed in the state – the main actor – having less power. States ceased to enjoy monopolistic control or have the capacity to establish and promote actions in six basic areas: 1. Communications. The Internet is the best example of world linkage without state control. Radio and television are also good examples. 2. Technological development. This depends more on companies than on the state and affects investment capabilities, from genetic techniques and cloning to technological developments designed for war. 3. Finances. Financial transactions flow around the world and generate regional and global crises with little capacity for intervention by the state. 4. Investments. Even though states generate reinsurance for investments, their ability to control decisions about where to invest and where to obtain the investments is minimal. 5. International migrations and the ability to control movement of people has also diminished in all states. 6. Trade has opened up more and more, and states have evident problems in setting up controls and restrictions. The above means that perceptions of threat have been generated that are different to traditional ones, and mechanisms of action to cope with them seem, and in many cases actually are, antiquated. The world has more information. Links are better. Political and social events in a country or region do not leave indifferent those who perceive them on the other side of the world.7 Economic decisions made in 7. This trend has increased with the impact of global terrorism and the fight to eliminate it. 15 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 15 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile one part of the world have direct consequences on economic growth and sustainability in other areas. All the above bears out the existence of substantial changes in the basic concept of sovereignty and demonstrates the reduced capabilities of nations to cope with their main problems.8 Hence, coordinating policies, establishing regulations and generating international regimes, based on shared values, are essential points in designing a new international system for the twentyfirst century. Only the ability to act jointly will allow states to recover their abilities to generate, together with other actors, a legitimate order capable of meeting the demands made, including the issue of security worldwide: building a world free from threats and fear. The basic concept that allows security to be understood in the post-Cold War period is that of cooperation. This concept emerges in all reports systematizing progress and interpreting the changes in the world. It also plays an important role in different views, both for preventing and for promoting peace and international security. The series of views indicate that new problems that must be incorporated into the concept go beyond military aspects; hence, elements of cooperation are an essential point. Interest and need to reconceptualize this field are not only multilateral, but also present in various countries around the world. This debate has been very important in the United States.9 Development of concepts of human security must be placed within this framework. During the Cold War period, Latin America was perceived, or perceived itself, to be within a conceptual framework defined by the bipolar conflict. The main threat was the extra-continental enemy. This reasserted prior tendencies from the pre-Second World War period. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the countries of the region are immersed in a process of debating and reformulating concepts of security. A conceptual transition is taking place from a Cold War perspective that visualized an enemy expressed in strongly military actions carried out by a state, to a post-Cold War perspective in which threats are diffuse, the weight of military factors has diminished and many of the threats appear not to be linked to state actors, and even not to be linked to any particular territory. 8. Roberto Bergalli and Eligio Resta (comp.), Soberanía: un principio que se derrumba, Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 1996. 9. Ann M. Florini and P. J. Simmons, The New Security Thinking: A Review of the North American Literature, New York, Rockefeller Foundation, 1998; Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1992; Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security. The Nonmilitary Aspects, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993; Patrice M. Franco, Toward a New Security Architecture in the Americas , Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000. 16 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 16 25/04/2003, 12:54 Introduction. Human Security: Emerging... Francisco Rojas Aravena We can say in general, however, that the end of the Cold War has led to a reappraisal of the main theoretical matrices used to evaluate international problems.10 This will allow progress to be made towards a new paradigm which, while recognizing conflict and confrontation, places greater emphasis on cooperation and association. This change requires tremendous political will on the part of core actors and specific forms of coordination. Development of theories about international regimes11 and about forming global public goods12 has acquired greater significance and importance, as have contributions to theories of negotiation 13 and practical instruments to relieve tension.14 Theoretical exploration of this field will generate suitable knowledge to improve multilateral relations and the results arising from them, especially those results capable of changing relations in the international system,15 beginning with cooperative multilateralism. 10. Michael P. Snnar and D. Neil Snarr (eds.), Global Issues, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Iaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘Power and interdependence in the information age’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, 1998. pp. 81–94; Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest, op. cit. 11. Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983, 6th ed., 1991; Roberto Keohane, Instituciones internacionales y poder estatal, Buenos Aires, Editorial GEL, 1993. 12. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, Global Public Goods, New York, UNDP/Oxford University Press, 1999. 13. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Negotiation Theory and Practice. Program on Negotiation Books. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law School, 1995. Roger Fisher, Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Elizabeth Borgmardt and Brian Ganson, Beyond Machiavelli. Tools for Coping with Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1994. Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Más allá de Maquiavelo. Herramientas para afrontar conflictos, Buenos Aires, Editorial Granica, 1996 (original version in English, 1994). 14. Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khurshid Khoja and Jenny S. Drezin, Global Confidence Building, New Tools for Troubled Regions, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1999. 15. Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders. Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Boston, Mass., Rowman and Littlepield Publishers, 1998. 17 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 17 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Human security: An emerging concept New vulnerabilities demand holistic perspectives or, in other words, the aggregation of variables in a totalizing point of view. The concept of international security at the beginning of the century can be articulated based on relating concepts of international security, state security and human security. The way in which that relationship is established will simultaneously meet global needs and the needs of states, people and peoples. To the extent that vulnerabilities and threats to international security increase, pressure will be put on states to take action in a context such as the one that we have defined, in which the state has less resources of real power. Hence, it is essential to foster more multilateralism and cooperative multilateralism, or correspondent multilateralism. In turn, inter-state crises and conflicts affect human security and international stability. So it is essential to achieve stability in inter-state relations by demilitarizing links. Furthermore, human security demands are made on both the state and the international system. The influence of civil society organizations in promoting this level of security is essential. Each dimension has its own logic. In international security, the logic is global aspects, globalization and the weight of state actors, international organizations and non-state actors. Macro definitions are made at this level, and global and/or regional regimes are promoted. Stability is a public good to be promoted. State security is classical security and involves aspects linked primarily to sovereignty and border issues. The weight of military force and the balance of forces, as well as concepts associated with dissuasion and defence, take place at this level. Human security addresses more local dimensions, although they involve large masses of humanity. It also addresses global issues that affect humanity, such as environmental matters and pandemics. Neither aspect is traditionally addressed at the other two levels at which security may be analysed. Building a holistic view requires emphasizing that each level must produce specific answers in at least three areas: use of force, conflict prevention and international cooperation. Increases in security at one level do not replace nor eliminate demands at other levels. On the contrary, insecurity at one of the three levels affects the other levels. From this point of view, human security is an emerging issue, which can give greater cohesion to interaction between international security and state security in this current period of globalization. 18 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 18 25/04/2003, 12:54 Introduction. Human Security: Emerging... Francisco Rojas Aravena This outlook that has to be built upon with greater coordinating pressure does not mean expanding the concept of security. Expansion would entail militarizing different areas or ‘securitizing’ everything that is important. New perspectives imply better coordination between levels. Four substantial elements need to be emphasized in this postCold War stage of globalization: (a) international security extends beyond its military components; (b) international security is transnational, global and interdependent; (c) international security is produced by a plurality of actors; the state having ceased to be the exclusive actor; (d) international security in the twenty-first century has enlarged its agenda and demands greater cooperation and association. Emphasis on which factor has primacy in the human security, state security and international security trilogy may vary depending on the scenario. In most, the weight of coordination will fall on state security, because the state continues to be the main international actor. For some geographical regions, mainly Africa, international security – and its main actors – in other words, the response capability of the international system in the face of crises of governance of weak or disappearing states, could be a larger centre of influence. The Millennium Report says that the world is progressing towards a new understanding of the concept of security. In fact the document states: ‘At one time it was synonymous with defending the territory against outside attacks, but security requirements today mean that it also covers protecting communities and individuals from different acts of internal violence.’ It adds: ‘The need to apply security criteria that are more focused on human beings is even greater due to the constant danger for humanity of weapons of mass destruction and, very especially, nuclear weapons: the very name reveals their scope and objectives, if they ever came to be used.’16 The above means that we have to rethink and reformulate the concept of security. A more comprehensive concept that is capable of addressing the different aspects that affect and influence the life and death of human beings needs to be built up. In 1994, the multilateral system began to develop a concept of human security which has been attracting more and more attention in multilateral agencies. It is somehow being transformed into a point of reference for the main global security trends of the twenty-first century. 16. ’Freedom from Fear’, in We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, Chap. IV, pp. 194-5, New York, United Nations, 2000. 19 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 19 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In fact, the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) targeted its analysis on new dimensions of human security and defined them based on two main components – freedom from fear and freedom from want. The UNDP indicates that these two components form part of the origin and foundation of the United Nations. In this regard, it emphasizes that ‘the world will never have security from war, if men and women do not have security in their homes and in their jobs’. The concept entails a list of threats that are grouped under seven categories that affect various spheres of action: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security.17 The capacity to generate preventive measures18 is, therefore, the central point of international action and of the governing agencies of the universal and regional system.19 In this respect, the UN faces the challenge and pressing need to establish efficient strategies in preventing long- and short-term conflicts. Moreover, the UN is interested in increasingly targeting preventive action in the sphere of international security as a crucial element in progressing towards a world free from fear. ‘In the last ten years, the United Nations has proved sadly and repeatedly that the best intentions in the world are not enough to replace the basic ability to make a convincing show of force, especially when a complex peace-keeping mission is involved.’20 The use of force by legitimate delegation of authority by the United Nations is considered, therefore, to be a substantial instrument. As the same report then states, however, ‘force alone cannot create peace; it can only create space to build it’. This assertion is the basic link that allows one to consider over and over again the relationship between peace, use of force and political conditions. Political will, restrictions on the use of force in settling disputes and development of efficient measures of dissuasion will create more space for politics and for building peace. 17. Human Development Report 1994, especially Chap. II, ‘New dimensions of human security’, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994. 18. Clingendael, ‘Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Organizations’, Working Paper, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1996. 19. Muthiah Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi, International Security Management and the United Nations, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1999. 20. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Committee), United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York, 21 August 2000. 20 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 20 25/04/2003, 12:54 Introduction. Human Security: Emerging... Francisco Rojas Aravena Human security is a wide-ranging concept which demonstrates the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of human beings, as well as their potentials. Opportunities for growth and development are increasingly linked, or become sources of insecurity. Global interconnection acquires greater significance and importance on a daily basis. Reducing risks implies greater coordination of national and global policies. The experiences of recent years show that it is essential to agree on the design and then on establishing and executing the international regimes that guarantee a consensual international order. It is the international regimes that can ensure protection for people. Vulnerabilities can be overcome based on the action of international regimes. Coordinating policies inside international regimes will make it possible to increase opportunities for more equal development. Progress can only be made in this respect by means of greater association and more cooperation. Cooperative global multilateralism and national democracies are the best guarantees of development and protection for people. Human security may be analysed and understood from different variables. In the central document of an international seminar on ‘Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability’, Jorge Nef21 proposes at least five dimensions – ecology, economy, society, politics and culture (Table 2). Each of these variables can be visualized at different levels. In this respect, I wish to emphasize how they are linked primarily to two crucial elements – globalization and the use of force. This will allow us to target and structure policy recommendations based on a concept, such as human security, that is still being developed and discussed. 21. Jorge Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability, 2nd ed., Ottawa, IDRC Books, 1999. 21 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 21 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Table 2 The five variables of human security and mutual vulnerability Variables Ecology Economy Society Politics (Life) (Wealth) (Support) (Power) Environmental capital Economic capital Social capital Political capital Culture (Knowledge) Cultural capital Effects Sustainability Disaster Prosperity Poverty Equality Inequality Peace Violence Wisdom Ignorance Globalization A world of associated Dark side of effect “greenhouse globalization and effect” competition, more inequality Refugees Migrations Hyperurbanization Governance Global regimes Co-operation/ conflict Identities Values Use of force Bio-terrorism Polarization Anti-mines Financial crisis Intolerance and E-terrorism. ungovernabi- Children at war religious wars. Money laundering lity. Small arms Local identities Citizen Traditional clashing with Security disarmament national and global security ones. Globalization has universalized such values as human rights, democracy and the market.22 This universalization has a strongly Western flavour. Basic technological and economic processes associated with globalization have generated greater global interdependence with positive and negative aspects, such as more trade, more dissemination of scientific knowledge and more global information. There is also greater danger to the environment; terrorism has acquired a global dimension; organized crime is worldwide and financial crises know no borders. Generating stability and global governance without proper institutions is difficult. Significant deficiencies can be observed in this area. In turn, there is increasing differentiation and multiplication of international actors in the context of globalization and this has a bearing on the degree of importance and power resources with which each one deals with the processes and seeks to influence future courses of action. A vision of the future is essential. In this framework and within the current period of the international system, various global concepts in specific areas such as security have not been honed. 22. David Held, La democracia y el orden global. Del estado moderno al gobierno cosmopolita, Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 1997. 22 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 22 25/04/2003, 12:54 Introduction. Human Security: Emerging... Francisco Rojas Aravena Human security visualizes a new global order, one world, founded on global humanism. The core issue is to solve the population’s basic needs in the context of globalization and interdependence. This presupposes, on the one hand, a tendency to unify behaviour, consumption and values centred on universal values, and, on the other, the requirement to recognize and respect diversity and particular identities and cultures. We have seen, however, that in addition to the above, globalization also increases differences and does not in itself solve any needs. Globalization also has an adverse effect on cultural practices and national and local identities. All this is taking place in a context of economic and social polarization in various areas of the world. The result is local ungovernability, which transfers instability to the global system and regional subsystems. Classic security asserts that there is no absolute security and that a greater security of one actor can mean a greater degree of insecurity of another actor. In the case of human security, we can assert that the vulnerabilities of one are manifested as the vulnerabilities of all, a mutual vulnerability. In the Latin American region, this requires that we pay greater attention to, and seek more alternatives for, the Colombian conflict. Security: Latin American perspectives The various regions and countries of Latin America and the Caribbean show a high degree of heterogeneity. None the less, we are considered to be a region. There are substantial differences between us and, in some cases, these are on the increase. There is, however, a broad base for common action based on a common language and culture and expressed in common interests in all areas. One of the substantial deficiencies of our region is not being able to act as one voice. We find it difficult to coordinate positions and foster projects in the world and even in the regional system in concert. There is no possibility of influencing the design of global rules if one does not act in concert.23 Hence the importance of relaunching the Rio Group. Latin America can make a qualitative leap in the field of international security. Ten trends imply this, although they do not guarantee it: 1. An important cycle of border conflicts, especially between major countries, has ended. 23. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (eds.), Latin America in the New International System, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 23 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 23 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile 2. Subregional cooperation and integration have increased thus regional opportunities can be discerned. 3. Despite globalization, we are a marginal, or rather a peripheral region, where strategic issues are concerned. This opens up positive opportunities for new areas of cooperation. 4. We are a denuclearized region free from weapons of mass destruction. 5. We learned from the 1990s that international cooperation in security issues required a new design and architecture. The Cold War institutions have became obsolete. 6. Efforts have been made to create new security regimes and to design new public goods in that area, although no results have been achieved. 7. There is renewed dialogue in Summit Diplomacy; although the operational level is low, it does have a strongly guiding nature. 8. Primary progress in goodwill and cooperation in security issues takes place at subregional level. 9. Track Two diplomacy has played an important role. This type of diplomacy must be fostered and expanded. 10. The more international security there is, the more democratic governance and human security will be targeted. In spite of the potential of these trends, there are important deficiencies that must be overcome. An important goal is to build and develop a common concept of international security in the Americas. As a region, we need a holistic concept that is able to embrace aspects of traditional security together with new threats and incorporate levels and dimensions relative to human beings. Highlighting peace as an essential value is a constant task. Condemning terrorism and indiscriminate violence against civilians is a requirement and aspiration associated with the search for peace. A common concept will give us: • More cooperation, participation and inter-state coordination, while at the same time reducing militarization and conflicting liaisons. • More multilateralism. More capacity of association and greater correspondence of actors in dealing with the international agenda. Cooperative multilateralism expresses this dimension. • More coordinated action by civil society organizations and greater weight of society in issues that directly affect it. The above shows that the region has the opportunity to build a Multilateral International Security Regime in the Americas. This will be 24 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 24 25/04/2003, 12:54 Introduction. Human Security: Emerging... Francisco Rojas Aravena able to cope with traditional inter-state dimensions, the emergence of new threats, and contribute to opening up opportunities for settling intra-national conflicts. Designing and defining goals is very important in a multilateral international security regime. The key, crucial element, however, is political will. New conflicts, the presence of new actors, evidence of new risks, require a new security. This must be capable of providing early warning mechanisms, space for strategic political dialogue, together with informal dialogue in Track Two diplomacy. Reviewing coercive diplomacy will provide more opportunities for democratic regions to coordinate policies. In short, the international regime will be organized around common concepts that allow threats to be targeted and concerted courses of action to be designed; in other words, control threats in terms of defence, open up a forum for diplomatic dialogue and reduce risks to people. This will increase levels of human security and, thereby, classical security and global security. 25 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 25 25/04/2003, 12:54 I. GLOBAL VISIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 27 25/04/2003, 12:54 HUMAN SECURITY AND MUTUAL VULNERABILITY JORGE NEF 1 Purpose and description This work focuses on the interface between three areas of concern that have generally been addressed separately: globalization,2 the transformation of the contemporary state and the development crisis.3 Its aim is to provide a set of proposals to help explain and understand the origins and development of the existing socio-economic and political order, from a perspective that combines structural and historical, micro- and macro-analytical views. Although the ultimate aim of this exercise is to provide an approach to the study of empirical phenomena, its orientation is mainly theoretical, emphasizing the link between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors affecting the processes mentioned above. 1. Professor of Politics, International Development and Rural Extension Studies, University of Guelph, Canada. 2. See Robert Cox, ‘Global restructuring: Making sense of the changing international political economy’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, pp. 17–44, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1994. 3. See J. Nef, ‘Development crisis and state crisis: Lessons from the Latin American experience’, in O. P. Dwivedi and P. Pitil (eds.), Development Administration in PapuaNew Guinea, pp. 10–33, Boroko, ADCOL-PNG, 1991. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 29 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The two central concepts in our approach are human security and mutual vulnerability. 4 The former refers to the creation and maintenance of circumstances conducive to the reduction of risk and uncertainty, in order to achieve what Lasswell referred to as ‘dignity of people’ or ‘human dignity’.5 The latter concept, mutual vulnerability,6 refers to the interconnectedness of dysfunctions, on a global scale today, conducive to imbalances and entropy among factors interacting at both the micro and macro levels of the world order. In our view, discussion on globalization, the nature of the state, or development, without reference to the concepts of human security and mutual vulnerability, would be insufficient to explain the transformations of the world system. Similarly, an analysis of global transformations without reference to the shift from a system of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) to one of Mutually Assured Vulnerability (MAV) cannot thoroughly capture the essence of the post-Cold War period, during which terms such as ‘national interest’ and even international relations, North-South relations and ‘Third World’ lost their heuristic value. For several decades, a variety of words relating to ‘security’ have emerged, such as national security,7 public safety, citizen security,8 cooperative security9 and so forth. Admittedly, according to a number of analysts, the concept of security entails the notion of force and of ‘legitimate’ violence and ‘sovereignty’10 on the part of the state. Nevertheless, there is an equally long-standing tradition that consists in using the term security to describe a reduction in adverse risks and contingencies that affect what is known as civil society and individuals. 4. J. Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability. The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, 2nd ed., pp. 13–14, Ottawa, IDRC Books, 1999. 5. Harold Lasswell, Politics. Who Gets What, When and How?, pp. 3–25, New York, Peter Smith, 1950. 6. Ivan Head, On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North, passim, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991. 7. Arturo Siat and Gregorio Iriarte, ‘De la seguridad nacional al trilateralismo’, Cuadernos de cristianismo y sociedad, May 1978, pp. 17–30. 8. See Patricio Tudela, ‘Integración regional y seguridad: desde las estrategias de defensa al crimen organizado y la seguridad ciudadana’, contribution to Panel II, ‘Hipótesis de conflicto – seguridad y defensa’ at the seminar ‘Nuevos escenarios de los procesos de integración: Desafíos y realidades’, organized by the Asociación Chilena de Ciencia Política and Fundación Konrad Adenauer, Santiago, 21 June 2001. 9. See Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latina’, in Chile 1999–2000. Nuevo gobierno: Desafíos de la reconciliación, pp. 71–3, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 2000. 10. Jorge Nef and Francisco Rojas, ‘Dependencia compleja y transnacionalización del estado en América Latina’, Relaciones Internacionales, Nos. 8 and 9, December 1984, pp. 101–22. 30 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 30 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef In fact, this widespread meaning of security underlies the abovementioned macro-political conceptions. Such is the case with the actuarial notion of ‘security’ and the expressions ‘social security’, ‘food security’,11 ‘company security’12 and other terms associated with the ideas of (second- and third-generation) ‘human rights’, human development and security communities. These terms certainly have much in common; their semantics and meaning often reflect different ways of expressing similar terms or emphasize one aspect or another of reality. Nevertheless, we should not be misled into assuming that all these notions are necessarily held together by a conceptual matrix or one based on common values. On the contrary, beyond the different public policy labels are contrasting conceptions of human rights, global relations and relations between state and civil society, and of the very nature of the state in relation to the regional and global system. This is particularly true in the case of a holistic understanding of ‘national security’. The latter embraces a narrow view of the resources required to achieve a form of security (military and defence) rather than a comprehensive and systemic understanding of purposes (teleologies), context and consequences.13 Structure of the paper The broad and comprehensive notions of security outlined above are covered by the term ‘human security’. We shall briefly examine its origins and development, its various theoretical foundations, its analytical dimensions and its implications in terms of public policy options. According to some writers, the origins of this concept can be traced back to our work with the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Presidential Commission in Canada in 1988 and the publication ofOn a Hinge of History14 by Ivan Head (1992) and Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability15 by the present author (1995) which, during 11. J. Nef and J. Vanderkop, Food Systems and Food Security in Latin America and the Caribbean: Politics, Ideology and Technology, pp. 1–5, Guelph, Centre for Food Security Research, 1989. 12. Concept used by Henri Fayol in Industrial and General Administration (1916), to refer to one of the six functions of a company: that of safeguarding heritage, commodities, health and company integrity. 13. Jean-Louis Weil, Joseph Comblin and Judge Senese, ‘The repressive state: The Brazilian National Security Doctrine and Latin America’, in LARU Studies, pp. 36–73, Toronto, Latin American Research Unit (LARU), 1979. 14. Ivan Head, op. cit., pp. 1, 95–7, 185–6. 15. J. Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability. An Exploration into the Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, Ottawa, IDRC Books, 1995. 31 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 31 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile the 1990s, influenced Canadian foreign policy-making by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy.16 However, it is very likely that its theoretical foundations date back to former works, including Harold Lasswell’s concepts relating to human dignity, Kenneth Boulding’s works and what is referred to as the international political economy,17 in particular the contributions of Johan Galtung18 and Robert Cox.19 In any case, the conceptual framework of human security has recently emerged in the foreign policy matrices of a group of twelve countries, including Chile.20 Interestingly, however, this concept is poorly understood beyond its semantic appeal. The interpretative essay that follows is structured around a series of interrelated issues – the environment, the economy, society, politics and culture – from a global perspective. First, an equally descriptive and theoretical general view is presented of the post-Cold War world order from the perspective of the political economy of development and underdevelopment. Structural and historical approaches to explaining the nature of this world order21 are emphasized, as well as the limitations of these approaches in developing both heuristic and public policy-oriented hypotheses. The notions of mutual vulnerability and security (and insecurity) are then examined as analytical, explanatory, normative alternatives of the new world order. This includes an analysis of the historical roots and the structuralenvironmental, economic, social, political and cultural circumstances of the world order and of global development and underdevelopment. Finally, a conceptual synthesis attempts to address the issue of systemic change in the light of the historic and structural factors mentioned above which put the heuristic value of the human security paradigm to the test. In particular, epistemological, ideological and conceptual (and public policy model) continuities and discontinuities are examined, together with other ‘security’ paradigms such as national security, public safety, cooperative security and citizen security, among others. 16. An outline of the concept of human security as a basis for foreign policy can be found in Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), ‘Statement, Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the G-8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting’, 9 June 1999 (http://198.103.104.95/humanrights/statement-e.asp). 17. Martin Staniland.What is Political Economy? A Study of Social Theory and Underdevelopment, pp. 1–9, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985. 18. Johan Galtung,The True Worlds. A Transnational Perspective, pp. 1–39, 107–78, 255–303, 305– 40, New York, Free Press, 1980. 19. Robert Cox,Production, Power, and World Order. Social Forces in the Making of History, pp. 1– 35, 407–15, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987. 20. The Human Security Network comprised twelve countries in 1999 – Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand – coordinated by ministerial meetings. See Rojas, ‘Seguridad humana ...’, in Chile 1999–2000, op. cit., pp. 66–7. 21. A general overview of the various theoretical stances is given in Jan Black,Development in Theory and Practice. Paradigms and Paradoxes, pp. 1–39, Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1999. 32 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 32 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef New world order and semantics of security and development Since the end of the Second World War, the notions of security and development have been the teleological axis of the world order and of superpower foreign policies. That security has generally tended to refer to the military aspect of relations between countries or among social groups within a country. On the one hand, the word security has been widely used – as mentioned above – since the beginning, in the sense of the reduction of risks, uncertainty and negative contingencies. On the other, most of the political science literature of the last forty years has conferred a restrictive connotation 22 on the term. The latter is related to the control of violence through coercion (or violence from ‘above’), as in what is called national security. Furthermore, the word development has become synonymous with the notions of progress and quality of life of the population. Its origins can be traced back to the Augustinian idea of providential action, and the terms progress, evolution and modernity23 are associated with its secularization. Development as counter-insurgency The current use of the term development began with the Marshall Plan and President Harry Truman’s Point Four Program.24 It has been understood as a process of induced economic growth, with substantial external financial and technological assistance, the result of which is gradual and continuous social change, which results in the strengthening of a stable Western-style democracy. It is essential to highlight this political aspect of development, which, from the beginning of the Cold War (and the concern for military security), was seen as a ‘soft’ alternative to insurgency.25 Its ‘tough’ counterpart was military force. The Alliance for Progress very clearly crystallized these ideas. Thus, development appears both as a condition and as a correlate of security – national, hemispheric or global – from the Western perspective. 22. See Rojas’ observation in Chile 1999–2000, op. cit., pp. 59–66. 23. Helio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study, pp. 4–12, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968. 24. Michael Mason, Development and Disorder. A History of the Third World Since 1945, pp. 16–23, Toronto, Between the Lines, 1997. 25. J. Nef and O. P. Dwivedi, ‘Development theory and administration: A fence around an empty lot?’, Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, 1981, pp. 42– 66, 68. 33 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 33 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile It is apparent from the foregoing that both terms (security and development) have been inextricably linked to an ethnocentric – especially American – world view, with several redefinitions, derived and fed back after four decades of academic research. This ‘orthodox’ paradigm was based on three basic assumptions, which together represented the cornerstone of development discourse. The first assumption was that dissemination and modernization resulted from international cooperation and technical assistance. The other was a Keynesian view of the state – the administrative state and development administration – in which the state was the driving force behind induced development, through planning. These key ideas of the First United Nations Development Decade were expressed in the various programmes of the multilateral international system (United Nations Development Programme, UNDP; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC) and of bilateral assistance, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Successive reviews of the experience gathered over the various ‘development decades’, such as the Pearson, Brandt, Brundtland and Nyerere reports,26 involved an adjustment of the assumptions and directions of induced development, in terms of shared objectives, environmental sustainability and interdependence. Nevertheless, the two core assumptions mentioned above remained. Another basic assumption that remained was the notion of an international system with two cultural and structural axes revolving around the division between East and West, and that between North and South. In other words, there were at least two possible development models: capitalism and socialism, along with various options and permutations and the existence of a ‘Third World’ (or ‘South’) comprising poor or underdeveloped, mainly non-aligned countries, in the face of the growing Cold War conflict. On the occasion of the inauguration of the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy clearly stated that development and revolution were conflicting options, when he said that those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable. 26. For an analysis of the last three United Nations Development Decades (1961–91), see the Commission on International Development (Lester Pearson, Chairman),Partners in Development; Report, New York, Praeger, 1969; Willy Brandt, North-South: A Program for Survival, Report by the Independent Commission on International Development, under the presidency of Willy Brandt, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980; World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), Our Common Future, pp. 118–46, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987; The South Commission (Julius Nyerere, Chairman), The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990. 34 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 34 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef Consequently, development is seen as a means of avoiding revolutionary change and as a foreign policy option for states seeking to strengthen their defensive stance on the diplomatic and military fronts. It has become an integral part of a ‘realistic’27 foreign policy towards peripheral countries, against a background of economic, ideological and military bipolarity. This form of realism represented a paradigm with hegemonic pretensions in the Western academic and politico-military community. Thus the quest for national interest, defined as the safeguarding of territorial and extraterritorial interests of the elite in power (or ‘public interest’) can be achieved through diplomatic and military action, prompting alliances and counter-alliances aimed at maintaining peace or balance among states. The theory of the balance of power has empirical references in the pragmatic system of dynasty alliances between the European monarchies following the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. In a bipolar situation such as during the Cold War, with its nuclear deterrent, alliances were essentially inflexible and highly ideological; hence the search for control over peripheral regions was considered paramount for maintaining the world order. From this perspective, interactions between agents are overshadowed by strategic-military and geopolitical considerations, in which conflict tends to prevail over cooperative relations. Furthermore, cooperation among allies and foreign aid (what is called international cooperation) is a foreign policy instrument against a background of bipolar global conflict. Nevertheless, in a system of nuclear deterrence and an inflexible ideological framework, the balance of power rather resembles a balance of terror, in which overreaction and escalating conflict can result in a nuclear holocaust.28 Bipolarity and national security An unexpected effect of rigid bipolarity was the shaping of an intricate international system in which the global divide among the superpowers produced not only incipient forms of polycentrism but also signs of transfigured multipolarity.29 In fact, foreign and defence 27. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., pp. 185–240, New York, Knopf, 1985. 28. John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, passim, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962; Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver’s Troubles; Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, pp. 3–21, New York, Council of Foreign Relations, McGraw-Hill, 1968. 29. Hoffman, ‘The acceptability of military force’, in Force in Modern Societies: Its Place in International Politics, London, Adelphi Papers, No. 102. 35 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 35 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile policies that had been upheld in a realistic framework were changing. A shift occurred, from a nuclear shield stance, subject to massive retaliation, towards the prescription of a flexible response, promoting the use of non-nuclear instruments of coercion, such as specialized institutions and civic action.30 This conceptual premise of a ‘flexible response’ is particularly important for Latin America. When the original mission of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) to provide an inter-American military alliance to counteract an external enemy (the USSR) was losing credibility, other ‘prophylactic’ tasks emerged, such as maintaining internal order and the interests of hegemonic power. Counter-insurgency doctrines and in particular what is called the ‘national security doctrine’ are the expressions justifying these tasks.31 Although originally articulated within the French army during the wars of Indochina and especially Algeria, the doctrine was significantly enhanced by Sir Robert Thompson’s experiences during the insurgency in Burma and Malaysia and the American participation in Viet Nam (Bernard Fall). Its broader conceptual framework could be found in the geopolitical doctrines of Kjellen and Haushofer after the post-First World War period. These notions very directly influenced the ideas of vital space and of the state as a Nazi Germany institution, as well as education in the Southern Cone military academies. Even though the term ‘national security doctrine’ was initially associated in Latin America with the Center for Higher Military Studies in Brazil in the 1960s,32 it mainly influenced the rest of the world through counter-insurgency courses at the School of the Americas, in the region of the Panama Canal and in Special Forces training centres in the United States.33 The idea of national security became the prevailing cultural ‘software’ in armies and the strategic planning of the Americas, particularly during the period of military dictatorship, between the mid-1960s (Brazil 1964) and the end of the 1980s (Chile 1989). This ideology radically changed the army’s primary mission, from territorial defence against a foreign enemy – as set out by ‘classic’ realism – to the united struggle against an internal enemy: civil society. 30. William Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1966. 31. Siat and Iriarte, loc. cit. 32. The doctrina do segurança in Brazil initially had a wide connotation, related to a NeoBismarckian vision of development and the ‘Manifest Destiny’ of the country in terms of power. In contrast, its American counterpart (that had a direct influence on the military in the Southern Cone, Central America and the rest of Latin America) was more limited to minimum civic action, in the sense of ‘community development’ aimed at preventing insurgency. The Peruvian experiment with Velasco Alvarado showed developmentalist and populist tendencies, but this developmentalist militaristic stance was very uncommon, only observed briefly in Ecuador under Rodríguez Lara and in Panama under Omar Torrijos. 33. See, for example, US Army Special Warfare School, Counterinsurgency Planning Guide, Special Text No. 31–176, North Carolina, May 1964. 36 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 36 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef In concrete terms, the National Security Doctrine (more precisely military security) is a deontologico-prescriptive and ideological subset founded on a variant of realism – both hegemonic and peripheral – whose prime policy line relates to ‘order’ and military matters. Thus the sovereignty of military organizations and their institutional interests – namely ‘national’ interests – is placed above other concerns, and defence requirements become a priority over other national objectives (such as education or development). Moreover, this doctrine rests on the assumption that the military-industrial complex of the ‘North’ and its Southern allies share the same interests. More importantly, though, it revolves around an implied ‘friend-enemy’ Manichaean notion, according to which the main threat, as mentioned above, is posed by an ‘enemy within’. The significant difference between centre and periphery in terms of application of the doctrine is that, in the former case, it suggests deep-seated territorial sovereignty (with an essentially foreign enemy), while in the latter case, sovereignty is secondary to common interests between local armed forces and the leading power. Despite the end of the East-West conflict, the doctrine has been upheld in the curricula of ‘security’ organizations. Danger and the ‘enemy’, both internal and foreign, are no longer directly communism or insurgency, but drug trafficking, terrorism and narco-terrorism. The same prescription remains as before: a state of national security to protect society, even from itself. In parallel with national security, additional sets of principles surfaced, including public safety doctrines and programmes. Although these principles mainly focus on internal security ‘policing’ operations, many – fostered by the International Police Academy, the Agency for International Development (AID) and the CIA – warn of an insurgent danger, of a ‘terrorist’ and criminal nature, of internecine strife. Public safety served as a link between national security with its focus on ‘communist’ guerillas, supported by Cuba and the USSR, and the anti‘narcoterrorism’ campaigns of the 1990s. In contrast to the National Security Doctrine (NSD), public safety programmes are based on the criminalization of danger and the modernization and fitting-out of police forces. In the years that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the ending of Central American insurgency, national security and what Juan Bosch referred to as ‘Pentagonism’34 lost considerable ground as an official doctrine, both in the United States and in Latin America, 34. Juan Bosch, El Pentagonismo, substituto del imperialismo, passim, Madrid, Guadiaga, 1968. 37 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 37 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile particularly against the background of a transition to ‘low intensity’35 democracy. Notions such as free trade, which underpin neoliberalism, and the triumph of the Trilateralist faction in Washington, gave rise to other theoretical conceptions whose bases had already been outlined since the mid-1970s. These theories, which attempted to explain and provide policy guidelines, were doubtless influenced by the failure of bipolarity as a conflict-management mechanism and by the growing ineffectiveness of national security to maintain the status quo, from Viet Nam to Latin America. More importantly, the new ideas reflected a considerable expansion in technology, trade and global management systems. In fact, the emerging polycentrism predicted by Stanley Hoffman 36 in the 1960s did not systematically find expression in the resurgence of multiple national centres (in Europe, Asia and the Middle East), but as a complex conglomerate with several operational centres of power,37 in the context of a global economy. Transnational capitalism gradually replaced Keynesian national capitalism and socialism, not only in the West and its periphery, but also in what was once the world of ‘real socialism’. Complex interdependency and theory of regimes This new context presented a challenge for the dominant realistic paradigm. The dynamics of the global order could not be explained only on the basis of territorial ‘national interest’ and the conditionalities derived from the balance of power. It is in this context that the complex interdependency paradigm of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye3 8 emerged, as a heuristic device to explain the complex relations between fundamentally economic regimes which arose from the mid-1970s onwards. The change in analytical perspective was not necessarily an epistemological ‘revolution’ in Thomas Kuhn’s sense,39 but had to do 35. Barry Gil, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson, Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order, pp. 3–34, London, Pluto Press, 1993. 36. Hoffman, ‘Restraints and choices in American foreign policy’, Daedalus, Autumn 1962, pp. 692–4. These ideas are developed in greater detail in his work Gulliver’s Troubles ..., loc. cit. 37. David Blake and Robert Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, pp. 1– 10, New York, Prentice Hall, 1976; Joan Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1977. 38. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1975. 39. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., pp. 15–17, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1970. 38 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 38 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef with parallelisms and solutions for continuity between realism à la Morgenthau and complex interdependency – or the theory of regimes. In the overwhelming majority of political science departments and international study programmes, realism continued to be the predominant discourse, with an incipient bias towards the ‘new’ neoliberal-style international political economy. This does not mean to say that Cold War realism ended, in spite of the end of the EastWest conflict. In fact, as a conceptual matrix it remains the favourite stance in national security programmes in universities and particularly in centres linked to the defence sector. In retrospect, the theory of regimes was not only a response to the heuristic exhaustion of conservative realism, but also a very direct and explicit response of the North to the pro-dependency conceptions generated by the Third World, especially Latin America.40 The complex interdependency model is interesting in that, in contrast to realism, it provides a solution for continuity between ‘internal’ and ‘foreign’ policy. The orthodox view of American political science rested on a national political order in which a ‘normal’ teleological state was consensus, whereas, on an international level, what was perceived as normal was a Hobbes-style state of nature, without rules or regimes other than the quest for ‘national interest’. Critical theory: dependency, world system and mutual vulnerability Nevertheless, such continuity between international system and internal order was observed in a political economy in line with traditional criticism (Marxist, socialist and anarchist), which gave rise to the dependency theories. Thus, conflict between states was an extension of conflict between social groups within the state. The best known among these notions is the thesis of imperialism, both in Hobson’s and Lenin’s versions. For its own part, the ‘dependency theory’,41 whose origins are attributed inter alia to the structuralism of ECLAC and subsequent developments by Cardoso, Faletto and Frank, never was one unifying theory. Neither was it clearly or fundamentally a paradigm in international relations. Instead, dependency represented a set of sociological and economic formulations that attempted to explain Latin 40. Keohane and Nye, op. cit, pp. viii–10, 1–37. 41. Ver Jan Black, Development in Theory and Practice. Paradigms and Paradoxes, 2nd ed., pp. 28–9, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1999. 39 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 39 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile American underdevelopment from a centre-periphery perspective. This vision undoubtedly had significant repercussions on the understanding of the relationship between underdevelopment, marginality, instability and penetration. From this standpoint, pro-dependency ideas substantially undermined the ethnocentric conceptions prevailing over development (‘modernization’), hemispheric relations and foreign policies. On raising the issue of academic orthodoxy from the perspective of the South, the supporters of dependency acquired a ‘subversive’ overtone. Raising the issue of the ‘radical’ idea of dependency (and of ‘conservative’ realism) was an important objective of the theory of regimes, as clearly indicated by its own authors. Few theoretical assumptions, excluding the thesis of imperialism, have been rejected as often as has dependency. Nevertheless, few conceptualizations have shaken the intellectual foundations of the Western establishment as the idea of dependency has done. To a large extent, dependency theories had a major influence on Galtung and Wallerstein’s world systems, on what was referred to as ‘global theory’ by Cox, Rosenau and Gil and on our own concepts of ‘complex dependency’ (Nef and Rojas, 1983)42 and human insecurity and mutual vulnerability (1995, 1999). Human security43 The human security paradigm is founded on the notion of mutual vulnerability. In other words, the strength and soundness of an interconnected global system – including its most-developed and seemingly best-protected components – are paradoxically conditioned by its weakest links. Therefore, despite the existence of extreme vulnerability and insecurity in certain sectors of the system, we are all vulnerable to a certain extent. Subsequently, the central theme of human security is the reduction of collective (and shared) risk through analysis, decisions, prevention and action aimed at reducing the causes and circumstances of insecurity. 42. Nef and Rojas, loc. cit. 43. This section summarizes and expands on our work Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability, op. cit., 1995 (1st ed.), 1999 (2nd ed.). 40 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 40 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef The definition of security adopted in this work is based on the probability of risk and vulnerability reduction, that is to say, the reduction and control of insecurity. This definition stresses the prevention of causes of insecurity, beyond the technical means of containing its symptoms. The form of insecurity that is particularly relevant here affects the large majority of the population, particularly in those sectors which are more vulnerable and exposed to risk factors. It may be suggested that security (or risk reduction) at more macro levels of the global system, caeteris paribus, depends on the successful establishment of security at these same levels. Similarly, subsystemic security is reciprocally affected by the security of the entire system. Successful sustained (and sustainable) homeostasis – the system’s maintenance – relies on a significant and constant reduction of risk and insecurity at all levels. With the end of the illusory protection of the nuclear shield and of the ‘national security state’, it has become apparent that real personal security does not primarily depend on the possession of conventional or other offensive-defensive weapons (military strength). Rather, security relies on diagnosis and prescription – preventive or ‘curative’ – capable of minimizing risks systemically. These modes of analysis and policies essentially refer to the causes of insecurity and the interactions between micro and macro levels of multiple interacting and dynamic factors in the environmental, economic, social, political and cultural spheres. Situations including the AIDS epidemic and other health threats,44 environmental degradation, the evolution of global economico-financial crises, drug trafficking, the expansion and spreading of local conflict, famine, the displacement of peoples and terrorism, are real and imminent dangers for which traditional paradigms have no effect. All these threats have been looming since the pre-Cold War. The novelty is that the bipolar conflict between East and West, that had provided a type of containment valve for these problems, disintegrated as an ideological-cultural matrix in 1989. This major U-turn also prompted the collapse of the North-South axis. The emerging configuration was a new type of functional bipolarity. Today, the conflict is occurring between a seemingly secure world, which provides access to the benefits of modernity and globalization, regardless of latitude, and the ‘other’, peripheral world. The latter consists of the bulk of populations in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and 44. See J. Nef, ‘Health Security and Insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean’, speech delivered at the Macalester International Round Table 2001, 11–14 October 2001. Also in press: The Body: Meditations on Global Health, St Paul, Minn., Macalester College, 2002. 41 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 41 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Latin America, and an increasing majority of people in the former socialist world and even in the United States and Western Europe that have been excluded from the benefits of modernity and must live with its dysfunctional effects. The emerging situation reveals a number of common characteristics: (a) First, the problem of growing insecurity is transnational, as borders and sovereignties have lost much of their impact. Against this background, bilateralism and hegemonic power tend to be ineffective, and existing multilateral mechanisms, though essential, are inadequate. Nevertheless, these problems must be addressed through concerted action, prevention and the configuration of increasingly wider security communities. (b) Second, insecurity stems from complex threats to general security. These include systemically intertwined environmental, economic, social, political and cultural variables that cannot be handled using conventional economic instruments (technical assistance or foreign investment for example) and military instruments (counter-insurgency, low-intensity operations). (c) Third, the new threats to security are of a fractal nature, thus (local) dysfunctions at the micro level have repercussions at the macro level and vice versa. For this reason, human security is a state policy based on multilateral international cooperation and multisectoral analysis, planning and action, whose orientations are both preventive and proactive. The notion of personal security is not failing, but is being channelled into an exclusive perspective based on the use of force or economic or technological ‘modernization’: ‘social engineering’ or purely military, economic or technocratic deontology. From this perspective, the causes (and ‘questions’) tend to be intertwined with the prescriptions (or ‘technical answers’) and institutional interests generated by such answers. Moreover, as demonstrated from the 1960s onwards by the Latin American experience, prescription has largely been related to the genesis and recurrence of the ‘problem’. In short, the use of counter-insurgency or economic methods becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy which further deepens the roots of the social conflict and socio-economic crisis it sets out to resolve. National (or state) security becomes a leading cause of insecurity at the national (or state) level and a vehicle for violence. A military stance without a broadly based substantive content is generally useless except for increasing dysfunctions. The same occurs with the usual underdeveloping impact of many development policies. 42 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 42 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef This does not suggest the denial of an appropriate (or even ethical) role for defence and the use of force, particularly if this is legitimate, approved and accountable in society. Similarly, effective development strategies can considerably reduce human insecurity. Force is certainly an essential ultima ratio politico-tactical instrument, but should be subject to very careful strategic and comprehensive analysis and planning. Economic growth is meaningful only if it reduces – not increases – inequalities and personal insecurity, is environmentally sustainable, and is geared primarily to meeting population needs. In practice, national security in Latin America was a doctrine that justified the hegemonic interests (political and economic) of the centre and local sectors that established this type of security. A similar occurrence was noted with the public safety and policing programmes that were complementary to or which instrumentalized ‘national’ security. But an analysis of economic policies, whether Keynesian or neoliberal, suggests that far from increasing job security, improving living standards, reducing poverty and creating conditions for sustainable development, the net result has been a significant increase in insecurity. Therefore, there is a pressing need for an integrated frame of reference whereby public policies can be analysed and formulated from a perspective different to that of core countries. This quest for a ‘different’ perspective on ethical grounds45 is not only confined to peripheral nations. An analysis of the framework of Canadian or Norwegian foreign policy reveals the search for an integrated perspective in line with their international position, and one that provides continuity with their policies on environment, human rights and support for multilateral initiatives. Neither realism nor its national security (and public safety) peripheral variant, nor complex interdependency, favour such a strategic vision. Nor do they reflect the various technological, economic or ideological interactions and circumstances of a world of diffuse unipolarity such as that which emerged after the end of the Cold War. Human security stems from the idea that social systems, unlike their natural, electronic and mechanical analogues, are not inherently self-correcting. In fact, correcting ability (homeostasis) or its opposite (entropy) are closely related to learning ability or inability.46 As a result, both security and development have become inseparable from the 45. Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest, pp. 25–6, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, quoted in Rojas, op. cit., p. 60. 46. See Humberto Maturana and F. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Cognitive, passim, Boston, Mass., T. Reidel, 1980. 43 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 43 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile notions of strategic planning and systemic analysis. Therefore, insecurity, like security, is a result of the interplay between (a) a changing context, (b) a culture that gives meaning and purpose to the system, (c) a set of structures, instruments and mechanisms (resources, people, lines of communication), (d) processes whereby structures work towards attaining aims, and (e) the effects of action undertaken on the context, culture and structures. Although insecurity comprises several factors, it is possible to distinguish analytically between five substantive, subsystemic, interrelated dimensions. The first is the environmental dimension, which encompasses the natural and biophysical environment in which socio-economic, political and cultural activity takes place. The second dimension is economic: this concerns the creation and distribution of wealth, using resources extracted from the environment, and its transformation into production and distribution processes. The third dimension is social: the interaction structures and processes between people and relationship networks – hierarchical or functional – that favour cohesion and coexistence. The fourth dimension is political: the relations, structures and processes related to conflict management among social groups, through the creation and distribution of power in the socio-economic order. Last but not least is the cultural dimension, relating to the symbolic, value-based, instrumental construction and representation of the socio-economic and political order and its natural environment. Substantively, the idea of human security implies a number of interwoven dimensions, centred on ‘human dignity’47 as referred to above. This notion is, broadly speaking, synonymous with human rights, in particular second- and third-generation human rights. The subsystems mentioned are interlinked by ‘bridges’: environment and economy are linked by natural resources; economy and society, by social forces; society and polity, by brokers and alliances; and politics and culture, by ideology. The above linkages between context, culture, structure and processes, in the environmental, economic, social, political and cultural order, may be represented schematically according to the following matrix: 47. Harold Lasswell, loc. cit. 44 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 44 25/04/2003, 12:54 VARIABLES 45 25/04/2003, 12:54 ECONOMY (WEALTH) SOCIETY (SUPPORT: Well-being, affection, respect, rectitude) Social Capital Environmental Capital Economic Capital Context Natural setting (biophysical surroundings of social action) Styles of development (economic models) Social expectations, Internal and external customs and traditions conflicts: capabilities/ expectations, elites/ masses, sovereignty/ dependency Culture Ecoculture: place of environment in cosmovision Economic doctrines: ways of understanding the economy Social doctrines: values, Ideologies: function of Philosophy: axiologies, teleologies, norms and attitudes: the State and its relation deontologies: moral and ethical identity and modal to the citizen codes Structure Resource endowment and spatial distribution relation between environment and resources Economic units: consumers/producers: labour/capital Status and roles: social structures, groups, classes, fractions Brokers and institutions: Formal and informal educational interest groups, parties, structures: schools, universities, cliques, governments, learning institutions bureaucracies Processes Depletion or regeneration of air, water, land, flora and fauna Production and distribution of goods and services Interactions: cooperation, conflict, mobilization, Conflict resolution: consensus, repression, rebellion, stalemate Learning: building of consciousness cognitions, basic values, procedures and teleologies Effects Sustainability - entropy Prosperity - poverty Equity - inequity Peace - violence Enlightenment - ignorance 45 48. This matrix is adapted from J. Nef, Human Security..., 2nd ed., p. 18, 1999. POLITY (POWER) CULTURE (KNOWLEDGE/ SKILLS) Political Capital Cultural Capital Images of the physical and social world and collective experiences Jorge Nef ECOLOGY (LIFE) Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 Analytical matrix of human security48 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile A global perspective A central concept in the study of human security is the macroanalytical notion of a ‘world system’.49 This construct encompasses historical, structural, and functional features that make it possible to analyse and reassess material global conjunctures, irrespective of the type of configuration or polarity found in the system. A world system can be multipolar, bipolar or unipolar, with various transformations and specific attributes and several patterns of continuity and change. This system is also likely to be studied in relation to various interrelated levels: global, regional, national, subnational, local and personal. A widely used term today is ‘glocal’,50 describing the close relationship between the micro and macro levels of the system – local becomes global and vice versa. Security and insecurity are interconnected at every level of the system. Micro security is affected by macro insecurity and collective security tends to be affected by insecurity at the micro levels. The current world system consists of an integrated pattern of global production, distribution and power whose foundations were laid in the seventeenth century, but whose expansion and consolidation have gathered momentum since the mid-nineteenth century and particularly since the end of the Second World War. It involves unequal and asymmetrical exchange processes and structures between a developed ‘core’ and impoverished semiperipheries and peripheries, in which systemic and subsystemic development and underdevelopment are functionally and historically, but not deterministically, interrelated. The thesis of mutual vulnerability posits that, in an interconnected system, neither developmental irreversibility nor a lack of ‘guaranteed’ protection is found only on the periphery, but that the centre has become increasingly vulnerable as insecurity grows on the periphery. Centres and peripheries For a long time, the notions of centre, periphery and unequal exchanges applied only to geographical units – countries, regions and what are called ‘worlds’ of development (First, Second and Third Worlds). International stratification referred to geographical units that 49. See the works of Johan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective, New York, Free Press, 1980; Emmanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II, New York, Academic Books, 1980. 50. See Arturo Escobar, ‘Discourse and power in development: Michel Foucault and the relevance of his work to the Third World’, Alternatives, Vol. X, Winter 1984–85, pp. 370–400. 46 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 46 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef were assumed to be essentially homogeneous for the purpose of the analysis. This methodology was also applied to the study of national development and international relations, both realistic and prodependency. The basic unit of analysis was the nation, or country; other entities were assumed to be national subcategories. At a high level of abstraction it is argued, for example, that the collective security of a population is synonymous with national security, as defined by the ruling elite or defence institutions. Nevertheless, the problem lies in the fact that these abstractions cannot adequately reflect the physical agents – individuals, groups, classes, etc. – associated with a specific time and place. Development and underdevelopment are conditions experienced by people, not abstract aggregates that define the totality of a territory. Thus the concept of centres and peripheries, although valid as a whole, requires to be redefined and improved. In our view, the centre consists of elite sectors which, regardless of the region of the globe, are transnationally integrated, reap the benefits of development and modernity, and experience – or may be under a general illusion of – security. The periphery comprises those excluded from the benefits of the present order, regardless of their country, and who experience extreme vulnerability and generally find themselves in an unequal exchange, against their will. This integrated vision of processes and structures, far beyond the labelling of categories a priori, avoids a simplistic and mechanistic application of stratification and dependency and of the neofunctional fallacy of ‘globalization’ and complex interdependency. The terms developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor countries, obscure the fact that in any actual society there is a substantial degree of transnational integration among elites and effective marginalization and exploitation of most of the population.51 This makes it possible to analyse the logic underlying relations between centres, semiperipheries and peripheries as part of a single structure and existing processes and in the longue durée.52 51. Osvaldo Sunkel, ‘Transnational capitalism and national disintegration in Latin America’, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 1973, pp. 140–50. 52. For a definition of the historic longue durée, see Fernand Braudel, ‘History and the social sciences: The longue durée’ in Braudel (ed.), On History, pp. 25–54, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1980. 47 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 47 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Regimes A world system presupposes the existence of regimes or mechanisms of governance and conflict management with structures of decision-making, rules and influence. Unlike the concept of international organizations, which presupposes the existence of highly differentiated, formally sanctioned norms and mechanisms of governance, regimes constitute the actually existing arrangements for handling a particular cluster of issues. Regimes are subsystems of the larger global system. Some are highly institutionalized, such as the economic-financial field (World Trade Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund), have clear boundaries, and enjoy a notable degree of concentricity. Others are loose and without a recognizable authority structure. In general, regimes also vary in terms of how effectively they manage the issues in their areas of concern. For the purpose of our model of analysis, it is necessary to examine relations between the regimes of the five subsystems discussed above (the environment, the economy, society, politics and culture) at a global, regional, national, subnational, local and personal level. Power and governance One important empirical aspect of the analysis of actual regimes is ascertaining who governs, as real power structures are often neither formalized nor transparent. Power, understood as the ability of one actor or cluster of actors to induce compliant behaviour in others – who would have not behaved in this manner without such induction 53 – is therefore the very essence of the global system and its constituent regimes. So is powerlessness. Security and insecurity are often associated with power and politics, but such power is dynamic, relational, multidimensional and takes many forms. It entails a fluid and changing relationship between ends (‘what for’) and means (‘with what’) and is much more than the sum of the resource capabilities, or even the possible share of resource commitments pledged by an actor or an alliance to achieve a purpose. In the last analysis, effective power can be assessed only as a three-variable equation, expressed in terms of outcomes vis-à-vis objectives pursued and resources used. In this respect, authority in the Weberian sense of legitimated power requiring 53. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, pp. 1–35, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1963. 48 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 48 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef minimal amounts of coercion (or conversely, rewards) is an efficient and effective element in regime governance. Governance essentially involves both the government’s and the governed’s having the ability to manage conflict. Power and metapower A second important aspect in the analysis of regimes is drawing the distinction between power and ‘relational control’, or metapower. 54 The latter is the ability of an actor or actors to affect the outcome of decisions, non-decisions, actions, and inactions in a given regime by altering the rules of the game. Metapower can be associated with three fundamental concepts in political analysis. One is the above-mentioned Weberian idea of legitimation on grounds of tradition, charisma, or legal-rational calculation; the second is Gramsci’s notion of hegemony;55 and the third is Michel Crozier’s observation regarding the relationship between power and uncertainty.56 Very few actors at any given time possess sufficient legitimacy, can articulate hegemonic discourses, or have established control over the sources of uncertainty. More often than not, those who can affect the outcome of an interaction, within the global system, in a specific functional system or at any level, are elite sectors within the centre of domestic and global order. It is precisely this ability to exert power over power that defines the principal role of ‘centre’ elites in the global system. Human security and democracy As indicated above, security and insecurity can be seen in relation to five areas of concern: the environment, the economy, society, politics and culture. Although all the micro and macro dimensions of security are equally central to the realization of human dignity, the political dimension holds the key to the safeguarding of environmental, economic, social and cultural rights. Politics, in terms of the allocation of valuables and necessities through authoritative choices, constitutes the organizing principle of a community’s life. Without it, the realization of other forms of ‘security’ would be impossible. 54. See Thomas Baumgartner, Walter Buckley, Tom Burns and Robert Schuster, ‘Metapower and the structuring of social hierarchies’, in T. Burns and W. Buckley (eds.), Power and Control: Social Structures and their Transformation, pp. 224–5, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1976. 55. A thorough discussion of Antonio Gramsci’s ideas can be found in Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, hegemony and international relations. An essay on method’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1984, pp. 162–75. 56. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, passim, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964. 49 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 49 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Thus, substantive, even procedural consensus and democracy lie at the core of political security. This involves the ongoing conflict management (and resolution) of three fundamental and interrelated contradictions: those between economic capabilities and social expectations, those between the sector that obtains most of the surplus (elites) and the rest of the population (‘masses’), and those between the capacity for self-government (autonomy) and subordination or dependency on other unities.57 Nevertheless, the ability of a polity to overcome crises and provide security for its members depends less on its resource base and autonomy than on its collectively learned capacity for conflict management. In other words, political security is a function of governance. Conversely, increased levels of political insecurity, beyond situations of extreme scarcity and loss of autonomy, will tend to depend on ineffectual and illegitimate conflict management. Threats to human security The main security threats emerge as a direct consequence of the internal dysfunctions of environmental, economic, social, political and cultural regimes that affect both the domestic and global spheres. These spheres are closely related, in such a way that dysfunctions in one system tend to express themselves in other, related, subsystems. Suffice it to say that mutual vulnerability is constituted by multiple dysfunctions linked in vicious circles of multiple causality. In a complex, fragile and highly asymmetrical conglomerate such as the contemporary international system, crises are highly unpredictable, fractal and have wide repercussions. From 1989 onwards, the rapid disintegration of forms of association that had developed during the Cold War such as the Eastern European bloc (Warsaw Pact and COMECON), the Non-Aligned movement, and the very idea of the ‘Third World’, left a global vacuum. It also limited the scope for mediation by ‘intermediate’ powers. This trend manifests itself in two directions. One is the emergence of powerful economic blocs, namely, the European Community, the Asian Bloc, NAFTA and MERCOSUR. The other is the apparent decline of the United States as an industrial power vis-à-vis Europe and Japan. However, this ‘polycentrism’ is deceptive, as US military and economic might is formidable. Susan Strange used the term ‘structural power’ to 57. J. Nef, ‘Stalemate and repression in the Southern Cone. An interpretative synopsis’, New Scholar, No. 8, Autumn 1983, pp. 372–3. 50 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 50 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef refer to this metapower over a new constellation of global interests which includes elites from the North and South.58 This new element of insecurity results from the combination of numerous factors, and finds expression in interrelated dysfunctions in the environmental, economic, social, political and cultural fields. We shall briefly analyse these issues using the conceptual matrix of human security and mutual vulnerability outlined in the first part of this paper. (a) Environmental crisis59 The existence of a global environmental crisis has been commonplace for many years. It is also indisputable that this problem, present on a planetary scale, has fundamentally human – not ‘natural’ – origins, although its consequence is a sharp deterioration of the biophysical environment. Such harmful effects on the biosphere include a long list of dysfunctions that feed on one another, forming a vicious cycle with development policies and models at the centre. For example, deforestation resulting from the overexploitation of forests reduces topsoil, damages genetic diversity and fosters soil erosion and desertification. The thinning of the ozone layer in the upper atmosphere, mainly due to the use of industrial fluorocarbons, has harmful effects on the marine food chain and presents serious radiation hazards for the animal kingdom. Air pollution resulting from carbon and sulphur emissions, both of which are products of industrialization and the growth of the car industry, cause considerable health problems. These emissions produce acid rain, which poses a threat to lake flora and fauna and contributes to defoliation. Acid rain is a substantial source of massive contamination of water supplies. Combined with the discharge of faecal and industrial matter into rivers and lakes, acidity places at risk water reserves that are already severely affected by droughts and other forms of extreme scarcity. In the context of the loss of forests and plant species, both drought and extreme climatic conditions are interconnected with socio-political disasters (wars and forced migration) that aggravate soil deterioration, erosion and desertification. The resulting loss of arable land contributes to food insecurity, though the latter is often triggered and influenced by economic and political attitudes. In turn, pollution and damage caused to seas and oceans, induced by the continuous use of the hydrosphere as a global sewer, industrialization, conflicts, overexploitation and maritime accidents have led the entire bioceanic system to a critical stage. 58. Susan Strange, ‘The future of the American Empire’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1988, pp. 1–17. 59. See Rodney White, North, South and the Environmental Crisis, pp. 22–38, 98–100, 146, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1993. 51 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 51 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile One of the outcomes is a catastrophic state of the environment in terms of both plant and animal biospheric health. Environmental deterioration is interrelated with other biosystem factors such as microorganisms, generating diseases and epidemics that place the life and well-being of people at risk. The cycle of dysfunctions does not end here. Serious threats to genetic diversity exist which are induced by manipulation and appropriation of natural genes, producing increasing vulnerability chains. There are also the dangers of the ‘Green Revolution’60 in agribusiness, resulting from the extensive use of varieties of hybrids, fertilizers, pesticides and large quantities of energy and hydraulic resources, not to mention the potentially greater hazards of the biotechnological revolution. Finally, there is the exponential accumulation of harmful waste incurred by ‘modern’ life through refuse disposal, landfill sites, and pollutant discharge into watercourses and the atmosphere. (b) Economic crisis Virtually as an extension of the environmental problem – and experienced in many ways – the economic crisis reflects the increasing inability of production, business and finance systems to eradicate the most serious blights of poverty, unemployment and inequity. An essential benchmark is that poverty has not only tended to persist but, as opposed to views based on the idea of ‘the trickle-down effect’, has tended to expand.61 Another related benchmark concerns the growth crisis.62 Over the last decade there has been a worldwide reduction in the growth rates used to ‘measure’ global wealth. Nevertheless, even in exceptional cases of relative growth, a generalized trend towards regressive income distribution 63 has been observed. Alongside this there has been a widespread foreign debt crisis,64 together with a sharp decline (or worsening) of the terms of trade. Then there is the impact of the ‘dark side of competitiveness’: the generalized loss of employment encountered in periods of both recession and growth, in which competitiveness justifies large-scale redundancies. 60. Frederick Buttel, Martin Kenney and Jack Kloppenburg, ‘From green revolution to biorevolution: Some observations on the changing technological bases of economic transformations in the Third World’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 34, No. 1, October 1985, pp. 37–8. 61. Ver Wayne Ellwood, The No-Nonsense Guide to Globalization, p. 101, Toronto, Between the Lines, 2001. The coefficient between rich and poor increased, respectively, by a difference in income of 30 to 1 in 1960, to 74 to 1 in 1997. 62. The growth rate per capita at world level collapsed from an annual average of 3.2% in 1960–70, to 1.6% in 1970–80, to 1.1% in 1980–90, to a negative rate in 1990–92. Figures since 1998 are even worse. 63. Ellwood, loc. cit. 64. The Global Cash Crunch. An Examination of Debt and Development, pp. 3–31, Ottawa, IDRC Books, 1991. (Searching Series No. 5.) 52 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 52 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef (c) Social crisis The social crisis is interlinked with the economic and environmental crisis, poverty, social disintegration and marginalization. The decrease in capacities and surplus in the midst of regressive distribution has tended to create a gap between population and resources. Thus it appears as though a large proportion of the population has become relatively – and in some cases excessively – superfluous, if the requirements for its reproduction and subsistence are taken into consideration. A result of ‘relative overpopulation’ is migration from country to city, from ‘periphery’ to ‘centre’, or simply to subsistence areas neglected as a result of war, famine or lack of opportunities. One aspect of these displacements has been the rising tide of refugees,65 fleeing from political, environmental and economic danger zones, which gives rise to situations of growing instability and major vulnerability, on a local, regional and global scale. Compounding this state of affairs are two closely interlinked issues: hyper-urbanization, and the decline and demise of communities. The former relates to accelerated growth in the megalopolis and large urban centres, generally unable to sustain and accommodate an increasing population flow. Alongside this process is a significant deterioration of the environment, personal security and quality of life. In relation to the above, the decline and possible ‘death’ of communities and basic relations causes the collapse of capital and social chains of support and maintenance. The circumstances surrounding social instability and disintegration, conducive to social fragmentation, loss of purpose and criminal and interpersonal violence persist, thus increasing pressure further to abandon certain locations and increase population flows to inhospitable cities. (d) Political crisis As mentioned above, politics plays a structuring role in the different orders – environmental, socio-economic and cultural – and at various levels (micro and macro) in terms of its mechanisms and methods for management and conflict management. Underlying the various crises affecting the subsystems mentioned here is an endless number of unmanageable conflicts. The contemporary political crisis entails the 65. See UNHCR (United Nations High Commissoner for Refugees), The State of the World’s Refugees. Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, pp. 275–87, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 53 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 53 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile juxtaposition of two general trends. One is the transformation of the global power system at the end of the Cold War. The other is a profound alteration of the state itself as a mechanism for conflict management and authoritative, autonomous decision-making. Five major dysfunctional trends emerge from this juxtaposition. The first is the apparently uncontrollable spread, in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, of subnational, ‘low-intensity’ conflict and civil turmoil.66 This results from the downfall of political regimes, despite a supposed ‘triumph of democracy’.67 The second is the pervasiveness of extreme forms of violence such as terrorism, and its counterpart, counter-terrorism. The third is the decline of the rule of law, expressed in soaring rates of crime and the criminalization of social conflict. The fourth trend is the generalized breakdown of civil society and political order (republican or not), brought about by the overwhelming presence of neoliberal policies68 and ‘receiver states’,69 whose aim is to manage their own bankruptcy. Against this background, exacerbated by a resurgence of intense conflict, authoritarianism has resurfaced in various forms, including incipient neofascism and other forms of repression. (e) Cultural crisis Last but not least is a generalized cultural crisis. Culture, understood here as the ‘software’ of a civilization, consists of a set of deontologies with underlying ‘visions’ of desirable states (utopia) and undesirable states (dystopia) and a system of values (axiology). This last is generally internalized and transmitted through the social practices already mentioned. In a world that is interconnected by highly concentrated, homogeneous and unidirectional communication networks, a ‘cultural’ discourse has emerged whose hallmark has been – more than a clash of civilizations – a crisis of civilization 70 and ‘modernity’ on a planetary scale. 66. See UNHCR, op. cit., pp. 185–273. 67. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The end of history?’, The National Interest, No. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18; ‘Liberal democracy as a global phenomenon’, PS: Political Science and Politics, December 1991, p. 660. 68. See our work with Wilder Robles, ‘Globalization, neoliberalism and the state of underdevelopment in the new periphery’, Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 27–69. 69. For a description of ‘receiver state’ in Latin America, see J. Nef, ‘Normalization, popular struggles and the receiver state’, in Jan Black (ed.), Latin America. Its Problems and its Promise, 2nd ed., Chap. 12, pp. 197–216, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1991. 70. Samuel Huntington, ‘The clash of civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 22– 49. 54 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 54 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef Underlying this crisis of civilization is a set of interconnected dysfunctional trends that feed back positively but have little selfgenerating capacity. First, there is a highly constructed and generalized hegemony of neoclassical economics and its economic, social and political corollaries. Second, the ideological monism resulting from this hegemony entails not only a rejection of new ideas but also a mechanistic predisposition to reject any form of critical reasoning. This gives rise to a crisis of ideas and learning, which chiefly causes the breakdown of educational institutions responsible for generating, modifying and reproducing the ‘cultural software’. Instead of selfregenerating reflection, there emerges a form of acritical incrementalism and ‘impractical pragmatism’, where ‘practical’ concerns are elevated into a dogma. This stance is consistent with the abandonment of the idea of politics as a creative activity and the prevalence of deontological techniques and procedures without an ethical content. In this context, means become ends and eventually determine the content of the action. The outcome is that the ability for learning and self-correction is lost, giving rise instead to the factors that induce crisis. Conclusions The analysis undertaken in this interpretative essay has attempted to clarify the concepts of human security and mutual vulnerability and their application within a new paradigm in order to explain and provide an understanding of globalization and its effects. The latter fall into three intrinsically related areas of concern: (a) international relations; (b) the nature of the state and its public policy options; (c) development processes. By and large, realistic conventional analytical models (with their national security corollary) and complex interdependency models (upheld by a neoliberal paradigm) are insufficient to provide an understanding of the specific predicament facing countries of the ‘South’. Similarly, the foreign policy ‘deontological’ alternatives outlined on the basis of these models present substantial functional, and even ethical limits.71 71. Rosalind Irwin, ‘Linking ethics and security’, in R. Irwin (ed.), Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy, pp. 3–13, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2001. 55 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 55 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Human security and other ‘securities’ Human security attempts to encompass, in a comprehensive analysis and intervention model, ‘humanitarian’ factors (human rights, health, environment, democracy and food security) and more traditional ‘state’ concerns (such as defence) but in the context of a systemic matrix. Far from excluding the idea of defence, human security presents a complex and strategic vision that transcends the notion of a closed system of ‘national security’ incorporating causes of insecurity, beyond the linear treatment of symptoms. Defence requirements are not confined to national security. A specific aspect illustrating this very clearly is an issue that is extremely omnipresent today: terrorism. In fact, our work on the problem of insecurity has historical precedents. This dates back to our studies on the ‘social pathology’ of repression (1974),72 terrorism and counter-terrorism (1978–89),73 ethics and technology (1988–89)74 72. See J. Nef, ‘The politics of repression: The social pathology of the Chilean military’, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 58–77. 73. See J. Nef, ‘Panorama general de la violencia y las ideologías en América Latina’, in Augusto Varas (ed.), Jaque a la democracia: Orden internacional y violencia política, pp. 53–68, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1990; ‘El fenómeno terrorista: Una perspectiva global y algunas consideraciones empíricas y teóricas’ (with E. A. Cebotarev) in Augusto Varas, ibid., pp. 69–89; ‘The spiral of violence: Insurgency and counter-insurgency in Peru’ (with J. Vanderkop), North/South. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vol. 13, No. 26, Autumn 1989, pp. 53–77, ‘Terrorismo y política: Algunas consideraciones básicas’, in Augusto Varas (comp.), Paz, desarme y desarrollo en América Latina, pp. 131–149, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1987; ‘Peru oprør og statslig modoffensiv’ (with J. Vanderkop), in Christian Thune (ed.), Konflicternes Verden 1987, pp. 80–94, Copenhagen, Century Schoolbooks, 1988; ‘Violence and ideology in Latin American politics: An overview’, in Marcel Daneau (ed.), Violence et conflits en Amérique latine, pp. 5–34, Quebec, Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, 1985; ‘Peru’s “Shining Path”’ (with J. Atlin), International Perspectives, July/August 1985, pp. 25–8; ‘Terrorismo: Política del miedo’, Relaciones Internacionales, No. 7, October 1984, pp. 77–86; ‘The terrorist weapon: An appraisal’ (with David Moore), Laurentian University Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, October 1981, pp. 27–39; ‘Some thoughts on contemporary terrorism: Domestic and international perspectives’, in J. Carson (ed.), Terrorism in Theory and Practice, pp. 4– 21, Toronto, Atlantic Council of Canada, 1978. See also the following articles: ‘Symbolic politics’, New Internationalist, No. 160, 1986, pp. 8–9;’Importing state terrorism’, The Nation, Vol. 231, No. 2, 1980, pp. 54–6; ‘Reign of terror’, Weekend Magazine (leading article), 5 May 1979, pp. 4–12. 74. Critical Choices! with J. Vanderkop and H. Wiseman, co-publishers, Toronto, Wall & Thompson, 1990; Ethics and Technology, with J. Vanderkop and H. Wiseman, copublishers, Toronto, Wall & Thompson, 1989; ‘Science, technology and underdevelopment: A conceptual approach’, with O. P. Dwivedi and J. Vanderkop, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. XI, No. 2, December 1990, pp. 223–40. 56 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 56 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef and food insecurity (1989), which prompted our subsequent paper on mutual vulnerability (1995, 1999), and a set of articles on human security and globalization (1998–2001)75 and on insecurity and health (2001).76 With regard to epistemological, ideological and in particular conceptual links between national security, public safety, citizen security, cooperative security and human security, significant common factors have been observed. For instance, a type of continuum exists between public safety and the more ‘liberal’ citizen security model which itself reveals a degree of isomorphism and consistency with several aspects of human security (e.g. personal security). As mentioned, there is a strong connection between the Public Safety Programmes of the 1960s and 1970s and national security. Meanwhile, cooperative security offers the opportunity of multilateralizing defence doctrines, including national security, as a crucial factor in a human security scheme. There are also significant gaps. Human security, in contrast to national security, focuses on the study of the causes of violence and stresses the need to control the latter by attacking its roots and the factors of its recurrence, not only its expression. This does not exclude the use of force, but requires that such force, as a last resort, be systemically limited by rational and ethical parameters. Indeed, there are common factors between human security and citizen security.77 However, in our view, a set of deontologies related to the latter – such as the notion of ‘zero tolerance’ – only evokes a formula or ideology of ‘law and order’, linked to the American extreme right, within and outside police organizations. Here, ‘counter-crime’ and vigilantism – such as ‘counter-terrorism’ – present just as many security problems for people as do criminality or terrorism for their targets, if not more. They constitute a real threat to freedom, human rights and actual personal security. Something similar can occur with cooperative security, particularly when it is confined to strictly military matters and justifies the maintenance of repressive systems, lent legitimacy 75. See ‘The ethics of mutual vulnerability: A developmental perspective for foreign policy’, in Rosalind Irwin (ed.), Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy, pp. 17– 37, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press; ’Human security: Perspectives for human resources and policy management’, in Our Fragile World. Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Development, text incorporated into the Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, Paris, EOLSS-UNESCO, in press; ‘Los procesos de integración y la globalización’, Diplomacia, No. 82, January–March 2000, pp. 11–17; ‘Globalization, neoliberalism and the state of underdevelopment in the new periphery’ (with Wilder Robles), Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Leiden, Brill, 2000, pp. 27–48; ’A new paradigm for interamerican relations’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena and Paz Buttedahl (eds.), Open Regionalism: Strengthening the Net. Perspective from APEC Countries, Santiago/Vancouver, FLACSO/VIA. 76. Nef, ‘Health Security …’, loc. cit. 77. Tudela, loc. cit. 57 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 57 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile today by international cooperation. There is no doubt that cooperative security is paramount for maintaining regional peace and limiting violence. To that extent, they are human security instruments, but this requires that they be channelled into dynamic peace, disarmament and development processes. Human security, terrorism and the ‘new’ Cold War78 What we have said so far must be analysed in the light of the dramatic events of 11 September 2001. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, on the one hand, clearly stressed that everyone – even the most powerful of actors, is vulnerable. On the other hand, the terrorist action, so carefully planned and executed, clearly shows that local and regional conflicts in peripheral areas have direct effects on the global power centres and, therefore, on the entire world system. The consequences and reactions to these events in the Western world are even more profound. In the economic field, North America and the world economy were severely affected by an environment of extreme uncertainty. In a political climate governed by a reactive mentality and overdetermined by the spiralling logic of violence and fear, voices have again arisen stating that the only possible security is that of a ‘tough’ doctrinaire view. This involves the usual prescriptive counter-terrorism and national security paraphernalia. From a critical point of view, the response to the extreme outrage shows the difficulties inherent in the application of a relatively conventional military methodology to the symptomatic treatment of a deep-rooted structural issue. Furthermore, the instrumentalities of intelligence, prevention, dissuasion and punishment proposed are basically the same ones that failed to prevent the tragedy. The only difference is that now it is suggested that the ‘solution’ to the problem is more of the same but applied with greater force. The orthodox repressive prescription tends to undermine the very basis of an open society (which is a clear target of any terrorist action from the ‘outside’), thus facilitating the erosion of legitimate links and breaking up the political order. Even worse, in this punitive euphoria, 78. This brief section, included at the request of FLACSO-Chile after delivery of the document, is based on a number of our works on the terrorism issue, at the centre of the human security paradigm. These include ‘El fenómeno terrorista: Una perspectiva global y algunas consideraciones empíricas y teóricas’ (with E. A. Cebotarev), loc. cit.; ‘Terrorismo y política: Algunas consideraciones básicas’, loc. cit.; ‘Symbolic politics’, loc. cit.; ‘Terrorismo: Política del miedo’, loc. cit.; ‘The terrorist weapon: An appraisal’ (with David Moore), loc. cit.; ‘Reign of terror’, loc. cit.; ‘Some thoughts on contemporary terrorism: Domestic and international perspectives’, loc. cit. 58 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 58 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability Jorge Nef the structural and historical causes and circumstances of the different forms of contemporary terrorism are ignored and a ‘technical’ approach is instead preferred, applicable to any form of terrorism. Many of the policies that fomented terrorism – whether ‘insurgent’ or ‘state’ forms – are usually forgotten or passed over, thus creating conditions for the reproduction of new and perhaps more virulent forms of violence. It is necessary – today more than ever before – to reflect from a systematic and integrating point of view that allows analysis of the conditions, structural factors, and precipitating elements leading to the crystallization of terrorist actions. But it is also urgent to act in a rational and effective way, by tackling and preventing the causes of the scourge, not only its manifestations. This comprehensive perspective is facilitated by the concepts of human security and mutual vulnerability. Transnational terrorism is a problem for all of us, requiring international, multilateral and concerted action in many areas and at many levels, thus developing a community of security founded on common interests and a shared system of values. Only in this way can terrorist actions – whoever the perpetrators – be perceived as an unacceptable dystopia. An effective antiterrorist policy, beyond hypocritical and double-standard Manichaeism, must be founded on the understanding that these acts are crimes and that ‘terrorism’ is not an opportunistic definition in order to discredit the adversary of the moment. Some foreign policy implications79 Devising and implementing an effective and rational foreign policy requires analytical and operational systems that favour and strengthen the decision-making ability of those who must understand and anticipate global, regional and bilateral processes. Such research and action models must be able to highlight substantive and ethical considerations in determining objectives (teleologies and desired/undesired states in the long, medium and short term), thus distinguishing them from merely reactive, mechanistic and allegedly ‘technical’ conduct. Indeed, political instruments (including ‘fashionable’ doctrines) take second place to these teleologies. Not only is there a close link between ends and means, but public policy ends are intrinsically related, and they should be seen from this integrated perspective. There is no clear distinction between foreign and domestic policy. Political models must therefore 79. Nef, in Irwin, op. cit., pp. 34–5. 