Third Parties and Legislative Productivity: The Role of Moderate Conflict
Scot Schraufnagel
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL
[email protected]
Johnathan Peterson
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL
[email protected]
Lawrence C. Dodd
Department of Political Science
University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida
[email protected]
Paper prepared for presentation at the Western Political Science Association annual conference.
Portland, Oregon – March 22-24, 2012. Our joint appreciation to Mathew Venaas and James
Carter for their help in collecting data analyzed in this paper. Additionally, Dodd expresses
appreciation to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for support that aided his
contributions to the paper.
Abstract
The research elaborates theory to suggest third parties, in a two-party dominant system,
might be expected to prompt legislative productivity if they moderate the level of major party
conflict. For instance, if a third party exacerbates major party conflict when it is too low and
attenuates major party conflict when it is too high, the party ought to be able to accomplish some
of its legislative agenda. Conversely, if the third party pushes legislative conflict to either polar
extreme their effect on the legislative process will be minimal. The theory is tested by
examining five third parties that gained representation in the U.S. Congress in the 19th and early
20th century. To advance testing of this theory a new measure of landmark legislative
productivity is created, along with a novel means of determining whether third parties added or
took away from major party tension. The findings comport well with expectations in each of the
five cases.
1
Introduction
The normative motivation for this research is effective legislative processes. In mass
democratic societies it is easy to imagine the need for the legislature to produce significant
legislation to address the pressing issues of any time. Yet, we know that democratic legislatures
are often deadlocked and unable to act when circumstances suggest the need for action. Because
democratic legislative process is normally defined by the workings of political parties, a logical
place to start any elucidation of stalemate, it seems, would be the study of partisan relationships.
To this end, this research develops a theory that defines the relative level of major party conflict
in a two-party dominant system which might be most effective. This research then tests whether
third political parties are able to influence the legislative process in a manner that fosters this
character of major party conflict. Most specifically, the research tests whether third parties that
aggravate major party conflict when it is too low, or assuage conflict when it is too high, will be
associated with significant legislative achievement.
Assuredly smaller ―third parties‖1 will not have the votes to directly muscle their agenda
through the legislative process. Hence, any effort to test whether third political parties can be, or
are, associated with significant legislative accomplishment must identify an indirect causal
mechanism. Indeed, scholars for years have suggested that third parties are associated with
significant legislation via an agenda setting role.2 Missing in this literature, however, has been
the elaboration of a more specific causal argument and empirical testing. This work seeks to
1
The term ―third‖ party in this manuscript is used to represent minor parties; parties that are not one of the major
parties that routinely compete for majority party status.
2
Murray S. Stedman, Jr., and Susan W. Stedman, Discontent at the Polls: A Study of Farmer and Labor Prties
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), v-vi; Russell & Russell, William B. Hesseltine, Rise and Fall of
Third Parties (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Publishing, 1957), 9-10; John F. Bibby, and L. Sandy Maisel Two
Parties-or More: The American Party System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).
2
rectify this lapse in theory development, and testing, through a case study analysis of five third
parties that gained representation in the U.S. Congress in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
An incomplete causal argument for third party legislative success suggests these
organizations are agenda setters. An intuitive causal thread might suggest: third party attention
to a legislative matter increases issue saliency, causing increased public demand, and consequent
legislative action. A logical extension of this argument suggests third parties with more electoral
success or greater representation in the legislature would be the most successful. Alternatively,
one might imagine third parties with popular or well-known leaders will be most likely to
associate with significant legislative accomplishments. As this research moves forward to test a
theory of third party conflict moderation, it will be important to control for the size of third
parties and the presence of well-known third party leaders.
Moving forward, it is important to acknowledge we only have speculation that third
parties are associated with significant legislative achievement. Moreover, if it is true that third
parties can be facilitators of legislative productivity we have an incomplete understanding of the
causal mechanism. Intuitive arguments that might help define third party success are notably
untested. With this backdrop this research elaborates a wholly new theoretical approach,
embracing the prospect that successful third parties may be conflict moderators in a two-party
dominant system. If this argument is collaborated, the conditions by which third parties might be
facilitators of legislative achievement, in a two-party system, will come into better focus.
We begin with a more complete elaboration of the theoretical argument, move to measurement
strategies, and finish with the empirical case study analyses.
The Polarity Paradox: Third Parties, Moderation, and Legislative Productivity
3
In using ―productivity‖ as a dependent variable, it is clear the type of productivity must
be considered. In theory, a democratic legislature may be populated by a cohesive group of busy
bodies who routinely pass laws in a sinister manner to control the society they represent. This
level of productivity, perhaps measured as a count of new intrusive laws, would suggest the
legislature is too efficient and that additional checks on legislative authority are in order. On the
other hand, it is not difficult to imagine, in a mass democratic society, there will be times when
the legislature will be faced with monumental problems whose attention is vital to the effective
functioning of society. If the later is the case, the legislative output would likely be viewed
reflectively as significant or even ―landmark.‖ In an attempt to hone in on meaningful legislative
productivity, as opposed to simply the volume of output, this work will make landmark
legislative achievement our dependent variable and our focus. Our specific measurement
strategy will be elaborated below, suffice it to say for now that when we seek to tie third parties
to legislative achievement we will set a fairly high standard.
The theoretical underpinning of our causal argument about landmark legislative
accomplishment starts from the premise that the capacity of any legislature depends significantly
on the character and regulation of conflict within the institution. Substantial and sustained
landmark productivity requires a legislative workplace that fosters real policy contestation
characterized by serious conflict, so that difficult policy problems can be brought to its attention.
But the legislature must then maintain internal conflict within moderate parameters to avoid
institutional meltdown and enable deliberative policy-making to proceed. Seen in this manner,
legislatures experience a polarity paradox, with too little, as well as too much conflict hindering
landmark productivity. The enactment of important laws ought to come amidst moderate
conflict.
4
To illustrate, the Democratic and Republican Parties in the U.S. have varied in their
levels of inter-party disagreement over time, but also their intra-party homogeneity. Indeed, in
many respects these are related concepts. Given two major political parties, if one party is
heterogeneous in its policy preferences this might easily result in overlap with the opposition
party, reducing inter-major party conflict. On the other hand, if the major parties are internally
homogeneous this might prevent similarity between the two parties and inter-party
distinctiveness and conflict would be more prevalent. In distinguishing the level and character of
conflict that exists between major political parties scholars have taken to analyzing what is
commonly referred to as party polarization, or more specifically, party distinctiveness in voting
behavior. Polarization may result from more intra-party homogeneity, more inter-party
difference, or both.3
The level of major party polarization is seen as a central factor shaping the intensity of
conflict in the U.S. Congress and the logic of politics that dominates policy-making in
legislatures, broadly speaking.4 As a legislature moves from low inter-party polarization to high
inter-party polarization it moves from a context in which intra-party differences dominate policy
making, amidst substantial inter-party similarities, to a context in which inter-party differences
dominate policy making, amidst substantial intra-party similarities. Party polarization can thus be
seen as a continuum from low to high with the center of that continuum representing a realm of
3
Steven S. Smith, and Gerald Gamm, ―The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress,‖ in Congress
Reconsidered, 9th Edition, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 2009).
