Polska wersja tekstu znajduje się w: Włodzimierz Galewicz (red.) Początki ludzkiego życia. Antologia bioetyki. Tom
2, Wyd. Universitas 2010:337-350
Ill
The
Case
WHENCHILDRENARE CONCEIVEDFOR OTHERS
I
against
Surrogate
Parenting
by HERBERTT. KRIMMEL
I
Is
it ethicalfor someoneto createa humanlife with the
intentionof giving it up?This seems to be the primaryquestion for both surrogatemother arrangementsand artificial
inseminationby donor(AID), since in both situationsa person who is providinggerminalmaterialdoes so only upon
the assurancethat someone else will assume full responsibility for the child he or she helps to create.
The Ethical Issue
In analyzingthe ethics of surrogatemotherarrangements,
it is helpful to begin by examining the roles the surrogate
motherperforms.First, she acts as a procreatorin providing
an ovum to be fertilized. Second, afterher ovum has been
fertilizedby the spermof the man who wishes to parentthe
child, she acts as host to the fetus, providingnurtureand
protectionwhile the newly conceived individualdevelops.
I see no insurmountablemoralobjectionsto the functions
the motherperformsin this second role as host. Her actions
are analogousto those of a foster motheror of a wet-nurse
who cares for a child when the naturalmother cannot or
does not do so. Using a surrogatemotheras a host for the
fetus when the biological mothercannotbearthe child is no
more morally objectionablethan employing others to help
educate, train, or otherwisecare for a child. Except in extremes, where the parentrelinquishesor delegates responsibilities for a child for trivial reasons, the practicewould
not seem to raise a serious moral issue.
I would argue, however, that the firstrole that the surrogate mother performs-providing germinalmaterialto be
fertilized-does pose a majorethical problem. The surrogate motherprovidesher ovum, and entersinto a surrogate
motherarrangement,with the clear understandingthat she
is to avoid responsibilityfor the life she creates. Surrogate
motherarrangementsaredesignedto separatein the mindof
the surrogatemotherthe decision to createa child from the
decision to have and raise thatchild. The cause of this dissociationis some otherbenefit she will receive, most often
money.' In other words, her desire to createa child is born
of some motive other than the desire to be a parent. This
separationof the decisionto createa child fromthe decision
to parentit is ethically suspect. The child is conceived not
HERBERT T. KRIMMELis professor of law, SouthwesternUniversitySchool of Law, Los Angeles. This article is an editedversion of his testimonybefore the CaliforniaAssemblyCommittee
on the Judiciary on November19, 1982, at its hearings on the
proposed "SurrogateParentAct," AssemblyBill #3771.
because he is wantedby his biological mother,but because
he can be useful to someone else. He is conceived in order
to be given away.
At theirdeepest level, surrogatemotherarrangementsinvolve a changein motivefor creatingchildren:froma desire
to have them for their own sake, to a desire to have them
becausethey can providesome otherbenefit.The surrogate
mothercreatesa child with the intentionto abdicateparental
responsibilities.Can we view this as ethical?My answeris
no. I will explain why by analyzing various situationsin
which surrogatemotherarrangementsmightbe used.
Why Motive Matters
Let's begin with the single parent.A single womanmight
use AID, or a single man might use a surrogatemother
arrangement,if she or he wanteda child but did not want to
be burdenedwith a spouse.2 Either practicewould intentionally deprive the child of a mother or a father. This, I
assert, is fundamentallyunfairto the child.