59 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 59 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile adopt an inclusive approach, linking public policies at the micro and macro levels. In such models, ethical considerations do not serve an aesthetic purpose and are not a ‘good’ public advertisement for justifying decisions or swimming against the tide. On the contrary, an ethical code based on values, circumstances and consequences is the cornerstone of an effective foreign policy that is accountable to the public; a policy that associates security of the country with global and regional security in a world of mutual vulnerability. An ethical frame of reference must be able to do away with the pseudo-pragmatism of a linear market model or the hypocritical double standards of the old – and new – Cold War. Indeed, a global theory focusing on human security can provide an explicit and transparent conceptual device for the anticipation of dilemmas facing decision-makers and for citizens 80 affected by those decisions. Such a conception of the world can also provide a multidisciplinary and strategic approach for evaluating decisions and action in a changing security context, so long as it is based on democratic principles. 80. See Rosalind Irwin, ‘Linking ethics and security’, op. cit., pp. 3–7. 60 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 60 25/04/2003, 12:54 HUMAN SECURITY IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: REFLECTIONS FROM EUROPE PATRICIO SILVA 1 Introduction As a result of the dramatic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the concept of security in the West has been practically reduced, at least for now, to a decisive fight against international terrorism. Thus, since then, the classic concept of security, which stresses supreme interests of states and favours the use of instruments of war, has gained unexpected force. One of the many questions that has arisen in relation to the international scenario after the attacks on New York and Washington has to do with the impact they will have on the concept of medium- and long-term human security. Did 11 September deal a mortal blow to the growing support that this new concept of security had received from international agencies, development aid institutions and the academic community since the mid-1980s? Or, in contrast, will the experience of 11 September finally 1. Professor of Modern Latin American History, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Leiden, the Netherlands. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 61 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile lead to strengthening efforts aimed at further spreading human security in the world in order to attempt to prevent similar occurrences in the next few years? This paper evaluates both progress made and difficulties experienced in accepting the concept of human security in Europe beginning in the 1990s. To that end, I deal specifically with the case of the Netherlands, where development aid agencies would seem to have adopted an intermediate position with regard to supporting this new concept of human security. This rather ambiguous position would seem to reflect the many bureaucratic-institutional and ideological contradictions and conflicts of interest caused by the adoption of policies in line with this principle. Human security: The conceptual problem Before starting to evaluate how the principle of human security has been incorporated into the framework of Netherlands foreign policy in general and international cooperation in particular, one must deal, albeit briefly, with the problem of conceptual clarity affecting the concept. Defining this concept is not just an academic exercise. In my opinion, the lack of clarity regarding this concept’s contents and limits is in itself an important, if not essential, factor when it comes to trying to explain the remarkable scepticism, and at times open rejection, that this concept still causes among officials responsible for policies of cooperation in European countries. The lack of clarity regarding this concept also generates insecurity and anxiety among the various departments and officials who cannot predict clearly whether any possible adoption of this concept will eventually benefit or harm their institutional interests. For example, if one confronts bureaucracy dealing with issues and affairs of a strictly strategic-military nature with bureaucracy that only addresses issues of development, one can see that both hope that reinforcing the concept of human security will lead to penetrating the opposing sphere of action. In other words, those responsible for military issues hope to be able to ‘insert’ their security issues in development aid, while the latter bureaucratic entity aspires to ‘sensitizing’ classical security sectors with regard to issues related to social development and the fight against poverty. In the event of an adverse scenario, however, both entities are afraid of being gradually ‘penetrated’ or ‘colonized’ by the other’s strategic agenda. 62 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 62 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security in an Age of Uncertainty ... Patricio Silva One of the most recurrent criticisms of the concept of human security is that it is connected to a practically limitless list of issues that, according to some authors, would make it practically inoperable (see King and Murray, 2000). Owens and Arneil (1999, p. 1), for example, have catalogued this concept as ‘amorphous’ and lacking clarity. And, indeed, one cannot deny that the human security agenda is very wide-ranging. The UNDP 1994 annual report, New Dimensions of Human Security, refers to the concept of human security in the fields of job insurance, income, health, environment, security against crime and common violence. The report concludes by calling on people to search for a new development paradigm ‘which places human beings in the centre of development, considers economic growth as a means, not an end, protects opportunities for life of future generations as well as current ones and respects natural systems on which all human beings depend’ (UNDP, 1994). The UNDP 2000 report on human development, Human Rights and Human Development, places the concept of human security in the more wide-ranging context of human development and at personal security and community security levels. It also specifies seven freedoms inherent to the fields of human development and human rights. These are freedom to discriminate in favour of equality; freedom from want to be able to enjoy a decent standard of living; freedom to develop the potential of every human being; freedom from fear, without threats to personal security; freedom from injustice; freedom of participation, speech and association; freedom to have a decent job without exploitation (UNDP, 2000, p. 31). For his part, MacLean (2000, p. 2) lists a series of fields related to human security, including access to basic elements to ensure life, protection of the individual against crime and terrorism, social diseases, political corruption, massive migration, political, economic and democratic development, environmental sustainability and efforts to reduce pollution (see also OAS, 2000). Thus, I agree absolutely with Rojas (2000, p. 5) when he points out that the wide-ranging nature of issues included in the human security agenda makes it very hard to generate policies that are capable of causing a substantial impact that would lead eventually to a noticeable change in international circles. Rojas proposes placing the use of force as the coordinating element of the concept of human security, so as to imbue it with a greater degree of consistency and coherence. Coupled with this, he underlines the need to focus simultaneously on the concept of human security from a regional, national and global perspective. 63 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 63 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile An issue that is related to the apprehensions of international cooperation and defence community bureaucracies is the question of how traditional concepts of security relate to the concept of human security. Are they two issues progressing parallel to each other, or is there an attempt being made to converge both concepts of security in the world? Rojas (2000, p. 5) appears to favour the second of these when he states that the concept of security would seem to be in a transitional stage. As he so rightly says, the Cold War period was dominated by concepts of security focused on the perspective of the state, or by concepts of security that branched out towards international security linked to state security and militarization of these relationships. In Rojas’ opinion, the process of convergence is not a natural process, but rather the result of an intellectual and institutional action in that direction. In other words, this possible conceptual ‘syncretism’ (and practical ‘syncretism’ in terms of state policies) is seen as positive and necessary. As he puts it (2000, p. 3): ‘The human security dimension as a key coordinating concept in a world in transition has appeared with great force in the Cold War period. Both perspectives have often appeared to be contradictory, although the final, ultimate aim of both should be human beings. The intellectual, and at the same time institutional and operational, challenge is to discover how to link and establish a conceptual concatenation from human security to international security, passing through state security.’ MacLean (1998, p. 270) stresses that both state security and human security are complementary objectives that need each other mutually. Thus, even though state security does not automatically imply providing security for individuals, state security is necessarily achieved by treating the population fairly and humanly, supplying their basic needs and guaranteeing people’s physical and moral integrity. Inversely, however, ‘a Nation State must first of all secure itself and its territory before being able to address itself to tasks aimed at improving the well-being of individuals and society, improving the quality of life and safeguarding the social interests of the population’. MacLean, however, warns that, even though state security is a necessary condition for human security, it cannot be inferred that once states have achieved their security, people will also find security and feel secure. The above would indicate that both types of security (state and human) represent essential objectives in attempts to achieve lasting peace in regions that have been historically swept by all types of war and violations of human rights (see Goucha, 2001; Villanueva, 2000, 2001). In this regard, I consider Thakur’s (1999, p. 58) position, stressing that the concept of 64 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 64 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security in an Age of Uncertainty ... Patricio Silva human security does not replace classical conceptualizations of security, but rather provides what he calls ‘pluralist co-existence’ in which the concept of human security is added to already existing concepts of security, to be very apropos. Human security and Netherlands foreign policy In recent years, gradual acceptance and adoption of the concept of human security by international policies and policies of cooperation of European Community states has been quite unequal. On the one hand, Scandinavian countries – particularly Norway – have gone pretty far in applying this principle as the cardinal factor in their international policy, while countries such as the United Kingdom have continued at length to favour classical military-strategic considerations and approaches, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These dissimilar positions regarding everything from state-territorial security to human security obviously respond to different historical traditions as well as to the existence of a different understanding of the political and military role that the countries assign themselves in Europe and the rest of the world. As stated in my introduction, the Netherlands have adopted a rather more intermediate position where, even though more and more attention and space has been given to the concept of human security, the Netherlands’ traditional ‘Atlantic’ orientation – it defines itself as an ‘intermediate power’ – has so far prevented this new concept from becoming the cardinal factor in its foreign policy and/or its policies of international cooperation. Thus, NATO security strategies continue to dominate the Netherlands’ security policies. From the country’s point of view, the NATO alliance, coupled with the process of European integration, are essential instruments for safeguarding peace and security in Europe. The Netherlands actively supports strengthening the role of the European Union in formulating foreign and defence policies, while at the same time it participates resolutely in forging a European identity in the fields of security and defence within the NATO framework. The Netherlands spends 1.6% of its gross domestic product on defence, with growing emphasis on undertaking peace-keeping operations in various areas of conflict around the world. Other important aspects that are often overlooked in evaluating attitudes of European authorities vis-à-vis the concept of human security are, on the one hand, the political and ideological nature of 65 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 65 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile the government of the moment (i.e. the political orientation of government coalitions) and, on the other, each nation’s particular type of specific institutional structures. Even though many aspects of foreign policies and development aid policies are long-term national concepts and projects, in my opinion the above two aspects can, in some cases, have significant specific weight. Such, at least, is the case of the Netherlands, where international cooperation (organized under the General Directorate for International Cooperation, DGIS) forms part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has two ministers. The Foreign Affairs Minister is primarily responsible for traditional foreign relations and issues involving European and transatlantic security. He is assisted for defence and security issues by the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, a think-tank made up of a team of experts in these fields and which represents NATO thinking. The DGIS is located in the Foreign Ministry building. It is headed by a minister without portfolio, who every year gives development aid to Third World countries worth almost US$3.5 billion (equivalent to 0.8% of gross national product). In absolute terms, only Japan, the United States, Germany and France spend more resources than the Netherlands on development aid. Traditionally, the Foreign Affairs Minister wields much more political weight – both in the cabinet and in the European and international scene – than the Minister for International Cooperation. This difference is reflected, among other things, in the preponderance of the defence and security agenda over the development aid agenda in Netherlands foreign policy. At the time of writing the government is built around an idiosyncratic alliance of social democrats and liberals, the so-called purple coalition (because of the colour of the alliance between ‘reds’ and ‘blues’). Foreign policy is in the hands of liberal Jozias van Aartsen, while development aid is the responsibility of social democrat minister Evelien Herfkens. This former officer of the World Bank has largely abandoned the traditional line followed for years by the cooperation of the Netherlands in the fight against poverty, centred on targeted support for initiatives from more marginal sectors of developing countries (ethnic minorities, women, children, immigrants, peasants, etc.). Minister Herfkens has recently brought policy into line with the postulates of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, encouraging the adoption of free trade and neoliberal policies by countries benefiting from Netherlands aid. Thus, financial and economic reforms are now favoured, while development aid has been conditioned on good 66 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 66 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security in an Age of Uncertainty ... Patricio Silva management (good governance) of treasury funds and the efficaciousness of those countries’ fiscal policies. Encouragement has also been given to multilateral aid through institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in order to finance economic reforms and support the balance of payments of developing nations. In 1999, the Netherlands Government decided to put an end to bilateral lines of cooperation with close to 100 countries to concentrate on giving bilateral aid to a list of seventeen countries (plus four countries on a provisional basis), which, according to the minister, are 2 characterized by having good governance. Even though the Netherlands is a member of the Human Security 3 Network and has participated in all the international meetings held so far as part of this initiative, we can confirm that the concept of human security has not been fully integrated into the vocabulary and documents produced in recent years by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4 and the Ministry for International Cooperation. The paradox in the case of the Netherlands is that, despite avoiding as much as possible the use of the concept of human security in its official documents, in practice it has always been – and continues to be, despite the changes introduced by Minister Herfkens – one of the main countries in the international community that has constantly and substantially supported most of the fields covered by the concept of human security. Thus, we can see that the Netherlands has always played a leading role in defending human rights and the validity of international humanitarian law. To this must be added the country’s efforts to mitigate extreme poverty in developing countries and to improve the personal security of women, children and the elderly as well as of other sectors in precarious conditions. In the context of the concrete agenda devised by the Human Security Network (see FLACSO, 2001), the Netherlands has been actively cooperating for years, both internationally and in aid-receiving countries, in such matters as eliminating anti-personnel mines in post-conflict zones, control of light weapons, giving aid both through international agencies (UNICEF, UNHCHR, etc.) and through local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and directly in order to improve the living and 2. This list includes Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine territories, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen and Zambia. 3. Which also includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand. 4. This was confirmed by an officer from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who regretted this fact because, in his opinion, the country’s lengthy humanitarian tradition made it a natural candidate to play a leading role in Europe in the defence of human security as a principle and cornerstone of foreign policy. 67 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 67 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile 5 security conditions of children in areas of armed conflict. Furthermore, the Netherlands has always acknowledged the existence of the socalled ‘non-state actors’ (NGOs, humanitarian agencies, the private sector, etc.) and has considered them to be privileged partners in channelling its development aid. In the light of all this, the question remains as to why the Netherlands refuses to adopt human security terminology in its official discourse, while in practice it has developed a foreign policy and policy of international cooperation that is very close to the objectives pursued by the human security agenda. For now, we can but speculate on the reasons for this paradox. First of all, it could be related to the nature of the political coalition that governs the Netherlands. The concept of human security could be seen by liberal sectors as very ‘progressive’ or even leftist and, therefore, avoiding this concept could answer to the need to maintain stability in the cabinet in general and in social democrat/liberal relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular. Secondly, Minister Herfkens’ refusal to give greater prominence to the concept of human security could be related to her determined efforts to make a substantial distinction between her line of action and the line pursued by her predecessor, charismatic social democrat Jan Pronk, who was always more in tune with agendas defended by United Nations Specialized Agencies and by representatives of developing nations in general. This factor leads us to a third possible explanation for this paradox. Herfkens’ efforts to implement principles of the ‘Washington Consensus’ in her policy of international cooperation has very often put her in positions that are diametrically opposed to those of such agencies as the UNDP, whose ‘paternity’, or at least decisive role, in proliferating the concept of human security in the debate on security and development is widely acknowledged. Final comments The dramatic events of 11 September 2001 caused a strong reaction of solidarity and unity of the Netherlands people with the North American people. Wim Kok, the Prime Minister, resolutely joined the Western crusade against international terrorism. After a few weeks, however, when strong initial emotions had been tempered somewhat 5. For a general list of fields in which the Netherlands gives active aid in a world context, see the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.minbuza.nl/english/ homepage.asp). 68 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 68 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security in an Age of Uncertainty ... Patricio Silva and it was evident that the feared wave of attacks in the United States and Europe had not occurred, the government started to adopt a position with regard to the war in Afghanistan that stressed humanitarian aid. This position was sealed by Kok’s visit to Pakistan, where he promised all kinds of aid to Afghan refugees in that country. The events of 11 September have caused a marked change in the way in which Western countries have started to approach financial and all kinds of emergencies that have arisen or been visibly aggravated since that date. The state has begun to assume a more active role in all fields, starting with the United States and other Western countries. Even though it is still too early to predict whether this reactivation of the role of the state (which is certainly a direct contradiction of the postulates of the ‘Washington Consensus’) will be only fleeting or whether it will acquire greater permanence, one can presume, none the less, that strong internal pressure will also be generated in developing countries to abandon structural readjustment programmes in order to strengthen the economic, political and, especially, social role of the state in those nations. If this does occur, then donating countries will feasibly de-emphasize the need for economic and financial reforms in aid-receiving nations and increasingly stress the need for political stability, reinforcing the primary aim of supplying the population’s basic needs. All this would constitute an effort to prevent the gestation of religious and all other kinds of extremism generated in the bosom of extensive marginal sectors, which could once again lead the world to the verge of collapse. Post-Taliban Afghanistan may become a test case where possibly, after the massive use of military force to destroy the former regime, we hope that in practice Western countries will implement the human security agenda in order to take care of the urgent needs of the population of this tormented Central Asian country. Bibliography FLACSO. 2001. Red de seguridad humana. Document prepared by FLACSO-Chile for the Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean, 26– 27 November 2001. GOUCHA , MOUFIDA. 2001. Address on the occasion of the Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa, Pretoria, South Africa, July 2001. 69 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 69 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile KING, GARY; MURRAY, CHRISTOPHER J. L. 2000. Rethinking Human Security (http://gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdf). MACLEAN, GEORGE. 1998. The changing perception of human security: Coordinating national and multinational responses. United Nations Association in Canada website (www.unac.org/canada/security/ maclean.html). MACLEAN, GEORGE. 2000. Instituting and projecting human security: A Canadian perspective. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 269–76. OAS. 2000. Human Security in the Americas. Document presented by the Canadian Delegation, Washington, D.C., Organization of American States. OWENS, HEATHER; ARNEIL, BARBARA. 1999. The human security paradigm shift: A new lens on Canadian foreign policy? Canadian Foreign Policy, No. 7, pp. 1–12. ROJAS ARAVENA, FRANCISCO. 2000. Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latina. In: Chile 1999–2000. Nuevo gobierno: Desafíos de la reconciliación. Santiago, FLACSO-Chile. THAKUR, RAMESH. 1999. The UN and human security. Canadian Foreign Policy, No. 7, pp. 51–9. UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York, United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. 2000. Human Development Report 2000. Human Rights and Human Development. New York, United Nations Development Programme. VILLANUEVA, MIRIAM. 2000. La seguridad humana: ¿una ampliación del concepto de seguridad global? Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, No. 59, pp. 129–30. VILLANUEVA, MIRIAM. 2001. La seguridad humana: Algunas repercusiones recientes en la agenda internacional. Argentina Global 5 (April–June) (www.geocities.com/globargentina/vill02.htm). 70 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 70 25/04/2003, 12:54 PEACE, HUMAN SECURITY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN – A VIEW FROM NORTH AMERICA HAL KLEPAK 1 Introduction It is probably not too much to say that since the events of 11 September the place of the debate on human security as a concept in the search for peace and conflict prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean has undergone a sea change. However, it is almost certainly too early to know in what direction that change is going even though we can make some educated guesses. Before the tragedy in New York the challenges posed by the breadth and potential scope of the concept were such as to attract the attention of governments and academics. But it must be said that much of the attention generated, at least among government actors, showed up as concern on the part of decisionmakers about the implications of accepting the concept as a basis for action. 1. Professor of Strategic Studies, Royal Military College of Canada. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 71 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Such action was seen as likely to be too wide-ranging, unclear and amorphous to be easily addressed by real states facing real issues of security, internal and external, traditional and non-traditional. And many worried that the costs involved in taking seriously the challenges of such a configuration of an approach to security would be astronomical and carry enormous burdens for all countries, but especially for those developed states which would be asked to shoulder most of the weight. This conference was planned, and its sister events took place, without the shadow of the impact of the terrorist attacks on central New York which have dominated our lives over almost the last three months. It is no longer possible to consider these issues, however, without these events in mind, as they have come to dominate our thinking in so many ways about the whole range of subjects concerning this conference: peace, human security, and conflict prevention. This paper attempts to show how the two countries of North America have seen the concept of human security in terms of its impact2 on peace and conflict prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is followed by an assessment of how this vision has been affected since 11 September, even though one must acknowledge that such changes are still ongoing and limited thought has been given to the subject to date, as so much attention has been deployed elsewhere and on other themes. Finally, ways ahead are suggested concerning the concept of human security, again from the perspective of the two North American countries. The concept of human security in North America First of all it is important to emphasize that the two countries of North America, the United States and Canada, while sharing much in their visions of international and hemispheric security, also differ a great deal. While this is not as dominant a feature of their foreign and defence policy as it was when Canada was still a self-governing member of the British Empire, or as it was during the Cold War and before Canada in 1990 finally joined the Organization of American States, it is still the case. And if in the present context, the convergence of security visions is especially obvious in the Americas and in Latin America and the Caribbean in particular, it is not true that the two countries see even security in this region in exactly the same way. 2. For the purposes of this paper, North America is considered as including only Canada and the United States, not Mexico. This is because this conference enjoys the presence of Mexican speakers who can address that country’s thinking on human security better than I. 72 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 72 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hal Klepak Human security has been a case in point. Reasonably activist Canadian governments, or at least foreign ministers, have developed the United-Nations-conceived concept and fleshed it out, with the open hostility of the United States in the early stages. Essentially this was the result of the thinking of Lloyd Axworthy, Foreign Minister from 1996 to 2000, a minister described by one specialist as ‘ambitious that Canada should pay a more prominent role …’. This observer goes on to say of Axworthy: ‘His style is spontaneous, the focus of his interests shifts frequently, and he expects rapid and cooperative 3 responses from the bureaucracy.’ Despite his strong personality, Axworthy was unable to make overly rapid progress with the concept. It has been slower to catch on in the more southerly of the two countries while it quickly became almost an article of faith for the more northerly one. While there has been less emphasis on human security in Ottawa under the new minister, John Manley, since his appointment in the autumn of 2000, it is doubtless still an important element in Canadian foreign and defence policy. Indeed, it is probably not too early to say that the new minister’s focus has changed since September’s terrorist attacks. Before then, in his first months of office, Mr Manley seemed to carry on with his previous cabinet priorities of trade and industrial development with little passion for issues of security and wider political affairs. Since September 2001, however, the centrality of security matters for Canada and its main neighbour has ensured that such personal preferences would have to yield to the dramatic events into which Canadian foreign policy has been pulled. The minister’s time has been massively deployed on the security dossiers before him. And this has occurred not only in the area of counter-terrorism but in other spheres of great importance to Canada, such as illegal immigration, the proposed US anti-ballistic missile defense system, the links between terrorism and narcotics in Latin America and elsewhere, and much else. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that such subtleties are hardly present in the US at this time. Indeed, there is no real debate at all on the subject. It will probably take considerable time before such a debate occurs again. I do not propose to spend much time on this post-September context here as that will be done in a number of papers. None the 3. Cranford Pratt, ‘DFAIT’s takeover bid of CIDA: The institutional future of the Canadian International Development Agency’, Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, 1998, pp. 1–13, 6. 73 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 73 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile less, it is worthwhile trying to give the North American context for the development of human security as a concept, and to say something about its birth within the Canadian foreign-policy world, and then turn to its reception in the foreign policy of the United States. Canada’s security and the idea of human security In many ways the development of new ideas in the field of human security is very much in keeping with the traditions of Canadian foreign policy, stretching back perhaps over half a century. In the face of vociferous and negative pro-imperial sentiment, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson moved far in the development of ideas about modern peacekeeping which were not necessarily well received by Canadians at the time of the Suez Crisis of 1956 and subsequent events. Pearson argued with his critics, especially in the armed forces, that the only danger to Canada’s direct survival during the Cold War was the threat of a central exchange of nuclear weapons between the two superpowers, inconveniently but immediately placed to the north and south of Canada. Whether the country were targeted or not, it would be destroyed in such an exchange. Thus it behoved Ottawa to do all in its power to ensure that small or ‘brush-fire’ wars remained such and did not attract excessive attention from the superpowers in a fashion that might raise the spectre of war between them. While remaining a loyal member of the Atlantic Alliance, peacekeeping as a direct and significant element of national defence steadily gained ground, and popularity, as something distinctly Canadian in the national contribution to collective security and international peace. And with time many of Canada’s allies began to acknowledge that the country’s efforts in the field of peace-keeping could yield real and positive results, even for the objectives of NATO as a whole, and not merely those of Canada. Many other original elements of Canadian thinking on international security came to the fore from the 1950s to the 1980s in the fields of arms control and disarmament. Once again, the basic tenet of the Canadian approach was anchored in direct security thinking and related to the exposed position in which Canada would almost certainly find 4 itself were nuclear war to occur. In Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Europe, in Confidence and Security Building 4. The details of, and thinking behind, this approach is discussed in Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, Une diplomatie de l’espoir: le Canada et le désarmement 1945–1988, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 1989. 74 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 74 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hal Klepak Measures, in nuclear force reduction talks, and in a host of other forums, Canadian policy was often felt to be original, if often seen by other allies as excessively idealistic. In the late 1980s Canadian foreign-policy proponents, as well as many of its academics working in the security field, were present in the development of the sort of thinking on security and defence matters which was to result in the idea of cooperative security. By September 1990, Canada’s Minister of External Affairs Joe Clark could formulate cooperative security in the following way: • it is inclusive in approach by seeking to engage adversaries and nonlike-minded actors as well as putative friends; • it emphasizes the need to move beyond the deterrence mindset, focusing on security as a broad concept incorporating a range of both military and non-military elements; • it envisages a more gradual approach to developing multilateral institutions; and • it is a flexible concept as it recognizes the value of existing balance of power arrangements in contributing to regional security and for retaining them – indeed, for working with and through them – allowing multilateralism to develop from more ad hoc, informal, and flexible processes, as well as building on established bilateral ties, until the conditions for institutionalized multilateralism become more favourable. 5 Here one was saying much of what would be said as well about common or shared security. All began with the idea of considering that the other state (or even group) had a right to its own security, just as one had oneself, and that acting to strengthen one’s security by means that reduced the security of others could easily end up pushing rivals to actions that would then reduce one’s own security. The security of one state was thus tied up in the security of others, be they neighbours, rivals or merely concerned members of the international community. The way was paved for making more concrete this thinking in ways related to the progress seen in much of the world with confidencebuilding measures. In addition, it became possible to speak of taking in the impact on rivals of one’s strategic moves before undertaking them, with the understanding that threats to one’s own security could in the new order of things just as clearly come about because of the weakness of others as because of their strength. Such thinking was neither traditional nor easily accepted by the conservative thinking on 5. David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, ‘Canada’s international security policy’, in D. Dewitt and D. Leyton-Brown (eds.), Canada’s International Security Policy, pp. 1–27, 14, Scarborough, Canada, Prentice Hall, 1995. 75 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 75 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile defence and security that is so often the norm. None the less, it gained ground with speed in the years after the end of the Cold War when the era of failed states, ethnic rivalries, violent separatisms and so much more came to trouble the international system. Human security in Canada It was in this context that Mr Axworthy did much of the thinking that resulted not only in the concept of human security but also translated that concept into government policy. Mr Bush’s new world order seemed merely a new disorder and the minister called for new thinking to address new issues. A number of studies were commissioned within and without the Department of Foreign Affairs with a view to clarifying the thinking. But what was evolving was a concept of security which, without abandoning the importance of the state at the centre of the international system, moved to bring the individual human being into a more central place in thinking on security. While acknowledging the role and indeed the value of the state and its security, human security thinking began to coalesce around ideas of: • the end of the Cold War allows for the needs of the individual in the area of security to come more to the fore; • the state’s interests can still be protected while paying more attention to individual needs; • the main problems of the post-Cold War era are social and economic, and not exclusively those related to traditional defence; • these problems, where the individual are concerned, tend to need rethinking rather than solutions found in more traditional, statecentred, contexts. This series of reflections led to an increasingly impressive amount of theoretical and more practical work on what might be the major thrusts of security in relation to these new trends and thinking about them. With growing emphasis on non-military issues, and non-state ones to boot, it proved possible to speak more of issues such as: • citizen security in the face of the explosion of crime in the cities, and to some extent, even in the countryside; • problems of security for the rich alongside the collapse of security for the poor; • questions of health which cross borders and kill or which simply stand out as threatening the sense of security of everyday people; 76 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 76 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hal Klepak • questions of human rights and abuses of them; • access to basic needs of education, social services, housing, and medical services, without which there is little sense in speaking of anyone feeling secure; • needs related to what appeared to be a rise in the number and intensity of natural disasters. Thus concerns rarely placed in the past in the traditional state-centred context of security came to the fore or at least were increasingly acknowledged as of relevance and finding their legitimate place in discussions of security. Building on ideas of common and cooperative security, this meant an expansion of the meaning of security in so far as it had been conceived in the modern state system. In addition, it seemed to call for a major effort in reactions at the state and lower levels in order to address the challenges of these non-traditional issues now being more readily debated at the international level. Needless to say, this new thinking could only take place in a situation of much-reduced potential for conflict within the inter-state system. And it could only take hold in Canada because of the reduced relevance of traditional schema of tensions in the international system and increased interest in responding to threats and challenges long accepted as irrelevant to wider security matters as seen through the state prism. It must be said that at first the Department of National Defence, and indeed many in the Department of Foreign Affairs, found it difficult to take seriously the thrust of the new thinking. While some felt that it was mere idealism unrelated to facts as it could not replace real state security as a priority, others felt that the costs of taking it seriously were prohibitive, whatever the inherent value of the idea. The first group argued that state-related insecurities remained present and demanded the continuing priority they had enjoyed before the end of the Cold War. Such thinkers did not usually deny the need to address other, new, security matters. However, they felt that these matters were so great in scope and so inappropriately placed within the security rubric of state concerns as to reduce the degree to which they could be properly managed in a security framework, at least in any security framework that could be envisaged at that time. The second group insisted on the idea that, even with the best will in the world, a serious effort could not be made to address the breadth of issues involved in human security without a total change in international attitudes towards economic, social and even political development. They argued that the costs of a real effort with any 77 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 77 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile chance of significant progress in these areas of human concern were so massive as to preclude such initiatives. Only a total reorientation of international relations, based on a deep-seated, and not merely Canadian, sea change in attitudes of solidarity with the international community, could, in their opinion, provide a political environment apt to sustain such an effort. Indeed, cynics (realists?) even within Canada argued that while the country was doubtless a leader in new thinking on the needs of developing countries, and that this was especially true in the security field; there was even in Canada no intention to make the changes implied by the human security approach in fields as central as access to the markets of industrialized nations of the North, freedom of movement of labour, and other reforms that were vital in order to make real progress. Such analysts felt that discussion of the idea of human security was indeed unhelpful as it raised hopes of major change that could not be achieved in the current context of international relations, even well after the Cold War. Notwithstanding the above, and especially the open scepticism of the Department of National Defence, Mr Axworthy was able to sell his vision to such an extent that, two years after his taking over the foreign affairs portfolio, it became a major plank of Canadian defence and foreign policy. And this was done with relatively little watering down of the approach’s tenets. Some came of course in the hope of assuaging defence and other critics and making them see its positive sides as non-threatening to their more realpolitik needs for the future. But the centring of the approach on individual and collective human needs short of the state did not change even though it remained far from fully defined. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs called a series of meetings to discuss the concept and invited foreign as well as Canadian analysis of what it would actually mean, globally and in a variety of world regions and sets of major issues. And bureaucratic structures within the department soon had the official job of selling the idea widely. Despite its scepticism, the Department of Defence also had to toe the official line where human security was concerned. 78 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 78 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hal Klepak The United States and human security Ideas of human security coming from across the northern border were at first given sort shrift in Washington. If opposition among realists had been strong in Canada, it was far stronger in the United States. But opposition, firmer of course here, was still to be found in essentially the same two streams of thought. United States mainstream strategic thinking could find little appealing in the idea. While generally acknowledging that there were many new elements of the international security scene than had been present in the Cold War world, US thinkers tended not to feel that the thrust of human security was either logical or acceptable. And while the reaction was hardly monolithic, and elements of the arms control and prodevelopment communities did have favourable things to say about human security, it was none the less true that most thinkers scoffed at the idea and at first gave it scant attention. And as in Canada, but even more so in the United States, many others merely felt that human security was wishful thinking as a construct for international action. They, and there were many of them, tended to argue that there was no basis at all for thinking that the international community had evolved to such an extent after the Cold War that it was prepared to make the real and significant sacrifices necessary to carry forward the international development programme such ideas required. In bilateral and multilateral forums, Washington politely but firmly suggested that the approach needed more serious work before it could be taken on as a real suggestion for reform of security approaches. Indeed, Canadian diplomats tended to find bemusement from US security analysts in the face of what they often considered merely another of the long string of Canadian idealistic and unworkable ideas on international security. And when the expressions of such thinking began to take on the form of support for an international ban on antipersonnel landmines and opposition to ballistic missile defence, US mainstream thinking seemed even less impressed, or even amused, by the idea. Despite this, over time the United States position softened. Canadian diplomats and military officers noted a slow but eventually perceptible change in United States attitudes on human security. While slow to enter US discourse itself, an evolution did take place as officials and academics saw the pertinence of at least some of the tenets of the approach. The clearly individual and non-traditional elements of much 79 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 79 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile of the context of narcotics abuse, international crime, illegal immigration, health, and ethnic and other modern conflicts forced a more accepting approach, at least to the idea of considering human security as useful in some important areas of concern. In the few months before 11 September the trend to acceptance grew. While most still held firm on the difficulties inherent in an approach that appeared to suggest at least an attempt to come to grips with the vexing issues of poverty and inequality, the rest seemed worth thinking about and not excluding out of hand. 11/9 and all that Then came 11 September. And as for so much else, so with human security, everything seemed to be forgotten in favour of the dramatic flavour of the month: counter-terrorism. And while this can hardly be surprising given the horror and scope of the impact of that day’s events, the fact remains that at least some of the tenets of human security were very much wrapped up in them. Human security had argued that only by addressing the root causes of discontent could one provide real security in the complex context of the beginning of the new millennium. Human needs for hope, progress economically and socially, and ways to go about their lawful business without fear, could easily be linked to the desperate feelings of terrorists who felt that their calls for justice and change were consistently and viciously ignored by an international community where only the security and other needs of the powerful were addressed while the weak were left to their own devices. A seemingly new lexicon exploded on the international security scene, sometimes harking back to the past, and sometimes looking distinctly to a new situation. The new terms included ‘asymmetric warfare’, ‘homeland defence’, ‘immigration controls’, and a host of rapidly evolving words confusing to expert and neophyte alike. The individual was perhaps to feel more personally threatened, at least in the United States and the West, than at any time in modern history. Yet the response to those needs was to be as state-centric as ever and to include the traditional state panoply of resources – military, police, justice, immigration, etc. – with which past threats had been addressed. 80 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 80 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hal Klepak Conclusion It is far too soon to see where recent events will lead us where human security is concerned. The Canadian Government hopes that the advantages the approach offers will stand the test of time and be acknowledged as helpful by the United States and other countries even in the current dreadful situation. There is as yet little reflection of this thinking in the United States. Canada believes that the responses of the US to the terrorism crisis are well-founded in so far as they go. Ottawa would agree that it is vital to do both things the US proposes: find and punish the terrorists responsible for the 11 September attacks while dismantling their terror networks, as well as acting in ways to diminish the vulnerabilities of our societies to such attacks in the future through improved defences against attack. But Canadians tend to add a further, third, pillar to the reaction in which one should be participating. This is the diplomatic and political initiatives necessary to pull the rug out from under those who argue for terrorist methods as the only ones that can potentially bring change where injustices are perceived. For the time being such thinking is not welcome in Washington. There is no guarantee that it ever will be. But the divergence in views between the two countries is clear. Americans speak of the ‘war on terrorism’ while Canadians avoid the term like the plague. Instead, in Canada the discussion is of a ‘campaign against terrorism’, an entirely different thing. The ‘campaign’ acknowledges other, dare one say more human dimensions, to the questions before us. The ‘war’ simplifies the issues at hand. The current crisis in Canada, despite the simply overwhelming and unprecedented sympathy for the United States present in the Canadian body politic, reflects in many ways the kind of thinking that gave birth to human security ideas and to human security itself. Its handling in the United States expresses the survival of very different ideas on how to deal with new security challenges. It is yet to be seen whether there will be cross-pollination between the two approaches. At the moment there seems to be few signs of any. But there are some, and the shock of the attacks may well stimulate a degree of new American thinking on the subject that may end up bringing the two visions much more closely into line. This is, however, far from certain at present. 81 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 81 25/04/2003, 12:54 HUMAN SECURITY NETWORK: FROM LYSØEN TO SANTIAGO CLAUDIA F. FUENTES 1 The Human Security Network grew out of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and Norway, signed at Lysøen Island (Norway) in 1998, and its aim was to form an association of countries with the purpose of promoting a new concept of human security centred on people. The first meeting of the Human Security Network was held in 1999, organized as a group of like-minded countries which, through informal and flexible mechanisms, seek to generate points of consensus and promote practical actions in this respect. The Network is currently made up of thirteen countries: Austria, 2 Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand. As provided in the Lysøen Declaration, the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries making up this association agreed to generate a forum for consultation and concerted action based on ministerial meetings at least once a year, ministerial groups to implement joint initiatives and meetings held 3 in parallel to traditional conferences. Since its launch, the Human Security Network has held four ministerial meetings, in Bergen and 1. FLACSO-Chile researcher. 2. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca 3. Juan Aníbal Barría, ‘Chile and human security’, paper presented at the Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, November 2001. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 83 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Lysøen, Norway (1999); in Lucerne, Switzerland (2000); in Petra, Jordan (2001) and in Santiago, Chile (2002). The next ministerial meeting will be held in May 2003, in Graz, Austria. The Network member countries have invited United Nations 4 5 representatives, academics and non-governmental organizations of different continents to participate in their working sessions with the purpose of establishing a concept and an action plan in relation to human security. These bodies have been associated with the various ministerial and preparatory meetings and have made important contributions through articles and research works carried out with governments and international organizations. The bodies participating in the meetings include the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, and the International Action Network on Small Arms. In the four ministerial meetings held to date, the ministers of foreign affairs have sought to refine their diagnoses and perceptions in order to build up common thinking about a concept of security that places protection of the human being as the lynchpin of international peace. In so doing, it is important to point out that Network member countries understand that human security is not a substitute for conventional security, but rather complements it, adding the element that the first6 priority is concern for the welfare of people, citizens and civil society. The Declaration of the First Ministerial Meeting points out that human security ‘means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives. ... Human security has become both a 7 new measure of global security and a new agenda for global action’. For its part, the Chairman’s Summary of the second meeting is more specific as to the variables or dimensions making up human security: ‘Ministers and representatives of the Human Security Network reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening human security with a view to creating a more humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from want and fear, and with equal opportunities to 8 develop their human potential to the full.’ 4. htpp://www.unesco.org/securipax 5. See article by Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latina’, in Chile 1999–2000. Nuevo gobierno: Desafíos de la reconciliación, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 2000. 6. Heraldo Muñoz, Speech of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile at the Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, November 2001. 7. Chairman’s Summary, First Ministerial Meeting, Lysøen, 1999. 8. Chairman’s Summary, Second Ministerial Meeting, Lucerne, 2000. 84 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 84 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes In addition to the declarations made at the ministerial meetings about the human security concept and the set of principles accepted by Network members, it should be noted that in the Network there is a debate about the extent this concept must cover. In this respect, one of the main tasks of this association of countries will be to work on the definition of the concept of human security, set its boundaries and establish links with other themes, especially in the field of human development. Together with the challenge of conceptually defining human security, the Network should go on working to establish its agenda and concrete actions capable of generating policies that may have an impact on the international context. Since it was created, the Network has worked within a human security agenda including a wide range of different subjects: anti-personnel mines, light weapons, groups at war, International Criminal Court, non-state actors in armed conflicts, education for peace, refugees, sustainable development, and peace operations, among others. It is important to point out that the Network has succeeded in drawing attention to some issues at an international level, in particular with respect to international cooperation in the campaign to ban landmines through the Ottawa Convention. However, this range of subjects, which is in part due to the diversity of the countries making up the Network, has made the development of more concrete actions more difficult for collective action in the international field. The main issues addressed at the four meetings of the Human Security Network are described below, followed by some reflections about the development of the Network and its action at international level. Lysøen, Norway (1999) 9 The First Ministerial Meeting on human security was held in Lysøen on 19 and 20 May 1999. Representatives of the governments of Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and Norway attended the meeting. South Africa participated as an observer. 9. Chairman’s Summary, First Ministerial Meeting, Lysøen, 1999. 85 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 85 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The concept of human security, its significance and the themes included in the human security agenda were analysed. The Chairman’s Summary of the meeting, entitled ‘A Perspective on Human Security’, provides a conceptual framework. According to the report, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives. It is indicated that human security and human development are mutually reinforcing concepts, as they aim at two interrelated objectives: to banish fear and to banish want. The participants at the First Ministerial Meeting established three fundamental requirements for human security development: • A commitment to human rights and international humanitarian law as the foundation for the building of human security. In so doing, human security is advanced through the protection and promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, a culture of peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. • The international organizations created by states in order to build a just and peaceful world order, above all the United Nations, in its role of maintaining international peace and security as stated in its Charter, must serve human security needs. • The promotion of sustainable human development through the alleviation of absolute poverty, providing basic social services for all, pursuing the goals of people-centred development. The report on the Lysøen meeting stresses that while the aim of improving human security is widely shared, the degree to which it is threatened varies in the different regions of the world, as do the resources available to deal with the threats. In this respect, the report shows the need to establish a framework of flexible cooperation and concrete actions in order to promote human security. Ministers and government representatives thus established an agenda for the promotion of human security, identifying challenges and proposals. Lysøen agenda Anti-personnel landmines: Ban the use and remove the mines from contaminated lands through the following mechanisms: • Strengthening joint work with the countries involved as well as at a global level through the UN. • Promoting the ratification and universalization of the Mine Ban Convention, particularly at the regional level. • Promoting partnerships with NGOs. 86 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 86 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes • Facilitating coordinated action in humanitarian emergencies in cases where the use of anti-personnel mines prevents the return of refugees. Small arms: Coordinate efforts to control the multiplication of small arms, including: • Encouraging national, regional and international action, focusing on both the illicit and licit traffic of armaments. • Strengthening the work of the UN Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms and supporting the decision of the UN General Assembly to hold an international conference on this problem. • Welcoming the Elements of Common Understanding in this matter, from the Oslo meeting of 13–14 July 1998, to the International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development held in Brussels on 12–13 October 1998. • Seeking solutions to this issue through the United Nations, regional and subregional arrangements in cooperation with civil society organizations. Children in armed conflict: Identify the specific needs of children in armed conflict, by: • Ensuring that humanitarian and development assistance programmes address the needs of children in armed conflict and by supporting, where appropriate, the work of UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNHCHR, in addition to intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working in this field. • Contributing to the follow-up of commitments made by governments and other parties involved in conflicts to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. • Promoting the implementation of existing standards, in particular those of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and working towards the adoption of an Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict. • Encouraging the recognition and enforcement of these standards by all armed forces or groups. • Promoting and participating in activities that contribute to public awareness and understanding of this issue in the Network member countries and in those that are at present affected by conflict. • Recognizing that the participation of children in armed conflicts can be considered as one of the worst forms of child labour, and working 87 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 87 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile towards the immediate elimination and prohibition of this form of child labour, as well as the adoption of international instruments dealing with this subject. • Promoting measures to facilitate the reintegration in society of former child soldiers. International humanitarian and human rights law: Strengthen the implementation and adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law by: • Cooperating to ensure that the 27th Red Cross Conference succeeds in revitalizing commitment to international humanitarian law in compliance with the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols. • Monitoring the implementation of international humanitarian and human rights law, particularly in situations of systematic violations of human rights. • Promoting the recognition and enforcement of the regulations of international humanitarian law by armed forces or armed groups. • Working together for the implementation and promotion of human rights training for peace-keeping forces and related personnel. • Promoting human rights education. International Criminal Court: Seek the speedy ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute establishing an International Criminal Court. Exploitation of children: Strengthen cooperation in the fight against the sexual exploitation of children. Safety of humanitarian personnel: Includes the identification of concrete measures to enhance the safety of humanitarian personnel and the promotion of universal adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel. Conflict prevention: Strengthen the capacity of the United Nations and regional organizations to develop cooperative strategies for conflict prevention. Transnational organized crime: Work together to develop a framework within the UN system to combat transnational organized crime, in particular through the negotiations of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols. 88 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 88 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes Resources for development • Strive towards the goal of the official development assistance proposed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Copenhagen, set at 0.7% of the gross national product of each country. • Review progress on the 20/20 initiative, which proposes that developing countries should reserve at least 20% of their budgets for priority matters of human development and donor countries should increase their help in this area by 20%. 10 Lucerne, Switzerland (2000) The second meeting of the Human Security Network was held in Lucerne on 11–12 May 2000. In addition to the eleven countries participating in the first meeting, delegations from Greece and Mali attended, giving rise to the present thirteen countries making up the Human Security Network. On this occasion, ministers and representatives of member countries reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen human security and they recognized the importance and the need to work together with NGOs in order to reach this goal. Concerning the agenda, two main points were developed: small arms and light weapons; and the role of non-state actors in human security. Among the commitments acquired by ministers and representatives of the countries attending the meeting, the following points are notable: • Working together and individually to combat poverty and to contribute to sustainable human development. In particular, to achieve sustained growth of income, which requires, among other factors, investment in health and education. • Promoting respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and good governance. Recognizing the need to foster a culture of peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflicts, to control the instruments of violence, and to end impunity in cases of violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. • Encouraging consensus on the subject of human security at the global level and promoting regional approaches and flexible frameworks for cooperation. • Deepening contacts among members of the Network, other states, and NGOs in order to sustain consideration of human security 10. Chairman’s Summary, Second Ministerial Meeting, Lucerne, 2000. 89 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 89 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile issues in international and regional fora, in particular the UN, as well as within the framework of international financial institutions. In so doing, they recognized the need to pool resources from different sources such as government, private sector and civil society. With respect to the need to develop alliances with NGOs, the representatives stressed the crucial role of NGOs as key non-state actors in developing, building and implementing human security. They recognized the invaluable expertise, energy and commitment of NGOs to progress across a range of key issues relevant to people’s security. The representatives undertook to promote greater engagement between governments and civil society on human security issues. Lucerne agenda Small arms and light weapons: Representatives of governments belonging to the Human Security Network called on the international community to adopt an action plan to prevent the destabilizing accumulation and propagation of small arms and light weapons and the illicit trafficking of armaments. In so doing, they recognized the importance of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects to be held in 2001. They also stressed some points to be addressed at the conference: • Preventing the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and combating illicit arms trafficking by means of marking, record-keeping and tracing. • Controlling the legal manufacture and transfer of small arms, including the activities of brokers, and reducing small arms flow to conflict regions. • Strengthening international cooperation and exchange of information between governments, judicial authorities, and improving transparency in these activities. • Assisting in the collection, transfer and destruction of illicit or surplus weapons. Non-state actors: The report of the second meeting indicates that the term ‘non-state actors’ includes several groups: NGOs, humanitarian organizations, armed groups and the private sector. It also points out the importance of non-state actors in human security and the need to strengthen dialogue among the different groups involved. 90 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 90 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes The government representatives paid special attention to armed groups, specifying that they play an important role in human security, especially in conflict areas. It was emphasized that the security of the population, including that of humanitarian personnel, could be improved if all actors, including armed groups, would respect existing international law and principles. In this respect, ministers and government representatives expressed their support for the publication of a manual of armed groups all over the world, with the purpose of creating a database on the targets, history, military capacity, funding and other background information on these groups. Other issues A new topic was added to the agenda, that of ‘corporate citizenship’. That is, the way in which small, medium and multinational companies may contribute to promote human security. In this respect, the ‘Global Compact’ initiative was appraised by the UN Secretary-General. The subject of human rights education was also added to the human security agenda. Ministers and government representatives agreed to work together to enhance human security through human rights education at national, regional and global levels, within the framework of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education. Finally, the Lucerne Conference Summary includes some issues that were previously raised at the Network’s First Ministerial Meeting in Norway: war-affected children and the protection of civilians in armed conflict; creation of the International Criminal Court; strengthening of conflict prevention; prohibition of use and eradication of anti-personnel mines. 11 Petra, Jordan (2001) The Human Security Network Third Ministerial Meeting was held in Petra on 11–12 May 2001. Ministers and representatives of the governments making up the Network as well as civil society experts attended the meeting. Participants reaffirmed their intention to focus on protecting people against violence and promoting an international agenda oriented towards this purpose. 11. Chairman’s Summary, Third Ministerial Meeting, Petra, 2001. 91 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 91 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The issues analysed related to human development and security, conflict resolution and prevention, the need to strengthen UN peace missions, and children’s insecurity arising from the situations of violence to which they are exposed. Petra agenda Human security and human development The government representatives recognized that human security and human development are complex and interrelated concepts. In many circumstances, the failure to achieve development is a powerful source of human insecurity, especially for marginal groups in society. As an example, the document points out some sources of human insecurity, such as inadequate access to basic entitlements such as food, health and education. From this point of view, the participants at the meeting stated that urgent and concerted action is needed to tackle the root causes of human insecurity. On the other hand, it was pointed out that violence or threats of violence are an important impediment to the promotion of development, as they prevent individuals from investing in the economic and social development of their communities. In this respect, the Petra Summary shows that the promotion of human security brings a people-centred perspective to issues of freedom from fear and violence, underlines the way in which different groups in society (women, children, minorities and other disadvantaged sectors) are particularly vulnerable to violence, including domestic violence. In this respect, those attending the meeting recognized the need for development policies taking into account these vulnerabilities. Finally, the participants indicated that the link between human development and human security is specifically illustrated by the HIV/ AIDS pandemic, which affects individuals and communities as well as the capacity of government institutions. Human Security Index Ministers and government representatives recognized the importance of developing human security indicators, similar to those already existing in the human development area, through the analysis of causes and consequences of human insecurity. It was proposed that Human Security Network members join with NGO experts, 92 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 92 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes universities and international organizations to participate in drawing up a Human Security Index. Peace operations and human security The participants at the meeting emphasized the need to find the necessary funds to strengthen conflict prevention in early and critical stages, the need to strengthen the UN capacity for peace-keeping, and establishing post-conflict peace-building measures promoting the development of local capacity-building. In this respect, they stressed the importance of taking into account the following points: • Recognizing the specificity of each peace operation, according to the different conflict areas. • Working with local and civilian experts before evaluating the need for military deployment. • Incorporating a gender-sensitive approach to peace-keeping operations. Children and human security The report of the Petra meeting recognizes that children’s security not only requires protection against physical violence in the context of war, but also the incorporation of other variables such as physiological necessities, communal relationships and opportunities for personal development. Concerning children affected by armed conflict, ministers and government representatives emphasized the importance of: • Ensuring that children’s security is included as an important factor in peace and reconstruction processes. • Encouraging strategies that include children’s rights in humanitarian assistance, development and cooperation programmes, as well as peace and security initiatives. • Raising awareness of children’s rights and their specific needs. Special attention was paid to the situation of children in the Middle East area, particularly in the Palestinian territories. • Respecting international humanitarian law, which includes special provisions for the assistance and protection of children. 93 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 93 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Other issues The issue of the HIV/AIDS pandemic was included in the human security agenda of the third meeting as affecting human security and countries’ social and economic development, particularly in Africa and Asia. Participants emphasized the need to encourage health strategies and access to the required drugs. Ministers and government representatives indicated the importance of including a gender dimension in human security. In this respect, they outlined the need to incorporate gender-sensitive indicators such as violence against women and women’s human rights. They stressed the fact that women are important actors in the peace-building process. The subject of human rights education was again pointed out as a fundamental aspect of the promotion of human security. Furthermore, the participants reaffirmed the commitment adopted at the Lucerne meeting in relation to an action plan to prevent the accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Finally, the launch of the Human Security Network website (www.humansecuritynetwork.org) was welcomed, its purpose being to provide an electronic forum of consultation and coordination of Network members’ activities. 12 Santiago, Chile (2002) The fourth ministerial meeting of the Human Security Network, held on 2–3 July 2002 in Santiago, Chile, was attended by ministers, secretaries of state and special envoys from all participating countries. On this occasion, ministers and government representatives stressed the fact that the terrorist attacks of 11 September in the United States had profoundly affected the current international mood, altering the sense of security of individuals all over the world. In this respect, they recalled the Statement of the Human Security Network (New York, 12 November 2001) and renewed the commitment of Network governments to support international efforts to eradicate terrorism through better understanding of the sources of global insecurity. 12. Chairman’s Summary, Fourth Ministerial Meeting, Santiago, 2002. 94 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 94 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes The participants also reiterated the importance of promoting the security of people and communities to deal with the new threats in order to ‘build a world free from fear and free from want’.13 At the same time, they stressed the importance of ensuring the effective functioning of the international system for the protection and promotion of human rights, within the United Nations and at the regional level. Santiago agenda The Santiago meeting followed the agenda proposed by the Government of Chile in its capacity of pro tempore secretary. This agenda included a general review of the matters considered or initiatives adopted by the Network at the three previous meetings. Particularly notable were conflict prevention; non-state armed groups; protection of civilians; NGOs and armed conflicts; international humanitarian law and humanitarian personnel in conflict situations; anti-personnel mines; small arms and light weapons; childhood and human security; entrepreneurship and human security; HIV/AIDS; resources for development; transnational organized crime; and women, peace and security. In addition, the agenda was oriented to an in-depth analysis of three issues: a human security perspective in public security policies; human rights and international law education focused on human security; and the measurement of human security – the Human Security Index. A human security perspective in public security policies The Chairman’s Summary of the meeting states that public security involves a wide range of issues, such as crime and corruption, terrorism, prisons, police and judicial authorities and the civil police, including the private security sector. In this context, and bearing in mind the problems of security and insecurity from the perspective of human security, the following recommendations were submitted for consideration by the member countries: • To support the modernization of the police and public forces and examine the guidelines and rules governing private security agencies. • To promote staff training, particularly by sharing best practices among countries and contexts. 13. ‘Building a World Free from Fear and Free from Want’, Chairman’s Summary, ibid. 95 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 95 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile • To promote communication among members of the Human Security Network on issues relating to public security. • To promote the use of control mechanisms, for example in relation to discrimination by police forces. • To support a pilot plan aimed at adopting alternative measures to deal with drug problems, based on the human security concept. • To promote examination of the prison system and its function in public security in the long term and in the development of secure communities. • To back analysis of the way in which insecurity is perceived as part of the concept of human security, with special emphasis on the function of the media. • To back modernization of the armed forces and increased cooperation among the countries of the Human Security Network in their efforts to reform the security sector. Human rights and international law education The report of the meeting states that in order to promote education on human rights and international humanitarian law, the following recommendations should be considered: • To address education on human rights and international law from a global, holistic and transdisciplinary perspective, which would involve governments, intergovernmental organizations, the academic world and civil society. Also, to promote coordination of different programmes of human rights education at national level. • To back investigation of the links between human rights education and human security. • Measures aiming at promoting human rights education can be considered as support for the creation of a global culture of human rights, where participatory training at a basic level can be encouraged as being of critical importance. • When implementing legal norms, the following elements deserve special consideration: - training of military and police personnel in human rights and international humanitarian law; - incorporation of human rights education in formal and informal teaching systems, including schools and universities; - initiatives in favour of wide diffusion, in particular through the use of the media. 96 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 96 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes • To promote international humanitarian law as a continuation of the initial policy commitment by the Human Security Network. • To adopt a long-term and proactive strategy giving priority to education policies. • To promote such relevant instruments as the Declaration of the People’s Movement for Human Rights Education in order to strengthen associations among governments, international agencies and all actors of civil society. The measurement of human security: Human Security Index Ministers and government representatives pointed out that the measurement of human security is a complex but necessary task for the operation of the Network. The meeting held that reliable data are required for any projection aimed at conflict prevention, and it was recognized that the most useful aspect of background data on human security is the ability to note different trends, thus allowing governments to take measures to improve human security. The meeting agreed to consider the following recommendations: • To supply methodological back-up for the ongoing investigation of human security elements and, in particular, to promote relevant investigation in various regional contexts. To promote projects to set up and maintain reliable databases on the causes of insecurity. • To consider the use of broader measurements of human security, but in such a way that the efforts of the Human Security Network can focus on one or two issues on the agenda in order to achieve some international success. • To draw up a Human Security Report to provide reliable data for the formulation of effective policies. Human Security Network agenda Analysis of the agendas for the four Human Security Network meetings held to date and for the one foreseen in Austria, shows some consistency, as well as a strong emphasis on certain subjects at particular times. 97 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 97 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Table 1 sums up the main themes dealt with at Network meetings. Three issues have grown in importance as they have been discussed at each ministerial meeting: the banning and eradication of antipersonnel landmines; controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and children in armed conflicts. Table 1 Agendas of the 1999–2002 Human Security Network Ministerial Meetings Lysøen-Bergen 1999 Anti-personnel landmines Small arms and light weapons Children in armed conflicts Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law International Criminal Court Peace operations Prevention of conflicts Transnational organized crime Resources for development Lucerne 2000 Small arms and light weapons Non-state actors (armed groups) Corporate citizenship Education in Human Rights Children in armed conflicts Conflict prevention International Criminal Court Anti-personnel landmines Protection of civilians in armed conflicts Petra 2001 Human security and development Peace operations Children in armed conflicts Human Security Index HIV/AIDS Gender and human security Small arms and light weapons Santiago 2002 Human Security Index Education in Human Rights Public security and human security Source: Chairman’s Summaries, First, Second, Third and Fourth Ministerial Meetings, Lysøen (1999), Lucerne (2000), Petra (2001) and Santiago (2002) respectively . The eradication of anti-personnel landmines has been repeatedly addressed at all the ministerial meetings, especially at Lysøen. The Human Security Network has played an important part at international level through its campaign to ban landmines by promoting the ratification of the Ottawa Convention. In addition, the trafficking of small arms and light weapons has been an ongoing concern to this association of countries owing to their presence in domestic conflicts and civil wars. This is especially evident in Latin America, where the illegal trade in weapons is associated with drug trafficking, guerrilla movements and the increasing violence 98 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 98 25/04/2003, 12:54 Human Security Network: From Lysøen to Santiago Claudia F. Fuentes exerted by paramilitary groups and gangs. For this reason, all countries of the Human Security Network took part in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects held in July 2001, issuing a joint declaration calling on the international community to adopt the plan of action drawn up by the conference to prevent the accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons, as well as their trafficking. This declaration also states the need to strengthen international cooperation and exchange of information among governments in order to promote transparency. Children in armed conflict is another ongoing issue in Human Security Network discussions which was specifically covered at the first and third ministerial meetings. Two points were particularly relevant. First, promoting the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the adoption of its Optional Protocols on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. Second, the need for the international community to incorporate the rights of the child into humanitarian assistance, development and cooperation programmes and peace initiatives. Apart from these three issues, which have been on the agenda of all meetings of the Human Security Network since 1999, other themes have been emphasized at some of the meetings: human rights and international humanitarian law; non-state actors (armed groups); and human security and development. At the first meeting in Lysøen, the need to strengthen the implementation and observance of international humanitarian law in accordance with the Geneva Convention and its Protocols was highlighted. In this respect, the Lysøen Declaration points out the commitment of member countries to human rights and international humanitarian law as the fundamental basis for the development of human security. In this framework, the issue of education on human rights and international humanitarian law was addressed at the fourth meeting in Santiago and an agreement was reached on the promotion of programmes to link human rights education with human security, and on the adoption of a long-term strategy to give priority to education policies. At the second meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, the need was discussed to incorporate the issue of non-state actors into the human security agenda, on the understanding that, in the new international context, there is a great number of them and they form complex relationships among themselves. The participants paid special attention 99 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 99 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile to armed groups and the need for them to respect the principles of international legislation in force in order to strengthen a feeling of security in the population, especially in conflict zones. The link between human security and development was one of the main themes of the previous meeting in Petra, Jordan. The participants pointed out that these concepts are interrelated, and for this reason they thought it appropriate to work together in promoting human development as one way to tackle the causes of people’s insecurity. However, this is one of the most complex issues of the human security agenda, as it is directly linked to the need for a definition of the whole concept of human security, a process that is still being discussed by the Network. The proposal arising from the Santiago meeting, to produce a Human Security Report in order to identify the initial parameters reflecting the main causes of people’s insecurity, is undoubtedly a good starting point in the formulation of effective policies by the member countries of the Human Security Network. Finally, even though some continuity has been noted in the themes of the human security agenda, it is important to mention that the Network has worked on a great number of issues, making it difficult for effective actions to be developed at an international level. In addition, as previously stated, when the approach focused on promoting the Ottawa Convention considerable success was achieved. In this respect, the main tasks to be addressed by this network of countries in the next few years include extending the analysis of the central themes of human security; strengthening links and cooperation with civil society and the academic sector; and continuing to stress the human security perspective, at both domestic and international level, through the various multilateral instances in which member countries take part. One of the greatest challenges for the Human Security Network is to become the main international reference point for the most urgent problems of the citizens of the world. 100 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 100 25/04/2003, 12:54 II. REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SECURITY Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 101 25/04/2003, 12:54 PEACE, HUMAN SECURITY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN HUGO PALMA 1 Peace A basic dictionary of philosophical terms2 reminds us that peace ‘is not limited to the absence of war. Harmony and understanding between men can only be achieved by means of a political, cultural project …’. Saint Augustine understood peace to be ‘tranquillity in order’. It is habitually associated with performance of justice, defined as ‘… a cardinal virtue, manifested by respect for other people’s rights (give every person his or her due) … basic value for morals and politics’. The most novel approach to the subject is the concept of a Culture of Peace, originally proposed by Peruvian priest Felipe MacGregor, developed with commendable enthusiasm by Federico Mayor, former Director-General of UNESCO, and eventually taken up by the United Nations General Assembly. According to UN Resolution 52/113, it consists of ‘values, attitudes and conducts which give expression to and at the same time arouse social exchanges and interaction based 1. Researcher, Peruvian Center for International Studies, CEPEI-Peru. 2. Francois Robert, Diccionario de Términos Filosóficos, Madrid, Acento Editorial, 1994. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 103 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile on principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, which reject violence and attempt to prevent conflicts by trying to attack their causes in order to solve problems by dialogue and negotiation, which guarantee full exercise by all of all their rights and provide the means for all to participate fully in the process of developing their society’. The concept of the Culture of Peace must not be banalized by generic invocations. When addressing the issue at the General Conference of UNESCO in October 1997, I stated: ‘Protests and declarations are not enough for countries to be credible; they must show their credibility with criteria that are not at all mysterious: Domestically, by creating conditions for proper functioning of free, democratic and peaceful societies. Internationally, by honouring principles and provisions of international law, fulfilling treaties, educating for peace, having true goodwill and sincerely looking to cooperate.’ Consequently, statements about being in favour of peace must be accompanied internationally by fulfilment of the above conditions and domestically by unequivocal demonstrations of respect for human rights, legitimate use of political or financial power, fighting against family violence, discrimination, exclusion and in favour of everyone participating in development. In sum, for peace to be achieved and consolidated the means must be found to consolidate democracy and law, inseparable concepts and conditions for peace, in both domestic and international circles of our global village. Never before has the awareness of historic need been so clear, the commitments made so specific and the desire of nations to make it happen so pressing. The concept of security The number of threats can be restricted or enlarged, depending on how wide-ranging one’s concept of security may be. A narrow vision of security restricts the military’s role to defending the nation’s sovereignty and repulsing direct aggressions against the state, for, in principle, ‘threats’ to security must be counteracted by defence or, in other words, by the option of using military force. Other problems require different types of response. The Declaration of Bariloche by Ministers of Defense of the Americas in October 1966, however, would seem to adhere to the tendency to increase the number of ‘threats’ to include, in addition to the above, such issues as the marginality of large 104 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 104 25/04/2003, 12:54 Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hugo Palma sectors, drug production and trafficking, terrorism, organized crime and violations of human rights. Others also consider such issues as irregular migrations, environment, lack or weakness of democratic institutions, technical and scientific backwardness, population explosion, racism, political or religious fundamentalism, subversion, etc., to be threats. These problems cause disquiet and adversely affect the normal course of economic, social and political life, but the responses do not indicate whether or not these are to be considered ‘threats’ within the ‘wide-ranging’ concept of security or ‘integral security’, and, as such, whether they are issues that must be dealt with by systems of defence, in other words, by the possible use of force which is security’s ultimate resource. In fact, there is a certain tendency to ‘militarize’ responses, which implies a growing participation of the defence sector and of the military in matters that are alien to their nature and function, including policies of development. On the other hand, one must understand that ‘new threats’ or ‘non-military threats’ form part of a development-underdevelopment agenda in which problems originating in poor countries not only compromise their own security but also regional and world security. This ‘southern threat’ is ambiguous and worrying, because it refers to problems originating in the continent itself that do not interest everyone in the same way, and because the generators of the threat are not states, as in classical cases, but rather groups of people or social, economic or political situations. There are several types of decentralized conflict in the globalized world. There is non-political urban violence associated with the social structure, as occurs in Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro and other towns. There is insurgent or subversive political violence, such as Shining Path in Peru, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and a series of movements in the Middle East, the Philippines and other places. Another form of political violence is linked to crime involving arms trafficking and money laundering. The relationship between organized international crime and the increase in local criminality is evident in these cases. Almost all these situations produce more or less massive violations of human rights. To further complicate matters, after the terrorist attacks on New York on 11 September, people are talking quite naturally about a ‘clash of civilizations’, to use Samuel Huntington’s phrase, where the Islamic world is in conflict with the West. Regardless of the difficulty of 105 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 105 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile accepting this type of proposal, one must be very aware of how dangerous current circumstances are. The highly predictable structured conflictivity of the Cold War has been replaced by a rather unpredictable, unstructured conflictivity. Furthermore, the classic concept of the security of states is giving way to an examination of concerns about the security of people. This includes new concepts of human security, democratic security and various other types of cooperative or shared security. Instead of the classic deterrent, more progressive states are considering cooperation and integration as central elements of their security systems. Hemispheric security In inter-American terms, the OAS has also taken up the concept of a culture of peace, coupling it with the need to promote it via education. The latter must be based on the Organization’s own principles, particularly those referring to achieving order based on peace and justice; strengthening cooperation; fulfilling obligations arising from treaties; the peaceful solution of disputes; the non-use of, or non-use of the threat to use, force; non-intervention and defence of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of its members; all subject to the conditions and within the framework of a democratic system. The situation of external peace in the Hemisphere, the absence of threats from outside the continent and the widespread presence of democratic governments have created a propitious climate for a new consideration of the meaning of security for states, societies and people. It is not easy, however, to discover security parameters in an association where different interests have resulted in evident asymmetry. One member has global strategic interests and commitments, while the others are basically concerned with their domestic situation and immediate surroundings, without implying that they are not interested in hemispheric security. ‘New’ treatment of these matters began in 1991 at the end of the Cold War. The Committee on Hemispheric Security is the official forum where governments express their ideas on these issues. Their results still do not compete with understandings in military areas. In fact, some countries have a hard time with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), the School of the Americas and InterAmerican Defense Board, which subsist despite being politically surpassed by the end of the Cold War. A hemispheric security format 106 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 106 25/04/2003, 12:54 Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hugo Palma should be designed taking into account the concerns of all countries. The Special Conference on Hemispheric Security planned for 2004 would be a good opportunity to bring these proposals to fruition. Latin American countries, however, are reluctant to study criteria among themselves for more informed, balanced treatment of hemispheric security issues. The Committee on Hemispheric Security studies measures to encourage trust and security, a new conceptualization of security, institutional aspects, transparency in military purchases, etc. American defence ministers have met in several conferences. Traditional conferences of commanders-in-chief of the armed forces continue to take place. Most of the activities are military and, even though improving military relations is convenient, it is not synonymous with increased security for all countries. A system of democratic, cooperative hemispheric security that aspires to consolidated peace must focus on cooperation and integration without threatening the sovereignty and independence of any state. It will include measures of mutual trust, arms control and limitations, disarmament, an institutional framework for hemispheric security, suitable participation by the United States and proper treatment in the OAS and the United Nations. Consequently, it does not entail creating a military alliance, nor a system of defence centred on the possible use of military force, but rather a system of security based on cooperation. Security in Latin America Without security, national viability does not exist and citizens are unprotected in the face of internal and external, new and old threats. In Latin America, however, the subject is socially unknown, academically marginal and politically concealed. As its urgency and significance are evident, the fact that it has not been given more attention is one of Latin America’s paradoxes. There has been very little thinking about security and defence issues in Latin America, other than specially prized geopolitical visions during military regimes, which led to increased spending and acquisitions and also to risks of conflict. The public is not interested in disarmament issues. Political parties only make vague references to peace and friendship and development combined with the need to ‘maintain a suitable system of defence’, a concept which few countries have managed 107 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 107 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile to clarify, even in its most generic aspects. The military consider that they are authorized to define images of security and defence, partly through default of society and politicians. The regions take tremendous delight in talking about common elements or identity, but this has not resulted in any action in the field of security, much less in that of defence. Progress in matters of political cooperation and regional integration do not automatically extend to military matters. Numerous political statements and understandings on security issues, building trust, reducing armaments and military spending and related subjects simply are not put into practice. The absence until recently of major proposals in matters of arms and disarmament is cause for concern. Treatment of security issues between Latin American countries has been basically bilateral. Relatively little has been done in ‘subregional’ terms and regional is understood as inter-American, where these and other issues show clear asymmetry. It is curious that issues which neighbours are unable to deal with between themselves are dealt with in this framework. Concepts of cooperative security, shared security and ‘non-offensive defence’ deserve greater interest from the region. The historical problem, which is still present, is the governance of complex societies with weak states, where the armed forces have always emerged as the most solid institution, with degrees of autonomy that border on independence, and have been considered as endowed with a transcendental mission. In these conditions, the question is not the ‘constitutional subordination’ of the armed forces to the government, which in practice has not worked, but rather the possibility of establishing an effective ‘democratic management’ of the armed forces. Hence, any approach to democratic security will have to be based on such elements as the rule of law, rapprochement of defence policies and foreign policies, studying authentic national security needs, priority strengthening of democratic institutions, overcoming ambiguities in civil-military relations, responsible formulation of roles and missions for the armed forces, non-offensive military deployment, complete observance of human rights, non-use of armed forces for political party ends, attention to economic conditions that presuppose that our countries will not return to the levels of military spending of a few years ago, and, finally, education for peace. Compared with other regions, Latin America seems to be a relatively stable, secure region. There is only one situation subsisting from the Cold War, and, in general, there is international peace. Some still 108 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 108 25/04/2003, 12:54 Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hugo Palma unresolved problems probably lack the potential for armed conflict. Paradoxically, Latin America is also an extremely violent zone because of such factors as subversion and terrorism, drug production and trafficking, common national and international crime, enormous illegal presence of individual arms; and its political volatility is cause for concern due to the relative fragility of new democracies and of some of the older ones. Security will also have to be reconceptualized for Latin America as a means of preserving and consolidating the democratic system. Defence, as the possibility of resorting legitimately to armed force, must concentrate on tasks related to its very raison d’être: protection in the face of armed aggression from abroad or armed internal threat against the democratic system, participation in United Nations peace missions and civil defence in the event of natural disasters. Legitimate use of force is clearly defined in international law and, consequently, its instruments, i.e. the armed forces, cannot have equivocal objectives such as ‘accomplishing national goals’. Democracy would increase the possibilities of peace and security with fewer or less expensive armed forces, but supported by society, based on conceptualizations of security that include appropriate definitions of the roles and missions of these armed forces. This definition implies a different way of perceiving and conceptualizing threats. Such a definition must be formulated politically, which means that security and defence must actually be treated as state policies and must be the object of public interest, academic study, parliamentary debate and political decisions. Those who are politically responsible, including the Council of Ministers, must have specific responsibilities in defining strategic visions and also in forming, composing, equipping, deploying and using the armed forces. That is how it works in democratic societies. The region’s security must be built on legal foundations and political conditions and must build real trust. These foundations could be: 1. General, hemispheric or Latin American, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, which has created a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, thereby allowing the region to enjoy a total absence of these weapons; the general process of democratization of the whole region after the military regimes which increased their forces, military spending and arms purchases and gave priority to ‘geopolitical’ schemes with constantly increasing options of open conflict; and the inter-American system and its legal obligations to maintain the peace and provide peaceful solutions to disputes, and which serves as a forum for discussing international security issues. 109 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 109 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile 2. Subregional, such as Central American efforts in the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America, which contains significant confidence-building measures and provisions for consolidating democratic regimes, respect for human rights, civil control of the military, etc.; Andean, such as the Declaration of Ayacucho, which represented a historical effort; Galápagos in 1989, which adopted resolutions regarding security issues and building trust; Cartagena which rejected all weapons of mass destruction. The presidents also approved general guidelines for a common foreign policy, strengthening the political nature of the process and regimes that build trust and security; Southern Cone, where the possibility of conflict between Argentina and Brazil and Argentina and Chile has been overcome; the latter two countries asked the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) for a method of comparing their military spending which they are about to implement. Finally, the presidents of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile proclaimed the area as a Zone of Peace free from chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Rio Group has also reached understandings in matters of security and confidencebuilding measures. 