4
Joseph Cooper, and David W. Brady, ―Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from
Cannon to Rayburn,‖ American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 411-25; David W. Rohde, Parties and
Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Gary W. Cox, and
Mathew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda. Responsible Party Government in the US House of
Representatives (Cambridge, MA and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Keith Poole, and
Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997); Steven S. Smith, and Gerald Gamm, ―The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress.‖
5
moderate polarization. As one moves across the continuum, intra-party differences are normally
declining while inter-party differences are increasing. This research is suggesting the middle of
the polarization spectrum, provides the best opportunity for policy productivity.
When thinking about the relationship between third political parties and landmark policy
making it is helpful to differentiate the character of conflict that exists between the major parties
in the manner just described. Specifically, intra-party difference and its accompanied lack of
inter-party distinctiveness suggest the possibility that there will not be sufficient structuring of
conflict to create meaningful policy options. Third political parties, in this instance, might
appear as mavericks or outsiders with little stake in the status quo of inactivity. Their stranger
status might allow them to stimulate meaningful policy debate and prompt a consequential
legislative agenda, especially if they are more aligned, ideological, with one or the other major
parties in a way that creates greater a larger voting bloc. Alternatively, intense inter-party
conflict between major parties often spurs elaborate and sophisticated use of obstructionist
tactics by the minority party to prevent majority rule and consequent productivity.5 In this
instance, third parties might serve as moderators, members who are divorced from the passion of
intense inter-major party rivalry, a rational voice each major party might seek to hear as they
attempt to forge allegiances or simply escape the drama of intense major party contestation.
To be certain, the theory being offered about aggregate levels of major party conflict and
policy productivity is most relevant if the party system is two-party dominant. A two dominant
political party legislative arrangement creates relatively straightforward arguments about the role
of partisan conflict in the legislative process. For instance, under conditions of two-party
dominance and a depolarized legislative process there is a simple yet critical problem for
5
Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress (Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press, 1997), Chapter 6.
6
generating landmark productivity. Because of heightened intra-party conflict and negligible
inter-party discord minimal differences will exist over public policy between the two major
parties, while substantial policy conflict will exist within each party. In such a situation no clear
and opposing tilt exists to partisan division over policy on behalf of which the articulation of
distinct party policy positions might occur. Such a scenario may have an underlying disquiet,
but nonetheless is unproductive because it is too easy to simply ignore problems because there
are no consistent preferences within the majority party and no loyal opposition to hold the
process accountable.
Yet there is a second problem for productivity in a depolarized setting. In the face of
intra-party conflicts over policy, rank-and-file party members will be hesitant to give party
leaders procedural and organizational power that might be used to identify, construct, and pursue
a partisan agenda, lest these powers be used to pressure members to support policy positions
against their personal commitments and electoral interests. Thus, while the major parties might
be close enough in ideological and policy terms to compromise and enact landmark legislation,
and close enough in size that neither can presume to enact policies on their own without
compromise, they have no policies to debate owing to inter-party agreement, intra-party
conflicts, and leaders without the authority to construct differential policy agendas, negotiate
compromise, and push the enactment of legislation.
Looking beyond the depolarization scenario, what should we expect under a condition of
intense or high major party polarization? Now, policy differences will exist between the major
parties while great policy agreement will exist within each of the parties. In such a situation a
clear and opposing tilt exists between the major parties so they will have many policy differences
to articulate and contest. Each party’s members are sufficiently cohesive in their agreement on
7
policies that they may be willing to give their leaders great procedural and organizational powers
to pursue these differential policies.6 In principle, a united majority would seem able to vote
down a united minority and enact its legislative agenda.
Yet, even in a single legislative chamber there are often multiple stages to the policymaking process, with each stage requiring majority support. The need for concurrent majorities,
mathematically, determines the need for a supermajority level of approval. As it relates to the
U.S. Congress procedures can be so complex that a united minority can easily obstruct the
majority in meaningful ways. This induces the need for inter-party compromise and negotiation
on procedural issues and even on policy content. Obstructionism, of course, is magnified by
bicameralism. In the U.S. Senate, rules require a supermajority for policy enactment. In the 21st
century, the Senate still honors the norm of unlimited debate or filibuster and three-fifths of the
entire body, currently 60 votes, is required to kill a minority party hold on legislation. Under
conditions of hyper-major party polarization, defined by strict two-party discipline, and no crossparty commitments, the legislative process will shut down. Majority parties are simply not large
enough to get their way.
And there is a second problem for productivity under conditions of high polarization or
hyper-conflict in a democratic legislature. Homogeneous political parties often mean more
ideological extreme party members. These members may have been elected in bitter partisan
elections; having come out victorious, members may assume they have a mandate for their
ideological agenda. These individuals, when confronted with the need to compromise in order to
6
For a discussion of the relationship between party homogeneity and the relative strength of political party leaders
see the work on ―Conditional Party Government‖ by David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform
House; John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, ―The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the
Electoral Connection,‖ in Congress Reconsidered, 7th Edition, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd, and Bruce I. Oppenheimer
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001).
8
enact policies, may oppose doing so because they promised constituents to deliver on a precise
partisan agenda. Moreover, because the majority party’s leaders will have been given great
powers to deliver on the party’s agenda, they will not want to water down the party program lest
they dilute their support. For their part, minority party members may oppose compromise in
anticipation that a great defeat of the majority party on critical policy issues may mobilize the
minority’s base and aid capture of the legislature in the next election cycle. To those who have
followed closely the workings of the contemporary U.S. Congress this storyline should resonate
well.
Thus, while the parties operating in a legislature with extreme major party polarization
may be far enough apart to articulate distinct policy agendas and cohesive enough to give their
leaders significant powers with which to pursue a partisan agenda, the complex realities of
congressional politics may impose on them a need to compromise that is likely to be thwarted by
rank-and-file members of the parties. Given this scenario, the enactment of landmark legislation
becomes difficult as majority party members are too sure of themselves to be willing to
compromise and minority legislators see majority party legislative accomplishment as a
stumbling block to their future electoral success.