Those who disagreemightpointto divorceor to the death
of a parentas situationsin which a child is deprivedof one
parentandmustrely solely or primarilyuponthe other. The
comparison,however, is inapt.Afterdivorceor the deathof
a parent,a child may findherselfwith a single parentdue to
circumstancesthat were unfortunate,unintended,and undesired. But when surrogatemotherarrangementsare used
by a single parent,deprivingthe child of a second parentis
one of the intendedanddesiredeffects. It is one thingto ask
how to make the best of a bad situationwhen it is thrust
upon a person. It is differentaltogetherto ask whetherone
may intentionallyset out to achieve the same result. The
moralityof identicalresults (for example, killings) will oftentimesdiffer dependingupon whetherthe situationis invited by, or involuntarilythrust upon, the actor. Legal
distinctionsfollowing and based upon this ethical distinction are abundant.The law of self-defenseprovidesa notable example.3
Since a woman can get pregnantif she wishes whetheror
not she is married,and since there is little that society can
do to prevent women from creatingchildreneven if their
intentionis to deprivethe childrenof a father, why should
we be so concerned about single men using surrogate
mother arrangementsif they too want a child but not a
spouse?To say thatwomen can intentionallyplan to be unwed mothersis not to condone the practice. Besides, society will hold the fatherliable in a paternityaction if he can
be found and identified, which indicates some social concern that people shouldnot be able to abdicatethe respon35
The Hastings Center
This content downloaded from 193.0.118.39 on Thu, 02 Apr 2015 08:55:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
sibilities that they incur in generatingchildren. Otherwise,
why do we condemn the provetbialsailor with a pregnant
girlfriendin every port?
In many surrogatemother arrangements,of course, the
surrogatemother will not be transferringcustody of the
child to a single man, but to a couple: the child's biological
father and a stepmother,his wife. What are the ethics of
surrogatemotherarrangementswhen the child is takeninto
a two-parentfamily?Again, surrogatemotherarrangements
and AID pose similar ethical questions: The surrogate
mothertransfersher parentalresponsibilitiesto the wife of
the biologicalfather,while with AID the spermdonorrelinquisheshis interestin the child to the husbandof the biological mother. In both cases the child is created with the
intentionof transferringthe responsibilityfor its care to a
new set of parents.The surrogatemothersituationis more
dramaticthanAID since the transferoccursafterthe child is
born, while in the case of AID the transfertakes place at the
time of the insemination.Nevertheless, the ethical point is
the same: creatingchildrenfor the purposeof transferring
them. For a surrogatemother the question remains:Is it
ethical to create a child for the purposeof transferringit to
the wife of the biological father?
At firstblush this looks to be little differentfromthe typical adoption,for whatis an adoptionotherthana transferof
responsibilityfrom one set of parentsto another?The analogy is misleading, however, for two reasons. First, it is
difficultto imagine anyoneconceiving childrenfor the purpose of puttingthem up for adoption.And, if such a bizarre
event were to occur, I doubt that we would look upon it
with moralapproval.Most adoptionsariseeitherbecausean
undesiredconceptionis broughtto term, or becausethe parents wantedto have the child, but find thatthey are unable
to providefor it becauseof some unfortunatecircumstances
that develop after conception.
Second, even if surrogatemother arrangementswere to
be classified as a type of adoption,not all offeringsof children for adoption are necessarily moral. For example,
would it be moral for parentsto offer their three-year-old
for adoptionbecausethey areboredwith the child?Wouldit
be moral for a couple to offer for adoptiontheir newborn
female baby because they wanted a boy?
Therefore, even though surrogatemother arrangements
may in some superficialways be likened to adoption, one
must still ask whetherit is ethicalto separatethe decision to
create childrenfrom the desire to have them. I would answer no. The procreatorshould desire the child for its own
sake, and not as a meansto attainingsome otherend. Even
though one of the ends may be stated altruisticallyas an
attemptto bringhappinessto an infertilecouple, the child is
still being used by the surrogate.She createsit not because
she desires it, but because she desires somethingfrom it.
To sanction the use and treatmentof human beings as
means to the achievementof othergoals insteadof as ends
in themselvesis to acceptan ethic with a tragicpast, and to
36
Historical Parallels
Proponentsof surrogatemother arrangementsrefer to
biblical passages such as Genesis 16, which deals with
Abram's having children by his handmaid, Hagar, and
Deuteronomy25:5-6, which deals with the duty of a man
to raise up children to his dead brotherby his sister-inlaw. However, it is quite clear that when Abram conceived Ishmael by Hagar, he had done so only after his
wife, Sarai, had given Hagar to him as a second wife
(Genesis 16:3). Similarly, Deuteronomy25:5-6 deals with
a situation where the woman becomes a wife. In both
cases the so-called surrogatemotheris not a surrogateat
all, but an extension (albeit polygamous) of the family
unit. In the biblical tradition,the second wife in no way
relinquishescontrol or responsibilityfor the childrenshe
creates; therefore, analogies between such biblical passages and present-day proposed surrogate mother arrrangementsare incorrect.
