`Teen Brain` Science and the Contemporary Storying of Psychological

‘Teen Brain’ Science and the Contemporary Storying of Psychological (Im)maturity
Monica A. Payne
Wilhelm Wundt’s establishment of the first experimental laboratory in 1879 is often
cited as a chronological marker of the emergence of psychology as a new discipline.
Although Wundt vigorously supported maintenance of links with the ‘social’ sciences, the
desire to secure a distinctive contribution to the study of human behaviour would promote
psychology’s allegiance to the natural science paradigm of systematic and objective
measurement, and generally discourage researchers to explore potential benefits of a
multidisciplinary perspective on developmental issues. My objective in this paper is to
interrogate possible consequences of the ongoing scientism within developmental
psychology as it contributes to the contemporary storying of adolescence to affect not only
the positioning of young people within society but also to theorising of (im)maturity across
the entire lifespan. Somewhat ironically, but perhaps inevitably, this involves engagement
with the conceptual legacy of Erik Erikson––one of the very few writers of influence within
mainstream developmental psychology both avowedly multidisciplinary and staunchly
nonempiricist. Under scrutiny is ‘resolving the identity crisis’, while the tool I choose to
utilize is his notion of ‘cogwheeling of the generations’––which invites examination of how
the discursive construction of adolescence may be seen as influenced by, and as having an
influence on, the psychological nature of all other lifespan stages.
Erikson had offered mid-twentieth century Western society a view of adolescence
focused on the developmental task of ‘identity achievement’.1 He proposed the second
decade of life should ideally be a ‘moratorium’ or ‘time out’ from ‘adult’ responsibilities of
marriage, childbearing and economic contribution to allow the psychological exploration
required to replace the ‘conferred’ self of childhood with a ‘constructed’ identity to carry
forward into adulthood. Although this ideal was soon attacked as having Eurocentric,
androcentric and classist limitations,2,3 it was in many respects ‘right for the times’. James
Marcia and other enthusiastic researchers would subsequently provide empirical support
lacking in Erikson’s own writing and arguably succeed in gaining acceptance for identity
achievement as the more universal marker of psychological health Erikson envisaged. As
participation in tertiary level study increased, many writers shifted completion of the process
into the third decade.4,5
By the turn of the century new challenges emerged. It was suggested, for example,
that contemporary societal demands for, and expectations of, personal and vocational
flexibility now disrupted the relationship between moratorium and achievement and was
1
possibly making the goal of strong and secure commitment to particular identities
psychologically counterproductive.6 It was also being argued that adolescence for many was
becoming less a period of freedom and opportunity and more one of dysfunctionally
retarded progress towards social maturity, Writing about North American culture, for
example, Thomas Hine observed:
When I speak about the rise of the teenager, I’m really talking about the
acceptance of the idea that youth is a time for experimentation and protracted
preparation, usually in school. … For many individuals, such a long period of
education, exploration, and deferred responsibility has been a tremendous gift.
For other individuals, it has not been a blessing. The absence of a significant
economic role for young people has made them dependent on their families for
longer periods than their ancestors often were. Young people are often judged to
be less able than they are. The concept of the teenager has been an impediment
that has kept them from becoming the people they are ready to be.7
Others were speaking of a growing segregation of adolescents and adults in Western society
that was creating a climate in which the adolescent is at once both infantilized and feared––
resulting, as Robert Epstein put it, in a ‘vicious cycle in which restrictions on teens have
produced more teen problems and teen problems have in turn produced more restrictions.’8
Epstein has recently argued for a revision of developmental theorising that would encourage
‘rediscovery’ of the competent teenager, while adolescent scholar Daniel Offer has long
encouraged psychologists to recognise that ‘Cultural definitions of what is desirable or
expectable have a significant impact on the adolescent’s psychological experience of
puberty.’9 Nonetheless, despite by now being almost taken for granted in sociological
writing on childhood and youth, a social constructionist perspective was still being widely
ignored or resisted within psychology by the time a new storyline entered the picture. Even
as deconstruction of the notions of hormonal ‘storm and stress’ and adolescent moratorium
gained momentum,10,11 neuroscience research started producing data seeming to offer not
merely support for the psychological ideal of delayed adulthood but evidence for its
biological authorization.