3. Bilateral, with a substantial number of agreements on confidencebuilding measures between several pairs of countries, with different levels of sophistication and compliance. Human security Human security is a key concept in the world today and forms part of the democratic system. Although recently stated, it was implicit to security proposals in more democratic, progressive societies. Canada has promoted it politically and academically and the OAS has addressed it. The concept is developed based on the changed nature of conflicts, which are now basically internal and not so much between states; and also on globalization, which gives rise to new forms of transnational violence and crime that compromise the individual security of people and nations. The human security vision questions the possibility of there being a secure state with insecure citizens, for security of the state is not an end in itself, disassociated from people’s security. In this, it is in line with the reappraisal of a individual’s worth, which results in the understanding that the state is at the service of people, and not the other way around. 110 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 110 25/04/2003, 12:54 Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hugo Palma Human security has two basic aspects which refer to chronic problems such as hunger, sickness and repression, but also to abrupt disruptions of daily living. The second refers to natural catastrophes or serious crises that can lead to human tragedies. From this point of view, human security can be threatened by economic, food, health, personal security, environmental, community or cultural and political problems, with elements of development having to be incorporated in order to achieve social peace. Human security must not be considered to be in conflict with state security. It is rather a different, superior way of interpreting security by redirecting its emphasis to the security needs of people, without losing sight of the fact that they also require guaranteed security in the face of, for example, the possibility of an external attack, but without exhausting their resources on it. Its operational aspects must refer to such issues as human rights and basic freedoms, the growing traffic and use of small arms, illicit production and trafficking in drugs, antipersonnel mines, corruption and impunity, widespread violence and contributing to achieving human development. The viability of the concept depends on the irreplaceable political support of democracy. At the 2000 General Assembly of the OAS in Windsor (Canada), the Canadian Chancellor stated: ‘All our citizens must be able to live in societies which reflect their interests, satisfy their legitimate aspirations and guarantee effective participation in the political, economic and social life of our countries. This is the cornerstone of human security.’ For his part, the Head of the United States Delegation considered that the concept involved an individual’s inherent dignity and values, from which principles derive the freedoms and rights of democracy, human rights and the responsibilities of the state in protecting its citizens. He asked, ‘Where does one start to define security and humanity? In a single word: democracy. Strong democratic institutions provide the only solid foundation for the complex architecture of human security. By strengthening institutions of justice and democracy and improving proper exercising of government, we protect human rights, improve public security and make it possible for all of our citizens to achieve a better life.’ Peaceful solutions to disputes Some think that conflicts do not occur because the ‘deterrent’ works. Nevertheless, there are other reasons why classical conflicts 111 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 111 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile do not proliferate – the weight of international law, cost/benefit ratio as the conflict can be very serious, greater economic interdependency, growth of a democratic institutional framework, possible deterioration of international image and international pressure against the conflict. The considerable number of international problems and differences that are resolved peacefully according to law go virtually unnoticed compared with the disputes that end in conflict and which, in contrast, receive enormous publicity. The relative absence of classical conflicts between states is not due, therefore, to a lack of problems, or necessarily to the effectiveness of deterrence. Theories of conflict and preparations for war can only be left behind by strict observance of international law and fulfilment of commitments assumed, by peaceful solutions to differences and the non-use of force, by political concert and diplomatic consultations, by economic, social and cultural integration, by policies and measures that build trust, by agreements for joint development of border areas, by neighbourhood committees, by military links and cooperation, and, finally, by defining the main points of security cooperation in the light of the needs of medium and small states and of regions and subregions. Domestically, so doing requires such elements as rule of law, political decisions, overcoming ambiguities in civil-military relations, responsible formulation of roles and missions for the armed forces, complete observance of human rights, non-use of armed forces for political party ends, ensuring that countries do not return to the levels of military spending of a few years ago, and education for peace. A qualitative change in the way in which political, social and academic leadership understand their responsibilities in matters of peace, security and development is also required. These new security conditions could require downsizing and restructuring the armed forces, which should be basically professional, avoiding any deformation of their role that could lead to unrestrained growth. The armed forces of the future must be professional, modern, efficient and capable of adapting to new roles and missions, but this does not mean that they should be excessively expensive or disproportionate. Large military forces do not guarantee the security or well-being of Latin American and Caribbean countries and they should rather adopt strategic visions promoting the stability of all countries. This will require developing and deepening measures of security and trust, fulfilling agreements on weapons that should be banned and, if possible, including more of them, maintaining a relative strategic balance, developing mutual 112 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 112 25/04/2003, 12:54 Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention ... Hugo Palma study, comparison and understanding of strategic doctrines and making them compatible. Strategic-military planning must be carried out on a deterrent-defensive basis, which presupposes doctrine, instruction, armament, equipment, logistics suitable for deterrence but unable to project military force outside the country’s territory; as well as discarding the possibility of supranational forces. Consequently, governments, institutions and social sectors may consider prompt implementation of proposals for spreading information about security and defence issues and training civilians, by dealing with these subjects on a bilateral level and in groups such as CAN, MERCOSUR and the Rio Group, by dealing with them politically as affairs of state and not exclusively of the government or the military, by supporting the United Nations Regional Disarmament and Development Centre and by promoting studies and research together with civilians both within a country and between countries. On the basis of current international peace, the task is to continue to develop forms of external and internal security that are democratic, politically defined, socially supported and economically cheap. Few developing regions, like Latin America, and especially South America, have the possibility of achieving greater security, development and well-being for their populations. Making this possibility a reality is an essentially political responsibility, but also an academic and social one. 113 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 113 25/04/2003, 12:54 CENTRAL AMERICA: INTEGRATION, SECURITY AND THE CRISIS IN THE REGIONAL SYSTEM LUIS GUILLERMO SOLÍS RIVERA 1 Introduction The dramatic transformations of the international system over the last three five-year periods have definitively changed the course of Central American history. This is not an exaggeration. Thanks to the peace talks, the authoritarian, intervened Central America of the 1980s gave way to a region where reason and pluralism have gradually taken root. After hundreds of thousands of deaths, the peoples of the Isthmus have finally opted for a new regional order, built on the symbol of democratic normality, whose ultimate aim is to achieve development with justice for the largest possible number. Central American integration is an imperative of the times. The experience of the Central American Common Market in the 1960s showed – both then and now – that such integration is profitable and, above all, capable of generating wealth for the region as a whole. It is 1. Professor of History and Political Science and Vice-Dean of the Social Science Faculty, University of Costa Rica. Director of the Programme ‘Conflicto, cooperación y medio ambiente en Centroamérica’ of the Foundation for Peace and Democracy (FUNPADEM). Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 115 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile true that some countries benefited more than others during the period and that the dividends of modernity did not permeate civil society. There were, however, irrefutable factors – such as the predominance of military dictatorships or anti-democratic civil governments – that inhibited these processes. Even so, the net profit was evident in the high indices of economic growth experienced by Central America from 1959, the year in which the General Treaty of Economic Integration was signed, and 1969, when a war between Honduras and El Salvador put a stop to it. Thanks to this ten-year experience, we learned that integration is a means to progress.2 The peace process, which culminated in the signing of the Esquipulas II agreements, added another no less important lesson to those learned from economic integration: integration is also a means of pacification. Thanks to that experience, Central America recognized the importance of also guaranteeing, building and defending a common space in politics, in the democratic arena. The opportunity had arisen to make new tracks, to rewrite a true system of regional integration.3 The integration that Central America needs and desires has changed, in these years of growing – although still insufficient – democratic normality, from an ideological aspiration rooted in the liberal principles of the nineteenth century to a true strategic need, without which it will be impossible to link up with the twenty-first-century world of global relations. Peace, democracy and development The 1987 Peace Plan was built on a virtuous trilogy – peace, democracy and development. More than a doctrinal position, these concepts embraced the convictions of the Central American presidents of the time that the future of the Isthmus would depend, in the long term, on a combination of at least four main facets: (a) social stability; (b) political legitimacy; (c) economic growth; and (d) respect for people’s self-determination. Needless to say, all these factors would only enjoy the possibility of success in an international environment that lent its support to Central America.4 2. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Director, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 3. Luis Gmo. Solís, in Luis Guillermo Solís and Fernando Naranjo, ‘Paz, integración y desarrollo: política exterior de la Administración Figueres Olsen (1994-1998), Heredia, EUNA/AGOCOI, 2000. 4. Luis Gmo. Solis, ‘Esguipulas: una experiencia centroamericana en resolución pacífica de conflictos’, in América Central: del conflicto a la negociación y el consenso, San José, UPAZlPAR, 1999. 116 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 116 25/04/2003, 12:54 Central America: Integration, Security ... Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera The success of the Peace Plan and its complex development over the following seven years showed the relevance of that approach. In fact, ceasefires led to free, clean elections, and these, in turn, to a gradual process of democratic institutionalization which included, significantly, a reduction in the size of armed forces and their subjection to civil, constitutionally elected authorities. Improved political conditions reactivated production and foreign investments, and this improved employment indices and growth of gross domestic product. On a regional level, governments decided to inject new spirit into the process of integration by creating the Central American Integration System (SICA) in 1991. Towards the end of 1996, when the peace talks concluded in Guatemala, everything seemed to indicate that Central America had inexorably changed for the better.5 The expectations generated by political normalization, however, were not fulfilled in any of the countries with the expected speed, nor to the expected depth. The greatest progress, none the less, occurred in the electoral field, but otherwise progress has been slow and very limited.6 Without going into details, I would like to point out the four main dysfunctions that explain the limits of democratic development in Central America in the last three lustrums. 1. Weakness of democracy: 7 The new Central American democracies have been unable to consolidate their democratic institutions, which still lack the necessary strength and roots to guarantee the existence of a true – and effective – democracy. This is particularly the case with regard to the administration of justice and the independence of the executive, the judiciary and the legislative. 2. Imperviousness of structures of domination:8 It has been very difficult to penetrate and successfully confront past schemes of domination. Except for progress made by the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, power in the other countries in the region continues to lie in the hands of more traditional political 5. Luis G. Solís, Centroamérica 2020: Los desafíos de sus relaciones externas, Hamburg, Instituto de Estudios lberoamericanos, 2000. 6. See State of the Nation Project (Estado de la región en desarrollo humano sostenible), San José, UNDP, 1999. 7. These problems could already be detected in the early 1990s and they have worsened. See Régine Steichen (comp.), Democracia y democratización en Centroamérica, San José, Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 1993. 8. Constantino Urcuyo (ed.), Partidos políticos y gobernabilidad en América Central, San José, UNDP, 1997. Also Carlos E. Ramos and Carlos Briones, Gas élites, San Salvador, FLACSO/USAID, 1999. 117 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 117 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile and economic sectors, including, in Nicaragua’s case, the historical leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). These sectors, currently allied among themselves, have inhibited the growth of alternative political sectors emerging from civil society by the use of, among other machinations, discriminatory electoral legislation and disloyal political practices. 3. Economic and social inequality :9 The predominance of extremely exclusive economic models has led poverty indices to rise consistently in the last decade. Reduction in actual investments in education, health and social housing, increase in unemployment and underemployment, worsening of the economic condition of female heads of families and the tremendous vulnerability of Central American populations to natural disasters have led to a significant decrease in quality of life and increased levels of both public and domestic violence. This has a direct impact on the quality of democracy, which cannot be optimum in an environment marked by injustice and poor income distribution. 4. Corruption and impunity:10 No Central American country has been free from serious problems of corruption, both public and private. This problem, which, although by no means new, has grown to dramatic proportions as channels of citizen information have continued to open up, is a constant challenge to the credibility of democratic institutions. This scandalous corruption is all the worse because it occurs in a context of almost total impunity and in the absence of any system of accountability. It is also aggravated by the existence of powerful networks of organized international crime that have penetrated police and military structures throughout the region. Renewed tension The situation in Central America is also worrying in another respect. The process of regional integration has been slowing down progressively since 1997. This slowdown is even more alarming because it has occurred in the midst of a resurgence of old border conflicts along all the region’s frontiers. This situation, aggravated by an overall deterioration in domestic scenarios of SICA member countries, has interrupted political dialogue between the region’s governments and, in one case at least – between Nicaragua and Honduras – it has seriously damaged the terms of trade of the Common Market. 9. State of the Region Project, op. cit. 10. On corruption and its mechanisms, see Mike Collier, Political Corruption in the Caribbean Basin: A Comparative Analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica, Miami, Fla., International University, 2000. 118 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 118 25/04/2003, 12:54 Central America: Integration, Security ... Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera Incidents that have aggravated regional tension abound. Recently, tension has grown prominently on two fronts: the border dispute between Honduras and Colombia with Nicaragua involving the delimitation of their territorial waters in the Caribbean Sea, and the signing of the Three Nations Declaration on 2 May 2000 between Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. In response to this latter conclave, which Hondurans considered to be an action aimed at isolating them in the region, the Honduran Foreign Ministry issued a communiqué rejecting the agreements that were supposedly detrimental to its sovereignty. In early August 2001, Honduran authorities announced the expulsion of two alleged Salvadoran ‘spies’ who acted as military advisors in their country’s embassy in Tegucigalpa. On 27 August 2001, the situation deteriorated after the bilateral meeting between the presidents of El Salvador and Nicaragua, in which, according to the joint declaration issued after the meeting, they tacitly ignored the rights granted to Honduras by the International Court of Law with regard to a territorial sea, a continental platform and an exclusive economic zone starting from the centre of the line marking the end of the Gulf of Fonseca in the Pacific Ocean. Once again Honduras considered that this meeting was an unfriendly act and that it deepened the misunderstandings resulting from the trilateral meeting in May. Meanwhile, further south, relations between Nicaragua and Costa Rica continue to be complicated. The dispute between both nations regarding free shipping on the San Juan River has not been settled. On the contrary, it has in fact been further complicated by an unusual decision handed down by the Constitutional Court of Costa Rica, which imposes on the Costa Rican Government an interpretation of the Cañas-Jerez Treaty with Nicaragua (signed in 1858) that, in practice, severely limits options for negotiation between the countries. Worse still, the revelation that the Costa Rican Government has included a US$1 million item in its budget for a possible lawsuit against Nicaragua at the International Court of Law at The Hague in 2002 has caused a burst of nationalism in Nicaragua, whose authorities have renewed threats – already fulfilled in the case of Honduras – to impose a ‘patriotic tax’ on Costa Rican products entering Nicaraguan territory, including those whose final destination is the rest of the Central American Common Market. All this is happening, unfortunately, at a time when there is dreadful news of famine in the east of Guatemala and the north of Nicaragua. These tragedies, which, in the former case, has caused forty-three 119 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 119 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile fatalities and, in the latter, is still being described by President Arnoldo Alemán as a ‘tall story’ being spread about by his political enemies, are a crushing reminder that democracy is far from being consolidated in Central America. Moreover, the Central American military are also being recycled. The days of assault troops and counter-insurgency battalions are over; strategies of laying waste the land and the paradigms of the National Security Doctrine are things of the past. Today, the armed forces are protectors of the environment, they pursue ‘invading species’ – not guerrillas – and the human security cause has become part of a new definition of their roles and duties in a democratic society. That is what emerges at least from the results of the conference on ‘Improving Co-operation between Security and the Environment in Central America and the Caribbean’, sponsored by the US Southern Command in San José, Costa Rica, two weeks ago. Paradoxically, this military ‘revival’ is taking place thanks to civilian efforts to demilitarize the concept of security. In fact, after the perfidious decade of the 1980s and with the advent of democracy, Latin America witnessed the emergence of a whole new range of definitions that went from ‘cooperative security’, ‘integral security’ and ‘alternative security’ in the Southern Cone to ‘democratic security’ in SICA and to the UNDP concept of ‘human security’. The result of this mélange is the military-environmentalist or the military-disastrologist; in any case, a military carrying letters of marque which feels that it has been authorized to participate actively in managing all areas of sustainable development. What was conceived fifteen years ago as the demilitarization of the concept of security, now threatens to end up militarizing the rest of the public policy agendas in Central America. Faced with this worrying new trend, voices have been raised saying that, as the presence of the armed forces in matters that are outside the typical tasks of national defence is inevitable, they should be restricted to providing support in specific emergency situations or natural disasters, while always being in a position of subordination to civil authorities. This position is even firmer where Central America is concerned, because of the existence of a three-nation military contingent devoted, for now, to mitigating natural disasters with help from the United States and answering, not to specialized civil regional institutions, but to a joint command of the Association of Central American Army Chiefs. 120 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 120 25/04/2003, 12:54 Central America: Integration, Security ... Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera Beyond any conspiracy speculation, this ‘revival’ of the Central American military is an important challenge for the region and a warning about the status of the democracies in the area. Few people believe that any kind of war could possibly break out among Central American nations. As a matter of fact, the possibility would be laughable were it not for the extraordinary suffering of the peoples in the region. Notwithstanding the above, even if there is no war between states, verifying the vulnerability of the process of integration and its negligent handling by the region’s governments is quite horrifying. It is difficult to be an optimist when faced with these facts and the scenario of despairing abandonment of the official institutions of SICA. Central America in the face of global security problems The presidents of Central America have agreed to join worldwide efforts against terrorism. Meeting in Honduras on 22 September 2001, the heads of state and the representative of the Prime Minister of Belize reiterated their willingness to fight against this scourge by ‘exchanging information about possible terrorist acts … reinforcing security on borders, at ports and airports in the region … coordinating actions that prevent Central American territories from being used by terrorist groups … and strengthening criminal legislation so that it classifies association with terrorist groups or people as a crime’, among other factors. They also ratified government support for a call by the OAS to deal with terrorism as a threat to democracy and hemispheric security, in the framework of the TIAR. The presidents’ declaration, widely disseminated in paid advertisements in the communications media of the Isthmus, included a declaration of solidarity with the American people and government and support for the thesis that the current situation ‘... must be handled in such a way that tolerance and good relations between different cultures, religions, ethnic groups and nations are maintained and augmented’.11 Central Americans were deliberately ambiguous regarding any possible military actions embarked upon by the United States in its campaign in what President George Bush termed ‘the first war of the 11. Declaration ‘Centroamérica unida contra el terrorismo’, in La Nación, 24 September 2001, p. 17. 121 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 121 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile twenty-first century’. They stressed their ‘firm decision to cooperate with and support the adoption and execution of measures aimed at punishing those responsible’, but that they would do so ‘… according to the rules of international law’. To this end and in order to bring to fruition the actions announced, the presidents called for meetings of the Security Committee, Directors of National Police Forces and the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CEFAC). Beyond the rhetorical symbolism of this declaration in the light of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, there are two ominous references that should not be allowed to go unnoticed. The first is an imprecise reference to ‘… all those political organizations that maintain relations with terrorist structures (must) suspend them immediately. These relations – added the presidents – are aimed at legitimizing international terrorism and can lead to the use of Central American territory as a point of support for terrorist acts’. The second is a ‘strong condemnation … of any link between groups or sectors of the Central American region and international terrorism’. This would seem to be addressed – although no names are mentioned – to organizations that took up arms against the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980s or which, as in the case of the FSLN, governed Nicaragua at the time. These groups were accused at that time of being linked to such terrorist organizations as the Basque ETA, the Irish Republican Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and al-Fatah, as well as to such countries as the Sudan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, among others, which allegedly supported those groups. In fact, in public declarations made on 1 October 2001, the President of Nicaragua denounced the danger for Nicaragua of more than 2,500 naturalized citizens who were naturalized during the government of former President Daniel Ortega (1981–90).12 The problem is that currently these former Central American insurgents and the FSLN have become powerful political parties and, at least in the case of El Salvador and Nicaragua, could be in power in the short term. In the light of this situation, the presidents’ declaration is at best worrying and at worst threatening. It is an example, as was foreseen, of using the concept of ‘terrorism’ with ulterior motives that in no way contributes to the common cause against terrorism in the world. 12. In La Nación, Monday 1 October 2001, p. 14. 122 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 122 25/04/2003, 12:54 Central America: Integration, Security ... Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera Final comments As a whole, the countries of the Central American Isthmus form a trade and economic bloc of some significance in the Hemisphere. Their combined gross domestic product in 1999 was US$58,000 million, with exports worth US$13,000 million and a per capita income of US$1700 per year.13 In this respect, the region’s prospects – if the enormous social problems and problems of governance that afflict it are resolved – should be positive. Otherwise, considered individually the countries in the region would have a hard time competing in a world of global markets. This is true for relatively more developed countries (Panama and Costa Rica), but even more dramatically true for Nicaragua and Honduras, whose viability, given current circumstances, is more than questionable in the medium and long term. This makes it extremely important to consolidate and expand the process of integration. Central America’s extreme dependence on its international surroundings is another of the most dominant features of the region’s history. Although in recent times this dependence has been centred on the presence of the United States as the hegemonic power, the fact is that Central America is also very vulnerable to its immediate geopolitical surroundings, including the larger countries from the Caribbean Basin. This sensitivity to external factors, which, though economic, is also expressed in political and security fields, is one of the biggest challenges that the Isthmus faces in the next few decades. Consequently, integration must not be a mere exercise in nostalgia, rhetoric, economics and even reactionism. Nostalgia and rhetoric, in so far as it attempts to beat the drum for the construction of a Central American Federation based on ungovernable democracies. Economics, if its sphere of actions is limited to economic growth and to establishing sophisticated ‘logistics corridors’ that guarantee a link with the world, but do not consider that growth can only be sustained by means of politically stable and inclusive societies. Reactionism, if there is no effective subjection of the armed forces to civil authority, if there is no respect for all human rights and if there is no explicit recognition that integration in itself does not solve all problems, nor guarantee fulfilment of all the aspirations of human development and security of all the people in the region. 13. Consultores Económicos y Financieros (CEFSA), Informe económico, 1999. 123 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 123 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Central American integration must be seen, then, as a gradual, progressive process solidly rooted in the commitment of its member countries and also of regionally organized civil society. This must take place in a context of increasing democratization, of increasingly more equal, productive regimes that are increasingly more responsible in their management of natural resources and geared more and more towards the common weal and solidarity. It would be totally unfair and wrong to ignore the tremendous progress made by Central America in political terms over the last decade. Despite its huge deficiencies, representative democracy has been gradually taking root on the Isthmus, whose history has always been dominated by military dictatorships, repression and violence. This is a tremendous achievement, especially if one compares the progress made in Central America with the prevailing situation in other parts of the world, which also experienced internal armed conflicts exacerbated by Cold War tensions in the 1980s. In this respect, one has to hope that things will improve and, for that to happen, some lines of thought will have to be considered and evaluated. First of all, it is essential that Central American governments should double their efforts against poverty and social exclusion. No democracy works in the midst of injustice and hunger. Pluralism does not flourish in an environment of poverty. The most important historical lesson that Central America should have learned from the political-military crisis of the 1980s is that poverty leads to violence. If Central America is unable to improve the quality of life of its people, it will end up dilapidating the democratic capital that it has acquired at so much cost over the last three lustrums.14 Secondly, any authoritarian temptation must be avoided. The increased social disquiet in Central America and the weakness of democracy mentioned above form an ideal breeding ground for reviving the repressive options to which traditional elites are prone. Even though diminished and relatively non-deliberative, Central American armed forces are still powerful economic and political poles that are reluctant to assume a subordinate role to the region’s civil authorities.15 Political elites, in turn, insist with increasing frequency on classifying the situation in their countries as ‘ungovernable’, a definition which could lead to a 14. Jorge Nowalski, Asimetrías económicas, laborales y sociales en Centroamérica: Desafíos y oportunidades, San José, CIDH, 2001. 15. Arnoldo Brenes and Kevin Casas, Soldados como empresarios: Los negocios de los militares en Centroamérica, San José, Fundación Arias/COSUDE, 1999. 124 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 124 25/04/2003, 12:54 Central America: Integration, Security ... Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera search for de facto solutions or, in any case, the search for firm-handed strategies, which far from containing social turmoil could increase it. Thirdly, although for now any efforts of this magnitude seem complex and useless, one must continue betting on the System for Central American Integration. Regardless of the weakness and manifest lack of ability of the SICA General Secretariat, and beyond the evident lack of prestige of the rest of the region’s institutional framework (with a few exceptions, including especially the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), the fact is that, without this basic instrument, it would be impossible to reactivate many of the region’s virtuous tendencies. Finally, the margins of participation of civil societies in decisionmaking processes must be expanded. It is commonly said that representative democracy has to evolve into participative democracy, in which traditional delegation of sovereignty goes hand in hand with growing levels of citizen action at national level and, more especially, at local level. The current make-up of representative democratic agencies throughout Central America (including the CC-SICA, of course) undoubtedly fails to guarantee popular representation or meet the aspirations of citizens. In order to increase participation, the state would have to be even further decentralized within the country (by strengthening local governments), and methods of control by citizens and accountability would have to be improved. Faced with this not very optimistic scenario, it must be said categorically that the problems of democracy can only be solved by more democracy, not less. Any attempt to the contrary weakens democracy and, ultimately, destroys it. Central America has already opted for democracy as its historical destiny; what remains now is to build it on a day-by-day basis. 125 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 125 25/04/2003, 12:54 THE ANDEAN REGION HUMAN SECURITY DYNAMIC 1 ARLENE B. TICKNER 2 ANN C. MASON 3 Introduction Increasingly characterized by spiralling levels of violence and social unrest, armed subversion, criminality, drug trafficking, poverty and deprivation, corruption and ingovernability, the Andean region has become the epicentre of hemispheric instability. While widely accepted that the Colombian crisis is the principal cause of this situation, such a state-based analysis is incomplete both conceptually and empirically. Focusing on how the internal problem in Colombia jeopardizes both its own national security as well as that of neighbouring states is certainly an important part of the story. Nevertheless, such an approach misses the complex, relational and multidimensional nature of the post-Cold War security predicament. The enmeshing of the domestic and international security domains calls for a more holistic, interdependent perspective of the security dynamic within the Andean region. Furthermore, Colombia´s high-profile crisis has acted to crowd out the consideration of other developments that also pose real risks to Andean security, and in particular, to the region´s inhabitants. 1. This article was supported by a grant for Research Collaboration in Conflict Zones by the Social Science Research Council’s Programme on Global Security and Cooperation. 2. Director, International Relations Center, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia and Professor, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 3. Director, Political Science Department, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 127 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile It has become increasingly recognized that the global security problematic involves a wide range of security referents: individuals; local, subregional and indigenous communities; civil society; subnational political, social and economic actors; and transnational groups, among others (Barry et al., 1998). Recent debates on human security are particularly relevant in this respect, given that they have had profound effects on the ways in which analysts and practitioners look at security problems, as well as the identification of those topics considered to be relevant security issues in the global context. While traditional statecentred definitions are limited to the management of external threats to the state, placing the individual at the epicentre of security discussions ‘… automatically enlarges the question of what is to be secured against, for individuals are jeopardized by a much wider range of issues than are the state or society’ (Terriff et al., 1999, p. 179). Human security also involves ‘… more than physical survival and the threats to it …’, while also raising ‘… the question of the positive dimension of security and security policy’ (McSweeney, 1999, p. 92). In consequence, the human security approach suggests that the prevention of threat at a global level, when people are the primary referents of security, requires a proactive definition of this problem. Since the end of the Cold War, significant juridical precedents have emerged that highlight a shift towards international recognition of individuals and human communities as legitimate subjects of international law and regulation (Gurtov, 1999). In addition to the emergence of the idea of humanitarian intervention within the United Nations system, the increasing institutionalization of universal human rights standards, the proposal to create the International Criminal Court, and expanding direct links between individuals and small social groups with international organizations, among others, attest to the ascendance of human security frameworks within global practices. In this paper, we attempt to provide a preliminary analysis of those factors affecting the security dynamic in the Andean region. Our discussion starts from the assumption that the state constitutes neither the exclusive, nor the most appropriate, unit of analysis to explore the complex security problems at play in the Andes. The security dynamic in the Andean region The Andean region security dynamic manifests itself in two fundamental ways: (a) characteristics that are shared by regional states 128 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 128 25/04/2003, 12:54 The Andean Region Human Security Dynamic Arlene B. Tickner / Ann C. Mason and societies, and that determine the ways in which the two interact; and (b) processes that spill across the entire region, irrespective of territorially defined borders. Both types of security problem are highly interdependent, and affect a wide variety of subjects, most notably the individual. Common traits exhibited by the countries of the region include state weakness/democratic deconsolidation; economic downturn/crisis; corruption; and the presence of global transnational agents. The Colombian conflict; US Andean policy; the drug and arms trade; as well as more positive dimensions of security, geared towards preventing such threats, potentially include global transnational agents and social resistance movements. State weakness/democratic deconsolidation It has become widely accepted that since the early 1990s Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela have all undergone varying degrees of weakening of state structures (Mason, 2000), and of the efficacy and credibility of their political institutions. In the Andes, the crisis of credibility and legitimacy of political institutions such as the legislature, executive, judiciary and traditional political parties, in combination with the increasingly contested nature of the political rules of the game, tended to undermine the institutional expression of the state, with which greater state weakening ensued.4 Irrespective of the root causes and specific manifestations of political crisis in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, in all these countries the ‘quality’ of democratic institutions is thus in question. As a result, social actors are increasingly forced to move outside of formal institutional channels in order to formulate demands, seek justice and resolve conflicts in this illiberal democratic setting. Corruption Corruption, although universal in scope, has normally been associated with the poor quality of public institutions, low levels of competition, social inequality, lack of acceptance of governmental authority, limited freedom of the press, among others (Lambsdorff, 1999). In all the countries of the Andean region corruption is widespread. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the persistence of institutionalized practices such as clientelism, the lack of horizontal 4. See Buzan (1991) for a comprehensive discussion of strong and weak states. 129 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 129 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile and vertical accountability, the general deterioration of political institutions, state weakness, and the presence of transnational criminal networks, most notably drug-trafficking organizations, also account for this situation. The countries mentioned rank amongst the most corrupt in Latin America and the world, according to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 2001. On a scale from zero (highly clean) to ten (highly corrupt), Peru was classified with a 4.1 corruption index (placing it at 44 out of 91 on the country ranking); Colombia 3.8 (50 ranking); Venezuela 2.8 (69 ranking); Ecuador 2.3 (79 ranking); and Bolivia 2.0 (84 ranking). Economic downturn/crisis Beginning in the 1990s, economic downturns and crises became commonplace in the Andean region. This state of affairs has been associated primarily (with the exception of Venezuela) with the implementation of neoliberal reform and the inability of the majority of the countries to effectively insert themselves into the global market. With the exception of Peru, all the countries in question experienced annual rates of growth below the Latin American average in the last decade. Downward shifts in the gross domestic product during this period were also dramatic in the cases of Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela (World Bank, 2000). More importantly, however, the overall results of structural reform in social and distributive terms have been dismal. One outcome has been a growth in unemployment, underemployment, and informal sector employment, which has combined with falling real wages (Smith and Korzeniewicz, 1997). Reform measures have also given rise to alarming levels of poverty and inequality: more than 50% of the population in the Andes lives below the poverty level. Presence of transnational actors The expanding influence and scope of international institutions, multilateral regimes, and global laws that reflect a worldwide shift from the state toward mechanisms of global governance directly affect regional dynamics within the Andean zone. Perhaps nowhere is this shift more evident than in the area of new global norms and institutions related to security. Not only is human security often prioritized over national security, but the globalization of security now means that humanitarian problems within the Andean states are considered a 130 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 130 25/04/2003, 12:54 The Andean Region Human Security Dynamic Arlene B. Tickner / Ann C. Mason legitimate concern of the international community, and that the responsibility for the provision of security now includes representatives of global civil society. This transformation in the security paradigm has resulted in high-profile visibility for the human rights crises of the last decade within Colombia and Peru, the swelling number of displaced persons who routinely cross international borders, the extraordinary levels of criminal violence, as well as indigenous rights platforms within the Andes. Growing external interest in the region in turn helps explain the dramatic increase of representatives of the United Nations system, international organizations, regional structures, transnational advocacy coalitions, and both local and international NGOs who work on human rights problems. The fusion of all the region’s national economies within one global economic structure has also prompted a growing regulatory role for multilateral economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which has implemented structural reform packages in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The ‘triumph’ of neoclassical economics in the periphery (Biersteker, 1992) highlights the tremendous weight that system-level determinants have acquired in the design of local economic strategy, while simultaneously reducing the autonomy of state and societal actors to develop autochthonous strategies for coping with domestic problems. Colombian conflict The intensification of the Colombian armed conflict since the mid1990s has led to increasing concern in neighbouring countries, as well as in the United States, over the potential spillover effects of this crisis, primarily in terms of national and regional instability and insecurity. Following United States approval of the Colombian aid package in mid2000, the militarization of neighbouring country borders in Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador (in addition to Brazil and Panama) intensified dramatically. The goal has been to confront the guerrilla incursions, and the flow of drug crops and displaced persons that the implementation of massive drug fumigation efforts in Southern Colombia have begun to produce. Clearly, such concerns have not been unfounded. In Venezuela, the kidnapping and extortion of inhabitants of the Colombian-Venezuelan border has become a common occurrence, while armed actors move freely between the two countries. Kidnappings, guerrilla and paramilitary incursions, and 131 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 131 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile the flow of illicit crops, and displaced persons fleeing from violence into Ecuador have also accentuated the permeable nature of that country’s border with its Colombian neighbour. These brief examples illustrate the increasingly transnational nature of the Colombian crisis, as well as the involvement of non-state referents such as migrant populations and armed groups. US Andean policy The ways in which the issue of illicit drugs has been addressed in countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia derive substantially from the US approach to this problem (Tickner, 2000). The definition of the drug traffic as a matter of US national security implies that other long-term objectives, including the strengthening of democratic institutions, the defence of human rights, the reduction of poverty and the preservation of the environment, tend to take a back seat to narcotics. In addition, the US ‘drug war’ logic fails to make a clear distinction between peasant coca growers and drug-trafficking organizations, to the extent that both are equally targeted as criminals. As a result, the crucial issue of economic, cultural and social subsistence faced by those marginalized social actors involved in the cultivation of coca is at best a secondary goal of the national drug control strategies in these countries. Although alternative development efforts have been implemented throughout the region, viable, sustainable substitutes for coca cultivation have not been forthcoming, as recurrent social protests in the coca-growing regions of both Bolivia and Colombia well indicate. Finally, US counter-narcotics strategies in the Andean countries that emphasize crop eradication have failed miserably in reducing the supply of illicit drugs on the US market. Rather, illicit crops have simply changed locale (from country to country, or among national regions), generating new forms of anomie between countries. A growing military role in the region has also had the effect of subordinating local security patterns to the security imperatives of the United States. The military presence in Colombia has been extended to Ecuador following an agreement facilitating the use of the Manta airforce base as a forward operating location, or FOL, for anti-drug reconnaissance missions. The repercussions of this situation are multifaceted, and include the aggravation of local tensions, as well as the imposition of US national security interests over regional concerns. 132 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 132 25/04/2003, 12:54 The Andean Region Human Security Dynamic Arlene B. Tickner / Ann C. Mason Drug and arms trade A major portion of the cultivation, processing and trafficking of illicit drugs are concentrated in the Andean countries, while illegal arms flows traverse the region. The effects of both black markets in terms of their capacity for increasing corruption, privatizing security and undermining governmental authority are well-known. Although the illicit arms trade in Latin America has been fuelled primarily by drug and insurgent-related activities, it also furnishes weapons to common criminal organizations, creating extremely complex dynamics that enmesh a wide variety of transnational actors in highly interdependent, multidimensional relations. The explosion of transnational criminal (and political) activity in the region in the last decade has been facilitated by the transformations normally associated with globalization, among them an increasingly fluid, global economy, revolutions in communications and transportation, and reductions in state sovereignty. As a result, transnational operations span territorially conceived borders as if they did not exist, while exhibiting a tremendous capacity for mobilizing resources in response to perceived earnings opportunities (Serrano, 2000, pp. 90–1). Such organizations or networks are drawn to weak state and/or illegitimate governmental settings that provide favourable conditions for their illegal activities, given high levels of corruptibility as well as constraints on the capacity to exercise traditional functions such as the administration of security and border control. Increasingly, arms for drugs transactions involving an array of state and non-state actors have become commonplace in the Andean region. In the Colombian case, the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the mid-1990s created a void that was filled in part by increasing involvement by the FARC and the paramilitaries in diverse aspects of the drug trade between 1994 and 1998. Since that time, drug revenues have become a significant source of financing for the armed activities of both groups (Rangel, 2000). In the case of the FARC, in addition to suspected links with international drug and terrorist organizations such as the Arellano Félix cartel of Mexico, and the IRA, there is mounting evidence that links this organization with the Russian mafia, which has become increasingly involved in global operations involving arms, drugs and money laundering (Bagley, 2001, p. 3). One smuggling ring operating between 1999 and 2000 involved large shipments of arms originating from the Russian black market in exchange for cocaine provided by the FARC for sale in Europe. In Jordan, used for refuelling on both routes, corrupt governmental 133 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 133 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile officials were normally bribed with cocaine. Brazilian drug baron Luiz Fernando Da Costa (alias Fernandinho), who was captured in Colombia in early 2001, was also discovered to have played an important intermediary role in these transactions (Bagley, 2001, pp. 11–12). The now infamous Peruvian-Jordanian arms scandal of mid-2000, in which National Intelligence Director Vladimiro Montesinos was also found to have been involved in arms sales to the FARC, clouds this picture even further. Social resistance movements The challenges posed by social movements to our understanding of Andean security dynamics transcend the immediate impact of popular protest in specific national settings. Specifically, social movement influence is related to: (a) the role of globalization and neoliberal reform in transforming the spaces in which protest and resistance take place; (b) the promotion of transnational linkages between social actors; and (c) the extent to which territorial notions of the state are undermined by these processes (Alvarez et al., 1998). The mid-1990s witnessed an upswing in social movement activity throughout Latin America, primarily in response to what was perceived as the negative effects of neoliberalism and globalization in the countries of the region, as well as the unresponsiveness of public authorities to the plight of the lower echelons of society (Seoane and Taddei, 2001). Although the Zapatista and Sin Tierra rural movements in Mexico and Brazil, respectively, became two of the most active and visible manifestations of resistance, popular protest, spearheaded in particular by peasant and indigenous movements in the Andean countries, also increased considerably. In the coca-producing areas of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, for example, social resistance has often been associated with United States counter-narcotics policy. In the case of Bolivia, wellorganized coca grower associations in the Chapare region have consistently opposed governmental efforts to eliminate coca production with massive national protests since the early 1990s. Between 1996 and 1997, unprecedented fumigation efforts in Southern Colombia also provoked violent social protests in the departments of Putumayo, Caquetá, Cauca and, mainly, Guaviare, that in turn allowed the FARC to strengthen its social base of support among those peasants involved in coca cultivation (Vargas, 1999). Such scenarios are frequently played out throughout the Andes, and express a variety of demands ranging from improved wages, increased prices for agricultural goods, and access to public services, among others. 134 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 134 25/04/2003, 12:54 The Andean Region Human Security Dynamic Arlene B. Tickner / Ann C. Mason In countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru (and to a lesser extent Colombia), the class differences underpinning social protest are made even more complex by the ethnic divisions inherent in these societies. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), for example, is one of the strongest, most well-organized indigenous movements in the whole of Latin America. The January 2000 coup that resulted in the ousting of Ecuadorean President Jamil Mahaud was orchestrated by indigenous groups led by CONAIE, along with members of the military. This was followed by a series of massive indigenous protests that led to the paralysis of Ecuador on several occasions during 2000–2001. Conclusions The discussion presented here has highlighted the fact that the security dynamic operating in the Andean region involves a wide array of referents, ranging from the state to the individual. However, not only do the Andean region, states, social groups and individuals experience different kinds of security, but threats in one security domain can result in increasing vulnerability in another. This is particularly clear in the case of state and individual security. As mentioned previously, a fundamental trait shared by the countries of the Andean region is state weakness. According to Brian Job (1992, pp. 17–18), the lack of legitimacy characteristic of weak states leads to an ‘insecurity dilemma’ which frequently circumvents the security of individual citizens. Given the highly contested nature of the state, the notion of ‘threat’ is derived primarily from domestic threats to the state’s own existence. As a result, the state’s instinct for selfpreservation reduces its institutional capacity to provide security and well-being for the population at large, leading to the increased vulnerability of society as a whole. One of the greatest obstacles to a comprehensive incorporation of the concept of human security at the policy level in the Andean region is this common assumption, derived primarily from the insecurity dilemma, that individual security is somehow counterproductive, rather than complementary, to the security of the state. 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Rosenau and ErnstOtto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, pp. 102–31. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. BUZAN, BARRY. 1991. People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers. BUZAN, BARRY; WAEVER OLE; DE WILDE JAAP . 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers. GURTOV, MEL. 1999. Global Politics in the Human Interest, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers. JOB , BRIAN L. 1992. The insecurity dilemma: National, regime and state securities in the Third World. In: Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma. National Security of Third World States, pp. 11–35. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers. LAMBSDORFF, JOHAN GRAF. 1999. Corruption in empirical research – a review. Transparency International Working Paper, November. MASON, ANN C. 2000. La crisis de seguridad en Colombia: Causas y consecuencias internacionales de un estado en vía de fracaso. Colombia internacional, Nos. 49–50, pp. 82–102. MCSWEENEY, BILL. 1999. Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. RANGEL, ALFREDO. 2000. Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia. Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 577–607. SEOANE, JOSÉ; TADDEI E MILIO. 2001. De Seattle a Porto Alegre. Pasado, presente y futuro del movimiento anti-mundialización neoliberal. In: José Seoane and Emilio Taddei (eds.), Resistencias mundiales. De Seattle a Porto Alegre, pp. 105–29. Buenos Aires, CLACSO. 136 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 136 25/04/2003, 12:54 The Andean Region Human Security Dynamic Arlene B. Tickner / Ann C. Mason S ERRANO , MÓNICA . 2000. Transnational crime in the Western Hemisphere. In: Jorge I. Domínguez (eds.), The Future of InterAmerican Relations, pp. 87–110. New York, Routledge. SMITH, W ILLIAM C.; KORZENIEWICZ, ROBERTO PATRICIO. 1997. Latin America and the second great transformation. In: William C. Smith and Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz (eds)., Politics, Social Change and Economic Restructuring in Latin America, pp. 1–20. Miami, NorthSouth Center. TERRIFF, TERRY ; C ROFT STUART; J AMES LUCY; M ORGAN PATRICK M. 1999. Security Studies Today. Cambridge, Policy Press. TICKNER, ARLENE B. 2000. Tensiones y consecuencias indeseables de la política exterior estadounidense en Colombia. Colombia internacional, Nos. 49–50, pp. 39–61. W ORLD BANK . 2000. World Development Report 2000/2001 . Washington, D.C., World Bank. 137 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 137 25/04/2003, 12:54 III. HUMAN SECURITY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 139 25/04/2003, 12:54 DEMOCRATIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA: REFLECTIONS ON BUILDING A CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN AND FOR DEMOCRACY 1 BERNARDO ARÉVALO DE LEÓN 2 I Considerations about the need for security concepts centred on people are not matters for theoretical speculation in Central America as a whole and Guatemala in particular, but rather unavoidable subjects on the public agenda of countries that are attempting to escape from cycles of political violence and systematic violations of human rights. Political conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century left a trail of destruction and death in Central American countries, which has made evident the need to build new concepts of security that prevent the aberration of states that sacrifice the security of their citizens in the interests of security understood as the survival of a given political order. Consequently, the agenda of the processes of pacification and democratization that took place during the final decades of the last century include revisions of concepts of national and regional security. 1. This paper is based on the article ‘De la teoría a la práctica: Reflexiones sobre la seguridad democrática’, in Bernardo Arévalo de León, Patricia González and Manolo Vela, Seguridad democrática en Guatemala: Desafíos de la transformación, FLACSOGuatemala, 2002. 2. Coordinator of the Security Studies Area, FLACSO-Guatemala. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 141 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile At a regional level, acknowledgement of the inoperability of traditional security frameworks in the new political context of the Isthmus gave rise to an effort to establish a region of ‘… peace, freedom, democracy and development …’ in Central America. This effort was made in the light of the new process of regional integration started by countries on the Isthmus after the successful process of pacification and democratization of Esquipulas (Guatemala). In a conscious attempt to establish a common conceptual reference, which would give regional backing to national processes of democratization, and just as ancient regional security structures served the counter-insurgency strategies of authoritarian states, this effort led in 1993 to the signing of the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (TMSD) in Central America. Its preamble clearly sets forth the new democratic orientation of state security polity: ‘The raison d’être of the Central American Model of Democratic Security lies in respect for, promotion and protection of human rights, so its provisions guarantee the security of Central American States and their citizens by creating conditions which allow them to develop personally, as families and socially in peace, freedom and democracy. It is based on strengthening civil authority, political pluralism, economic freedom, overcoming poverty and extreme poverty, promoting sustainable development, protecting consumers, the environment and cultural heritage, eradicating violence, corruption, impunity, terrorism, drug trafficking and arms trafficking, and establishing a reasonable balance of forces which takes into account each particular State’s domestic situation and the needs of Central American countries to cooperate in order to guarantee security.’ The effort to redefine concepts of security governing the state’s action in Guatemala was taken up in the process of political negotiations, which, in 1996, put an end to more than three decades of internal armed conflict. The Agreement to Strengthen Civil Power (AFPC) and Function of the Army in a Democracy, an integral part of the Peace Agreements, included an explicit reference to the need for new conceptual frameworks vis-à-vis security, by developing a concept of integral security which the signatories promised to institute as a governing principle of the Guatemalan state security policy; it is defined as follows: ‘Security is a wide-ranging concept that is not limited to protection by the Army against external armed threats or protection by Civil National Police against threats to law and order and internal security. The series of Guatemalan Peace Agreements sets forth the idea that firm, long- 142 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 142 25/04/2003, 12:54 Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections ... Bernardo Arévalo de León lasting peace requires respect for human rights and for the multi-ethnic, pluricultural and multilingual nature of the Guatemalan Nation, the country’s economic growth with social justice, social participation, conciliation of interests and strengthening of the democratic institutional framework’ … ‘Within this concept, citizen security and state security cannot be separated from citizens fully exercising their cultural, social, economic and political rights and duties. Social and economic imbalances, poverty and extreme poverty, social and political discrimination, corruption, among others, are factors of risk and direct threats against democratic coexistence, social peace and, therefore, the democratic constitutional order.’ Although qualifying terminology may differ – democratic or integral – and some nuances may be different, both efforts have the same aim: establishing a new conceptual reference for the security action of democratic states. This new concept is based on two basic principles. First of all, the conviction that, in a democratic regime, the state’s security interests cannot enter into conflict with, nor subordinate, the people’s security interests. Secondly, that the security conditions required by human beings for their growth and development, and that the state must procure in fulfilment of its basic functions, are not limited to traditional political and military issues, nor to problems of law and order, but rather incorporate all political, economic and social issues that ensure a life free from risk and concerns. This emphasis is the direct result of the experiences of societies subjected to arbitrary actions of political regimes whose main resource for maintaining law and order and their own existence, given the impossibility of developing any foundation of legitimacy as a result of their exclusive, authoritarian nature, was the coercive power of the state. When the implicit conflicts in establishing a political order, which subordinated the interests of the majority of society to those of a few of its sectors, gave rise to outbreaks of rebellious actions – some of them taking on the nature of insurrectionary movements – the state turned this power against its own citizens, with sometimes tragic consequences. The people’s security was sacrificed for the state’s security. This juxtaposition of interests between society and political institutions is obviously impossible in a democratic regime, whose governance rests on the legitimacy given by citizens to various legal and institutional expressions of a political order. From this point of view, establishing a democratic regime would be enough to substantially transform security’s conceptual frameworks – the logic of democratic 143 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 143 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile values and principles, injected into political and social actors, would permeate the respective policies. In the process of consolidating democracy, however, establishing electoral regimes and developing suitable legislation is simply one of the stages – essential but not sufficient – in a long process that entails attitudinal and structural changes that cannot be arranged by decree. The scope of these changes, particularly in societies such as Guatemala, which are acceding to democratic life for the first time or after a long authoritarian period, includes changing aspects of political culture that are never easy or quick. Meanwhile, in the context of formal democratic institutions, there may persist groups whose values, actors, attitudes, perceptions and institutions are rather more geared towards residual authoritarian elements. II Security is one of the spheres of action of public policies, which is more susceptible to harbouring this type of residual element. The centrality of the state security apparatus in authoritarian regimes and the subsequent need to establish clear doctrinal control over its operation generate a conceptual-institutional complex that does not fully and spontaneously adapt to democratic logic. This is not necessarily because there is an explicit attempt to resist, but because, faced with the lack of any clear conceptual and operational alternatives, ancient logics remain current through simple institutional inertia. From this point of view, conceptual definitions of security contained in the TMSD and AFPC are vitally important. Reintegrating the human being as the ultimate aim of state security action and the subsequent broadening of its agenda to incorporate threats to the security of those previously relegated or simply ignored are the essential foundations for renewed security polity by the state. But they are only the foundations and, unless accompanied by the corresponding institutional infrastructure, are not enough to extirpate all residual authoritarian elements, nor, consequently, to exert any real influence on the conditions of security of the country’s population. Guatemala will have to overcome two obstacles in this effort at institutional rebuilding: the conceptual definition of the demarcation between security and development resulting from the incorporation of new issues into the security agenda, and the weakness of the state’s ability to design and implement public policies, which is explained by the very nature of the process of democratic consolidation. 144 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 144 25/04/2003, 12:54 Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections ... Bernardo Arévalo de León It is obvious, in the first case, that the incorporation of issues such as sustainable development, poverty and extreme poverty, protection of cultural heritage (TMSD), or social and economic imbalances, social and political discrimination and corruption (AFPC), generates an overlap between security and development agendas, which is not resolved in either of the two agreements. These agreements do not establish any institutional-operational mechanisms, over and above the political declaration of new principles and guidelines, which might serve to clearly mark the boundary between these two aspects, thus they concentrate their policy efforts on security agencies devoted to traditional matters – defence, domestic security, law and order. Consequently, the intention of generating a different, wide-ranging and integrating public security polity remains incomplete. The difficulty in transcending mere declarations makes the security agenda vague and uncertain and restricts the possibility of sectoral policies reflecting the wide-ranging, integrating spirit of policy declarations; in the best of cases, basic principles to protect human rights are included in security apparatus regulations (which in itself is a significant step forward), but always within the context of traditional security issues. In the second case, we must remember that the process of democratic consolidation in Guatemala is taking place in a context marked by two critical traits: an institutionally weak state, with serious limitations in terms of human and material resources, and a political class most of whom find it difficult to transcend cliental, electioneering attitudes rooted in the façade of democracy of authoritarian regimes. This situation blocks the formation of clear, coherent public policies invested with a medium- and long-term vision that transcends personal polity and expresses the conceptual clarity, political will and operational ability required by any public sector polity in the context of institutional rebuilding. This is a critical need in security terms, not just because the lack of a clear sectoral policy allows residual authoritarian elements that could be manifested in various different aspects of the respective public sector polity to remain, but also because the continued presence of institutional structures that have not been renewed in depth is a potential threat to efforts to consolidate the democratic regime. In fact, the continued existence of a largely authoritarian political culture at all levels of society creates the risk of state actors or civil society resorting to quick, forceful solutions typical of authoritarian thinking, when faced with political or security crises. As a result of the structural weakness of the State of Guatemala to perform basic functions of development, integration and protection in a manner that 145 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 145 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile meets the expectations of the population, state institutions have difficulty legitimizing themselves in the public eye. This combination of unsatisfied expectations and precarious legitimacy generates problems of governance, which reveal themselves, on the one hand, in anomic expressions such as the defenestration of municipal officers and lynchings, and, on the other, in authoritarian-type demands such as militarizing public security or the more or less veiled invitation for military intervention during the current political crisis. In this type of scenario, reforming security institutions according to new conceptual frameworks not only improves sectoral polity but also contributes directly to the possibilities of political consolidation. After all, the best guarantee for human security lies in maintaining the framework of democratic rights and freedoms. III Guatemala’s main challenge, therefore, is to translate declared principles of democratic security into clear policies endowed with the necessary instruments for security polity to operate fully. In order to do so, it must start by clearly establishing the demarcation line between security and development agendas. The first objective must obviously be to define clearly what we mean when we refer to the concept of security, especially in the light of the emergence of alternative versions or similar but not identical descriptions, which has led to ambiguities and confusion. In this respect, the distinction must first of all be made between a restricted concept of security and a wide-ranging one. This distinction establishes two extremes in a continuum which runs from the concept of security centred on strategic international problems of a politicalmilitary nature – which restricts the security agenda to threats against territorial integrity and political sovereignty – to the concept of security which incorporates the various cultural, social, economic and political conditions required in order to guarantee the well-being of people and society. Within this continuum, each state identifies a specific concept expressed in an operational legal-institutional model, which responds to the specific conditions of its general context – political, social, economic, international, etc. Guatemala has had to adopt a wide-ranging concept of security, which includes in its agenda a series of elements that put the economic, political and social well-being of Guatemalan society at risk. More than 146 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 146 25/04/2003, 12:54 Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections ... Bernardo Arévalo de León mere rhetoric, this reformulation is required in order to counteract state-centred, militarist interpretations born in the context of a counter-insurgency state and re-establish, in clear, unequivocal terms, that the priority good that the security action of the state must defend is human beings. In the context of an underdeveloped nation such as ours, however, this expansion almost means an overlap between security and development agendas. As a result of the state’s historic inability to implement efficient public policies that take care of the population’s needs in terms of their well-being – because of a lack of political will or of material and non-material means – the country’s living conditions are such that most of the population is exposed on a daily basis to risks that severely erode levels of well-being: morbidity and mortality, malnutrition and hunger, unemployment and poverty, common violence and organized crime, degradation of the environment and pollution, among others. The primary task of political authorities in a developing state is to overcome these weaknesses in society: health policies to solve the problems of morbidity and mortality; economic and financial, agricultural and labour, employment and social security policies to take care of the problems of poverty and unemployment, etc. Consequently, by establishing that the task of security is to create the necessary conditions for overcoming the various dangers that threaten the quality of life of the population, a complete overlap is created between development and security – a single agenda. The effects are clearly negative for both development and security. For the former, conceptualizing the solution of weaknesses caused by underdevelopment as a problem of security makes the process of designing and institutionalizing public sector policies more difficult. As security is easily identified with emergency or urgency, and emergency situations require extraordinary measures, the development and security overlap means ascribing the characteristics of an exceptional situation, implicit in all emergencies, to development. And the danger of considering extensive issues from the country’s public agenda as exceptions is obvious, particularly when low levels of political institutionalization, and the continued existence of elements from an authoritarian political culture, mean that there is a lack of proper structures of public control and social auditing. Situations can quickly and easily arise in which the ‘exceptional nature’ of problems of development justifies deferring new democratic regulations in the interests of efficiency and security. Making exceptionality a routine mechanism of government is fatal for 147 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 147 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile consolidating the democratic rule of law – from the continued existence of due process of law or administrative decrees for proper administration of resources, to collective or individual political guarantees. Furthermore, making an issue part of the security agenda means giving it priority in the state’s political agenda, which is evidenced in mobilizing extraordinary resources in order to immediately deal with a problem that looms as a threat. From this point of view, mutually identifying development and security would be profitable in so far as it served to prioritize the importance of improving prevailing conditions of underdevelopment and social, political and economic backwardness. If the security agenda overlaps with the development one, however – if every situation of vulnerability of the population is classified as a threat – the effect is to prioritize the whole series of state policies, which means that the very idea of setting priorities as a mechanism for mobilizing material and non-material resources loses force. If everything is urgent, then nothing is. Consequently, the effect of the security agenda as a mechanism for mobilizing resources in an extraordinary manner is nil. Finally, mutually identifying the development agenda with the security agenda places us in a conceptual framework that is dangerously close to the National Security Doctrine that fed the security concepts of a counter-insurgency state, although from diametrically opposed points of origin. In fact, where that doctrine was concerned, polity – the series of state actions in various areas of national life – was an element within the strategy whereby the state pursued goals arising from its concept of the nation as a meta-historical project and within the framework of a defensive concept – Permanent National Objectives. Security became the state’s supreme goal. The need to guarantee the security of these objectives meant, in practice, that polity was subordinated as simply another tool in the state’s strategy motivated primarily by state security interests that were very often juxtaposed to the security interests of the population as a whole. From the point of view of democratic security, mutually identifying the objectives of development policies with the objectives of security policies would have similar effects. This would not, however, be as a result of a meta-historic project, but rather as an expression of a democratic political pact; and the state’s political structures would not be the core of the problem, but rather human beings and society would be the focus of attention. Identifying development as the objective of security would mean subordinating one – development – 148 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 148 25/04/2003, 12:54 Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections ... Bernardo Arévalo de León to the other – security. This subordination would occur as a result of the connotations of urgency and emergency associated with security problems: the implicit cost of this type of situation forces the use of exceptional measures, which relegate regular procedures. Once again, in contexts where democratic values have still not been deeply rooted, this subordination can give rise to actions that ultimately end up threatening the consolidation of the democratic system. Hence the need to establish a clear distinction between security and development, which restores each one’s conceptual and operational specificity in the interests of consolidating democratic rule of law. An initial element in establishing this distinction is the difference between positive security and negative security. Positive security is the ability to continue or maintain a positive relationship. Negative security implies the ability to terminate or stop a negative relationship. Within the conceptual framework of democratic security or integral security, positive security is the ability of the state to generate conditions that mitigate vulnerabilities affecting society and threatening general well-being. Its logic is to identify opportunities and potentials, which maximize available material and non-material resources; this is the positive relationship. Negative security is the ability of the state to contain or detain specific threats against these conditions that affect society’s well-being. Its logic is to identify dangers and threats against efforts to generate well-being; this is the negative relationship. The point of reference for both concepts must not be an ideal security/well-being situation, but obviously the specific situation of vulnerability to which the population is exposed at any given moment. In other words, identification of existing dangers and threats must be based on real, not potential, living conditions of a population and on its real, not ideal, nature. Although the security/development overlap in terms of positive security is not solved, confusion in terms of negative security vanishes. In fact, the action of state development policies is positive by definition, because it attempts to generate conditions of well-being for the population. Even though the objective of some public policies may be identified as fighting a specific calamity – extreme poverty or infant mortality, for example – its sense is to develop a positive relationship which overcomes existing vulnerability. From this point of view, in countries whose conditions of development expose the population to a wide range of vulnerabilities, a positive security policy would be almost the same as a development policy. 149 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 149 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In contrast, a condition of negative security is given by threats looming over the conditions of well-being of the population. Consequently, the action of the state in this respect must identify the negative relationships which are acting against existing vulnerabilities – dangers and threats – and define measures to counteract them. State policy in this regard would, therefore, be different to development policy to the extent that it is not geared towards generating conditions of well-being, but rather towards containing any dangers or threats against these conditions. A further distinction will allow us to further confine the sphere of action of security issues – the difference between conditions or situations of security and of insecurity. Conditions of security are those in which dangers or threats against well-being are stabilized, neutralized or counteracted, often via state action. Conditions of insecurity are those in which there are dangers or threats against which there are no effective countermeasures available. So what classifies a situation as security or insecurity is not the presence of danger or threat – much less of vulnerabilities, which is the starting point for so many analyses – but rather the presence or absence of an effective policy aimed at containing or detaining them. If we apply the distinction between positive and negative security from this point of view, positive security tries to generate conditions of security by developing measures to effectively eliminate vulnerabilities, dangers and threats to which society and its institutions might be exposed. Once again, there is complete overlap with development. In fact, positive security would be that part of development that deals with situations of vulnerability affecting the well-being of society and its institutions. By way of example, in so far as they attempt to reduce mortality and morbidity indices of large sectors of the population – an evident vulnerability – mother-child health policies would in turn form part of a positive security policy and, therefore, of the development policy. In contrast, negative security attempts to counteract all those dangers and threats which at any given moment surpass the state’s ability to protect the security of society and its institutions. Therefore, its relationship with development would be complementary. Development policies would include all those issues for which measures are adopted that promote conditions of security in an attempt to establish a positive relationship. Policies to resolve negative security would include all those issues for which policies implemented within the framework of development policies do not envisage suitable measures. 150 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 150 25/04/2003, 12:54 Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections ... Bernardo Arévalo de León For practical purposes, the term democratic or integral security should be used exclusively to indicate the condition of well-being generated thanks to the action of development of the state, designating specific measures for boosting development as development policies. The term security policies should be confined to the series of actions aimed at counteracting dangers and threats looming over conditions of vulnerability of society and its institutions. The next step would be to clearly establish what issues belong to which of the two polities. The specificity of a security policy is expressed unequivocally in a list of subjects or issues that it seeks to tackle and resolve. This is what is normally referred to as a country’s security agenda. Based on the parameters that we have established so far, we could describe the security agenda as the series of dangers and threats against the well-being of people, society and its political institutions, whose effects must be controlled and counteracted, and which are not provided for in development policies. In fact, this distinction allows us to differentiate between situations of risk that the state attempts to solve by procuring conditions of positive security within the framework of its regular public policies and those resulting from threats against which there are no concrete measures in place and which surpass the latter’s sphere of action. In fact, the challenge of defining new operational concepts of security lies in this area. We must remember that one of the dangers of enlarging the concept of security is the confusion between spheres of action of security policy and development policy. In so far as the term security often implies a level of state mobilization that implies exceptional conditions, one of the objectives must obviously be to reduce as much as possible the series of issues dealt with within the framework of a security agenda. This is particularly so when, as we have stated, issues for which the state does not have a suitable and/or planned response form part of this agenda. In fact, one of the objectives of public action must be to ‘normalize’ security issues – transfer problems or issues from the security policy sphere of action, which deals in emergencies and exceptions, to the development policy sphere of action, which deals in regularity and regulations. This would be an indication of the extent to which state action that has been effective in neutralizing various threats and policies aimed at generating conditions of positive security has been developed. Therefore, the objective of the state security policy must be to keep to a minimum the number of problems dealt with from the security agenda and the time it takes to deal with an emerging problem within the framework of security policies. For all 151 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 151 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile that, a reduced security agenda begins by defining the criteria whereby a situation of risk or threat is classified to be included in the urgent, exceptional regime implicit in the agenda. Issues traditionally included in security agendas are those linked to problems of survival, those whose existence poses an existential threat to the state, which justifies using extraordinary measures to deal with them. By adapting categories set up for international security problems to the problems of democratic security, the following levels could be tentatively established: (a) Existential problems: those threatening the survival of the state or any of its components – society, territory, political system – in the short term. (b) Vital problems: those threatening the viability of the state or any of its components in the long term. (c) Major problems: those which, if not properly corrected by the state, could become vital problems. (d) Minor problems: those which affect the well-being of the population, but which in terms of magnitude, sphere of action or effects, are not a major threat. Major and minor problems obviously do not belong at the level of urgency and exceptionality of the security agenda, but rather to the conditions of positive security that must be generated via development policies. This is precisely the challenge of national development; if not dealt with, the country’s health conditions – to take an example – could deteriorate to the extent that they threaten the survival of the population, political stability, economic viability, etc. But they must be dealt with within the positive relationship generated between a problem and its solution in the specific public policies that the state has to draw up in fulfilment of its basic functions, not in the security agenda’s sphere of exceptionality. Poverty is not an issue for the security agenda; neither are unemployment, insalubrity, malnutrition, degradation of the environment. Not because they are not important per se or even vital at an individual level – as are insalubrity or malnutrition – but because, in underdeveloped countries such as ours, these are given situations that must be dealt with within the framework of regular public policies. The same is true of vital problems. Although the magnitude of these problems makes them a threat to the viability of the state, to the extent they are posed as problems with a long-term effect, they obviously do not have the sense of emergency that justifies resorting to the exceptionality implicit in a security agenda. Consequently, vital 152 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 152 25/04/2003, 12:54 Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections ... Bernardo Arévalo de León problems, regardless of how serious they are, must be dealt with within the framework of the state’s regular policies; in other words, government authorities must include them as part of the objectives of regular public policies with a view to controlling them initially so that they do not become an existential threat, and then counteracting and defeating them. In fact, the capacity of the state is an essential element in this definition of the nature of a problem: the lack or inefficiency of suitable state measures converts a major problem into a vital one, or even an existential one. And vice versa: an efficient security policy converts an existential problem into a vital one, and a suitable public policy can even convert it into a major or minor one. Therefore, the issues on a security agenda are obviously those of an existential nature, which cannot be dealt with within the framework of regular state policies. But, what classifies a problem to be included on a security agenda with its characteristic urgency and exceptionality? Traditional security points of view, and particularly international security points of view, restricted this to political-military spheres – military threats against territorial integrity or national sovereignty. In fact, the international political context of the second half of the twentieth century led to security being focused in strictly political-military terms. But, within a framework of a wide-ranging, integral definition of democratic security, how are existential or vital threats that threaten human beings, society or its political institutions to be identified? Are there any existential or vital threats in the economic sphere? What are they? And in social, political, environmental spheres, etc.? Two basic concepts need to be defined in order to outline an answer to these questions – securitization and threshold. Securitization is the action of projecting policy beyond established rules, enshrining an issue as a special type of policy or over and above the policy. This is based on the concept that any public issue can be located in a spectrum that runs from non-political (that which fails to attract the attention of the state and does not become a subject of public debate and decision) to political (that which falls within the sphere of public policies, requiring decisions and/or allocation of resources by levels of government) to securitized (that which constitutes an existential or vital threat and, therefore, requires emergency measures beyond the limits of regular political procedures). Within the two spheres where it must act (the latter two), the state operates by means of specific measures – in the political sphere, via its development policy and agenda, which is the sum of the various sectors’ public policies; in the securitized sphere, via its security policy and agenda. 153 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 153 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Effective securitization of an issue implies three basic stages: (a) identifying an existential threat; (b) identifying an emergency action; and (c) freeing that action from the restraints imposed by the regular set of regulations. There are issues in which the type of threat – its recurrence, persistence, scope – causes the sense of urgency and exceptionality to be institutionalized, with that being understood to refer to the process whereby the threat is ‘routined’ within a precise legal-institutional framework. The most obvious case is that of military threats. Even if the threats are potential, the scope of military aggression elicits perceptions of security and exceptionality that lead to securitizing national defence issues a priori. Similarly, fighting various forms of criminality – common or organized – that affect society involves measures of urgency and exceptionality that place public security permanently on the state’s security agenda. Finally, the magnitude of the destruction associated with given natural phenomena (earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, etc.), and the type of response required to cope with their effects, also implies that they should be dealt with by the state in a normal fashion in terms of emergency policies. From the point of view of an expanded agenda, however, there are a series of issues which are normally dealt with as part of regular public policies but which, in given circumstances, can become existential threats. This is the case of ad hoc securitization, where securitization of a specific issue – social, environmental, political – based on critical connotations assumed at a given moment can transfer it from the sphere of action of regular institutional policies to that of security policies. The concept of threshold is vitally important in these cases. Threshold defines the limit at which an issue passes from being dealt with within the framework of regular state political institutions to being dealt with by security policies, from the development agenda to the security agenda. It is the space that the securitization process must traverse. Where securitization has been institutionalized, thresholds do not apply; the whole issue is dealt with regularly within the framework of exceptionality and urgency of security policies. Where issues are normally dealt with by regular public policies, however, the importance of an issue passing from one sphere of action to the other, and who makes the decision, is vital. It implies the existence of suitable criteria for each sphere of action, as well as clearly identified institutional agents who take on the responsibility of securitizing an issue. The importance of clearly identifying who is institutionally responsible arises from the fact that it is impossible to establish the 154 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 154 25/04/2003, 12:54 Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections ... Bernardo Arévalo de León threshold for each issue a priori. First of all, because the specific nature of the issue – political, social, economic, environmental – prevents generic universally applicable criteria from being established: the threshold justifying the transfer of an economic issue from the regular public policy agenda to that of security can be so high that makes its application quite improbable; but, in the case of a political issue linked to democratic governance, the threshold can be relatively low. Secondly, because the nature of an existential threat does not arise so much from the nature of the event itself as from the various social actors’ perceptions of that event. Security as social building is a process that results from the intersubjectivity of relevant actors at any given moment; what is and what is not an existential threat is not discovered; it is defined. IV The process of institutional building required to handle security and development policies as different but integrated spheres of public action based on a unifying concept of democratic or integral security obviously will not be easy. Efforts at institutional building in a country that is still suffering the consequences of a long, complex and violent political crisis that has undermined its human, social, economic and political resources, face serious problems. This issue does not only affect the security sector; it also has an adverse effect on the state’s overall ability to generate coherent policies that allow it to overcome current weaknesses and, therefore, it also limits the state’s ability to deal with danger and mitigate vulnerabilities to which its population is subject because of the effects of shamefully low levels of human development. The road is still open, however. Both the TMSD and the AFPC are useful conceptual references and, if they are developed into proper policies, they might substantially improve the polity of the state in this respect. The necessary steps for new concepts of security to transcend mere declarations of intent and become public polity centred on human beings and based on democratic values include fine-tuning terminological concepts, making an effective separation between agendas, institutionalizing operational mechanisms and developing public polity within a framework of principles of responsibility and transparency that are required by democracy. 155 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 155 25/04/2003, 12:54 COLOMBIA: MORE HUMAN INSECURITY, LESS REGIONAL SECURITY JUAN GABRIEL TOKATLIAN 1 Introduction The Andean region is currently suffering from a profound crisis with unpredictable consequences. Colombia is just the tip of an enormous iceberg of cumulative problems that have not been solved. In fact, since the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century the Andes has become the major focus of South American instability and concern. Politically, the self-imposed coup d’état of Alberto Fujimori in Peru, the constitutional fall of Carlos A. Pérez in Venezuela, the political exit of Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador, the quasi debacle of Ernesto Samper in Colombia and the coming into power of former coup participant Hugo Banzer in Bolivia, stand out. The social disaster that led to the de facto overthrow of Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador, the authoritarian ambition of kleptocracy established by Fujimori in Peru, the delicate institutional uncertainty generated by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the growing problems of all kinds in Bolivia and the explosive situation faced by Andrés Pastrana in Colombia are eloquent indicators that the Andes is in the midst of a storm. 1. Director of Political Science and International Relations at the Department of Humanities of the Universidad de San Andrés, Victoria, Argentina. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 157 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Militarily, the largest border conflict in the Hemisphere took place between Ecuador and Peru, and the border experiencing the greatest degree of tension is that of Colombia-Venezuela. The Andean zone is the region of the Americas that most systematically violates human rights, with Colombia and Peru being the most dramatic cases. Growing, processing and trafficking of coca leaf are concentrated in the Andes region, and the five countries (together with Mexico) are key actors in the illicit narcotics business. These are also some of the countries with the highest levels of corruption in the world, especially Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Andean countries demonstrate high degrees of environmental degradation, especially in the area of the Amazon basin that they share with Brazil. In socio-economic terms, all Andean nations have alarming rates of unemployment, marginality, poverty and insecurity with low quality of life indicators, poor, volatile growth, heavy concentration of income and paltry investments. Partial collapse of the state has been exacerbated in the last decade in all five countries, although to varying degrees. Furthermore, in the post-Cold War scenario, the Andean region is the area (particularly Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) where the military have maintained greater incidence and influence in politics and business. Likewise, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) continues to be increasingly more withdrawn. Finally, the Andean world is increasingly dependent on Washington in material and political matters, and increasingly further away from the Southern Cone in cultural and diplomatic issues. The sphere of influence2 of the United States is moving from its traditional mare nostrum – the extensive Caribbean Basin – and projecting itself with ever-increasing strength into the Andean corner of the South American continent. In sum, the whole Andean region is suffering simultaneously from different types of acute problems. Various social conflicts tend to increase in the region, and the democratic regimes are very obviously unable to process their citizens’ age-old, unmet demands. In this context, Colombia is undoubtedly the most catastrophic case. Colombia stands out for the magnitude of its crisis, but it is by no means an isolated, solitary example. The whole Andean region is living in conditions of ungovernability, which forebodes dangerous institutional cataclysms. 2. On the notion of sphere of influence in international politics, see, among others, Paul E. Keal, ‘Contemporary understanding about spheres of influence’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1983. 158 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 158 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian Thus, the way in which the Colombian crisis is dealt with will serve as a potential model for foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Hemisphere. Likewise, how and how much area (Latin America), region (South America) or zone (Southern Cone) contribute to resolving the issue are at stake. The most difficult example – Colombia – must be tackled, not avoided. Only by so doing will we be able to see whether the diplomacy of our countries has matured sufficiently to cope with the challenges of this new century with a greater degree of relative autonomy. Nature of the war The armed conflict in Colombia can be analysed from different perspectives. Here, I would like to emphasize two of them: one from the perspective of the state and the other from the perspective of the war itself. For a growing number of foreign and domestic analysts, this Andean country is in the process of suffering from the collapse of the state, comparable to the one that caused the experience known simply as the Violence, but rather more unusual and complex. According to the expression coined by Oquist regarding the ‘partial collapse of the (Colombian) State’ in the 1940s and 1950s, the ‘specific tie-ins’ – internal, not exogenous – that characterized it were (a) the ‘breakdown of established political institutions’, (b) the ‘loss of legitimacy of the state’, (c) the ‘contradictions within the state’s armed machinery’ and (d) the ‘physical absence of the state.’3 Except for the third factor and in spite of the reforms introduced in the 1991 Constitution, the other indicators emerged strongly in the mid-1970s and have been consolidating themselves at the start of the twenty-first century. If we adopt a more recent definition of a collapsed state, then it is characterized by an implosion of structures of authority and legitimacy.4 A problem of ungovernability then arises as a result of the combination of internal forces and outside pressure. Simultaneous war and crime on an internal front, combined with Plan Colombia and the Andean Project at the same time on the outside, form a lethal combination. In my opinion, Colombia, which is by no means an exceptional, unprecedented case, is on its way to this collapsed status. 3. See Paul Oquist, Violencia, conflicto y política en Colombia, Bogotá, Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1978. 4. See, among others, I. William Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995; William Reno, ‘Economic motivations of warfare in collapsed states’, National Strategy Forum Review, Winter 2000. 159 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 159 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile This will lead sooner or later to the country being witness to a failed state, in other words, a state that is unable to protect its individuals and communities from the forces that threaten their existential security.5 In this respect, Colombia does not have an anarchical state (complete absence of central government), but it is currently experiencing a mixture of a ghost state (exercises authority in a few limited areas while it is nonexistent in others) and an anaemic state (its energies are consumed fighting different kinds of armed groups). It must be mentioned in this context that, according to one of the main reports of the transcendental U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, jointly headed by Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, the United States must establish priorities in the event of an expansion of the problems of failed States. Thus, it states: ‘Not every such problem must be primarily a U.S. responsibility, particularly in a world where other powers are amassing significant wealth and human resources. There are countries whose domestic stability is, for differing reasons, of major importance to U.S. interests (such as Mexico, Colombia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia). Without prejudging the likelihood of domestic upheaval, these countries should be a priority focus of U.S. planning in a manner appropriate to the respective cases. For cases of lesser priority, the United States should help the international community develop innovative mechanisms to manage the problems of failed states.’ Following experts who have defined different forms of state suffering from acute internal instability, Colombia is close to becoming a failed state, in other words, unable to protect its individuals and communities from the forces that threaten their existential security. It seems obvious that the country is not experiencing a political, popular revolution, nor an avenging citizens’ revolt against a strong, dominating state. It is rather an amorphous, intemperate uprising of a complex amalgamation of emerging, unsatisfied, excluded and forgotten sectors. This uprising is partially and contradictorily channelled through powerful, armed groups, which, in spite of their lack of a univocal project, assert their social influence, territorial control and political projection in the midst of a partially collapsed state and the suffering of unarmed society. It is a violent, widespread state of unrest caused equally by guerrilla movements, organized mafia and reactionary bands, which seem to be strong enough to have pushed the state into a corner, but do not have the ability to build new structures of authority. 5. On the problem of failed states, see, among others, Robert H. Dorf, ‘Democratization and failed states: The challenge of ungovernability’, Parameters, Summer 1996; JeanGermain Gros, ‘Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the new world order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Haiti’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1996; Richard J. Norton and James F. Miskel, ‘Spotting trouble: identifying faltering and failing states’, Naval War College Review, Spring 1997; Susan L. Woodward, ‘Failed states: Warlordism and tribal warfare’, Naval War College Review, Spring 1999; Daniel Thürer, ‘The failed state and international law’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 836, December 1999. 160 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 160 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian The equilibrium perspective that characterizes reflection on legitimacy does not seem to be very useful in this particular case. There is no homogeneous project that grows in legitimacy as the other diminishes, thereby compensating a situation of ups and downs as far as legitimacy and illegitimacy is concerned. There is no traditional, reigning, enlightened elite, nor any compact, vigorous, civilizing counterpower. Rather, we are witnessing degraded legitimacies, both existing and challenging. We are in the presence of a dangerous failure of democracy, but there is no immediate alternative on the horizon capable of establishing order, peace and well-being. Hence, what predominates is a mixture of political warfare, criminal violence and humanitarian violations. This conflict has become increasingly more intricate, which does not mean, however, that it is indecipherable. Some clear trends must be stressed. The irregular war that has predominated in Colombia for decades is becoming a civil war in increasingly more places, with heavily armed bands heading up polarized ideological projects and with their own social bases of support. Likewise, the political war seems increasingly to be a criminal war. Armed actors demean their political profile more and more, abandon practices based on principles and adopt criminal behaviours. The Colombian conflict is also more than the summation of disparate, contradictory local wars; the country is suffering from a national war, in other words, the conflicts are not restricted to a region, but have acquired the logic of a confrontation that extends throughout the length and breadth of the country. In this context, while rural clashes continue and are exacerbated in more areas of the country, the conflict has also taken root in new urban milieus. In the same way, the war in Colombia is no longer a domestic one. The gradual, specific, persistent involvement of the United States in the internal conflict has made the country the epicentre of an increasingly more internationalized low-intensity war. Finally, the Colombian war is no longer restricted in terms of victims, armed participants and scope. The data could not be more eloquent.6 6. Colombian and international public reports are the source of all data referred to here. Figures come from official bodies such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Public Defender’s Office and the Foreign Office, as well as Colombian NGOs such as the Fundación País Libre and the Comisión Andina de Juristas, also from such institutions as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 161 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 161 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Violence was expressed during the last decade by nearly ten deaths a day. About 120 municipalities (12% of the total) have been completely destroyed by the guerrillas. There were over 500 massacres (group murders of four or more defenceless people) in the 1998–2000 twoyear period, mostly committed by paramilitary groups. More than 4,000 people have disappeared for political reasons since the 1980s. In 2000 alone, 743 people disappeared. About 12,000 kidnappings were committed by armed individuals, common criminals and even state security agents between 1995 and 2000. The number of homicides in the 1990s was more than 250,000. Almost 350,000 Colombians have left the country since 1996. More than 1,800,000 people have been forcibly displaced in the last three lustrums. More than 1,000,000 children, including those who have been murdered, mutilated, kidnapped, displaced and recruited, are war victims. Most of these events go unpunished. All the above means that the Colombian war has caused, causes and will continue to cause distressing, excessive human insecurity, which mainly affects the non-combatant civilian population. This changing, complicated and critical conflict in Colombia has encouraged US interference in the country’s affairs. There is no unanimous consensus in the United States, nor between the United States and Latin America, regarding the best solution to Colombia’s armed conflict. There is relative agreement, however, on the potential negative effects of this Andean country’s critical situation on South America as a whole and especially on its neighbouring countries. Washington, with tacit consent from Latin America shown by the region’s evident silence on the matter, has deployed an exceptional method of indirect intervention in the Colombian case. On the one hand, there is an old-style interventionism typical of the Cold War, such as that used at one time in El Salvador. The United States is now giving military support (aid, arms, training, information, etc.) to a country affected by an increasingly bloody internal war. Colombia’s greater geopolitical importance, its size, population and economy and the combination of different threats (drug trafficking, organized crime, guerrillas, terrorism, paramilitary groups) have meant that US aid to Bogotá has become massive and growing. On the other hand, there is also a new type of post-Cold War interventionism: pressure and support (as the case may be) for neighbouring countries to create a diplomatic and military cordon sanitaire around Colombia and also the development of contingency plans for potential use of greater force with the participation of countries friendly to Washington. 162 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 162 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian This dual model has been gradually improved in recent years and is made up of several components. These include increased security aid for Colombia, elevation to the status of a ‘problem country’ at hemispherical and international levels, growing regional diplomacy aimed at mobilizing the countries in the area towards strategies designed to contain the Colombian problem, and an increase in unifying official rhetoric regarding the existence of an inexorable ‘narco-guerrilla’ threat in Colombia. Potentially, this new interventionism in Colombia could adopt three forms. First, ‘intervention by imposition’: against the will of the Colombians and in spite of efforts at internal negotiation, Washington sets up an ad hoc coalition which decides to become militarily involved in the Andean country in order to establish a new ‘order’. Second, ‘intervention by desertion’: the Colombian State is unable to contain the internal armed conflict nor guarantee national sovereignty, which serves as an excuse for Washington to head up a temporary intervening coalition until established authorities in Bogotá have been strengthened. And third, ‘intervention by invitation’: an elected government asks for outside cooperation because it is unable to maintain internal order, national unity and a democratic institutional framework autonomously. Thus, Colombian military forces plus foreign forces from several countries in the Hemisphere and led by the United States would act together to prevent a national implosion. Although at present these scenarios arouse justifiable rejection, one cannot reject the political probability that some of them are being seriously considered, with the third being the least improbable. In short, the degraded nature of the war in Colombia, together with US interventionism, has become a serious problem for regional security, despite the fact that Latin American countries in general seem to be unperturbed by this explosive combination. US Plan Colombia The multimillion-dollar security aid from the United States to Colombia is already under way. In 2000, the Congress in Washington authorized US$1,319.1 million to respond to a complex, degraded internal war. The B component of so-called Plan Colombia – a plan drawn up in 1999 in the Nariño House as suggested by the White House – will be applied after intense debate in Washington, tenuous discussions in Bogotá and worrying silence in the Hemisphere. 163 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 163 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Andrés Pastrana government’s Plan Colombia, worth US$7,500 million, has three parts so far. Component A is internal; it is the largest and its purpose is to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis being suffered by the country using measures aimed at bringing the state closer to the areas most affected by the violence. This type of ‘Plan A’ within the overall Plan Colombia is aimed at reinforcing institutional presence in the country’s territory. The idea of the ‘carrot’ is inherent to its design – pacification by state contact with the community and a negotiated solution. ‘Plan B’ is US aid. Washington is offering more of the same, but in a shorter space of time and for a different recipient. In fact, between 1989 and 1999, Colombia received US$1,388 million in anti-drugs and security aid.7 The country will now receive a similar amount, but in only two years, and the main recipient will not be the police as in the 1990s, but the army. This is the ‘stick’ to go with the ‘carrot’. The underlying logic is that only more firepower and increased spatial deployment of armed forces can counterbalance the growing territorial power of the guerrillas and the enormous regional influence of drug trafficking. If all the US security resources given to Colombia in the last ten years simply increased violence of all kinds, human rights violations and pushed the war out of control as never before, there is no reason to believe that these same problems will not be made worse in the next two-year period.8 7. US aid figures for Colombia can be checked in Nina F. Serafino, ‘Colombia: U.S. assistance and current legislation’, in CRS Report to Congress, 13 June 2001. 8. At the end of the government of President Virgilio Barco (1986–90), faced with the growing problem of drugs and its typical violence, the president submitted the Special Co-operation Plan (PEC) for US$1,774 million. The main purpose of the PEC was to strengthen the Colombian State and achieve support from more developed nations in the fight against drugs. The country contributed 33.2% (US$590 million) and the international community was asked for 66.8% (US$1,184 million). The United States responded with its traditional ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ combination on one hand and its rhetoric of joint responsibility of supply and demand on the other. The then Secretary of Defense of the Bush Sr administration, Richard Cheney, deployed a ‘sea blockade’ of Colombia in January 1990, after the invasion of Panama. Likewise, as mentioned, between 1989 and 1999 Washington gave Bogotá US$1,388 million in anti-drug and security aid. In parallel, in 1991 the United States Congress approved a ten-year Andean Trade Preferences Agreement (ATPA) to encourage growth of a legal economy over the illegal one. In turn, the then anti-drugs Czar, William Bennet, promised a decisive war on drugs, although in the 1990s the United States only devoted 32% of its budget on average to reducing the demand. For its part, in 1990 Europe approved a four-year renewable General System of Andean Preferences. Latin America did not do much for the country; only Carlos Menem’s Argentina supported anti-drugs repression by sending two Pucará aircraft. For its part, Colombia continued to enforce extradition until it was forbidden to do so by its Constitution. Fifteen Colombian nationals were sent to the United States in 1989–90. The country eradicated almost 220,000 hectares of illicit crops between 1990 and 1998. The two Medellín and Cali cartels were also pursued and dismantled. But the state was not strengthened. On the contrary, it was weakened even further – violence, human rights violations and the power of all armed actors increased. Because of the resurgent threat generated by the drug problem and the exceptional power of the insurgents, Colombia launched another SOS to the international community in order to once again strengthen the state. Plan Colombia of President 164 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 164 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian The United States’ Plan Colombia has very precise components. The specific package for Colombia amounts to US$860.3 million. Military aid accounts for US$519.2 million of this total, while police aid accounts for US$123.1 million. The idea is to strengthen the armed forces (three new battalions to operate in the south of the country; sixteen Blackhawk helicopters and thirty UH-1H Huey helicopters, plus better combat and communications instruments), so that they can actually assume a more offensive position in the war, and improve the ability of the police in the war on drugs (two Blackhawk helicopters and twelve UH-1H Huey helicopters, training in spraying techniques, etc.). Other categories include alternative development (US$68.5 million), aid for displaced people (US$37.5 million), human rights (US$51 million), judiciary reform (US$13 million), application of the law (US$45 million) and peace (US$3 million). The rest of the US$1,319.1 million – in other words, US$458.8 million – is broken down into two main categories: aid for Colombia’s neighbouring countries (US$180 million) and resources to be used directly by US authorities (US$278.8 million). US$276.8 million of the latter category are for the Department of Defense (improving bases in Ecuador, Aruba and Curacao; routine and classified intelligence operations; radar equipment; among others). If the overall package is broken down into its various parts, recipients and aims, about 75% is geared towards strengthening the military in the already very long, inefficient ‘war on drugs’, a war which increasingly seems to be more in the nature of a ‘fight against narco-guerrillas’ in Washington nomenclature. Andrés Pastrana’s administration (1998–2002) is four times as big as the PEC; the country now contributes 53% of the Plan’s US$7,500 million and more industrialized nations the remaining 47%. The United States responded with its own Plan Colombia involving US$1,319 million. For its part, the European contribution is, as usual, much smaller. Latin American contribution is non-existent; it does not even propose a more lucid outlook. The new administration of George W. Bush and Richard Cheney drew up the Andean Project involving US$882 million as a continuance of Plan Colombia. In turn, the US Congress debated extending the ATPA again, while the national and international anti-drugs budget 2002 only considers 31% of the US$19,200 million to reduce demand. In addition, the new anti-drugs Czar, John Waters, who was John Bennet’s right-hand man, has set up a renewed crusade in the ‘war on drugs’. Colombia is now enforcing extradition again after a constitutional reform. In 1999–2000 alone, the country eradicated about 105,000 hectares of illegal crops. The fight against twenty sophisticated, but less visible, networks of drug traffickers continues. Collapse of the state, however, does not seem so far off. Colombia is experiencing the eternal return of a failed strategy, something which many acknowledge in private but conceal in public, both in Colombia and abroad. The United States has imposed a vicious, not virtuous, cycle in overcoming drugs on its own society and on Colombia – today, the world narcotics business is more lucrative, virulent, widespread and reactionary than it was ten years ago. 165 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 165 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile ‘Plan C’ is Europe’s contribution to peace. This part of Plan Colombia represents the contribution aimed at improving social conditions in regions where the state has less presence. Europe does not aim to solve anything, but rather compensate for the costs of erroneous policies, particularly those induced by Washington. This is not a new component. Europe has always promised ‘another’ contribution – it has done so since 1990 via its System of Andean/Drug Preferences – ‘another’ outlook, that of joint responsibility in drug issues, and ‘another’ spirit, in favour of human rights and peace via dialogue. And, as at other times, not much can be hoped for from these promises; they are always superseded by actions. Contributions by European states have been more symbolic than practical. The Donors Committee meeting in Madrid in July 2000 corroborated it. Only Spain (US$100 million) and Norway (US$20 million) committed resources to Plan Colombia. Months later the European Union decided to contribute 105 million euros for the period from 2000 to 2006, as a means of giving institutional support to the peace process and with a view to defending human rights, protecting the environment and replacing illegal crops. Europe’s diplomatic, material and strategic influence has been, is and will be much less than Washington’s. In this context, Colombia would seem to urgently need a ‘Plan D’, one capable of seriously solving, not just containing in the short term, the war from which it is suffering. This Plan should be drawn up by the Colombians and be supported by Latin Americans. Colombia urgently needs a Contadora Group. A Contadora Group that reappraises negotiation and commitment over arms and promises. A Contadora Group that is boosted by the Southern Cone and examines the silence of Latin America and the paralysis of South America. A political ‘Plan D’ is essential because neither massive US military aid, nor remote European participation, show any signs of being able to resolve the existing situation. The Contadora Group for Colombia needs, in turn, to transcend the level of the state. An alliance of Colombian unarmed civil society, influential social and political Latin American actors, democratic sectors of the United States and progressive European groups is essential. This could well repoliticize the Colombia crisis – once again politicize the behaviour of the state and the conduct of the guerrillas. Although it has still not been genuinely attempted, this option could expedite a potential solution to a devastating war. 166 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 166 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian Clinton and Colombia The armed conflict in Colombia undoubtedly has international relevance. Possibilities of peace and war are conditioned by external factors (growing consumption of drugs in more industrialized nations; massive, clandestine supply of arms; US foreign policy; boom of transnational organized crime; institutional uncertainty in the whole Andean region; recurring brushes with neighbouring countries), while the internal humanitarian drama has an increasingly large impact on the region and internationally. Stressing the magnitude of the Colombian tragedy, however, cannot lead to justifying any kind of military interference, but it should lead to measured political intervention. Colombia needs a new Contadora Group, in other words, wide-ranging diplomatic support led by South America and in favour of a negotiated political solution. The urgency of a Contadora Group for Colombia must be evaluated in the framework of the novel strategic situation in the area. In this regard, the presence of Bill Clinton in Cartagena towards the end of August 2000, in the context of a 10-hour visit to Colombia symbolized the crossing of a thin line – the United States hopes to ensure that its sphere of influence extends beyond the Caribbean Basin. This brief visit to Colombia by the President of the United States was extremely significant. The meeting of Clinton and Pastrana sealed a strategic situation, rather than an individual relationship, which set the scene for a novel moment in inter-American relations. As a matter of fact, this brief summit enclosed multiple messages for various different audiences against a common backdrop: the Colombian case was definitely politicized, and a complex struggle for power was being decided there that transcends that nation’s borders. In terms of his domestic policy, President Clinton made the Colombian conflict and its effects on US security highly visible; he showed that he was capable of being firm in the ‘war on drugs’; he tried to set a state policy (bipartisan, complete and long range) in dealing with the Colombian case and sought to placate those who see treatment of Colombia as the beginning of a new Viet Nam. In terms of relations between Washington and Bogotá, the visit strengthened Pastrana as far as domestic matters were concerned, but restricted his margin of manoeuvre in the medium term: it implied a strong political blow against the guerrillas and legitimized the growing influence of the United States in Colombian affairs. 167 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 167 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In regional terms, the trip reinforced US preference for unilateralism in hemispheric affairs; it hindered the summit of South American presidents organized by Brazil at the time; it contributed to identifying Colombia as the greatest security problem in the area; and it reinforced increasing militarization of Andean and Amazon zones to contain the consequences of the Colombian crisis. The basic factor is that Washington now dominates its Caribbean mare nostrum and is now looking for effective control in the Andes, this ‘homeland’ of South America.9 Thus, it is essential to define zonal alliances and equilibriums. The United States has forcefully imposed a cordon sanitaire around Colombia with resigned support from Panama and Ecuador and ambivalent backing from Peru. Panama, a close ally of the United States, has armed its borders. Ecuador, which is suffering from a delicate internal situation and has chosen the dollarization of its economy, has accepted Washington’s Plan Colombia de facto, because it will obtain US$81.3 million – US$20 million for anti-drugs work and US$61.3 million for improving the radar systems of its Eloy Alfaro airport. The United States has implicit and explicit support from the small countries closest to Colombia. For example, Nicaragua, Colombia’s neighbour across the sea, has taken advantage of these circumstances to put forward its claims to the San Andrés and Providencia Archipelago, under Colombian sovereignty, but which has suffered from marginal secessionist outbreaks. Jamaica, Honduras, Haiti, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic – Colombia’s neighbours increasingly more affected by drug trafficking – do not question Plan Colombia or the militarization of the greater Caribbean as promoted by Washington under the guise of a war on drugs. Prospects are not very comforting either in areas a little further away to the north of Colombia. Some Caribbean islands have aligned themselves with Washington. As part of Plan Colombia, the United States will give US$10.3 million and US$43.9 million to improve radar systems of Queen Beatriz airport on Aruba and Hato International airport on Curaçao, respectively. For its part, Cuba is playing a discreet, constructive role: Fidel Castro has fostered an attitude of dialogue within the Army of National Liberation (ELN) and is trying to use his diminished ascendancy over the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to prevent Colombia from being led to disaster. For its part, Mexico varies between 9. It is pertinent to remember that on 38 of the 39 occasions on which the United States used its armed forces in our continent in the twentieth century it did so in the Caribbean Basin and only once (1986 in Bolivia through Blast Furnace) in South America. In this respect, see Richard F. Grimmett, ‘Instances of use of United States armed forces abroad, 1798–1999’, CRS Report for Congress, 17 May 1999. 168 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 168 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian support and distancing: in recent years Mexican diplomacy has sought to disassociate itself from Colombia, thereby showing, with its eyes fixed on Washington, that there is a difference between them in terms of drugs and insurgency. South of Colombia, Bolivia (which will receive US$110 million from Plan Colombia and for whom Clinton requested total cancellation of its foreign debt of US$4,500 million) supports the United States in silence. Chile is expectant, but does not categorically condemn Washington and, in practice, supports Plan Colombia. Diplomacy in Argentina fluctuates between asepsis and scepticism; it formally supports peace, but does not do much for Colombia nor censure the United States. The south of the Southern Cone is geographically distant from the Colombian situation and politically less inclined to vehemently criticize Washington. Its traditional immediate interests do not seem to be at stake, but that is a major strategic blunder. Tremendous instability is being generated in the whole Andean region, and sooner or later it will have an adverse effect on the region as a whole. Similarly, in South America the positions of Brazil and Venezuela are converging more and more, although for different reasons. Venezuela has fortified its Colombian borders. Complex friction and recurring incidents feed a delicate situation, which combines a historical dispute in the Gulf of Venezuela, recent separatist demonstrations in Colombian departments, such as Norte de Santander and Vichada, and the ‘Bolivarian spirit’ shared by President Hugo Chavez10 and the FARC. Caracas is heavily influenced by multiple border problems and the danger of a domino effect in the middle of a convulsed internal situation in Venezuela and a desire to distance itself from Washington on several fronts. 10. On the whole, revolutionaries and revolutions aspire to propagate themselves beyond the specific framework of a nation. The revolutionary ideal tends to be grandiose in form, contents and scope. Initially, the French Revolution was born with transcendental passion. The Bolshevik Revolution started with the desire to spread around the world, far beyond Russia’s borders. In more recent times and in a more hemispheric milieu, the Peronista Revolution in Argentina in the 1940s, the Cuban Revolution after 1959 and the Sandinista Revolution in the 1970s imagined projecting themselves beyond national borders. These and many other revolutions were founding actions: they attempted to establish a new internal political order. All these revolutions intended to expand to neighbouring countries and even further afield. Sooner or later, however, revolutionaries understood that survival of the national revolution depended, among other factors, on sensibly securing internal power and restricting their hazardous irradiation abroad. Venezuela is currently experiencing the Bolivarian Revolution of Hugo Chavez via a kind of plebiscitary democracy. As with all revolutions, it involves the emergence of a new social figure who plans to achieve full hegemony. It is, in the best of senses, the greatest plebeian revolutionary exploit in the Andes in decades, led by a populist, heterodox caudillo under the praetorial protection of military forces. The Chavist project openly declares his dream of spreading through the Andean heart of South America. Latin America and the United States face the challenge of not repeating in Venezuela’s case the isolation and harassment to which Cuba was subjected. The Chavez phenomenon must first be understood, then moderated; neither aggression nor marginalization are favourable alternatives for Venezuelan stability and pluralism in the long term. 169 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 169 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Brazil has significantly increased its military deployments on the border. A border full of holes is equally useful to guerrillas and drug traffickers, while the growing presence of US advisors in Colombia has put the country on full alert. Metaphorically speaking, drug traffickers and green berets are perceived equally as threats to a country, which historically has not had any difficulties or imminent danger in delimiting its borders. Neither must it be forgotten that drug trafficking has expanded enormously in Brazil. There is obvious evidence of more use of drugs, more routes used to transport them, more discoveries of illegal crops, more urban violence linked to organized crime, etc. It must be stressed, however, that Colombia is neither Viet Nam nor El Salvador. Direct military intervention by the United States is not an immediate possibility. Indirect military intervention by the United States is growing and becoming more complex, and it is accompanied by a diplomatic-military fence that is being built around Colombia. Unarmed Colombians, however, do not need the Viet Nam paradigm, or the El Salvador one. Colombia requires a new Contadora Group to politically solve the country’s internal war. Bush and Bogotá Appointments by the George Bush administration related to key aspects of international and hemispheric policy have put Colombia on alert and Latin America in a situation that requires deep reflection. The profiles of several officers with considerable influence on Washington’s foreign policy generate disquiet and uncertainty. Their personalities, background or opinions augur a step backward in terms of peace and suggest ambiguity in drug-trafficking issues. All are mixtures of contradictions and stubbornness, and that will have a confusing influence on official bilateral links and make solving Colombia’s vital problems more difficult. The above, in turn, could negatively exacerbate inter-American relations and hinder hemispheric progress in terms of trade negotiations. The spectrum of prominent decision-makers can be divided into six categories. On the one hand, there are the crusaders, such as John Ashcroft (Secretary of Justice), Asa Hutchinson (Director of the DEA) and John Walters (anti-drugs Czar), who form a kind of species of moral extremist who would wish that Colombia would wage a ‘war on drugs’ until every last Colombian were dead. Then there are the recalcitrants, such as John Negroponte (Ambassador to the UN), Otto Reich (State Department Under-Secretary for Hemispheric Affairs) and Roger Noriega (Ambassador to the OAS). The first two have a 170 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 170 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian past marked by arduous, clandestine promotion of the Nicaraguan Contras and by an acknowledged disrespect for human rights. Noriega’s only merit is that he was the right-hand man of Jesse Helms, the ultraconservative republican legislator from North Carolina who, until May 2001, chaired the powerful Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs. Similarly, the dysfunctionals, such as Paul O´Neill (Secretary of the Treasury) and Richard Armitage (Under-Secretary of State), whose conduct could seriously affect the international fight against drugs, stand out. In fact, in early 2001, O´Neill stunned the United States main partners in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) when he stated that Washington would no longer support efforts of OECD members to combat ‘fiscal paradises’, which, as is well known, are epicentres for drug money laundering. According to various sources, some time ago Armitage – who was linked to the CIA in the 1970s and the Department of Defense in the 1980s – proposed using heroine to weaken the fighting capabilities of communists in Indochina and Afghanistan. There are also the orthodox, such as Condoleeza Rice (National Security Advisor) and Paula Dobriansky (State Department UnderSecretary for Global Affairs), who maintain an approach marked by the Cold War and centred on the Russian Federation and China. Colombia will increasingly be perceived in geopolitical code and in terms of a double ideological (Marxist) and criminal (Mafia) offensive to undermine the power of the United States. There are also the hawks, such as Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) and Paul Wolfowitz (Under-Secretary of Defense), who are seeking to consolidate US unipolarity at any price and seem to conceive a rather more military than diplomatic regionalization of the way in which the case of Colombia is dealt with. Finally, one must emphasize the warriors, such as Richard Cheney (Vice-President), who, as a legislator, staunchly defended Oliver North and the Iran-Contras operation and then, as Secretary of Defense for George Bush Sr, was the architect of the ‘sea blockade’ of Colombia in January 1990. In this scenario, Secretary of State Colin Powell would seem, at least at the beginning of the George W. Bush administration, to be the least bellicose and the most moderate. Make no mistake, however, they are all alike. Their mental structures and codes of reference belong more to the Cold War than to globalization; they are in essence more ideological than pragmatic; in general, they are more right wing than centre; they seem to be more inclined to an iron fist than deliberation; they tend more to the ominous threat of force than prudent diplomacy; they look at the world through a classical realistic prism, not through a generous idealistic lens; they are seeking 171 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 171 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile economic primacy, military sufficiency and political unilaterality of the United States to the detriment of balanced, multilateral, stable, multipolar thinking. The future of Colombian-US ties lies in the balances of power and strategies of action of these actors and their respective bureaucracies. In this regard, the future does not look very promising. The combined effect of Washington’s Bogotá policies and the Colombian and Andean situation on the inter-American system is evident. A future of more war and abundance of drugs will only cause more violations of human rights, more displaced persons, more militarization, more degradation of the environment, more corruption and more drug trafficking, as well as less investments, less stability, less governance, less security and less growth in South America. Hence, it is essential to systematically follow Washington’s Bogotá policies. In 2001, the Bush administration submitted the Andean Project, involving US$882.3 million for the fight against drugs, to the US Congress for approval. This project, which was reduced to US$731 million in early 2002 as a result of changes introduced by the House of Representatives and the Senate, combines some ‘carrot’ (US$291 million in economic and social aid) and a lot of ‘stick’ (US$440 million in anti-drug and security aid), and reflects continuity between the current administration and Bill Clinton’s administration, in terms of an indirect but massive involvement in the Colombian crisis. The new republican strategy has three basic aims: consolidate the military-offensive aspect of Plan Colombia – Washington version – ‘Americanize’ the war on drugs in the north of South America and set up a diplomatic-military cordon sanitaire around Colombia.11 On the 11. It is essential to understand the conceptual basis of the war on drugs promoted by Washington. To do so one must consider US reasoning, not its rhetoric. Washington’s actions in this issue are based on four suppositions: first, it assumes that demand depends on supply, so it seeks to repress centres where drugs are grown, produced, processed and trafficked. Second, it assumes that punitive treatment at the centres of supply of the drugs is more effective in terms of effects (goals and accomplishments) and resources (aid and budget). It is more advantageous for Washington’s cost-benefit balance to concentrate anti-drugs efforts on centres of supply. Third, it assumes that there will be multiple effects for producing countries from increased eradication of illegal crops. Among others, it emphasizes the drop in price of the illegal crop in production zones, reduced power of drug traffickers and containment of violence generated by drug trafficking. And fourth, it assumes that there will be three types of effect for consumer countries from increased eradication of illegal crops: less availability, higher price and less potential purity of the drugs. It would be pertinent, therefore, based on these suppositions, to evaluate the results of the policy based on this reasoning. In this respect, it must be said that Colombia sprayed illegal crops with paraquat towards the end of the administration of President Julio César Turbay (1978–82). Colombia increased massive spraying during the administration of President Belisario Betancur (1982–86), applying glifosato for marihuana and using garlon-4 for coca. Colombia 172 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 172 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian one hand, it shows America’s persistent concern and obvious interest in strengthening the military capacity of the Colombian State. On the other, it aims to intensify a common punitive policy against drugs based continued forced, chemical eradication of marihuana and coca during the administration of President Virgilio Barco (1986–90). Colombia reinforced spraying of marihuana and coca and began the destruction of poppy using glifosato during the administration of President César Gaviria (1990–94). Colombia beat all national and international records in chemical and manual eradication of illegal crops during the administration of President Ernesto Samper (1994–98) and tried more toxic herbicides such as imazapyr and tebuthiuron. In 1998 alone, the Samper government (until August) and the administration of President Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) sprayed 66,083 hectares of coca and 2,931 hectares of poppy and manually destroyed a further 3,126 hectares of coca, 181 hectares of poppy and 18 hectares of marihuana. The current government destroyed about 90,000 hectares of coca between 1999 and 2000. Finally, Washington has been putting pressure on Bogotá since 2000 to apply a dangerous fungus, Fusarium oxysporum, in the process of forced eradication in Colombia. In spite of these efforts, the effects of chemical repression of illegal crops have been very poor. As a matter of fact, in 1981 Colombia had 25,000 hectares planted with marihuana and coca. In March 2001 the annual US State Department report on drugs (International Narcotics Report) indicated that Colombia had 138,000 hectares planted with coca alone. In 1990, production of heroine was insignificant; in 1996, the country was already producing 63 metric tonnes, and today Colombia has surpassed Mexico as the main supplier of heroine in the Hemisphere. Whereas in 1998 Colombia produced 435 metric tonnes of cocaine, in 1999 it produced 520 metric tonnes and in 2000 it increased its production to 580 metric tonnes. In the 1980s, Colombia had an emerging criminal class; today it is experiencing the consequences of wealthy, violent and defiant narco-criminality. The Colombian situation, however, is neither exceptional nor extravagant. In spite of years of forced, chemical eradication of illicit plantations in the world, according to the most recent report from the United Nations Office for Control of Drugs and Prevention of Crime (Global Illicit Drug Trends 2000) coca plantations increased from 240,000 hectares in 1987 to 270,000 hectares in 1999, poppy plantations from 211,000 in 1988 to 217,000 in 1999. Meanwhile, in the 1990s, 120 countries reported the existence of cannabis crops in their territories. In 1999, global production of heroine was 580 metric tonnes, of cocaine about 1,000 metric tonnes and of marihuana about 30,000 metric tonnes. Figures from the main consumer markets can be added to these. In 1981, the price of a gram of cocaine in the United States was US$191 and purity was 40%, whereas in 1999 the price was US$44 and purity 70%. In 1981, the price per gram of heroine was US$1,200 and purity 5%, whereas in 1999 the price was US$318 and purity 25%. Similarly, in Europe the price of a gram of cocaine in 1999 was US$90 and of heroine US$98. In 2000, more drugs of better quality and lower price were available in the United States and Europe. In terms of demand, the situation in Europe shows worrying signs of increasing, while there has been no definitive improvement in the United States where there are still almost 14 million consumers. The rate of growth of young cocaine users in the United States has increased alarmingly since 1997. Consumption of marihuana among young people, which had dropped towards the end of the 1980s, increased notably from 1992 to 1995 and continues to be high. Concomitantly, total drug-related arrests (for consumption, sale, distribution, manufacture, etc.) in the United States in 1990 were 1,089,500, whereas in 1996 they increased to 1,128,647. In 1990, the total percentage of federal prisoners jailed for drug-trafficking-related offences was 53.5%, whereas in 1995 it was 59.9%. Compared with the world’s most industrialized nations, today the United States has the largest population of prisoners imprisoned for drug-related offences. In sum, Colombia has already sprayed enough of its territory with substances that are harmful to the health of its population and preservation of the environment, while the demand for drugs among US citizens continues to rise and consumption of narcotics in Europe is on the increase. Any additional chemical eradication promises more of the same – a pyrrhic victory that fails to solve the essential problem of the drug business. The consequences will also be the same. The highest costs of this prohibition will continue to be paid by the Colombians, and the dividends of this lucrative business will continue to be laundered in banks in the United States, the Caribbean, Switzerland and Monaco, among others. 173 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 173 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile on militant prohibitionism in the area around Colombia. The full prohibitionist package tends to include – as it has already done in Colombia and Mexico – demands for more criminalization, militarization, spraying, interdiction and extradition. Finally, it seeks to co-opt Washington’s allies (Panama, Ecuador and Bolivia), convince those who are ambiguous about Plan Colombia (Peru) and put pressure on opponents of US strategy in dealing with drug trafficking and insurgency (Brazil and Venezuela), forming a circle of contention and coercion around Colombia. An analysis of the amounts, proportions and recipients of the Andean Project corroborates the above. Colombia is the biggest recipient with US$439 million, broken down into US$164 million (37.3%) for economic and social aid and US$275 million (62.7%) for anti-drugs and security aid. In addition to what Colombia will receive as part of this Project, Bogotá will receive US$218.9 in military and police aid as part of various items of the US budget for defence and the fight against drugs. Hence, in 2003 the country will receive a total of US$657.9 million in US aid (US$493.9 million for the ‘stick’ and US$164 million for the ‘carrot’).12 The Andean Project also considers US$292 million for Colombia’s neighbours, several of which are already receiving US$222.3 million of the US$1,319 million of the current Plan Colombia. Peru, which, during the Fujimori government, had maintained an ambivalent policy regarding the Colombian crisis – they criticized President Pastrana for having initiated a process of dialogue with the FARC and, at the same time, sold the latter arms through the corrupt practices of Vladimiro Montesinos, a CIA favourite for many years – will receive US$135 million. Bolivia, which has been supporting Plan Colombia, will get US$91 million. Ecuador, which has docilely accepted US anti-drugs policy in the zone, will receive US$37 million of the Andean Project. Panama, which has not seriously questioned Plan Colombia and which is the weakest link in the increasingly more internationalized Colombian war, will receive US$9 million. Brazil and Venezuela, the two countries most reluctant to support Washington in its Colombia strategy, will receive US$20 million. The former will get US$12 million solely in anti-drugs and security aid. Venezuela will receive US$8 million also earmarked for anti-drugs and security aid. 12. For these data, please consult information in the Center for International Policy as part of its Colombia Project (http://www.ciponline.org/colombia). 174 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 174 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian The Andean Project then reinforces Plan Colombia, consolidates a view that concentrates repression of the lucrative drug business on centres where drugs are grown, processed and trafficked, and strengthens the potentially intervening fence around Colombia in the event of an uncontrolled internal implosion. In this context, a foreseeable US Colombian policy could consist of two phases or components that are not necessarily exclusive. The Bush government could further politicize the Colombian case; for example, it could consider that the country’s real threat arises from an economic, territorial and militarily strong insurgence, not just from drug trafficking and organized crime. In fact, it would all be intermeshed: guerrillas, terrorism, organized narco-criminality would be relatively the same thing. It could also put pressure on the Andrés Pastrana government to cease political dialogue with the FARC and concentrate on military combat. In exchange, the United States would promise more military, technical and intelligence aid. So as not to appear to be sabotaging peace in Colombia, Washington would agree to the start of talks with a weakened ELN. In short, this first phase would be cheap. Colombians would shoot each other on the one hand and dialogue on the other, while the United States would intervene indirectly with more military aid, but no fatalities of its own. If this component of the Colombian strategy were to fail, then a second, more extensive phase would be drawn up. In this case, there would be more intervention. It would begin with more sophisticated use of military technology and interdiction – testing new weapons (as was done in Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo), mass spraying of illicit crops, capture of guerrillas, drug runners and paramilitary in other countries, on the high seas or the country’s borders (Panama and Ecuador by preference), increased presence of mercenaries disguised as private security companies (as is already contemplated in US Plan Colombia), increase of advisors on the field, etc. Greater, more military interference in Colombian affairs would gradually be legitimized. To do so, Washington would have to set up an ad hoc Latin American coalition to support its strategy. After 11 September The infamous terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and against the Pentagon in Washington marked the end of an era in world politics and 175 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 175 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile announced the start of a new stage in international relations. The postCold War ended tragically and symbolically. This hiatus of only a decade between the lengthy Cold War and a future scheme of things that is just beginning to emerge ended in a worrying fashion. George W. Bush immediately reported the start of a ‘new war’, whose main characteristics will be its unconventional nature, its almost unlimited length, worldwide scope and destructive purpose. Two aspects must be underlined in this presentation, which was fulfilled in the counter-attack on Afghanistan. First of all, the perspective of a ‘day after the war’ in which victors proclaim their victory and a new order is structured is no more. Since Washington, and not the UN Security Council, communicated the start of the ‘war against terrorism’, the United States reserves the right to tell the world when the goal of this military confrontation has been accomplished. In this respect, it must be noted that countries which act based on opportunist reasoning, seeking presumed dividends from their support of the United States, are making a mistake – conviction, not opportunism, will be eventually rewarded when the elusive end of terrorism is achieved. Secondly, Bush’ argument erased the distinction between war and peace. If the war against terrorism is unlimited in time and geography, then peace wanes in the midst of a constant war. We would then be in a period of Hot Peace. The Cold War between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had very precise rules of the game and little likelihood of developing into a direct, massive conflict. The Hot Peace between multiple states, illegal transnational groups and rebellious forces that resort to indiscriminate violence lacks any rules and has a high probability of causing an unlimited number of victims. The summons to an international ‘war against terrorism’ makes one wonder how to cope with a non-traditional conflict. Terrorism expresses the existence of an asymmetrical conflict, in which, paradoxically, the less powerful actor has the most advantages. The latter chooses instrument, place, moment and objective of the action. As did many other countries, the United States coexisted with this asymmetrical condition. In fact, the strategy against international terrorism practised by Washington during the last three lustrums was inserted into the complex dynamics of asymmetry. The architect of this strategy was the father of the current President of the United States, George Bush, who, as Vice-President in the Ronald Reagan administration, headed the Task Force on Combating Terrorism in 1985. The report’s conclusions guided US public policies from 1986 176 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 176 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian to September 2001. Its four main tenets were: terrorism was a ‘potential threat to national security’ of the United States; states which harboured terrorism should suffer the ‘consequences’ of that decision; Washington would not make any ‘concessions’ to terrorism; and the government of the United States would combat it ‘without sacrificing basic freedoms or putting democratic principles at risk’. After the attacks of 11 September, the way of dealing with the asymmetric conflict has become the centre of a worldwide controversy. Two alternatives now stand out. One model, which seems to be favoured by the administration of Bush Jr, is to achieve symmetry with the opponent. The basic aim is to make international terrorism, now defined as a lethal threat to national security, impractical. This aspiration means that the more powerful party becomes as perfidious as the weaker one. This does not just involve improving the ability to garner good intelligence, increase worldwide cooperation in the fight against terrorism, impose more sanctions on states that harbour international terrorism and ostracize those who foster terrorist groups. It also involves reducing public freedoms in the interests of possibly greater security, legitimizing clandestine murders and destruction in advance of people suspected of terrorism, ignoring rules of international law on human rights issues and privatizing the combat against terrorist groups. The foreseeable consequence would be a cutback on democracy inside and outside the United States. The Huntington of the ‘waves of democracy’, not of the ‘clash of civilizations’, would have been correct: democratic progress can be stopped and even reverted. The ‘third wave of democracy’ that Huntington talked about would fade away in the sands of the ‘war on terrorism’. A second model considered by European experts, for example, would aim at overcoming the asymmetry in a longer, not so immediate, period of time and using means that are not exclusively repressive. The idea in this case would be to make terrorism improbable, unnecessary and illegitimate. This would require dissuasion, development and dialogue. Military and police dissuasion obviously belong to the sphere of the state and imply more prevention, more intelligence and more sophistication. The effect of dissuasion is to make terrorist behaviour improbable. Political, social and economic development involves the state and the private sector. If one wants to make terrorism unnecessary, the specific living conditions of millions of people need to be improved, both in the Arab world and on the periphery, and a just answer to the specific cause of Palestinians needs to be achieved. Finally, dialogue 177 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 177 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile belongs to the non-state sphere of action – NGOs, parties, churches, youth, among many others. There urgently needs to be more communication between cultures, religions and civilizations and these need to be brought closer together to make resorting to terrorism an illegitimate act. The potential consequence of this alternative could be the gradual, effective reduction of terrorism in the framework of a moderate democratizing process with greater global scope. Now, regardless of the model that prevails in dealing with asymmetrical conflicts, the strategic scenario for Colombia changed drastically after 11 September. Colombia became the main referent of hemispheric insecurity. And Colombians will have increasingly less time to define their armed conflict in political terms and will be put under increasing pressure to redefine it in criminal terms. Either a basic space to reinitiate a very different type of negotiation with a Marxist guerrilla movement, which preserves its status as political interlocutor, is maintained, or conditions to foster a basically military war against a terrorist enemy of any ideological persuasion are consolidated. In foreign terms, the limits and scope of one or the other option for Colombia will be decided by three elements. First of all, the final results of US military action in Afghanistan will have to be evaluated. In addition to a massive attack with enormous deployment of technology, we will probably witness a new kind of armed confrontation that combines elements of a conventional war and of a guerrilla war in the framework of an extended operation. If this exercise in force is successful in terms of objectives accomplished – break-up of terrorist enclaves – and of legitimacy achieved – its proportion and precision are widely supported throughout the world – it might possibly be tried in other countries identified as fertile territories for terrorism. Secondly, debates about Plan Colombia in Washington, after the first phase of the counter-attack against international terrorism initiated by the United States has been completed, will have to be analysed carefully. In this respect, it is not unlikely that Plan Colombia should cease to be an anti-drug plan, as requested by the Executive and approved by the Legislative in 2000, and become an anti-terrorist plan whose more explicit purpose would be to combat the FARC and the ELN, and even the ultra-right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Thirdly, the use of the Interamerican Defense Treaty (TIAR) revived by the OAS Resolution of 21 September in support of the United States will have to be evaluated. Much reflection must be given to the unexpected revival of this 1947 treaty, especially with regard to its 178 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 178 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian Articles 3 and 6 on what the Consulting Body considers to be an attack on members of the inter-American system of defence and on state aggressions that do not constitute an armed attack, which could possibly be invoked in the event that the Colombian crisis worsens and gets out of control. Two questions arise in this respect. On the one hand, if Colombia does not make progress in settling its armed conflict, the country will definitely be subject to external forces and factors beyond its control. On the other hand, if South America maintains its current disdain with regard to the Colombian case, the implacable logic of the ‘war on terrorism’ will cross the threshold into the heart of the subcontinent. From the Philippines to Colombia? Whenever a process of negotiation involving an armed conflict in search of power breaks down, the non-combatant civilian population loses out and the hard men on either side impose their terms. The Israeli-Palestinian example is an eloquent one. Colombia is not an exception. The end of the dialogue between the government and FARC in this corner of South America in February 2002 heralded the arrival of the time of the hawks. Nobody is thinking now of sitting down to talk again, but on how to intensify the war. On one side, there are segments of the establishment, a sector of the political class, the armed forces and paramilitary groups. On the other side, the most intransigent groups within the guerrillas are reasserting their warlike attitudes. A fraction of the elite – especially cattle ranchers, big landowners and the nouveau riche from drug trafficking – feel that this is not a time for social reforms, but rather for taking the country on a crusade against insurgency. Part of the political class – liberalism linked to presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe and more orthodox conservatism, for example – seem to be betting on a firmer policy. Most of the armed forces will be thinking that, with massive military support from Washington and considering the tiredness of citizens in the face of a process of dialogue that made no progress in three years, they will now have sufficient internal and external support and sufficient political autonomy to defeat ‘communist subversion’. The paramilitary will see that nobody is stopping them and that they have been given a blank cheque to not only contain the guerrillas but also bring back their regional influence by means of atrocious massacres and murders. 179 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 179 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The guerrillas, in turn, will increase their less ‘revolutionary’ practices. Kidnappings of civilians, blackmailing of companies in their area of influence, resorting to the drug business and indiscriminate attacks on urban centres will increase. In this context, the war in Colombia will be based on ever-fewer principles and the time for peace will be postponed for when all the bands are exhausted or further delegitimized. In this context, the role played by the United States is crucial. When the process of negotiations in Colombia between the Pastrana government and the FARC broke down, various different scenarios to understand the direction that the armed conflict in Colombia would take, and Washington’s policy in that regard, were proposed. For some, the most probable image would be that of Viet Nam – the United States directly involved in an internal war in a South American country. For others, the possible image would be that of El Salvador – Washington offering massive aid and intervening indirectly in the country’s crisis. For others, the most conceivable image is that of Rwanda – warlords involved in an atrocious conflict, and tardy interference by the United States on humanitarian grounds. These images could be true, but they are inserted in a typical Cold War or post-Cold War outlook; they fail to consider the changes that occurred in US foreign and defence policy after 11 September 2001. From now on, the war in Colombia will be identified by Washington within the framework of a worldwide fight against terrorism. In this respect, the best comparison for Colombia is not Afghanistan, but the Philippines. The ‘war on terrorism’, begun energetically against Afghanistan and headed in increasing solitude by the United States, now has a new confrontational scenario in the Philippines. Presidents George W. Bush and Gloria Arroyo agreed to send 650 US soldiers to support the Philippine armed forces in their fight against the Abu Sayyaf (‘Bearer of the Sword’ in Arabic) armed movement. Five characteristics of Washington’s direct military involvement in Philippine anti-insurgency policy need to be underlined. First, Abu Sayyaf is identified as being closely linked to international terrorism, in this particular case with strong connections with al-Qaeda. Second, Abu Sayyaf normally resorts to kidnapping, even of American citizens. Third, military clashes will be concentrated geographically in the country’s southern area. Fourth, the actions to be taken by the US contingent will not imply fighting against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the National Democratic Front, as specified by the Philippine 180 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 180 25/04/2003, 12:54 Colombia: More Human Insecurity, Less Regional Security Juan Gabriel Tokatlian Government. And, fifth, the United States will furnish US$100 million to create a special Philippine anti-terrorist force. The Colombian case, where Washington’s Plan Colombia authorizes the presence of up to 500 US advisors and subcontracting private security firms (formerly known as mercenaries), has very similar symbolic and practical characteristics. First, the FARC is very often presented as a movement with links to international terrorism – the IRA, for example, among others. Second, the FARC is the group that undertakes the most kidnappings. Third, the FARC controlled but has now abandoned the goodwill zone granted by the government in 1998, but still exercises de facto control over the south of the country and has done so for lustrums. Fourth, progress in talks with the ELN could lead the Colombian Government not to request direct military aid from Washington to combat this movement and, thereby, focus the fight on the FARC. And, fifth, the White House has just asked Congress for US$98 million in aid so that US troops can train Colombian armed forces in protecting the country’s infrastructure. Given these similarities, the obvious questions hinge on who will be the Colombian Gloria Arroyo; what will be the diplomatic implications of increased direct military involvement by the United States in Colombia; what does this situation mean in terms of depoliticizing the armed conflict and subsequent definitive criminalization of the FARC; and whether Colombian armed forces will become a rearguard for an armed US contingent. A brief final reflection In short, for Colombia not to become a testing ground for methods of military intervention, our countries – especially those in South America – must assume a leading role in resolving the Colombian crisis by diplomatic means. The country now needs and deserves the type of political solidarity that prevailed with regard to Central America in the Contadora Group, not the military arrogance displayed by NATO in Kosovo, nor the lucubrations which led to invoking the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and much less the probability that the more recalcitrant sectors in Washington should set up an additional scenario of the ‘war against terrorism’ in South America. 181 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 181 25/04/2003, 12:54 POVERTY, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND CITIZEN INSECURITY: SOME HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES IN BOLIVIA JUAN RAMÓN QUINTANA 1 Introduction This paper is a reflection on the conditions of poverty being experienced by Bolivian society, as well as on the factors that prevent progress from being made in solving this structural and historical problem. It also analyses the modest results achieved in this regard at a time when democracy is being consolidated and the state is being modernized, although still in an insufficient and much questioned manner. One of its most important conclusions is the lack of a state policy to cope integrally with poverty, as well as the absence of a social pact that asserts the legitimacy of the state in mounting its strategies. Even though poverty may be a necessary condition for stimulating a climate of violence, insecurity and conflict, it is no less true that other important factors must be taken into account, such as, for example, unresolved historical and socio-economic patterns, the quality 1. Sociologist. Member of the National History Committee and Bolivian Strategic Studies Program. Specializes in security and defence institutions and social conflict. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 183 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile of democratic governance and its effects on public opinion, as well as those external variables which a precarious, unintegrated, uncompetitive national economy with an enormous deficit in modern technology has difficulty in controlling. One of the effects of the unfavourable structural conditions that the country has been experiencing for some time is the citizen security crisis. Even considering its origins in precarious living conditions, low degree of social integration and loss of social capital in a free market economy, the truth of the matter is that the state is dramatically losing its ability to exercise legitimate monopoly over forces of law and order. The loss of legitimacy, effectiveness and response capability of judicial and police institutions set up to protect citizens is explained by the increase in violence, criminality and social self-protection, as well as also the increase in private security and the alarming access of marginal populations to private justice. In this context, one of the major problems faced by society is its defencelessness in the face of crime, caused in part by the collapse of the state security model and especially by the chronic inability of the police to prevent, control and repress criminal acts. Approaches to poverty in Bolivia Poverty is one of the most complex problems faced by Bolivian society at the beginning of this century. The poverty problem, which the state has still not addressed with proposed solutions that are in line with its social and economic magnitude, is a critical disruptive element for democratic governance and human development. Similarly, it is one of the factors causing asymmetric conditions in the process of integration, besides casting a shadow of uncertainty over the stability and security of the region. The poverty problem has been subjected to numerous evaluations and investigations in a continuous attempt to identify its causality. These have progressed from unilateral approaches that treat the problem based on insufficient income (poverty line), passing through multicausal factors linked to education (incremental illiteracy and school enrolment rates), lack of access to basic utilities (suitable housing, health, potable water and basic sewerage). Other approaches take into account criteria linked to more general privations, such as the lack of opportunity to achieve greater citizen participation.2 2. Various authors, Las políticas sobre la pobreza en Bolivia. Dimensión, políticas y resultados (1985–1999), La Paz, PRISMA Institute, 2000. 184 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 184 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana From a government perspective, poverty in Bolivia is considered to be the expression of the lack of opportunities to obtain resources which would supply basic needs, especially to guarantee a minimum level of consumption and basic utilities. Consequently, its causes would be related to economic, social and cultural factors. This is associated with macro-economic instability, low growth rates and increased inequality. In this context, an unstable economy lowers the income of the poor, and low growth rates reduce job opportunities. Some experts maintain that three factors have conditioned the lack of development and high poverty prevalent in Bolivia: geophysical conditions, social organization and economic policies.3 This approach claims that, in addition to the crisis and collapse of the state economic model of the 1980s, plus the adverse effects of the structural reforms implemented since 1985, there is also the problem of unequal economic development caused largely by geographical variables. The main conclusion reached is that, in addition to insufficient economic development and unequal distribution of income and opportunities, high poverty is associated basically with low returns on investments resulting from poor agricultural yields and work performance. Population distribution, with greater concentration in rural areas and limited contribution to gross domestic product, the low degree of technological development, the problem of land ownership and erosion are considered to be obstacles to improved productivity. Likewise, heavily sloping land and precarious fertility of the soil severely threaten development of the country’s agriculture and livestock.4 In general, causes of poverty in Bolivia would be associated with: (a) concentrating, exclusive pattern of socio-economic development, driven by exports of raw materials and unchanged for more than a century; (b) historical persistence of notions entertained by the ruling classes that the country contains an abundance of natural resources, while, in fact, the opposite is true; (c) presence of physical and institutional obstacles which make it difficult to incorporate production technologies capable of maintaining a sustained increase in levels of agricultural productivity in the country’s western zone.5 Despite numerous studies, there are no unanimous, trustworthy indicators that can be used to measure this situation. 3. See Anaya Rolando Morales, Bolivia. Política económica, geografía y pobreza, La Paz, Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar, 2000. 4. Morales, op. cit. 5. See Las políticas sobre la pobreza …, op. cit. 185 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 185 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Over and above the multiple, complex causes which occasion the precarious living conditions of the population, the fact is that Bolivia occupies one of the lowest positions on the scale of Human Development in Latin America. It is above Haiti and in a similar position to Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. With an average annual per capita income of US$925, most Bolivians live below the poverty line. Although it is no consolation, however, the country’s levels of inequality in income distribution are lower than most Latin American countries. Two-thirds of the population is classified as poor, and more than twothirds has a daily income of less than US$2 per person. Furthermore, about a third of the population lives in conditions of chronic poverty, while the next third shows symptoms of deteriorating income or employment levels. The country is in a much more critical situation than in the 1960s or 1970s, yet some significant progress has been made. Human development indicators have improved in the last three decades. According to the UNDP Report on Human Development in Bolivia 1998, together with another thirty-four countries in the world, Bolivia has climbed from a low level of development to a medium one. Life expectancy increased from 42.7 to 59.7 years, illiteracy dropped from 43% to 18% and per capita income in relation to purchasing power parity of the dollar increased from US$650 to US$1,142.6 One of the major obstacles to tackling poverty is the non-existence of a state policy. Since 1985, governments have targeted several strategies which have not made sufficient impact to revert social indicators. Furthermore, without adequate analysis because of a lack of statistics and trustworthy information to guide definition of such a policy, recommendations made by international cooperation were adhered to in a disciplined manner. The latter’s approaches have been as heterogeneous as erratic government proposals. Over the last four years, the government has insisted on implementing a drastic policy of foreign debt reduction in order to renegotiate terms and conditions and volumes of national resources flowing to the international financial community every year. This strategy was also used to give continuity to the free market economic model, for the impact of the crisis in the early 1980s, typified by hyperinflation and a fall in prices of ore, coupled with the foreign sector crisis, drastically reduced social investment. To compensate for the cost of this readjustment, stabilization policies and government reforms, 6. See Informe de desarrollo humano en Bolivia 1998, La Paz, United Nations Development Programme, 1998. 186 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 186 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana governments promoted social policies based on the creation of Emergency Funds (FSE), Social Investment Funds (FIS) and Peasant Development Funds (FDC). Currently a Single Fund Committee (DUF) operates; its purpose is to promote decentralization of public sector investments and resources from international cooperation by poverty lines. The DUF is made up of regional and national investment funds. As some studies show, despite promotion of social investments to compensate for the readjustment, poverty’s structural roots were not attacked and, even though wages recovered, they failed to rise to the levels achieved in previous decades. Creation of the funds was backed by international financial agencies, but they were criticized as well. One such criticism stated that, because the funds were not coordinated with social sectors and with income distribution, they did not achieve the desired success because they were not targeted on vulnerable sectors. The most severe criticism stated that what should have been done instead of trying to compensate for the effects of the readjustment was to protect the income of the poorest.7 As a result of these criticisms, since the early 1990s policies in the fight against poverty have been focused on vulnerable populations (targeting), especially on mother-child couples. Investments were also geared towards social sectors with the greatest incidence on the population’s conditions of reproduction and towards two areas considered to be the most important for reducing poverty – education and health. Social investments in the 1990s increased considerably compared with the 1980s.8 Even though first-generation reforms managed to stabilize the economy (1985–93), reduce fiscal deficit and remove the state from business activities to give way to private enterprise, second-generation reforms (1993–97) were aimed at modernizing the country by promoting growth whose centre of gravity was focused on a policy of capital formation. Similarly, an attempt was made to correct regional imbalances and unequal investments by redistributing income via the Law of Popular Participation. To that end, 312 municipalities were created and began an aggressive process of social investments. Correspondingly, municipalities and prefectures were assigned the task of administering decentralized educational reform and health and social security policies. Together with these reforms, an attempt was made 7. See Morales, op. cit. 8. Ibid. 187 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 187 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile to implement a novel policy of subsidies for people over 65 through the BONOSOL (Solidarity Bonus). These resources come from distributing profits theoretically generated by pension fund administrators (AFP). Despite the progress made, the government that came into power in 1997 made a series of changes to the state modernization programme. It designed a new government project to fight poverty based on the following four central issues. Opportunity to promote economic growth, which includes strengthening the financial system, systems of regulation, micro-credits, foreign trade, road infrastructure and rural power supply. Dignity as a strategy for fighting drug trafficking on four fronts: alternative development, interdiction, eradication of the coca leaf and prevention of consumption. Institutionalization with a view to strengthening governance, access to and modernization of the legal system and the fight against corruption. Finally, equity, as a series of strategic actions to promote social and human development. This includes strongly promoting education, health, basic sewerage, rural development, utilities and gender perspectives. The catastrophic administration of President Banzer (1997–2001) put paid to any plans to fight poverty. Contrary to expectations, the country was embroiled in one of the most turbulent historical cycles of social conflict of recent decades, caused by the crisis of governance, corruption and the ineptitude of government bureaucracy. The only success achieved in four years of government, before Banzer’s resignation, was the fight against drugs. Despite the difficulties faced by democratic governments, social investment in education and health improved qualitatively in relation to the 1960s and 1970s. In relation to GDP, education increased from 3.7% to 4.5% and health from 1.8% to 3.1%. Illiteracy rates dropped from 36.8% in 1976 to 20% in 1992 and 15.9% in 1996. Global health indicators also improved considerably. The infant mortality rate dropped from 150 per thousand in 1976 to 67 per thousand in 1998. Similarly, vaccination coverage in children from 10 to 13 years old surpassed 10 percentage points. Institutional care of pregnancy and birth improved from 52.5% to 69%.9 Housing indices have not suffered any major changes. Electricity coverage in rural areas is very low, and almost a third of the population does not have access to potable water. A third of the population does not have access to a radio to keep informed. Of course, the digital disparity in Bolivia is dramatic. 9. See National Demographic and Health Survey (ENDSA), National Institute of Statistics, 1998. 188 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 188 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana Reports for 1997 from the government unit of social and policy analysis (UDAPE) stated that almost 59% of homes were under the poverty line and 32% did not have enough income to even cover a basic food basket. Poverty in urban areas dropped from 49% to 47%, and extreme poverty was reduced from 22% to 20%. In contrast, the percentage of homes in rural areas living in conditions of poverty and extreme poverty has not changed between 1993 and 1997. Poverty affects 76% of the population and extreme poverty 50%.10 In March 2001, the government submitted the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (EBRB) to international cooperation with a view to drastically reducing its foreign debt (Debt Reduction Initiative Additional to the Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries, HIPC I and II) with creditor countries. This relief will allow the country to reinvest resources in development. Agreements reached with the international community will allow more than US$1,500 million to be invested in the next fifteen years. A second component of the strategy is linked to domestic efforts, especially maintaining fiscal balance. Correspondingly, policies of institutionalization are being implemented in tax collection and control of contraband, as well as in the tax regime. The third component of the strategy has to do with access to markets, improving competitiveness, fighting corruption and strengthening public authorities, especially the legal system. Legal support for the EBRP consists of the National Dialogue Law, a public instrument of consent agreed to by social, political and economic actors in round-table discussions. This law defines criteria for distributing the resources from HIPC II, determines procedures for implementing the policy of compensation, establishes social control mechanisms and sets up regular national round-table discussions. The latter will serve as a constant, vital mechanism of social participation, evaluation of strategy and verification of its impact on the reduction of poverty. The pivotal aspects on which this strategy turns are decentralization, strengthening of the institutional framework, development of production and social investments. The instruments for executing it will be the country’s 312 municipalities, whose centre of gravity will be geared towards developing their production capacity, infrastructure, investments in health, housing and education, as well as implementing environmental policies. The government plans to invest US$4,149 million from 2001 to 2006. 10. See Bolivia: perspectiva económica y social 2000 – 2010. Unidad de Análisis de Política Económica (UDAPE), Cuadernos de Futuro No. 10, La Paz, UNDP, 2000. 189 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 189 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In sum, the need has been established to invest resources in increasing job and income opportunities for the poor population, developing production capacity and increasing protection and security of the poor. Similarly, plans have been made to improve social participation, maintain transversal policies and strengthen institutional capabilities. There are several proposals for overcoming current conditions of poverty in Bolivia that are in line with the heterogeneity of social diagnoses. These can be summarized in four general lines of action: the government proposes (a) increasing job and income opportunities, (b) raising poverty indices, (c) reducing vulnerability, and (d) promoting participation.11 The academic community maintains that they must: 1. Direct their efforts towards sustained economic growth, setting up access to markets in developed countries, executing actions to resolve the problem of access to the sea and developing a systematic strategy geared towards optimizing mechanisms of regional integration; 2. Transform the rural land ownership system in the Andean area; 3. Reconsider production capacities of the Altiplano; 4. Focus on pockets of ‘hard’ poverty by means of multisectoral actions and direct efforts towards migration programmes; 5. Evaluate school and health infrastructure programmes to optimize their use; 6. Stress qualification of education and health services, accelerate educational reform; 7. Carry out a strict follow-up of the debt-relief programme; 8. Eliminate political interference in development programmes and institutions; 9. Improve social statistics as a state policy and support independent research.12 Finally, independent experts suggest that it is imperative to combine poverty and development. To that end, they propose: 1. Promote economic growth and access to jobs, make available good quality land, access to credit, technology and markets, increase production infrastructure; 2. In the field of human development, increase supply and demand for education, health, water, environmental clean-up, from a perspective of equity and efficiency; 11. UDAPE, Bolivia: perspectiva …, op. cit. 12 Various authors, Las políticas sobre la pobreza …, op. cit. 190 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 190 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana 3. Promote citizen development, popular participation, fight cultural and gender discrimination and improve government performance. In terms of economic policies, increase returns on investments, redefine public spending and encourage competition. In terms of public sector policies, defend the environment, guarantee equal access opportunities to productive employment and basic utilities, strengthen municipal m anagem ent and improve adm inistrationofjusti13 ce. More qualitative fieldwork carried out in direct consultation with the people and with support from the World Bank offers a more wideranging perspective on the problem of poverty.14 Those consulted believed that problems of poverty, quality of living and well-being were closely linked to the concept of well-being, social priorities, operation of institutions and the precarious situation of women. They thought that the economic problem was the basic cause, but that it was insufficient to explain the miserable situation and lack of well-being. Similarly, the urban area population associated well-being with job security, while the rural population placed more emphasis on producing enough. There was a strong demand for justice, expressed in terms of unity, not exclusion. It was assumed that exclusion of communities, especially rural ones, was a condition favouring vulnerability and, consequently, people believed that the possibility of living in a community was a basic condition for their security. Those consulted admitted the need to combine individual efforts, outside help and a favourable environment in order to overcome poverty. Work was not enough to break the vicious circle, so people considered that transgenerational conditions needed to be accumulated because poverty could not be solved in the short term. People pointed out that poverty was caused by a complex set of mutually reinforcing factors. People also asserted that their living conditions were worse now than before and that, even though conditions in terms of education and health services were better, that was not enough because of the prevailing need to work as a family. Public institutions were seen to lack legitimacy and to act in a discriminatory fashion. Faced with the exclusion shown by the state, people preferred to take refuge in their families and to strengthen community ties. The question of gender was of course basic to the problem of poverty. In recent times, women 13. See Anaya Rolando Morales, op. cit. 14. See Consultando con los pobres. Reporte de síntesis nacional, La Paz, World Bank, 2000. 191 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 191 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile had acquired more responsibilities, especially work-related, but inversely they received less benefit than men. Domestic violence was seen to have increased dramatically and the family was not exactly the best place to guarantee the safety of women and children. Obstacles to and potentials for development and human security15 Bolivia currently faces a complex scenario of social, economic, political and cultural conflict that has built up over time. The evil consequences of poverty are the most critical factors that put a brake on efforts to progress towards human development and security. It would seem that neither the 1952 Revolution, which significantly disrupted old post-colonial structures, nor the structural reforms implemented since 1985, have been enough to qualitatively improve levels of development. Studies of human development in Bolivia undertaken by the United Nations offer an illustration of the obstacles to achieving reasonable standards of growth and human security. The current situation consists of a set of unresolved paradoxes. Social understanding of human development is focused on a strong demand for modernity, but lacks political leadership based on values associated with the common good. There is a demand for greater social integration, but equal opportunities do not exist. The demand for decent employment is made in a context of recession, low wages and job flexibility. The state’s bureaucratic structure is required to work better, but its operations are anchored in corrupt practices of patronage on dubious legal ground. There is a strong sense of national frustration, and its effects encourage commitments to conservative government trends, especially when the sense of citizen insecurity, violence and public disturbances are set against the erratic answers received from the government.16 According to studies undertaken by the UNDP, there are three basic obstacles in this context: social disparities, institutional weakness and the competitiveness factor.17 15. This section is based on the UNDP Report on Human Development in Bolivia 1998 (Informe de desarrollo …, op cit.). 16. See Mitchel A. Seligson, La cultura política de la democracia boliviana, La Paz, Pittsburgh University/Encuestas & Estudios, 1998 and 2000. 17. Informe de desarrollo …, op. cit. 192 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 192 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana Reports on social disparities show that, despite the progress made in the last twenty years, differences in rural and urban development indicators have been maintained. The poorer the department, the larger the gap between country and town. Similarly, gender inequalities continue, showing that women’s levels of human development are lower than men’s. One of the constant indicators is level of income: when it comes to wages, women receive on average a third less than men. Differences in development by province remain constant. In many cases, the gap in the Human Development Index (HDI) between Andean and eastern regions is abysmal. Some eastern provinces evidence a level of development similar to the average of developed countries, while that of Andean provinces is close to the poorest countries in Africa. This social asymmetry interferes with, and in many cases creates obstacles for, social mobility. Social mobility and public prestige are essential for promoting human development. In this respect, differences in regional and provincial development by gender and income contribute to generating cultural intolerance. Persistent discrimination prevents changes in the social and economic situation of the population. Although no precise records exist, it would seem that less-developed social sectors harbour greater feelings of frustration and misfortune. The difficulty in acceding to resources would also seem to heighten intolerance. The less resources available for regions, municipalities and communities, the more limited are the possibilities for dialogue. Hence, social conflict is not only activated by obstacles that prevent access to resources, but also by the frustration caused by failure to comply with negotiated agreements. As the UNDP report states, closing social gaps requires among other factors that people understand them and mobilize to overcome them.18 Another obstacle lies in the level of competitiveness. Competitive prospects are clearly critical. Bolivia is placed last among seventy-five countries in the latest World Economic Forum Report. There is absolute imbalance between assets and liabilities in this field. The country’s liabilities are associated with low growth of GDP and industrial production, low public debt-equity ratio, poor road infrastructure, reduced capacity for technological innovation, high unemployment and a cumulative deficit in education. Crossing competitive factors by department or municipality will produce the same negative results. Statistically, there is a low correlation in Bolivia between competitiveness and human development. 18. Informe de desarrollo, op. cit. 193 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 193 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Competitiveness, which is impossible to avoid given the force of globalization and the processes of regional trade integration, requires an in-depth transformation of education and training of human resources. At the same time, building an efficient institutional framework, which not only guarantees investments but also strengthens society’s production capacity, is essential. A third factor is institutional. It has been proven that this variable acts interdependently with human development. Without a stable, sustainable institutional culture, without state public policies and with only a low degree of citizen participation in public decisions, there is little likelihood of progress in building competitive conditions. The country must qualitatively change its democratic culture and, especially, improve its social capital. In other words, it must raise the level of availability of society to participate actively in a common project. It is essential that democracy should become a public good experienced by all. For it to do so, freedoms must be exercised more, citizens must acquire a great capacity to join together and, crucially, mechanisms of negotiation and alternative solutions to conflicts and disputes must be strengthened. Unfortunately, the economic crisis tends to break the fabric of family and community, introducing a good deal of frustration and social disenchantment. Together with social capital, proactive mechanisms to encourage social trust, equality and tolerance must be encouraged. Societies such as ours fail to properly take advantage of the opportunities arising from cultural and ethnic diversity. In fact, the opposite is true, and, because of underlying intolerance and discrimination in urban and rural spheres of power, this diversity has become an additional factor of conflict. In this respect, the weight of colonial influence on our society – so prone to establish territories, highlight ethnic differences and exclusion – has not been overcome, although significant progress has been made. The institutional framework is one of the major problems that political elites must solve. In this respect, political parties continue with ancient patrimonial methods of patronage. Failure to fulfil electoral promises, inadequate functioning of the legislature and the loss of equilibrium and independence of public authorities contribute to frustration and disenchantment with democracy. Similarly, party shields in the face of illicit acts obstruct the course of justice, corrupt public values and socialize practices of impunity, besides voiding the ethical, egalitarian sense of the law. 194 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 194 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana Faced with this triad of obstacles, education has become one of the main strategies to see the light of day. Education must be conceived as one of the plausible means for improving inclusiveness of the people, optimizing production capacity and encouraging citizen participation and representation in public authorities. Notwithstanding the limitations mentioned above, Bolivian society has enormous expectations that it will change its low degree of human development. As the UNDP report states, subjectivity is the key to starting a process of interdependence that is proactive with human development. 19 One of the main challenges faced by future governments is changing the past accumulation of pessimistic subjectivity. In this respect, Bolivia has socio-cultural assets that can contribute to improving the situation. One of these assets is the ability of the Bolivian community, especially the Andean community, to organize itself, mobilize and demand liability from public authorities. A large part of the population is registered in some kind of social organization from which people work or mobilize for different purposes. Another Bolivian asset is a sensitivity to dialogue and the search for concertation, notwithstanding demonstrations of violence and social unrest. Despite economic, political and social difficulties, the community has a high degree of mutual sociability and trust. Bolivia is characterized by its tendency to live as a community. As in few societies, community living is admitted to be an important strategy for collectively overcoming difficulties arising from frustration and poverty. Appreciation of dialogue as a means of resolving conflicts is another attribute that can be used as a starting point for progressing towards development. Unless bridges of dialogue are built, there is little likelihood of overcoming poverty. Dialogue and the desire to be heard contribute to solving problems, designing strategies, questioning concentration of power and limiting its authoritarian tendency. Finally, the community is extremely appreciative of the possibilities of overcoming poverty on a local scale. Its ability to mobilize and participate in social organizations supports this assertion. People believe that poverty can be overcome when the community is organized into small groups with the participation of public authorities. 19. Informe de desarrollo …, op. cit. 195 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 195 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Democratic government and social conflict: From unstable equilibrium to constant conflict Almost two decades have not been enough to forge a climate of democratic governance, consolidation and construction of a new state pact in Bolivia. Past instability continues to throw a shadow over the present. The conflict between state and society has become a constant, which over time has eroded democratic values and social aspirations. The country is extremely vulnerable and fragile in institutional terms. At the same time, the quality of life of the population does not seem to improve. So much so that, when there is a major social and political crisis, the Roman Catholic Church and non-state mediators, such as the Permanent Assembly on Human Rights (PAHR), take over negotiations from the government. As a result of its cumulative frustrations since it became a republic, Bolivian society is on the verge of conflict as never before. This situation is fed by the force of globalization and the prevalence of a liberal economic model which lays bare the structural backwardness of a precariously integrated society. Even though conflicts between state and society no longer imply mutual destruction or the logic of war, this does not mean that economic and human costs are any less than in the past. On the contrary, the recurrence, intensity and expansion of social conflict in Bolivia, in proportion to its economy, production capacity and infrastructure, have irreversible effects. This leaves the possibility of improving conditions of development and human security even more remote. There is no doubt that the challenges that must be faced in order to prevent an escalation of violence and conflict are immense. Where the state is concerned, it must be modernized and institutionalized, there must be administrative reforms, corruption must be fought and the efficiency of public services improved. Challenges on the social plane include land distribution, more sovereign management of natural resources, overcoming social exclusion and increasing citizen participation in public decision-making. Similarly, the reactive, repressive pattern of behaviour traditionally assumed by governments when dealing with social conflicts absolutely must be changed. The general view of the people associates inertia and deepening of poverty with the failure of the free market economic model. Similarly, it questions monopoly and privatization of natural resources managed by foreign companies whose sole goal is seen to be to plunder the country’s heritage. According to experts, there are several causal 196 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 196 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana explanations for the pessimism and sense of social misfortune, two of which are fundamental. First, structural reforms were implemented without any consensus and in a socio-cultural context that was not very predisposed to change. Second, the economic measures adopted provided stability but failed to generate development and economic growth. In this context, the political system is seen to be an evil mediator that widens social disparities by benefiting only a privileged minority. Although not enough studies have been undertaken to make any correlation between the economic model and the transformation of patterns of conflict in Bolivia, several analysts have suggested that the roots of violence lie in a lengthy process of unresolved post-colonial accumulation, deepened and updated by application of the free market model.20 Even though Bolivian society has been extremely tolerant of economic reforms implemented since 1985, hoping for improved conditions and quality of life, the fact is that the sacrifice made did not produce the compensation expected. The threshold of social resistance was breached in 2000. That year, the country experienced one of its most intense cycles of social conflict and violence, which put democracy in check. Several factors were influential in taking this situation to unforeseen limits. Two events marked this turning point in the country’s history over the past two decades: the so-called ‘water war’ (Cochabamba, April 2000) and the largest road blockades since 1979, also called ‘the flea war’ (Andean Altiplano, September/October 2000). In the first conflict, several of Cochabamba’s social sectors, allied to suburban and rural communities associated with the demand for community water management, instigated one of the largest social mobilizations of the twentieth century. Privatization of this resource and the increase in water rates for irrigation and human consumption detonated confrontations with the forces of law and order. In the context of a state of siege, police/military mobilization caused several deaths and hundreds of wounded and also furnished evidence of anticonstitutional behaviour by the forces of law and order who used military ‘sharpshooters’ to shoot defenceless civilians. The second event was characterized by one of the longest, most stubborn blockades by peasants of the roads linking the Altiplano and valleys with La Paz. The country’s political and economic capital was surrounded by thousands of indigenous people who cut off and stopped 20. See Xabier Albó and Raúl Barrios (eds.), Violencias encubiertas en Bolivia, Vols. I and II, La Paz, Ediciones CIPCA/Aruwiyiri, 1992. 197 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 197 25/04/2003, 12:54 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile the supply of basic goods to more than one million inhabitants. The blockades set up by the Aymara indigenous movement, a political force whose roots of rebellion date back to the seventeenth century, were in support of the creation of an indigenous state. These mobilizations rocked the country, but at the same time instigated one of the largest spirals of violence, death and destruction of the road infrastructure.21 Both events point to a break in the traditional pattern of conflict in the country and its consequences, that is, displacement of the political prominence centred on the miners’ movement to the indigenous and peasant movement. Under the monotony of trade union centralism, miners had dominated the political scene from 1952 to the end of the twentieth century. Currently, peasants are the ‘new political force’, which articulates many social demands and whose political weight includes the powerful Chapare coca-growers movement. Incorporation of a radical discourse calling for the ‘defeat of the neoliberal, oligarchic, racist and excluding state’ is in line with this displacement in the correlation of social forces. This renewed social movement proposes setting up a new state based on respect for cultural identity, indigenous participative democracy and selfmanagement of natural resources, and rebuilding of democratic, community forms of production.22 In fact, the peasant movement proposes reconstruction from a historical perspective, strongly linked to the past, whose symbolic synergy fosters its mobilization and orders strategies of resistance around a radical, anti-colonial discourse. Indigenous movements from the east, the Amazon and the Chaco, as well as the recently established Landless Movement, have gained strength in conjunction with the emergence of the peasant movement. There is no doubt that the peasants from the Altiplano and the cocagrowers from Chapare and the Yungas are the new, questioning, mobilizing force that has put Bolivian politics in check. It has also caused a geographical displacement of the conflicts. Mobilization and resistance in new territories have obliged the government to embark on extraordinary movements of their forces of law and order. 21. Some students of politics have coincided in pointing out that the size and nature of these conflicts mark the end of the liberal economic model administrated by an incompetent, corrupt political system. In fact, these outbreaks of social unrest crowned the profound crisis of governance, supported by pyrrhic interparty agreements and pacts, with political parties more concerned with hiding their behaviour behind a shield of impunity. See H. Róger Cortez. ‘La reforma estrangulada’, Pulso, La Paz, 2001. 22. See Linera Alvaro García. ‘Sindicato, multitud y comunidad. Movimientos sociales y formas de autonomía política en Bolivia’, in Various authors. Tiempos de rebelión. Colección Comuna, La Paz, 2001. 198 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 198 25/04/2003, 12:54 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana The strength of the mobilizations has imposed new forms of negotiation and handling of territories under conflict. Government representatives now travel to negotiate in the territories occupied by the peasant movement. Thus, new codes are being rewritten for the struggle and these have laid bare the fragility of the state and its current administrators. The peasant-indigenous movement has managed to relocate ‘civilizing’ negotiations historically set up in town and in the domain of dominant authorities, moving them to the countryside. This is a singular event, because it breaks with all the traditional forms of mediation and the political clientele. The grassroots now negotiate directly with government ministers and their leaders are mere mediators of their demands. This new style of negotiation has incorporated the role of women in a significant manner; although they had always been present in trade unionism and the social movement, until now they had remained invisible. The negotiations introduced components of social control. These were carried out under supervision by the community to avoid any manipulation. This new form of handling conflicts and negotiations from a social basis is an expression of the high degree of mistrust and resistance in the face of recurring government deception. In turn, it is a negation of the traditional practice of co-opting trade union leaders. Of course, the fighting strategies of the new social movement have changed radically. It has opted for a type of efficient return to past indigenous resistance, but also emancipation from that past. There is no doubt that the greatest strategy and weapon in this struggle is the roadblocks, which, given Bolivia’s serious limitations, have a catastrophic impact on the economy. This strategy has transformed the power and balance of the peasant movement, forcing it to move through different stages of organization and resistance. In this context, strikes by miners would seem to be in decline as the main strategy in the political struggle of the workers’ movement. There is no doubt that the new pattern of conflict formulates demands concerning not only social inclusion, but also modernization, recovery of ethnic identity, respect for indigenous rights and tolerance of cultural diversity. In urban circles, demands include re-establishing social victories and restoring the authority of the state in dealing with private and transnational companies. Essentially, the right for migrant populations to own land, as well as improvement of the economy to provide jobs for the population working in the informal market. In general, demands are focused on solving problems of poverty, correcting governmental oversights, solving economic backwardness, 199 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 199 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile unemployment, fighting against corruption and resisting privatization of public assets.23 Government administration and performance, in other words its crisis of efficiency and legitimacy, are vigourously questioned. Even though the conflicts entail maximalist positions, there are reasonable convictions behind them. In general, people do not believe that conflict is the ideal way to make their demands, but it is the only one that allows them to achieve anything. It is not the best, but it is effective. This would suggest that the government itself and the state have become instigators of social conflicts. Conflicts develop in a vicious circle – protest/indifference, mobilization/underestimation, intensification of mobilization/hurried negotiations to conclude with a spurious resolution. In fact, much of the conflict arises from the government’s failure to fulfil its promises.24 Even though conflicts have become constant, in general terms Bolivians are deeply concerned with democracy as a possible means of achieving equality, as an affirmation of their rights and opportunities and as an option for building civic responsibility; also, the country’s destiny as a unit. They aggressively reject the free market economy. All the above has triggered the possibility of conflict in society, repeatedly stirred up by the defects of the political system. The view of conflict described above coincides with the first diagnoses of the climate of violence and human insecurity made in the mid-1990s. That report stated that the social problems faced by Bolivians could be grouped under five tendencies: 1. Acknowledgement of the lack of social integration mechanisms and of a persistent, strong tendency to exclude more vulnerable groups from the dynamics of development; 2. Strong, deep-rooted pessimism in most of the population regarding their individual and collective chances of improving their situation; 3. Acknowledgement of a national cultural logic that is restricted in terms of its capacity to adapt to modern changes; 4. Growing illegitimacy of state institutions, typified by patronage, cooption, inefficiency, impunity and crisis of credibility; and 5. Non-existence of channels of communication between the state and society and within society itself.25 23. See Encuesta nacional sobre conflictos sociales en Bolivia. Observatorio de conflictos, La Paz, Analytical Unit for Defense Policies, 2001. 