If the proponents of surrogate mother arrangements
wish to take biblical authoritiesas analogies, they might
well look to the end of the story of Hagar and Ishmael:
how they were drivenout by Sarahafter Sarahgave birth
to Isaac (Genesis 21). The family animosityof thousands
of years ago is with us today as the sons of Ishmael (the
Arabs) and the sons of Isaac (the Jews) still have some
difficultiesgetting along.
-H.T.K.
establisha precedentwith a dangerousfuture. Alreadythe
press has reportedthe decision of one couple to conceive a
child for the purposeof using it as a bone marrowdonorfor
its sibling (LosAngeles Times, April 17, 1979, p. 1-2). And
the bioethics literaturecontainsarticles seriouslyconsidering whetherwe should clone humanbeings to serve as an
inventoryof spare partsfor organ transplants4and articles
that foresee the use of comatose humanbeings as self-replantsfor human
plenishingblood banksandmanufacturing
hormones.5How far our society is willing to proceeddown
this road is uncertain,but it is clear that the first step to all
these practicesis the acceptanceof the same principlethat
the Nazis attemptedto use to justify their medical experiments at the NurembergWar Crimes Trials: that human
beings may be used as means to the achievementof other
goals, and need not be treatedas ends in themselves.6
But why, it might be asked, is it so terribleif the surrogate motherdoes not desirethe child for its own sake, when
under the proposed surrogatemother arrangementsthere
will be a couple eagerlydesiringto have the child and to be
its parents?Thatthis argumentmay not be entirelyaccurate
will be illustratedin the following section, but the basic
reply is that creatinga child withoutdesiringit fundamentally changesthe way we look at children-instead of viewing them as uniqueindividualpersonalitiesto be desiredin
The Hastings Center Report, October 1983
This content downloaded from 193.0.118.39 on Thu, 02 Apr 2015 08:55:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
theirown right, we may come to view them as commodities
or items of manufactureto be desiredbecause of theirutility. A recent newspaperaccount describesthe business of
an agency that matches surrogatemotherswith barrencouples as follows:
Its firstproductis due for delivery today. Twelve others are on
the way and an additional20 have been ordered. The "company"is SurrogateMotheringLtd. and the "product"is babies.7
The dangersof this view arebest illustratedby examining
what might go wrong in a surrogatemotherarrangement,
and most important,by viewing how the variouspartiesto
the contractmay react to the disappointment.
What Might Go Wrong
Ninety-ninepercentof the surrogatemotherarrangements
may work out just fine; the child will be born normal, and
the adoptingparents(that is, the biological father and his
wife) will want it. But, what happenswhen, unforeseeably,
the child is born deformed?Since many defects cannot be
discoveredprenatallyby amniocentesisor othermeans, the
situationis bound to arise.8Similarly,considerwhat would
happenif the biological fatherwere to die beforethe birthof
the child. Or if the "child"turnsout to be twins or triplets.
Each of these instancesposes an inevitablesituationwhere
the adoptingparentsmay be unhappywith the prospectof
gettingthe child or children.Althoughlegislationcan mandate that the adoptingparentstake the child or childrenin
whatever condition they come or whatever the situation,
providedthe surrogatemotherhas abidedby all the contractual provisions of the surrogatemother arrangement,the
importantpoint for our discussion is the attitudethat the
surrogatemotheror the adoptingparentmight have. Consider the example of the deformedchild.
When I participatedin the SurrogateParentFoundation's
inauguralsymposiumin November1981,I was struckby the
attitudeof both the surrogatemothersand the adoptingparents to these problems.The adoptingparentsworried,"Do
we have to take such a child?" and the surrogatemothers
said in response, "Well, we don't want to be stuckwith it."
Clearly, both groups were anxious not be responsiblefor
the "undesirablechild" born of the surrogatemother arrangement.What does this portend?