Given the expectation that third parties might be able to moderate legislative conflict and
previous research that suggests moderate conflict is most conducive to landmark legislative
productivity,7 it seems prudent to move forward by carefully looking for empirical evidence to
either confirm or reject this thesis. Anytime an attempt is made to test a particular theory,
measurement assumptions must be made that will need to be scrutinized. Specifically, in the
7
For work that measures the effect of moderate legislative conflict on meaningful legislative productivity,
irrespective of any role played by third parties, see Lawrence C. Dodd, and Scot Schraufnagel, ―Congress, Civility
and Legislative Productivity: A Historical Perspective.‖
9
research design offered below it is necessary to discuss and cautiously choose a level of
meaningful third party representation in the legislative process, to prudently establish a measure
of landmark legislative accomplishment, and to ascertain the nature of major party conflict that
existed when third party members arrived on the legislative scene.
Measurement Strategies
There has been considerable academic effort to produce statistical models capable of
illuminating legislative stalemate and/or productivity in the U.S. Congress.8 Rather than produce
another statistical test of variables that may determine legislative productivity in an era of third
party success when data is sparse this research will use a case study approach. Specifically, third
parties that reach a minimum level of representation in Congress will be studied to determine
whether the issues they relate to were addressed by Congress when the third party was serving in
the national legislature. Moreover, the third party agenda items must be addressed by laws that
retrospective judgment has deemed ―landmark‖ legislation. It will also be necessary to measure
the relevant level of major policy conflict that existed when the third party showed itself in the
national legislature. With these measurement strategies in hand we can then test whether third
parties who moderate conflict are legislatively successful, while unsuccessful third parties
pushed legislative conflict to either polar extreme.
Measuring Third Party Involvement in Congress
8
There has been a great deal of scholarly attention to the issue of legislative gridlock. For a sampling of this
literature see, Patricia A. Hurley, ―Assessing the Potential for Significant Legislative Output in the House of
Representatives,‖ Western Political Quarterly 32 (1979): 45-58; David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party
Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990; Sean Q. Kelly, ―Divided We Govern: A Reassessment,‖ Polity
25 (1993): 475-84; George C. Edwards III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake, ―The Legislative Impact of Divided
Government,‖ American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 545-63; David W. Brady, and Craig Volden,
Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Carter to Clinton (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); John J.
Coleman, ―Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness,‖ American Political Science
Review 93 (1999): 821-35; William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann, ―Divided
Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94,‖ Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (2000):285312; David R. Jones, ―Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock,‖ Political Research Quarterly 54 (2001): 125-41;
Sarah Binder, Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96.
10
The process for measuring viable third parties was initiated by first considering some
minimum level of third party electoral success to study. Although it is possible that the mere
presence of third parties in electoral contests might influence the legislative process the theory
espoused above suggests the causal mechanism by which third parties might affect landmark
productivity has to do with their position as antagonists or facilitators in the actual legislative
process. Hence, this research will look to test third party involvement when third parties are
actually present in the U.S. Congress.
Assuming there is a certain level of membership in a legislature necessary for third party
influence on the legislative process is one thing. Determining precisely what minimal level of
representation is sufficient is conspicuously unknown. When considering the U.S. one can safely
exclude the post-WWII era, which has witnessed, practically speaking, no third party
representation. In addition, it does not make sense to consider the variety of third parties that
existed in Congress in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. Civil War that had the word ―union‖
in their name. These parties often were simply a cover for Democrats and Republicans that were
trying to take advantage of nationalism and patriotism in the war’s aftermath. Next, third parties
that were strong in only one American state such as the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota or the
La Follette Progressives of Wisconsin are not considered.
In the end, the decision is made to examine the five largest third parties that do not fit one
the excluded criteria just mentioned. These are the Anti-Masonic Party, the Know-Nothing
Party, the Free Soil Party, the Populist Party, and the Bull Moose Progressive Party. Each party
had a minimum of three percent membership in one of the congressional chambers for at least
two Congresses. Three of the parties—the Anti-Masons, Know-Nothings, and Populists—had
over ten percent membership, in one of the chambers, during at least one Congress. The Know11
Nothing Party was the largest with 22 percent membership in the 34th House of Representatives
(1856-57). The party also held the position of speaker in that Congress. The Bull Moose
Progressive Party is the smallest of the five with a total of 15 members who served in three
Congresses (1913-19).
Measuring Landmark Productivity
Having identified instances of third party involvement in Congress that can reasonably be
expected to matter, it is now necessary to determine what ought to be considered important or
―landmark‖ legislative productivity. A database was constructed which draws on seven histories
of Congress, the presidents, or the U.S., and six encyclopedias on the same topics, and then adds
two encyclopedias on American public policy. In all 15 varied sources were consulted, a list of
the sources is available from the authors. Each of the 15 sources is readily available in most
university libraries, which aids replication of this measurement strategy.
Multiple and wide-ranging sources were used to provide a robust check on the landmark
status of each law. The seven histories are read page-by-page and all new laws mentioned in the
text of the histories are noted. With the encyclopedias, only the indexes are consulted and each
law mentioned is entered into the database. All entries were independently confirmed via
multiple listings in the varied sources or by searching Statues at Large to ensure that the entry
represented an enacted law. There are no treaties or independent executive branch actions
included in the database. 9 The analysis reaches back to the 1st Congress (1789-91) and forward
to the 103rd Congress (1993-94). In all, there are 1649 public laws or joint resolutions mentioned
9
The vast majority of the entries are public laws; however, joint resolutions that propose amendments to the
Constitution are also included. Admission of new states and declarations of war are also included if they are
mentioned in the sources consulted.
12
in the 15 sources, with 940 of the laws mentioned in more than one source. Only the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is mentioned in all 15 sources.10
During the time period covered by this research, the 20th to the 65th Congresses, there are
479 laws to consider or laws that were mentioned in at least one of the sources. Being
mentioned in only one source though is not likely sufficient to be considered an important or
landmark law. Hence, the research makes a qualitative judgment about the number of mentions
necessary to call an enactment either ―notable‖ or ―landmark.‖ Specifically, if a law is
mentioned three or more times these enactments are referred to as notable laws. There are 187
of these laws in the time period examined. If the law is mentioned in five or more sources, at
least one of which was a Congress-specific publication, these are referred to as landmark laws,
and there are 134 of them during the time period this research focuses on. The requirement that
one of the Congress specific sources mentions the law is done to ensure that a landmark law has
support from scholars of that branch of government. Five total sources are required to ensure
that a law has broad visibility as a significant enactment.
In order to get a handle on the validity of the measure of landmark productivity
assembled for this research, values were compared to two existing measures that also measure
landmark legislative achievement Congress-by-Congress. The intention is to provide some
indication of the quality of the measure to be used in the analysis that follows. It was necessary
to create a completely new measure because the existing measures did not cover the entire time
period being studied by this research. Table 1 presents bivariate correlations between our
measures of notable laws, landmark laws, and the existing measures. The existing measures
10
An additional 12 pieces of legislation are mentioned in either 13 or 14 of the 15 sources.