24. See Roberto Laserna, David vs Goliat en Cochabamba: Los derechos del agua, el neoliberalismo y la renovación de la propuesta social en Bolivia, Revista tinkazos, La Paz, No. 8, 2001. 25. La seguridad humana en Bolivia, percepciones políticas, sociales y económicas de los bolivianos de hoy, La Paz, PRONAGOB-PNUD/UNDP-ILDIS, 1996. 200 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 200 25/04/2003, 12:55 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana In sum, Bolivian society is facing a crisis of democratic governance, both in terms of its political capacity to promote and legitimize change and in terms of being able to execute it. This crisis stirs up conflict and reduces opportunities for dialogue and consensus with a view to instigating a national development project. In this context, uncertainty, a sense of abandonment, vulnerability and insecurity of the people are on the increase. The conduct of the state in dealing with the conflict has also changed. It has focused more on reactive/repressive tendencies than on preventing conflict. In fact, governments have been unable to understand the change in the patterns of conflict, nor, worse yet, the new culture of conflict which currently envelops Bolivian society. The government’s attitude towards encouraging dialogue is marred by a constant superior logic and lack of preventive capacity. In recent years, the government has lost its power to bring people together and its legitimacy to make propositions that will solve conflicts. Consequently, the two sides resort to third parties, such as human rights institutions and the Roman Catholic Church, who act as efficient mediators. Governments have opted reactively to employ two political weapons – repression of the social movement and a state of siege. Paradoxically, neither of these has produced reasonable results. Until now, no government has absolved itself from declaring a state of emergency. There is still no democratic government, moreover, in which human rights violations have not been a constant associated with the irrational use of the forces of law and order. Citizen security and state reaction in check In spite of the fact that there are no comparative studies correlating poverty with violence and insecurity, there has been a tendency in the last few years to associate both with structural weaknesses long since inherited by the country. Expert opinion remains ambiguous. Some analysts have tended to combine deterministic explanations as structural causes of violence with the type of institutional violence and social conflict caused by the weakness of the state. At the beginning of a new century, Bolivia undoubtedly presents a complex set of paradoxes. One is the modernization of its economic policy, anchored in a perspective of liberal openness, which coexists with patronage, corruption and unpunished practices. The poor democratic institutional framework, growth of inequality and poverty 201 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 201 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile and enlarged sphere of social exclusion contrast with moderate economic growth and stability, based on the creation of political pacts which gave the country its longest democratic cycle of the twentieth century. As Mayorga has stated, this is a contradictory situation. ‘Growth of democracy has meant institutional progress in the political and electoral systems and in civil-military relations, but, notwithstanding the above, the disastrous inheritance of a tradition dominated by the absence of basic constitutional guarantees that are essential for exercising civil responsibility and by the violation of human rights, has not been overcome.’26 There is a kind of sociological density which clouds the correlation between economic, political and social factors and the growth of crime and insecurity. In fact, over the past few years qualitative changes have occurred in several areas of the country’s circumstances: intensive urbanization, high rates of unemployment, conflictive social environment, disintegration of drug-trafficking networks, increase in social inequality and crisis of the political system, in addition to a weakening of the legal system, despite its modernization. To this must be added the impact of the international economic crisis, which is contrasted with the country’s low degree of insertion in world markets. It is in this context that we consider citizen security, understanding it to be a ‘concern for quality of life and human dignity in terms of freedom, access to the market and social opportunities’.27 One of the most visible problems of the last decade has been the loss of the state’s ability to handle and administrate its monopoly of the forces of law and order, as well as deficient administration of justice. Police corruption, which resulted in the largest institutional crisis of the century, emergence of armed groups, privatization of security, inefficiency of judicial agencies, as well as the exponential growth of private justice, all furnish revealing data on this problem. Over the past few years, we have observed the sustained growth of various forms of violence and insecurity. According to data from the National Institute of Statistics,28 furnished by the national police force, recorded cases per year according to type of offence, misdemeanour, minor crime and intervention have spiralled not only 26. See R. Antinio Mayorga, ‘Democracia y seguridad ciudadana e instituciones del orden público’, talk given at the Forum on Governance and Human Development, La Paz, PRONAGOB-PNUD/UNDP, 25 March 1997. 27. See Irma Arriagada and Lorena Godoy, Seguridad ciudadana y violencia en América Latina; diagnóstico y políticas en las años 90, p. 9, Santiago, ECLAC, Social Policies Series, 1999. 28. See Estadísticas policiales. Delincuencia, violencia y disturbios civiles, La Paz, National Institute of Statistics (INE), 1995–1999. 202 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 202 25/04/2003, 12:55 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana in terms of number but also in intensity. Ordinary offences increased from 68,853 in 1995 to 100,145 in 1999, misdemeanours and minor offences from 58,776 to 82,118 and interventions from 16,896 to 22,481. The same source shows that offences against property increased 87% between 1995 and 1998. One of the most striking statistics is undoubtedly the growing number of people arrested for various offences. In 1995, 68,231 people were arrested compared with 168,839 in 1999. Of all crimes recorded from 1995 to 1998, 64.2% on average were offences against property. Of these, during the same period, 68.6% on average were robbery and theft compared with 42% in the 1980s. Civil disturbances, many leaving unfortunate victims, have undergone understandable variations due basically to different styles of governance, implementation of state policies and also the capacity to manage and solve disputes. Notwithstanding, the nature of conflict has changed dramatically as a result of the increase in poverty and crisis of governance. An average of some 3,000 disputes per year was recorded between 1995 and 1998.29 Theft of vehicles is one of the most critical problems in crime. These thefts increased by more than 100% in recent years. These data must be treated cautiously, however, because surveys of public opinion regarding citizen security provide much more serious data, as shown below. Citizen security seems worse when one compares complaints filed by private citizens with the ability of the police and legal system to resolve them. In practice, both institutions fail to resolve even 40% of complaints filed. This enormous difference, coupled with general distrust of extremely corrupt police and court actions, encourages people to take justice into their own hands. Lynchings have increased significantly in the past five years. Twelve lynchings were recorded in the country between 1992 and 1996. In 2001, this figure had jumped to thirtyseven lynchings, eight of them failed. Most occurred in town suburbs, caused by the people’s sense of impotence and their anxiety at seeing their precarious assets threatened. As Rivera stated: ‘private executions are a kind of delegitimization of existing legal procedures and practices, an action undertaken by the populace because they feel vulnerable and 30 insecureduetotheinabilityofthepoliceandthecourts .’ 29. According to National Institute of Statistics records, civil disturbances are considered to be strikes, public demonstrations, plenary meetings, disturbances, shutdowns and blockades. See INE, op. cit. 30. See Fredy Rivera Vélez, Violencia y seguridad ciudadana, Revista iconos, No. 7, FLACSO, Ecuador, (http://www.cebem.com/centdocum/documentos/dviolenciaecu.htm). 203 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 203 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The crisis in citizen security, especially the institutional collapse of the police force in the face of crime, has caused the emergence of dozens of private security firms. The latter, together with the creation of municipal police forces, private detective agencies, vigilante committees and community night patrols, are holding in check the authority of the state with regard to its primary role, which is to provide the population with security. Recent governments have been powerless in the face of growing organized and common crime. Their answer has been to militarize not only citizen security but also the fight against drugs and control of contraband.31 Of course, violence and crime have multiple causes. Hence, it would be useful to consider some aspects which bear directly on this problem. In the first place, Bolivian society, as is the case in most of the region, is exposed to the internationalization of crime, whose most objective expressions are drug trafficking, arms trafficking, armed robbery of banks and private financial institutions, kidnapping and prostitution. Bolivia’s geographical position is especially important in this respect, for it has become a transitory bridge and temporary refuge for international bands of criminals. At the same time, it provides opportunities for criminal activities and easy movement between the Andean region and MERCOSUR countries. Intelligence investigations have shown that criminal migration works simultaneously and very efficiently with vertical tactics (domestic level) and horizontal ones (transnational), especially in terms of armed robbery, drug trafficking, and transfer of arms and vehicles. Second, the growth of domestic criminal networks linked to foreign organizations has included the use of sophisticated information systems, technology and criminal intelligence services, which in many cases neutralize the state’s preventive capability. Third, high levels of police corruption, inefficiency and incompetence, as well as the weakness of courts in punishing and imprisoning criminals, encourage crimes to be committed. Fourth, the absolute lack of state policies in matters of citizen security reduces the capacity of social reaction against crime. The sum of these and other factors contributes to creating a climate of constant insecurity in the population. The impact of violence and insecurity on public opinion is constantly increasing, especially through the daily coverage provided by the media. It must be noted, however, that levels of perception of the substantial growth of crime, measured in surveys of victims in 1995 and 2001, 31. See Juan Ramón Quintana, Gobernabilidad y fuerzas armadas en Bolivia, Lima, Andean Committee of Jurists, August 2001. 204 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 204 25/04/2003, 12:55 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana confirm the seriousness of the problem. People perceive that offences involving vehicles have increased alarmingly in the past six years. For example, total theft of vehicles increased by 422%, partial theft by 335% and malicious damage by 225%.32 The survey shows that the most extreme cases of vehicular crime quadrupled, other cases tripled and minor offences doubled. Furthermore, the crime recurrence rate in this same field increased by 11% in the same period. Survey data show that geographical areas where crimes are committed have also changed. Whereas in 1995 crime was concentrated in specific areas, in 2001 people were of the opinion that the danger was the same anywhere in the towns. This leads one to think that all towns are dangerous and that nowhere is free from danger. The perception of domestic crimes, especially robberies, has increased by 27% in the last five years. Even though robberies have not increased to the same extent as vehicular crimes, the fact is that the danger of having one’s home robbed has spread to all social classes and the rate of recurrence is 11%. One of the most critical statistics is undoubtedly personal robbery with violence. This type of crime has increased by 82% over the same period. According to the results of the survey, personal crimes are at an intermediate point – less serious as the situation concerning vehicles in the last six years, but much more serious than domestic robberies. Criminals used to prefer assaulting people of little means. Today criminal selectivity has practically disappeared. Whereas in 1995 the tendency was to rob older men and women, in other words defenceless people, now no criteria is used because absolutely everyone is susceptible to being assaulted and robbed. Similarly, personal crimes have spread to all towns. The number of criminals has tended to drop over the last six years. Fewer criminals are operating, but they are doing so with increasing violence. More firearms are being used by criminals than six years ago, and the criminals’ arsenal has diversified considerably. Sexual crimes show the greatest increase during this period. Sexual harassment of women has increased by 87% with a rate of recurrence of 20%. Tendencies regarding criminals and places where the crimes are committed have not changed: people close to the victims commit the crimes in well-known places. Similarly, intra-family violence has increased at the alarming rate of more than 135%. 32. See ‘Así piensan los bolivianos No. 76. Encuesta nacional sobre delincuencia y criminalidad’, Encuestas y estudios, Vol. II, August 2001. 205 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 205 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The low credibility of the courts and police corruption and inefficiency continue to encourage social resistance to reporting crimes. Even though it is true that the percentage of people who reported crimes to the authorities increased from 12% to 18% between 1995 and 2001, 82% and 88% abstained from doing so for various reasons, mainly those mentioned above. The sense of insecurity has increased alarmingly. The degree of freedom to walk the streets has dropped from 57% to 48% in the last few years, and trust in the police has fallen noticeably. 95% of people think that the police do a poor or only a fair job, while only 5% think that they do a good job. Faced with this situation, 12% of people said that they had acquired a firearm, while 5% said that they had taken out some kind of insurance against theft. Of course, given this critical perception of insecurity, citizens tend to place greater trust in private justice. 35% of people surveyed nationwide agreed that neighbours should take justice into their own hands. Along these same lines, support for the death penalty has increased in proportion to the level of mistrust and disbelief in the law. In 1995, only 54% supported the death penalty, while in 2001 67% supported it. Finally, one of the essential factors for explaining the climate of citizen insecurity is undoubtedly the problem with the police force. This problem is vitally important in Bolivia, because the institutional behaviour of the police in the last few years has confirmed what an enormous danger they are, not only to citizen security but also to democratic governance itself. All surveys of public opinion in the country, without exception, point to the police force as the country’s most corrupt institution. Similarly, reports from the People’s Defense Committee, civil human rights organizations and Parliament have showed that it is the state institution that commits most human rights violations. The police force shares first place with political parties and Parliament as the least trustworthy of all public or private institutions. Surveys reiterate its bad reputation, as well as its professional inability to resolve citizens’ problems.33 During the last half-century, the Bolivian police force has shown terminal symptoms of organic decomposition, marked by cumulative problems of institutional inefficiency and disorder, without any solutions being offered by the state. Paradoxically, after nearly two decades of democracy and state reforms, the police force, just like the armed forces, continues to be left out of all projects involving institutional reform and modernization. 33. See ‘Así piensan los bolivianos …’, op. cit. 206 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 206 25/04/2003, 12:55 Poverty, Social Conflict and Citizen Insecurity ... Juan Ramón Quintana There are various explanations for the crisis in the police force.34 These include, in particular: 1. This problem forms part of a major crisis caused by modernization of the state and factors associated with the internationalization of organized crime. 2. It is an expression of the expiration of the political system whose prebendal logic of patronage is subsumed by the police force as an institution. This explains the existence of reciprocal pacts of complicity and shielding from blame between the political system and the police force, which for a long time fed an unresolved process of internal politicization. 3. Extreme bureaucratization aimed basically at endowing the police with extra-legal economic privileges and prerogatives at the expense of carrying out the mission entrusted to them by the Constitution. This includes collecting legal and illicit funds which feed pockets of corruption without any governmental or parliamentary control. 4. Chronic institutional weakness expressed in the fragmentation of corporate capital, which, encouraged by the lack of ethical values and the institution’s leadership vacuum, tends to political deliberation and discretionary application of rules and regulations. 5. Enormous corruption reflected repeatedly in criminal association between police and criminals. 6. Chronic loss of public service mandate arising from lack of professionalism. 7. Militarization of structure, values, doctrine, organization and institutional functions. 8. Institutional autonomy which places the police force above the rule of law. Finally, the lack of a modern state policy on public security has prevented the conception of projects aimed at modernizing and professionalizing the institution, essential in order to restore the authority of the state in the face of police autonomy. Similarly, institutional inefficiency and incompetence form part of the collapse of both the police force model and state security logic. Traditional patterns of action were not changed in democracy, nor was a new code of police ethics introduced that would reconcile the rule of law with citizens’ rights. 34. See Juan Ramón Quintana, Policía y democracia. Los laberintos de la inseguridad ciudadana en Bolivia, Research Project, Bolivian Strategic Research Program (PIEB), La Paz, 2001. 207 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 207 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The absence of a policy on citizen security prolongs the state’s traditional operational inertia, the failure of which is evident in the face of the rapid sophistication of the criminal element. Instead of redesigning a new institution which can respond to the complexity of domestic and international crime, the police force continues to be a bureaucratic organization with little resources, deficient intelligence services, precarious technology and limited training of its human resources. All this puts members of the police force in an untenable, very vulnerable position. The number of police casualties in performance of their duty has increased over the last few years. In sum, deficient police action based on an inadequate organizational structure reflects the crisis of a public security model anchored in a still authoritarian, informal state logic rather than in the prevalence of the rule of law. Similarly, the police crisis is an expression of the collapse of a political system with which the police force has maintained uninterrupted buddy relations for more than half a century. Conclusions The structural poverty in which Bolivian society is immersed, and which at present has no possible solution, requires a policy of state, but at the same time the construction of a new social pact. Democracy and the process of consolidation are undoubtedly essential factors for political stability and economic growth. However, profound changes in cultural and educational patterns for managing, negotiating and solving social conflicts in an alternative manner are required. Other, no less important, challenges involve uprooting patronage, improving poor performance of public administration and eliminating corruption in state bureaucracy, while at the same time rebuilding the legal authority of the state and its legitimate monopoly of the forces of law and order. Correspondingly, preventing the community fabric from being broken down and social capital from deteriorating in the face of the apparently unstoppable maelstrom of the free market economy and globalization means mobilizing citizens and strengthening their civic potential so as to be able to imagine and design alternative solutions to the irrational imbalance between capital and work. 208 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 208 25/04/2003, 12:55 CHIAPAS: CRISIS AND DISRUPTION OF SOCIAL COHESION. CHALLENGES FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 RAÚL BENÍTEZ MANAUT 2 Disruption of social and political cohesion This paper evaluates the crisis in Chiapas, Mexico, from the point of view of a very long process of social and political crisis, which culminated in the disruption of the fabric of society and pre-existing cohesion among communities. This disruption of social cohesion has had a severe political impact and has transcended regional borders to become a national crisis. Social structures existing in Chiapas since colonial times, and which were restructured in the nineteenth century, managed to adapt to the revolutionary regime in the twentieth century, maintaining agricultural power as the core of political domination. Social reforms made by the Mexican Revolution were implemented without changing historical structures, thereby failing to prevent polarization and radicalization of political conflicts. Political order began to gradually 1. This paper is a personal academic reflection. It does not include or represent any institutional opinion. 2. Researcher with the North American Research Center, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 209 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile deteriorate starting in the 1970s, and indigenous peoples and peasants slowly emerged as subjects demanding the transformation of dominant structures. Numerous factors combined to transform the crisis of semi-feudal domination into a radical disruption of political relations. These elements include the influence of insurrections in Central America, the emergence of alternative pastoral activities to traditional ones, both by groups from Protestant Churches and from the ‘theology of liberation’; the successful creation of a foundation of social support by an armed group that was not considered to be involved in guerrilla activity, and which won this support by focusing its struggle on the demands of indigenous peoples and putting claims for autonomy, restoration of traditional cultures and the proposal that the Mexican Constitution should be amended to accept ethnic plurality, respect for common law and education in indigenous languages as the core element in its negotiations. Disruption of social cohesion in indigenous communities in Chiapas was nourished by the collapse of an almost feudal regime of domination. Protests by numerous indigenous and peasant sectors began to emerge in the 1970s, causing a defensive reaction by local groups of landowners supported by state and federal power structures. The result was the rebellion by indigenous peoples in Chiapas in January 1994, headed by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). As the Chiapas crisis is the result of the unviability of a model of political, social and economic domination, whereby relations between dominant sectors supported by the Mexican State and indigenous communities were disrupted, the solution must of necessity be brought about by rebuilding or building a new social fabric that includes new mechanisms of social and political cohesion among communities. This paper maintains that, starting in 1994, the Mexican Government has tried to contain the insurgent forces and the communities and groups that support them by means of an ‘indirect approach’, based on social policies aimed at isolating the political, social and international support which the rebellion headed by the EZLN has managed to win. This containment strategy was not successful from 1994 to 2000. There has also been a clear deployment of military force to ‘saturation’ levels, in order to ensure that any military strategy by the EZLN should be considered impossible as a result of the enormous difference in correlation of forces between the two military groups. Another mechanism of containment and ‘reconstruction of social cohesion’, having failed so far, has been to dialogue with the insurgent group, seeking their disarmament and insertion in political life, a strategy 210 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 210 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut which has also been unsuccessful for six years. In other words, there has been a ceasefire, dialogue and bogged down negotiations, but no decisive negotiations have taken place that satisfy the demands of the EZLN and the communities that support it to the extent of transforming it from a military force into a social, political movement. Dialogue has failed, but military fighting has not broken out again, thereby gradually and increasingly undermining political stability and causing the outbreak of serious political violence, which has heightened the crisis of social cohesion and deterioration of the rule of law to unprecedented levels. The most significant indicator is human rights violations, whose maximum expression was the Acteal massacre in December 1997, where those primarily responsible were local security forces (police and local government officials). On a military level, Mexican armed forces received orders to clash directly with the EZLN between 1 and 12 January 1994 and between 9 and 16 March 1995. The army uses an almost constant ‘deployment of forces’ as a deterrent in Chiapas, without being able to clash directly with the EZLN. The core element in explaining military deployment in Chiapas is consolidation of a deterrent and indirect containment. This is due to the lack of a suitable political climate for using the army directly. There simply has not been enough consensus regarding the government’s Chiapas policies among Mexican political elite [now divided into three main parties – the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)], in civil society and at an international level. The EZLN, for its part, primarily from 1994 to 1996 built a network of support that has become its main defence strategy. The EZLN has managed to convey an image that is a guerrilla force whose main weapon is its ‘moral strength’ in representing indigenous Mexican peoples. It is supported by significant segments of the Mexican political elite (basically in the PRD) and civil society. Similarly, it has very large international solidarity networks, mainly in the United States, Canada and Europe, basically organized through NGOs. There is consensus in the bosom of Mexico’s political elite and civil society to search for a solution via dialogue and negotiations. This is also the view expressed internationally, starting with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, various branches of the government of the United States and numerous European governments and NGOs. In sum, a military solution to the conflict is not very likely, so the army must restrict its deployment of forces to shows of force (deterrent), control of communications (patrolling roads and highways) and 211 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 211 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile guarding strategic and border facilities. The current Mexican State does not have enough legitimacy to resort to direct military action.3 State monopoly of the use of force. The Mexican Government’s weakness and failure of the Mexican Revolution According to Max Weber, the modern state is ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory’,4 so it is the only one that can legally and politically use force in a society. This theory does not apply to rural areas in Mexico. As a result of the failure of agricultural land distribution and social policies of Mexico’s revolutionary regimes, peasant and indigenous rebellion has once again become one of the deciding elements of social and political conflict in Mexico. The failure of the state has led to widespread ‘systems of self-defence’ as a means of protecting property and settling political disputes. This has become widespread in the country’s more backward regions. Consequently, since the 1970s a large wave of violence between peasants and landowners has erupted in many states, primarily Chiapas and Guerrero. In other words, rural social cohesion, which was considered one of the most important elements of the policies of the Mexican Revolution, has entered a terminal crisis. Chiapas is the state with the worst poverty indices in Mexico; it has the largest percentage of indigenous population in relation to the whole and the least capacity of the state to implement effective policies in the fight against poverty. Similarly, the rule of law is practically non-existent in Chiapas. Indigenous peoples and peasants do not have access to the law.5 Consequently, the Mexican federal government 3. The change in the governing party with the triumph of Vicente Fox on 2 July 2000, heading an alliance of parties centred on the PAN, does not invalidate the theory that the Chiapas crisis can only be resolved via politics and negotiations. 4. Max Weber, Economy and society, Vol. I, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, New York, Bedminister Press, 1968. 5. José Ramón Cossío, José Fernando Franco and José Roldán, Derechos y cultura indígena. Los dilemas del debate jurídico, Mexico, Miguel Angel Porrúa, 1998. See also Magdalena Gómez, ‘Chiapas: El estado de derecho y la legitimidad’, and José Roldán Xopa, ‘La crisis de Chiapas: Desafíos para el derecho’, in Cynthia Arnson and Raúl Benítez Manaut, Chiapas, los desafíos de la paz, Mexico, ITAM/Miguel Angel Porrúa/ Wilson Center, 2000. 212 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 212 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut has failed in its attempt to impose the rule of law in Chiapas, so systems of justice based on self-defence have been developed. The State of Mexico has repeatedly allowed local landowning classes to dominate local systems of justice, thereby causing a gradual disruption of the traditional fabric of society without any alternative mechanisms based on efficient, modern state institutions. As a result, military force (active and deterrent) is the mechanism used to project the Mexican State. The agricultural reform as a product of the Mexican Revolution has not had enough impact to satisfy the needs of the indigenous and peasant population. This has led to ownership of land being concentrated in the hands of a few and the marginalization and extreme poverty of most of the indigenous and peasant population.6 By way of showing how backward it is, a National Population Council document evaluating the educational structure in Chiapas states: ‘In 1940, for example, nearly 45.9% of the population of the Republic of Mexico knew how to read and write, whereas in Chiapas less than 23.8% knew how to do so. By 1980, figures show that a little over 80% of the population of the Republic of Mexico knew how to read and write, while in Chiapas only 63.8% knew how to do so. This year, the illiteracy rate in Chiapas is at the same level as that of the Republic of Mexico in 1950.’7 At the same time, this study mentions that only 11% of the population has access to institutional health services.8 Whereas 70% of the population on a national level has drinking water, only 43% of the Chiapas population has access to this utility; this percentage drops to 23.5% in Selva Lacandona and 33.4% in the north,9 the zones where the EZLN is strongest. On analysing these problems of quality of life among the indigenous population, the study states: ‘The indigenous people per se are not a problem, but there are serious situations of backwardness associated with them which have a negative effect on their quality of life; for example, only 8% have access to piped water, 100% do not have sewerage, 100% do not drink milk, 90% do not eat meat and 75% do not eat eggs; their diet consists of corn and beans, which in most cases is not enough’.10 6. Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, A Poor People. Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1989. 7. Consejo Nacional de Población Estudio Sociodemográfico del Estado de Chiapas, p. 68, Mexico, CONAPO, Provincial Government Secretariat, 1985. 8. CONAPO, op. cit., p. 68. 9. Ibid., p. 72. 10. Ibid., p. 78. 213 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 213 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Information available for 1995 shows that these conditions have not changed; on the contrary, they have worsened. For example, only 14.46% of the whole population is a beneficiary of the Mexican Social Security Institute or the State Workers’ Social Security and Services Institute (ISSSTE).11 The rest only enjoy coverage from the Health Secretariat, or departments that run parallel health programmes, such as the Social Development Secretariat or the armed forces. There are only 12,721 doctors in the State of Chiapas to take care of 3.5 million people (1 doctor for every 235 inhabitants). The illiteracy rate stands at 27% of the population and is the highest in the country.12 These conditions describe the quality of life of the Chiapas population, similar to conditions in Central America in the 1970s, when armed movements expanded their activities. One can say, therefore, that the Mexican Revolution failed in Chiapas. Social, political conflicts and violence. The guerrilla is reborn Political conflicts arising from the struggle for land predominate in Chiapas. Landowners defend their properties with armed ‘white guards’, and peasants and indigenous peoples ‘invade’ these properties. Both groups resort to violence and none resort to the law. The violence of this struggle for land in the 1980s thus produced the widespread conditions that led to the outbreak of ‘small civil wars’ throughout most of the state. Self-defence and ‘taking the law into one’s own hands’ became accepted methods in the fight between landowners and peasants and indigenous people. For landowners, it was to protect their properties using white guards; for peasants and indigenous people, it consisted of violent takeovers of properties because the Agricultural Reform Secretariat did not hand over the land.13 The federal State of Mexico showed a tremendous inability to impose the law and prevent social, political and subsequently military polarization in Chiapas. In other words, it was unable to maintain Max Weber’s paradigm – the monopoly of legitimate force.14 11. INEGI Anuario Estadístico del Estado de Chiapas, p. 196, Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), 1997. 12. INEGI, op. cit., p. 237. 13. Juan González Esponda and Elizabeth Pólito Barrios, ‘Notas para comprender el origen de la rebelión zapatista’, in Chiapas, Vol. 1, Mexico, Economic Research Institute, UNAM, 1995. 14. Implausible Deniability. State Responsibility for Rural Violence in Mexico, New York, Human Rights Watch/Americas, 1997. 214 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 214 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut On the other hand, the disintegration and weakness of armed leftwing groups in Mexico in the 1960s and 1970s meant that most analysts could assert that a similar rebellion to the one that occurred in Central America in the 1980s could not possibly happen in Mexico. Besides, their tactics and strategies could not aspire to taking over the reins of power, nor coordinate with popular movements: ‘No rural, local guerrilla movement can triumph in such a vast, urban country as Mexico.’15 Consequently, analysts considered that situations such as those occurring in Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia or Peru could not occur in Mexico. Between 1977 (year of the political reform and amnesty, which reinserted guerrillas into legality) and 1994 (public appearance of the EZLN), there was no significant guerrilla activity, so containment by the army and government security forces can be considered to have been successful in those years. On 1 January 1994 an unknown group, which had organized itself in almost complete clandestinity, seized San Cristóbal de las Casas and six settlements in the State of Chiapas.16 The EZLN was born of the former FLN guerrillas.17 As such, according to its own spokespersons, it had celebrated its tenth anniversary on 17 November 1993,18 so its actions had been executed in total silence (in other words, what in guerrilla parlance refers to the phase of ‘accumulation of political and military force’). This was the first time in the history of contemporary Mexico that a guerrilla force managed to generate sympathy and real political leadership in large sectors of the population, for it is estimated to have more than 2,000 sympathisers and militants,19 and its area of political influence includes more than 200,000 indigenous peoples. The Mexican army itself estimated that the EZLN had 5,000 combatants at the start of the conflict.20 Most interpretations point to the emergence of the EZLN in Chiapas as a product of two circumstances which coincide in time.21 15. Jorge Castañeda, La utopía desarmada. Intrigas, dilemas y promesa de la izquierda en América Latina, p. 104, Mexico, Joaquín Mortíz, 1993. 16. Literature on the Chiapas crisis is vast. See Elaine Katzenberger, First World. Ha, Ha, Ha, San Francisco, City Lights Books, 1995; EZLN. Documentos y comunicados, Vol. 1, Mexico, ERA, 1995; EZLN. Documentos y comunicados, Vol. 2, Mexico, ERA, 1996; Carlos Tello Díaz, La rebelión de las Cañadas, Mexico, Cal y Arena, 1995; Chiapas, 4 vols, Mexico, Economic Research Institute, UNAM, 1995, 1996, 1997. 17. Tello Díaz, op. cit., pp. 60–85. 18. ‘Aniversario de la formación del EZLN, 19 de noviembre de 1994’, in EZLN. Documentos y comunicados, Vol. 2, p. 131. 19. Representatives of 1,111 indigenous communities participated as EZLN militants just in the March on Mexico City in September 1997, La Jornada, Mexico, 14 September 1997. 20. La Jornada, Mexico, 7 January 1994. 21. The army’s interpretation of the Zapatista rebellion can be seen in Revista del ejército y fuerza aérea mexicanos, Era III, Year 88, Mexico, SEDENA, January–February 1994. 215 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 215 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile On the one hand, there were very similar economic, social and political structures to those in Central America; the State of Mexico had not been able to express itself through, nor develop, its institutions, political leadership was controlled by an elite of local political bosses and landowners and there were no real, impartial structures for imparting justice. The above led to an accumulation of disputes and tension over land and the emergence in the 1970s, and primarily in the 1980s, of a large number of autonomous peasant and indigenous movements, which were brutally repressed by the authorities. This led to a polarization of the social and political situation, speeding up social and political breakdown in a similar manner to Central America. Dominant sectors began to develop structures of ‘self-defence’, and the peasant and indigenous movement began to radicalize its actions (mainly takeovers of rural properties). This private exercising of justice by both poles of conflict caused the disappearance of already inherently weak police and legal structures. In other words, rural zones in Chiapas were feudalized.22 On the other hand, radical political leaders managed to insert themselves successfully and take over leadership of peasant and indigenous movements that were fighting against the power of dominant local classes, and little by little what in 1993 was to become the EZLN began to develop. The link between these peasant and indigenous movements and the EZLN became a ‘strategic alliance’.23 Religious leaders known as ‘theologians of liberation’ joined the movement, setting up an ‘alternative power group’.24 Thus, a duality of power emerged in Chiapas between traditional groups permanently occupying local PRI and state government structures, supported by Mexico’s federal government, and this emerging, autonomous, power group, which gradually began to organize around the EZLN. They were two antagonistic projects with no common ground between them, and this led to extreme violence. 22. Neil Harvey ‘Rebellion in Chiapas: Rural Reforms and Popular Struggle’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1995. See also Jan de Vos ‘Raíces históricas de la crisis chiapaneca’, in Arnson and Manaut, op. cit. 23. Donna Lee Van Cott, Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American Security, p. 65, Washington, D.C., Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996. 24. Carlos Bravo, Samuel Ruíz, Pablo Latapí and Andrés Aubry, Chiapas: El evangelio de los pobres. Iglesia, justicia y verdad, Mexico, Espasa-Calpe Mexicana, 1994. 216 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 216 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut Declaration of war on the army and phases of conflict The EZLN initially declared war on the federal government and army: ‘We declare the following to the Mexican federal army, the pillar of the Mexican dictatorship that we suffer from, monopolized by a one-party system and led by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the maximum and illegitimate federal executive that today holds power,’ and ordered its military forces to march on Mexico City: ‘… advance to the capital of the country, overcoming the Mexican federal army’.25 These original demands, projected to national levels, were changed very quickly to focus on the demands of the indigenous communities. Acceptance of the ceasefire proposed by the federal government changed the objective – of reaching Mexico City – and, by dialogue with the government, ‘legitimized’ a power which the EZLN had considered to be ‘illegitimate’. The list of thirty-four demands made by the EZLN on 3 March 1994 all focused on the needs of the peasant and indigenous population of Chiapas.26 The EZLN subsequently did an about-turn in its strategy, abandoning its objective of ‘taking over power’ and denying any intention to act again in a military fashion. It centred its discourse on projecting the representativity of Mexico’s indigenous population and its demands. Its messages and press releases began to be targeted on that objective, thereby avoiding being considered a ‘military adversary’ and obtaining significant support which made it impossible for the army to act against it. For example, in December 1995 it stated: ‘The EZLN has a public commitment with the people of Mexico to insist on dialogue and negotiations in order to search for a political solution to the war begun in 1994. The EZLN has no warlike intentions and is not making any preparations to assume offensive actions against supreme government forces or the positions that they occupy, nor does the EZLN intend to in any way alter the local, regional or national situation (…). We are preparing for peace, not war.’27 Based on the above, the phases of the Chiapas conflict are as follows: 1. War. From 1 to 11 January 1994. Characterized by the EZLN offensive and the active defensive response of the army – active military containment. The military result of this phase was 152 dead. 25. ‘Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, 2 de enero de 1994’, in EZLN …, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 34. 26. ‘EZLN. Pliego de demandas. 3 de marzo de 1994’, in EZLN …, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 178–85. 27. ‘Comunicado, 23 de diciembre de 1995’, in EZLN. Documentos y comunicados, Vol. 3, Mexico, ERA, 1997, p. 67. 217 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 217 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile 2. Ceasefire and initial dialogue. From 12 January 1994 to 8 February 1995. This phase is characterized by two subperiods – dialogue between the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee of the EZLN (CCRI-EZLN) and the Chiapas Peace and Reconciliation Commission (headed by ‘commissioner’ Manuel Camacho, with mediation by Bishop Samuel Ruíz). Meetings were held from January to June 1994, at which time the EZLN rejected the government peace proposal, issued a ‘Second Declaration from Selva Lacandona’ and called upon ‘civil society’.28 From that moment until 8 February 1995 there was a ceasefire without any official communication between the government and the EZLN. In November 1994, Samuel Ruíz set up the National Mediation Commission (CONAI). 3. 9 February 1995 to 6 March 1995. Second military phase of the conflict. From the order to capture Subcomandante Marcos (identified by the government as Rafael Sebastián Guillen Vicente) to debate and approval by Congress of the ‘Law for dialogue, conciliation and honourable peace in Chiapas’. The military operation against the EZLN was called ‘Rainbow’ and, in theory, Marcos was to be captured in five days.29 4. Start of the second phase of dialogue between the EZLN and the government. Two instances of mediation were set up: CONAI and the Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (COCOPA). The first was headed by Samuel Ruíz, and the second by a committee of PRI, PRD, PAN and PT senators and deputies. This phase of dialoguenegotiations culminated with approval at the negotiating table of the Larráinzar Agreements on 16 February 1996.30 5. Cooling of dialogue and negotiations without any military confrontation,. March 1996 to December 1997. The government – through representatives of the official party – failed to incorporate the Larráinzar Agreements into Union Congress debates. These would supposedly have involved reforms to the Constitution, primarily with regard to the ‘autonomy of indigenous peoples’, in other words, acknowledgement that Mexico was not an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation.31 28. ‘EZLN. Segunda Declaración de la Selva Lacandona. 12 de junio de 1994’, in EZLN …, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 269–78. 29. Andrés Oppenheimer, México: en la frontera del caos, op. cit., p. 251. This author states that this operation was one of the army’s military failures: ‘But Operation Rainbow was a total failure: Marcos had fled from his headquarters shortly before the army’s attack,’ p. 256. 30. ‘Acuerdos sobre derechos y cultura indígena a que llegaron las delegaciones del EZLN y el gobierno federal en la primera parte de la plenaria resolutiva de los Diálogos de San Andrés Sacamch’en’, in Chiapas, Vol. 2, op. cit., 1996. 31. Luis Hernández Navarro, ‘Entre la memoria y el olvido: Guerrillas, movimiento indígena y reformas legales en la hora del EZLN’, in Chiapas, Vol. 4, op. cit., 1997. 218 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 218 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut 6. Breakdown in communications, dismantling of CONAI and no dialogue, from January 1998 to 2000.32 As a result of the ‘Acteal Crisis’, which led to the resignation of Emilio Chauffet, Provincial Government Secretary, and an enormous national and international questioning of the government for human rights violations. Chiapas security forces were held legally responsible. 7. Change of government, attempts to negotiate and the Zapatista caravan. From 1 December 2000 to date, the government set up a new negotiating commission, demilitarized the areas of conflict and allowed the Zapatista caravan to take place. The Union Congress accepted the presence of Zapatista representatives in Congress. The EZLN once again withdrew to the mountains. Negotiations without any solution Negotiations are centred on the debate to change the constitution to recognize ‘Indian peoples’. Writer Carlos Montemayor states: ‘The Indian people’s struggle has to be to transform the State, which would be at Constitutional level, and transform its relationship with regional governments. Indian peoples have to be very clear about when they are fighting against the government of a region, when they are facing the government of the whole country and when they are considering what form the country as a whole should take as a State’.33 This postulate paves the way for polarized debate. On the one hand, it is asserted that there cannot be laws of exception for any individual or group in Mexico (the liberal philosophy of the 1824, 1857 and 1917 Mexican Constitutions) and that all citizens are equal in terms of rights and duties, with Mexico’s territorial integrity being in danger.34 On the other, it is asserted that constitutional spaces must be opened for indigenous communities.35 This debate conditions negotiations between the EZLN and the government. Resistance to changing the Constitution is not only political, but also philosophical, throwing doubt on the foundations of ‘national unity’ and the ‘social cohesion’ which it implies is rejected.36 This is the result of a prevailing classical concept 32. This analysis covers up to October 2000. 33. Carlos Montemayor, ‘Reconocimiento jurídico a los pueblos indios’, paper submitted to the Second Assembly of the National Indigenous Congress, Mexico, 14–15 September 1997, Coyuntura, Mexico, No. 83, November–December 1987, p. 18. 34. José Manuel Villalpando César, Los Acuerdos de San Andrés Larráinzar: Retorno al pasado-problemas a futuro, México, Instituto de la Integración Latinoamericana, 1998. 35. Jorge A. Vargas, ‘NAFTA, the Chiapas rebellion, and the emergence of Mexican ethnic Law’, California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1994. 36. Felipe Vicencio Alvarez, ‘El reconocimiento del otro, condición para una reforma justa’, in Autonomía y derechos de los pueblos indios, Chamber of Deputies, México, 1998. 219 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 219 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile of national security, which is threatened by the possibility of fragmented territories or ‘pockets’ of autonomy.37 Negotiations between the government and the EZLN are evidently in crisis from several points of view: 1. Mediation format. The peace commission formula (1994) failed and a government delegation was tried (1995 to 1997), with the CONAI and COCOPA acting as links between the EZLN and the government. A four-party negotiating table. 2. From military to political-community or ‘feudalization’. As of 1995, the core of the conflict moved from a military confrontation between the EZLN and the army – currently virtually impossible – to generalized violence between communities – mainly in the north of Chiapas – between EZLN sympathizers and PRI sympathizers. This phase peaked with the massacre of forty-five indigenous people in Chenalhó on 22 December 1997 by paramilitary groups directed by PRI militants.38 The federal government abandoned political efforts and transferred efforts to ‘contain’ the EZLN to local political elites39 (which meant ‘feudalizing’ security). This strategy was based on harassment of Zapatista sympathizers by ‘paramilitary’ groups. Several sources of information state that there are seven of these groups (Chiapas versions of the Guatemalan or Salvadoran ‘death squads’ of the 1970s and early 1980s) and that, since 1995, they have caused the death of more than 1,500 indigenous people and displaced more than 10,000 from their communities of origin.40 The strategy of feudalizing the countryside sought to cause an outbreak of conflict in indigenous communities by having peasants and indigenous peoples clash for reasons of religion, land, heritage, etc. This, of course, increased violence, further weakened the rule of law, and, in sum, strengthened ‘feudal’ forces while weakening federal government.41 37. Donna Lee Van Cott, op. cit., pp. 65–87. 38. Reforma; La Jornada, Mexico, 24 December 1997. See article ‘Aseguran que grupos priístas dan entrenamiento paramilitar a jóvenes’, La Jornada, Mexico, 17 June 1997, p. 5. 39. Claudia Guerrero, ‘Una guerra paralela’, Reforma, Mexico, 8 December 1997, p. 4A. 40. ‘Exterminio en Chiapas’, Proceso, Mexico, No. 1104, 28 December 1997, pp. 6–17. The seven paramilitary groups are Peace and Justice, The Chinchulines, Red Mask, Fray Bartolomé de los Llanos Alliance, Antizapatista Insurgent Revolutionary Movement (MIRA), The Throat-cutters and The People’s Armed Forces. The group held responsible for the Chenalhó massacre on 22 December 1997 was Red Mask, led by the PRI´s mayor of Chenalhó. CONAI sources say that 11,443 indigenous people were displaced between 1995 and 1997, La Jornada, Mexico, 31 December 1997, p. 1. 41. Roger Bartra, ‘Violencias indígenas’, La Jornada semanal, Mexico, 31 August 1997. Bartra is one of Mexico’s foremost anthropologists. 220 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 220 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut 3. The army as main actor. The army headed efforts to contain the EZLN on two brief occasions – from 1 to 11 January 1994 and from 9 February to 5 March 1995. During the remainder of the conflict, the army has been a passive containment force, making a large deployment of force as a deterrent (between 20,000 and 40,000 at any given moment), which means committing more than 20% of its soldiers to Chiapas on a semi-permanent basis. 4. Impossibility of military formulae. Both the army and the EZLN have been prevented from acting militarily. During the conflict, the Salinas government (January–November 1994) and subsequently the Zedillo administration (as of December 1994) have come up against enormous national and international rejection of the use of military force during moments of tension (January 1994 and February 1995). In contrast, efforts to set up dialogues lend legitimacy to government strategy. 5. ‘Moral strength’, the EZLN’s shield.42 The EZLN’s projection of its discourse both nationally and internationally is based on its ‘moral strength’ – representing the indigenous peoples and fighting for a noble, just cause. This logically also makes the direct use of arms unviable. Thus, the EZLN has become an armed guerrilla group that cannot use its arms. It has managed to deploy an international ‘invisible army of militants’ or ‘network warriors’ which gives it political strength,43 in the face of its precarious military capability. The Mexican army cannot act against this new type of combatant, because it is set up to fight a ‘conventional war’ or the irregular ‘guerrilla-style’ wars typical of the Cold War period. The primary impact on the army, however, is that for the first time since the mid-1970s, the armed forces have been accused of violating the human rights of the civilian population.44 Faced with this crisis in the peace negotiations, in an opinion poll of August 1998, Mexican civil society had this to say:45 42. ‘Moral strength’ in the sense that Clausewitz gives it in a war: ‘Moral strength is the spirit which impregnates all war ... the state of mind and other moral qualities of an army, of a general, of a government, public opinion in the regions where the war takes place, the moral effect of a victory or a defeat’, Carl von Clausewitz de la Guerra, Diógenes, Vol. 1 of 3, p. 155, Mexico, 1973. 43. David Ronfeldt and Armando Martínez, ‘Comentarios sobre la guerra de red zapatista’, in Sergio Aguayo and John Bailey (coor.),Las seguridades de México y los Estados Unidos en un momento de transición, p. 343, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1997. 44. Human Rights Watch/Americas Mexico, The New Year Rebellion: Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law During the Armed Revolt in Chiapas , Vol. 6, No. 3, Washington, D.C., 1 March 1994. Amnesty International Mexico, Disappearances: A Black Hole in the Protection of Human Rights, Report AMR 41/05/98, London, 7 May 1998. 45. ‘Percepción de la sociedad mexicana sobre el conflicto de Chiapas’, Perfil de la jornada, 19 August 1998. Survey by the Rosenblueth Foundation. The sample comprises 4,854 people over 18 years old interviewed on the street in twenty-three states. 221 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 221 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Questions No 1. Has the government made its best efforts to achieve peace? Yes Don’t know 57% 35% 8% 2. Has the EZLN made its best efforts to achieve peace? 49% 41% 10% 52% 42% 6% 60% 22% 18% 5. Has the army treated indigenous communities with respect? 61% 25% 14% 6. Has the army allowed or encouraged the formation of paramilitary groups? 45% 28% 27% 55% 34% 11% 8. Do you think that the army should withdraw from indigenous communities? 56% 32% 12% 9. Is the presence of the EZLN a useful contribution to the process of negotiation? 42% 40% 18% 44% 40% 16% 3. Has the army been useful in conserving the peace? 4. Has the government been consistent in what it says and does? 7. Does the army represent a danger to indigenous communities? 10. Does the EZLN legitimately represent indigenous peoples? 11. Who is responsible for the Acteal massacre? Federal government 45% State government 10.5% PRI paramilitary 13.9% EZLN 10.6% Roman Catholic Church 4.8% Don’t know 12.4% 222 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 222 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut To sum up, public opinion in Mexico is divided regarding the Chiapas crisis. The EZLN has a better image than the government in terms of its desire to search for peace, and the population is mainly in favour of the army being withdrawn. In other words, the EZLN is the first armed movement in Mexico since the Cristeros movement in the 1930s which has a basis in society and has succeeded in legitimizing its demands in sectors of the nation’s civil society and even internationally. Hence, the only way to pacify Chiapas is by political negotiation. Strategic-military analysis In political terms, both the EZLN and the army have won by not using ‘arms’. The army gains national and international recognition and legitimacy by submitting to ‘civil authority’ and not imposing military solutions.46 The EZLN shows that it is not ‘fundamentalist’, that it accepts the ceasefire and that it prefers dialogue with the government to acting in similar fashion to other armed groups in Latin America. In this respect, the EZLN has gained similar recognition to the FMLN in El Salvador and the URNG in Guatemala,47 when they accepted to dialogue and negotiate with their respective governments, reinserted themselves in legal, political life and dismantled their military forces. Hence, for both the army and the EZLN, arms are a ‘deterrent’, not for shooting, and being a guerrilla force that does not fight is the EZLN’s main legitimization. There is tremendous speculation in Mexico about the existence of more armed groups. Since the outbreak of the Chiapas crisis, there has been much talk of other groups that are reorganizing in clandestinity. One group of former guerrillas from the 1970s, who form part of the Center of Historic Investigations of Armed Movements (CIHMA), maintains that there are ‘at least’ fourteen armed groups operating mainly in Puebla, Hidalgo, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Veracruz and Guerrero. Likewise, the CIHMA maintains that between them, from 1994 to 1997, government officers and soldiers and guerrillas suffered ‘500 casualties’.48 46. Stephen Wager and Donald Schulz,The Awakening: the Zapatista Revolt and its Implications for Civil Military Relations and the Future of Mexico, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 1995. 47. Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) signed a peace accord with the government of El Salvador on 16 January 1992, and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) signed a peace accord with the government of Guatemala on 29 December 1996. 48. La Jornada y reforma, Mexico, 2 December 1997. According to the CIHMA, the revolutionary nomenclature of the 1990s has set up the following groups. In the State of Guerrero, the Southern Armed Revolutionary Commando, Genaro Vázquez Army of Execution, Chilpancingo Army of Insurgency, Southern Liberation Army, Southern Mountains Liberation Army and Clandestine Armed Forces for National Liberation. In Oaxaca, the Clandestine Indigenous Commando for National Liberation and the Clandestine Armed Forces for National Liberation operate. In Baja California, Chihuahua and Sonora, there is the Popular Insurgent Revolutionary Army. 223 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 223 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Given the dispersed nature of these groups and the uncertainty as to whether or not they exist, action by the army and state security forces, structured mainly around the Provincial Government Secretariat, is defensive, preventive and intelligence gathering. In June 1996, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) made its appearance in the State of Guerrero. 49 It was set up on the first anniversary of the ‘Aguas Blancas massacre’, when ‘militarized’ police forces of the Guerrero state government murdered seventeen peasants who were members of the Southern Mountains Peasant Organisation (OCSS). 50 The EPR acts in one of the most violent regions in Mexico, where local political bosses, joined together through ‘families’, 51 control economic, social and political structures.52 The EPR’s main areas of action are the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca. Its predecessors are the armed groups from the 1970s (mainly the PROCUP), and its name was changed as a result of the merger of fourteen dispersed clandestine groups. For the EPR, the Mexican State and its political system have not changed, there is no true process of democratization and, therefore, waging a guerrilla war is viable. The EPR has shown that it has commandos in the states of Mexico, Hidalgo, Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca. Its forces are based in rural indigenous and peasant communities in the two latter states, while the others are urban cells.53 Popular support for the EPR is small compared with the EZLN and it has no support at all in ‘civil society’. Government strategy in dealing with it reiterates actions against guerrillas in the 1970s – rural counter-insurgency with the army taking the initiative, and security forces being used to detect urban cores. No type of dialogue or negotiation is envisaged with the EPR. According to the journal Proceso, up to December 1996 the EPR was operating in seventeen states and had caused twenty-six casualties among soldiers and police. 54 The strategy of war is justified for the EPR, because it considers that, despite the elections of 6 July 1997, democracy still does not exist in Mexico: 49. ‘Mexico’s New Guerrilla Eruption’, World Press Review, November 1996, pp. 16–17. 50. The Aguas Blancas massacre, committed on 28 June 1995, was investigated by the National Committee for Human Rights (CNDH) and several national and international human rights institutions. The conclusion was that the Guerrero state government was totally responsible. This led to the police responsible being imprisoned and the resignation of the governor. Political polarization led to the radicalization and increasing linkage of several peasant movements which would later form part of the EPR. See ‘Clamor de justicia en el segundo aniversario de Aguas Blancas’, La Jornada, 28 June 1997, p. 3. 51. The most powerful ‘family’ of local bosses in Guerrero is that of Rubén Figueroa. The ‘family’ power structure in Guerrero is very similar in this case to that of Sicily. 52. Armando Bartra, Guerrero bronco: campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa Grande, Mexico, Ediciones Sin Filtro, 1996. 53. This is studied in depth in Raúl Benítez Manaut, ‘Guerrilla. Civilizarse o morir’, Enfoque-Reforma, Mexico, 5 January 1997. 54. Proceso, Mexico, No. 1098, 16 November 1997, pp. 22–8, which maintains that the data are from ‘military intelligence’. 224 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 224 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut ‘It’s hard to believe that we have reached the end of the road to democracy when this type of injustice is taking place in our Mexico; it’s hard to think that democracy has begun its journey in our Nation when most of the people are witnesses to and victims of corruption, demagogy, exploitation, injustice and oppression’.5 5 Three federal government institutions are basically responsible for containing armed groups in Mexico: the Provincial Government Secretariat (responsible for domestic law and order and civil intelligence services), the Attorney General’s Office of the Republic (PGR) (responsible for enforcing the law) and the National Defense Secretariat, which acts when security and police forces are overrun, based on the codes of the Constitution and its defence plan DN2. In Mexico, however, direct use of the armed forces has always been a subject of controversy. Since the student movement in 1968, the army has tried to stay clear of becoming involved in controlling political commotion and the PGR is a collapsed, inefficient institution. Hence, in most cases, the Provincial Government Secretariat assumes responsibility for seeking a negotiated solution to the conflicts. In the 1970s, the army was able to contain rural guerrilla groups, primarily the Party of the Poor in Guerrero, using a classical counterinsurgency strategy. In the 1990s, the strategy of containment for the EZLN is indirect, while it is direct for the other armed groups (basically the EPR). Numerous sources of information in 2000 mention that there are as many as sixteen armed groups, but only four of them have evidenced any military capability – the EZLN, EPR, ERPI and FARP.56 Since 1994, the armed forces have been training in modern counterinsurgency tactics, despite the fact that their policy is ‘deterrence’.57 As an American analysis has stated, in Chiapas ‘moderation in the government’s response was a reaction to the growing popularity and legitimacy of the Zapatistas’.58 Consequently, the government moved from a direct response (use of the army) to an indirect response, looking to negotiate. The presence of foreigners in indigenous communities in Chiapas is a real obstacle to any military action and to attacks by local paramilitary groups; hence, they serve to ‘protect’ the communities. 55. ‘Comunicado del EPR sobre las elecciones del 6 de julio de 1997’, Reforma, Mexico, 27 July 1997. 56. The ERPI is the Insurgent People’s Revolutionary Army and the FARP are the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces. FARP have been active in Mexico City in 2000. 57. Tactically, the Mexican army wrote its Manual de Guerra Irregular in order to provide its members with conceptual and practical elements for fighting guerrillas. See Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA), Manual de Guerra Irregular. Tomo I. Operaciones de Guerrilla, Mexico, 1998, and SEDENA, Manual de Guerra Irregular. Tomo II. Operaciones de contraguerrilla o restauración del orden, Mexico, 1998. 58. Major Antony Lerardi and Major Casey Wardynski, ‘The Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas’, Military Review, Vol. LXXIV, No. 10, 1994, p. 74. 225 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 225 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The armed forces budget was increased in the 1990s in order to strengthen their combat capability. The percentage of military spending in relation to government spending between 1990 and 1996 increased from 1.96% to 6.16%.59 Similarly, the number of personnel under arms increased considerably. Between 1986 and 1995, it increased from 169,746 (army and air force 129,695, navy 40,051), to 225,200 (army and air force 172,072, navy 53,128).60 By 1999, the number is expected to have risen to 323,000 personnel, of which between 20,000 and 40,000 will be deployed in Chiapas.61 This increase in the resources of the armed forces is not only due to the possibility that they may have to be used directly in Chiapas, but also to strengthening their capabilities in the war on drug trafficking and their growing responsibilities in reinforcing public security forces, watching borders and the strategic installations of Pemex, the staterun oil company, and CFE, the Federal Electricity Commission.62 Another important army mission in indirectly supporting deterrent containment of the EZLN is performing numerous activities that can be considered as ‘civic action’. These are support activities for marginal sectors (indigenous communities) consisting of vaccinations, dental treatment, building rural roads, distributing basic foods, etc. This civic action forms part of the classic counter-insurgency theory, in other words ‘win over the hearts and minds’ of the population, and ‘leave the fish stranded out of water’, which is to cut down the guerrilla group’s leadership among the population. There is absolutely no doubt that the Chiapas crisis forced the army to institute an in-depth reform of its organizational structure, with the creation of the Airborne Group of Special Forces (GAFE), which has been set up in twelve regions and forty-four military zones. The GAFE is a foundational factor in containing drug trafficking or armed movements, depending on the region or military zone.63 59. Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal, Mexico, SHCP, 1991, 1997. 60. Poder Ejecutivo Federal, Segundo informe de gobierno, Anexo, 1 September 1996, Mexico, 1996. 61. This is studied in Raúl Benítez Manaut, ‘Las fuerzas armadas mexicanas a fin de siglo’, Fuerzas armadas y sociedad, Year 15, No. 1, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, January–March 2000. 62. This was very important when the army took over command of the police in Mexico City from May 1996 to December 1997. 63. The Grupo Aerotransportado de Fuerzas Especiales is a Mexican adaptation of the ‘hunting’ battalions of the Salvadoran army, created in the mid-1980s to confront the FMLN. The hunters were small, extremely mobile battalions, well-trained, more capable of penetrating zones controlled by guerrilla forces and with intelligence training. 226 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 226 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut Through binational cooperation programmes between Mexico and the United States, the latter has been instrumental in boosting the modernization and professionalization of the army.64 Mexico was the Latin American country that most benefited in 1996 and 1997 from military aid targeted through the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), with 221 students in 1996 and 192 in 1997. To this must be added Mexican attendance at Spanish-language training schools, which was higher than any other Latin American country. 149 Mexican students attended the School of the Americas in 1996, and 305 in 1997. 141 attended the Interamerican Air Force Academy in 1996, and 260 in 1997. 1,085 students were trained in military and police courses in 1998, and the aid budget was US$26 million. This budget dropped to US$21 million in 1999. Significant amounts continue to be applied for from required aid budgets, however, to support training of Mexican military personnel at the School of the Americas and the Interamerican Air Force Academy.65 For example, in justifying the need in Congress to request foreign aid funds for 2001, the following was said about Mexico: ‘The United States is interested in good government, application of the law and regional stability by means of an evolution in the capabilities of the Mexican military in terms of human rights. IMET funds for 2001 will provide professional and technical training in areas of mutual concern, such as military command capabilities, technical abilities, human rights, resource administration, and English speaking abilities. The effectiveness of IMET will be measured in part by the promotion of officers trained in the United States and civil personnel to positions of leadership and command, thereby increasing interoperability and cooperation in joint operations, and the effectiveness of missions against drugs and others that help strengthen application of the law’.66 The aid given to Mexico was the largest of any Latin American country, with the exception of Colombia. Cooperation was targeted significantly on anti-drug-trafficking programmes, but academy courses also include training in irregular warfare. The emphasis on respect for human rights is directly related to the Chiapas crisis. 64. Adam Isacson and Joy Olson, Just the Facts. A civilian’s guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington D.C., Latin America Working Group, 1998. 65. Adam Isacson and Joy Olson, Just the Facts. 1999 Edition. A civilian’s guide …, pp. 90–1, Washington, D.C., Latin America Working Group, 1999. 66. U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001, 15 March 2000, p. 29. 227 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 227 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile This increase in budget, personnel under arms and US military aid has led some analysts to talk of ‘militarization’.67 The above is asserted because: more troops are seen to be deployed on highways and roads leading to rural communities; responsibilities have been transferred from other security forces and the police to the army, and officers from the armed forces are being used in security forces; and men and budget have increased.68 One of the elements making it difficult for the armed forces to be used directly in the Chiapas conflict is the type of strategies and tactics employed by each party. If we use Alvin Toffler’s scheme69 as a theoretical point of reference, then the EZLN combines military forms from the first agricultural civilization (its military base is made up of indigenous peoples who are politically and ideologically motivated, but have no military training or modern weapons) and the third technological civilization (use of modern communications and international solidarity networks), while Mexican armed forces are trained for wars from the second civilization (conflicts between nationstates) and confront insurgency with ideologies, strategies and tactics developed during the Cold War (such as the armed movements of the 1970s or the EPR). Consequently, their different ways of understanding military strategy and the fact that they base their strength on different elements (the EZLN on ‘moral strength’ and mobilization of the indigenous peoples, without any weapons, and the Mexican army on ‘material strength’ and the backing of the rest of the machinery of the state, with an overwhelming superiority in human, material and equipment resources) make it very difficult for either of the two forces to be able to successfully fight against its adversary. Because of the above, the political arena has become the main arena where the fight must take place. One of the most important strategic elements present in the Chiapas conflict is the presence, as indirect actors, of numerous NGOs, mainly defenders of human rights, which support the EZLN. This variable, present in many conflicts in other parts of the world, can be considered an unconventional, but very important, actor, which stops the Mexican army from taking direct action. It has become a virtual defensive shield and projection of the EZLN’s demands to other countries.70 Similarly, 67. Graham H. Turbiville Jr, ‘Law Enforcement and the Mexican Armed Forces: New Internal Security Missions Challenge the Military’, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1997. 68. Turbiville, op. cit., pp. 69–70. 69. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war, Boston, Mass., Little Brown Press, 1993. 70. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activist Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1998. 228 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 228 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut many of these NGOs, including many linked to European political parties and religious organizations, develop an activism that is essential for the EZLN and which the Mexican government or armed forces are powerless to deal with (except by applying the Immigration Law).71 Similarly, this support for the EZLN is projected through important figures in the international political and even artistic scene. Four scenarios The breakdown in negotiations in 1996 has led the conflict’s primary actors – the government and the EZLN – into a dead-end street. There are social and political forces opposed to a negotiated solution to the conflict – mainly landowner sectors in Chiapas – and many sectors in favour of negotiation (in the rest of the country). The above results in the following scenarios for the conflict: 1. Prolongation of the current impasse, leaving direct containment to local forces (government of the State of Chiapas and its security forces and the landowners). This ‘solution’ entails a growing humanitarian catastrophe because of human rights violations, conflicts between communities for religious or land-related reasons and refugees from these conflicts (there are currently 10,000 displaced people). The Ernesto Zedillo administration’s strategy was to ‘wear down the EZLN’, and the EZLN was seeking to survive through to the end of the Zedillo government in December 2000. This option ‘feudalizes’ the conflict, propagates each party’s (landowners and peasants and indigenous peoples) systems of self-defence and undermines state governance and stability. The result of this strategy is the outbreak of small civil wars in communities and constant confrontations and tensions between local security forces and peasant and indigenous movements. Both parties maintain ‘hard’ positions: the government refuses to amend the Constitution (if the Larráinzar Agreements were implemented), and the EZLN will not dialogue unless those agreements are fulfilled.72 The result of this option is the constant presence of armed forces and their deterrent. This scenario means an almost complete absence of the rule of law and institutions that impart justice. 71. During the first months of 1998, the Mexican government expelled groups of proZapatista activists, thereby causing tremendous controversy. In March, 145 Italians were expelled. 72. For an analysis of the Agreements of San Andrés Larráinzar, see Luis Hernández Navarro, Chiapas. La nueva lucha india, Madrid, TALASA, 1998. 229 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 229 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile 2. Resumption of military clashes. This is the least likely of the scenarios. Vicente Fox’s triumph in the elections on 2 July 2000 makes it even less probable. If the EZLN were to start any military offensive, it would lose everything that it has gained nationally and internationally in political and even financial support. To quote Clausewitz, it would lose its moral strength and legitimacy. Zedillo and the military high command have constantly refused to use the armed forces. Vicente Fox has also rejected the idea of using the army as an option. The Mexican Government would not have the backing of Congress or civil society (most pressure groups, such as businessmen and the Church, oppose a military solution), or backing from abroad. The United States has been emphatic in stating that the solution must be a negotiated one. When asked the question, ‘What does the United States want for Chiapas?’, Jeffrey Davidow, the US Ambassador to Mexico, replied, ‘It wants a negotiated peace, without violence’.73 The main obstacle for the government and the armed forces in a military solution would be the probable violation of human rights of the civil population (it is estimated that in a counter-insurgency war between five and ten innocent people die for every guerrilla killed). Another element making a military solution difficult is the probable prolongation of the conflict (that a rapid deployment operation fails to achieve its objective), that the rebellion is dispersed and becomes very difficult to detect and fight and that the ELZN’s reaction is a ‘war of attrition’, entailing the danger of ‘Messianization’ in an indigenous sense. 3. Stalled national negotiations. The need for a negotiated solution is acknowledged, but no novel formula that can break the impasse in place since 1996 has been implemented. This option has been set aside because of a lack of political will and the inflexible positions adopted by each party. The government has implemented several mutually contradictory formulae in the negotiations with different offers for the EZLN. In May 1994, the EZLN was offered a package of measures which even made references to political and administrative autonomy.74 Subsequently, in February 1996, the Agreements of San Andrés Larráinzar were signed. Once signed, the government made an about-turn and refused to debate them in Congress (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), and then existing mediating bodies were disallowed and accused of being biased (which caused the CONAI to disband in 1998). The government has had five different Peace Commissioners or mediators, with different levels of leadership and organizational abilities.75 Two different mediation formulae 73. Ambassador Davidow’s interview with María Elena Medina, Reforma, México, 6 August 1988, p. 10A. 74. During the period in which Manuel Camacho was the federal government negotiator. 75. Manuel Camacho, Jorge Madrazo, Marco Antonio Bernal, Pedro Joaquín Coldwell and Emilio Rabasa. 230 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 230 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut have also been used: the first was via a Peace Commission (1994), and the second via a Commission from the Provincial Government Secretariat (1995–2000). Negotiating tables have been set up in two formats: three-party during 1994 (government, EZLN and mediator), and four-party from 1995 to 1998 (government, EZLN, CONAI and COCOPA). After the Larráinzar Agreements had been signed, the conflict between February 1996 and 1998 focused on negation and amendment (government’s position) or full fulfilment (EZLN), which led to the suspension of negotiations. The EZLN has participated in the negotiations in two ways: through Subcomandante Marcos and conditioning negotiations to mediation by Samuel Ruíz (1994) and, subsequently, through the commission set up by the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee (CCRI) and mediation by the CONAI. The EZLN considers that the negotiations were concluded in the Larráinzar Agreements and maintains that they should be executed. In the face of this impasse in dialogue and negotiation, the debate has again focused on the method of mediation and legitimacy of the mediators, because the EZLN refuses to recognize the government’s mediators; for example, no talks were conducted with Emilio Rabasa. 4. New forms of mediation. After the crisis caused by the Acteal massacre in December 1997, there has been talk since early 1998 of new mediation formats so that dialogue suspended since 1996 can be renewed. Four proposals have been focused on to renew mediations: (a) The government proposal to continue with the ‘mediator’ method of the Provincial Government Secretariat in a ‘direct dialogue’ with the EZLN, without any intermediaries. This format is rejected by the EZLN, because it ‘does not trust’ the government; (b) A new mediation format using Mexican ‘dignitaries’ trusted by both the EZLN and the government to get the two parties communicating again and thereby renew negotiations; (c) International mediation. This formula can be implemented via ‘dignitaries’ – there was insistent mention of the possibility of Latin American Nobel prizewinners – or institutional mediation by the United Nations.76 This third form of negotiation is rejected by the Mexican government, considering that it threatens national sovereignty and foreign policy principles, and because it would mean acknowledging the inability of domestic resources. In this regard, President Zedillo said, ‘We Mexicans do not need, nor do we accept, foreign tutelage to settle our differences or solve our problems’.77 The 76. Raúl Benítez Manaut, ‘Chiapas: La bandera nacional contra la ONU’, Milenio, Mexico, No. 48, 27 July 1998, pp. 32–3. 77. Ernesto Zedillo, ‘Cuarto informe de gobierno, 1 de septiembre de 1998’,Novedades, Mexico, 2 September 1998, p. A-10. 231 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 231 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile EZLN has kept silent about this possibility, which is seen as tacit acceptance; (d) New mediation set up by representatives of the new government elected on 2 July 2000, because, in the final phase of his election campaign, Vicente Fox promised to accept the Larráinzar Agreements and debate them in Congress. When appointing his team for the transition in July 2000, Fox appointed Luis H. Alvarez, PAN member and COCOPA participant, to build a new form of mediation with Chiapas. The first step in this new effort was to make contact with EZLN leadership.78 Final reflections The first three of these four options have shown a lack of efficiency that increasingly undermines the stability of the state. The strategy of wearing each other down simply cannot be allowed to continue, because the image of all the actors involved – government, army, EZLN, clergy, Congress, etc. – has been weakened by the lack of any constructive mediation. The various options implemented between 1994 and 2000 have failed to come up with an effective mediation formula. The military solution is the most dangerous, because it would make the Chiapas situation more tense and would have dangerously expansive negative impacts – human rights crisis, political crisis, deterioration of legitimacy and image of the actors (government, armed forces, EZLN) – and it would be difficult for either of the two parties – EZLN and the armed forces – to win anything in a war applying military strategies. The military solution is the least likely of them all. In any case, the military solution would only solve one dimension of the conflict for both parties, leaving its social and political components latent. On the other hand, the ‘facade of negotiations’, as the period from 1996 to 2000 could be termed, has reached its limit. The attempt at dialogue via a commissioner appointed by the Provincial Government Secretariat did not even achieve minimal communication from the EZLN, and attempts by other actors involved in the conflict – the clergy (through CONAI), legislature (through COCOPA), state government (through security forces and paramilitary groups) – have also failed to come up with an alternative formula. The reason for this failure is the lack of political will to return to negotiating the Larráinzar Agreements, as they were signed in 1996, as a basis for renewing the talks (for that is the minimal condition demanded by the EZLN in order to resume communications). 78. ‘Solución en Chiapas, prioridad de Vicente Fox’, Milenio diario, Mexico, 18 July 2000; ‘Reunión entre Fox y EZLN, prioridad de Luis Alvarez’, La Jornada, Mexico, p. 4; ‘Quince minutos para pacificar Chiapas’, El País digital, Madrid, 15 July 2000. 232 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 232 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chiapas: Crisis and Disruption of Social Cohesion ... Raúl Benítez Manaut Consequently, rebuilding dialogue and transforming it into negotiations is the only way out of the Chiapas crisis. In this regard, the State of Mexico, now in a process of rapid democratization, must rebuild formulae for dialogue and talks with the EZLN. Only political negotiations can rebuild social cohesion in the communities that have taken up arms in Chiapas, for, even though the military solution could restore the rule of law, it could never rebuild social harmony in the communities. The new government headed by Vicente Fox on 1 December 2000 stated the possibility of opening up new spaces of communication and goodwill with the EZLN. The strategy was based on three elements: (a) demilitarize indigenous regions in Chiapas, leaving army, air force and navy detachments solely to protect the border and strategic installations; (b) promote the Indigenous Law; (c) open up spaces of tolerance and goodwill, allowing the Zapatista caravan in February and March 2001 to take place and inviting EZLN leadership to direct dialogue with the president. This strategy was in force during the first half of 2001. By sending the caravan to Mexico City, popularity of the EZLN soared during the early part of the year.79 This political mobilization climaxed, however, with the speech in Congress by EZLN commanders. Debate between government and the EZLN centred on the Indigenous Law, with the EZLN demanding fulfilment of the Agreements of San Andrés Larráinzar, signed in 1996, without any amendments, and the government proposing the amendment of those Agreements by means of a Bill that considers the indigenous problem in conjunction with the other ethnic groups resident in the country.80 The Indigenous Law proposed by the government was approved by eighteen states, rejected by nine and at the time of writing is still pending in four. Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo and Oaxaca, which have high percentages of indigenous population, rejected the law. 79. The Zapatista caravan started on 24 February 2001 with a speech by Subcomandante Marcos in San Cristóbal de las Casas. Comandante Ester’s speech to Congress was given on 28 March; they returned to Chiapas on 2 March. 80. The Indigenous Law was voted in the Chamber of Deputies on 28 April 2001. 385 deputies voted in favour, 60 against, 2 abstained and 53 deputies were absent. The Chamber is made up of 500 deputies. This law led to the process of legislative approval by the various state congresses. Most of the local congresses finally approved it on 14 August. It should be mentioned that in general PRI and PAN deputies voted in favour, while PRD deputies, closer to the EZLN position, voted against. Note that the law was not approved in Chiapas. Pro-indigenous and political organizations close to the PRD and EZLN say that this law does not favour the peace process. 233 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 233 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile When the Indigenous Law was not approved on the basis of the Agreements of San Andrés Larráinzar, the EZLN decided not to negotiate with the government of President Fox, nor with the negotiating committee, and its leadership returned to the Chiapas mountains. In this unprecedented manner, the EZLN missed the opportunity given to them by the government to move freely about the country, present their proposals to Congress and rejected a meeting with the president. This withdrawal to the jungle has meant a return to the strategy of attrition, waiting for more advantageous political conditions, used between 1996 and 2000. Meanwhile, Zapatista mobilization has lost strength since April 2001 and is no longer a subject of national politics. The EZLN’s contradiction between a prolonged strategy of social pressure and approval of the law based on the Larráinzar Agreements has isolated it. Finally, it must be said that, after the events of 11 September 2001 with the terrorist attacks on the United States, there has been a growing climate of rejection of any political activity which implies or threatens the use of violence. This could isolate the EZLN, because it failed to take advantage of the political opportunity that opened up with the caravan to continue to exercise political pressure within the legislature. Consequently, the future scenario would seem to be a prolongation of the conflict, although tension will be unlikely to increase. In other words, the conflict will probably be handled on the basis of a prolonged impasse. 234 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 234 25/04/2003, 12:55 IV. HUMAN SECURITY: CITIZEN SECURITY Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 235 25/04/2003, 12:55 CITIZEN SECURITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA LAURA CHINCHILLA 1 Characteristics of citizen insecurity The crime problem The Peace Agreements, which put an end to twelve years of civil war in El Salvador that had caused an average of 6,250 deaths per year, were signed in January 1992. Violence, however, did not diminish after these agreements; rather it simply changed to criminal violence. This country is estimated to have experienced annual homicide rates between 1994 and 1997 that were higher than the average annual deaths by violence during the war.2 1. Former Minister of Public Security, Costa Rica. 2. Diálogo Centroamericano por la Seguridad y la Desmilitarización, ‘El SalvadorViolencia’, Diálogo Centroamericano, No. 30, San José, Fundación Arias para la Paz y el Desarrollo Humano, May 1998. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 237 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Similarly to El Salvador, Guatemala evidences a serious crime problem with one of the highest homicide and kidnapping rates in the world; and the other countries in the region have smaller, though growing rates. Several criminal behaviour indicators, such as the crime rate and victimization indices, confirm this. Countries with relatively reliable crime statistics show a constant increase in crime, especially violent crime – crimes against people. Thus, for example, between 1987 and 1997 crimes against property increased by 40.5% in Costa Rica, while crimes against people increased by 79%,3 in other words almost double the increase in crimes against property. The contrast is even greater in Nicaragua, where crimes against property increased by 39.7% between 1991 and 1997, while crimes against people increased by 61.4%.4 The situation in Panama also illustrates the point; whereas crimes against property increased by only 4.3% between 1991 and 1995, crimes against life increased by 55.9%.5 The violent death rate in most of the countries in the region – except for Costa Rica – is high, as Table 1 shows. Table 1 Central America: Violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, 1994–98 Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica 69.8 164.5 38.2 16.5 5.3 68.3 149.7 36.8 15.6 5.2 66.9 139.0 37.2 15.6 5.2 75.2 145.1 41.0 15.0 5.7 76.9 82.4 40.7 13.3 5.8 Source: Charles T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity, Hamburg, Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde, 2000. (Central America 2020, Working Papers No. 8.) (http://ca2020.fiu.edu/Themes/Charles_Call/Call.pdf) If crime statistics are supplemented with victimization surveys carried out in recent years, crime is seen to affect more than 20% of the population in most Central American countries (Figure 1). 3. Poder Judicial, Departamento de Planificación, Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, 1991–1997, San José, Costa Rica. 4. Ministerio de Gobernación, Policía Nacional, Compendio estadístico 1991–1995, y anuario estadístico 1997, Managua, Nicaragua. 5. Policía Nacional, Dirección de Planeamiento, Estadísticas 1991–1995, Panamá. 238 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 238 25/04/2003, 12:55 Citizen Security in Central America Laura Chinchilla Graph 1 Central America: victimization rates 50 41 40 33 30 20 29 16 20 16 10 0 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama Source: United Nations Development Programme, Democratic Governance in Central America Project, Barómetro Centroamericano, Encuesta de Opinión Pública 1997, San José, UNDP, 1997. Sense of insecurity in the population The sense of insecurity, understood as being citizens’ perception of their personal situation, or the situation of their town or country in relation to crime, is an important component of citizen security. Based on surveys carried out to attempt to measure this sense of insecurity, Central American citizens in general consider their situation and the situation of their countries to be insecure (see Table 2). Table 2 Central America: Perception of level of insecurity, 1998 (percentage) Country Citizens who consider their country insecure or very insecure Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica 65.7 82.7 72.1 86.0 66.1 Source: Prepared by author based on results of a survey carried out in Villa Nueva (Guatemala), Ilobasco (El Salvador), Choluteca (Honduras), Masaya (Nicaragua) and Pavas (Costa Rica). In Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Proyecto Seguridad Ciudadana en Centroamérica, Seguridad ciudadana en Centroamérica: Diagnósticos sobre la situación, p. 30, San José, IIDH, 2000. 239 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 239 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Main factors linked to insecurity Considering the complexity involved in evaluating the genesis of criminality and the fact that there has been little research on this issue in Central America, it would be pretentious to categorically establish a direct relationship between certain factors and the increase in crime in the region. A series of factors, however, tends repeatedly to be associated with some of the violent ways in which the criminal problem is manifested in those countries. These factors include the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions of the population, the after-effects of armed conflicts, the growing presence of organized crime and certain patterns of behaviour associated with the use of psychoactive substances, especially alcohol. The thesis that there is a relationship between the deterioration of social and economic living conditions of extensive sectors of the Central American population and the increase in criminal violence is increasingly gaining ground as an explanation, particularly for the problem of juvenile delinquency. Thus, it is estimated, for example, that in Central America 18.9% of children between 7 and 12 years of age, and 59.7% of children between 13 and 18 years of age, did not have access to education during 1997,6 a situation which favours participation by this sector of the population in criminal bands. Some authors have gone even further, making a positive correlation between the fall in levels of consumption of the Central American population and the increase in crimes against property.7 When mention is made of the impact of the armed conflict on current levels of violence, it is based on three situations arising from it. These are the prevalence of typical patterns of behaviour of post-war societies based on conflict and violence,8 the failed attempts to demobilize members of regular and irregular armies which fostered their participation in criminal activities,9 and widespread circulation of firearms to which the civil population has easy access via the ‘black market’. 6. Proyecto estado de la región, op. cit., p. 168. 7. Elias Carranza et al., Delito y seguridad de los habitantes, Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1997, pp. 23–49. 8. José Miguel Cruz, ‘Los factores posibilitadores y las expresiones de la violencia en los noventa’, Estudios Centroamericanos, San Salvador, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, No. 588, October 1997, pp. 977-992. 9. According to declarations made in 1995 by a former Assistant Inspector of the National Civil Police, ‘most organized bands of criminals operating in El Salvador are made up of members who used to be in the armed forces or the FMLN’. Alarcón, ‘La perspectiva policial’, in Carranza, op. cit., p. 339. 240 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 240 25/04/2003, 12:55 Citizen Security in Central America Laura Chinchilla Any link in the relationship between common crime and organized crime tends to be established basically via drug trafficking and activities arising from it. Central America is obviously located between the main drug-producing countries and the major drug-consuming markets, and this has made the region a natural bridge for the passage of psychoactive substances. Passage of drugs through the region has favoured the establishment of local networks specializing in transportation, warehousing and packing; these have tended to receive payment ‘in kind’, which has fostered an increase in drug consumption in Central American countries and the development of criminal structures devoted to selling drugs, which operate using violent methods. Thus, for example, the emergence of organized bands in Guatemala in the last ten years is considered to be linked to local market distribution of drugs left over from their passage through the country.10 The drug market has also encouraged a series of illicit activities such as gun running, stolen vehicles, money laundering, etc., all of which has entailed the establishment of criminal structures whose methods of operation tend to be increasingly more violent and sophisticated. The case of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, where the circulation of large amounts of illegal arms and the increase in drug trafficking has fostered a bartering trade of guns for drugs, is an example of this.11 In general, various factors associated with the increase in consumption and distribution of drugs among the population, particularly the adolescent population, are considered to have created a ‘new criminal subculture’ in Central America.12 Finally, other factors must be stressed which, coupled with the above circumstances, tend to aggravate violence in the region. These involve particularly high patterns of consumption of psychoactive substances, especially spirits. A recent study carried out in Costa Rica showed that nearly 60% of violent deaths that took place in a six-year period had occurred when the victim or perpetrator had been under the effects of alcohol.13 10. Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Geopolítica, 1997, p. 230. 11. Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, op. cit., p. 232. 12. International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC XVI), March 1998. Informe del grupo de trabajo de México y América Central, San José, Costa Rica. 13. Guido Miranda and Luis del Valle, ‘La violencia en Costa Rica: visión desde la salud pública’, Aportes para el análisis del desarrollo humano sostenible, No. 6, March 2000, State of the Nation Project. 241 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 241 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Public security agenda In spite of manifestations by citizens regarding the diverse nature of the measures that should be applied, governments in the region have opted rather for a more restrictive security agenda stressing repressive-penal and police responses aimed at placating the sense of insecurity and obtaining immediate returns. From national security to public security Current public security agendas of Central American countries show evident conceptual progress compared with the agendas that prevailed in the years prior to the 1980s. Progress has been made from an agenda centred on the concept of national security to one governed by the idea of public security, with differentiated actions and allocation of different levels of prominence to institutional actors which participate in formulating and applying these agendas. The National Security Doctrine conditioned a public agenda whose primary concern was to control ‘dissident’ political and social manifestations that threatened the established order; it completely blurred the boundary between internal and external security, presuming that the former was simply an extension of the latter; and it entrusted formulation and management of ‘security’ actions to the armed forces, militarized the police and undermined the independence of the courts. The second half of the 1980s saw Central America begin a process of national and regional reconciliation that culminated in the Esquipulas II Agreements and execution of the Procedure to Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in the Region,14 which made peace possible first of all in Nicaragua and El Salvador and then in Guatemala. The climate of goodwill generated by these processes in the Isthmus, accentuated by an international context marked by the end of the bipolar world, led to an abandonment of the national security concept and transition to the idea of public security, which has given rise to a new security agenda. 14. For an evaluation of the contents of the Esquipulas II Agreements, see Francisco Rojas A. and Luis Gmo. Solís, Súbditos o aliados? La política exterior de Estados Unidos y Centroamérica, San José, FLACSO, 1988. 242 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 242 25/04/2003, 12:55 Citizen Security in Central America Laura Chinchilla Characteristics and limitations of the current public security agenda New government security agendas could be characterized by the following traits: a notion of public security which favours problems of crime – common and organized – and law and order; preference for repressive rather than preventive measures; and a sectoral approach to solving the problem that is not so much integral as centred on criminal justice and police sectors. We must point out that the notion of public security tends to be assimilated strictly to concepts of criminality and breaches of the peace, with the former being understood to be a whole series of violations of penal law, and the latter actions which, although not punishable as crimes, are none the less breaches of life in society and, therefore, punishable by administrative means. The genesis of the problems of criminality and law and order tends to be associated more with individual dysfunctions than with faults in the system. Thus, notions such as ‘social dangerousness’ and ‘deviant behaviour’ tend to prevail in treatment given to criminals, whether adults or minors. However, it is important to recognize the progress that has been made in this area, as is shown by legislation being approved in the region with regard to minors who violate the law, and which is based on the doctrine of integral protection fostered by the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.15 These public security notions have encouraged treatment of problems of crime and breaches of the peace that favours intervention to mitigate the effects of certain criminal manifestations and neglects prevention to neutralize the causes of these manifestations. Similarly, the problem is not tackled in an integral fashion, but rather encourages sectoral intervention with the weight of this intervention falling on criminal justice and police sectors. Furthermore, this emphasis on intervention by the police and the courts has occurred at a time when these institutions are coping with significant procedural reforms, most of which have still not been consolidated. Thus, for example, most of the reforms to the Penal and Procedural Codes, as well as legislation associated with domestic violence and juvenile delinquency, were approved in the 1990s. 15. UNDP, Acceso a la justicia en Centroamérica: Niñas, niños y adolescentes infractores de la ley penal, San José, Imprenta LIL, 2000. 243 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 243 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Changes experienced by criminal justice in the region have been both normative and functional. The traditional inquisitorial model of criminal law has been changed to a rather more accusatorial or mixed one;16 and new legislation regulating minors who infringe the law, inspired by the doctrine of integral protection promoted by the Convention on the Rights of the Child,17 has been approved. In parallel, training programmes have been implemented, career systems in the judiciary have been strengthened and investments have been made in computerizing and equipping court offices, primarily with funds from international cooperation. The reforms undergone by Central American police forces have been equally important. All Central American countries have approved specific laws converting the police into a civil force and stipulating action principles that must guide a police career. Demilitarization and professionalization have been reinforced by changes in training programmes, which stress respect for civic and democratic values, as well as technical-legal aspects. Reforms of the police and court systems of the Isthmus have been strengthened by some regional instruments (see Table 3), which have either strengthened a democratic security doctrine,18 or attempted to improve levels of cooperation between police and court authorities in matters involving organized crime. 