Advances in non-invasive brain imaging technology during the 1990s, particularly
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), allowed researchers to acquire a more detailed
knowledge of brain development throughout childhood and beyond. Overturning
assumptions that hardwiring of the brain was mostly completed in the first three years,
2
studies unexpectedly revealed a further major period of neuronal growth and pruning
beginning in early adolescence. Moreover, maturation of the pre-frontal cortex––responsible
for the so-called ‘executive functions’ of planning, judgment and impulse control––was
shown not to be finalized until at least the mid-20s, and scans of the brain in action
performing recognition and problem-solving tasks also suggested that until structural
maturation is complete young people must rely on less sophisticated areas of the brain for
processing emotions and interpreting social situations.12,13 This seemed to explain––even
more successfully than the traditional ‘storm and stress’ story––why teenagers may be able
to demonstrate reasonable decision making skills under certain “cold cognition” conditions
but experience far more problems than adults when operating under ‘hot’ or high arousal
conditions,14 and so to confirm the ‘fact’ of their behavioural unpredictability. Pioneer
researcher Jay Giedd of the U.S. National Institutes of Health managed to significantly
enhance the status of this account by introducing the now widely established catchphrase of
the adolescent brain as ‘a work in progress’.
The teen brain literature had immediate appeal for mainstream developmental
psychology. Although some fairly authoritative caveats might give the impression this
enthusiasm generally remains tempered by caution––or example, as late as 2008 eminent
psychologist Laurence Steinberg admitted that ‘much of what is written about the neural
underpinnings of adolescent behaviour … is what we might characterize as “reasonable
speculation”’,15 while leading textbook author John Santrock continues to advise students
the study of brain development in adolescence remains ‘in its infancy’16––the weight of
evidence suggests the opposite. Interpretations of MRI data have been characteristically
embraced and embellished in uncritical fashion and quickly on-sold as essentially
uncontested advice for policy makers, practitioners and the general public. According to
Judith Bessant:
Those who popularise the idea of ‘the adolescent brain’ are so confident that
they argue that anyone questioning or rejecting ‘the science specifically around
adolescent brain development’ is a bit like being a member of the Flat Earth
society.17
What explains developmental psychologists’ unguarded willingness to buy into the
teen brain story? Arguably, as suggested above, a major reason was compatibility with the
visions of adolescence offered by its earlier eminent theorists, Hall and Erikson. The
pictures they supplied of adolescents as––either ideally or unavoidably––moody, stubborn,
3
rebellious, risk-taking, irresponsible and unpredictable was well established as the discourse
into which Western (perhaps particularly Anglophone) teenagers were being socialised.
Interpretations of teen brain research were instantly at home in this discursive environment
and served to expand and reinforce it. In addition, these studies appeared to be offering
neutral and objective ‘hard science’ that could be accorded a priori legitimacy even when
they were small and exploratory. Although Bessant rightly points out the need to
acknowledge a distinction between the research findings themselves and how they are being
interpreted and used by others, it is also true to say that some neuroscientists have––in
interview if not in writing––encouraged unwarranted readings of their own data.
This paper is not primarily designed as a contribution to the developing critique of
the teen brain story but it may here be worth including some demonstration of its scope in
pushing the boundaries of pre-existing versions of adolescent immaturity. It has apparently
persuaded some writers that lack of a fully mature pre-frontal cortex implies almost zero
ability to plan ahead or make good decisions––for example, Australian psychologist Michael
Carr-Gregg offered the following expert advice after a fatal car crash:
Teenage boys flirt on the edges of danger. They engage in risky behaviour
because they think they have a cloak of invulnerability draped around them.