It is human naturethat when one pays money, one expects value. Things that one pays for have a way of being
seen as commodities. Unavoidablein surrogatemotherarrangementsare questionssuch as: "Did I get a good one?"
We see similarbehaviorwith respectto the adoptionof children:comparativelyspeaking,thereis no shortageof black,
Mexican-American,mentally retarded, or older children
seeking homes; the shortage is in attractive, intelligentlooking Caucasianbabies.9Similarly, surrogatemotherarrangementsinvolve more than just the desire to have a
child. The desire is for a certaintype of child.
But, it may be objected,don'tall parentsvoice these same
concernsin the normalcourse of having children?Not exactly. No one doubtsor minimizesthe pain and disappointmentparentsfeel whenthey lear thattheirchild is bornwith
some genetic or congenitalbirthdefect. But this is different
fromthe surrogatemothersituation,whereneitherthe surrogate mothernor the adoptingparentsmay feel responsible,
andbothsides may feel thatthey have a legitimateexcuse not
to assumeresponsibilityfor the child. The surrogatemother
might blame the biological father for having "defective
sperm," as the adoptingparentsmight blame the surrogate
motherfor a "defectiveovum" or for impropercare of the
fetus duringpregnancy.The adoptingparentsdesire a normal child, not this child in any condition,and the surrogate
motherdoesn't want it in any event. So both sides will feel
threatenedby the birth of an "undesirablechild." Like
bruisedfruitin the producebin of a supermarket,thischild is
likely to become an object of avoidance.
Certainly, in the natural course of having children a
mothermay doubt whethershe wants a child if the father
has died before its birth;parentsmay shy away from a defective infant, or be distressed at the thought of multiple
births.Nevertheless,I believe they aremorelikely to accept
these contingenciesas a matterof fate. I do not thinkthis is
the case with surrogatemotherarrangements.After all, in
the surrogatemotherarrangementthe adoptingparentscan
blame someone outside the maritalrelationship.The surrogate motherhas been hostingthis child all along, and she is
deliveringit. It certainlylooks far more like a commodity
than the child that arrivesin the naturalcourse within the
family unit.
A Dangerous Agenda
Anothersocial problem, which arises out of the first, is
the fear that surrogatemotherarrangementswill fall prey to
eugenic concerns.'?Surrogatemother contracts typically
have clauses requiringgenetic tests of the fetus and stating
thatthe surrogatemothermusthave an abortion(or keep the
child herself) if the child does not pass these tests."
In the last decade we have witnessed a renaissanceof
interestin eugenics. This, coupled with advances in biomedical technology, has createda host of abuses and new
moral problems. For example, genetic counseling clinics
now face a dilemma: amniocentesis, the same procedure
that identifies whethera fetus suffers from certaingenetic
defects, also discloses the sex of a fetus. Geneticcounseling
clinics have reportedthat even when the fetus is normal, a
numberof mothersabortfemale children.'
disproportionate
Aborting normal fetuses simply because the prospective
parentsdesirechildrenof a certainsex is one resultof viewing childrenas commodities.The recent scandalat the Repositoryfor GerminalChoice, the so-called "Nobel Sperm
Bank," providesanotherchillingexample. Theirfirst"customer"was, unbeknownstto the staff, a woman who "had
lost custodyof two otherchildrenbecausethey were abused
37
The Hastings Center
This content downloaded from 193.0.118.39 on Thu, 02 Apr 2015 08:55:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
_
in an effort to 'make them smart."'"Of course, these and
similar evils may occur whether or not surrogatemother
arrangementsare allowedby law. But to the extentthatthey
promote the view of children as commodities, these arrangementscontributeto these problems. There is nothing
wrong with striving for betterment,as long as it does not
result in intoleranceto that which is not perfect. But I fear
that the latterattitudewill become prevalent.
Sanctioningsurrogatemotherarrangementscan also exert
pressuresupon the family structure.First, as was notedearlier, there is nothingtechnicallyto preventthe use of surrogate mother arrangementsby single males desiring to
become parents.Indeed, single females can alreadydo this
with AID or even withoutit. But even if legislationwere to
limit the use of the surrogatemotherarrangementto infertile couples, otherpressureswould occur:namelythe intrusion of a thirdadult into the maritalcommunity.'4I do not
thinkthat society is ready to accept either single parenting
or quasi-adulterousarrangementsas normal.