13
were assembled by Valerie Heitshusen and Garry Young 11 along with Joshua Clinton and John
Lapinski.12 First, it can be noted in Table 1 that landmark laws and notable laws are very highly
correlated with one another suggesting the two new measures are mutually confirming. Second,
both indicators correlate reasonably well with the Heitshusen/Young and Clinton/Lapinski
measures during the time period the measures overlap. Third, the new measures correlate with
the two existing measures at a higher rate than the existing measures correlate with one another.
Last, but not reported in the table, because the time period studied here does not overlap, the
measures of notable and landmark laws correlate with measures that have been created by Sarah
Binder and David Mayhew that cover the post-World War II era.13
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Measuring the Level of Major Party Conflict
Figure 1 plots the level of major party polarization from the 1st to the 111th U.S.
Congress. The chart uses data supplied by Keith Poole who uses a form of factor analysis to
derive an indicator of the distinctiveness of the voting behavior of each individual member of
Congress called DW-NOMINATE Scores.14 These scores are routinely aggregated to obtain
party specific values. Specifically, Figure 1 displays the absolute value of the difference
between the median values of the two largest parties in the U.S. legislature, Congress-by11
Valerie Heitschusen, and Garry Young, ―Macropolitics and Changes in the U.S. Code: Testing Competing
Theories of Policy Production, 1874-1946,‖ in The Macropolitics of Congress, eds. E. Scott Adler and John S.
Lapinski (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).
12
Clinton, Joshua D., and John Lapinski. 2006. ―Measuring Legislative Accomplishment, 1877-1994.‖ American
Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 232-49.
13
See David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990; Sarah
Binder, Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. The strongest correlation occurs
between Landmark Laws and David Mayhew’s measure. In this instance, the correlation climbs to r = .76, n = 24.
The Binder ―Gridlock 1‖ measure correlates with Landmark Laws at r = -.65 n = 24. The correlation is negative
because her measure is of gridlock and not productivity. Both measures of productivity created for this research,
during the post-World War II period, are more highly correlated with Mayhew and Binder than they are with each
other.
14
Keith Poole, Data Download (University of Georgia: Athens, GA), http://www.voteview.com/dwnl.htm, last
accessed 3 September, 2010.
14
Congress. As an aside, when we standardize these values (mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1)
it is possible to create a measure of ―moderate polarization.‖ This is done by multiplying the
negative values by a -1.0 and keeping the positive values the same. Now as the values grow
larger this indicates a move away from the mean and away from moderate conflict. These
transformed values are negatively correlated with the number of ―notable‖ acts at r = -.15 and the
number of ―landmark‖ acts r = -.06 (n = 103) across all Congresses. When we examine only the
46 Congresses when the third parties analyzed here were in Congress the correlations grow
slightly: r = .20 for the count of notable laws and r = -.08 for the count of landmark laws (n =
46). These correlations do not reach acceptable levels of statistical significance; however, the
negative values do suggest a move away from moderation is inversely related to productivity.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The median level of two-party difference, or party polarization, for the entire period is
.666. For the purpose of this research we will consider a time period when polarization is higher
than this number an era of too much major party conflict and when the polarization score drops
below the median an era of too little major party difference. Using this specification, we make
the claim that when the Anti-Masonic Party was in Congress major party polarization was too
low. The party first gained representation in the 20th Congress and the polarization score for the
previous three Congresses averaged .24 and the Congress immediately preceding the Anti-Mason
Party gaining representation in Congress the polarization score was .37 almost two standard
deviations below the median value. When the Know-Nothing Party first gained representation in
the 29th Congress major party difference was close to average, but still below the median value.
The three previous Congress had an average score of .63 and the polarization score for the
Congress immediately prior to the first Know-Nothing Party member showing up was .61.
15
Given these values, the theory espoused by this research suggests that if either the Anti-Masons
or Know-Nothings are to be associated with legislative achievement, these third parties would
need to intensify legislative conflict in a manner that allows for clearer policy options and/or
stronger leaders.
The next three parties, the Free Soil Party, the Populist Party, and the Bull Moose
Progressive Party all came to office when major party polarization was above average. In the
case of the Free Soilers, polarization was close to the median. The previous three Congresses
had an average score of .67, but the Congress immediately prior to the Free Soilers taking office
had a score of .73. The three Congresses prior to the Populist Party taking office had an average
polarization score of .76 and the Congress immediately prior to their taking office had a score of
.78. Last, when the Bull-Moose Progressive Party took office the three previous Congresses had
witnessed an average polarization score of .88 and the Congress directly prior to their taking
office had a score of .85. If theory holds these three third parties should be associated with
landmark legislative achievement only if they managed to reduce major party conflict.
In order to test this theory the research develops a unique measure of the role third party
members may have played in terms of either exciting or attenuating major party dissension.
Specifically, we use individual third party member DW-NOMINATE scores and plot them
against the average major party median scores for the Congresses that each third party member
served in. If third party members exacerbated conflict their scores should lie next to one or the
other major party median scores adding fuel to the fire by associating themselves consistently
with the policy preferences of one of the major parties, giving this party a larger voting bloc, and
a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the opposition major party. Alternatively, if third party
members served to pacify major party discord then their DW-NOMINATE scores should appear
16
somewhere in between the major party median scores suggesting that some of these party
members agreed with one major party while others agreed with the other party. Now, the third
party members would be expected to reduce major party conflict. The plots just elaborated are
presented as Figures in each of the five case studies that follow.
The Case Studies
Primary and secondary sources are consulted to learn the relevant legislative agendas of
the five third parties analyzed here. In the Tables that conclude each case study, the legislative
agenda of the third parties is noted and whether there was a landmark law passed during the
Congresses when the third party members were actually in Congress is recorded. This
correlation analysis, in some instances, is supported by narratives from histories of the U.S. and
articles from the New York Times, which suggest a direct causal role played by the third party or
its members in the passage of the landmark law.
Anti-Masonic Party
As the Era of Good Feelings in the U.S. came to an end in 1824, the one-party dominance
of the Democratic-Republican Party was decimated and two factions formed in the national
legislature. One faction, led by supporters of Andrew Jackson went on to become the Democratic
Party. While the other, led by supporters of Henry Clay, went on to become the Whig Party. The
Anti-Masons began as a social reform movement in upstate New York during the late 1820s,
eventually, becoming political in nature with the inclusion of such members as John Quincy
Adams, Millard Fillmore, and William Henry Seward. From the 20th to 26th Congresses (18271841) the Anti-Masonic Party sat 43 different members in the House of Representatives. In the
23rd Congress (1833-1835) the party hit a high water mark and sat 26 members, 10.8 percent of
the chamber.