They believe that nothing will ever happen to them. Recent advances in
functional MRI technology ….demonstrate that adolescents have significant
neurological deficiencies that cause stark limitations of judgment. … It is clear
from the research that a unique characteristic of adolescent boys is an inability to
predict the consequences of their actions. …So part of the reason for what
happened on Sunday night is that the driver was a teenage boy and his brain was
simply not capable of making a sensible judgment.18
Campaigning for abolition of the death penalty for minors, the International Justice Project
invoked the teen brain to claim:
The inability of adolescents’ (sic) to fully understand the consequences of their
actions in the adult sense impacts upon their culpability in committing the
deviant act. Teenagers look only to the immediate future, with a time horizon
of 1 – 3 days. The lack of capacity to plan ahead exemplifies the problems in
treating the culpability of adolescents in the same way as that of a fully mature
adult.19
4
Neuroscientist Deborah Yurgelun-Todd has explained in interview that teen brain research
should help adults understand that ‘the teenager is not going to take the information that is in
the outside world and organize it and understand it the same way we do.’20 Her (admittedly
originally questionable) examples ended up thus recycled in an online article for educators,
health professionals and youth workers:
Asking a teenager to multi-task (i.e. ‘Clean your room, take the garbage out, and
put your bicycle away’) can overwhelm an adolescent brain that is just learning
how to sort and prioritize.21
Notwithstanding the fact that other researchers meaningfully study the development of
empathy in early childhood, British neuroscientist Sarah-Jayne Blakemore is quoted in
interviews suggesting this is a quality apparently no longer to be found in teenagers:
There’s a whole host of things that teenagers are famous for. Yes, being
impulsive, being risk-takers, not being very good at empathy, not being very
sociable, or at least sociable with certain groups but not with others like adults.22
We think that a teenager’s judgment of what they would do in a given situation
is driven by the simple question: “What would I do?” Blakemore said. “Adults,
on the other hand, ask: “What would I do, given how I would feel and given how
the people around me would feel as a result of my actions?”23
Some writers have used neuroscience to justify positioning adolescents essentially outside
society as ‘no longer normal’ in mental health terms.24,25 In his best-seller Michael Bradley
told parents of teens to expect a repeat of toddlerhood, because ‘Both that toddler and
adolescent brain are at times unstable, dysfunctional, and completely unpredictable.’26 He
advised:
Don’t talk to crazy people like they make sense. …Your child doesn’t qualify as
sane for now, and that’s not a happy way to be … Adolescence, at times, is a
kind of mental illness.27
I am not the first to complain about such talk,28,29,30 but here I am most interested in
exploring implications for the discursive construction of the lifespan beyond the teenage
5
years, taking on board Erikson’s ideas about the psychological interface between
generations:
By cogwheeling, Erikson meant to show how the various life stages of persons
interconnect with the stages of other-generational persons and how that series of
generational wheels supports and moves each other along through time. At their
best, these operate with strength and support, functioning as a set of tightly
connected, smoothly fitting cogs that bolster abilities and ease transitions instead
of roughly abrading or disconnecting.31
I suggest the idea of cogwheeling invites consideration of at least the following. First, it
demands historical location the teen brain story within the broader framework of a century
or more of ‘scientific’ accounts of development that have served to pathologize/marginalize
particular populations and groups. Most obviously, therefore, it may be recognised that
[C]laims that young people are naturally irrational or anti-social entails the same
kind of prejudice displayed by those who spoke of the ‘Jewish brain’, the
‘female brain’ or the ‘Negro brain’ to explain how those groups were both
different and problematic.32
It might be argued that the ‘teen’ brain differs from its other prejudiced counterparts in not
constituting a handicap ‘for life’––but if so it is worth considering what purpose this
exaggerated picture of second decade incompetence performs in relation to psychology’s reconstruction of developmental stages and tasks for the third and fourth decades of life. Thus
far it has produced interesting controversy regarding the ‘labelling’ of individuals during the
third decade. Some favour retention of the term ‘adolescent’ for those in their early twenties
to be followed by ‘early adulthood’, while probably the most widely embraced of recent
innovations is Jeffrey Arnett’s proposal for the new stage of ‘emerging adulthood’ for the
years 18 – 25 (and possibly longer).33 Arnett said it is pointless for psychology to call people
in their early/mid twenties ‘adolescents’ when they themselves would never use the term––
but are yet also unlikely to think of themselves as ‘adult’. Moreover, he argued, viewing
oneself as an adult in today’s world has much less to do with biology and much more with
subjective feelings of autonomy. Anecdotal evidence from discussions at conferences
suggests those who align themselves with the apparent implications of teen brain research
tend to vehemently reject Arnett’s concept as unnecessary and/or ‘unscientific’, preferring to
6
retain the model that better accommodates a story of prolonged immaturity, and it arguably
remains more generally true that psychologists are much less likely than sociologists to
criticise the research literature as ‘adultist’––that is, to explicitly acknowledge its promotion
of a view of adolescence that overwhelmingly reflects how adults view teenagers rather than
how teenagers view themselves.