Another stress on the family structurearises within the
family of the surrogatemother. When the child is surrendered to the adoptingparentsit is removed not only from
the surrogatemother, but also from her family. They too
have intereststo be considered. Do not the siblings of that
child have an interestin the fact thattheirlittle babybrother
has been "given" away?15One woman, the mother of a
medical studentwho had often donatedspermfor artificial
insemination,expressedher feelings to me eloquently. She
asked, "I wonder how many grandchildrenI have that I
have never seen and never been able to hold or cuddle."
Intrafamilytensions can also be expected to result in the
family of the adoptingparentsdue to the asymmetryof relationship the adopting parentswill have toward the child.
The adopting motherhas no biological relationshipto the
child, whereasthe adoptingfatheris also the child's biological father. Won'tthis unequalbiological claim on the child
be used as a wedge in child-rearingarguments?Can't we
imaginethe fathersaying, "Well, he is my son, not yours"?
What if the couple eventually gets divorced? Should
custody in a subsequent divorce between the adopting
motherand the biological fatherbe treatedsimply as a normal child custody dispute? Or should the biological relationship between father and child weigh more heavily?
These questions do not arise in typical adoptionsituations
since both parentsare equally unrelatedbiologically to the
child. Indeed, in adoptionthereis symmetry.The surrogate
mother situation is more analogous to second marriages,
where the children of one party by a prior marriageare
adopted by the new spouse. Since asymmetryin second
marriagesituationscauses problems,we can anticipatesimilardifficultiesarisingfrom surrogatemotherarrangements.
There is also the worry that the offspring of a surrogate
motherarrangementwill be deprivedof importantinformation about his or her heritage. This also happens with
adoptedchildrenor childrenconceived by AID,'6who lack
38
On the Legislative Front
The first bill to cover surrogatemother arrangements
was introducedin the Alaska House of Representatives
in 1981, and since then at least five other states-California, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, and South Carolinahave considered or are planning to debate legislation on
this issue. However, so far no state has actually enacted
any law. The Michigan bill, HB 5184, on which the
South Carolinaproposal is modeled, would regulate the
process by spelling out the specifics of the Probate
Court's "order of filiation" establishing paternity, of a
consent to relinquish parental rights by the surrogate
mother, and of the adoption of the child by the wife of
the biologic father. Includedin the bill is a list of criteria
for the evaluation of the suitability of the couple for
"surrogate adoption." The California bill, AB 3771,
would "facilitate the inability of infertile couples to become parentsthroughthe employmentof the services of
a surrogate." -C.L.
information about their biological parents, which could be
importantto them medically. Anotherless popularlyrecognized problem is the danger of half-sibling marriages,17
where the child of the surrogate mother unwittingly falls in
love with a half sister or brother.The only way to avoid
these problemsis to dispensewith the confidentialityof parental records;however, the naturalparentsmay not always
want their identity disclosed.
The legalization of surrogatemother arrangementsmay
also put undue pressure upon poor women to use their
bodies in this way to supportthemselvesand theirfamilies.
Analogousproblemshave arisenin the past with the use of
paid blood donors.'8 And occasionally the press reports
someone desperateenough to offer to sell an eye or some
otherorgan.9 I believe thatcertainthings shouldbe viewed
as too importantto be sold as commodities,and I hope that
we have advancedfrom the time when parentsraised childrenfor profitablelabor, or found themselvesforced to sell
their children.
While many of the social dilemmasI have outlinedhere
have their analogies in other present-day occurrences such
as divorced families or in adoption, every addition is hurtful. Legalizing surrogate mother arrangements will increase
the frequency of these problems, and put more stress on our
society's shared moral values.20
A Tale for Our Time
An infertile couple might prefer to raise a child with a
biological relationship to the husband, rather than to raise
an adopted child who has no biological relationship to either
The Hastings Center Report, October 1983
This content downloaded from 193.0.118.39 on Thu, 02 Apr 2015 08:55:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
the husband or the wife. But does the marginal increase in
joy that they might therefore experience outweigh the
potential pain that they, or the child conceived in such arrangements, or others might suffer? Does their preference
outweigh the social costs and problems that the legalization
of surrogate mothering might well engender? I honestly do
not know. I don't even know on what hypothetical scale
such interests could be weighed and balanced. But even if
we could weigh such interests, and even if personal preference outweighed the costs, I still would not be able to say
that we could justify achieving those ends by these means;
that ethically it would be permissible for a person to create a
child, not because she desired it, but because it could be
useful to her.