17
In Figure 2, each point on the Anti-Masonic Party line represents an individual party
member’s DW-NOMINATE score, which can be compared with the party median scores for the
two major legislative factions or parties at this time.15 The Figure clearly demonstrates that the
Anti-Masons were aligned with the anti-Jacksonian faction in Congress. There is also a strong
indication that many members were more radical (their voting behavior was more distinct) than
the median anti-Jacksonite. The most radical Anti-Mason in Congress was none other than John
Quincy Adams, the son of a former president. During his time as an Anti-Mason in Congress the
younger Adams was seen as the party’s leader, which is important as it suggests a well-known
third party leader, with his extreme voting behavior, might be expected to awaken the legislative
environment and prompt legislative action.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Nominally, the Anti-Masons only differed substantively from other members of the AntiJacksonian faction on the issue of Masonry. Their 1832 party platform was essentially a list of
grievances against the Masons. However, party members were also known to support higher
tariffs, high public land prices, preservation of the Bank of the U.S., and for the general
development of a system of internal improvements. These issue positions and their call for a ban
on extra-judicial oaths and an investigation of the Masonic Order are listed in Table 2. Our
contention is that because the Anti-Masons sided consistently with one of the two major parties
they would have increased major party conflict when polarization was low. According to theory,
this should cause the Anti-Masons to be associated with landmark legislative achievements.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
15
For members that served in more than one Congress, the DW-NOMINATE score and party median scores are
calculated as an average. Generally, Anti-Masons who served in more than one Congress had the same DWNOMINATE score for each Congress they served in.
18
Indeed, allied with Anti-Jacksonites, the Anti-Masons are associated with landmark
legislation as defined by this research. The Force Bill of 1833 and the Compromise Tariff of
183316 both have retrospectively been judged as landmark legislation that protected high tariffs
and domestic producers. While there was no landmark law passed during the Anti-Masons’
tenure in office that dealt with the maintenance of high public land prices, a ―notable law,‖ as
defined by this research, was passed. Specifically, the Federal Deposits Act in 1836 helped to
maintain high public land prices. The Anti-Masons were not successful in passing any antiMasonic legislation at the national level; however, they successfully initiated and saw through to
passage this type of legislation in the New York state legislature and other state legislatures, such
as Vermont. The Anti-Masons were not able to prompt an override of President Jackson’s veto of
the reauthorization of a national bank.
Overall, the Anti-Mason Party was associated with considerable meaningful legislative
achievement at a time when the major parties (Jacksonians and Anti-Jacksonians) were not
characterized by strong leaders and were split more over personality than policy. However, the
party also had the son of a former president, John Quincy Adams, as a leader so we cannot yet
discount the possible role a well-known third party leader might play in helping a third party
achieve landmark legislative accomplishments.
Know-Nothing Party (aka American Party)
The Know-Nothing Party espoused anti-Catholicism and hyper-nationalism during their
time in Congress. A total of 75 members of the Know-Nothing Party served between the 29th
and 37th Congresses. The 34th Congress saw 51 members of the party (21.8 percent of members)
serving in the House of Representative along with one member of the Senate. During the 34th
16
The tariff which was passed was a compromise between Henry Clay and John Calhoun of South Carolina, but still
managed to keep tariffs high.
19
Congress Nathaniel P. Banks, a Know-Nothing Party member from Massachusetts was elected
Speaker of the House. Former President Millard Fillmore also joined the Know-Nothing fold and
urged other Whig Party members to do the same. He would eventually serve as the presidential
nominee for the party in 1856, receiving eight electoral votes and over 21 percent of the popular
vote.17
Figure 3 shows the DW-NOMINATE scores for the Know-Nothing Party members of
Congress in contrast with the median party scores for the two major party factions. The party
system in the U.S. during the 16 years Know-Nothing Party members were serving in either the
House or Senate was somewhat fractured. The Democratic Party, with its own internal conflicts
over the issue of slavery, stood in opposition to either the Whig Party, members known
collectively as the ―Opposition,‖ or the Republican Party.18 The fractured nature of the party
system, in turn, may suggest the ineffective structuring of legislative options and ineffective
party leaders. A disorganized party system when combined with a lower than average level of
major party polarization, prior to the Know-Nothing Party coming to office, suggests if this third
party is going to accomplish any landmark legislation it would need to side with one or the other
major factions in consistent opposition to the other major party. This might provide a sufficient
elucidation and elaboration of policy options in a manner that would prompt action the way the
Anti-Masons had done a decade earlier.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
An examination of Figure 3 suggests Know-Nothing Party members are all over the place
in terms of their policy preferences. Some are clearly siding more with the Democratic Party,
17
Donald J. Green. Third-Party Matters: Politics, Presidents, and Third Parties in American History; Sean Wilentz,
The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln.
18
Because the Republican Party stood in opposition to the Democratic Party for the longest time, while the KnowNothing Party was represented in Congress we label the party median line in Figure 3 ―Republican.‖
20
while others are aligned with the opposition or Republican Party. There is little, if any,
ideological cohesion in the Know-Nothing Party. This lack of consistency in an already fractured
party system, suggests the Know-Nothing Party would attenuate conflict that was already below
average. The expectation, based on theory, is that the party would be ineffective legislatively.
Table 3 lists the Party’s agenda based on their 1856 national party platform. Many of the policies
they offered were intended to advance their nativist agenda, such as imposing a twenty-one-year
waiting period for naturalization and barring non-natives from government employment. They
also proposed limits on the sale of alcohol.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
During the tenure of the Know-Nothings in Congress not a single landmark law was
passed that dealt with any of their main issues. Moreover, there is little indication that the
Know-Nothing agenda inspired the program of subsequent Congresses. The Eighteenth
Amendment certified in January 1919, did limit the sale of alcohol but this occurred nearly 60
years after the last Know-Nothing Party members left Congress. It seems the Know-Nothing
Party confused major party conflict in an era of ineffective party structuring offering further
evidence that third parties must change the character of major party conflict if they can be
expected to be associated with significant landmark legislative achievement. Moreover, the
arguments that a well-known third party leader and a larger membership will cause third parties
to be more effective are both dealt a blow. The party had a former president (Millard Fillmore)
as leader and ran this person as their own presidential candidate. This well-known third party
leader is not able to prompt third party accomplishment. In addition, the Know-Nothings are the
largest third party to serve in the history of the U.S. Congress and this does not appear to be
sufficient to cause productivity.
21
Free Soil Party
The Free Soil Party had a relatively brief tenure in the U.S. Congress. This third party
was only able to elect members to three consecutive Congresses: the 31st (1849-1851) to the 33rd
Congress (1853-1855). The party had 18 different members serve in the House of
Representatives and the 31st Congress saw their peak representation with a total of 11 members
(nine in the House and two in the Senate). In the 32nd and 33rd Congresses the Free Soil Party
had three and four members in the Senate, respectively. This total represented just over four and
six percent of the upper chamber’s membership at the time. The party elected only three
members to the lower chamber in each of these Congresses. This pattern of membership is unlike
the other third parties discussed, as the Free Soil Party had most of its strength in the Senate.
Perhaps the most famous Free Soil senator was Salmon P. Chase who becomes Secretary of the
Treasury in the Abraham Lincoln administration and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Martin
Van Buren, another former president, received the presidential nomination of the newly-formed
Free Soil Party in 1848. In the election, Van Buren won roughly ten percent of the popular vote
but no Electoral College support.19
Figure 4 exhibits the DW-NOMINATE scores for the Free Soil members of Congress
relative to the median scores of the major parties in the relevant congressional chamber. The
Figure clearly shows Free Soil Party members are more closely aligned with the Whig Party.
Unlike the wild inconsistency of the Know-Nothing Party, the Free Soilers in Congress displayed
some sense of uniformity in their congressional voting behavior. Historical evidence suggests the
Free Soil Party, because of their relative consistent support of Whig Party positions, made the
19
Frederick J. Blue, The Free Soilers: Third Party Politics; 1848-54 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1973).
22
process of compromise in Congress more difficult. 20 Given major party polarization was above
average, and Free Soilers exacerbated major party conflict by consistently supporting one of the
major party factions. Theory suggests the party should not be associated with legislative
achievement.21
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
Table 4 displays the major issue positions of the Free Soil Party, laid out in both the 1848
and 1852 national party platforms. Much of the party’s agenda was focused on the end of
slavery, but there was also a call for free land for Western settlers and an increase in immigration
for the purpose of increasing the European population on the North American continent.
Interestingly, the 31st Congress, one of the Congresses when the free Soil Party was present, did
see the passage of four pieces of landmark legislation. This should not be surprising given that
major party polarization was quite moderate at this time. But none of these landmark acts were
part of the Free Soil party platform. Indeed, three of the new laws produced compromises on the
issue of slavery,22 which went against the stated positions of the Free Soil Party. Some members
of the party did vote in support of the compromise legislation, but this seemed to only harden the
resolve of party leaders who made opposition to compromise on slavery even more explicit in
their 1952 platform, calling specifically for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.23
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
20
Frederick J. Blue, The Free Soilers: Third Party Politics; 1848-54, pgs. 191-92.
Interestingly, there was such a close division between the major parties, in the House of Representatives, during
the 31st Congress (neither party had a majority) the Free Soil Party held the balance of power in the selection of the
Speaker of the House.
22
All three were part of the broader legislative success known as ―The Compromise of 18050.‖
23
In addition, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which created the territories of Kansas and Nebraska and left the
issue of slavery up to the citizens of the territories, was passed when the Free Soilers were in Congress (33 rd
Congress). This is another landmark act passed that was opposed by Free Soil party members serving in Congress.
Historians consider the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act the death knell for the Free Soil Party; Frederick J.
Blue, The Free Soilers: Third Party Politics; 1848-54.
21
23
None of the landmark acts passed between the 31st and 33rd Congresses was supported by
the Free Soil Party. Although it can be noted that some of the party’s issue positions did result in
landmark acts in subsequent Congresses, which suggests that the party may have played an
agenda-setting role for future Congresses. Specifically, the Homestead Act of 1862, the Morrill
Land-Grant College Act 1862, and the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (1865), which
outlawed slavery, are each pieces of landmark legislation as define by this research, which
addressed issue positions championed by the Free Soil Party. Yet, none of these were passed
while the Free Soil Party was serving in Congress. Not even a former president as party leader
(Martin Van Buren) was sufficient to prompt contemporaneous landmark success. This research
contends this is likely the case because the Free Soil Party exacerbated major party conflict when
major party conflict was already higher than average.
Populist Party
For a twelve year period, spanning 1891 to 1903 the Populist Party was able to seat
members in both chambers of the U.S. Congress. In the 55th Congress (1897-99) there were 22
Populist Party members in the House of Representatives representing a little over six percent of
total membership. In both the 55th and 56th Congress (1897-01) there were five Populist Party
members in the Senate, representing 5.6 percent of that chamber. The party originated in the mid
to late 1870s representing farming interests in Western states. A primary policy concern was
falling prices on agricultural commodities.24 At the time when the Populist Party was in
Congress major party polarization was much higher than average and consequently theory
suggests if they were going to be successful the party would need to reduce major party tension.
24
Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in
America (Oxford, UK: Oxford Press, 1978); Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New
York: Basic Books, 1995).
24
Figure 5 exhibits the DW-NOMINATE scores of the Populist Party members of Congress
in contrast with the party median scores for the two major parties in the relevant chambers.
While the Populists do seem more closely aligned with the Democratic Party, they are generally
more moderate and all but two party members had DW-NOMINATE scores between the
Democratic and Republican Party median scores. Importantly, many Populist Party members of
Congress were aided by candidate fusion practices, which allowed members to run as both a
Populist and as either a Democrat or a Republican Party candidate.25 In the South, Populists
fused with the Republican Party and in other regions of the country with the Democratic Party.
Moreover, there is evidence that Republicans during this time period routinely considered
running Populist fusion candidates in the South to help break up Democratic Party dominance in
the region.26 It is easy to imagine these cross-major party electoral alliances might have caused
Populist Party members to be facilitators of compromise during legislative deliberations defined
by higher than average major party conflict.27
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
At the party’s first national convention, held in 1892, party leaders adopted what today is
known as the Omaha Platform. The major planks called for a graduated national income tax, the
unlimited coinage of silver in opposition to a gold standard, direct election of U.S. senators,
adoption of the Australian ballot, a term limit for the U.S. president, an eight-hour work day for
government employees, opposition to the national bank, civil service reforms, limits on
25
James L. Hunt, Marion Butler and American Populism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 2003).
26
― Deserting Populist Allies; North Carolina Republican Want All The Spoils,‖ New York Times. 25 Dec 1894, 9.
27
One member of the Populist Party, Albert Taylor Goodwyn, had a DW-NOMINATE score nearly equal to the
Republican Party median when he served. Goodwyn was a former captain in the Confederate Army, but later in life
fought to heal regional wounds propagated by the war. In the post-Civil War era he was the first representative of a
Confederate veterans organization invited to a presidential inauguration. Goodwyn’s congressional career is
emblematic of the moderating role of the Populist Party. This is further support for the notion that Populists worked
to attenuate conflict.
25
immigration, and passage of a system to allow for direct democracy in the form of referenda and
ballot initiatives.28
Table 5 spells out the ten issues that made up the Omaha Platform. Of these, income tax
reform and limits on immigration were both addressed by landmark laws while the Populists
were in Congress; the later by two pieces of legislation that this research has labeled landmark. A
third and fourth issue, the eight-hour work day for government employees and civil service
reform, were addressed by new laws while the party was in Congress, but these laws do not
reach landmark status as defined by this research.
Two additional legislative matters, the adoption of the Australian ballot and the adoption
of direct democracy procedures, also occurred during the period the Populist Party was serving
in the national legislature. However, both of these issues dealt with matters relating to state law
and consequently were not addressed by the U.S. Congress. In all, six of the ten Omaha
Platform policy issues saw legislative action during the twelve year period the Populist Party was
in office. Moreover, it is quite common for American history books to point out the relationship
between the Populist Party and the passage of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 (income tax
reform), suggesting a causal relationship between the party’s issue position and the passage of
the first peace-time income tax.29
The party did have a relatively high level of representation for a U.S. third party, which
might have contributed to their success. But, as was learned with the Know-Nothing Party large
membership does not always lead to legislative success for third parties. The party’s leader at
28
Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in
America; William Alfred Peffer, Populism, Its Rise and Fall; Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American
History.
29
James A. Henretta, David Brody, Lynn Dumenil, and Susan Ware, America’s History, 5th Edition (Boston, MA:
Bedford/St. Martin, 2004), 536-38.
26
the national level was William Jennings Bryan, a noteworthy historical figure for certain, but not
a former president, suggesting that a well-known third party leader is not necessary for third
party legislative success. In all, the possibility that Populist Party members were electorally
aligned with both Democrats and Republicans, when major party disagreement was high
suggests the party’s success may be attributable to their ability to moderate major party conflict
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Bull Moose Progressive Party
A split in the Republican Party between President William Howard Taft and former
President Theodore Roosevelt led to the creation of the Progressive Party of 1912, also known as
the Bull Moose Progressive Party. Roosevelt had broken with Taft around 1911 and sought the
Republican nomination for president in 1912. Following Taft’s success at the Republican
National Convention, Roosevelt left the party and created the Progressive Party to run candidates
at both the state and national level.30 Roosevelt was able to garner 27 percent of the popular vote
in the 1912 presidential election compared to only 23 percent for the incumbent President Taft.
This is the only instance since the Civil War of a third party presidential candidate receiving
more votes than a major party candidate.31 Some argue that Roosevelt’s defeat was attributable
to both the unity of the Democratic Party and the progressive nature of Woodrow Wilson’s
platform.32 Furthermore, the Bull Moose Party had significant funding issues complicated by the
Party’s effort to elect candidates at both the state and national levels.33 Even with these hurdles,
30
John A. Gable, The Bull Moose Years: Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party (Port Washington, NY:
Kenniket Press, 1978); James Chace, Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft, and Debs—the Election That Changed the Country
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).
31
George Edwin Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (New York: Hill and Wang, 1960);
James Chace, Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft, and Debs—the Election That Changed the Country.
32
John A. Gable, The Bull Moose Years: Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party.
33
Amos Pinchot, History of the Progressive Party, 1912-1916 (New York: New York University Press, 1958).
27
the party manages to swear in nine members of the House of Representatives in 1913 and the
party was represented in three consecutive Congresses (63rd-65th).34
Figure 6 shows the DW-NOMINATE scores of the Bull Moose members of Congress
compared to the party medians of the two major parties. The Figure clearly shows that Bull
Moose Progressives were moderates. Importantly, this occurs in an era of high major party
polarization. Moreover, there is compelling evidence that the Bull Moose Progressives acted in
ways to attenuate major party conflict. Although naturally aligned with the Republican Party
many party members were more amenable to the agenda of the Wilsonian Democrats.35 There
was even a move within the Progressive Party, in 1916, to nominate Woodrow Wilson as the
party’s candidate for president that year.36 The theoretical expectation is that the party will be
associated with legislative achievements.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
Table 6 outlines the platform adopted at the Progressive Party’s first national convention
in August of 1912. The foundation of the document was centered on a philosophy known as
New Nationalism, which emphasized that a strong national government was necessary to protect
individual rights and to ensure proper regulation of the economy.37 Many of the issues
enumerated in Table 6 are likely familiar to observers of American politics as many of the same
topics are debated in Congress, today. Suggesting the Progressive Party was truly progressive.
In all, the Progressive Party platform in 1912 outlined 17 different issue positions. Of these, six
34
The national party largely falls apart following the 1914 midterm elections, which saw only six party members
win seats in the House of Representatives. While Roosevelt was nominated for president once again in 1916, he
quickly withdrew from the race to support Republican candidate Charles Evan Hughes. This election also saw the
last of the Bull Moose members elected to the House of Representatives.
35
―Rebellious Progressives,‖ New York Times, 19 June, 1916, 10.
36
―Moose Convention May Name Wilson,‖ New York Times, 25 July, 1916, 5.
37
Robert S. La Forte, ―Theodore Roosevelt’s Osawatomie Speech,‖ Kansas Historical Quarterly 32 (1966): 187200.
28
saw landmark legislative action while the Progressive Party members were seated in the House
of Representatives. One of the issues, income tax reform, witnessed four new landmark laws
during the three Congresses the party held seats. In addition, there were two new landmark laws
that addressed farm relief and financial regulation, other Progressive Party positions. In all, 11
new landmark laws addressing six Progressive Party topics passed during the party’s brief stint
in Congress. Moreover, members of the party played a role in writing some of this legislation
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, one of the landmark laws, was sponsored by Progressive
Party Representative Victor Murdock of Kansas.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
President Woodrow Wilson acknowledged the significance of the Progressive Party in
landmark legislative achievements. Wilson noted, in the 1912 elections the Democratic Party
platform did not actively advocate for child labor restrictions or a Federal Reserve, however,
after the Progressive Party ―sharply call[ed] the attention of the people to these needed
measures,‖ the issues were ultimately taken up by the Democratic Party and passed.38 This
direct acknowledgement by the president of third party influence on the passage of landmark acts
suggests a direct causal link. Importantly, the Progressive Party had only very minimal total
representation in Congress. It is the smallest of the third parties discussed by this research. But,
the party came to the legislative table with some cross-party allegiances at a time when major
party polarization was considerably higher than average. The legislative environment was
sufficiently polarized to produce strong leaders and structured policy options; it seems the input
of moderating third party voices was all that was necessary to make the era truly progressive.
Conclusion
38
―Wilson Kept Pledges,‖ New York Times, 30 August, 1916, 5.
29
When conflict-moderating third parties such as the Anti-Masons, Populists and
Progressives have managed to hold seats in Congress their platform positions have been enacted
in contemporaneous Congresses. Moreover, the new laws associated with these third parties
represent more than incremental change. The policy changes associated with the third parties
have found their way into general history books and encyclopedias. On the other hand, when the
Know-Nothing and Free Soil Parties held seats their members either confused effective policy
structuring when major party polarization was below average, or exacerbated major party
conflict when the intensity was already above average. Not surprisingly these third parties are
not associated with a single piece of landmark legislation when party members were serving in
the national legislature.
Assigning causality is forever a tricky matter. There is always the possibility that other
considerations are intervening and corrupting the validity of a correlation analysis. There are a
myriad of explanations for legislative accomplishment. Yet, two intuitive alternatives: third party
size and well-known third party leaders do not hold up in this analysis. The largest third party
(the Know-Nothings) is associated with no landmark legislation and the smallest of the five
parties (Bull Moose-Progressives) is easily associated with the most productivity. Neither does a
well-known leader thesis withstand scrutiny. Although two of the three successful third parties
(Anti-Masons and the Bull Moose Progressives) were led by well-known individuals (the son of
a former president and a former president), the two unsuccessful parties in this analysis were also
led by former presidents.
The goal of this research was to go further than to simply identify association between
third party representation in Congress and the production of new laws. The hope was to extract
some basis for making a causal claim regarding the presence of third parties in Congress, their
30
role in conflict moderation, and ultimately the production of important new laws. Considering
the history of the five largest third parties in U.S. history that had broad support and extensive
agendas, three of them moderated existing major party conflict scenarios and two did not. The
three that did can be identify with 33 different agenda items and of these, 27 percent were
addressed by new laws that retrospective judgment has deemed landmark. The two third parties
that did not moderate conflict are associated with 13 different issue positions and none of these
were addressed by new legislation, while the third party members served in Congress.
31
Table 1.
Correlations between “Notable” and “Landmark” Legislative Production
and Existing Measures of Productivity by Congress
MEASURE
Notable
Notable
(1st – 103rd)
1
Landmark
(1st – 103rd)
.94 ***
n = 103
Landmark
Heitshusen/Young
Clinton/Lapinski
1
Heitshusen/Young
(43rd – 76th)
.67 **
Clinton/Lapinski
(45th – 103rd)
.74 **
n = 34
n = 59
.71 **
.63 **
n = 34
n = 59
1
.41 *
n = 35
1
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed test).
32
Table 2.
Anti-Masonic Party and Landmark Legislation, 1827-1841
Platform Items
Support for High Tariff
Maintain High Public Land Prices
Investigation of Masonic Order
Banning of Extrajudicial Oaths
Preservation of the Bank of the U.S.
Development of Internal Improvements
Landmark Law Passed
in Contemporaneous Congresses
Force Bill of 1833 ( 4 Stat. 632);
Compromise Tariff of 1833 (4 Stat. 629)
No a
*
*
No b
No
* Passed by many state legislatures.
a
―Notable‖ law was passed, the Federal Deposits Act in 1836 helped to maintain high public land prices.
b
Legislation passed Congress but was veto by President Andrew Jackson.
33
Table 3.
Know-Nothing Party and Landmark Legislation, 1845-1863
Platform Items
Perpetuation of the Union
Bar non-native Am. from govt. service
Bar anyone subject to foreign power
(including Pope) from govt. service
Fed. Govt. can not violate states rights
Only citizens granted suffrage
Wait 21 years for naturalization
Separation of church and state
Limit the sale of alcohol
Landmark Law Passed
in Contemporaneous Congresses
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
34
Table 4.
Free Soil Party and Landmark Legislation, 1849-1855
Platform Items
No expansion of slavery
Abolition of slavery
Free grant of land to settlers
Repeal of Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
Promotion of immigration to U.S.
Landmark Law Passed
in Contemporaneous Congresses
No
No
No
No
No
35
Table 5.
Populist Party and Landmark Legislation, 1891-1903
Platform Items
Income tax reform
Free coinage of silver
Direct election of senators
Adoption of Australian Ballot
Term limit for the president
8-hr.work day for government
No national bank
Civil Service reform
Limits on Immigration
Direct Democracy Initiatives
Landmark Law Passed
in Contemporaneous Congresses
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act (ch. 349, Stat. 570)
No
No
*
No
No
No
No
Geary Chinese Exclusion Act (P.L. 47-71, ch. 126);
Immigration Act of 1903 (ch. 32, Stat. 1213)
*
* Passed by many state legislatures.
36
Table 6.
Bull Moose Progressive Party and Landmark Legislation, 1913-1919
Platform Items
Women's suffrage
Mandatory health insurance
Income tax reform
(post-16th Amendment)
Labor union rights
Child labor laws
Farm relief
Inheritance taxes
Direct election of senators
Primary elections
Recall judicial decisions
Direct democracy provisions
Public control of utilities
Worker’s compensation insurance
Financial Regulation
Campaign finance reform
Registration of lobbyists
Landmark Law Passed
in Contemporaneous Congresses
#
No
Revenue Act of 1913 (P.L. 63-16);
Revenue Act of 1916 (P.L. 64-271);
Excess Profits Tax of 1917 (P.L. 65-63)
Revenue Act of 1918 (P.L. 65-254);
Clayton Anti-Trust Act (P.L. 63-212)
Keating-Owen Child Labor Act (P.L. 64-249)
Smith-Lever Act (ch. 79, Stat. 372);
Federal Farm Loan Bank Act (ch. 245, Stat. 382)
^
17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
*
No
*
*
*
Federal Reserve Bank Act (P.L. 63-43);
Federal Trade Commission Act (P.L. 63-203)
No
No
No
Make committee hearings public
# Passed very early in the next Congress (May/June 1919). Party members served only until March 1919.
^ Estate Tax of 1916 passes in the 64th Congress, but is not considered a landmark legislative accomplishment, as
defined by this research.
* Passed by many state legislatures.
37
Figure 1. Major Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives, by Congress
38
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
Anti-Masons
Jacksonians
Anit-Jacksonians
Figure 2. Anti-Masonic Party Member’s DW-Nominate Scores and Major Party Median
Scores, 21st-26th Congress (1829-41)
Note: The y-axis represents individual DW-Nominate scores; n = 43 party members
39
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
Know-Nothings
Democrats
Whigs/Opposition
Figure 3. Know-Nothing Party Member’s DW-Nominate Scores and Major Party Median
Scores, 29th-37th Congress (1845-63)
Note: The y-axis represents DW-Nominate scores; n = 75 party members
40
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
Free Soilers
Democrats
Whigs
Figure 4. Free Soil Party Member’s DW-Nominate Scores and Major Party Median
Scores: 31th-33rd Congresses (1849-55)
Note: The y-axis represents individual DW-Nominate scores; n = 18 party members
41
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
Populists
Democrats
Republicans
Figure 5. Populists Party Member’s DW-Nominate Scores and Major Party Median
Scores: 52nd -57th Congress (1891-1903)
Note: The y-axis represents DW-Nominate Scores; n = 45 party members
42
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
-1E-15
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
Bull Moose
Democrats
Republicans
Figure 6. Bull Moose Progressive Party Member’s DW-Nominate Scores and Major Party
Median Scores: 63rd-65th Congress (1913-19)
Note: The y-axis represents DW-Nominate Scores; n = 15 party members
43