It seems also worth exploring similarities between teen brain implications for
adolescent behaviour and more disparate manifestations of scientific pathologizing––for
example, the hard-to-shift notion that women become ‘slightly mad’ during menstruation.34
Concerns currently appear to be growing around the ‘new human phenomena’ created by
interface between decline in age of onset of puberty (especially in girls) and new
interpretations of adolescent social/emotional immaturity.35 How might this also interface
with pressures on young girls to look older, on women to look younger, and the
pathologizing of both teenage pregnancy and the menopause? Alternatively, how is the teen
brain story interfacing with contemporary discourses of masculinity and boys’ educational
underachievement? To avoid simplistic answers Mike Males cautions that:
Biodeterminist claims are the most profound and potentially dangerous that
scientists can make about human beings. They posit a group as innately limited
by unalterable biology. …When groups labelled by scientists as biologically
limited are also publicly feared and politically powerless––as they always seem
to be before brain scientists appear on the scene––legal and social repressions
can be serious and long-lasting.36
The teen brain story also raises some important questions about the discursive
construction of ‘maturity’. In this literature adolescents (and young people who would
probably no longer answer to that label) are regularly compared to the ‘fully mature adult’,
who apparently no longer manifests any of the immature shortcomings noted above.
However, as Bessant observed, ‘the accompanying prejudice that adults are models of
rationality, morality and good judgment and are prosocial is not well grounded.’37 Males
claims that (in the US at least) many of the ‘risk factors’ allegedly associated with biological
immaturity are actually better predicted by socioeconomic status: that is, the experiences and
behaviours of teenagers and middle-aged adults living in poverty are more similar than those
of poor and wealthy teens or poor and wealthy adults.38
Taking an alternative perspective, much advice to parents underpinned by the teen
brain story requires them to be prepared both to maintain the responsibilities of surveillance,
7
protection and providing ‘good role models’ over a considerably extended period yet expect
to live with young people who they cannot expect to understand or even like. In the context
of the trend for later childbearing, this potentially has significant implications for
developmental expectations in middle age.
Approaching from yet another angle, there could also be value in exploring the teen
brain story within the broader context of a contemporary lifespan discourse characterised by
veneration of protracted youthfulness. Although this is an issue normally discussed with
regard to physical health and appearance, there has not as yet been (to my knowledge) any
published discussion of the interface between teen brain research and the emerging notion of
‘psychological neoteny’, even though there would seem to be obvious connections with
some of the changing societal conditions noted earlier. Promoting this hypothesis Bruce
Charlton has suggested:
So long as a person is in formal education, or is open to the possibility of
returning for more formal education, their minds are in a significant sense
‘unfinished’ … we may expect to accumulate ever-more chronologically middleaged and elderly people who remain youthfully-minded. …The modern
exemplary geriatric should continue to compete for high status, remain actively
interested in love and sex, show themselves adaptive to change, and continually
seek new experiences and challenges. Because such attributes are highly valued,
they seem to have become much more common.39
There seems to be a notable contrast between this developmental storying of older people
rising to new challenges and experiences and that of teenagers rendered vulnerable or
dangerous by their unwise risk-taking. But are both stories in fact problematic, or can both
be envisaged as holding more positive than negative potential? How will they ‘cogwheel’
and influence each other? Taking an optimistic view, positive outcomes might be possible.
Yet for the time being it is arguably hard to avoid seeing the teen brain story as serving only
to foster disrespectful attitudes to young people and encouraging ‘abrading and
disconnecting’ rather than the facilitation of healthy and productive intergenerational
relations.
8
Endnotes
1.
EH Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis, Norton, New York, 1968.
2.
C Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
3.
BR Slugoski & GP Ginsberg, ‘Ego Identity and Explanatory Speech’, in Texts of
Identity, J Shotter & KJ Gergen (eds), Sage, London, 1989, pp. 36-55.
4.
T Honess & K Yardley (eds), Self and Identity: Perspectives Across The Lifespan,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1987.
5.
JJ Arnett, ‘Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens
through the Twenties’, American Psychologist, vol. 55, no. 5, 2000, pp. 469-480.
6.
JE Côté & SJ Schwartz, ‘Comparing Psychological and Sociological Approaches to
Identity: Identity Status, Identity Capital, and the Individualization Process’, Journal
of Adolescence, vol. 25, no. 6, 2002, pp. 571-586.
7.
T Hine, The Rise and Fall of the American Teenager, Avon Books, New York, 1999,
p. 7.
8.
R Epstein, The Case Against Adolescence: Rediscovering the Adult in Every Teen,
Quill Driver Books, Sanger, 2007, p. 374.
9.