Edmond Cahn has termed this ignoring of means in the
attainment of ends the "Pompey syndrome":21
I have taken the name from young Sextus Pompey, who appears in Shakespeare'sAntony and Cleopatra in an incident
drawn directly from Plutarch. Pompey, whose navy has won
controlof the seas aroundItaly, comes to negotiatepeace with
the RomantriumvirsMarkAntony, OctaviusCaesar, and Lepidus, and they meet in a roisteringpartyon Pompey's ship. As
they carouse, one of Pompey'slieutenantsdrawshim aside and
whispersthat he can become lord of all the world if he will only
grantthe lieutenantleave to cut firstthe mooringcable and then
the throatsof the triumvirs.Pompeypauses, thenrepliesin these
words:
Ah, this thou shouldsthave done,
And not have spoke on't!
In me 'tis villainy;
In thee't had been good service.
Thou must know tis not my profitthat does lend mine honour;
Mine honour, it. Repentthat e'er thy tongue
Hath so betrayedthine act; being done unknown;
I should have found it afterwardswell done,
But must condemn it now. Desist, and drink.
Herewe have the most pervasiveof moralsyndromes,the one
most characteristicof so-called respectablemen in a civilized
society. To possess the end and yet not be responsiblefor the
means, to grasp the fruit while disavowing the tree, to escape
being told the cost untilsomeoneelse has paidit irrevocably;this
is the Pompey syndromeand the chief hypocrisyof our time.
REFERENCES
1SeePhilip J. Parker,"Motivationof SurrogateMothers:InitialFindings," AmericanJournal of Psychiatry 140:1(January1983), 117-18;see
also Doe v. Kelley, Circuit Court of Wayne County Michigan (1980)
reportedin 1980 Rep. on HumanReproductionand Law II-A-1.
2See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Supp. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977);
"Why She Wentto 'Nobel SpermBank'for Child,"Los Angeles Herald
Examiner,Aug. 6, 1982, p. A9; "Wombfor Rent,"Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, Sept. 21, 1981,p. A3.
3See also RichardMcCormick, "ReproductiveTechnologies:Ethical
Issues" in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, edited by WalterReich, Vol. 4
(New York:The Free Press, 1978) pp. 1454, 1459;RobertSnowden and
G. D. Mitchell, The ArtificialFamily (London:George Allen & Unwin,
1981), p. 71.
4See, e.g., AlexanderPeters, "The Brave New World:Can the Law
Bring OrderWithinTraditionalConceptsof Due Process?"SuffolkLaw
Review 4 (1970), 894, 901-02;RodericGorney, "The New Biology and
the Futureof Man," UCLALaw Review 15 (1968), 273, 302; J. G. Castel, "Legal Implicationsof Biomedical Science and Technologyin the
Twenty-FirstCentury,"CanadianBar Review 51 (1973), 119, 127.
5SeeHarryNelson, "MaintainingDead to Serve as Blood MakersProposed:Logical, SociologistSays," Los AngelesTimes, February26, 1974
p. II-1;Hans Jonas, "Againstthe Stream:Commentson the Definition
and Redefinitionof Death," in Philosophical Essays: From Ancient
Creed to TechnologicalMan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974), pp. 132-40.
6See Leo Alexander,"MedicalScience underDictatorship,"New England Journalof Medicine241:2(1949), 39; United Statesv. Brandt,Trial
of the MajorWarCriminals,InternationalMilitaryTribunal:Nuremberg,
14 November 1945-1October1946.
7Bob Dvorchak, "SurrogateMothers:PregnantIdea Now a Pregnant
Business," Los Angeles Herald Examiner, December27, 1983, p. Al.