16. The basic features of this new model are: strengthening the role of the Office of Public Prosecutor, both during the instruction stage as well as during the trial itself; greater respect for and protection of procedural guarantees; reduction of procedural deadlines; reduction of assumptions for preventive imprisonment and introduction of alternatives to criminal persecution; greater participation by the victim in the process; and orality and public nature of the trial during all stages. 17. We are referring to the Minor Infractor Law of El Salvador in 1995; the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law of Costa Rica in 1996; the Childhood and Youth Code of Guatemala in 1996; the Childhood and Adolescence Code of Honduras in 1996; the Childhood and Adolescence Code of Nicaragua in 1998 and the Special Regime of Criminal Responsibility for Adolescents of Panama in 1999, as well as to another series of legislation on matters of intra-family violence. 18. Such is the case of the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security, whose security doctrine emphasizes the following aspects: security is a condition for development resulting from the combination of a multiplicity of factors, including ‘the supremacy and strengthening of civil authorities, reasonable balance of forces, security of people and their goods, overcoming poverty and extreme poverty, promoting sustainable development, protection of the environment, eradication of violence, corruption, impunity, terrorism, drug trafficking and arms trafficking’; security is not the result of an action taken by the state on behalf of civil society to fanatically defend a stability understood as being the ‘status quo’, but rather emerges from the free, peaceful interaction of governors and governed; the difference between citizen security (Section II) and regional security (Section III) is established, thereby delimiting the obligations of the armed forces, which are restricted to such aspects as protecting territorial integrity, reasonable balance of forces, arms control and the collective security of the states in the region. 244 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 244 25/04/2003, 12:55 Citizen Security in Central America Laura Chinchilla Table 3 Central America: Regional security instruments Instrument Date of enactment Joint Declaration for Establishing the Association of Central American Police Chiefs July 1992 Mutual Legal Aid Treaty in Criminal Matters October 1993 Agreement Establishing the Permanent Central American Committee for the Eradication of Production, Trafficking, Consumption and Illicit Use of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances October 1993 Central American Treaty on Recovery and Return of Stolen, Robbed and Illicitly or Improperly Appropriated or Retained Vehicles December 1995 Framework Treaty on Democratic Security December 1995 Agreement Establishing the Central American Higher Institute of Advanced Police Studies July 1996 Central American Agreement for Prevention and Repression of Money Laundering and Asset Laundering Crimes Related to Illicit Traffic of Drugs and Associated Crimes July 1997 Despite the extent of police and court reforms, they are still too weak to contain the criminal problem faced by the region, within a framework of respect for procedural guarantees and the rule of law. This situation produces a sense of impunity among the population and weakens the credibility of social control institutions. Thus, for example, the survey carried out by the Barómetro Centroamericano showed the prevailing lack of confidence among the region’s population with regard to the judiciary and the police (see Table 4). 245 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 245 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Table 4 Central America: Level of distrust in judiciary and police, 1997 (percentages) Country Judiciary Police Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica Panama 50.6 31.0 50.0 50.5 26.9 60.3 59.5 33.0 48.6 45.9 37.3 41.8 Source: United Nations Development Programme, Democratic Governance in Central America Project, Barómetro Centroamericano, Encuesta de Opinión Pública, San José, UNDP, 1997. Responding to social pressures, governments have fostered other types of measure in matters of social control, which run contrary to the spirit of the penal and police reforms announced previously and threaten to revive elements of the former National Security Doctrine. The most common of these measures is to propose Penal Code reforms, either to introduce new types or to increase terms of imprisonment or have judges impose maximum sentences. Thus, for example, Costa Rica changed from a maximum twenty-five-year prison sentence to a fifty-year one; Congress in El Salvador is debating the eligibility of the death penalty; and Congress in Honduras is also debating an initiative sent by the Executive to institute life imprisonment. For its part, Guatemala has imposed the death penalty with extensive publicity in recent months. Another oft-repeated measure has been the incursion of the armed forces in police functions. The most frequent interference of military institutions has been in patrol duties, such as, for example, the ‘Guardian Plan’ in El Salvador in 1995, the ‘Cordillera Plan’ in Guatemala in 1997,19 and joint patrols in Honduras throughout 1998. 19. The Guardian Plan was designed initially for the army to patrol rural zones, while coverage by the recently created Civil National Police Force was being extended; it was then extended to urban zones, however, and is now a common practice. The Cordillera Plan was designed to cover certain roads by joint army and police patrols. See ‘La seguridad llega por Cordillera’, in Siglo XXI, Guatemala, December 1997, p. 5. 246 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 246 25/04/2003, 12:55 Citizen Security in Central America Laura Chinchilla ‘Social clean-up’ operations by police raids, as has occurred in Costa Rica,20 and the imposition of curfews as a measure for ‘neutralizing youth gangs in Honduras’,21 or extreme measures such as extrajudicial executions of members of youth gangs, pickpockets and street children in Guatemala, which involved self-defence groups working, according to reports by human rights agencies and local press, in complicity with members of the security forces, have been resorted to.22 Citizen reaction to crime The high sense of insecurity prevailing in the Central American population, coupled with low levels of credibility in institutions devoted to social control, have produced a social reaction that is characterized by a tendency to look for private answers to the problem and demand that the government should adopt repressive measures. At a personal and community level, measures for ‘protection’ against crime, such as installing home security devices – railings, alarms, dogs, etc. – purchasing firearms, hiring private security guards and organizing neighbourhood watch committees,23 stand out. There is also a tendency on the part of the population to use force and violence to resolve problems of a criminal nature. The clearest manifestation of this tendency is the increasing use of popular punishment, such as lynchings, to pursue and punish alleged criminals. Although there are instances of this type of action in every country in the region, the most sensitive is Guatemala where in one year (January 1997 to February 1998) about ninety popular lynchings took place, with it subsequently being proved that, in some cases, the victims had not been involved in the crime for which the citizens blamed them. The population tends to legitimize forms of state intervention of a repressive nature in the face of crime, although it also calls on the authorities to adopt preventive and socio-economic measures (see Table 5). 20. In spite of the fact that this kind of practice was declared unconstitutional, the local press has reported that several raids have been made since June 1998. 21. In September 1998, the Mayor’s Office of Tegucigalpa issued an ordinance whereby people under 18 were forbidden from being in public areas after 11 p.m., under penalty of arrest and the imposition of a fine. 22. There is an extensive Amnesty International report on this aspect, 1997. 23. Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Proyecto Seguridad Ciudadana en Centroamérica, Seguridad ciudadana en Centroamérica: Diagnósticos sobre la situación, p. 31, San José, IIDH, 2000. 247 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 247 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Table 5 Central America: State policies supported by citizens (percentages) Measure Guatemala Increase sentences Build jails Increase number of police Prevention programmes Rehabilitation programmes Improve economic conditions El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica 21 4 18 6 6 47 7 9 9 13 26 8 17 4 7 10 5 17 6 6 45 8 7 31 2 29 13 35 51 5 Source: Prepared by author based on results of a survey carried out in Villa Nueva (Guatemala), Ilobasco (El Salvador), Choluteca (Honduras), Masaya (Nicaragua) and Pavas (Costa Rica), in Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Proyecto Seguridad Ciudadana en Centroamérica, Seguridad ciudadana en Centroamérica: Diagnósticos sobre la situación, p. 38, San José, IIDH, 2000. By way of conclusion Central America has made significant progress in terms of its security agenda compared with the years prior to the 1980s and the period immediately following. There was a change from an agenda focused on concerns about social protest and armed insurrection, inspired by the National Security Doctrine, to one that focuses on criminal violence. Actions aimed at making the rule of law more dependable by reforming the courts and police have been implemented, and the level of cooperation between countries has been increased by promoting regional instruments. Prevailing national public security agendas, however, still demonstrate serious conceptual limitations, which, coupled with a significant deterioration in criminality and strong social alarm in the face of crime, generate actions that are not very effective and even counterproductive for democratic stability. If Central America wishes to improve the levels of insecurity affecting its population without endangering processes of democratic consolidation and strengthening of the rule of law, it must adopt an integral security proposal within its new agenda that considers the following premises: 248 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 248 25/04/2003, 12:55 Citizen Security in Central America Laura Chinchilla • The ultimate aim of a security policy is to ensure full enjoyment of citizen rights and guarantees, so these must be protected with full adherence to the rule of law. • Causes of citizen insecurity are multiple and complex, so interinstitutional intervention is required and must be properly coordinated and based on common goals. • Citizen insecurity has multiple stages and manifestations, so any intervention must take place on various different fronts: crime prevention – social, situational, community; punishment and repression; rehabilitation and restoration. • Citizen insecurity is manifested in various, specific ways depending on the context, so promoting decentralization in designing and executing actions by encouraging the participation of local authorities and organized communities is recommended. 249 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 249 25/04/2003, 12:55 HUMAN SECURITY: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES ALEJANDRA V. LIRIANO 1 Introduction Many analysts think that the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States have led the world back to the situation that prevailed during the Cold War. Others see in these events and the consequent military action the start of a new era in global international relationships. The truth is that these events seem to dispel the fixation by state and non-governmental actors on the notion that, with the end of the Cold War and the bipolar confrontation, a more stable world with less world tensions was foreseeable, that is, a world where social and development agendas would largely replace military agendas and budgets. The asymmetrical war in Afghanistan, as well as the integration of military coalitions made up by new and old allies around a military objective and the international campaign against terror which is now beginning to take shape, place before us a redefinition of the international and local safety agendas. 1. Political and international analyst, coordinator of the Security and International Relations Area, FLACSO-Dominican Republic. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 251 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In this new scenario, where terrorism ‘from any place’ becomes the main threat to world safety and stability, the following question arises: where can human security be placed? In this respect and during their recent participation in the United Nations General Assembly’s 56th regular session (2001), the heads of state and government of Latin America and the Caribbean – while strongly condemning the terrorist attacks and declaring their unquestionable support for the United States in dealing with this catastrophe – asked that the unresolved agenda in the region, mainly referring to the fight against poverty, drug trafficking and its associated crimes, as well as development issues and other factors, should not be forgotten. Under the current international circumstances, the beginning of a debate is appropriate to tackle the issues and needs of human security, peace and prevention of conflicts from the point of view of moving towards the solution of the tensions existing between global security, as defined in essentially military terms, and human security, understood as a condition and consequence of human development. The war against Afghanistan has harshly underlined the impact of using weapons of great destructive power against communities and populations living in conditions of extreme poverty. Combat aircraft drop bombs as well as foodstuff for people trapped between the extreme fundamentalism of the local authorities and that of military action which is seeking a diffuse rather than a localized target. Human security: A complex concept The Human Development Report 1994 produced by the UNDP was accurate in identifying the ‘New Dimensions of Human Security’. It was prepared at a time of paradigmatic changes in the international system, of development models breaking off, of new forces and actors with a number of motivations (political, ideological, religious, economic, social, criminal, technological and cultural) at the national, regional and international levels,2 and after the inrush of non-traditional threats to global security on a large scale, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, mass migrations, genocides, disasters caused by natural phenomena, etc. 2. See Ayón Mirian Villanueva, ‘La seguridad humana: Una ampliación del concepto de seguridad global?’, in Argentina Global, No. 3, October–December 2000. 252 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 252 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Perceptions and Realities Alejandra V. Liriano The definition of human security focused on the human being and concern about the way in which people live their lives in society, the freedom with which they may exert different options, their degree of access to the market and to social opportunities and to life in conflict 3 or in peace, places us in a complex frame of analysis, as it refers to a term of ‘multidimensional nature, polyvalent order, anthropocentric content, universal, interdependent, preventive, democratic, global, integrative, local and with quality and quantity connotations’.4 Human security indeed corresponds to a pattern where two factors concur: a perception of insecurity and conditions where needs are not met, on the one hand, and on the other the creation of a climate of confidence which makes possible ‘participation, cooperation, trust and also dealing with conflicts’.5 The fact is thus stressed that the increase of people-oriented opportunities, such as income, longevity and education, is not enough unless it takes place within a social environment which allows access to their benefits. In increasingly interdependent societies, the link between international, state and human security is also growing. The emphasis on which factor prevails may change according to different scenarios. For some authors, the axis around which this linking takes place is still the state. ‘The state continues to be the main international actor and the one having the greatest number of resources as regards the use of force. Also, as the demands of civil society, expressed as a demand for human security, are presented to the state, the latter must meet these demands. International instability, in turn, is meant to be overcome by generating alternatives in multilateral frameworks, where states are the actors generating recommendations and resolutions’.6 The above argument is interesting because the central role is brought back to the state actor as regards the possibilities of implementing strategies in favour of human security. Without overlooking the role played by non-state actors of a local and international nature in promoting human security at different levels, it is also true that the necessary measures to provide people with conditions guaranteeing their economic, political, environmental, nutritional, health and personal security can only be carried through redistributive policies, a role which should be played by the state rather than the market. 3. Human Development Report 1994, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994. 4. Villanueva, op. cit. 5. De la seguridad humana en la modernidad. El desarrollo humano en Chile [On Human Security in Modernity. Human Development in Chile], 1998. 6. Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latina’, in Chile 1999–2000. Nuevo gobierno: Desafíos de la reconciliación, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 2000. 253 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 253 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile As we know, globalizing trends have questioned the importance of the state in social construction, but today, following concrete experiences of the crisis of the neoliberal model, reconstruction of this view is under way. In this context, the state’s role in constructing human security must be rethought, as well as the dimensions in which it is going to intervene effectively in its generation. Agendas trying to respond to the specific needs of the people are defined in the continuous flow between the global and the local, between international security and the security of citizens. Global figures speak to us of a more insecure world, of a world at risk: ‘1,300 million people lack the basic necessities and are living in extreme poverty with less than one US dollar per day; 3,000 million people live in poverty and must survive with less than two dollars per day; 1,300 million lack current water; 3,000 million have no basic sanitary facilities and 2,000 million have no electricity.’7 In many countries, the increase of insecurity produced in some cases by active riots, political terrorism, acts of organized crime and repressive governments, threaten the very existence of states, which lose political and territorial control, thus increasing the number of people displaced from their places of origin and being forced to become permanent refugees in their own territories. As mentioned by the Reports of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,8 people cannot prosper in an environment where their survival is at risk. Threats from the increase in production and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, indiscriminate use of light weapons, coexist with the insecurities linked to social injustice, inequality and lack of opportunities, as well as the violation of human rights. Modernization, exclusion and construction of security It is important to integrate the issue of people’s perceptions of security in the framework of the debate on human security in Latin America and the Caribbean, that is, to consider how people perceive insecurity based on the material and social conditions of their life. The existence of a cause and effect relationship between violence and poverty is not clear. For some, it cannot be affirmed that under 7. Kliksberg Bernardo and L. Tomassini, Capital social y cultural: Claves estratégicas para el desarrollo, IBD, Maryland University, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Argentina, 2000. 8. Reports of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, Carnegie Corporation, 1997. 254 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 254 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Perceptions and Realities Alejandra V. Liriano conditions of extreme poverty, conflicts and violent events are more likely to occur, as – so they argue – if this were the case we would experience constant bursts of violent conflict in many African countries, or in Haiti in our own Hemisphere, affected by a progressive fragmentation of the state structure. This would be a very simplistic approach to such a complex problem as that of human insecurity. Nevertheless, agreement is growing on the effect of inequality and social exclusion on the creation and worsening of conditions leading to events that threaten people’s security, including violence. This is not just a question of poverty, but about how people perceive it in a context of increasing inequality of opportunity and social exclusion in societies which, at the same time, include them (only) symbolically in their development horizons, thus greatly raising their expectations. Violence and insecurity in citizens In a study on perception of citizen insecurity prepared by FLACSO in two urban sectors of the city of Santo Domingo, the population associated the increase of delinquency and criminality with the lack of a future for the younger sector of the population, which is asked to live with the illusion of the benefits of modernization without having the resources and abilities to access them. As an example, some relevant results from this study are given below. Neighbourhoods selected for the study Los Alcarrizos, a community located in the north-west zone of the city of Santo Domingo, specifically along Duarte Highway, which is a through route for land transport to the northern part of the country. Over time, and despite the features of the land, two factors determined the development of Los Alcarrizos: the great displacement of population from the rural areas to the cities that has occurred in our country; and the relocation of victims of natural disasters, as well as the evictions from private and government property that have taken place in other areas of the city of Santo Domingo. The rapid growth of Los Alcarrizos in the last ten years saw new neighbourhoods spring up, especially in the northern area of Pueblo Nuevo, such as Nuevo Amanecer, Horizonte and Nazareno, which juxtapose certain elements that give a particularly interesting focus to 255 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 255 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile our research, in that highly typical characteristics of the rural and urban environments concur in a substantial way. All this gives rise to situations that facilitate the basic elements of the development of actual threats to security in a general sense and to the security of citizens in particular. In institutional terms, Los Alcarrizos has become an area on the outskirts of the city of Santo Domingo rather than a neighbourhood, consisting of more than fifteen neighbourhoods, banks, stores of different types, a local office of the National District City Council, Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, neighbourhood associations, an industrial zone, primary and secondary schools and two police stations or outposts. The other neighbourhood, Gualey, located in the northern part of the city of Santo Domingo, is delimited to the north by the Ozama River, to the south by Oscar Santana Street, and to the east by Francisco del Rosario Sánchez Avenue. Like other neighbourhoods in the north of the city, it has socio-demographic and economic features that place it among the clusters of poverty in the country. According to figures presented by the Map of Poverty prepared by the National Office of Planning (ONAPLAN) in 1997, Gualey ranks third among the ten poorest neighbourhoods of the National District, with 54.4% of poor homes, only surpassed by Damingo Savio (Los Guandulez) and La Zurza. Together with other neighbourhoods of the National District, Gualey demonstrates the levels of poverty considered to be the general trend for the Dominican Republic, with an unemployment rate of 36% for the poor population and 43.5% for those in extreme poverty, the group most affected being young people between 15 and 19 years. The 1997 ONAPLAN report on poverty in the Dominican Republic states that the Gualey neighbourhood has 58.5% of poor households, that is over half, with 49.3% of them assigned to Category II. The characteristics of this group are as follows: the socio-economic level of these neighbourhoods is ‘medium’ and ‘low’, with an average family income of RD$751, above the indigent line but below the poverty line (RD$850, that is, the approximate cost of the basic shopping basket). They also demonstrate a significant number of unsatisfied basic needs.9 According to a UNDP Human Development Report, in the Dominican Republic over 2 million people (25.8% of the population) live in households with a per capita income below the poverty line of US$60 per month. Generally, studies on human development also show a low educational level. The incidence of poverty where the head of household has no education attains 37.8% of the population.10 9. ONAPLAN, Report on ‘Focalization of Poverty in Dominican Republic’, No. 11, December 1997. 10. Human Development in the Dominican Republic, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 2001. 256 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 256 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Perceptions and Realities Alejandra V. Liriano General characteristics of the population The study on the perception of citizen insecurity in the neighbourhoods of Gualey and Los Alcarrizos was carried out with a sample of 600 people, 300 in Gualey and 300 in Los Alcarrizos. Of the total population, 49.8% is male and 50.2% female. This is also a mainly young population, with 63.1% within an age range not above 39 years. Forty per cent of interviewees in both neighbourhoods are between 0 and 29 years old; 23.1% between 30 and 50 years, and 30% over 50 years. We must emphasize that this is a young population, which is relevant to the aims of the study in that the results not only express the perception of a prevailingly young population, but also the expectations of a population affected by the public order measures implemented to control delinquency and crime. Regarding the schooling levels of the population, the results are as follows: 31.6% of the sample has incomplete primary studies, while 25.6% has incomplete secondary studies. Only 12.2% had finished primary studies and 13.3% had finished secondary studies. The employment situation of the interviewees is the following: 30.7% of interviewees are housewives, followed by 14.7% who work in the private sector and 10.9% unemployed, while 8.4% are engaged in informal employment. Only 7.3% of interviewees work in the public sector. Independent technical activities, with 7.1%, and occasional or seasonal workers with 6.0%, are the prevailing activities. Concerning the family income, the majority (23.6% of the total interviewees) earn between 3,701 pesos and 5,000 pesos per month, while the proportion of those with an income up to 2,500 pesos per month is 23.1%. This figure shows a population living above the poverty line. Also 19.3% of interviewees have a monthly income of between 6,701 pesos and 13,200 pesos. Insecurity and poverty: not always a clear link The analysis of citizen insecurity has two dimensions: first, objective, considering the events of violence and crime known and reported by the media or forming part of the statistics of police and judicial reports; and second, subjective, expressing people’s personal experiences and feelings in relation to violent facts, situations and events which may or may not affect them directly. 257 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 257 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The subjective dimension, notwithstanding the complexity of its approach, has a central significance in shaping the insecurity issue and in spreading the fear of crime. The increase in this feeling of insecurity becomes an important problem, both in the sense that it may be a hindrance to peaceful living and solidarity and in the sense that such a perception may cause the population to demand stronger repression of the escalation of violence and to a certain extent justify excesses, ignoring the importance of respecting human rights. An important component of citizen security is related to the feeling of insecurity, understood as the perception by the citizen of his/her personal situation and the situation of the neighbourhood and the country in relation to crime.11 In this respect, the study showed that the population considers the insecurity situation to be serious or very serious. Percentages are as follows: 69.2% of citizens interviewed consider insecurity as serious and very serious, while only 25.8% consider it normal. Analysing these figures separately, we may note that for the Gualey neighbourhood, 80.7% of interviewees consider the situation as serious and very serious, as compared with 17.6%, who consider it normal. These figures change for Los Alcarrizos inhabitants, where the perception of insecurity ranges between serious and normal, with 41.6% of interviewees considering insecurity as serious, 34.3% considering the situation normal and only 15.7% considering it to be very serious. Figure 1. Perceptions of insecurity by neighbourhood 50 40 30 20 10 0 Very serious Serious Gualey Normal No problems Alcarrizos 11. Laura Chinchilla, ‘Citizen security in Central America’, paper presented at the Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, November 2001. 258 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 258 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Perceptions and Realities Alejandra V. Liriano Criminal behaviour in the neighbourhoods This perception of insecurity as serious or very serious is associated with the behaviour patterns of criminal activity in both neighbourhoods. Insecurity is very serious where crime in these neighbourhoods is increasing; 46.6% of the population thinks that the crime rate is increasing, but this perception is not the same in both neighbourhoods. In Gualey, 51.5% of interviewees considered that criminal activity has increased in recent years, while in Los Alcarrizos only 41.6% think that. The percentage of people who think that the crime rate has decreased, however, is significantly high: 35.4% of interviewees in Los Alcarrizos and 31.6% in Gualey say that the crime rate has decreased. We face a paradox, as on the one hand the population perceives an increase in the levels of insecurity and crime in their neighbourhood, but at the same time an important number of people say that the crime rate has decreased. This complexity reveals a neighbourhood as a complex of social networks, where people meet each other and establish relationships that make it difficult to identify certain actions as crimes.12 In the same neighbourhood, criminals live alongside non-criminals. Although many people are against criminal acts, they live with criminals and they even develop survival strategies towards these acts. In many cases, this coexistence reaches the agencies responsible for public order. Despite the complex social networks existing in the neighbourhoods, it is also true that the population lives in fear of the increase of criminal and delinquent acts taking place in their territories, but especially of the impunity surrounding those who commit crimes. Such expressions as ‘nobody speaks, nobody tells, because they are put in jail, but are released immediately’13 reveals the degree of distrust in the mechanisms of the police and legal system as a means of controlling crime and delinquency. Impunity, then, becomes one of the main causes of criminality. Referring to a study carried out in Chile, in 1940 Adolfo Ibáñez stated: ‘There has been an impression for many years that most crime in Santiago goes unpunished; numerous victims do not report the crimes of which they have been victims, because they consider that the nuisance involved is absolutely pointless or to no effect.’14 12. Interview with the anthropologist Tahira Vargas. 13. Interview with a leader of the neighbourhood association in Gualey. 14. Adolfo Ibáñez, Contribución al estudio del aumento de la delincuencia en Chile, 1940, cited by Hugo Frühling, in ‘Violence and insecurity in modern Chile’, paper presented at the Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, November 2001. 259 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 259 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Main crimes affecting neighbourhoods The information gathered on people’s perception of which are the violent and/or criminal situations affecting their neighbourhood produces important values for analysing insecurity. Drug trafficking and consumption. 90.9% of interviewees mentioned drug consumption as the main issue as regards violence and criminal behaviour affecting both neighbourhoods, followed by drug trafficking with 87.4%. Domestic burglary. The third most frequent crime is burglary of private houses, 48.4% of interviewees in both neighbourhoods mentioning this as the most frequent criminal act. Homicide is ranked in fourth place with 47.9%. Armed robbery, with 41.9%, ranked fifth among the most frequent criminal acts in these neighbourhoods. Although difficult to characterize on the same level as the previous acts, 35.3% of interviewees mentioned prostitution as a frequent crime. Also, 27.4% of interviewees mentioned robberies committed by gangs as frequent crimes in these neighbourhoods. Finally, 18.1% identified physical aggressions as frequent. There are significant variations in the data provided by the inhabitants of Gualey and Alcarrizos concerning these criminal acts, except for drug trafficking and consumption, which is equally high in both neighbourhoods: 88.6% and 87.5% for interviewees in Gualey, and 92.2% and 89.0% in Alcarrizos. It is important to analyse the disaggregated figures in both neighbourhoods. As regards drug trafficking and consumption, the levels are equally high in each neighbourhood. In Gualey, 88.6% of interviewees mentioned drug consumption, while 87.5% referred to drug trafficking; in Los Alcarrizos, on the other hand, 92.2% referred to drug consumption and 89.0% to drug trafficking. The perception has increased that the origin of many of the robberies committed in the neighbourhoods under study lies in wellorganized gangs which are often associated with drug trafficking. In this respect, the results reveal that 41.8% of interviewees in Gualey mentioned robberies committed by gangs as the most frequent criminal act. In Alcarrizos the situation is different, as only 19.9% of interviewees considered the robberies committed by gangs to be frequent. In recent years, networks of South American drug dealers have used the Dominican territory in their way to the United States. The increase in activities associated with narcotics trafficking, as well as its 260 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 260 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Perceptions and Realities Alejandra V. Liriano location mainly in densely inhabited and deprived neighbourhoods and the increasing use of children in ‘merchandise’ delivery activities have resulted in the association between drug trafficking and criminality. Public perception has increased that there is a cause and effect relationship between drug trafficking and consumption and the increase in criminality. According to figures provided by the National Directorate of Drug Control (DNCD), about 325 minors below 17 years old were prosecuted due to their involvement in the trafficking, sale and consumption of drugs in 2001, compared with 267 in 2000.15 The activities of the gangs and their fights for territory are not a new problem, nor are they exclusively associated with drug trafficking and consumption. In popular culture and in social relationships in the popular sectors, the control of territory carries a lot of weight. Disputes over territory are often related to revenge, vindication of masculinity and ‘honour’, but due to the boom in drugs, the control of a territory has increasingly become an alternative economy, where poverty is mixed with the alternatives offered by the drug trade. Neighbourhoods turn more violent and insecure as zones controlled by groups linked with drug trafficking are established. This perception of a very dangerous neighbourhood is held by those living outside these neighbourhoods, rather by the inhabitants themselves. It is no secret, however, that ‘there are areas that neither people nor police dare to enter’.16 Complex social networks are organized around the territory, promoting all kinds of exchange and at the same time making it difficult to control criminal activities. We are referring to networks where money, favours, services, territory or territorial boundaries and functions are exchanged. Through these mechanisms, people associated with crime relate to the rest of the neighbourhood; everyone knows who sells and who consumes drugs; the drug dealers in turn use other people to store the merchandise – because of the economic benefit involved – who do not necessarily support this trafficking. Fear and insecurity of citizens The neighbourhood continues to be a space where living is possible, but interviewees showed fear that they themselves or their homes 15. Statement by DNCD (Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas) spokesman, Mr Jacobo Mateo Moquete, published in El Caribe, 3 January 2002. 16. Interview with a leader of the neighbourhood association in Gualey. 261 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 261 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile would be attacked or assaulted. This is shown by the answers given to the questions about what is security, the answers to which may be divided into four major groups. The first is related to security at home, as for the interviewees living in a peaceful house is to feel protected, without fear of being assaulted or robbed, as well as being able to leave the doors open. Another set of answers refer to security in public places and streets, showing that expectations of security outdoors are also important. To be able to walk in the street without fear of being assaulted or robbed is regularly repeated in people’s answers. The other sets of answers relate to the security and protection given by the authorities and, finally, to socio-economic and political conditions. Subjective security and the press The general opinion is that the media are often responsible for the perception of an increase in violent or criminal acts, although this does not necessarily correspond to reality. By giving blanket coverage to violent events, an atmosphere is promoted of public alarm, sensationalism of images and repeated statements about the ineffectiveness of control measures for delinquency and crime.17 Many people take news about the increase in criminal acts splashed across the media to be true, without submitting the information to any kind of verification. The part that sources of information can play in building up a subjective dimension of security has often been emphasized. In addition, third parties’ comments and accounts may give rise to rumour, with its negative consequences on public opinion through lack of accurate information.18 In the period covered by this study on perceptions, different social sectors of the Dominican Republic publicly expressed their concern about the increase in violence and criminality. The reference to a wave of crime and delinquency never before seen in the country, even resorting to kidnapping, were some of the concerns stated by the government, the Church and civil society.19 17. Luis Vial, ‘La inseguridad ciudadana y la participación’, in Correa Enrique and Marcela Noé, Nociones de una ciudadanía que crece, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 1998. 18. Rosa del Olmo, ‘Ciudades duras y violencia urbana’ [Inhospitable Cities and Urban Violence], in Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, No. 167, May-June 2000. 19. See ‘Evangélicos muestran su preocupación por creciente ola de violencia’, Hoy newspaper, 6 August 2001, article signed by Hilda Feliz. In this respect, the article by R. González of Hoy of 6 August reports the pronouncements of Dr César Mella, medical advisor to the Executive, when referring to the need to launch a crusade, that is, a great demonstration against violence and crime. 262 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 262 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Perceptions and Realities Alejandra V. Liriano When asked if the media reflect the feeling of insecurity in the neighbourhoods, 61.5% answered yes, while 34.5% answered that they do not reflect reality. Guillermo Sunkel states that changes in people’s concerns are closely linked to changes in the media in their attempt to tune in with the latest concerns shown by mass audiences, where violence occupies a very important place in the dynamics of the market place.20 We must accept that the state of public opinion expresses a concern founded on an actual boom in delinquency and crime, while insisting on the fact that the lack of reliable statistics prevents an assessment of the trends of this growth, that is, to see delinquency not as an isolated phenomenon, but as part of the social network where disfunctionalities operate. Citizens as victims As already mentioned, we do not have in our country updated or reliable figures of the state agencies responsible for security and justice policies, which may serve as reference in order to establish classifications, trends of growth, locations and other necessary references, in order to give a historical starting point for the behaviour of the victimization rate and its relationship with the behaviour of type of crime. In this study, which is generally focused on dealing with the perception of security by citizens of specific neighbourhoods of the city of Santo Domingo, we may not overlook the need to establish victimization indexes, as they also become the determining factors per se of the scenario studied and, in a practical sense, victimization is the most immediate reference in terms of experience that ordinary citizens have; therefore this is the most direct determining factor in their perception of crime. For some experts on the subject of citizen security, the concept of victim is generated as from the fears founded on real considerations, which may inhibit citizens in the exercise and use of their rights as such, due to the danger and threats when getting in touch with a certain public environment, while for other authors, the victim originates in the damage caused to the physical or moral people, both to their properties, belongings or other qualities, with this implying a direct contact between the victim and the offender. 20. Guillermo Sunkel, ‘Medios de comunicación y violencia en la transición chilena’, Santiago, 1992, cited by Luis Vial, op. cit. 263 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 263 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In our context, the above means that a diagnosis about insecurity is not enough. Insecurity must be related to the security of people as a regulatory horizon and a condition for the lasting success of a fully modern society.21 Thus, human security becomes a permanent social construction in the field of opportunities and threats 2 2 both nationally and internationally. From this perspective, the creation of social mechanisms of security should aim not only at the limitation of threats via preventive diplomacy, or at the reduction of weapons, the control of terrorist groups and networks of organized crime, but also at promoting rules and practices within states, thus allowing the development of resources and economic potential, so as to avoid and prevent conflicts and promote practices of good governance. We have attempted to go through the possibilities and opportunities of the complex concept of human security in the framework of worldwide conflict scenarios, where the solution seems to be a return to a largely military response to events of a political nature. Also, we wished to place human security in the context of the reorganization of national and international strategies intended to enlarge the scope the state has to control citizens via intelligence, as required by the international fight against terrorism.23 21. De la seguridad human en la modernidad …, op. cit. 22. Ibid. 23. The study on the perception of citizen insecurity in two neighbourhoods of Santo Domingo was prepared by Alejandra Liriano and Daniel Pou. A complete version is currently in press. 264 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 264 25/04/2003, 12:55 HUMAN SECURITY AND PUBLIC SECURITY: GLOBAL ISSUES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON LOCAL ONES JORGE DA SILVA 1 Introduction Scenes showing children brandishing the latest automatic rifles in armed conflicts have become commonplace. I was struck by an image on television a few years ago showing a scrawny African boy, about 12 or 13 years old, dressed in torn civilian clothes and holding a shiny automatic rifle in his hands. It is also common in Latin America and the Caribbean to see teenagers brandishing European or North American automatic rifles, not only in armed guerrilla-type conflicts, but also in gang fights to control drug trafficking in poor areas on the periphery of major towns. It must be pointed out that, both internationally and locally, the use of state force as the primary means for resolving conflicts has caused more victims among civilians than among the combatants involved in the conflict. This even applies to the way in which police are used in the fight against drugs in various towns in Latin America. The police are used as a fighting force, and dealers (whether real or imaginary) are seen as enemy ‘combatants’. Consequently, dealers die in confrontations between gangs; dealers die from police action; police die; defenceless women and children die from stray bullets. 1. Researcher, FLACSO-Brazil. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 265 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The questions must be asked: How can we live in a world in which the financial resources that are lacking in order to mitigate the hunger of children and adolescents are in abundant supply when it comes to putting guns into their hands so that they can kill and be killed? What security can be given to hungry children in the world, especially in poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America? What security can citizens have against pollution of the rivers in their towns or villages? What security do they have against rash or corrupt management of resources by the governors of their country, province or district? What security do they have against their own use of drugs? What security do citizens who do not use drugs have against the effects of militarized repression of those drugs? The substance of this paper shows that the security paradigm that has guided relationships between nation-states in the international system, which is still geared towards issues of economy, power and the force of arms, is the same one that has guided public security actions within countries, especially in the periphery of major towns. The paper shows that this has to do with the rejection of multilateral solutions, which has marked the decisions of major powers on the international scene. An initial appreciation is made of the concept of human security and its applicability to local problems in a world in which coordination of global and local issues takes place independently of geographical boundaries and isolated decisions – for example, the drug problem and the firearms issue. Drugs cannot be fought as if they were a merely local problem; and the proliferation of firearms in our towns cannot be dealt with without taking into account the fact that international producers and beneficiaries from this legal and illegal business do everything possible to boost this proliferation. The next section presents an evaluation of the negative effects of applying the international security paradigm to domestic issues in Latin American and Caribbean countries. The adoption of the human security and civil society perspective in the fight against urban violence and local crime, as set forth by the United Nations and other supranational agencies, is proposed. Human security – the concept The concept of human security has been developed in the context of international relations. It is true that, from a philosophical, religious 266 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 266 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security and Public Security ... Jorge Da Silva point of view, humanitarian concepts have been around since Antiquity. But in formal terms, the humanitarian methodology, which places human beings at the centre of political concerns, as Rojas 2 points out, ‘has been a basic source of international law for 500 years, even before the Westphalia peace treaty, which established inter-state order in 1648’. Humanitarianism has not been strong enough to fully accomplish its goal of putting human beings at the core of social relations, both between nations and within them. It can be said, then, that humanitarianism has been developed as a theory, but its effects have not transcended treaties and conventions. Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century security continues to be sought based on power and the force of arms. The destructive consequences of traditional development and security logic can be seen in The State of World Population 20013 report from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The report is an objective account of global threats, mainly to the environment, and of the abysmal disparities to which the world population is subject (6.1 billion people; double the population in 1960): ‘POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENT. Despite substantial economic activity estimated today at more than US$30 trillion per year, nearly 1.2 billion people live on less than one dollar a day. Close to 60% of the 4.4 billion people in developing countries do not have basic sewerage; almost a third do not have access to clean water; a quarter do not have suitable housing; 20% do not have access to modern health services; and 20% of children will not pass fifth grade at school.’ The problems set forth above continue to challenge global governance, which is still involved in power issues. It appears that state security is preferable to the human security of populations. The (neo)liberal point of view, whereby a country’s economic development is a precondition for human development and the well-being of its citizens, prevails. This is used to justify the poverty of countries and peoples. It is also used to justify tremendous lack of equality within countries with good economic performance, but with groups of people living in conditions of extreme poverty similar to those of people living in economically very poor countries. A Brazilian president once said, ‘The economy is doing fine, but the people are doing badly’, expressing the idea that a country must first grow economically in order to then be able to divide the ‘cake’. 2. Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latina’, in Chile 1999–2000. Nuevo gobierno: Desafíos de la reconciliación, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 2000. 3. The State of World Population 2001, New York, United Nations Population Fund, 2001. 267 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 267 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Thus, the concept of human security opens up a new perspective for nations and peoples, especially for the poor throughout the world. It is hoped that social relations in international or local spheres of action may be marked by government policies that reflect a decision to put human beings at the core. It is hoped that the efforts of humanitarians are not lost and that the idea of human security should prevail over the idea of security sought through the use of arms and in the interests of the state. The old Latin precept, si vis pacem para bellum, has once again proved in post-modernity to be a fallacy promoted by warmongers and arms dealers. We must avoid dealing with the fight against urban violence in the public security arena as if it were a war, with poor communities transformed into theatres of operation, as has been done in our towns. This is a very important point for Latin America, a region strongly marked by a belief in military ‘solutions’ to social problems. As Rico says (1997, pp. 25, 26, 61):4 ‘This system was made worse by the military nature of Latin American states towards the end of the nineteenth century. … Military characteristics from the previous century permeated police issues to a greater depth in the first decades of the twentieth century. … The largest obstacles faced by the process of democratization in Latin America are militarism, economic crisis, foreign debt, social consequences of structural adjustment, permanence of traditional schemes and attitudes, extremism (right and left wing), surviving guerrilla forces, party bureaucracy, corruption and drug trafficking’. The concept was made official with the publication of the UNDP Human Development Report 1994, whose central theme was human security based on another concept – sustainable development – which is in turn based on the universal right to life: ‘The life of no one person is worth more than that of another. No child at birth should be condemned to a short or poor life simply because he or she was born into the ‘wrong class’, the ‘wrong country’ or the ‘wrong sex’.5 If one makes human beings the centre of one’s concerns, the nature of the challenges faced will be different. Focus changes from territorial security to personal security anywhere in the world, without considerations of race, origin, class, religion, culture, conception of 4. For militarization of public security, see also Da Silva, 1996. 5. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994. 268 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 268 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security and Public Security ... Jorge Da Silva the world, etc. Human beings are the supreme value, and a rich child from a rich country is considered the same as a hungry child from a peripheral country; a rich child from a rich neighbourhood is considered the same as a hungry child from a poor community. In fact, a project with such humanitarian content sounds like Utopia. Those who think that way are right to a certain degree. But one must first remember that, in today’s world, this is not just a humanitarian question, but also one of security and survival for all, rich and poor, both internationally and locally. In point of fact, the new concept of security began to appear in reports on human development published in 1990. The 1990 UNDP report introduced new development indicators, in addition to economic ones. Measuring the quality of life of people around the world has been considered important since then. The main indicator is the Human Development Index (HDI), used not only to compare quality of life between different countries but also between groups of human beings within individual countries. The index expresses people’s conditions based on such variables as per capita net domestic product (and true purchasing power), life expectancy, and school enrolment rates, and includes concerns about food security, human rights violations, proportion of military and social spending, access to drinking water, gender inequality, incidence of HIV/AIDS, access to newspapers and telephones, availability of hospitals and doctors, security against crime, drugs, etc. In sum, the core of the index is a concern for threats against the human condition. As Regehr also stated (1999): ‘The idea of emphasizing the ‘human’ in security is to re-establish balance in the security discourse, which has placed too much emphasis on state security and too little on people security within the country’s borders. While security and behaviour of countries is obviously central to people’s security, the excessive concern for sovereignty, state structure, military defence of territory and, in many cases, survival of the regime, is frequently detrimental to and gives little attention to the security, well-being and physical integrity of people.’ Although prepared focused on the security of the international system, Table 1 (MacLean, s.d., p. 3) could be very useful in establishing distinctions between dimensions of what one could call ‘traditional public security’ and ‘human public security’. 269 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 269 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Table 1 Dimensions of traditional security and human security Dimension Traditional security Human security Spatiality Focus Issue Territorial sovereignty State Diplomatic and military Patterns of control Decision-making Potential threat Responses Institutionalized Formal (political) Structural violence Diplomatic and military Not spatially oriented Community and individual Socio-political, socioeconomic, environmental Not institutionalized Informal (intuitive) Non-structural violence Scientific, technological, multilateral governance Source: MacLean, op.cit. My point, as mentioned above, is that the logic that has guided security in the international field is the same logic that has guided local decisions in the fight against crime and violence, a logic which is based primarily on the principle of the legitimate use of violence by the state, as Weber (1968) explained in ‘Three pure kinds of legitimate domination’. The result is that public security has not been focused on people. Even when people are taken into account, their human values have been differentiated by reasons of race, gender, wealth, etc. If Table 1 is analysed bearing in mind public security and the fight against urban violence, the ‘dimensions’ of human security on an international scale are shown to be completely applicable to public security at local and community level. This becomes very clear if the effects of the traditional concept of security on the area of public security are analysed, as is done below. Traditional security paradigm and its effects on public security After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, CNN television immediately coined the phrase ‘America’s New War’, and soon afterwards, ‘War Against Terror’. In the midst of world commotion, President George W. Bush did actually declare a ‘new war’. Curiously enough, from an acknowledged unilateral (and isolationist) position, whereby the world’s problems were only important if they directly affected the United States, President Bush began to exert pressure on all countries to join the United States6 in 270 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 270 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security and Public Security ... Jorge Da Silva dealing with a problem which, from that moment onwards, he considered to be everyone’s problem. This point is especially important because the United Nations and other supranational humanitarian agencies have been fighting for multilateral policies and cooperation for a long time, and for the focus of world society’s concern to change so that an agenda putting human beings at the centre of local, national and international policies could be established. These organizations’ struggle has concentrated on efforts to give priority to such issues as ‘firearms control’, ‘proliferation of anti-personnel mines’, ‘child soldiers’, ‘hunger and poverty in the world’, ‘pollution’, ‘human rights’, ‘racism’, etc. Despite humanitarian rhetoric in official discourse, the truth is that security has continued to be focused on economics, power, territory, etc., with its favoured tool for action being the force of arms. According to MacLean (op. cit.), at the beginning of the twentieth century the proportion of dead and wounded in military conflicts was 90% soldiers and 10% civilians; at the end of the century, the proportion was inverted – 10% soldiers and 90% civilians. The fact that a country makes war without loss of soldiers (compared with the enemy) has been commemorated as tremendous progress. After the terrorist actions of 11 September, everyone began to talk of a Third World War, as if it were a traditional war between nations. Such is not the case. The US is leading a non-conventional ‘war’, an asymmetric one some would say, but against terrorist groups with cells in different, possibly unknown countries. In a Manichaean equation, the world’s countries have been presented with only two possible alternatives. They either consider themselves real or potential victims of terror, or they are considered ‘suspicious’ for not unconditionally supporting the US in the fight of ‘good against evil’. In his declaration of war, Bush warned that politically neutral positions would not be accepted, not even in countries where religious, ethnic or ideological extremism was not a major problem. Thus, either one chose to be a ‘victim of terror’, together with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, or one became a country ‘suspected’ of practising or supporting terrorism together with Afghanistan and who knows who else. 6. The El Clarín newspaper, in its edition of 18 August 2001, states: ‘BUSH REJECTS MULTILATERALISM. Since he assumed the Presidency last February, President George Bush has rejected all international treaties, always on the same pretext: ‘They are fatally flawed.’ Until now, the Bush administration has rejected the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from the same year, ratification of three projects favoured by Clinton – the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court and the Ban on Nuclear Tests – signed by the Democrats but not ratified’. In July 2001, the United States and Israel also unilaterally walked out on the Conference Against Racism and Intolerance in Durban, South Africa. 271 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 271 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile A serious consequence of this Manichaeism is the tendency for people to emerge in peripheral nations, who, whether to make sure that their dedication to the ‘centre’ is not doubted, or because of a compulsion to mimicry, see ghosts on every side, or even, for some unfathomable reason, appeal to an unfailing alarmism, ‘discovering’ conspiracies and hate where they had never existed before and choosing enemies because of their appearance or origin and resurrecting Cesare Lombroso from the grave. There is no doubt that terrorism is an abominable practice, a statement which could only be disagreed with by terrorists and those who support them. That is one thing. Not gauging relative responsibilities of countries in the fight against terrorism, and adopting procedures that are also worthy of condemnation, are something else altogether. As has been stated, the main thrust of this paper has to do with the effect of all this on public security in Latin American towns. In this respect, this is not really the Third World War, but the Fifth. The Third was the War on Communism; the Fourth was the War on Drugs, both declared by countries in the ‘centre’. And now we have the Fifth, the War Against Terror, with the same model of distribution of tasks that characterized the Third and the Fourth. The guideline given to countries, peoples and individuals to orient their actions, even in domestic spheres of action, is contained in a single word – ‘war’. In the light of this new conflict, then, it would perhaps be appropriate to bring to mind some data, which, although apparently obvious, have none the less been passed over in these discussions. During the ‘War on Communism’, in the so-called Cold War period (the Third), we were witness to a rather strange distribution of tasks. While we in Latin America let our imagination run wild thinking of magical, infallible buttons which, presumably, the United States and the Soviet Union kept ready for any emergency – and which could be pressed at any moment (but, apparently, were not pressed either in New York or in Washington) – we worked on our own ‘hot war’, killing each other in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and other places (except in the countries which had declared the ‘Cold War’). During the ‘War on Drugs’, we were, and still are, witnesses to mass killing of our youth in large towns in these marginal countries, very often using guns produced in Europe and the US, while we have to exert every effort to ensure that the drugs do not reach European and North American consumers. I believe that perhaps we need to reflect a little more on the fact that countries such as Colombia and Brazil, for 272 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 272 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security and Public Security ... Jorge Da Silva example, lead the number of dead (Colombians and Brazilians) in the ‘War on Drugs’. Consequently, in the ‘War Against Terror’, Latin American and Caribbean countries must establish their own guidelines (and not have them set for them), and the citizens and institutions of these countries must not exaggerate possible problems riding an opportunistic wave. More than that, careful attention must be paid to opportunists, who are experts in heightening fear to create new markets for the production of electronic devices, intrigue, state intelligence bureaucracies, anti-terrorist troops, and expert, academic theses on ‘terrorism’. Without getting into the merits of the motivations that lead suicidal extremists to perpetrate such dastardly actions against innocent human beings as those of 11 September (labelling them fanatics or crazies does not really explain the problem), and keeping some precautions, such as those specified above, in mind, every country and citizen around the world has the moral obligation to support the American people and help in the fight against terrorism, which does not mean closing their eyes and embarking on a new global ‘war’. It seems that, in the whole negative picture of the world today, with wars, poverty, oppression and all the rest, the unilateralism that has characterized the action of central countries has no place in the current world situation. Until 11 September, human security seemed to be an exclusive aspiration of persistent humanitarians and of peoples constantly exposed to suffering and hardship. It was really a Utopia. Since then, however, it has to be recognized that what is at stake is the survival of everyone, including the rich, as has been pointed out. It is as if a historical conspiracy has opened up a real opportunity to achieve multilateral cooperation. The curious thing is that it has come about in a way that could never have been imagined. We must continue to hope and fight for the human security doctrine to prosper, not only on the world stage but also nationally and locally. Much can be done in the area of public security, if human security is the focus of our concern. The truth is that, as we have seen, the focus of public security is also territorial (spatial) and patrimonial, and the preferred means used by the state is force, with human beings relegated to third place. Thus, I believe that it has been amply proved in any town in Latin America that acting against urban violence as if it were a problem totally isolated from global issues, in other words, a problem that can be solved by using the police, has had the perverse effect of increasing the level of violence and, above all, of 273 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 273 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile increasing discrimination, based on who is ‘dangerous’ and who is not, who is ‘good’ and who is ‘bad’ in society. The intimate relationship between global and local in security issues can be inferred from the words of Ramírez-Ocampo, commenting on the effects of the Cold War on Latin America (2001, p. 179):7 ‘(...) In many latitudes, this false global security implied arbitrary, premeditated action by government authorities in dealing with their inhabitants, very often seen to be ‘internal enemies’ and, therefore, a danger to ‘national security’ interests proffered to the control of East or West’. Thus, the concept of international security in the ‘War on Communism’ forced regimes and governments, within their territories, to join the rationale imposed by the major powers, with the consequences that we all know so well and which Ramírez-Ocampo has so eloquently stressed. As we said above, we cannot make the same mistake again. Urban violence and human public security Public security is concerned with public order, violence and crime at a local level. One of the challenges faced by those responsible for this sector in our towns and countries is related to doing so within the framework of human rights. Thus, I simply cannot refer to violence without first making a few observations about what it means to fight for human values in developed countries and what it means to fight for those same values in Latin America, which is still strongly marked by authoritarianism and social hierarchy. Above all, one must consider the paradox that historically human rights have followed different routes in the world. In countries such as France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom the route has been towards more rights; in Africa, Asia and Latin America, towards fewer rights. And, most importantly, the conquest of the citizens of Central European countries occurred at the same time that those countries were imposing domination and oppression and ensuring that colonized peoples did not have even the most basic rights – the right to freedom, to individuality, to their own culture, to their own religion, to their own lifestyles and even to life itself. Today in Latin America we are still concerned with first-generation rights for most Latin American peoples, fighting inequality, poverty, oppression and state violence. 7. On discrimination of ‘dangerous’ people, see also Da Silva, 1998, pp. 51–62. 274 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 274 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security and Public Security ... Jorge Da Silva In sum, the following must be kept clearly in mind as a primary concern in the search for human rights in Latin America: from a formal point of view, the rights of all are declared in the Constitution and laws of the land, but material conditions, in other words, the region’s history and issues involving power and economics, prevent them from being universally guaranteed. Considering public security without taking into account the fact that there is a tremendous gulf in our countries between formal and informal simply contributes to digging a deeper pit; it is a perverse, though not intentional way, of expiating the blame of political elites and leaving things as they always were. Consequently, it can be said that, in most of our countries, the expression ‘maintaining law and order’ means fighting to maintain hierarchies, authoritarianism and exclusion. When speaking of militarizing public security in Latin American countries, it must be recognized that this is not an isolated choice. In fact, it involves applying the traditional model of order sought using military force, which explains the presence of the military in directing public security activities and even in the police itself. The idea of an ‘internal enemy’, of militarized raids against drug dealers in poor communities, the use of cordon sanitaires, all owe their origin to a concept of security that is not focused on human beings. If problems related to the proliferation of small arms around the world are combined with the problems of the militarist logic of the socalled ‘War on Drugs’, what is happening in many Latin American towns in terms of urban violence is understandable. For example, according to statistics from the State Public Security Secretariat, in Rio de Janeiro alone the police have impounded 72,274 firearms in the last ten years, and the number continues to increase. In 1991, 3,958 firearms were impounded; in 1995, 5,115; in 1999, 9,502; in 2000, 10,332; and in 2001 the projected figure is 12,000 firearms. In the last three years alone (1999, 2000 and 2001), the police have impounded 362 rifles, 123 submachine guns and 1,171 hand grenades. The above shows that one cannot offer people security simply through the police; it shows that global factors, such as the interests of the worldwide arms industry, the financial power of drug trafficking around the world, the connections of crime with the international financial system, directly affect local decisions. Not taking these factors into account and believing in the use of force by the police simply means establishing a vicious circle around a mistaken view of ‘more of the same’. In this context, the police 275 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 275 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile themselves can contribute to heating up the drug and arms market,8 in addition to becoming a factor that increases violence, as Zaffaroni (1988, pp. 5–8) has stated in his book with the suggestive title “Criminología: Aproximación desde un margen”. The author maintains that there are two main types of response in these situations – ‘responses that do not question authorities’ and ‘responses that do question authorities’. He suggests that the role played by the penal system as a power structure in Latin American countries should be questioned. Responses that do not question authorities are those that do not consider the theory that the penal system can become a conditioning element of crime and violence; in this, Zaffaroni is in agreement with Lopez-Rey (1981), who had already listed what he termed the five main ‘conditionates’ of crime – power, development, inequality, human condition and the penal system. After pointing out a few characteristics of the system in Latin America, such as its selective, elitist, classist and racist operation and its intimate links with authorities, Zaffaroni concludes (p. 19): ‘All this shows us that in our latitude we need knowledge that allows us to explain what our penal systems are, how they work, what effects they produce, why and how their effects are hidden from us, how they are linked to other instances of social control and authorities, what the possible alternatives to these systems are and how they can be implemented.’ I mentioned above the number of firearms impounded in the State of Rio de Janeiro, but I did not mention that, in the same ten-year period, in other words, from 1991 to September 2001, 75,829 people were murdered in the state, most of them poor young people from the periphery. Nor did I mention that the number of teenagers imprisoned by the penal system also increased consistently during the same period. In 1991, 203 minors were imprisoned; in 1995, 631; in 1996, 1,385; in 1999, 1,634; in 2000, 1,594.9 Thus, if one considers the problems of the proliferation of firearms, the complexity of international narcotics trafficking, the method adopted in many places to fight drugs (such as imprisoning young people), and the number of killings, one can better understand what Zaffaroni was trying to demonstrate. And one will understand that the best thing to do in the interest of all citizens is to opt for human public security. 8. The world drug trade is estimated to turnover about US$500 billion a year, more than the international oil industry and twice that of the automobile industry (see Estudo, 2000, p. 8). 9. Data from trials of children and teenagers in the town of Rio de Janeiro. 276 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 276 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security and Public Security ... Jorge Da Silva Conclusion The traditional perspective of security, in other words, the idea of security based on such notions as sovereignty, military and economic power, has caused much suffering in the world, as was mentioned above. The concept of human security, putting human beings at the centre of concerns of global governance and local governments, is an imperative for civilization. It presupposes support from every country in the world, primarily from the major powers, for its aim is to put an end to threats against humanity and people in their homes, their work and their lives. My point, as I mentioned at the start, is the application of the concept of human security to public security. I believe that I have demonstrated that international security logic has had a negative effect on local decisions in such issues as maintaining law and order and the fight against crime and urban violence. I referred to problems of public security in towns in Latin America and how coping with them has been conceived. It is evident, of course, that public authorities have been concerned primarily with their assets and their own interests, in other words, national security interests. Setting basic questions to one side, the thinking is that an end will be made to violence and crime by simply using the police, as if the police were an army fighting against declared enemies. This view puts police in a cause and effect relationship with violence. If violence does not diminish, the thinking is that more police are needed or that they are not properly trained. So the decision is made to increase the number of police and train them. Then once again, if violence does not diminish, the thinking is that even more police are needed and even more training. Well, first of all, it must be borne in mind that two different things are being referred to. One is the ideal of having a police force that respects citizens, a well-trained police force that works professionally; another thing is to think that a police force organized along these lines is the means par excellence to put an end to violence, as has been the tendency in the discourse of governments, police, journalists and even academics. By doing so, they forget basic issues such as, for example, the effects of globalization on Latin America and its towns, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and, it must be reiterated, the financial interests of international dealing and trafficking in drugs and arms. It would seem that, after 11 September, the two major powers are a little more disposed to support cooperative multilateralism. Public 277 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 277 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile security in Latin American and Caribbean towns will be benefited by action on two main fronts: (a) on an international scale, by a tremendous effort to control firearms and contain their proliferation in the world, something that can only be done under the leadership of the United States; and (b) internally, our countries must set their own agenda, taking into account local problems and priorities. Supporting the fight against terror and drugs is a duty, but it cannot be done to the detriment of problems which affect our populations more directly – such as hunger, inequality, and the killing of our youth. The question must be asked: Why do we continue with a militarized fight against drugs in the poor neighbourhoods of our towns just to see more and more pointless deaths of thousands of young people? There is no doubt that, with the concept of human security prevailing in political decisions regarding public security in our towns, we will be able to come up with more rational alternatives in order to solve the problems that afflict us in particular. The concept to be developed is that of ‘human public security’, and the key word is PEACE. Bibliography DA SILVA, JORGE. 1996. Militarização ideológica da segurança pública. In: Ricardo S. Bustamante (org.), Ensaios Jurídicos – O Direito em Revista, pp. 497–519. Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Atualização Jurídica– IBAJ. DA SILVA, JORGE. 1998. Violência e racismo no Rio de Janeiro. 2nd ed. Rio de Janeiro, Forense. Estudo global sobre o mercado ilegal de drogas no Rio de Janeiro (Relatório de Pesquisa). 2000. Rio de Janeiro, NEPAD/UERJ; CLAVES/FIOCRUZ. LOPEZ-REY, MANUEL. 1981. Introducción a la criminología. Madrid, Universidad Complutense, Instituto de Criminología. MAC LEAN, GEORGE. The Changing Perceptions of Human Security: Coordinating National and Multilateral Responses. Paper prepared for the United Nations Association in Canada conference, The United Nations and the New Security Agenda, Ottawa, Ontario, 8 May 1998 (http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~maclean/). RAMIREZ-OCAMPO, AUGUSTO. 2001. La paz internacional, seguridad humana y protección de la democracia. In: Rodrigo Alberto Carazo Z. (comp.). Violencia y paz en América Latina. Cartago, Costa Rica, Libro Universitario Regional. 278 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 278 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security and Public Security ... Jorge Da Silva REGEHR, ERNIE. 1999. Defense and Human Security. In Ploughshares Monitor, December 1999 (http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ MONITOR/mond99a.html). Rico, JOSÉ MARÍA. 1997. Justicia penal y transición democrática en América Latina. Madrid/Mexico City. Siglo Ventiuno Editores. ROJAS ARAVENA, FRANCISCO. 2000. Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latin. In Nuevo Gobierno: desafíos de la reconciliación. Yearbook. Santiago, FLACSO-Chile. UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York, United Nations Development Programme. UNFPA. 2001. The State of World Population 2001. New York, United Nations Population Fund. WEBER, MAX. 1968. Three pure types of legitimate domination. In: Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.), Economy and Society, Vol. 1. New York, Bedminister Press. ZAFFARONI, E UGENIO RAÚL. 1988. Criminología: Aproximación desde un margen. Vol. I. Bogotá, Editorial Temis. 279 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 279 25/04/2003, 12:55 VIOLENCE AND INSECURITY IN MODERN CHILE 1 HUGO FRÜHLING 2 Introduction Violence is a particularly relevant subject for analysing factors affecting people’s security. In order to work properly, every social system requires the production of reciprocal certainties, securities, acknowledgements and expectations that are met to a reasonable degree. The lack of these certainties threatens social stability and people’s psychological well-being. Social change creates new factors of insecurity or diminishes the importance of old ones. Transition from a rural society to an urban one, and from an economy with high levels of intervention by the state to a free market one, are two examples of changes that modify areas of certainty, causing some to disappear while creating new ones. At the same time, these social changes cause existing security mechanisms to be modified; in other words, they modify policies and measures aimed at dealing with factors that cause insecurity. 1. This paper owes a great deal to the research assistant, Azun Candina. 2. Lawyer, Doctor in Juridical Sciences and Master in Law, Director of the Center for the Study of Citizen Security of the University of Chile. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 281 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile This paper evaluates the changes experienced since 1930 as a result of a perception of insecurity based on crime and political violence in Chile. It refers, therefore, to expressions of interpersonal and inter-group violence. Any evaluation of violent crime as a factor causing insecurity must of necessity comprehend it as a historical circumstance in order to understand its real influence on modern life. Until recently in Chile, certain violent, criminal acts were traditionally accepted as normal and considered acceptable within certain limits, given power relationships within the home. Such is the case of violence against women, traditionally very common in both rural and urban Chile, which none the less, was considered for decades to be a fact of life with very different connotations to those of a crime and which was never cause for collective fear (Tinsman, 1995, pp. 111–46). Citizens’ interpretation of crime is also affected by the historical context. The history of humanity shows the existence of regular manifestations of collective fear imputable to a wide variety of circumstances (natural catastrophes, epidemics, military conflicts, political violence, unemployment and sudden increases in crime). Of course, whether or not these causes of insecurity prevail in the perception of citizens depends, in part, on how serious they are and on how vulnerable citizens feel when confronted by them. In other words, collective fear increases when there is a sense that existing social mechanisms are incapable of preventing the occurrence of events that threaten personal security (Rico and Salas, 1988, p. 13). It is not our intention here to measure growth or diminution of insecurity caused by crime, because such historical measurements are limited by the lack of reliable statistics and by the fact that significant percentages of crimes remain in the shadows. It would be much less feasible to establish how fear of crime has evolved, as it has only been measured by recent surveys. What we would like to do, however, is specify the ways in which crime has evolved as a cause of insecurity and how it relates to the country’s prevailing perceptions. Likewise, we would like to refer to security mechanisms that have been recommended and adopted to fight crime at different times in the country’s history. Fear of common crime or violence is not a recent problem in Chile’s history. Urbanization gave rise to forms of crime that are typical in large towns, but which seem to appear mostly in popular sectors. The response to this process of the state and of individuals was a mixture of policies aimed at promoting stability in the home and actions that would increase the attributes of the criminal justice system. 282 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 282 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling New patterns of violent crime and political violence marked by increases in robberies and the emergence of groups committing common crimes for political ends began to take root in the 1970s. Citizen concern was focused on the significant increase in political mobilizations. The 1980s and 1990s saw an increase in widespread fear of crime in the country, typified by a general fear among citizens of the criminal element that was stimulated by an increase in crimes against property and by the fact that the perpetrators were often armed. Criminal violence acquired an increasingly rational, instrumental nature keyed to acquisitive goals, while criminal violence as the product of irrational impulses and interpersonal disputes diminished. Fear was also intensified by the very acute perception that the criminal justice system was in crisis. This period is characterized by widespread fear of crime and its identification with armed robbery. In addition, crimefighting proposals were geared basically to modernizing police and court systems. There is no reason to think that this fear will ease up in future. Certain typical risk factors of societies that have to cope with crime, such as use of drugs, prevalence of an acquisitive, individualistic culture, will continue. Furthermore, until now it would seem that no mechanisms promoting more in-depth solutions to the problem have been used. Crime and violence. Historical background This section covers a period starting in the 1930s and ending in the second half of the 1980s. We have divided it into two parts. The first emphasizes social representation and perception of common crime until 1964, while the second deals with the irruption of political violence as a result of political mobilization begun in the second half of the 1960s. This chronological division means that we can evaluate the sources of fear of violence while the so-called State of Commitment was in force in Chile, and then during the process of installing social and economic liberalism under a strongly authoritarian regime. Rural violence Crime and violence in Chile did not emerge with the process of urbanization. They had a great deal of influence on those who migrated 283 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 283 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile to rural zones close to the Central Valley at the beginning of the twentieth century. Some maintained that these popular movements were caused by the poor living conditions of the tenants. Others, in contrast, maintained that the main reason lay in banditry and insecurity in the fields (Arteaga, 1995, p. 183). One must not forget in this regard that rural banditry was an enormously important problem after the end of the War of the Pacific. Historical literature has recorded declarations saying that organized banditry scoured the countryside with impunity, frightening the population (Maldonado, 1990, p. 9). In order to ensure successful colonization of the south, which involved foreign immigrants, the ‘Colonial Police Force’ was formed in 1884 and entrusted with maintaining law and order in Arauco, Malleco, Cautín, Valdivia and Llanquihue. This force was eventually broken up and replaced in 1902 by a Police Squadron consisting of members of the army who performed the same function (Aguila and Maldonado, 1996, p. 76). A peasant’s daily life witnessed frequent acts of physical violence, although not caused by the actions of professional criminals. Men on the haciendas were linked to productive work, while women did the housework. Selling food and alcoholic beverages in their homes and installing canteens or bars were an additional way of obtaining income for the family, or for subsisting in the case of women living alone. Studies of criminal cases show that there were frequent hold-ups and fights inside these properties, usually caused by excess consumption of alcohol and ending in serious injuries and death (Arteaga, 1995, pp. 184–7), just as happened in the towns. However, these actions only occurred among popular rural sectors. As a result of the rapid process of urbanization begun in the nineteenth century and speeded up in the early decades of the twentieth century, images and expressions of violence were transferred to a different context – the urban context and more specifically the city of Santiago.3 Representations of urban criminal violence (1930–64) In the years following the economic crisis of the 1930s, specialized literature of the time told of concern about the increase in crime, recorded empirically through the increase in the number of criminal 3. In 1930, 51.6% of the 4,287,445 Chileans lived in rural zones, while the urban population accounted for 49.4%. In 1940, the urban population was 52.5% and in 1952 it was 60.2%. In 1970, it had already climbed to 75.2%. See National Housing and Population Censuses, 1952, 1960 and 1970. 284 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 284 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling cases passing through the courts. Businessman Adolfo Ibáñez, in a paper presented in the Puerto Varas Rotary Club Conference in 1940, stated: ‘This study, this tremendous effort to get involved in a field so alien to the author, intends to be a contribution to the tremendous work of saving at least some of those thousands of unfortunate souls whom crime is pulverizing every year in our country. Caught up by the impression of lives destroyed by crime, by compassion for annihilated families, by horror at such dreadful crimes, I began studying the statistics of this horrible epidemic …’ (Ibáñez, 1940, p. 4). Figures quoted by the author are eloquent: criminal cases taken to court in 1930 amounted to 88,000, the next year 67,000 and by 1937 they had risen to 144,000 (Ibáñez, 1940, p. 20). He is not particularly rigorous in defining the crimes to which he refers. He maintains, however, that if one considers trials of primary crimes – fraud, homicide, robbery, fire, assault and battery, theft – then these increased by 4,335 between 1838 and 1939 (Ibáñez, 1940, p. 21). Ibáñez asserts that the average number of people imprisoned for robbery, theft, fraud, assault and battery and homicide every year amounted to 17,838 in the five-year period from 1922 to 1926, dropped to 12,256 between 1927 and 1931, and then rose to 24,956 between 1936 and 1938 (Ibáñez, 1940, p. 29). He also asserts that the number of offenders per 100,000 inhabitants was double the figure for European countries, such as Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Manifestations of a deep concern about crime continued through the 1950s. This is borne out, as we will see, by the Senate debate of the bill establishing antisocial statuses. It had been a project of the Gabriel González Videla government aimed at dealing with assault using violence or intimidation, known as ‘mugging’. 4 Four years later, in 1958, criminologist Israel Drapkin criticized the editorial line of the press at the time, because it placed too much emphasis on the increase in criminality and the impunity of crimes, on the need to increase sentences and enlarge the police force, without putting forward any serious arguments (Drapkin, 1958, pp. 119–25). This shows that crime continued to be a current issue in national debate as the 1960s drew near. Studies in the 1940s maintained that medical, hereditary, social and economic reasons had a bearing on crime, and that these, in turn, were influenced by the moral conditions in which poor urban sectors lived and bred. 4. Speech by Senator Pedro Alvarez, ordinary session of 2 June 1954. Minutes of ordinary Senate Session, 1954, Vol. I, p. 294. 285 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 285 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In his dissertation for his degree, Salvador Allende maintained that there was an evident influence of hereditary defects and degenerative diseases in the aetiology of crime. He based his reasoning on European studies, which showed the influence of epilepsy on the genesis of crime. He also maintained that alcoholism, tuberculosis, venereal diseases and drug addiction were other aetiological factors (Allende, 1933, p. 12). Thus, in his conclusions, he recommended dealing with crime by means of educational and public health measures: enlarging and spreading experimental schools for the mentally weak, creating and organizing mental hygiene services throughout the country and establishing medicalcriminological services in jails and prisons (Allende, 1933, p. 18). Evaluations at the time clearly could not overlook social and economic factors that predisposed people to crime. Once again factors which have been repeated in subsequent decades were considered. One of the factors which, of course, was specified as speeding up crime in the second half of the 1930s was the economic crisis with its after-effects of unemployment, poverty and moral decline. Reference was also made, however, to other causes related less to the economic cycle than to changes occurring in society. Thus, the process of urbanization was seen to be one of the primary causes of the increase in crime. As Abraham Meersohn stated in an excellent test thesis, the urban media was where crimes were committed with greater frequency due to greater population density, the marked contrast between the wealth of some and the poverty of others, the abundance of dens of vice and corruption, as well as job instability (Meersohn, 1940, pp. 9–15). A second social risk factor was the rapid break-up of family organization by so-called industrialism, which displaced private production and changed the system of family life. Fathers now had to earn a living outside the home, leaving their children in the care of their mothers or sometimes of strangers. This had repercussions on the children’s moral formation, upon which depended whether or not a child became first a young offender and then a professional criminal. (Meersohn, 1940, pp. 22, 23). The most devastating expression of this break-up of family organization was abandoned children, a situation that, according to Meersohn, brought with it a greater degree of danger. Abandoned children fed the ranks of vagrants and beggars. The author maintained that there were about 4,000 beggars in Santiago and about 6,000 vagrants wandering about the town with no fixed activity. These occasionally committed crimes. 286 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 286 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling According to Meersohn, vagrants and beggars were more perverse and vicious than habitual criminals (Meersohn, 1940, p. 31). His evaluation in this respect reflects the learned opinion prevailing in the nineteenth century. The populace lived in a ‘vicious, perverse’ social milieu, which had a bearing on the lack of moral formation; the picture was one of poorly formed families, alcoholic parents, with illegitimate children who ended up as prostitutes or vagrants and beggars. In his dissertation for his degree in medicine, Salvador Allende referred to ‘unsavoury characters’ who represented a transition stage between honesty and crime. As such, they were untouched by the law, but society had to defend itself against them and protect them for they were a breeding ground for future criminals (Allende, 1933, p. 16). Vagrants and beggars, however, were the most extreme expression of the problem of a lack of social discipline and lack of diligence, which were important seeds of crime. Adolfo Ibáñez, whom we have already mentioned, maintained that the cause of crime was not low wages and that workers and employees would live better if they knew how to better invest their wages and earnings, for they liked to drink and very often wasted their money on drinking and gambling (Ibáñez, 1940, p. 36). The risk factor, which received the most attention in those years, was alcoholism. High consumption of alcohol in the country was shown by the fact that 55.7% of all inmates of public jails had been imprisoned for drunkenness. According to a study by doctor Luis Cubillos entitled ‘Crime, a Social-Biological and Legal Problem’ and cited by Meersohn, about 70% to 75% of Chilean murderers had a background of alcoholism (Meersohn, 1940, p. 73). The same author maintains that statistics from the Detective Service and the Institute of Criminology indicated that drunkenness was the cause of a high percentage of the most violent crimes, such as homicide, assault and battery and rape. Finally, just as in previous decades, one of the main causes of crime was considered to be its impunity. Ibáñez quotes a speech by the President of the Republic stating that most crimes committed in Santiago went unpunished and reiterates: ‘There has been an impression for many years that most crime in Santiago goes unpunished; numerous victims do not report the crimes of which they have been victims, because they consider that the nuisance involved is absolutely pointless or to no effect’ (Ibáñez, 1940, p. 25). The author agrees absolutely with this point of view and states that the direct cause of the increase in crime is the lack of discipline, fostered by impunity. 287 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 287 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The image that emerges from the studies quoted above is that of a criminal from the low classes, living in a milieu in which violence, alcoholism and social dissolution prevail. Criminals were individuals acting alone, but who sometimes acted with accomplices and were protected by accessories after the fact. Criminals did not act in constant association with other criminals. But, what were the most worrying crimes? The studies by Allende and Meersohn stress so-called violent crimes against people, such as homicide and assault and battery. The former declared that criminality in Chile was essentially homicidal in nature (Allende, 1933, p. 18). Ibáñez, in contrast, referred to epidemics of robberies, which in popular neighbourhoods took the form of typical muggings. Both, in turn, referred to crimes which were not serious in themselves, but which could cause fear in the population and foster social disorder – vagrancy, mendicity and alcoholism. Is this perception supported by statistical data? Crime: true facts (1930–64) As is well known, police statistics on crime are only part of the truth, never a faithful reflection of it, because a large percentage of crimes are never reported or never recorded by the police. Chile only has statistical records of crimes reported to the police since 1948. In turn, the Plainclothes Detective Force has only recorded its orders to investigate since 1944. There is information about arrests made by the police during the whole period, but these are rather more a reflection of police activity. Existing information reveals a significant amount of crimes against people during the years covered by these statistics. In fact, the highest homicide rate was recorded in the period from 1944 to 1949, amounting to 10.72 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Similar rates were only repeated between 1970 and 1973. The number of homicides investigated by the Plainclothes Detective Force, however, obviously declined starting from 1950. Reports of assault and battery remained high throughout the period from 1948 to 1972, dropping quickly after that date. The lack of any additional information makes it hard to interpret these figures. If, however, a large percentage of homicides and assault and battery were caused by fights under the influence of alcohol, then naturally the gradual increase in the income and education of popular sectors of the population would be reflected in a fewer number of cases. 288 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 288 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling The number of reports of robberies and thefts during this period stayed the same with a slight tendency to decline. In sum, the natural psychological impression caused by violent crime, and the fact that rates of violent crime were high during the period, combine to consolidate the public image that violent crime during this period typically involved bloodshed and people from popular communities. Security policies Insecurity during this period was dealt with basically via state policies, which increased discretionary powers and the severity of the penal system and sought to promote the stability of legitimate families and control the consumption of alcohol. All this was in line with the prior diagnosis that the breakdown of family organization and excessive consumption of alcohol contributed to the increase in crime. The most obvious expression of greater discretionary powers for the police was the gradual increase in arrests on suspicion by the police, coupled with arrests for vagrancy and mendicity that usually did not lead to any convictions, but which increased in number during the 1930s and 1940s. I refer to this as an increase in discretionary powers of the police, because arrests were not on suspicion of having committed a specific crime but rather on suspicion of having evil intent. Consequently, arrest on suspicion became a system of control designed for people from the populace considered to be dangerous. As Appendix 5 shows, arrests on suspicion were 11.8% of total arrests in 1930, while in 1964 the figure was 35.2% of total arrests. In 1930, 18,612 people were arrested on suspicion, while in 1964 173,288 people were arrested on the same grounds. The most obvious attempt to increase the discretionary powers of the system of criminal justice to deal with crime was the enactment of Law 11.625 on Antisocial Statuses, approved on 4 October 1954, to deal with robbery with violence. Among other things, this law established a criterion of dangerousness in penal legislation by defining ‘antisocial statuses’, which was the status accorded to given persons who were considered to be a danger to society, because they were discovered in situations that were a breeding ground for criminals and, therefore, they would later commit crimes. The new law was aimed at homosexuals, drug addicts, vagrants, drunks and identity forgers, among others. Its Article 3 sets forth such measures to deal with these groups as internment in agricultural workhouses, the obligation to reside in a given place, bail-bonds, etc. These security 289 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 289 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile measures were to be adopted after a short proceeding before a judge. As can be seen, the law imposed restrictive measures on personal freedom without having to prove that a specific crime had been committed. This part of the law was never applied, because the regulations issued under it were never issued; but, in fact, it remained in force until 1994 when it was repealed by Law 19.313. The same Law 11.625 on Antisocial Statuses introduced a series of severe amendments to sentences imposed for robbery and theft. Article 47 amended Article 450 of the Penal Code, prescribing that robberies and thefts under Section IX of the Code would be punishable as having been perpetrated even if they had only been attempted. This eliminated sentences imposed on attempted robbery or theft. Likewise, Paragraph 2 of Article 450 of the law placed armed robbery as a separate crime. Sentences were severe, including life imprisonment. The law also stipulated that persons over 18 years of age who participated in robberies and thefts with persons under 18 would always be punished as authors, even if they had only been accomplices. These sentences were subsequently tempered by Law 13.303 of 1959.5 In addition, policies on the stability of legitimate families and prevention of alcohol consumption sought to act on risk factors that created conditions for an increase in criminal violence. These included abandoned children, lack of discipline and alcoholism in popular communities. Promoting legitimate families was done basically through promotional and legislative activities. The law expedited conditions for recognizing illegitimate children, thereby preventing them from evolving, as was believed at the time, towards abandonment, vagrancy and crime. Thus, Law 4808 of 1930 imposed the obligation on Civil Registry Officers to explain to those who were about to marry that they could legitimize their illegitimate children. This led to nearly 19,000 illegitimate children being legitimized between 1933 and 1937 (Meersohn, 1940, p. 35). Social security legislation also recognized some privileges for married workers that were not recognized for unmarried ones. Thus, the preventive medicine law approved in 1938 granted married workers and widowers a subsidy equivalent to 75% of their wages, if they were absent through illness. Single workers only received 50%. Payment of a family allowance for workers was approved from 1952, but could only be collected for legally recognized children. Benefits paid by the Obligatory Insurance Fund only applied if children were legally recognized. 5. See Jorge Burgos, pp. 26 ff. 290 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 290 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling Preventive and repressive efforts to reduce consumption of alcohol did not lag behind those made to promote family stability. At the time, alcohol was considered to be the cause of heavy economic losses and also to induce the most violent crimes. The Alcohol Law in force in the 1930s and 1940s heavily taxed new vineyards that were planted, except for those whose production was geared towards consumption of grapes or to making pisco for export. Teaching notions of physiology that showed the consequences of alcohol abuse was obligatory in all schools, and people found in an evident state of drunkenness on the public thoroughfare were meted additional punishment. Based on the series of legislative, preventive and repressive measures referred to above, we can assert that during this period there existed a model of security measures consisting of a combination of repressive actions and preventive and promotional ones, but always carried out by the state. The instrument used was always the judiciary acting through punishments or rewards and bonuses. The state was strongly regulatory and did not hesitate to renege on liberal-democratic principles in order to respond to criteria of dangerousness and deal with unsavoury characters. Both penal law and social measures sought to consolidate a society based on a strong family system and disciplined workers. Evidence from the times, however, would seem to indicate that these security mechanisms were not the result of any scientifically designed criminal policy. Furthermore, many of the measures, such as the mass alcohol prevention campaigns, were only implemented on paper. Political violence The second half of the 1960s marked the beginning of patterns of political violence which, if not exactly new, achieved new levels of intensity and culminated in the installation of a military government in 1973. With it, concern for common crime was attenuated. Official crime figures show some not very serious fluctuations in this period. The number of reports of robberies was 223.4 per 100,000 in 1964 and 284.2 per 100,000 in 1980. The truly significant, explosive increase occurred later, in the 1980s and 1990s. The highest number of reports prior to 1982 occurred in 1972. Theft, in contrast, declined noticeably. According to the Plainclothes Detective Force, homicides rose sharply between 1970 and 1973 and then stabilized at levels that can be considered normal for the period. 291 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 291 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile A distinctive sign of this subperiod, however, was the increase in violence originating in social-political aims and often manifested through collective action, thereby becoming a manifestation of inter-group violence. There was a marked increase in acts of violence starting from 1967, partly due to the emergence of new social actors, such as the peasant, shanty-town dweller and student movements. A recent study of the causes of human rights violations in Chile, based on journalistic reports, shows that, whereas in 1966, 37 acts of violence of a political and social nature were recorded, in 1967 these rose to 89, in 1968 the figure was 71, in 1969 151 and in 1970 219 (Frühling, 1999, p. 28). The number of acts of violence rose during the government of Salvador Allende (1970–73) and, in addition, the make-up of this violence also changed considerably. In fact, acts of violence classified as terrorism, seizure of land, farms and industries and street fighting predominated (Frühling, 1999, p. 48). Another study covering the period from 1947 to 1987 reaches the conclusion that the average number of acts of popular violence during the presidential period of Gabriel González Videla (1947–52) was 12.5, during the presidency of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1952–58) it was 10.6, during that of Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (1958–64) it was 18.6, while during the presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–70) it was 31.5 and during that of Salvador Allende Gossens it was 63.0 (1970–73) (Salazar, 1990, p. 132). These inter-group conflicts not only occurred in large towns, but were also enormously widespread in rural areas. In 1967, there were 702 rural conflicts as a result of strikes and seizures; this figure dropped to 674 in 1968, rose to 1,275 in 1969, to 2,036 in 1970 and to 3,036 in 1971 (De Vylder, 1976, p. 204). The level of political confrontation under the Allende government rose to even greater heights and the opposition began to include groups that also performed acts of violence and sabotage. 83% of the people interviewed in a survey undertaken in September 1972 declared that Chile was living in a climate of violence, while only 17% declared that it was not.6 The beginning of the military government opened the way for an increase in new forms of political violence. There was repressive violence, of course, aimed at breaking up opposition parties and groups, and there were armed actions by groups opposed to the military 6. Revista Ercilla, 13–19 September 1972, p. 11. Cited in Arturo Valenzuela, El quiebre de la democracia en Chile, p. 188, FLACSO-Chile, Santiago, 1989. 292 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 292 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling government that began operating in the late 1970s and reached their peak in the 1980s. Government repression was most intense in 1973, when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report recorded 1,264 homicides and disappearances, which in many cases involved common criminals. Action by government security forces remained high in the following years, but became more selective. The most deaths were recorded in 1974, 1975 and 1976, but figures were lower than in 1973. Of course, in addition to these events, there were politically motivated arrests and numerous left-wing militants were sent into exile. Armed left-wing organizations began to act as well towards the end of the 1970s. These performed armed propaganda acts, blew up buildings, committed armed robberies and made selective attacks on members of the military and police. In fact, the years in which most of their actions took place were 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1988 (Frühling and Waiser, 1995, pp. 112–13). These series of events took place in a social and economic context of profound socio-economic change, characterized by the reduction in the size of the state and privatization of state-owned companies. The country was adversely affected by two strong recessions – 1975 and 1982–83. All this meant high rates of unemployment over many years, lack of job stability and slow product growth. One journalist defined the subjective feeling of the population as one of fear. This fear had many different causes, not just the probability of being affected by physical violence. Moreover, some of these fears could explain why the authoritarian political order was considered desirable and appropriate to prevent precisely the events that caused insecurity. Patricia Politzer wrote as follows about the series of life interviews she did to obtain different versions of the first decade of the military government: ‘As time passed and I dug deeper into the hearts of such diverse people as a priest, a member of the military, a communist militant and a bank clerk, I began to perceive that fear was a common element in almost all of them. Their histories are as diverse as that of a Chicago Boy, a copper miner, a volunteer worker at the Women’s Secretariat or a mother of a missing detainee. At some moment during the conversation, however, fear emerged more or less explicitly and for more or less justified reasons. For some, it was fear of the military; for others, fear of losing their job; for others fear of poverty, of informers, of repression, of communism, of Marxists, of chaos, of violence or of terrorism. Everyone had his or her own fear’ (Politzer, 1985, p. 10). 293 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 293 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Citizen insecurity increased with the onset of the economic crisis in 1982, and robberies multiplied, rising in 1986 to an until then unheardof rate of 581.5 reports for every 100,000 inhabitants. Figures from Chile’s Plainclothes Detective Force indicate that the number of robberies with violence that they had to investigate increased by 77% between 1980 and 1986 (Blanco et al., 1995). Even though some refer to an increase in crime (Jacob, 1984, pp. 47–8), the truth is that the problem did not achieve the same impact as the rise in crime subsequently did under the democratic regime. There could be many different explanations for this. We would simply like to put forward one. The increase in criminal violence in the 1980s coincided with a milieu loaded with concerns about the economic crisis, increased unemployment, increasing terrorism and political polarization. This to a certain extent meant that the problem of an increase in common crime was kept hidden from public debate and coverage by the press. The increase in repressive actions by the government and in actions by armed groups caused worry and fear, but also low levels of insecurity. In fact, government action was mostly selective and aimed at relatively well-defined targets. The same thing was true of terrorist actions, which only rarely affected people not involved in the main political conflict. Current fear of crime is rather different. Current crime and violence With the restoration of democracy, fear of common crime has impregnated all of society and has become a subject of discussion that is de rigueur and takes up prime time in the news transmitted by the media. Even more importantly, in order to calm citizen anxiety, a series of measures aimed at dealing with the collective feeling of insecurity and new criminal characteristics has been put into practice. Perceptions of urban violence Since the democratic regime started in 1990, perception that crime has increased, that it is not under control and that the government should do more to deal with the problem has been strong. 294 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 294 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling Table 1 Priority given to crime by Chileans, 1989–957 Issues March March April June 1989 1991 1992 1993 December November 1994 1995 Crime Health Poverty Education Wages Employment Housing Terrorism Demonstrations, disturbances 21.5 46.3 30.9 39.3 45.6 44.5 19.0 – 64.0 38.8 26.0 26.9 36.6 27.3 22.2 14.6 62.7 44.1 32.2 26.6 32.9 28.5 20.2 10.0 56.4 49.2 39.0 31.9 27.9 23.4 19.0 7.3 40.0 50.0 50.0 29.0 26.0 30.0 20.0 4.0 35.0 38.0 48.0 29.0 27.0 30.0 17.0 – 10.4 3.7 5.5 4.0 2.0 – Source: Surveys by CEP-ADIMARK (1989–93) and CEP (1994–95). As may be seen from Table 1, from 1990 crime has become one of the three priority issues for Chileans. In contrast, terrorism, demonstrations and disturbances have gradually become less important in public opinion as they have become increasingly more isolated incidents. Tables 1 and 2 both reflect fluctuations in citizen concern and priority given to the crime issue. These would seem to be due, however, to the importance or violence of the events described in the press rather than to any changes in actual conditions of crime. Table 2 Evaluation of government performance in various issues 8 Issues April 1992 June 1993 November 1995 Education Terrorism Health Poverty Crime 63.1 26.1 41.0 28.7 20.5 49.9 25.0 21.5 18.4 13.7 61.0 ***** 41.0 29.0 30.0 Source: Surveys by CEP-ADIMARK (1992–93) and CEP (1995). 7. The question posed a list of problems for the respondents. They were asked to indicate the three most important problems to which the government should dedicate most effort. The percentage in the table indicates the percentage of respondents who included the issue among the three most important. 8. The survey asked for an evaluation of government performance with a grade of 1 (very bad) to 7 (excellent). The percentage represents the proportion of respondents who graded performance in the issues specified with a 5, 6 or 7. 295 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 295 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Government performance on crime consistently received one of the lowest evaluations in the three surveys carried out. In 1993, 1996 and 1997 the company ADIMARK, in association first of all with the Centre for Public Studies (CEP) and later with the Citizen Peace Foundation, carried out surveys focused on the crime issue. These surveys were carried out in the largest towns in the country and consistently showed a strong fear of crime, robbery and assaults. In March 1997, 68.6% of respondents considered that crime had increased since the previous year. Likewise, 84.2% considered that crimes were more violent than a year before. A larger percentage of people interviewed declared, in turn, that they believed that crime would increase in future.9 1997 figures are somewhat lower than 1996, but still considerably higher than 1993. According to information provided by the surveys themselves, this greater fear does not change in relation to the percentage of respondents who had been victims of some kind of robbery during the previous year.10 A recent ADIMARK survey carried out in 1996 for the Citizen Peace Foundation in the community of Santiago revealed that 92.4% of residents thought that they could be the victim of a robbery or assault, 44.2% that they could be the victim of a rape or sexual assault and 35.7% that they could be the victim of a murder. None of the inhabitants of the homes surveyed, however, had been victims of a murder in the past twelve months, and only 0.5% had been a victim of rape or some kind of sexual assault. The survey carried out by ADIMARK in 1993 ranks answers according to socio-economic level, political position and gender of the respondents. It is significant that the percentages of respondents who thought that crime had increased in number and violence compared with the past correlates positively with age and a more conservative political position. Even though all ages showed fear, it was significantly greater in people older than 55 and in those whose political leanings were to the right. This increased perception of violence has significantly curtailed people’s freedom of movement. The three surveys show that more than 50% of the respondents have stopped going to certain places, stopped going out at certain times of day, or have reinforced the security of their homes. 9. Delincuencia y opinión pública, Fundación Paz Ciudadana/ADIMARK, 1997. 10. In the survey carried out in March 1996, 73.5% of respondents said that crime had increased in comparison with the previous year, whereas in March 1993 only 58.5% had said so. In 1996, 67.8% maintained that crime would increase, while in March 1993 only 37.9% had said so. Differences in the percentage of respondents who had been victims in those years, however, were minimal. Respondents suffered more robberies without violence in 1996 than in 1993. But robberies with physical violence in public places had increased in 1996 (14.7% compared with 12.4%). 296 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 296 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling Before analysing in greater detail how fear of crime has changed, we focus our study on current criminality. To do so, we discuss official figures reported by the police and results of a victimization survey carried out in 1997 by the United Nations Development Programme as part of this project. Current criminality Robberies reported to the police have increased since 1982, reaching their highest point in 1991 when there were 614.2 reports for every 100,000 inhabitants. This increase is undoubtedly very significant, as in 1980 there were only 284.2 reports for every 100,000 inhabitants. This figure has fallen since 1991, although it is still above historical averages. However, it rose again in 1997 and 1998. At first sight, this robbery rate seems very high when compared with other countries, but comparisons are difficult because Chile’s definition of a robbery includes acts which in other countries would not be classified as such. The only other crime that seems to have increased substantially is the trafficking of narcotics. According to data from the Chilean Police Force,11 in 1977 254 people were arrested for this crime, while in 1999 the figure was 10,119. Two basic aspects of robberies must be taken into account. The first is a sharp increase in robberies with violence or intimidation between 1980 and 1992. According to figures from the Plainclothes Detective Force, this increase was 66.5% (Blanco et al., 1995, annexes). More important than this increase, however, is the fact that the methods used to carry out these assaults have changed substantially in recent years. In fact, bands of armed criminals have been detected assaulting banks, financial establishments and commercial stores, using tactics formerly used exclusively by armed groups of a political nature.12 Likewise, the press often reports armed robberies of homes, which undoubtedly is a factor that causes great fear among the population. A second important factor is that reports of robberies increased significantly in the wealthiest communities of the Metropolitan Region. In 1992, Vitacura recorded 3,214 reports for every 100,000 inhabitants, Las Condes 2,735 and Providencia 5,237. Crimes against property increased significantly more in wealthier communities during 11. Note that cases of drug trafficking are not reported because there is no victim as such, as would be the case in a robbery, for example. 12. See, for example, ‘Banda de asaltantes usaba tácticas subversivas’, La Epoca, 10 July 1997, p. 20. 297 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 297 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile those years, while crimes against people were more numerous in popular communities. The increase in fear in the country’s most influential sectors has undoubtedly permeated the media, contributing to the general sense of insecurity. This increase in fear of crime has highlighted the deterioration in police and court means of dealing with these new challenges. One indication of this is the reduction in the ratio of police to inhabitants, as can be seen in the maximum personnel established by the law (Table 3). Table 3 Number of inhabitants to number of police, according to maximum personnel stipulated by law Year Population Uniformed Police Plainclothes detectives Total Inhab./ Police 1933 1941 1954 1963 1968 1975 1984 1990 1994 4,420,363 5,094,495 8,183,524 8,183,524 9,134,462 10,336,560 11,855,655 13,099,513 13,994,355 17,713 18,713 18,771 20,930 22,000 22,482 28,341 30,341 36,759 1,631 2,954 2,060 2,424 2,554 6,514 6,514 6,514 6,514 19,344 21,667 20,831 23,354 24,554 28,996 34,855 36,855 43,273 228.51 235.13 392.85 350.41 372.02 356.48 340.14 355.43 323.40 Source: Compilation of Laws and Decrees. General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic 1932– 1994, Population Estimates and Projections 1950–2050, INE-CELADE, 1996. Faced with this new situation, security policies and private security mechanisms have undergone substantial transformations. There are important differences between social strata, however, regarding the circumstances that cause fear in the population and the degree of satisfaction with police protection. Low- and middle-income sectors undoubtedly feel the most vulnerable (Table 4). 298 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 298 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling Table 4 Situations causing fear and satisfaction with police protection, by socio-economic level Socio-economic level High Middle Low Feels most fear · On returning home at night · When leaving home for work · At home at night 48.3 32.8 25.5 62.7 56.6 30.9 66.6 63.3 34 Satisfaction with police protection · Satisfied · Dissatisfied · More or less 48.9 24.8 26.3 36.5 44.7 18.8 35.6 45.5 18.8 Source: Centre for Public Studies, 1993. The reason for this fear is that many of those who are in a situation of social risk are perceived to also consume drugs and alcohol, and, as such, subject to a significant lack of control. Existing studies assume (although it has still not been empirically proved) that there is a close link between consumption of crack in Santiago’s poorer sectors and the emergence of new forms of violence and crime (José Bengoa, 1997, p. 14). Consumption of crack contributes to the break-up of poorer families and also to the increase in violence, definitively breaking with any form of social integration. Sociologist Doris Cooper maintains in this respect that armed domestic robberies, which have increased in recent years, are normally perpetrated by non-professional criminals who use drugs and alcohol, hence the violence with which they act (Cooper, 1992, p. 53). Current social representation of urban violence, then, is closely linked to common crime and in particular to robbery with violence. Those who write or comment on crime tend to see robbery with violence as the most dangerous, most repeated expression of urban violence. This agrees, as we will see, with specific figures from police statistics. Part of the fear expressed by the population is also caused by the disproportionate growth of the city of Santiago and the intensification of typical patterns of social segregation. The National Urban Development Policy enacted in 1979 repealed regulations governing ‘urban limits’, opening up the possibility of incorporating almost 65,000 299 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 299 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile hectares into urban use. This made it much harder for police to patrol the city, encouraged the emergence of new housing developments where neighbours did not know each other and made eradication policies possible. These policies were carried out between 1979 and 1985 and consisted of evicting about 30,000 families living in shanty towns in the eastern area of the city and incorporating them into social housing programmes in the low-income outskirts of the city (Sabatini, 1997, p. 4). This process of concentrating poverty in areas that very often lacked essential basic services and which forced residents to make long trips to find work, had negative effects because it concentrated social pathologies in these communities that received massive contingents of urban poor (Sabatini, 1997, p. 15). Reports written in the 1980s by municipal officers in the communities that received these families state that these eradications had a negative impact on the security of people and their goods. In many cases, the new housing developments were concentrations of social disorder and crime (Frühling and Sandoval, 1997, p. 267). Our hypothesis, still unproved, is that the changes experienced by the city had two effects. First, social experiences became more impersonal and transitory, which made mechanisms of social control more difficult. Second, the process of concentrating poverty in specific geographical areas increased the possibility of a critical mass and the consolidation of subcultures that reject the legal system. This sense of fear has meant first of all a significant increase in private security spending, which has led to a high demand for private security services, alarms and insurance. Similarly, public spending on police and on the system of criminal justice as a whole – criminal courts, police, National Minors Service and prison guards – has increased. Public policies aimed at dealing with citizen insecurity have become a constant government concern. Until now, programmes to stimulate citizen participation, implemented by the General Secretariat of the Government, have been minor. The ADIMARK and Citizen Peace Foundation survey carried out in 1996 asked respondents about types of behaviour adopted to deal with the fear of crime. Most preferences talked of evasive behaviour and the acquisition of physical means to reinforce security of their homes. 1 3 This is borne out by the increased demand for security 13. 69.5% of respondents declared that they had stopped going out at certain times of day and 67.3% said that they had reinforced the security of their homes. In contrast, only 51.3% said that they had reached agreements with their neighbours to help each other (Citizen Peace Foundation, 1996). 300 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 300 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling products and private security services. An evaluation of the cost of crime in 1994 shows that US$66,840,000 were spent that year on security guard services, US$7,737,000 on insurance against robberies and breaking and entering and that US$14,449,000 worth of national security products were sold (Citizen Peace Foundation, 1994). This increase in the demand for protection has led some authors to suggest deregulating the private sector to provide additional security units for those who can pay for them. The main argument is that this would allow more private resources to be contributed to the fight against crime (Guzmán, 1995, p. 96) and also contribute to increasing competition among security companies, thereby lowering their cost. The private security guard system is currently concentrated almost exclusively in wealthy neighbourhoods and thereby very clearly and distinctly marks the profound social segregation that characterizes Santiago. In addition, some high-income communities arbitrarily close streets and control access using private security guards who have no competence to do so. The government, and particularly the police, are opposed to granting freedom of action in the streets to security companies, for fear that they might usurp the exclusive prerogatives of the police force. Action by the state is characterized by a significant increase in the budget allocated to controlling crime by creating specific entities dedicated to coordinating narcotics control policies and proposing and evaluating measures to tackle public security issues. Finally, several bills designed to make it easier to report given crimes, to more drastically punish drug trafficking and to change the structure of current criminal proceedings, also setting up a Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is non-existent at present, have been approved or are in the process of being approved. Table 5 shows how fiscal contributions to the Uniformed Police Force and Plainclothes Detective Force evolved during the decade from 1986 to 1996. Table 6, in turn, shows how total fiscal contributions have evolved during the period under study, divided into two subperiods – 1986–90 and 1990–96. The division is given by the restoration of democracy, which, as mentioned above, marked growing concern over crime. Of the two institutions, the Plainclothes Detective Force demonstrates the most growth in terms of numbers, with its resources being increased by 87% in the period between 1986 and 1996. If one only considers the percentage variation under democratic government, growth is almost 127%. There are two reasons for this. First of all, the 301 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 301 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile government considered that the Plainclothes Detective Force was in a particularly precarious position at the end of the military regime and, as it is a smaller institution, any contributions to its sustenance obviously have a greater proportional impact. The Uniformed Police Force also experienced negative growth under the military regime and a variation of 86% in the period from 1990 to 1996, almost 23 percentage points higher than the variation for the whole period. Table 5 Total fiscal contribution to uniformed police and plainclothes detectives (thousands of dollars, June 1996) Year Total Uniformed police Plainclothes detectives 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 82,080,716 75,961,038 82,035,722 75,926,169 71,732,533 78,589,715 95,675,013 103,198,855 107,660,764 115,872,730 133,687,443 18,148,384 16,547,152 17,177,284 15,609,945 15,000,035 16,287,175 21,077,902 25,232,453 26,315,340 28,205,421 34,002,177 100, 229,100 92, 508,190 99, 213,006 91,536,114 86,732,569 94,876,890 116,752,916 128,431,308 133,976,104 144, 078,151 167,689,620 Source: Budget Law for each year. *Includes fiscal contribution in local and foreign currencies. Table 6 Evolution of total fiscal contribution to uniformed police and plainclothes detectives (thousands of dollars, June 1996) Year Total Uniformed police Plainclothes detectives 1986 1990 1996 100,229,100 86,732,569 167,689,620 82,080,716 71,732,533 133,687,443 % variation 1986–90 % variation 1990–96 % variation 1986–96 -13.5 93.3 67.3 -12.6 86.4 62.9 18,148,384 15,000,035 34,002,177 -17.3 126.7 87.4 Source: Budget Law for each year. *Includes fiscal contribution in local and foreign currencies. **Does not include DIPRECA. 302 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 302 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling Although no detailed information is available, it must be added that the Uniformed Police Force has also received large municipal and private contributions of a logistical nature during this period. Similarly, the increase in fiscal contributions has also benefited the judiciary, the National Minors Service and prison guards. In September 1990, the government created the National Council for Narcotics Control (CONACE), made up of representatives of the government, Congress and the police. This council immediately launched a study entitled ‘National Plan for the Prevention and Control of Drugs’. This has led to regular surveys of national narcotics consumption (CONACE, 1996), funds being allocated to projects to prevent consumption and, above all, the enactment of the new narcotics control law. The Public Security and Information Bureau was created on 30 April 1993 by Law 19.212. One of its objectives is to propose policies and plans that the state can implement in internal public security and public order issues. Legislative policies implemented in recent years have increased the powers of police agents, established obligatory security measures for certain companies and more drastically punished drug trafficking. Law 19.077 of 1991 made it easier for victims to report cases of robbery and theft. The same law authorized agents of both police forces to search without a warrant in the event of flagrant crimes and always provided that there were well-founded grounds for suspicion that those responsible for the crime were in a given premises. Law 19.303, in turn, determined that companies specified by supreme decree should assume the cost of installing security measures stipulated by the competent authorities. New legislation punishing the illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances also increased police powers to investigate these crimes,14 created new crimes such as money laundering, and granted the Council for the Defense of the State the power to report or file criminal complaints for perpetration of these crimes (Law 19.366 of 30 January 1995). Finally, the government has submitted several bills and constitutional reforms to Congress aimed at creating a Public Prosecutor’s Office and establishing an accusatorial penal procedural system that is both oral and public. These efforts are aimed, in part, at establishing a more efficient system of criminal justice that responds properly to the needs 14. The law on undercover agents and informers in Article 34 may be mentioned in this respect. 303 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 303 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile of criminal investigations, as currently the responsibility for investigating the crime, accusing the guilty parties and passing final sentence is all concentrated in the judge. A survey of leaders of neighbourhood organizations in three popular communities of Santiago showed that cooperation to protect the neighbourhood was not a widespread option (Frühling and Sandoval, 1997, p. 284). Furthermore, there does not seem to be any long-term strategy for relations between police and community, other than ensuring that communications between them continue to be good. Clearly, based on the above and on the description of existing security mechanisms to deal with citizen insecurity, there is a strong emphasis on improving the system of criminal justice, thereby increasing the state’s capacity of deterrence in order to achieve a drop in the crime rate. Even though it is true that financing of drug-addiction and alcoholprevention programmes has increased and that public discourse promotes citizen organization to deal with criminality, the fact is that most of the emphasis has been placed on police strategies and reforms to penal legislation. A new private security services market is being developed parallel to this emphasis by the public sector, but for the moment its benefits are only available to commercial companies and high-income residents of Santiago. In sum, it does not seem that security measures adopted will be able to rebuild a sense of neighbourhood community that is so essential to generate systems of informal control of adolescent behaviour, especially in popular urban communities. Citizen security in future Any speculation about future evolution of violence is certainly risky, especially when it is difficult to determine precisely what factors shape human behaviour. Some elements of the cultural and social changes taking place in Chile are important when it comes to predicting how crime will evolve in future and what security mechanisms will be set up to deal with it. The country is evolving into a consumer society in which a large sector of poverty will coexist for some time with a large sector of extreme wealth. This will probably not be expressed, however, in a revitalization of sweeping ideological concepts, which used to mobilize large sectors 304 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 304 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling of society and which were incarnated in conflicts with the social structure. Rather, an individualistic, acquisitive value trend that responds to a complex, fragmented social and cultural system will predominate. It can be inferred from this that – at least for now – crime or breaches of the peace for political reasons will diminish, while crimes against property, now perpetrated by young people acting more violently than in the past and who do not share the cultural values of old-time crooks, will increase. In future, we will foreseeably experience a deterioration of organizations and institutions that have played a central role in socializing people – family, school, church – so our society’s community links that shape informal social control of human behaviour will be further debilitated. Economic growth will increase the number of potential targets for criminal activities, by increasing income and the number of commercial and industrial establishments. Furthermore, the difference in income and individualistic trends will be a stimulus for an increase in robberies. It would not be unthinkable for these to become more violent and better organized to deal with increasing security measures adopted by the population. As the country’s income increases, crimes against property will foreseeably be displaced to middle- and even lower-class communities, and to other communities and regions where desirable targets for criminal acts are also to be found. The security measures adopted to deal with this situation will probably be the result of a growing awareness that the increase in crime, as well as of occasional breaches of the peace or vandalism, must be prevented by means of different kinds of policies, as the mere operation of a system of criminal justice (arrest, trial and imprisonment of the offender) does not seem to be a suitable formula. One can feasibly expect, then, that policies of development and community participation aimed at rebuilding a more densely woven tissue of social relations will be designed. Bibliography AGUILA ZÚÑIGA , E RNESTO; MALDONADO PRIETO, C ARLOS . 1996. Orden público en el Chile del siglo XX: Trayectoria de una policía militarizada. In: Peter Waldmann (ed.), Justicia en la Calle. Ensayos sobre la policía en América Latina. Medellín, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 305 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 305 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile ALLENDE G OSSENS, SALVADOR. 1933. Higiene mental y delincuencia. Summary of dissertation, Degree in Medicine, Universidad de Chile. ARTEAGA , C ATALINA A. 1995. El des/orden campesino. Violencia en San Felipe (1900–1940). Proposiciones, No. 26. BENGOA , JOSÉ. 1997. Droga, juventud popular y delincuencia. In: Alvaro Gaínza et al., Futuro y angustia. La juventud popular y la pasta base de cocaína en Chile. Santiago, Ediciones Sur. BLANCO, RAFAEL; FRÜHLING, HUGO; GUZMÁN, E UGENIO. 1995. Seguridad ciudadana. Políticas públicas. Santiago, Universidad Nacional Andrés Bello, CED/Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo. BURGOS , JORGE. 1972. Algunos aspectos de la evolución de la penalidad del hurto y robo. Universidad de Concepción, Concepción. CEP. 1996. Estudio social y de opinión pública. Working Document No. 196. Santiago, Centro de Estudios Públicos. CITIZEN PEACE FOUNDATION. 1994. Costo de la delincuencia en Chile. Santiago, Fundación Paz Ciudadana. Unpublished. CITIZEN PEACE FOUNDATION. 1996. Anuario de estadísticas criminales. Santiago, Fundación Paz Ciudadana. CONACE. 1996. Estudio nacional de consumo de drogas. Informe nacional 1996. Santiago, Ministry of the Interior. COOPER, DORIS. 1992. Delincuencia mapuche y no mapuche en Chile en el marco de la teoría del continuo subcultural de la delincuencia. Revista Chilena de ciencia penitenciaria y de derecho penal, Santiago, No 17. DE VYLDER, STEFAN. 1976. The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. DRAPKIN SENDEREY, ISRAEL. 1958. Prensa y criminalidad. Santiago, Ediciones de Los Anales de la Universidad de Chile. FRÜHLING, HUGO; with HEINZ, WOLFGANG. 1999. Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by state and state-sponsored actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina, 1960-1990. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. FRÜHLING, HUGO; SANDOVAL, LUIS. 1997. Percepciones de inseguridad y realidad delictiva en tres comunas populares de Santiago. Estudios públicos, Santiago, No. 68. FRÜHLING, HUGO; W AISER; MYRIAM. 1995. La violencia contra el estado en Chile: 1976–1991. In: Hugo Frühling (ed.), El estado frente al terrorismo. Santiago, Editorial Atena/CED. GUZMÁN, E UGENIO. 1995. Políticas públicas y delincuencia. Una agenda político-social. In: Rafael Blanco, Hugo Frühling and Eugenio Guzmán, op. cit. 306 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 306 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling IBÁÑEZ, ADOLFO B. 1940. Contribución al estudio del aumento de la delincuencia en Chile. Santiago. JACOB SANCHEZ, HÉCTOR. 1984. Análisis crítico sobre la policía uniformada chilena. Santiago. MALDONADO PRIETO, CARLOS . 1990. Los carabineros de Chile: Historia de una policía militarizada. Nordic Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. XX, No. 3. Stockholm, Ibero-Americana, pp. 3-31. MEERSOHN SCHIJMAN, ABRAHAM. 1940. Factores sociales del delito en Chile. Thesis, BA Legal and Social Sciences, Universidad de Chile. POLITZER, P ATRICIA. 1985. Miedo en Chile. Santiago, CESOC Ediciones Chile-América. RICO, JOSÉ MARÍA; SALAS, LUIS. 1988. Inseguridad ciudadana y policía. Madrid, Editorial Tecnos. SABATINI, FRANCISCO. 1997. Liberalización de los mercados de suelo y segregación social en las ciudades latinoamericanas: El caso de Santiago, Chile. Unpublished. SALAZAR, GABRIEL. 1990. Violencia política popular en las grandes alamedas. Santiago, Ediciones Sur. TINSMAN, HEIDI. 1995. Los patrones del hogar. Esposas golpeadas y control sexual en Chile rural, 1958–1988. In: Lorena Godoy et al. (eds.), op. cit. VALENZUELA, ARTURO. 1989. El quiebre de la democracia en Chile. Santiago, FLACSO-Chile. 307 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 307 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Appendix 1 Homicides. Orders to investigate, rate per 100,000 inhabitants and percentage of participation in total crimes investigated, 1944–94 Year Population Total orders to investigate Orders to homicides Rate % 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 50,397 49,756 53,721 57,148 57,367 54,586 52,359 55,707 52,439 53,383 58,029 58,145 56,858 53,994 59,737 59,409 61,681 61,913 65,780 68,372 78,013 84,268 85,969 82,806 89,354 83,157 97,234 92,275 110,545 99,982 84,837 96,699 117,579 119,340 128,640 132,599 139,965 134,959 143,344 158,606 163,059 169,696 183,109 176,309 166,926 171,140 183,210 178,366 152,967 148,120 152,044 484 506 577 616 552 537 428 452 419 384 402 511 371 391 377 381 429 416 514 557 558 578 560 650 775 556 970 837 833 870 626 647 610 599 670 644 665 749 698 604 699 673 712 697 793 794 741 669 679 648 650 8.96 9.13 10.22 10.72 9.43 9.01 7.04 7.29 6.62 5.94 6.08 7.55 5.36 5.52 5.20 5.13 5.64 5.34 6.44 6.81 6.66 6.74 6.39 7.26 8.48 5.97 10.21 8.66 8.47 8.69 6.15 6.26 5.84 5.62 6.19 5.87 5.97 6.62 6.07 5.17 5.90 5.59 5.81 5.60 6.26 6.16 5.66 5.02 5.01 4.71 4.64 0.96 1.02 1.07 1.08 0.96 0.98 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.72 0.69 0.88 0.65 0.72 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.67 0.78 0.81 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.78 0.87 0.67 1.00 0.91 0.75 0.87 0.74 0.67 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.55 0.49 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.48 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.43 5,400,742 5,541,325 5,643,258 5,748,526 5,854,715 5,962,981 6,081,931 6,202,797 6,332,409 6,469,786 6,613,955 6,763,940 6,920,390 7,083,958 7,253,666 7,428,539 7,607,600 7,793,440 7,986,710 8,183,524 8,379,998 8,572,247 8,760,948 8,948,692 9,134,462 9,317,241 9,496,014 9,669,935 9,839,683 10,006,524 10,171,727 10,336,560 10,449,098 10,658,494 10,817,638 10,979,419 11,146,726 11,318,558 11,492,991 11,671,524 11,855,655 12,046,884 12,246,720 12,454,160 12,666,946 12,882,818 13,099,513 13,319,726 13,544,964 13,771,187 13,994,355 Source: Chilean Plainclothes Detective Force Annual Police Statistics. National Institute of Statistics-Plainclothes Police Force, 1994. Population Estimates and Projections 1950–2050. INE-CELADE, 1996. 308 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 308 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling Appendix 2 Reports of robberies and thefts 1948–94 Year Population Thefts Rate Robberies Rate 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 5,854,715 5,962,981 6,081,931 6,202,797 6,332,409 6,469,786 6,613,955 6,763,940 6,920,390 7,083,958 7,253,666 7,428,539 7,607,600 7,793,440 7,986,710 8,183,524 8,379,998 8,572,247 8,760,948 8,948,692 9,134,462 9,317,241 9,496,014 9,669,935 9,839,683 10,006,524 10,171,727 10,336,560 10,449,098 10,658,494 10,817,638 10,979,419 11,146,726 11,318,558 11,492,991 11,671,524 11,855,655 12,046,884 12,246,720 12,454,160 12,666,946 12,882,818 13,099,513 13,319,726 13,544,964 13,771,187 13,994,355 20,835 22,573 23,584 23,130 21,367 20,381 21,278 22,175 22,194 21,027 19,859 19,528 20,321 19,129 17,606 18,639 20,899 20,454 19,940 17,786 18,070 17,213 17,553 16,513 17,845 17,952 15,848 18,157 17,825 15,705 16,100 15,295 15,514 13,927 14,292 16,979 18,052 21,690 22,082 22,961 19,802 17,685 19,118 18,205 15,457 16,102 17,576 355.9 378.6 387.8 372.9 337.4 315.0 321.7 327.8 320.7 296.8 273.8 262.9 267.1 245.5 220.4 227.8 249.4 238.6 227.6 198.8 197.8 184.7 184.8 170.8 181.4 179.4 155.8 175.7 170.6 147.3 148.8 139.3 139.2 123.0 124.4 145.5 152.3 180.0 180.3 184.4 156.3 137.3 145.9 136.7 114.1 116.9 125.6 14,935 13,902 14,951 14,907 13,439 13,603 13,578 13,552 14,241 13,916 13,590 13,548 15,145 14,958 14,832 16,129 18,723 19,881 19,773 19,767 19,758 21,298 25,228 27,671 31,597 27,630 21,706 28,698 29,351 26,901 27,765 29,449 31,679 29,398 38,570 45,648 51,747 63,814 71,215 67,831 61,719 61,082 76,719 81,804 74,182 74,779 72,058 255.1 233.1 245.8 240.3 212.2 210.3 205.3 200.4 205.8 196.4 187.4 182.4 199.1 191.9 185.7 197.1 223.4 231.9 225.7 220.9 216.3 228.6 265.7 286.2 321.1 276.1 213.4 277.6 280.9 252.4 256.7 268.2 284.2 259.7 335.6 391.1 436.5 529.7 581.5 544.6 487.2 474.1 585.7 614.2 547.7 543.0 514.9 Source: Republic of Chile Annual Statistics. National Institute of Statistics. 1948–1976. Chilean Uniformed Police Force Annual Police Statistics. National Institute of Statistics-Uniformed Police Force, 1977–1994. Population Estimates and Projections 1950–2050. INE-CELADE, 1996. 309 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 309 25/04/2003, 12:55 Arrests for reasons specified Number of arrests and percentage participation in total number of arrests 1930-1994 310 25/04/2003, 12:55 Year Total Arrests Mendicity (A) % Vagrancy (B) % Suspicion (C) % Druntenness % (D) Total % A+B+C+D 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 157,241 172,967 162,151 186,667 213,188 251,452 274,106 327,297 314,560 294,044 289,793 289,197 298,130 318,485 356,864 343,480 335,318 348,812 423,149 516,106 559,136 564,538 448,516 213 225 510 1,271 2,252 1,348 2,286 3,826 2,427 2,536 2,164 1,032 776 662 1,266 1,058 1,001 578 374 537 711 1,063 602 0.14 0.13 0.31 0.68 1.06 0.54 0.83 1.17 0.77 0.86 0.75 0.36 0.26 0.21 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.13 986 2,106 936 2,377 4,480 4,741 3,972 4,419 4,054 4,368 4,540 2,353 2,698 2,235 2,987 2,257 1,799 1,387 903 1,593 1,785 1,748 1,972 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.3 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 18,612 16,617 15,527 18,739 19,973 31,934 34,821 44,716 46,816 45,138 41,764 47,569 43,193 56,069 72,079 61,868 70,696 84,312 108,090 156,778 184,688 188,292 141,443 11.8 9.6 9.6 10.0 9.4 12.7 12.7 13.7 14.9 15.4 14.4 16.4 14.5 17.6 20.2 18.0 21.1 24.2 25.5 30.4 33.0 33.4 31.5 64,520 81,339 60,190 66,569 87,869 104,138 117,991 147,718 139,268 127,264 120,625 120,563 133,852 143,236 159,387 169,352 154,304 147,075 185,142 217,063 236,429 231,221 169,147 84,331 100,287 77,163 88,956 114,574 142,161 159,070 200,679 192,565 179,306 169,093 171,517 180,519 202,202 235,719 234,535 227,800 233,352 294,509 375,971 423,613 422,324 313,164 41.0 47.0 37.1 35.7 41.2 41.4 43.0 45.1 44.3 43.3 41.6 41.7 44.9 45.0 44.7 49.3 46.0 42.2 43.8 42.1 42.3 41.0 37.7 53.6 58.0 47.6 47.7 53.7 56.5 58.0 61.3 61.2 61.0 58.3 59.3 60.6 63.5 66.1 68.3 67.9 66.9 69.6 72.8 75.8 74.8 69.8 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile 310 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 Appendix 3 311 311 Mendicity (A) % Vagrancy (B) % Suspicion (C) % Druntenness % (D) Total % A+B+C+D 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 476,140 515,661 568,322 612,454 552,962 594,163 626,397 585,586 520,970 555,242 512,451 492,990 472,729 536,936 524,463 551,150 N/a 460,187 486,045 493,967 459,455 667,659 806,304 915,477 999,060 850,999 783,884 748,616 714,022 756,856 467,317 403 446 505 641 375 932 1,223 646 113 702 214 574 299 350 142 140 n/a 129 136 N/a 25 72 1,789 n/a 2,185 1,700 1,944 1,307 1,345 975 1,024 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.22 2,424 1,921 1,604 1,065 935 1,015 1,499 2,170 1,240 1,607 2,023 3,151 2,016 1,910 1,584 2,579 n/a 2,333 2,264 n/a 1,266 1,108 2,666 n/a 3,343 4,492 4,232 4,009 3,664 5,102 5,254 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.1 143,624 155,739 172,018 187,763 180,342 196,717 203,023 193,337 174,420 174,911 176,519 173,288 169,447 196,349 194,187 207,068 n/a 185,318 191,127 n/a 154,590 233,102 288,218 N/a 313,940 315,919 312,996 297,367 278,721 294,430 n/a 30.2 30.2 30.3 30.7 32.6 33.1 32.4 33.0 33.5 31.5 34.4 35.2 35.8 36.6 37.0 37.6 0.0 40.3 39.3 0.0 33.6 34.9 35.7 0.0 31.4 37.1 39.9 39.7 39.0 38.9 0.0 194,517 209,584 240,142 259,609 208,758 225,417 240,981 209,410 180,334 211,781 198,640 182,067 170,299 200,765 190,592 198,585 N/a 136,118 152,713 146,371 110,501 187,334 225,875 256,969 308,467 274,492 244,627 223,054 195,948 198,034 204,026 340,968 367,690 414,269 449,078 390,410 424,081 446,726 405,563 356,107 389,001 377,396 359,080 342,061 399,374 386,505 408,372 0 323,898 346,240 0 266,382 421,616 518,548 0 627,935 596,603 563,799 525,737 479,678 498,541 210,304 40.9 40.6 42.3 42.4 37.8 37.9 38.5 35.8 34.6 38.1 38.8 36.9 36.0 37.4 36.3 36.0 0.0 29.6 31.4 29.6 24.1 28.1 28.0 28.1 30.9 32.3 31.2 29.8 27.4 26.2 43.7 71.6 71.3 72.9 73.3 70.6 71.4 71.3 69.3 68.4 70.1 73.6 72.8 72.4 74.4 73.7 74.1 0.0 70.4 71.2 0.0 58.0 63.1 64.3 0.0 62.9 70.1 71.9 70.2 67.2 65.9 45.0 Hugo Frühling 25/04/2003, 12:55 Total Arrests Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 Year 312 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total Arrests 723,456 608,664 576,654 621,334 624,302 658,011 636,323 713,741 756,814 720,654 701,291 Mendicity (A) 1,309 1,135 856 1,263 1,335 904 1,194 761 666 511 550 % 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.08 Vagrancy (B) 5,722 4,051 5,123 5,382 5,510 6,534 7,963 8,559 6,366 5,427 5,695 % 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 Suspicion (C) 279,245 208,258 181,048 174,057 138,985 132,399 122,490 164,118 157,097 54,442 27,581 % 38.6 34.2 31.4 28.0 22.3 20.1 19.2 23.0 20.8 7.6 3.9 Drunkness (D) 190,985 160,319 149,822 181,594 208,034 234,110 222,568 236,749 265,115 297,555 286,897 % 26.4 26.3 26.0 29.2 33.3 35.6 35.0 33.2 35.0 41.3 40.9 Source: Republic of Chile Annual Statistics. National Institute of Statistics. 1930–1976. Chilean Uniformed Police Force Annual Police Statistics. National Institute of Statistics-Uniformed Police Force, 1977–1994. Population Estimates and Projections 1950–2050. INECELADE, 1996. Total A+B+C+D 477,261 373,763 336,849 362,296 353,864 373,947 354,215 410,187 429,244 357,935 320,723 % 66.0 61.4 58.4 58.3 56.7 56.8 55.7 57.5 56.7 49.7 45.7 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile 312 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 Year 25/04/2003, 12:55 Violence and Insecurity in Modern Chile Hugo Frühling Appendix 4 Growth rate of financing for components of the criminal justice system 1986–96 (base 100 = 1986) Years Judiciary Legal Prison Services Guards National Minors Uniformed Service Police Detectives 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 100 102 111 108 100 100 129 162 207 233 296 100 92 122 103 91 100 112 149 174 209 276 100 93 93 84 79 75 86 95 107 124 153 100 91 95 86 83 90 110 133 143 153 184 100 92 98 88 84 91 118 138 164 184 226 100 92 98 91 85 93 108 119 128 136 158 Source: Prepared by author based on Budget Law for each year. 313 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 313 25/04/2003, 12:55 V. THE HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 315 25/04/2003, 12:55 HUMAN SECURITY: DEFINITION AND CHALLENGES FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN MIRIAM KORNBLITH 1 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have generated multiple consequences in the life and interrelations of the world’s nations. It is still difficult to evaluate the full extent of these consequences, but the least that can be said is that several dimensions of the concept of security have been affected – international security associated with multilateralism, state security linked to national sovereignty and human security related to governance (Rojas Aravena, 2000). In this context, the implications of the human security concept in general, and in the Latin American and Caribbean region in particular, have become more relevant and urgent. We outline below some of the challenges posed for this region by human security, starting with an examination of the relatively novel concept itself. The paper is divided into two parts. The first analyses the concept of human security, and the second examines the challenges to human security as applied to the Latin American and Caribbean region, keyed to the issues and questions used as a framework of reference for the seminar. 1. Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, Universidad Central de Venezuela. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 317 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Definition of human security Although the following is not a complete definition of the human security concept, it none the less presents some of the elements that comprise it.2 Context • The notions of human development and human security put forward by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began to take shape at the beginning of the 1990s. They were born at a moment in human history when real socialism was falling apart, the welfare state was in crisis and doubt was beginning to be cast on the concept of development that has been termed neoliberal. They are associated with the communications revolution, the new wave of democracy around the world and globalization. • The human security concept was used for the first time in 1994 in the UNDP Human Development Report, of which it was the main subject. Human security emphasizes the social milieu that makes possible stable, secure exercising of the options created by human development. • It is a concept in a transitional stage associated with new paradigms based on persuasion, cooperation, international regimes and global public goods as formulae to meet human needs and prevent and settle conflicts. It is a wide-ranging category that transcends the military and involves non-military aspects. Wide-ranging definition • According to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, human security means ‘safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats’. The definition presupposes people’s right to live, work and participate without fear in social, political and economic structures that affect their lives. • The core concept of human security is the person. The essence of human security is the expectation that individuals may go to sleep or walk down a street without the real threat of being assaulted or murdered. The focus or goal of any human security doctrine must be the physical and psychological security of individuals in the framework of nation-state structures. 2. The following documents were consulted for this analysis of the concept: FLACSOChile (s.a.); Goucha (2001); Human Security Network (2001); Smith and Stohl (2000); UNDP (1998); Rojas Aravena (2000). 318 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 318 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith • The purpose of strengthening human security is to create a more humane world where people can live with security and dignity, free from want and fear, from physical and/or psychological intimidation, with equal opportunities to fully develop their human potential. • The wide-ranging concept of human security includes the whole range of international relations, from prevention of conflicts to taking care of the after-effects of a conflict. A conceptual concatenation needs to be established from human security to international security, passing through state security. • When human security is discussed, emphasis is placed on the necessary search for an equilibrium or complementarity between the opportunities that every change brings with it and security requirements that human beings require in order to continue taking on new risks and challenges. Human security must be distributed equally in society. Human security and modernity • The human security concept explains the dynamic nature of security in modern society by stressing conditions for people to be able to access the opportunities created by modernization. The human security concept seeks to emphasize the nature of the simultaneous means and ends posed by security for an effectively modern society. • Security is a product of society. At any given time one can have a strong degree of security in the face of existing opportunities and threats, but weak response capability in the face of new threats and opportunities. Society’s capacity for self-reflection forms a substantial part of its capacity to respond to new challenges and correct modernization’s course towards modernity. • Security in the modern age can be defined as people’s ability to take advantage of the opportunities for fulfilment furnished by the process of modernization and neutralize the threats that it holds for them. • Human security fosters the search for a point of equilibrium and complementarity between modernization and subjectivity. What happens in the life of a country, the objectives and transformations undertaken, must pass through the daily life of its people as opportunities, risks or threats that are known and assumed in a reflexive manner. • The relationship between human security and modernization emphasizes the natural tension between transforming society, 319 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 319 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile economy, nature and institutions and the subjectivity of actors involved in that transformation. • Human security as a social objective implies recognizing the ‘other’ as an individual in the process of modernization. Human development and human security • Human security is centred on human beings. It is concerned with the way in which people breathe in society, the freedom with which they can exercise various options, their degree of access to the market and to social opportunities and to a life in conflict or peace. Human security means that people can exercise these options freely and securely and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they enjoy today will not totally disappear tomorrow (UNDP, Human Development Report 1994). • What is the link between human development and human security? Human development consists of expanding people’s opportunities, whereas human security has to do with the possibility of enjoying these abilities in a stable fashion, in other words, that today’s opportunities do not vanish over time (UNDP, 1994). • Human development is the process of expanding the range of opportunities available to people to become subjects and beneficiaries of development. It is a constant effort to deepen and explain the perspective of people-centred development. • Human security is not something that people can wait for and receive passively from social institutions. Active participation by people and their ability to take on risks form a consubstantial part of it. • The concept of human security stresses that increasing opportunities aimed at people, such as income, longevity, education, is not enough, unless it takes place in a social milieu that allows people to access them and enjoy them. It emphasizes the social milieu that makes possible human development. Without social peace, equality, solidarity and confidence, opportunities created for development cease to be such, for they are no longer available to all in secure, stable, equal conditions. Indivisibility of human security • This notion has two connotations. In the first place it refers to the impact that any sudden, profound change in one aspect has on the whole. It also has a spatial connotation for the effects of a lack of 320 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 320 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith human security in a given region, country or territory generally expand to other territories. • Recognizing the multidimensional nature of human security from this theoretical point of view, one can define seven dimensions: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security. • The dimensions chosen are not only the most relevant, but also the easiest to deal with from an empirical perspective and with a possible impact at public policy level. It is important to stress that, even though one can separate them in an analysis, all these dimensions form part of a single issue – human security. This concept is ‘indivisible’, and insecurities affecting one of its dimensions will also affect the whole. Objective and subjective human security • In an objective sense, human security refers to the mechanisms, networks or links that prevent the emergence of any alteration in the course of action of individuals, society or both, or, when one does emerge, allow the course of action to achieve its purpose to a reasonable degree. In a subjective sense, human security refers to a psychological state and provisions for action resulting from the perceptions of individuals regarding available mechanisms, networks or links. Objective mechanisms and subjective perceptions of human security are mutually conditioned and form an indivisible whole. • Social human security mechanisms are not only aimed at limiting threats. They are also human security instruments designed to enhance the ability to take advantage of new opportunities for which there are no pre-established methods of behaviour. Security may be of enablement or fulfilment. The former refers to preventing a threat that could hinder somebody from participating fully in the development of society or fully restoring their participation if it has been interrupted. The latter refers to mechanisms that allow new social opportunities to be taken advantage of. • Both securities are indivisible. Somebody who is not enabled to participate in society cannot take advantage of new opportunities created by it, and repeated inability to take advantage of new opportunities eventually produces social exclusion. 321 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 321 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Variations in human security • Threats against human security and the resources available to deal with them vary considerably from one region and country to another and within each region and country. Human security must be understood in its socio-historical, cultural and geographical context. • Society and its members recognize, name, explain and prioritize threats. Recognition and explanations – in other words, coding the threats – are socially relative. Be that as it may, there is no possible security mechanism for socially unrecognized or non-coded threats. • Certainties, dangers and risks, as well as their respective security mechanisms, are distributed unequally. Society favours certain threats, certain dangers and certain risks when it designates securities. Thus, it protects some social groups and functions more than others. • Many social conflicts originate in social groups’ search for public recognition and institutional regulation of their uncertainties. This security conflict may be erected against other groups, which see this recognition as a threat to their own securities. Conflicts may also arise in the face of the typical inertia of traditional coding and consensus that govern the political order, which may make it difficult to recognize new uncertainties and threats. Human security requirements and promotion • Promoting human security also requires stimulating respect for human rights and international humanitarian law and strengthening democracies and good governance, reinforcing a culture of peace, which includes peaceful settlement of conflicts, controlling instruments of violence and putting an end to impunity in cases of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. • The human security agenda is associated with the ability to prevent, act and react to humanitarian emergencies, with the preventive capacity to protect the life and security of people and with creating the ability to move ahead of events and prevent crises that affect people’s security. • Collective and coordinated efforts of international agencies, governments, the private sector and civil society are required in order to increase the level of human security based on global solidarity. 322 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 322 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith • Without inter-state security, people’s security runs even higher risks. Without multilateralism, force prevails, opportunities for cooperation are reduced and the costs of human security and violation of humanitarian law increase. • An international system that places the values of human beings at the centre and promotes peaceful settlement of disputes and demilitarization of inter-state links needs to be designed and projected. Links and actors • There is an inexorable link between individual, national and international security. Individual freedoms are interrelated in such a way that security is increasingly related to achieving security on the international scene by implementing reciprocal policies derived from national priorities. • Police, judiciary and other branches of public authorities, political parties and special interest groups are essential for creating a favourable atmosphere for sustainable human security. • International security is linked to the concept of multilateralism, state security to that of national sovereignty and human security to that of governance and development. • The concept of human security is associated with the use of force, due to the absence of state monopoly of violence or to the inability to build a demilitarized order. Associated issues • Natural disasters, racism, education for peace, refugees, human rights and humanitarian law, cooperation for development, natural resources, sustainable development, equality, small arms, children at war, exploitation of children, security for personnel on humanitarian missions, prevention of conflicts, transnational criminal organizations, anti-personnel mines, International Criminal Court, environmental sustainability, etc. 323 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 323 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Hypothesis, indicators and operationalization of human security3 • The 3rd meeting of the Human Security Network (Petra, Jordan, May 2001) set forth the need to develop human security indicators by analysing the causes and consequences of human insecurity. • The main questions posed were: How are human security achievements distributed inside a society? What dimensions most influence the security circumstances of different groups or are associated with them? Where are the biggest gaps between objective and subjective human security situations? • The main hypotheses on human security maintain that certainties, dangers and risks are distributed unequally inside each society. When different social groups are compared, their perceptions of security may be very different to the amount of objective security resources to which they have access. • The human security concept needs to be defined from two perspectives – objective and subjective – because both are different spheres of action that structure a person’s overall security situation. Thus, perceptions of insecurity or threats may cause behaviours that lead to objective insecurity situations. Objective Human Security Index (OHSI) • Preparation of the Objective Human Security Index aims to measure the availability of security mechanisms for each person. In other words, instruments, rights or abilities, which constitute means for people (and those who depend on them) to carry out their life projects and deal with their problems, making the most important course of action for the daily life of individuals viable. • Variables chosen are social security contributions, health contributions, average school attendance, skills development, job stability, occupation, housing ownership, quality of housing, presence of health clinics, presence of police stations, trade unionization, survival. 3. This section is based on the UNDP National Report on Human Development for Chile, 1998, and its applications and conclusions are applicable to Chilean circumstances. None the less, it can be an interesting contribution to the empirical study of human security problems in other circumstances. 324 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 324 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith • Human development in general, and the Human Development Index (HDI) in particular, belong rather to the family of results indices. They highlight situations that show levels of satisfaction or privation regarding a valued good in comparison with a desired goal. In contrast, the characteristics of the OHSI comply rather with an index that combines the logic of access indicators. These represent people’s actual use of socially available means or resources to obtain a result, such as, for example, human development. • This distinction puts both concepts in a special relationship, which shows that human security is a necessary condition for human development. In general, existing opportunities may only be taken advantage of by those who have the proper mechanisms; in this regard, some social groups enjoy a greater degree of human development. Consequently, and given this close conceptual and empirical link, it would be possible to assert that human development cannot be achieved nor maintained without human security. Human security, economic performance and poverty • One can evaluate the quality of the opportunities generated by the economy by relating the OHSI to the economic characteristics of a region. The number of opportunities is not always related to their quality. Not every economic growth or every level of income is suitable for giving people the necessary security mechanisms for managing their daily lives. What is required is one that allows workers to increase their resources, accumulate abilities, in short, achieve full development. • Poverty is a condition of shortage or lack where, by definition, there is no human security. As is known, large numbers of people considered to be poor are people who work. Their precarious job situation and the insecurity of their job opportunities, however, prevent them from accumulating the necessary abilities to overcome their condition of poverty in a stable manner. In short, it seems clear that without human security it is very difficult to achieve any significant progress in overcoming poverty. Subjective Human Security Index (SHSI) • The aim is to compile a set of indicators of people’s opinions and perceptions of the efficiency of available security mechanisms in a combined index. Everyone must evaluate positively or negatively 325 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 325 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile whether or not they have efficient security mechanisms available to cope with the different situations of insecurity presented. Dimensions: sociability, social security, job integration, information, health, crime. Integrated view of objective and subjective human security • An integrated view of the main aspects making up a person’s security situation is required. This is made up by the quantity of objective resources available to cope with situations of insecurity, and the psychological conviction that these resources are within reach and are indeed effective solutions. • The main hypothesis consists of presuming the existence of a ‘gap’ or ‘dissonance’ between objective situations of security and subjective perceptions. This dissociation could be the symptom of a malaise caused by the lack of complementarity between development or modernization of operational systems and development of people’s subjective perceptions. • It seems plausible to presume that whatever group has more objective security mechanisms should feel subjectively more secure. There is a degree of dissociation, however, that can be interpreted as a criticism of the efficiency of those objective mechanisms and satisfaction with them. • There may exist a gap between objective and subjective achievements in people’s security, or they may be out of tune one with one another. In this respect, it is socially desirable for objective security resources, their rationality, their inclusiveness, the logic on which they are founded, and the type of social relations that they structure, to be internalized by people so as to be built up into subjective appraisals of security. Hence the existence of ‘gaps’ between one area and the other, or the fact that they are out of tune with one another, causes a lack of complementarity between systems and people that could eventually produce a marked malaise in society. Examining the various facets of the human security concept reveals its richness and the wide-ranging research and action programme that arises from its use. This is true both for spheres where political decisions are made and public policies for national, regional and international situations are designed and implemented as well as for institutions dedicated to academic reflection. The holistic nature of the concept leads to the need to complement views from different disciplines and different sources of initiatives. 326 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 326 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith Human security challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean Using the examination of the human security concept as a guide, we develop below some of the issues and problems proposed for this seminar. Human security in the Andean subregion There has been a recent increase in the number of meetings of an academic nature or associated with multilateral agencies where the focus of attention has been the problems which are affecting some of the region’s countries, particularly some countries in the Andean region, such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.4 Grounds for concern are related to the political instability of those countries, the probable collapse of democracy, growing deficiencies in terms of economic growth, difficulty in acceding advantageously to the challenges of globalization, limitations of state structures in meeting the population’s demands for basic services, institutional erosion generated by actions of international mafias linked to terrorism and drug trafficking, and deficiencies in governance. Some of the considerations outlined below have arisen from reflection rather more focused on these nations, although they could be extended to the rest of the region. In the last few decades, Latin America has experienced the influx and reciprocal consequences of two fundamental processes – redefinition of economic models associated with programmes of readjustment and globalization, and processes of political liberalization linked to the establishment of democratic regimes. Every country in the region has experienced these processes at different times, with different intensities and different consequences. It is important to examine the scope and limits of these processes from the perspective of human security and contribute a critical dimension to evaluating good decisions and errors in approaches associated with setting in motion programmes of economic readjustment and establishing democracy in these countries. 4. See, for example: Paul Drake and Eric Hershberg, ‘Crises in the Andes’, paper presented at the International Seminar on Crisis in the Andes sponsored by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Duke-North Carolina Consortium in Latin America, in Chapel Hill, N.C., 10–11 September 2001. A new version of the conference was held in Quito, sponsored by FLACSO-Ecuador, on 4–5 October 2001. 327 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 327 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Finally, an unavoidable issue in examining current circumstances in Latin America, especially in the Andean region, is the fight against drug trafficking and guerrillas in the Colombian context and setting into motion the so-called Plan Colombia, combined with efforts to promote political initiatives to generate negotiated solutions to the conflict. The combination of individual, national and international dimensions of human security stands out at once in the Colombian case and its multiple, complex implications, which clearly extend beyond that particular country’s sphere of action. Readjustment programmes, modernization of the economy and human security Economic readjustment programmes were set in motion throughout Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. In very general terms, the aim was to rethink the central role of the state in the model of economic growth by encouraging, in contrast, greater pre-eminence of the private sector in boosting the region’s economies and inserting Latin American economies in international markets by fostering the competitiveness of the region’s products. These programmes included wide-ranging measures and policies covering all areas of economic activity. In the field of social policies, the region’s traditional welfare approach was replaced by programmes geared towards taking care of deficiencies and problems generated by the programmes of readjustment, as well as dealing with more deep-rooted problems based on new approaches in which civil society and the communities affected acquired greater pre-eminence. Currently, the need is being put forward to complete the first generation of measures by implementing what has been called ‘second-generation’ measures that stress the need to deepen reforms of structures and institutions where decisions are made and their compliance is enforced. There has been a mixed evaluation of the impact of these structural reform programmes, and it is still ongoing. One can say, however, that they created tremendous uncertainties among the population in several countries in the region, as key aspects in normal management of the economy and relations between it and other spheres of societal life, such as politics, were severely criticized in both discourse and practice. Economic discourse and practice in Latin America are not associated with an emphasis on human beings as is typified in the human security concept. The late establishment of programmes of readjustment that stress individual efforts and competition between individuals or units 328 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 328 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith of production is in stark contrast to the normal conception of the region’s economic activity, which puts the emphasis on the state. In turn, readjustment programmes were also accompanied by rhetoric and practice that avoided important aspects related to people and their needs. Programmes of readjustment emphasized language and operations arising from market and other types of institutions, incentives and mechanisms. Thus, the human security perspective can contribute to redefining the emphases of programmes of readjustment and modernization in the region, incorporating an emphasis on human beings and their objective and subjective security needs. Resistance generated by the programmes of readjustment and possible resistance to any attempt to transform deep-rooted key aspects that order societal life must be taken into account. From the experiences of this last decade, the need arises to incorporate participation as an intrinsic variable in designing and putting into motion new programmes of economic development – or programmes affecting any other dimension of collective living. Similarly, the considerations set forth in treating the concept of human security, which differentiate objective from subjective security, acquire tremendous importance. Thus: ‘Every process of transformation requires space for human security. This implies legal and practical acceptance that people are capable of being actors in this change. Reforms, such as health, education, and rural or community and regional institutional frameworks, may be founded on the social capital present in society. Too many historical evidences show that, regardless of how consensual political, technical or business establishment decisions may seem, elitist methods of modernization can generate processes of passive and active resistance, or social malaise. The goodness of the reforms cannot be defined only by elites; they must win adherence from all of society. This will help in the effort to create Human Security for all actors and subjects’ (UNDP, 1998, Introduction, p. 4). Human security, economic development and poverty When discussing the issue of programmes of readjustment and redefinition of models of economic development, one cannot avoid the issue of poverty in the Latin American region and the Andean region in particular. This issue has probably received the most attention and research, and there are a number of accumulated studies and empirical evidences regarding the difficulty – or impossibility, as the case may be – of acceding to human security when minimum conditions 329 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 329 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile of participation in collective well-being do not exist. Thus, just to emphasize once again, proper treatment of the problem of overcoming poverty is a necessary condition for achieving individual, national and international human security. Democracy and human security The region faces a fundamental ongoing challenge resulting from the relatively late establishment of democracy in some cases, and the vicissitudes which its full consolidation still has to cope with. These pose a similar challenge to the validity of the concept of human security, maintaining, of course, the significant differences between the various countries of the region. Predictability of political processes Democracy is associated with stable, trustworthy, shared rules of the game, which define the interactions, duties and rights of the various actors and individuals that make up society and the framework through which collective disputes are settled. The existence of rules with these characteristics is the foundation for the predictability of a socio-political order, which does not mean that the result of the collective interactions can or should be predetermined. In contrast, rules of the game in autocratic orders, or in orders based on the discretion of those who hold positions of authority, may be defined capriciously and accommodatingly and do not offer any security in terms of the regularity and fairness of collective interactions, but rather are conceived to obtain pre-established results according to univocal wills. Updating the concept of human security requires a democratic order that promotes deep, wide-ranging levels of political, legal and economic certainty and security, while at the same time generating extensive spaces for expressing individual and collective preferences and abilities. Close examination of the group of nations that make up the Andean subregion draws attention to the dangers caused by democracy’s precarious institutional framework, or by recent threats to its deinstitutionalization in countries that previously had a fairly longstanding history of democracy. The presence of personalistic leaderships, and the lack of political party systems capable of representing and aggregating interests 330 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 330 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith efficiently and legitimately, make for a dangerous combination. This combination gives rise to socio-political orders that depend enormously on the quality and intensity of the relationship between personalistic leader and dismantled masses. This is a movement which puts sociopolitical life in order (or perhaps disorder) and profoundly weakens the democratic institutional framework and basic key aspects of an order founded on respect for the state. In these circumstances, the military can acquire a threatening pre-eminence, becoming the institution that holds effective control and has the power to veto and directly intervene in managing the life of the community. Poor quality democracies and weak institutional frameworks The late institutionalization of democracy in many countries in the region, together with the vicissitudes in establishing it, such as the need to set up pacts of governance that maintain special privileges for sectors capable of threatening the stability of a political order, or weak separation of government authorities with exaggerated pre-eminence of the executive over the other branches of government, has led to poor quality democracies or democracies with weak institutional frameworks, considered as whole or keyed to specific areas of sociopolitical activity. These democratic deficiencies lead to human security deficiencies, such as the threat to use force to settle collective disputes, capricious definition of the rules of the game in social, economic or political spheres of action or limited awareness of the need to respect the human rights of minorities. The poor quality of democracy or weak institutional framework of these regimes is expressed with particular strength in the difficulty of structuring reliable, efficient authorities for collective arbitration, such as courts of law, electoral agencies, or authorities for controlling public management, such as comptrollerships or the legislative. In an efficient democracy, biases and the varied distribution of power resources that naturally exist in any society and are used by interested parties to promote or affect specific interests must also have containment barriers, including institutional provisions that suitably channel conflicts and efficiently control any possible abuse of power in the use of public resources. Otherwise, the institutional weakness of these authorities for arbitration and control generates legal and political insecurity, allows and promotes abusive, unilateral use of public resources and inclines 331 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 331 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile the balance of decisions to those who are best able to promote their own interests. These conditions restrict people’s human security. Such a precarious order does not guarantee that individuals can carry out their normal activities free from fear of violent and non-violent threats to their integrity; nor does it guarantee equal opportunities for all individuals. It does not allow individuals to enjoy the advantages of economic, political, social, cultural, etc. development with stability and in conditions of equality. Cooperative multilateralism has tremendous potential as a counterpart to situations of poor quality democracies and democracies with weak institutional frameworks, and, in fact, its benefits have already been in evidence. Missions of observers for elections with the participation of international agencies can become a barrier to control fraudulent electoral processes. The Inter-American Human Rights Court is an authority to which individuals and organizations appeal when national judicial authorities are unable to hand down fair decisions in accordance with the law. Similarly, inclusion of the democracy clause in Organization of American States (OAS) countries is a resource conceived to dissuade or punish those regimes which threaten the democratic institutional framework. From a human security point of view, an attempt should be made to reinforce these mechanisms, and/or create new ones, based on an evaluation of their efficiency to compensate for deficiencies in the democratic institutional framework and generate incentives to overcome them in the countries in the region. Socio-cultural diversity and human security The issue of international terrorism has highlighted the potential human conflict inherent in the existence of marked socio-cultural, religious, linguistic, political or any other type of differences between large groups of people throughout the world and within specific nations or regions. These differences are evident in the Andean region, and coexistence between different sectors is marked by various degrees of cooperation and/or conflict. Recognition of the potential for conflict and insecurity inherent in this coexistence, together with recognition of the legitimacy of the existence of these differences and their peaceful expression, are a condition for bringing human security to fruition. Modernization and modernity bring with them the homogenization of patterns of life, values and behaviour. This is stated as an empirical 332 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 332 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith fact, but it is sometimes used as a governing criterion against which sizeable communities, defending their right to be different and live in a world in which their security is associated with the permanence of guidelines and values that are known to, but not necessarily shared by, all sectors that make up a nation, can rebel by different means. Peace and prevention of conflict require proper understanding of diversity, sincere acceptance of its legitimacy and the design of institutional mechanisms to process tensions, which may arise naturally from the existence of marked diversity in society. Guerrillas, drug trafficking, Plan Colombia and human security An inevitable issue when one examines the current circumstances of the Andean subregion is the problem associated with the fight against drug trafficking and guerrillas, particularly the case of Colombia, together with its possible consequences for Colombia’s neighbouring countries and implementation of Plan Colombia. In this context, several issues associated with human security emerge from these critical situations. These include political and economic refugees and refugees from threats to life and property, trafficking of small arms and personal weapons, security for personnel on humanitarian missions, and inclusion of minors in actions of war. Systematic, efficient initiatives to prevent the negative consequences of these issues need to be reinforced or brought forward, as the case may be, for each of them. The ideal for every democratic society is to be able to settle its disputes peacefully. The basic condition for achieving this ideal is the willingness of the parties. A problem that comes clearly to mind in situations in which such actors as guerrillas, drug trafficking and paramilitary groups are involved is the lack of incentives for them to generate and accept these peaceful solutions. Threats to all dimensions and expressions of human security arising from the action of these agents are serious, current and massive. They are extremely able to penetrate and erode institutional structures, and generate violence and desolation. Their actions are marked by the presence of governing frameworks that contradict the democratic order and respect for human rights. Similarly, the resources that make their existence possible are traded outside established market rules, so regulating them is very difficult indeed. One could hope, however, that recent experience in combating international terrorism and the new conceptualization of the problem will contribute to designing more efficient formulae to combat these evils so deep-rooted in the subregion. 333 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 333 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Cooperative multilateralism is very valid in this regard, because the actions of drug traffickers and guerrillas transcend Colombia’s border and, at the very least, adversely affect neighbouring Andean countries. Countries such as Peru and Bolivia have significant experience in handling these issues, which are also acquiring increasing importance in Venezuela. One could hope, in the current international context characterized by the definition of terrorism as a threat to the human security, that this situation could be treated and dealt with in a more energetic fashion, as is actually happening. Initiatives are currently taking place both to deal with the war in Colombia and to start political negotiations. There is a possibility, however, that the war dimension could overflow and acquire preeminence, thereby generating consequences that would require the design of conflict and disaster prevention mechanisms associated with threats to the security of people in geographical areas linked to the zones of conflict. A priority in the human security agenda: cooperative multilateralism A wide-ranging, rich agenda for academic reflection and institutional practice can be derived from this examination of the problems and challenges related to the human security concept and its multiple, analytical, regulatory, disciplinary and institutional implications. Designing this programme of reflection and action would be a task for several teams and projects. Restricting myself to only one aspect of this wideranging programme, however, I would like to emphasize the potential of cooperative multilateralism in human security. This is presented as an especially useful resource and condition for promoting greater levels of human security, weakening factors that threaten it and generating a favourable context that is able to influence reinforcement of achievements in this area. The weaknesses, lacks, threats, achievements and scopes in human security issues that are distributed unequally throughout the various countries of Latin America and the Caribbean – and the world, of course – could be ‘compensated’ somehow through efficient formulae of multilateral interaction aimed at maximizing achievements, minimizing threats and deficiencies, and generating conditions that encourage individuals, organizations and nations to act in a cooperative fashion. In a positive sense, its acceptance would attempt to foster suitable conditions to improve the quality of human security in the region and, in a negative sense, it would attempt to prevent and avoid threats to it. 334 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 334 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: Definition and Challenges ... Miriam Kornblith Consequently, the necessary conditions to encourage and improve cooperative multilateralism, making it more efficient, must occupy a prominent position on the agenda of issues to be examined. Cooperative multilateralism must be understood in its inter-state dimension, in the dimension of the interaction of the region’s NGOs and of the interactions between both groups of actors. This cooperation is not limited to the spheres of action of the region’s countries, but extends considerably beyond, as is demonstrated by the experience of the Human Security Network. It is important to properly evaluate and consider the recent, rich experience of Latin America and the Caribbean in matters of multilateral cooperation in different areas, in order to learn lessons that contribute to detecting the region’s weaknesses and strengths in this area. Similarly, it is important to design efficient formulae that allow the world’s existing experience to be shared and taken advantage of in order to strengthen and promote this dimension. Bibliography DRAKE, P.; HERSCHBERG , E. 2001. Crises in the Andes. International Seminar on Crisis in the Andes, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and Duke-North Carolina Consortium in Latin America, Chapel Hill, N.C., 10–11 September 2001. (Mimeo) FLACSO-Chile, Red de seguridad humana, Document prepared by FLACSO-Chile for the Expert meeting on Peace, Human Security, and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean, 26-27 november 2001. GOUCHA, M. 2001. Address on the occasion of the Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. (Mimeo) HUMAN SECURITY NETWORK. 2001. Principles. Approaches. Commitments. (http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/). ROJAS ARAVENA, F. 2000. Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latina. In: Chile 1999–2000. Nuevo gobierno: Desafíos de la reconciliación . Santiago, FLACSO-Chile. SMITH, D. (Ret. Colonel); STOHL, R. 2000. The Evolving Role of the Military Forces in Human Security. Washington. Center for Defense Information. (Mimeo) UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York, United Nations Development Programme. 335 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 335 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile UNDP. 1998. Desarrollo humano en Chile: Las paradojas de la modernización. National Report, Chile. New York, United Nations Development Programme (http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail_reports.cfm?view=393). 336 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 336 25/04/2003, 12:55 HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANDEAN REGION ADRIÁN BONILLA 1 The notion of human security for the Andean region A human security agenda for the Andean region cannot fail to take into account the fact that most of the permanent or structural threats against the survival or well-being of people, as individuals, come from a context in which the state is unable to institutionalize societal relationships or efficiently process the conflict. In other words, even though it seems paradoxical, the human security agenda in the Andean region is linked to national security agendas. Human security can be interpreted in the widest sense, in so far as its object is the survival of people and to develop the necessary conditions so that they can feel secure;2 but this does not obviate the institutional architecture required to establish valid regulations that govern relationships between them. Elements such as the validity of the law, public order and legal proceedings to settle conflicts, as well as legitimate punishment of criminal or violent conduct, presuppose a scenario whereby, in democracy, people’s security3 is guaranteed. 1. Academic Subdirector, FLACSO-Ecuador. 2. This concept is comprehensively inferred from the classic UNDP Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. 3. Sverre Lodgaard, ‘Human Security: Concept and Operationalization’, United Nations University for Peace, 2001 (http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/lodgaard.pdf). Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 337 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile This presupposes the idea of a state with regulatory authority over the population. When the opposite is true, i.e. when the state is weak, the possibilities of protecting people’s lives are rather more limited. National security favours the state. Now, there is no theoretical justification for the state in itself to be the entity that guarantees people’s security. In order to be able to associate national security with human security, one must postulate a normative view, which implies assessing the state and its institutions. The theory is that only a democratic state may be associated with human security, for three main reasons. First of all, as a form of government democracy embodies the constellation of values defined as the minimum programme of modernity expressed in first-generation human rights.4 Secondly, state security in democracy presupposes a series of mechanisms to guarantee the identity of the population, its participation and representation. Finally, in the liberal-inspired theory of democracy, sovereignty is a consequence of the will of the community; the legitimacy of the state becomes the representation of the interests of the community. Sovereignty, as an objective of national security,5 is thus the expression of a group of people given form in a regulated mandate to its authorities, which automatically presupposes an efficient system of accountability. Finally, the concept of human security subsumes that of societal security, which links the economic, ecological and cultural dimensions of people’s lives. This approach provides the foundation for building second- and third-generation human rights, which can only be executed through public policies emanating from the state.6 From a conventional United Nations point of view, the human security agenda is widely linked to notions of development, and priorities emerging from force-related issues, which are classic security themes, could possibly disappear. Even though ideas such as economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and citizen security7 could clarify such aspects as equality or a comprehensive view of development, they might not be the best instruments to apply at this particular moment to the evaluation of public policies and social conduct in a region beset by transnational illegal problems, chronic political instability and the use of violence in the pursuit of political ends. 4. Hans Gregor Rader, ‘On Human Security’, working document, Munich, September 1990. 5. See debate on the concept in Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear, pp. 67–8, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991. 6. All United Nations literature on human development since 1994 points in this direction, especially conventions against discrimination and those asserting collective and labour rights. 7. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994. 338 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 338 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla If the UNDP concept were applied to every country in the Andean region, none of them would be able to display a propitious environment for human security. This concept, without being fleshed out, would simply reflect a series of hostile scenarios from Venezuela to Bolivia that are related basically to the historical construction of these societies, which were built on models of domination, inequality and exclusion. The various different Andean societies can, however, be clearly distinguished; human security and national security conditions in Colombia, for example, are definitely not the same as in the other countries. And the levels of development in terms of economic and social security in Bolivia and Ecuador are also different to those of, for example, Venezuela or Colombia. It would seem necessary, therefore, to delimit or define the boundaries of the UNDP concept in terms of horizons that contribute to producing analytical and comparative criteria that can identify specific problems as the origin of perceptions of insecurity. ‘Safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats’8 could be a concept that establishes threat perceptions in specific communities and identifies specific social or political processes. This could imply, then, a methodology that establishes the sense of security based on threat perceptions, and it is precisely on the basis of that possibility that a connection can also be made with the idea of national security. With these elements, the concepts of national security and human security are not necessarily dichotomous, which is what is postulated in the 1994 UNDP document, but rather both categories may supplement each other. In democracy, human security is contained in national security. National security criticism refers to the context of the Cold War and the systemic attribution of the idea of sovereignty to the very existence of the state. In conventional national security literature that predominated during the Cold War, sovereignty was never considered in terms of the legitimacy of its origins, but was rather an attribute of nation-states at an international level9 that deliberately isolated itself from state and individual levels.10 8. Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, 1999, cited on Canada’s Human Security website (www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/menu-e.asp). 9. Classical realist and neo-realist literature on the theory of international relations is based on these premises. See Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, pp. 3–42, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1995; Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Liberalism and Security: The Contradictions of the Liberal Leviathan, Copenhagen, Peace Research Institute, 1998; Marco Cepik, ‘Seguranca nacional e seguranca humana: Problemas concetuais e consequencias políticas’, in Security and Defense Studies Review, 2001 (www3.ndu.edu/ chds/journal/index.htm). 10. Kenneth Waltz, Man, State and War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959. 339 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 339 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Sovereignty was seen, then, as an attribute that implied the authority of a state over a population and a territory and which, in its relationship with other states, presupposed a dual dimension: independence in formulating a foreign policy that responded to the interests of a community reified in the state, and autonomy in conducting its domestic policy. In other words, sovereignty presupposed a state’s ability to prevent other states or societies from intervening in its internal affairs. This approach to the idea of sovereignty inspired state alliances during the Cold War and internationally legitimized domestic political processes that devastated human rights and created extreme conditions of human insecurity in several national societies. In this concept, the state emerged as an entity that reified the interests of society and, at an international level, as the embodiment of the community’s power, without any reference to how that power was transferred or to the community itself. As the state was the only actor for national interests, its survival and the survival of its institutions alienated people’s needs for survival. National security, then, ended up rendering the needs of people and communities invisible.11 Perceptions of insecurity in the Andean region cannot be understood without taking into account a theoretical approach that can explain the proliferation of internal conflicts, which, while being a consequence of the international system, also have a tremendous impact on it. Issues such as building and consolidating the state, which imply both the domestic situation and international legitimacy, as well as the capacity of the community and political society to become institutionalized, must be included in order to be able to develop an orderly idea of human insecurity scenarios. In terms of method, this analysis implies the following premises: domestic and international issues are linked, especially in areas of conflict; issues of a domestic political nature must be explained in light of the state’s capabilities; these capabilities, in turn, are the result of political and social processes that are also both international and local, which ultimately explains the link between domestic political conflict and international conflict.12 11. Makoto Iokibe, ‘Human and world security’, in Kentaro Serita and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), Our Planet and Human Security, Selected papers, United Nations University Global Seminar ’96 Shonan Session, 1–4 October 1996. 12. Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Subaltern Realism: International relations theory myths the Third World’, in Stephany Newman, International Relations Theory and the Third World, New York, St Martins Press, 1998. 340 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 340 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla Andean societies are beset by problems involving the consolidation of the state and the presence of fragmented societies; economic and financial problems of the economic agents of the respective states – the result of the way in which they have entered into globalization; crises in their political systems – participation, representation and accountability; and erosion of governance.13 Building the state Andean national identities and political crises From an international political perspective, the Andean identity is an edifice built on the image of its nation-states and their association in institutional, bureaucratic networks that are based on a kind of reconstruction of the past, which, in turn, has been erected on several common signs and icons. The Andean Community of Nations is the entity that, for now, reifies this idea – the idea of the Andes as a social and political edifice.14 The founding logic of Andean nation-states is based on the preexistence of state institutions. Bolivianism or Ecuadorianism had to have been subsequent to the foundation of Bolivia or Ecuador as a result of the invasion by Venezuelan armies (at a time when the republic of Venezuela did not even exist). In other words, in contrast to the founding legends of some European nation-states, in Andean societies the republican state, a direct continuance of colonialism, was prior to the nation, which was deliberately developed based on state institutions and the myths that they were able to generate. Part of the explanation of the crisis of instability affecting the Andean world can be found in the capacity of representation of its political associations based on the core splits that are so common to all of them. All Andean societies are beset by regional contradictions, by ethnic and cultural antagonisms and by vast social gulfs typified by concentration of income and exclusion. 13. These variables are mentioned repeatedly in various works. See, for example: Paul Drake and Eric Hershberg, ‘Crises in the Andes’, paper presented at the International Seminar on Crisis in the Andes, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Duke-North Carolina Consortium in Latin America, Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001; Adrián Bonilla, ‘Vulnerabilidad internacional y fragilidad doméstica. La crisis andina en perspectiva regional’, Nueva sociedad 173, Caracas, 2001. 14. This paper understands Andean societies to be those whose states form part of the Andean Community of Nations. 341 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 341 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile The Andean political crisis, and this is an initial hypothesis, is basically a crisis of legitimacy caused by persistent practices of exclusion that have their roots in history and are the result of building a republican state illuminated by homogenizing ideas of modernity in the face of societies that are marked, not only by cultural differences, but also by the disruption caused by practices of domination that went hand in hand with the processes of building ownership and political power. Andean societies are racist, hierarchical and authoritarian, and their state institutions are insufficient to process conflict and societal demands in the complex, globalized context of civil society. Since the mid-1990s, all Andean states have experienced a permanent political crisis defined by a precarious legitimacy, the result of a chronic lack of representation. This lack has at least three main features. First of all, most people do not participate in national strategic decision-making, nor in decision-making involving the particular affairs of their own communities. Secondly, there are no efficient, legitimate mechanisms of accountability – levels of impunity in civil society and in the exercising of political power are extremely high – and, finally, large portions of their societies do not qualify as citizens. The fragility of the institutions and their precarious legitimacy mean that politics is governed by relationships of patronage, which regulate the exchange of services and resources by means of loyalties. This practice is common to the whole political system, but it is also common in private relationships of a social nature. Feather-bedding and patrimonial methods are the immediate results of this particular way of conducting politics, and, when it comes to processing conflict and societal demands, they replace the regulatory capacity of the institutions. An additional consequence of this method of building the state is that, because societies are chronically under-represented, their heterogeneity favours the emergence of national, local and regional party bosses, whose ability to bring in the crowds is the basis for organizing political movements and mechanisms of participation. Parties then become electoral machines, rather than the means for communicating the demands of political society and the instruments for facilitating them. All Andean societies have notable specificities in economic, ethnic, cultural and political terms. But they also have many dynamics that are common to all these aspects. Political turbulence and economic deterioration are scenarios that all these societies share at the start of the twenty-first century. Although, in general terms, quantitative 342 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 342 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla indicators are different15 to the rest of Latin America and MERCOSUR, growth in all Andean countries has declined since 1996. Despite the fact that the problems are similar, governance scenarios in the region are not the same. The conflict in Venezuela would seem to be between a form of political management based on plebiscites and the presidentialist system in force for the last thirty years, in the context of a reform of the state institutional framework and the collapse of the old order. This scenario is not the same as in Colombia, where guerrilla violence, paramilitary groups, illegal drug-trafficking organizations and competition between state actors put governmental capacity in doubt. The political instability in Ecuador precludes stabilizing the economy. The state is facing regional pressures and the need to not only restructure its administrative environment in geographical terms, but also its role as protector and promoter of social groups. Pressures in Peru come from the state’s inability to open up the political system, build mechanisms of transparency and accountability and face up to the challenges of social violence and state responses to it. Meanwhile, administrative weakness and lightweight institutions in Bolivia contribute to exclusion dynamics. All Andean societies have faced political problems that they have not been able to resolve. These have arisen in contexts of structural scarcity in societies with weak institutional frameworks, in some cases with governments that fail to control the national space as a whole, and are besieged by economic pressures from the international market that force them to reform the state and restructure the economy.16 International context and local conflicts: The United States, drug trafficking and the Colombian conflict Drug trafficking as a transnational problem has probably been the most important issue in Colombia’s international relations in the past two decades. The agendas of presidential summits in the Hemisphere deal with drug trafficking under the guise of democracy. These summits 15. Basically referring to gross domestic product and economic exchange. See Indicadores mensuales de la comunidad andina, Secretaría General, 2001. 16. For political practices in the Andean region, one can consult Helena González and Heidful Schmidt (eds.), Democracia para una nueva sociedad (Modelo para armar), Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1997; Dieter Nohlen and Mario Fernández (eds.), El Presidencialismo renovado, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1998; Felipe Burbano de Lara (ed.), El fantasma del populismo. Aproximación a un tema (siempre) actual, Caracas, FLACSO-Ecuador/Nueva Sociedad, 1998. 343 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 343 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile have taken up the basic issues of the US Agenda and may be considered a demonstration of the new US hegemony in the Hemisphere.17 The strategic national objective of the United States in dealing with drug trafficking is to reduce the supply of narcotics from Andean societies. The strategy for source countries is aimed at policies of interdiction, control and repression of illegal activities. Its goals are to eradicate and break up the cartels and control money laundering. Drug trafficking is considered to be a national security issue, and that means deploying military resources and also the logic of giving this issue priority over any other multilateral or bilateral agenda of the Andean countries. Democracy in the Andean region involves a problem of stability with security implications. Venezuela is observed with suspicion because of the possibility of a hostile government. Colombia is struggling with a civil war, and the United States has taken part in defending the elected government and autonomously turning against guerrilla organizations, which it accuses of being drug traffickers. Instability in Ecuador has been dramatic, and Peru has opted to stop tolerating an authoritarian government. The economic recession in Bolivia is a matter of concern. Drug trafficking has in common the same agenda of interlocution – i.e. the United States – but, as with democracy, its scenarios are diametrically different.18 Bolivia is primarily a producer of coca leaf, and the issue presupposes decisions that involve social policies. Thousands of workers produce a crop that is illegal, but which, given the value added by its illegal by-products in the industrialized northern market, has not been able to be successfully replaced.19 Colombia, where the coca leaf is grown, refined and exported, faces immediate problems arising from the symbiosis between multiple violent actors, including state agencies, and the political economics of drug trafficking. Ecuador is a transit point and money-laundering centre. Peru also has problems with drug-related violence and is a drug producer and exporter. Venezuela could be a large money-laundering centre. 17. Peter H. Smith, ‘Strategic Options for Latin America’, in Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach (eds.), Latin America in the New International System, p. 44, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 18. Key texts for understanding drug trafficking were published in the 1990s. To the extent that the anti-drugs strategy continues, the effects and suppositions of these texts basically remain current. See Bruce Bagley and William Walker (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1994; Peter H. Smith (ed.), Drug Policy in the Americas, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1992. 19. Coca has not been able to be replaced with another more profitable product in any of the Andean countries. Products such as annatto achieved very high prices at given moments, but the market was saturated and prices fell to their original level. Such is not the case of the coca leaf, whose value depends on an illegal market for its by-products. 344 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 344 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla The perception of Andean states, especially Colombia, is that drug trafficking is not an issue that can be handled on the basis of a foreign policy or the simple capacity of the state. It is, rather, a global problem requiring equally global policies. In this regard, the realistic approach of the State Department’s anti-drug strategy practices, targeted on interdiction and control, cannot be efficient because it presupposes capabilities that Andean states in particular do not have. Moreover, the only solution left to this strategy is to militarize antidrug police forces, and that means causing a distorting effect on Andean social and political scenarios; it also fails to take into account the reduced capacity of local entities of control, the confusion inherent in the missions of various different security entities and exposure to the risk of corruption and violence of the whole institutional framework of Andean nations. This very quickly became obvious.20 The problem, however, lies in implementing policies of cooperation, as the United States, the most important political actor in the international drugtrafficking scenario, has opted to make what could be a simple public health issue a national security one. It must be pointed out that Andean states have come to share this perception. They have been compliant, as in eradication in Bolivia, or ultimately consensual, as in the case of Ecuador,21 which has ceded part of its territory for an airbase and has supported Washington policy without any major criticism for the past ten years. Andean governments have admitted that growing, refining and selling psychotropics is a threat to their own security. Seen in perspective, however, this policy contains a strong reaction to a greater threat to government stability, institutional continuity and the very presence of these nations in their international setting, particularly in the series of regulations and institutions that make up the inter-American system – the potential hostility of the United States. The possibility of diverging from the US anti-drug policy, and especially its construction of drug trafficking as a national security issue, is remote. The political and economic costs that an Andean nation would suffer upon adopting an anti-hegemonic policy in this regard would be much higher than the theoretical benefits in terms of stability or control of internal violence. Maintaining harmonious relations with the United States is more important for the national security of Andean nations than the typical effects of the war on drugs. 20. See, for example, Bruce Bagley, ‘Myths of Militarization: Enlisting Armed Forces in the War on Drugs’, in Peter H. Smith, op. cit. 21. Adrián Bonilla, ‘National Security Decision-Making in Ecuador: The Case of War on Drugs’, Chap. IV, Ph.D. thesis, Miami University, 1994. 345 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 345 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Drug trafficking causes different problems in different societies, and this makes it more difficult to draw up a common foreign policy, beyond the rhetoric of collaboration. Each country processes this issue differently in its dealings with the United States, just as each particular government’s policies in dealing with its respective society are different.22 Security policy agendas in the Andean region separate drug-related issues from the behaviours that all Andean countries must adopt in compliance with the United States. The system of preferential tariffs, potential trade sanctions, direct reprisals against local elite (cancelling visas, for example) have shaped behaviours that cooperate with the US anti-drug strategy based on an asymmetrical relationship,23 but this strategy, which is inspired by a regional view, can only be implemented through bilateral security policies. The purpose of this common regional agenda, which is in fact a global policy, is to generate cooperative international regimes that reinforce interdiction, destroy illegal organizations, arrest drug traffickers and control illicit earnings. This gives rise to several areas of action: eradicating crops, monitoring supplies and precursors used in processing, improving international legal cooperation, extradition, etc., and stopping drug running.24 This regional agenda meets the bilateral mechanism head-on in crude accountability procedures, the most important of which in political terms is certification. Each country’s performance relating to treaties that have been signed separately is actually evaluated separately. Budgets for cooperation against drug trafficking are also similarly compartmentalized, which shows ultimately that the policy is implemented separately for each particular country. 22. In Andrés Franco, Estados Unidos y los países andinos, 1993–1997: poder y desintegración, Bogotá, Universidad Javeriana, 1998. Several papers by various authors from different national perspectives are offered on the relations of Andean countries with the United States. It is probably the most complete book on the subject published in the 1990s. 23. The concept of compliance denotes a dependent relationship between the foreign policies of two countries characterized by the symmetry of the actors. It presupposes a system of rewards and punishments that operates by shaping the behaviour of the weaker actor who finds it advantageous to ally himself to the interests of the other country. See Bruce Moon, ‘Consensus or compliance? Foreign policy change and external dependence’, in International Organization, Vol. 39, Spring 1983; Jeanne Hey, ‘Foreign policy options under dependence: A theoretical evaluation with evidence from Ecuador’, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 25, 1993, pp. 543-574. 24. P. R. Rajeswari, ‘US counter-narcotics policy’, in Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXIII, No. 11, 2000, p. 5. 346 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 346 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla Bilateralism, on the other hand, is an inevitable consequence of the securitization of the drug-trafficking agenda, especially when one considers that there is no cooperative security regime in the region; there is nothing at all like an Andean army joint command. The bilateral approach also means that the US agenda, which has militarized the fight against drug trafficking, is imposed with no feedback that could modify it, despite its evident failure over the last twenty years. Militarization of the war on drugs has not only produced some of the least friendly human rights scenarios in the Andean region in the last few decades, but has also eroded the very foundations of democracy as a political regime in the region, in addition to being a threat to the regional security of several Latin American countries;25 but, above all, it has failed to accomplish even one of its strategic objectives in breaking up the illegal drug market. In fact, while this security approach continues, the probability of success using this particular strategy is very low indeed. The Colombian conflict is the very image of the Andean region as it has developed as a result of US strategy and is a catalyst for the various different foreign policies implemented by Andean countries. Confrontations between guerrillas, paramilitary troops and regular troops have direct implications for the domestic political processes of countries that border on Colombia, especially at regional level and in border zones. In contrast to what occurs with US foreign policy for Ecuadorians, Venezuelans and Panamanians, drug trafficking is a backdrop for the violence that threatens their own countries, but is not necessarily the main scenario nor the danger that has to be immediately neutralized. The armed conflict is, and the implications of the latter mean that it is very much linked to, but differentiated from, drug trafficking. The perception of the threat that Colombia generates in the Andean region is related to a fragmented civil society and a state that is unable to exercise control over political actors or over all the country’s territory. It is not the insecurity generated by aggressive or competitive policies in a realistic, classical scenario. Colombian violence is a postCold War conflict that has trouble accepting cooperative mediation from countries, because it involves a real, active threat whose nature and sources vary depending on the region and actors with which it interrelates. It reaches beyond the capacity of national states, which 25. Glen Segell, ‘The narcotics war and civil-military relations’, p. 14, paper presented at the 41st International Studies Association Conference, 2000. 347 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 347 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile they have been granted by the notion of being prominent actors in the international system, and involves very diverse, subnational, political actors from different countries: peasants, military, police, businessmen, border settlements, local governments, human rights organizations, smugglers, drug traffickers, suppliers and traders, to name but a few examples of interests that do not necessarily work using violent practices, but ultimately are interpreted by them. Colombian governments have not been reluctant to internationalize their conflict, and in this they are in agreement with Washington. The Colombian State is betting on being able to call upon international civil society and allied governments, under the principle of co-responsibility, because it has envisioned its own institutional limits and abilities.26 The budget disparity between what the US Government provides for fighting, interdiction and police reinforcements compared with social investments means that, in spite of having been proposed as a development strategy, Plan Colombia has in fact ended up becoming a point of Colombian-US agreement to fight drug trafficking, under the logic of interdiction and putting pressure on the supply and guerrillas in a strategy that also involves the inter-American community, for three reasons. First, it is impossible to assume that a US policy can isolate the existing inter-American institutional framework and that it does not accept responses, even by default, from the other Latin American countries. A US security policy implies a regional approach, given the asymmetry and degree of influence of the superpower in the Western Hemisphere. Second, the military conflict is taking place in a sector of the Colombian jungle, which borders with three countries – Ecuador, Peru and Brazil. One of these countries, Ecuador, is directly involved in the conflict by having ceded an airbase to support operations in Colombia, and the other two have militarized their frontiers. Third, the argument that drug trafficking is a transnational problem is correct and, as the US perspective links it to the guerrillas, it ends up making the latter not only a domestic Colombian agent but also an international one. America’s position is based on the belief that the Colombian conflict affects international order and especially regional security. Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, Mexico and the Caribbean are in some way influenced by illicit activities linked to drug 26. Plan Colombia is a document by the Colombian government, which develops a tenpoint strategy for growth and peace. Its most important points concern eradicating crops and the guerrilla peace plan. 348 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 348 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla trafficking. US objectives in these South American countries are basically to increase the capacity of the government to develop intelligence activities, eradicate illegal plantations, maintain interdiction of narcotics and strengthen Colombian entities of control and repression, as well as its legal system.27 In addition, the US government starts from the hypothesis that neither Colombia nor its neighbours are capable of carrying the burden of the war on drugs on their own. In other words, American aid is aimed at making up for the deficiencies of neighbouring countries to Colombia and Colombia itself. Just as in Pastrana’s view, the United States is betting on internationalization.28 The Colombian conflict is precisely a domestic political process that generates international effects and has an impact on inter-state relations. Four threats are perceived in the region as a result of the international drug-trafficking conflict and the war in Colombia: 1. neighbouring countries will face a problem that might imply the presence of any of the violent Colombian actors on foreign soil;29 2. a humanitarian disaster and social conflict detonated by mass migrations; 3. an ecological catastrophe; 4. dissemination of illegal crops in their territories. Conclusion: The Human Security Agenda in the Andean region From a United Nations perspective, the Andes are a dramatic scenario of human insecurity basically as a result of the structural nature of the violence, conceived as ‘pressure by human beings on human beings, which diminishes the possibilities of personal fulfilment of those that have been subjected to this pressure’.30 Problems such as extreme 27. Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz, Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads, pp. 19–29, Carlisle, US Army War College, 1999. 28. See Statement by the US President, the White House, 11 January 2000 (http:// www.whitehouse.gov/). 29. The incursion of violent actors along the whole length of the Ecuadorian border in 2000 has led to the kidnapping of dozens of oil technicians. There have also been clashes with Brazilian military forces, something that has been going on for several years now in Venezuela. 30. This concept of structural violence was applied to the whole Andean region and is conceived in the theoretical tradition of John Galtung. The idea comes from Felipe MacGregor and Marcial Rubio Correa, Violencia en la región andina, p. 13, Lima, Asociación Peruana de Estudios para la Paz (APEP), 1993. 349 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 349 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile poverty, inequality, personal violence, environmental degradation, cultural, ethnic and gender discrimination and political insecurity are common to all these countries. An initial point of this agenda, then, must involve the possibility of bringing to fruition development policies that also structurally modify the constellation of societal and political relations. A second dimension related to patrimonial mechanisms of patronage, feather-bedding and caudillos, which form the framework of support for all political society in Andean countries, is to strengthen the democratic institutions of the national states. The historical explanation for the way in which Andean political systems have been developed is relationships of domination based on racist, unequal and exclusive societies. Changing the political systems depends largely on transforming societies. State institutions will not be able to be strengthened, or at least not efficiently, if societies themselves are not democratized. Political conditions for human security include in particular the need to ‘citizenize’ political participation.31 A supplementary programme to the above two in human security terms involves the consequences of contingent conflicts for specific populations. It would be pertinent in this regard to observe how issues perceived as national security threats and threats arising from Andean conflicts affect the specific lives of people who are involved in the dynamics of contemporary politics. Drug trafficking is a common theme for the whole region. From the perspective of populations linked to the production process, one must think about: • medical and environmental effects of spraying; • consequences of human displacement due to forced eradication campaigns; • environmental effects of growing and processing illegal drugs; • economic consequences of eradication; • effects of illegality on daily living; • impacts of criminal violence and police repression of trafficking and growing; • consequences of associating the illegality of drug production and trafficking with conflictive, violent political processes. 31. See, for example, Chantal Mouffe, El retorno de lo político, Barcelona, Paidós, 1996. 350 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 350 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security in the Andean Region Adrián Bonilla Specific dimensions of the Colombian conflict affect the Colombian population in particular, but also neighbouring societies. First of all are scenarios of constant violations of human rights by all the armed actors in the conflict. Protecting people, however, requires reformulating not only combat strategies, but also the foreign policies of states involved in the conflict, especially the United States.32 The basic human security programme in the Colombian conflict is geared towards implementing humanitarian rights and normalizing the war in terms of such issues as directing it towards military and not civilian targets, protecting recruitment of minors and the use of violence against them, allowing and supporting humanitarian aid and developing regimes liable to guarantee humane treatment of enemy prisoners.33 Another factor to be taken into account is that of displaced persons. Thousands of people are constantly on the move as a result of armed clashes in the conflict zones, but they are also displaced as they seek economic refuge as a result of the collapse of crops and production in drug-trafficking zones. Dramatic scenes can be witnessed in this connection in Bolivia, Colombia and on the Colombian borders of Venezuela and Ecuador.34 From this point of view, recurring United Nations human security issues – small arms, anti-personnel mines, role of non-government organizations – may be applicable, always provided that they are associated with the political and social problems that cause them. In themselves, insecurity instruments are not their cause, but rather one of their consequences. 32. This is, for example, the point of view of Human Rights Watch, The Sixth Division, Military-Paramilitary Ties and US Policy in Colombia, 2001, which establishes a link between US foreign policy and the operational capacity of one of the armed groups. 33. Carlos Vicente de Roux, ‘Humanización del conflicto y proceso de paz’, in Alvaro Camacho and Francisco Leal (comps.), Armar la paz es desarmar la guerra, CEREC-IEPRI et al., 2000. 34. See 2000 and 2001 reports by Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org/), also Human Rights Watch publications (http://www.hrw.org/). 351 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 351 25/04/2003, 12:55 HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA: THE CASE OF MERCOSUR ERNESTO LÓPEZ 1 Security as a complex issue An extraordinary concentration of events tends to be summed up in the phrase ‘the fall of the Wall’. These include, among others, the destruction of the Berlin Wall to which the phrase refers, dissolution of the Soviet Union, deactivation of the Warsaw Pact and reunification of Germany. All this also tends to be called the end of the Cold War, which ended the cycle of confrontation between two mutually exclusive economic, political and social systems. As is well known, this confrontation in the field of international security was based on the so-called ‘balance of terror’ – the mutual assured destruction of both systems, even after having been the recipients of a nuclear attack. The end of the Cold War was concomitant with the definitive consolidation of a series of world trends, which produced what is now called globalization in the economic domain. To be concise, let me summarize it thus: the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the 1. Director of the Armed Forces and Society Research Program (PIFAS) and ViceRector of Institutional Relations at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 353 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile end of the East-West conflict freed the cumulus of trends favouring the expansion of globalization from their restraints. In other words, when the world scenario was freed from the constraints imposed on economic growth by this security problem, globalizing trends were given an exceptional boost. As a result of both these macro-phenomena (end of Cold War and globalization), enormously significant changes occurred in economic and security and defence fields. The former included, among other noteworthy events, the opening up of domestic markets, increase in international flows of finance and trade, spatial reorganization of production, widespread use of labour-saving technologies and welfare state reforms. The result was (a) an increase in interdependence between different countries and economies; (b) a process of intrastate and/or local fragmentation and differentiation; and (c) an evident tendency to form regional economic poles. Changes in security and defence, in turn, gave rise to new conditions of development and new circumstances. Specifically, economic interdependence boosted by globalization consolidated its propensity – already pointed out several years ago by Keohane and Nye2 – to cause significant changes in the international security field. The increasingly frequent formation of coalitions to deal with conflicts in the international arena – from the Gulf War to the 2001 war in Afghanistan – and the increasing commitment of medium and small countries to be included in peace-keeping missions, are examples of this. Peace or war in scenarios that for some used to seem remote and far from any kind of commitment are now cause for concern in actors who at other times dismissed the international scene or were reluctant to participate in it. Furthermore, the question of security and defence has become more complex and now moves on at least three different planes: (a) changed relationship between national and international; (b) multidimensional nature of security; and (c) multiplication of objects, actors and scenarios. One can clearly perceive today that the traditional way of relating national and international affairs is in the process of changing. There is an abundance of literature referring to the limits of nation-states and their declining sovereignty, and to the development of a world economy, a global society, etc. 2. R. Keohane and J. Nye, Poder e interdependencia, Buenos Aires, GEL, 1988. The first English edition of this book was published in Boston by Little, Brown and Co. in 1977. 354 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 354 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security Agenda: The Case of MERCOSUR Ernesto López To my way of thinking, the multidimensional problem of security is clear in today’s so-called ‘new threats’. These ‘new’ threats are added to classical or conventional threats arising from the possibility of external military aggression, thereby configuring a novel, multifaceted picture. The incidence of military factors, and also economic, social, political, environmental, etc. factors, on the question of security has been stressed on several occasions, but perhaps the most noteworthy in recent times is NATO’s revised Strategic Concept, approved at the Washington Summit on 23 April 1999.3 The multiplication of objects, actors and scenarios implies the existence today of wide diversity in these fields. The object of security may be, as it was exclusively before, the state. But it can also be any group that is threatened in some way or other (for example, minorities in multicultural or multinational states: Serbs, Bosnians, Kurds, Yanomamis, Kamayuras, etc.). Focus must be placed on the individuals of these groups precisely as individuals. Actors have also multiplied. Together with the classical and still central state, societies, groups and even individuals 4 have become protagonists in security issues. There are also transnational actors (NATO, for example). Scenarios, in turn, are supranational, national or subnational. The organization headed by Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, is a subnational actor. Its action is deployed transnationally when it is on the offensive, and subnationally when it is on the defensive. And the aims pursued by its actions would seem to invoke a supranational and supraterritorial object – defending ‘true’ Islam.5 This hasty summary, however, does not round out – and not because of its evident imperfection – the complex picture referred to. It must be said that the classical or conventional – should we call it ‘old’ or ‘former’? – scenario, which understands security and/or defence as being linked to the possibility of external aggression, understood almost exclusively as military action, and which, consequently, gives priority to self-sufficient defence managed in a predominantly unilateral manner and to deterrence and balance of power as important objectives. This still coexists within the new security context, but new factors have been introduced as well. 3. A noteworthy milestone in the perception and conceptualization of the multidimensional nature of security is the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (United Nations, A/CN. 10/38, 8 April 1983), also known as the Palme Report after the former Swedish Prime Minister who chaired the Commission. 4. Osama Bin Laden, for example, has been practically catapulted as an individual by the United States Government to the position of enemy of state. 5. It should perhaps be said that, from the point of view of the object, the above supraterritoriality and supranationality refer to individuals. Ultimately, the intention is to protect individuals, whether living in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Palestine or Indonesia, from the ‘Great Satan’ and lead them along the path of good Islam. 355 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 355 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile In sum, the complexity of the security problem derives in part from the appearance and development of a new security context whose salient traits are interdependence and complexity, and in part from the coexistence of this burgeoning context with the former one, which still persists.6 Human security If this framework is accepted, in other words if one accepts the complexity of the overall security problem, one must also accept that the matter can be tackled from different angles. I agree to some extent – perhaps more in a general sense than with his specific conceptualization – with the approach set forth by Francisco Rojas referring to the existence of different levels or dimensions of the concept of security.7 To my mind, given the complex picture described, adopting the perspective of human security means making individuals the cardinal factor; to be even more precise, making people – and not states or groups (societies) – the object of security. Several agents could act with this object in mind – states, associations of states, NGOs, individuals. Similarly, there can also be multiple scenarios – local, international or national. Thus, what specifies this kind of security is that its object is individuals. Making people the cardinal factor does not mean negating the importance of state security. It is certainly true, as Rojas states in the document referred to above, that ‘without inter-state security, people’s security runs the highest risks’.8 It is obvious, however, that focusing concern on another object – human security – means associating security with other, more wide-ranging issues than those to which state security gives priority. Within the framework of the United Nations, which was one of the first organizations to discuss the matter, human security is repeatedly linked to two great issues – development and peace. This route has led to a conceptualization of security that links it to two differentiated spheres of action – ‘freedom from danger’ and ‘freedom 6. This is expressed in Argentina, for example, in the need to control air space or in problems with intruding fishing vessels around the 201 mile mark. In Brazil, it is expressed in deployment in Amazonian areas and concern about the border with Colombia. 7. See Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘Seguridad humana: Una perspectiva académica desde América Latina’, in Chile 1999–2000. Nuevo gobierno: Desafíos de la reconciliación, pp. 3–4, Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 2000. 8. Op. cit., p. 4. 356 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 356 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security Agenda: The Case of MERCOSUR Ernesto López from want’. The former has to do with issues that place people’s lives and possessions at risk, as well as minimum thresholds that condition the quality of life. War, crimes against people and property, various forms of citizen insecurity and degradation of the environment are some of its most frequent manifestations. Freedom from want is related to chronic threats, such as hunger, disease, unemployment, social exclusion, lack of opportunities in education and deterioration of rights. It refers, in general, to all those problems contained in the old concept of ‘social security’9 and in education and people’s rights. This probably most strongly links the problem of human security with that of human development and/or sustainable development – in the conceptual context generated by the production and circulation of ideas within the United Nations. The wide range of problems embraced by this way of looking at things has been criticized, and not without reason, because it enormously expands the domain of the concept of security; it ‘securitizes’ areas of the real world that are not normally associated with the concept.10 Without losing sight of the danger, I give priority below to human security as it relates to ‘freedom from danger’, but I also make some unavoidable references to the question of ‘freedom from want’. Human security in MERCOSUR The members of MERCOSUR – particularly Brazil and Argentina, on which this paper focuses – have undergone a socio-economic process that, in general terms, could be characterized as prototypical in relation to the growth of globalization. Economic growth and social problems do not mix very well in globalized contexts in general and in the so-called emerging nations in particular.11 Economic development tends to go hand in hand with a process of social destructuring, exclusion and disintegration, with 9. Without detracting from progress made in this regard by social democrat experiences in Northern Europe, the beginning of a normalization of social security could perhaps be considered to date back to 1935 and the appearance of the Social Security Law promoted by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States. 10. See, for example, Bjørn Møller, ‘Seguridad nacional, societal y humana: El marco general y el caso de los balcanes’, Fuerzas armadas y sociedad, Santiago, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2000. 11. I have discussed this problem quite extensively in ‘Globalización y democracia: Esbozos’, Revista de ciencias sociales, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Buenos Aires, Nos. 7–8, April 1998. 357 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 357 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile extremely harmful consequences. Economic ‘success’ is not accompanied by a corresponding success in social areas. Economy and society remain at a distance from each another, to such an extent that one can even speak of a break between them. One could simplify this by saying that two demands – competitiveness and exclusion, one economic and the other social – are operating simultaneously. Globalization, with its requirement to open up national markets and significantly increase flows of international trade, imposes a high demand for competitiveness. Simultaneously, the dismantling of the welfare state, the prevalence of capital-intensive models of production – whose aim is plainly and simply automation – with the subsequent reduction in job supply and increase in unemployment, and the difficulties on the cost side – vis-à-vis demands for fiscal discipline and competitiveness (which leads to reduced contributions from the private sector) – and the maintenance of state networks of social protection, among other factors, cause the onset of social exclusion.12 The widespread image of the contemporary battle between market and state, usually resolved in favour of the former, is nothing less than a manifestation of what has just been said. As a result of all this, a perverse force has been making inroads everywhere – especially in countries such as Argentina and Brazil, which have few possibilities of influencing the progress of this globalizing process – bringing pressure to bear, on the one hand, from pretty well implacable economic demands and, on the other, from unfortunate social consequences. Thus, a unique antinomy between competitiveness and inclusion is born, igniting particular societies of what today are called emerging nations. The search for competitiveness breeds exclusion, while defence of social inclusion obstructs competitiveness (and, therefore, any possibility of acceptable performance in the globalized world). Brazil and Argentina are suffering from the problems described above, with their own particular traits and characteristics derived from their respective historical processes. From the point of view of human security considered in relation to ‘freedom from want’, this obviously has clearly negative repercussions in terms of employment, social welfare, food possibilities, health welfare, education, rights and environmental living conditions, among other significant aspects. 12. Destructuring, disaster, lack of solidarity, fragmentation and hanging out to dry have been some of the phrases also used to describe this problem. See, among others, R. Castel, Las metamorfosis de la cuestión social, Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 1997; J. Fitoussi and P. Rosanvallon, La nueva era de las desigualdades, Buenos Aires, Manantial, 1997; P. Rosanvallon, La nueva cuestión social, Buenos Aires, Manantial, 1995. 358 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 358 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security Agenda: The Case of MERCOSUR Ernesto López The ‘freedom from danger’ aspect can be observed from the two points of view referred to above – exclusion and prevalence of market over state. Social exclusion has an immediate impact on the increase in crime and citizen insecurity. In both cases, there is a concrete increase in crimes against people and property. Likewise, one can perceive an increased participation in criminal activities by sectors of the population who have no other alternative, and that criminals tend to be increasingly younger.13 The existence of a situation that can be defined as ‘more market less state’ has also given rise in both countries to an increase in corruption and white-collar crimes, with a subsequent deleterious influence on state institutions directly linked to security, such as the courts and police. Thus, one can assert that the break between economy and society, evidenced by the competitiveness/inclusion antinomy, has a direct impact on the increase in human insecurity, both by threatening needs and by placing people in danger. Other new problems closely linked to globalization also have a negative impact on human security. Among the most notable are drugrelated activities, such as trafficking, money laundering and chemical precursors (used for processing cocaine in clandestine laboratories), other forms of international organized crime, such as arms running, money laundering of proceeds from political corruption and tax evasion, and international terrorism. All these problems have been of concern in either Brazil or Argentina. The magnitude of drug trafficking in Brazil and its impact on human security is evident, for example, in the presence of drug traffickers in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, which practically escape police control. There are no situations as flagrant as this in Argentina, but there the consumption of marijuana and cocaine has certainly increased in the last five years – as it has in Brazil. Both countries also continue to be significant links and transit zones in the drug trafficking chain. The ‘First MERCOSUR Specialized Meeting of Officers for Drug Enforcement, Prevention of Drug Abuse and Rehabilitation of DrugAddicts’ was held in April 2000 in Buenos Aires. The meeting included countries from the enlarged MERCOSUR, as it is called (full members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay plus associated members Bolivia and Chile), and its purpose was to examine the problems from the point of view of demand and supply. It was the first interesting project 13. See, for example, Varella Márcio, ‘A banalizacao da violencia’, UNB Revista, Vol. I, No. 2, April–June 2001, Universidad de Brasilia, Brasilia. 359 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 359 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile of its kind to take a common look at problems and seek suitable forms of cooperation to tackle them. Unfortunately, no other meeting has yet been called, and none of the ideas proposed at the first meeting have been implemented. Very little progress has been made in either country in controlling chemical precursors and no joint action has been taken. This is not a minor problem, because both Argentina and Brazil are the exclusive suppliers of the Bolivian ‘industry’, which is the second-largest supplier of the European market. These products are legally purchased and used by the chemical industry, and buying and selling them are not crimes in themselves. Their use could be traced, however, to prevent them from being employed in illegal, clandestine activities. Brazil and Argentina are significant markets in South America for money laundering (money from drug trafficking, as well as from other criminal activities such as arms running, political corruption or tax evasion). Informal estimates circulating in these spheres of activity indicate that Brazil launders about US$50,000 million per year on average, and Argentina about US$10,000 million. These data obviously have to be taken with a pinch of salt, but they none the less indicate the magnitude of the problem. As has been said, the cost paid in terms of human security in this case is mediate in relation to the original crimes – especially drug trafficking and arms running – but in itself money laundering does not adversely affect ‘need’ nor generate ‘danger’. It is necessary, however, to complete the original crimes, to bring them to final fruition. Money laundering of funds from tax evasion, however, has an immediate impact on ‘freedom from want’, for it diminishes resources available to the state. Finally, all the types of money laundering briefly examined above have a poisonous effect whose repercussions are immediate in terms of the negative influence they spread by infesting sectors of the courts and police. In June 2000, Brazil and Argentina simultaneously joined the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), an international agency that seeks to coordinate efforts and consolidate cooperation in the fight against money laundering. In December 2000, a South American force (GAFI) was set up as a joint project by Brazil and Argentina, sponsored by Spain. Both are interesting projects whose continued development will have to be observed closely. There is rather fragmentary information available on arms running, both in terms of large-scale deals – such as Argentine operations with Croatia and Peru, both widely known – and of small-arms traffic. This 360 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 360 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security Agenda: The Case of MERCOSUR Ernesto López information is enough, however, to recognize that the problem is a sizeable one. There is no joint action against this traffic, and government activity would seem to be limited to what security and control services can do in each particular case. International terrorism is also a perceptible threat to human security in both countries. As is well known, Argentina has suffered two brutal attacks in the recent past – attacks on the Israeli Embassy and on the Jewish mutual aid fund, AMIA – which caused dozens of deaths and hundreds of wounded. More recently, and as a result of investigations undertaken after the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September, the support being given to several fundamentalist Arab groups on the Triple Border of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay has become evident. The three countries share a so-called Triple Border Command, from which attempts are made to develop concerted actions to cope with the problems in evidence there. More generally, responding to a recommendation from the Second Summit of the Americas, held in Chile in 1998, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States created the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism on 7 June 1999 and entrusted it with tasks and responsibilities involving concert and cooperation in regional anti-terrorism activities. Argentina and Brazil form part of this committee. In summary, one could say that the most significant human security issues affecting Brazil and Argentina – observing the distinction that has been made throughout this paper between problems affecting ‘freedom from want’ and problems affecting ‘freedom from danger’ – are as follows: Main problems affecting ‘freedom from want’: • social exclusion and marginality; • precarious job and unemployment situation; • non-existence of social welfare networks or their deterioration and even disappearance; • chronic food insufficiency and/or diminished food possibilities; • non-existence, deterioration or disappearance of health welfare; • poor environmental conditions or their degradation; • insufficient education; • non-existence or loss of elementary rights; Main problems affecting ‘freedom from danger’: • increase in common crime (crimes against people and property); 361 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 361 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile • increase in insecurity in towns (not just increase in common crime, but also deficient policing and, in some cases, deficiency of the courts); • increase in corruption and white-collar crimes; • drug trafficking; • supplying chemical precursors; • different kinds of money laundering; • arms running (macro-business and small arms); • international terrorism. A MERCOSUR agenda There are problems which can be read as human security, but which more properly perhaps belong to the spheres of international and state security. If they are left on one side, it becomes clear that a human security agenda for MERCOSUR must be built on a consideration of the typical problems that are thought to be the most important at that level, i.e. those listed above. Having made this first distinction, another must be made. Even at a human security level per se, one must distinguish between issues affecting ‘freedom from want’ and issues affecting ‘freedom from danger’. The former cover such a wide-ranging field – see list – that they become mixed up with politics, economics, social policies, etc. Precisely for this reason, warnings have been given about the danger of excessive ‘securitization’ of problems that can normally be read as belonging to other disciplines (as above). The fields of human security and development are obviously interconnected. Not enough attention can be called, however, to the centrality to human security of the problems inherent in these fields. So much more so if one considers the perverse force resulting from globalization and the competitiveness/inclusion antinomy referred to above. Everything done in this field will be too little during our lifetimes. All minimally reasonable ideas must be encouraged in order to close the gap between economy and society. The actions of NGOs and other non-state institutions, such as foundations, neighbourhood organizations, etc., must be supported. Similarly, the highest possible level of state concern must be demanded. One must fight against naturalization of state impotence (whether at federal, provincial or municipal level), which tends to abound in times when ‘belts are 362 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 362 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security Agenda: The Case of MERCOSUR Ernesto López tightened’ and fiscal discipline is enforced. And one must try to expand the margins of accountability. There are a series of issues affecting ‘freedom from danger’ to which the above considerations also apply. Problems making up so-called international organized crime (drug trafficking, chemical precursors, money laundering and arms running in the above list), international terrorism, corruption and white-collar crimes, are so complex and have such international ramifications that state action is absolutely essential. Once again, responsible state concern in this area, with accountability at the highest possible level, must be demanded. As mentioned in the previous section, there have been a series of incipient ideas – such as the FATF, the South American GAFI and the InterAmerican Committee Against Terrorism – which must be observed closely. If need be, all state action in these fields – not just that involving international cooperation – should be monitored as far as possible by public opinion in general and by civil society control organizations (such as human rights agencies or Citizen Power in Argentina) willing to keep an eye on these matters. In addition to making demands on and controlling state institutions responsible for tackling the increase in common crime and insecurity in towns, the development of civil society agencies or institutions, which can play an important role in improving the situation, must be encouraged. Such is the case, for example, of neighbours who group together to form a neighbourhood watch, set up warning systems, organize a rapid connection to the police, etc. All these methods, if developed in cooperation with the police, improve local security conditions. These organizations can be helped by equipping them with a better institutional framework, setting up networks, etc. The same can be said of local or sectoral agencies that organize themselves to prevent or control police abuse or deficiencies in the courts. In short, it would seem that specific action on MERCOSUR’s priorities as regards human security covers two major questions: (a) demanding responsible concern, control and accountability from the respective government agencies; and (b) encouraging the activities of NGOs and other civil society agencies which contribute by cooperation or control to the irreplaceable action of state institutions. 363 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 363 25/04/2003, 12:55 CHILE AND HUMAN SECURITY JUAN ANÍBAL BARRÍA 1 Some background on human security This ‘global village’, as our world has been called, is marked by positive occurrences such as the internationalization of economies, growth of democracy as a parameter of political legitimacy, greater awareness of the value of basic rights and freedoms, positive impact of new information technologies which shorten distances and change our methods of communication, to name but its most widespread and applauded ‘highlights’. But globalization also has a ‘dark side’, a shadowy nature expressed in, for example, extreme poverty, terrorism, epidemics, digital gap, transnational organized crime, financial crises and degradation of the environment. Thus, we are face to face with evils that know no boundaries and which directly affect people. These are seen as ‘other’ causes of insecurity. The most serious problems of our times, whatever their nature, are neither seen nor felt to be remote. The dangers of our times, as noted, are not limited to a given geographical area, for their effects quickly and easily spread to the rest of the world. 1. Lawyer and Counsellor to the Chilean Embassy in the Holy See. This paper basically sets forth ideas presented in 1999 in the XXVII Course on International Law, organized in Rio de Janeiro by the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the OAS. The opinions expressed are the author’s exclusive responsibility. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 365 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Moreover, the current trend involves intra-state conflicts, not international ones. These conflicts are not civilian and have been aggravated, in turn, by the extensive use of small, light weaponry that is easy to use, acquire, produce and transport. These characteristics mean that these weapons cause the most loss of life and human suffering. They are also factors of instability, which obstruct economic, social and political development. Widespread use of small arms has become a salient aspect of domestic wars. Stopping illicit possession and trafficking of these arms is a particularly complex task, especially in border areas where access is difficult. In these situations, the supply of relatively cheap small arms follows the ebb and flow of conflicts beyond the control of any one nation. As a result of all these elements, irregular armed groups, paramilitary forces and criminal organizations make frequent use of these small arms, and their availability and proliferation have both increased considerably. As a result of their projection into the political and institutional life of nations and the establishment of a culture of violence and lack of respect for individual guarantees, this issue has been included in security proposals and, especially, in notions that examine security from a point of view that focuses on human beings.2 The extremely serious occurrences in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, which were condemned by international society and gave rise to various ad hoc courts – the so-called ‘kangaroo courts’ – contributed, among other reasons, of course, to the concretion of a long-time human aspiration – the establishment of an International Court designed to punish international crimes and enforce respective individual criminal responsibilities, contributing in passing to healing old wounds in post-conflict societies and, thereby, contributing to processes of reconciliation and pacification. It would be appropriate in this respect to mention a few additional elements which explain the origin of this legal institution, for, in an era of increasing interdependence, as we have seen, globalization is not only evidenced in the trading of goods and services, but also in terms of ethical values and principles. Thus, the International Criminal Court is a clear instance of ‘globalized justice’ and the expansion of universal 2. I recommend Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, edited by Lora Lumpe and published for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) by Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot (UK), 1999. I also suggest Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana B. Cipollone (eds.), Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda, New York/Geneva, UNIDIR, 1998. 366 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 366 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chile and Human Security Juan Aníbal Barría jurisdiction. More than fifty years ago, the international military courts of Nuremberg and Tokyo punished aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and mass war crimes committed during the Second World War. The Nuremberg court stated: ‘It has been long recognized that international law imposes duties and responsibilities on individuals and states … Crimes against international law are committed by individuals, not by abstract entities, and the provisions of international law can only be enforced by punishing the individuals who commit such crimes … Anyone who infringes the rules of war cannot claim immunity by the simple fact of having acted in obedience to state authorities, when, according to international law, the state has exceeded its own competence by authorizing said action ... .’3 Later, the United Nations approved the work of these courts, and the resulting principles of this wealth of jurisprudence were crystallized in the principles of international criminal law. In 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted, coming into force three years later. The Convention defines genocide as any act committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, by killing its members, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, a crime which states promised to prevent and punish. Those accused of genocide could be tried generally by a court holding jurisdiction in the state where the crime was committed, or by an international criminal court whose jurisdiction had been recognized by the state concerned. Setting up the latter – primary precedent for an international legal agency – took a long time. The Court was born in 1998 and is an extraordinary step taken by the international community to ensure that the most serious crimes do not go unpunished. Its sphere of competence includes genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes committed as a result of armed or international conflicts and crimes of aggression, over which the Court holds jurisdiction only from the moment that the nature of the crime is determined and always provided that it has been committed after the court’s statutes have come into force. One aspect that must be stressed is that the Court does not replace national courts in their task of trying the above 3. International judge Shigeru Oda, ‘El individuo en el derecho internacional’, in Max Sorensen (ed.), Manual of public international law, London, MacMillan, 1968. 367 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 367 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile crimes; it simply supplements national courts when they are materially prevented from exercising their duties, when they are incapable of exercising efficient, independent or impartial justice or simply when a denial of justice has occurred. The concept of sovereignty – the external projection of internal autonomy – proclaimed and defended in the past, has gradually lost force and vigour. In modern international practice, different universal or regional regimes, to which states have partially ceded their sovereignty and jurisdiction in favour of an international action and response that is considered legitimate, prevail. In a complex, interdependent world, states more frequently resort to adopting agreements that regulate such diverse, specific areas as the use of nuclear power, changes in the weather, international trade and finances, sea and ocean spaces, copyrights and human rights. These are nothing less than express limitations on sovereignty. International law, once considered a compilation of laws for and of states, has been affected by the ‘winds of change’. Currently, individuals, corporations, non-government organizations and civil society are actors that coexist with states and have erupted with unprecedented strength on the international scene, even participating actively in multilateral conferences or treaty negotiations, as shown by the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, and in processes involving the validation or implementation of conventional instruments, such as occurred with the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. The freedom of action of states is undoubtedly more curtailed now. This curtailment includes substantial restrictions on the ability of states to sign treaties, previously unlimited, such as the incorporation of peremptory norms or jus cogens into the Vienna Convention on Treaty Rights, described as legal norms that are superior to the will of the states, necessary for peaceful international coexistence and expressing the noble interests of the international community as a whole and which are, therefore, by nature provisions, for they cannot be ignored or amended by agreements between states or by their unilateral actions. Security, understood in its classic sense of defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity, is a precarious, insufficient concept to properly respond to a series of threats which have begun to arise in almost every region of the world and which, as never before, specifically affect people. The nature and scope of these new threats mean that concern for individual security is extended beyond internal boundaries. ‘Security stopped being a purely military concern, for the security 368 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 368 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chile and Human Security Juan Aníbal Barría agendas of individual countries and of the international system as a whole include so-called new issues, such as good governance, environment, drug trafficking, population growth and the re-emergence of ethnic, religious and cultural tension … .’4 With regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, Heraldo Muñoz, an expert on inter-American relations, has written that the countries in the region ‘traditionally … have defined security in terms of classical concepts of national sovereignty … This concept of security, however, seems to be insufficient to respond to a series of non-military dangers and threats being faced by Latin American and Caribbean countries. (A) revised concept of security must include those conditions that increase or reduce countries’ individual ability to solve critical economic or social problems and achieve a more egalitarian, democratic internal order’.5 The military factor, then, does not dominate modern security schemes. Traditional threats have been replaced by challenges of another nature and magnitude, so state security has stopped being an end in itself, although peaceful relations between states are still admittedly necessary requirements for human development and social and economic growth. They are, after all, supplementary approaches. Thus a new perspective – human security – has arisen. This is a new term in the diplomatic lexicon, which appeared for the first time in a section on ‘new concepts of human security’ in the UNDP Human Development Report 1993. After stressing positively restrictions and cutbacks in military spending, it encourages the use of these resources for human development, for security in people’s food, employment and environment. This vision, which fosters a society designed to meet people’s specific needs – which must also be the core of any security philosophy – was developed in detail in the 1994 UNDP report, New Dimensions of Human Security, which states: ‘... For too long, security has been equated to protecting a country’s borders against threats. For too long, countries have tried to arm themselves in order to protect their safety. Currently, for most people their sense of insecurity is due more to concerns about daily living than fear of a world cataclysm. Security in employment, security in the environment, security in income, security in health, security against crime: these are human security concerns emerging around the world’.6 In short, more than 4. Heraldo Muñoz, Política internacional de los nuevos tiempos, p. 77, Santiago, Chile, Editorial Los Andes, 1996. 5. Heraldo Muñoz, ‘The environment in inter-American relations’, in Heraldo Muñoz (comp.), Environment and Diplomacy in the Americas, p. 3, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. 6. See the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) website at http:// hdr.undp.org/reports/ for summaries of the reports referred to here. 369 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 369 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile keeping the peace by military means, which continues to be necessary and a must in the post-Cold War world, what is important is to guarantee the security of human beings, with that being understood in its very widest sense. Consequently, the UNDP approach was well received. It suitably combined the agenda for peace with the agenda for economic and social development. Peace loomed as such a solitary feature that it had to be associated with other features. In this logic, the absence of outbreaks of war and increased stability would lead to less need for military purchases, which, in turn, would produce greater social development in the long term, reducing poverty and favouring respect for personal rights and the establishment of true democratic governments. There is a link between human rights, good governance, security, disarmament and development. Coordinated work of multilateral entities is essential in the pursuit of these objectives in order to optimize their always limited resources. The security concept set forth in the report was criticized for being too vast, for it covered economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.7 This reservation is a valid one, but it does not in any way prevent all aspects of security from being highlighted. Moreover, the tragic events in New York and Washington in September 2001, which have caused people to wonder about the root causes of terrorism, make it advisable to take, and justify taking, an all-embracing, comprehensive look at all ingredients of security. According to the above, then, the goals or aims of security must be established and accomplished more in terms of human than state needs; the agenda must be for and of the people. As Heraldo Muñoz so aptly pointed out in his speech at Lucerne during the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network: ‘Human security entails the need to ensure that people themselves experience a sense of security in their daily lives, which is very often different to state security.’ In this respect, anti-personnel mines, which were always considered weapons to defend a country’s territory regardless of the immense cost that their production, sale and use has for the life, health and physical integrity of civilian populations, is an apt illustration. By banning them, the Ottawa Convention (1997) therefore gave priority to people’s security over state security. 7. The term ‘human security’ was used in preparatory works for the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), but it is not mentioned in that Conference’s conclusions. 370 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 370 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chile and Human Security Juan Aníbal Barría The renovating change represented by human security has become increasingly more widespread in the region’s academic sector;8 it will slowly be incorporated into multilateral diplomatic language; it was proposed in speeches at Committees of the United Nations General Assembly in 1999,9 as well as in official speeches at the Millennium Summit;10 it was a primary issue at the 2000 General Assembly of the OAS in Windsor (Canada, 2000), one of the points on the agenda of the 14th Presidential Summit of the Rio Group, which took place in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia, 2000);11 it was referred to – briefly, one must admit – in the Political Declaration of the Third Summit of the Americas (Quebec, April 2001), and will progressively become a guiding issue in the foreign policy of such countries as Canada,12 Chile and Norway.13 8. See, for example, Donald J. Puchala and Morris J. Blachman, ‘Las organizaciones internacionales y la seguridad humana en América Latina’, in Olga Pellicer (comp.), La seguridad internacional en América Latina y el Caribe, Mexico, Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos, first edition, 1995. There are not many books on the subject in Spanish. 9. In the general debate of the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly on 6 October 1999, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, Ambassador Yukio Satoh, said that his country ‘was fighting for the international community to concentrate its attention more clearly on human security and, thereby, understand the meaning of human security in its widest sense’ (press release from the Japanese Mission). 10. Speaking at the opening of the Millennium Summit on 6 September 2000, President Clinton, without mentioning human security, referred to new challenges when he stated ‘... the UN was formed “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” ... but now we must find ways to protect people as well as borders. We must also work … to prevent conflict, recognizing the iron link between deprivation and war. … Too many nations face a tidal wave of infectious diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS, which cause one quarter of all deaths in the world ...’ (http://www.un.org/millennium/ webcast/statements/usa.htm). 11. In her work on ‘Los pueblos del Grupo de Río ante la cumbre del milenio’, María Soledad Alvear states, ‘We had the opportunity as a country to expound to Heads of State and Government the concept of human security, which pushes public policies towards a central concern for human beings. The best thing about this approach … is that it puts the targets of public actions on the same wavelength as the leaders … human security assumes and is committed to the clamour of people who want a suitable quality of life that meets their aspirations and resolves their uncertainties …’, in Revista diplomacia, No. 83, April–June 2000, p. 14. 12. One can read the declaration by Lloyd Axworthy on soft power, which he typifies as ‘a kind of touchy feely approach to international relations that emphasizes negotiation over confrontation, ‘human security’ over national security and the power of ideas over the power of weapons’, in the International Herald Tribune, 22 February 1999, in an article entitled ‘Ottawa’s new age diplomacy ruffles many feathers in Washington’. 13. Speech by Aslaug Marie Haga, Norway’s State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament, 18 February 1999, where she stated: ‘The issues of land mines and small arms demonstrate how important it is to address human security. This fact does not exclude the continued relevance of state security questions. Indeed, human security and state security are interrelated ... .’ 371 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 371 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Chile and the Human Security Network Chile, together with another twelve nations,14 make up the Human Security Network, an association which to date has held four ministerial meetings – in Bergen, Norway (1999), Lucerne, Switzerland (2000), Petra, Jordan (2001) and Santiago, Chile (2002). Austria will be the host country in 2003. In May 1998, the governments of Canada and Norway signed the ‘Lysøen Declaration’, in which their foreign ministers agreed to establish a framework for concerted consultation and action (ministerial meetings at least once a year, bilateral teams to develop and implement joint ministerial projects, parallel meetings in traditional or usual international conferences) and identified the following projects as being typical of a human security agenda: human rights, humanitarian international law, anti-personnel mines, International Criminal Court, child soldiers, child labour and small, light weaponry. At the 1998 General Assembly of the United Nations, the foreign ministers of Norway and Canada invited the foreign ministers of Austria, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand to set up an informal partnership to promote human security; this involved a group of like-minded countries. Other methodological agreements of interest, such as the absence of a fixed agenda, search for points of consensus and promotion of practical actions based on them, were also set up. The Network also encourages dialogue and cooperation with international organizations and nongovernment agencies with know-how and experience in specific human security issues. It must be specified that this is not an institutionalized referent. Until now, the host country for the ministerial meeting has assumed a kind of pro-tempore secretaryship, making known its preferred subject matters prior to the conference. Its foreign minister chairs the event and is responsible for drawing up the main document known as the ‘Chairman’s Summary’. Foreign ministers or vice-ministers participate in the proceedings, which normally last two days and are conducted in English. The ministerial meeting is preceded by preparatory sessions, which may take place in the host country or elsewhere. The UN General Assembly has also been a meeting point for the Network’s ministers – or top foreign office officials – so far showing tremendous practical usefulness and efficiency. 14. Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand. South Africa participated as an observer. (Greece and Mali were not part of the Network until 1999). 372 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 372 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chile and Human Security Juan Aníbal Barría As is well known, the interaction with NGOs of the countries making up the Network is one of its distinctive qualities. These entities are granted partner status and, hence, participate in ministerial and preparatory meetings via papers and research and work done with governments and international organizations. In this respect, Amnesty International, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, International Action Network on Small Arms, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, International Council on Human Rights Policy, Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, among others, may be mentioned. Through its director, Francisco Rojas, FLACSO-Chile has participated outstandingly in the ministerial meetings in Lucerne and Petra, and performed the same function of support and cooperation at the meeting in Chile. In Bergen, the Head of the Chilean Delegation, Ambassador Raimundo González, stated: ‘the decline of the bipolar scenario and the fall of ideological walls have fuelled a growing demand from people, citizens, for their governments and authorities to establish conditions that favour sustainable, integral development, for their security problems and need for dialogue and peace to be met, for their basic rights and guarantees to be respected and properly safeguarded. The vision of human security has emphasized a series of problems that all involve the vulnerability faced by man in our day and time, especially in violent situations. The common denominator in complex, apparently totally dissimilar issues, such as, for example, anti-personnel mines, illicit drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, children in wars and the International Criminal Court, is precisely the person, not the state … .’ He goes on to refer to work in the non-government, private world: ‘In accordance with this spirit of giving the individual more space, Chile considers it essential to strengthen and improve channels of communication between the public sector and civil society organizations in order to receive the latter’s contributions. Consequently, a wide field for closer, more wide-ranging mutual cooperation is opened … .’ Ambassador González made a methodological point in this speech, which must be remembered because it was reiterated by our representatives at the meetings in Lucerne and Petra. The point in question is this: ‘We do not want the subject matters included in human security to be so ambitious, covering so many issues, that they cannot be dealt with efficiently. Thus, we would prefer to concentrate 373 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 373 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile on a few more pressing issues, following them up properly, so we would suggest realistic tasks and activities that can feasibly be carried out within flexible temporary frameworks.’ In Lucerne, in turn, Heraldo Muñoz, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who headed the Chilean delegation, stated: ‘human security does not replace traditional security; rather it supplements it, adding the missing element as its primary concern. During the Cold War, addressing security issues meant referring to state security. There was an implicit premise, whereby a secure state presupposed secure citizens, a secure population. The concept of human security, however, now denotes that people’s security depends on factors that transcend states. The antithesis of security is insecurity, and insecurity threatens people from dimensions that are beyond the state’s effective control – such as transnational organized crime, large population displacements, etc.’ He added, ‘There is a different sense of insecurity that may seem less dramatic, but is no less important, given its human consequences. In fact, most people experience insecurity at a domestic level, at work, in their neighbourhoods, in their communities … . This type of insecurity does not receive much international attention … . We should acknowledge that these insignificant episodes of fear and insecurity, which affect our everyday lives, are the origin of the large-scale insecurity problems being experienced in our day and time. We have to tackle the small insecurities of everyday living. By doing so, we will prevent and definitively solve more serious cases of insecurity.’ He went on to say that Network members should actively lobby for human security within their own regional groups. (In this respect, Chile has spread the idea in the Rio Group.) He then stated that the Network should comment on specific serious situations that endangered the rights of people and contributed to a gradual deterioration of the basic freedoms of populations. He also said that, for the group to be more efficient, it would be appropriate to consider expanding it to include one or two states per region.15 The ideal size of the Network should be a subject for future reflection, as its success and dissemination would surely lead to pressure from states to join it. An initial agreement was reached that 15. It should be mentioned that, in his 1999 speech in Bergen, Ambassador González disclosed this criterion when he stated: ‘Chile … believes that, given the magnitude and seriousness of the challenges that lie before us, we should consider and, if applicable, agree to open up and expand our association to other members of the international community, which, sharing our ethical and legal values and principles, wish to cooperate and support the undertaking that we began in Norway.’ 374 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 374 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chile and Human Security Juan Aníbal Barría Latin America, Asia and Africa should have one more representative. Even though the Human Security Network was not born as a regionally balanced group, but rather as a like-minded group where doctrinal issues were concerned, the obvious imbalance between North and South is evident, so Southern presence should be strengthened. In any case, one must bear in mind that a group with many members makes discussion and decision-making much more difficult. One of the points made by Ambassador Mario Artaza, DirectorGeneral of Foreign Policy, who headed the Chilean delegation at the Third Ministerial Meeting in Petra, was the following: ‘We recognize the importance of continuing to focus our attention on existing links and opportunities between human security and human development. We believe that discussions should be geared towards developing action programmes for the Human Security Network in specific areas. From this point of view, we must continue with our talks on the importance of efforts to enhance the profile of human security issues by developing human security indicators or indices similar to those used for human development and by encouraging proper evaluations of the causes and consequences of human insecurity. We believe that human security and human development are different concepts and that a narrower definition of human security is conceptually and analytically more useful that a wider one.’ It is pertinent to highlight what President Ricardo Lagos stated in his article, ‘Chile in a changing world’, published in the first Spanish issue of Foreign Affairs (Spring 2001), to wit that ‘Chile is striving to take on its international responsibilities in a world marked by increasing interdependence, because there are tasks that are beyond the organizational capabilities of a single country, vast global goals that are now being set by humanity … Chile has joined the Human Security Network, in which our country, together with a small group of nations, is devoted to proposing measures that improve the world’s security conditions, not just for states but also very especially for people ...’ . Finally, and in order to ensure that the coherence of Chile’s position on this doctrine, which has been reasserted after the events in the United States in September 2001, is noted, the following was stated in the most recent plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly by Juan Gabriel Valdés, former Chilean Foreign Minister and current Ambassador to the United Nations: ‘… There will not be any solution to the problems that we face until we come to understand that terrorism dwells in the most dislocated spaces of our societies and kills from there.’ 375 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 375 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile This means that our concept of global security, mainly expressed in undoubtedly indispensable disarmament agreements, must of necessity also turn decisively to examining what we have termed ‘human security’.16 Some points for future Ministerial Meetings of the Network The main merit of the notion of human security is that it has made the needs, concerns and respect for the worth of the individual part of the international scenario. Consequently, foreign policy agendas must bear this philosophy, this preferred option, in mind, for states must protect and give security to their populations at all times and everywhere. However, what protection and what security are we talking about? An answer that delimits its boundaries and establishes its true dimensions is essential. The more or less precise coordinates of human security will have to be determined in the short or medium term. Coevally, human security must be distinguished from other notions and terms to which it is related, basically that of human development. Where does one start and the other end? How are they joined together or how could they be intertwined? These are just some of the questions that arise. Given the above, perhaps the first major conceptual effort that must be made is to typify the concept with a view to adopting a Letter, Commitment or Declaration of the Basic Principles of Human Security. This document could be discussed and approved in future ministerial meeting. The ultimate aim would be to take it to the UN General Assembly for its proclamation via a resolution. This is a route that must be explored carefully, because negotiating a text of that calibre takes time. Now, what form would it take? First of all, it would have to start by defining the concept, saying that to receive protection is an inalienable right of every human being, of his or her person, family and goods, as well as every country. It would have to be drawn up in such a way that it safeguarded human beings from traditional physical threats, as well as from new dangers and causes of insecurity. The suitability of drawing up a catalogue of the most frequent insecurity theories in the contemporary world could be reflected on here. Then the importance 16. See full text of the speech in Session Document A/56/166, ‘Medidas para eliminar el terrorismo internacional’ (http://www.un.int/chile/Discursos/disc20011001). 376 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 376 25/04/2003, 12:55 Chile and Human Security Juan Aníbal Barría of people as the core subjects of security would have to be emphasized, clearly and specifically pointing out their aspirations and demands in a realistic, feasible framework. This would have to be done, of course, without neglecting what we put forward about a right – perhaps incipient in an initial phase – of the people. Some social groups or sectors that are particularly vulnerable in emergency situations or conflicts would have to be identified and paid more attention. The commitments that states must assume in order to draw up public policies and programmes geared towards human security would have to be established. Internationally, states would have to encourage cooperation with a view to mutual support in dealing with the challenges of human security. Space would also have to be devoted to international agencies, so that they could incorporate this perspective into their agendas. The same would be true of NGOs and civil society, which have much to contribute on human security initiatives. That would be the first step. The next would be to create an index, with its respective verification mechanisms. This has been done with the ‘right to development’, which is a good paradigm for this purpose. In fact, the UNDP launched its first annual Human Development Report in 1990, introducing the Human Development Index, which was the first international attempt to measure and evaluate the situation of countries around the world based on additional parameters to simple economic growth and, thereby, set up a method of measurement that would evaluate a country’s level of development from a multidimensional perspective. The index uses a ‘complex set of indicators to create a single human development indicator per country or region. Its novelty is that it measures socio-economic progress over the years, thereby making it possible to evaluate, criticize and improve government policies in those areas. The index establishes a minimum and a maximum for each dimension and shows what sectors of development are priority sectors for each country, as well as in terms of the relationship between countries. Thus, the index makes it easier to determine priorities of a particular state policy with regard to the economy, social investments and evaluate them over the years …’ .17 Some suggestions on methodologies are presented below. The Human Security Network is obviously responsible for taking care of the proliferation of new problems connected to individual vulnerability, which have a very high profile in world public opinion. It must be selective in making its choices, however, preferably devoting its energies to those neglected segments that require priority action. 17. Virgina Trimarco, ‘El aporte del PNUD a la promoción del derecho al desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe’, in El sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos en el umbral del siglo XXI, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Vol. 1, p. 648. 377 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 377 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Its proposed solutions and initiatives must then be both specific and viable. An exhaustive catalogue of initiatives would lead nowhere and could be frustrating when not all of them could be examined. Nor would it be efficient to duplicate the work of multilateral agencies by dealing with given issues on several fronts at the same time. Thus, devoting a ministerial meeting to evaluating two or three issues – and agreeing to tasks regarding them – is positive, because it provides for more enriching dialogue and the fruit of this exchange of ideas and observations can lead to specific expressions. Agreeing to a common platform for working in multilateral contexts, which uses human security profiles as a point of reference, is a methodology that should be constant and paramount in the Network. This Network, we must remember, was set up precisely to work and act efficiently. It is important, finally, for the Network to achieve international impact. In our opinion, it lacks presence in multilateral forums, which are its natural framework and where by preference it should pour out its proposals. The countries making up this Network should involve international agencies, especially those of a financial nature, and commit them to human security as an inspiration for their activities. In these times when, as we stated at the outset, concern for human beings is becoming increasingly more important and influential, human security as a philosophy and working proposal seems both attractive and appropriate. When it is understood that many of the roots of the insecurity and vulnerability of people and societies are not exclusively military in origin, then it is healthy to take a look at a kind of security that has different ingredients and elements. 378 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 378 25/04/2003, 12:55 DOCUMENTS Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 379 25/04/2003, 12:55 HUMAN SECURITY: PEOPLE AS THE MAIN BENEFICIARIES OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICIES 1 H.E. Ms MARÍA SOLEDAD ALVEAR VALENZUELA I would like to thank FLACSO-Chile and UNESCO for their willingness to work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in organizing this important seminar on ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean’. For our part, we complied with our commitment to foster, together with nongovernmental actors, new policies and initiatives that would allow us to approach international security issues with an emphasis on people. This new focus has become particularly relevant in recent times, when the so-called ‘new threats to security’ are riveting the attention of the whole world. Let us remember that in 1997 Canada and Norway launched the idea of setting up a Human Security Network and an arrangement was signed at Lysøen Island (Norway) in 1998; then in 1999 several countries from different regions of the world – including Chile – were invited to take part in a joint project. This Network has garnered a great deal of success, such as international cooperation in the campaign to eradicate landmines. 1. Opening statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile at the Expert Meeting on 'Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean', Santiago, Chile, 26-27 November 2001. Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 381 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile As a member of the Network, Chile is attempting to apply the same energy and commitment to a wide variety of situations that threaten the right of individuals both to lead their lives free from fear and to have their most elemental needs satisfied. In fact, human security for our country is not only linked to a humanitarian view of conflicts but also to the outcry of people, wherever they might live, for a decent quality of life that meets their aspirations and provides a response to their uncertainties. Therefore, our conviction is that peace is directly related to the opportunities men and women have to lead a better life. For this reason, we emphasize that for us the highest degree of human security will be attained only when we seriously consider people as the main beneficiaries of national and international public policies. Action taken by the Human Security Network During its short life, the Human Security Network has cooperated with the United Nations in its efforts to foster and emphasize the need to protect civilians, especially women and children, as well as in other topics directly related to the prevention of international conflicts. In this sense, then, during the three previous ministerial meetings in Norway, Switzerland and Jordan, humanitarian considerations have been examined from different perspectives. This approach will continue during the Fourth Ministerial Meeting that will take place in our country next July. Chile has proposed contributing to the development of this topic, addressing it from a regional point of view, thus making this seminar particularly interesting for the future endeavours of the Network in Latin America and the Caribbean. Using a flexible, informal approach, we have been able to identify specific areas for collective action and to attract international attention to such emerging topics as respect for and compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law and human rights within the present international context, the latter aspects having come rapidly to the forefront after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the ensuing international action in Afghanistan. 382 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 382 25/04/2003, 12:55 Human Security: People as the Main... H.E. Ms María Soledad Alvear Valenzuela Links to specific topics Chile, the sole Latin American member of this informal group, has proposed an approach to international security issues that links them to specific topics such as human development, human rights education, humanitarian law and the elaboration of public security policies that reflect a reinforced notion of international security, wherein human security really prevails. We are concerned about such serious problems as the indiscriminate effects of anti-personnel mines or the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as well as the participation of children in armed conflicts. These have been specifically addressed by the Human Security Network in an effort to define clear-cut areas of action where solutions are identified that confront the complex realities posed by such problems. In this respect, we deem that this objective may be achieved if there is a bonding of academic, political and humanitarian points of view, as has already taken place in the formation of a number of coalitions of governments and of several non-governmental actors. The challenge is particularly relevant when it comes to creating international instruments that compel states to take concrete action. One clear example of this is the Ottawa Convention banning landmines, ratified by Chile on 10 September 2001. The world scenario, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the international reaction of unreserved condemnation and counterattack that they produced, has shown the extreme insecurity to which very different and distant places around the world are submitted today. Latin America and the Caribbean is a geographic reference point of huge human, economic and cultural proportions with increasing worldwide connections. Recently, an ever more homogeneous group of countries has been coalescing which shares basic values and principles, founded on democracy, respect for human rights and mitigation of inequalities. In this context, human security underlies any concept or system aiming to effectively build a more developed and stable society. This is so because, as mentioned previously, the security of nations is far more than the absence of belligerent conflicts. Social peace requires that the gap between rich and poor does not widen. We cannot remain indifferent to the fact that, despite the efforts expended, 383 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 383 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile between 1990 and 1999 those living below the poverty line in Latin America increased by 11 million, as can be observed in the latest report issued by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). There are 211 million impoverished persons in Latin America, of which somewhat more than 89 million are found to be below the poverty line. To this we must add that, between 1990 and 1999, the number of unemployed persons in Latin America rose from 7.6 million to 18.1 million and job quality deteriorated. The danger we are facing now is that the new international situation will cause these figures to rise to new heights. The concept of human security thus requires each country to consistently aim to improve people’s quality of life, thus fostering a series of elements in domestic policies that go beyond the traditional concept of security. In this area, our action should follow a dual course: on the one hand, internally, care should be taken that state agents and bodies are reliable, pervaded with the higher values of social co-existence and a vocation for service and, on the other hand, internationally, action must be taken to strengthen international systems for protecting basic human rights and to increase solidarity, allowing those countries facing the most serious problems to find a way out of their weakened situations. The challenges, then, are enormous. Recently, within the framework of the UN General Assembly in New York, I had the opportunity of meeting the foreign affairs ministers of the member countries of the Network. As host of the forthcoming ministerial meeting, I coordinated an interesting debate that promises a successful and fruitful outcome. The endeavours that you are undertaking will without a doubt make a significant contribution to our debates in July because, if there is one thing that characterizes the Network, it is the joint work of governments and organized civil society. For this reason, we look forward with great interest to your contributions. 384 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 384 25/04/2003, 12:55 PARTICIPANTS AT THE EXPERT MEETING ON ‘PEACE, HUMAN SECURITY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN’ Rómulo Aitken Hellec Chilean Police Chief Sub-Inspector Organized Crime General Mackenna 1314 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6728026 / 5445048 E-mail:[email protected] Gilberto Cristián Aranda Bustamante Ministry of the Interior Public Security and Information Analyst Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-5555588 E-mail: [email protected] Bernardo Arévalo de León FLACSO-Guatemala / WSAP International Area Coordinator of Security Studies / Latin American Representative 5ª Avenida 6-23, zona 9 Ciudad de Guatemala, 01009, Guatemala, C.A. Tel: +502-3629240 E-mail: [email protected] Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 385 Carlos Basombrío Ministry of the Interior Special Coordinating Commission on National Police Restructurization Plaza 30 de Agosto s/n, 4° piso, Corpec, San Isidro Lima, Peru Tel: +51-1-2244542 / 7501397 E-mail: [email protected] Gustavo E. Basso Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE) Head of Security and Defense Course Eliodoro Yañez 2760, Providencia Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2315021, ext. 23 Raúl Benítez Manaut UNAM-Mexico Researcher CIIH-UNAM Torre II de Humanidades, Piso 9 Ciudad Universitaria 04510 DF, Mexico Tel: +52-53-56230303 Fax: +52-53-52501255 E-mail: [email protected] 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile Adrián Bonilla FLACSO-Ecuador Academic Sub-Director Paez N° 19-26 y Av. Patria Quito, Ecuador Tel: +59-3-22528200 / 99711669 E-mail: [email protected] Claude Bruderlein Harvard University, HPCR Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 1033 Massachusetts Ave. 4th Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Tel: +1-617-4968640 E-mail: [email protected] Laura Chinchilla Public Security and Police Consultant San José, Costa Rica Tel: +506-2823111 Fax: +506-2432078 E-mail: [email protected] Jorge Da Silva FLACSO-Brazil / UERJ Professor Rua Luiz de Mattas 86-Fonesca Niteroi-RJ 24120-220, Brazil Tel: +55-21-26256462 / -8610 E-mail: [email protected] Mireya Dávila Presidency of the Republic Public Policy Advisor Alameda 1515, of. 92 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6904770 E-mail: [email protected] Enrique d’Etigny Ministry of Foreign Affairs Scientific Advisor Catedral 1143 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6980301 / 6885137 E-mail: [email protected] Raúl Elgueta González Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sub-Director, DIPESP Department CTO-CIE Catedral 1143, 2 piso Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6794452 E-mail: [email protected] Renán Fuentealba Ministry of Defense International Advisor Villavicencio 364 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6322968 E-mail: [email protected] Claudia Fuentes J. FLACSO-Chile Researcher Av. Dag Hammarskjöld 3269, Vitacura Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2900200 E-mail: [email protected] Hugo Frühling Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CED) Area Coordinator of Citizen Safety Nueva de Lyon 128, Providencia Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2311953 / 2312723 Moufida Goucha UNESCO Chief, Section of Philosophy and Human Sciences Division of Foresight, Philosophy and Human Sciences 386 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 386 25/04/2003, 12:55 Participants at the Expert Meeting on ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict... 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France Tel: +33-1-45684552 Fax: +33-1-45685552 E-mail: [email protected] Eduardo Gutiérrez Universidad para la Paz Regional Advisor for Latin America Plaza Libertad 1356 / 803 Montevideo, Uruguay Tel: +598-2-9031443 E-mail: [email protected] Carlos Gutiérrez Palacios Universidad ARCIS Center for Strategic Studies Director Moneda 1490 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-3866515 E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Alejandro Pablo Iturra Gamarra Universidad ARCIS Center for Strategic Studies Member Researcher / Head of Defense-Security Crisantemos 995, Providencia Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-3355767 / 3358011 E-mail: [email protected] Alain Joxe École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales Director of Studies 54, boulevard Raspail Paris, France E-mail: [email protected] Hal Klepak Department of History Professor Department of History Royal Military College of Canada Kingston, Ontario, K7K 5LO, Canada Tel: +1-613-5416000, ext. 6615 E-mail: [email protected] Miriam Kornblith Universidad Central de Venezuela Institute for Political Studies Institute for Higher Studies of Administration Researcher and Professor Edificio IESA, Calle IESA San Bernardino Caracas 1010, Venezuela Tel: +58-212-5520056 E-mail: [email protected] Margaret Kowalsky Harvard University Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, HPCR 1033 Massachusetts Ave. 4th Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Tel: +1-617-3847407 E-mail: [email protected] Thierry Lemaresquier Residential Representative in Chile of the United Nations Development Programme Av. Dag Hammarskjöld 3241, Vitacura Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-3372400 E-mail: [email protected] Alejandra V. Liriano FLACSO-Dominican Republic Area Coordinator of Security and 387 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 387 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile International Relations Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Tel: +1-809-6863675 E-mail: [email protected] Tte. Coronel Sergio Lizana Carrasco Chilean Army (CESIM) Head of Academic Extension Department Bandera 52 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-4501916 / 4501918 E-mail: [email protected] Elsa Llenderrozas Universidad de Buenos Aires Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Libertad 471 1641 Acassuso Buenos Aires, Argentina Tel: +54-11-47987014 Fax: +54-11-47987014 E-mail: [email protected] Ernesto López Universidad Nacional de Quilmes Director of Armed Forces and Society Research Program Vice-Principal of Institutional Relations Roque Saenz Peña 180, (1876) Bernal, Prov. de Buenos Aires, Argentina Tel: +54-11-43657100 E-mail: [email protected] Jeffrey Marder Canadian Embassy Second Secretary Nueva Tajamar 481, piso 12 Torre Norte, Edificio World Trade Center, Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-3629660, ext. 3251 E-mail: [email protected] David R. Mares University of California, San Diego Professor 5018 Bristol Road San Diego, CA 92116, USA Tel: +1-858-5344205 E-mail: [email protected] Claudia Maresia UNESCO Section of Philosophy and Human Sciences Division of Foresight, Philosophy and Human Sciences 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France Tel: +33-1-45684554 Fax: +33-1-45685552 E-mail: [email protected] Manuela Mesa Center for Peace Research (CIP) Peace and Development Coordinator Duque de Sesto 40, Entreplanta 28009 Madrid, Spain Tel: +34-91-7511789 / 5763299 E-mail: [email protected] Paz V. Milet FLACSO-Chile Area Coordinator of International Relations and Strategic Studies Av. Dag Hammarskjöld 3269, Vitacura Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2900200 E-mail: [email protected] M. Francisca Möller U. Center for Strategic Studies of the Chilean Navy Av. Pedro León Gallo s/n Valparaíso, Chile 388 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 388 25/04/2003, 12:55 Participants at the Expert Meeting on ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict... Tel: +56-32-281981 E-mail: [email protected] Tel: +55-21-22759903 E-mail: [email protected] David Mutimer Center for International and Security Studies, York University Acting Director / Assistant Professor of Political Science 4700 Keele Sr. Toronto Ontario M3J IP3, Canada Tel: +1-416-7365156 E-mail: [email protected] Juan Ramón Quintana Ministry of Defense Political Defense Analysis Unit Director Calle Pedro Salazar 676 Sopocabli, La Paz, Bolivia Tel: +591-2-2422589 E-mail: [email protected] Cristóbal Ortiz Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Policy Division Catedral 1147, piso 2 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6792388 Fax: +56-2-6984722 E-mail: [email protected] Hugo Ernesto Palma Valderrama Peruvian Center for International Studies (CEPEI) Researcher Av. J. Pezet 1165 Lima 27, Peru Tel: +51-1-4427633 / 9423201 E-mail: [email protected] Carlos Portales C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Planning Director Catedral 1158 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-67944221 / -2 E-mail: [email protected] Domício Proença Júnior Universidades do Brasil (UFRJ) Professor R. Barata Ribeira 184 AP 903 22011-000 Rio de Janiero RJ, Brazil Ricardo G. Rojas Ministry of Foreign Affairs Planning Division First Secretary Catedral 1158, of. 203 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6794221 E-mail: [email protected] Francisco Rojas Aravena FLACSO-Chile Director Av. Dag Hammarskjöld 3269, Vitacura Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2900200 E-mail: [email protected] Víctor Rojas Martínez Chilean Civil Defense Director-General Vergara 135 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6995304 E-mail: [email protected] Marcelo Fabián Sain Universidad Nacional de Quilmes Professor-Researcher Roque Saenz Peña 180, (1876) Bernal Prov. de Buenos Aires, Argentina Tel: +54-11-43657100 / 47932853 389 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 389 25/04/2003, 12:55 UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Andrés Serbin CRIES / Universidad de Belgrano President / Director of CECRE Montevideo 1488, 6° piso Capital Federal 1018, Argentina Tel: +54-11-4817458 E-mail: [email protected] Patricio Silva University of Leiden Professor Wassenaarseweg 52 PO Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden The Netherlands Tel: +31-71-5273471 / 5273485 E-mail: [email protected] Luís Guillermo Solís Rivera FUNPADEM-Costa Rica Conflict, Cooperation and the Environment Programme Director Apdo Postal 12835-1000 San José, Costa Rica E-mail: [email protected] Vera Lucia Teixeira Da Silva Universidad do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Professor Rua Luiz de Mattos 86-Fonseca-Niterói 24.120.220, RJ, Brazil Tel: +55-21-26256462 / 8610 E-mail: [email protected] Francois Theron South African Embassy Advisor Av. 11 de septiembre 2353, p. 17 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2312862 Arlene B. Tickner Universidad de los Andes Center for International Studies Director Carrera 1 Este N°18 A-10 Bogotá, Colombia Tel: +57-1-3394949, ext. 3348 / 3344 E-mail: [email protected] Juan Gabriel Tokatlian Universidad de San Andrés Director of Political Science and International Relations Vito Dumas 284, Victoria 1644 Prov. de Buenos Aires, Argentina Tel: +54-11-47257091 E-mail: [email protected] Paolo Tripodi Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Professor, Defense Studies Campus San Joaquín Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-3547818 E-mail: [email protected] Tracy Tuplin FLACSO-Argentina Project Management Ayacucho 551, (1026) CF Buenos Aires, Argentina Tel: +54-11-47969583 E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Joaquín Urzúa Ricke CEADE Academic Secretary La Cabaña 711, Las Condes Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2159403 E-mail: [email protected] 390 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 390 25/04/2003, 12:55 Participants at the Expert Meeting on ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict... Patricio Valdivieso Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Institute for Political Science Professor Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul Casilla 306, Correo 22 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-3547825 / 3547805 E-mail: [email protected] Diego Velasco Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Policy Division Catedral 1147, piso 2 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6794393 Fax: +56-2-6794340 E-mail: [email protected] Julio Von Chrismer Escuti National Academy of Strategical Political Studies (ANEPE) Professor, Editor Política y Estrategia Av. Eliodoro Yáñez 2760, Providencia Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-2315021 Luis Winter Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Policy Director Catedral 1147, piso 2 Santiago, Chile Tel: +56-2-6794374 E-mail: [email protected] 391 Seguridad Humana inglés.P65 391 25/04/2003, 12:55
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