D Offer & KA Schonert-Reichl, ‘Debunking the Myths of Adolescence: Findings
from Recent Research’, Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, vol. 31, no. 6, 1992, pp. 1003-1014.
10.
GS Hall, Adolescence, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1904.
11.
Erikson, op. cit.
12.
JN Giedd, ‘The Teen Brain: Insights from Neuroimaging’, Journal of Adolescent
Health, vol. 42, no. 4, 2008, pp. 335-343.
13.
D Yurgelun-Todd, ‘Emotional and Cognitive Changes during Adolescence’, Current
Opinion in Neurobiology, vol. 17, no. 2, 2007, pp. 251-257.
14.
L Steinberg, ‘Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence’, Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, vol. 9, no. 2, 2005, pp. 69-74.
15.
L Steinberg, ‘A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-taking’,
Developmental Review, vol. 28, no. 1, 2008, p. 81.
16.
JW Santrock, Life-span Development, 12th edn, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2009, p. 360.
17.
J Bessant, ‘Hard Wired for Risk: Neurological Science, ‘The Adolescent Brain’ and
Developmental Theory’, Journal of Youth Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 2008, p. 348.
9
18.
M Carr-Gregg, ‘Dr Michael Carr-Gregg: Answers to an Accident’, Herald Sun, 11
December 2007, viewed on 2 June 2009,
<http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,22901382-5000117,00.html>.
19.
‘Brain Development, Culpability and the Death Penalty’, The International
Justice Project, n.d., viewed on 16 December 2008,
<http://www.internationaljusticeproject .org/pdfs/juvBrainDev.pdf>.
20.
‘Interview: Deborah Yurgelun-Todd’, Public Broadcasting Service, 2002, viewed
on 10 December 2008,
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html>.
21.
LB Chamberlain, ‘The Amazing Adolescent Brain: Translating Science into
Strategies’, Institute for Safe Families, 2008, viewed on 2 June 2009,
<http://instituteforsafefamilies.org/pdf/theamazingbrain/The_Amazing_Adolescent
_Brain.pdf>.
22.
‘Teenagers’ Brains’, ABC Radio National, 14 October 2006, viewed on 11
December 2008,
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/scienceshow/stories/2006/1764412.htm>.
23.
S Goudarzi, ‘Study: Teen Brain Lacks Empathy: Area of Brain Associated with
Higher-level Thinking Underused in Youths’, MNSBC, 8 September 2006, viewed
on 2 June 2009,
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14738243>.
24.
B Strauch, The Primal Teen: What the New Discoveries about the Teenage Brain
Tell Us about our Kids, Doubleday, New York, 2003.
25.
N Latta, Before Your Teenagers Drive You Crazy, Read This! HarperCollins,
Auckland, 2008.
26.
MJ Bradley, Yes, Your Teen is Crazy! Loving Your Kid Without Losing Your
Mind, Harbor Press, Gig Harbor, 2001, p. 8.
27.
ibid., p. 15.
28.
Bessant, op. cit.
29.
R Epstein, ‘The Myth of the Teen Brain’, Scientific American Mind, vol.18, no. 2,
2007, pp. 56-64.
30.
M Males, ‘Does the Adolescent Brain Make Risk Taking Inevitable? A Skeptical
Appraisal’, Journal of Adolescent Research, vol. 24, no. 1, 2009, pp. 3-20.
31.
CH Hoare, Erikson on Development in Adulthood, Oxford University Press, New
York, 2002, p. 156.
32.
Bessant, op. cit., p. 357.
10
33.
Arnett, op. cit.
34.
AE Walker, The Menstrual Cycle, Routledge, London, 1997.
35.
ME Hermann-Giddens, ‘The Decline in the Age of Menarche in the United States:
Should We Be Concerned?’, Journal of Adolescent Health, vol. 40, no. 3, 2007, pp.
201-203.
36.
Males, op. cit., p. 5.
37.
Bessant, op. cit., p. 357.
38.
Males, op. cit.
39.
BG Charlton, ‘The Rise of the Boy-Genius: Psychological Neoteny, Science and
Modern Life, Medical Hypotheses, vol. 67, no. 4, 2006, p. 680.
Bibliography
Arnett, JJ, ‘Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens through
the Twenties’. American Psychologist, vol. 55, no. 5, 2000, pp. 469-480.
Bessant, J, ‘Hard Wired for Risk: Neurological Science, ‘The Adolescent Brain’ and
Developmental Theory’. Journal of Youth Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 2008, pp. 347-360.
Bradley, MJ, Yes, Your Teen is Crazy! Loving Your Kid Without Losing Your Mind. Harbor
Press, Gig Harbor, 2001,
‘Brain Development, Culpability and the Death Penalty’. The International Justice
Project, n.d., viewed on 16 December 2008,
<http://www.internationaljusticeproject .org/pdfs/juvBrainDev.pdf>.
Carr-Gregg, M, ‘Dr Michael Carr-Gregg: Answers to an Accident’. Herald Sun, 11
December 2007, viewed on 2 June 2009,
<http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,22901382-5000117,00.html>.
Chamberlain, LB, ‘The Amazing Adolescent Brain: Translating Science into Strategies’,
Institute for Safe Families, 2008, viewed on 2 June 2009,
http://instituteforsafefamilies.org/pdf/theamazingbrain/The_Amazing_Adolescent
_Brain.pdf
Charlton, BG, ‘The Rise of the Boy-Genius: Psychological Neoteny, Science and Modern
Life. Medical Hypotheses, vol. 67, no. 4, 2006, pp. 679-681.
Côté, JE & SJ Schwartz, ‘Comparing Psychological and Sociological Approaches to
Identity: Identity Status, Identity Capital, and the Individualization Process. Journal
of Adolescence, vol. 25, no. 6, 2002, pp. 571-586.
Epstein, R, The Case Against Adolescence: Rediscovering the Adult in Every Teen.
Quill Driver Books, Sanger, 2007.
11
Epstein, R, ‘The Myth of the Teen Brain’. Scientific American Mind, vol.18, no. 2,
2007, pp. 56-64.
Erikson, EH, Identity, Youth and Crisis. Norton, New York, 1968.
Giedd, JN, ‘The Teen Brain: Insights from Neuroimaging’. Journal of Adolescent Health,
vol. 42, no. 4, 2008, pp. 335-343.
Gilligan, C, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
Goudarzi, S, ‘Study: Teen Brain Lacks Empathy: Area of Brain Associated with
Higher-level Thinking Underused in Youths’. MNSBC, 8 September 2006, viewed
on 2 June 2009,
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14738243>.
Hall, GS, Adolescence. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1904.
Hermann-Giddens, ME, ‘The Decline in the Age of Menarche in the United States:
Should We Be Concerned?’. Journal of Adolescent Health, vol. 40, no. 3, 2007, pp.
201-203.
Hine, T, The Rise and Fall of the American Teenager. Avon Books, New York, 1999.
Hoare, C. H., Erikson on Development in Adulthood. Oxford University Press, New York,
2002.
Honess, T & K Yardley (eds), Self and Identity: Perspectives Across The Lifespan.
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1987.
‘Interview: Deborah Yurgelun-Todd’. Public Broadcasting Service, 2002, viewed on 10
December 2008,
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html>.
Latta, N, Before Your Teenagers Drive You Crazy, Read This! HarperCollins, Auckland,
2008.
Males, M, ‘Does the Adolescent Brain Make Risk Taking Inevitable? A Skeptical
Appraisal’. Journal of Adolescent Research, vol. 24, no. 1, 2009, pp. 3-20.
Offer, D, & KA Schonert-Reichl, ‘Debunking the Myths of adolescence: Findings from
Recent Research’. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, vol. 31, no. 6, 1992, pp. 1003-1014.
Santrock, JW, Life-span Development. 11th edn, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2009.
Slugoski, BR & GP Ginsberg, ‘Ego identity and explanatory speech’. In Texts of Identity, J
Shotter, J & KJ Gergen (eds), Sage, London, 1989, pp. 36-55.
Steinberg, L, ‘Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence’. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, vol. 9, no. 2, 2005, pp. 69-74.
12
Steinberg, L, ‘A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-taking’.
Developmental Review, vol. 28, no. 1, 2008, pp. 78-106.
Strauch, B, The Primal Teen: What the New Discoveries about the Teenage Brain
Tell Us about our Kids. Doubleday, New York, 2003.
‘Teenagers’ Brains’. ABC Radio National, 14 October 2006, viewed on 11 December 2008,
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/scienceshow/stories/2006/1764412.htm>.
Walker, AE, The Menstrual Cycle. Routledge, London, 1997.
Yurgelun-Todd, D, ‘Emotional and Cognitive Changes during Adolescence’. Current
Opinion in Neurobiology, vol. 17, no. 2, 2007, pp. 251-257.
13