8"Surrogate'sBaby Born with DeformitiesRejectedby All," Los Angeles Times, January22, 1983, p. 1-17;"Man Who Hired SurrogateDid
Not FatherAiling Baby," Los Angeles Herald Examiner, February3,
1983, p. A-6.
9See, e.g., Adoptionin America,Hearingbeforethe Subcommitteeon
Aging, Family and HumanServices of the Senate Committeeon Labor
and Human Resources, 97th Congress. 1st Session (1981), p. 3 (comments of SenatorJeremiahDenton) and pp. 16-17(statementof Warren
Master,Acting Commissionerof Administrationfor Children,Youthand
Families, HHS).
'0Cf. "Discussion:Moral,Social and EthicalIssues," in Law and Ethics of A.I.D. and EmbryoTransfer(1973) (commentsof Himmelweit);
reprintedin Michael Shapiroand Roy Spece, Bioethics and Law (St.
Paul: West PublishingCompany, 1981), p. 548.
"See, e.g., Lane (Newsday), "Womb for Rent," Tucson Citizen
(Weekender),June7, 1980, p. 3; SusanLewis, "Baby Bartering?Surrogate MothersPose Issues for Lawyers, Courts,"The Los Angeles Daily
Journal, April20, 1981;see also ElaineMarkoutsas,"WomenWhoHave
Babies for OtherWomen,"Good Housekeeping96 (April 1981), 104.
2SeeMortonA. Stenchever,"An Abuse of PrenatalDiagnosis,"Journal of the AmericanMedicalAssociation 221 (1972), 408; CharlesWestoff andRonaldR. Rindfus, "Sex Preselectionin the United States:Some
Implications,"Science 184 (1974), 633, 636; see also PhyllisBattelle, "Is
It a Boy or a Girl"?Los AngelesHeraldExaminer,Oct. 8, 1981,p. A17.
3"2 ChildrenTakenfrom SpermBank Mother,"Los Angeles Times,
July 14, 1982; p. I-3; "The Sperm-BankScandal,"Newsweek 24 (July
26, 1982).
'4SeeHelmutThielicke,The Ethics of Sex, JohnW. Doberstein,trans.
(New York:Harper& Row, 1964).
'According to one newspaperaccount, when a surrogatemotherinformed her nine-year-olddaughterthat the new baby would be given
away, the daughterreplied:"Oh, good. If it's a girl we can keep it and
give Jeffrey [her two-year-oldhalf brother]away." "Wombfor Rent,"
Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Sept. 21, 1981, p. A3.
"See, e.g., LorraineDusky, "BraveNew Babies"?Newsweek30 (December6, 1982). Also testimonyof SuzanneRubinbeforethe California
Assembly Committeeon Judiciary,SurrogateParentingContracts,Assembly PublicationNo. 962, pp. 72-75 (November 19, 1982).
'7Thishas posed an increasingproblemfor childrenconceived through
AID. See, e.g., MartinCurie-Cohen,et al., "CurrentPracticeof Artificial Inseminationby Donor in the United States,"New EnglandJournal
of Medicine 300 (1979), 585-89.
"See e.g., RichardM. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship:From Human
Blood to Social Policy (New York:RandomHouse, 1971).
LSee, e.g., "Man Desperatefor Funds:Eye for Sale at $35,000," Los
Angeles Times, February1, 1975, p. II-1; "100 Answer Man's Ad for
New Kidney," Los Angeles Times, September12, 1974, p. 1-4.
20See generally Guido Calabresi, "Reflectionson Medical Experimentationin Humans,"Daedalus 98 (1969), 387-93; also see Michael
Shapiro and Roy Spece, "On Being 'Unprincipledon Principle':The
Limits of Decision Making'On the Merits,"'in Bioethics and Law, pp.
67-71.
21EdmondCahn, "Drug Experimentsand the Public Conscience," in
Drugs in Our Society, edited by Paul Talalay (Baltimore:The Johns
HopkinsPress, 1964), pp. 255, 258-61.
The Hastings Center
39
This content downloaded from 193.0.118.39 on Thu, 02 Apr 2015 08:55:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions