Camp David Accords
1
Camp David Accords
The Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar
El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September
17, 1978, following thirteen days of secret negotiations at Camp
David.[1] The two framework agreements were signed at the White
House, and were witnessed by United States President Jimmy Carter.
The second of these frameworks, A Framework for the Conclusion of a
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, led directly to the 1979
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and resulted in Sadat and Begin sharing the
1978 Nobel Peace Prize. Little progress was achieved on the first
framework however, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,
which dealt with the Palestinian territories.
Celebrating the signing of the Camp David
Accords: Menachem Begin, Jimmy Carter,
Anwar El Sadat
Background
The Camp David Accords were the result of 18 months of intense diplomatic efforts by Egypt, Israel, and the United
States that began after Jimmy Carter became President.[2] Efforts initially focused on a comprehensive resolution of
disputes between Israel and the Arab countries, gradually evolved into a search for a bilateral agreement between
Israel and Egypt.[3]
The Carter Administration's Multilateral Approach
Upon assuming office on January 20, 1977, President Carter moved to rejuvenate the Middle East peace process that
had stalled throughout the 1976 presidential campaign in the United States. Following the advice of a Brookings
Institution report, Carter opted to replace the incremental, bilateral peace talks which had characterized Henry
Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy following the 1973 Yom Kippur War with a comprehensive, multilateral approach.
The Yom Kippur War further complicated efforts to achieve the objectives written in United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242.[4]
Carter visited the heads of state on whom he would have to rely to make any peace agreement feasible.[4] By the end
of his first year in office, he had already met with Anwar El Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, Hafez al-Assad
of Syria, and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. Despite the fact that he supported Sadat's peace initiative,[5] King Hussein
refused to take part in the peace talks;[5] Begin offered Jordan little to gain and Hussein also feared he would isolate
Jordan from the Arab world and provoke Syria and the PLO if he engaged in the peace talks as well.[5] Hafez
al-Assad, who had no particular interest in negotiating peace with Israel,[6] also refused to come to America and only
agreed to meet with Carter in Geneva.[4]
Carter's and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's exploratory meetings gave him a basic plan for reinvigorating the
peace process based on the Geneva Conference and had presented three main objectives for Arab-Israeli peace:[4]
Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace,[4] Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories gained in the Six
Day War through negotiating efforts with neighboring Arab nations to ensure that Israel's security would not be
threatened[4] and securing an undivided Jerusalem.[4]
Israel's Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and his successor, Menachem Begin were both skeptical of an international
conference.[2] While Begin, who took office in May 1977, officially favored the reconvening of the conference,
perhaps even more vocally than Rabin, and even accepted the Palestinian presence, in actuality the Israelis and the
Egyptians were secretly formulating a framework for bilateral talks. Even earlier, Begin had not been opposed to
returning the Sinai, but a major future obstacle was his firm refusal to consider relinquishing control over the West
Camp David Accords
2
Bank.[7]
The key to the arrangement between Begin and Sadat took place on Sunday, August 6, 1978, as a result of a
telephone call made that morning to the Israeli Prime Minister's office by a United States citizen who had an "Idea
For Peace." The Prime Minister had not yet arrived at his office and the caller spoke to Mr. Yechiel Kadishai, a
Begin staff head. Kadishai said that "no one was speaking with anyone and we expect a war in October." He also
told the caller that if any high level talks were to occur the caller could be assured that they would be using his
approach. Begin arrived, was informed of the plan, and contacted Sadat who agreed to the plan on that day. On the
next day, U.S. Secretary of State Vance traveled to the Middle East to obtain firsthand confirmation of the agreement
between Israel and Egypt. The following day, Tuesday, August 8, the Camp David meeting was scheduled to take
place in exactly four weeks time; on September 5, 1978. The plan was that Israel agreed on August 6 to return the
land to Egypt. Sadat’s then waning popularity would be greatly enhanced as a result of such an achievement. Israel's
security was insured by the specific activities to take place during the “transition period.” Those activities also were
included in the "Idea for Peace" communicated to Begin's office on August 6.
The Sadat peace initiative
President Anwar El Sadat came to feel that the Geneva
track peace process was more show than substance, and
was not progressing, partly due to disagreements with
his Arab (mainly Syria, Libya, and Iraq) and his
communist allies. He also lacked confidence in the
Western powers to pressure Israel after a meeting with
the Western leaders. His frustration boiled over, and
after clandestine preparatory meetings between
Egyptian and Israeli officials, unknown even to the
NATO countries, in November 1977 Anwar El Sadat
became the first Arab leader to visit Israel, thereby
implicitly recognizing Israel.
Menachem Begin, Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat at Camp David,
1978
On November 9, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat startled the world by announcing to parliament his
intention to go to Jerusalem and speak before the Knesset. Shortly afterward, the Israeli government cordially invited
him to address the Knesset in a message passed to Sadat via the US ambassador to Egypt. Ten days after his speech,
he arrived for the groundbreaking three-day visit, which launched the first peace process between Israel and an Arab
state. As would be the case with later Israeli-Arab peace initiatives, Washington was taken by surprise; the White
House and State Department were particularly concerned that Sadat was merely reaching out to reacquire Sinai as
quickly as possible, putting aside the Palestinian problem. Considered as a man with strong political convictions who
kept his eye on the main objective, Sadat had no ideological base, which made him politically inconsistent.[8] The
Sadat visit came about after he delivered a speech in Egypt stating that he would travel anywhere, "even Jerusalem,"
to discuss peace.[9] That speech led the Begin government to declare that, if Israel thought that Sadat would accept
an invitation, Israel would invite him. In Sadat's Knesset speech he talked about his views on peace, the status of
Israel's occupied territories, and the Palestinian refugee problem. This tactic went against the intentions of both the
West and the East, which were to revive the Geneva Conference.
The gesture stemmed from an eagerness to enlist the help of the NATO countries in improving the ailing Egyptian
economy, a belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world,
and a hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and her other Arab
neighbors and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin's response to Sadat's initiative, though not
what Sadat or Carter had hoped, demonstrated a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin also
saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country's best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity
Camp David Accords
to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make
unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern
communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders – summit diplomacy – would
distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. Carter's people apparently had no inkling of the secret talks in Morocco
between Dayan and Sadat's representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat's initiative. Indeed, in a
sense Egypt and Israel were ganging up to push Carter off his Geneva track. The basic message of Sadat's speech at
the Knesset were the request for the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Sadat's visit was the first step to
negotiations such as the preliminary Cairo Conference in December 1977.
Washington reluctance to bilateral talks
A mechanism had yet to be created for Israel and Egypt to pursue the talks begun by Sadat and Begin in
Jerusalem.[10] The Egyptian president suggested to Begin that Israel place a secret representative in the American
embassy in Cairo. With American "cover," the true identity of the Israeli, who would liaise between the Egyptian
and Israeli leaders, would be known only to the American ambassador in Cairo.[10]
Sadat's liaison initiative spoke volumes about his reasons for wanting to make peace with Israel. He wanted an
alliance with the American superpower and he wanted to kill Carter's Geneva initiative.[11] His trip to Jerusalem
signaled a major reorientation of Cairo's place in the global scheme of things, from the Soviet to the American
camp.[12] Carter's acceptance of the proposed liaison scheme would have signaled American backing for Sadat's
unprecedented peace initiative. But Carter said no. However, Carter could not thwart the Israeli-Egyptian peace
push. Within days Israeli journalists were allowed into Cairo, breaking a symbolic barrier, and from there the peace
process quickly gained momentum. An Israeli-Egyptian working summit was scheduled for December 25 in
Ismailiya, near the Suez Canal.[13]
The talks
Accompanied by their capable negotiating teams and with their
respective interests in mind, both leaders converged on Camp David
for 13 days of tense and dramatic negotiations from September 5 to 17,
1978. By all accounts, Carter's relentless drive to achieve peace and his
reluctance to allow the two men to leave without reaching an
agreement are what played the decisive role in the success of the talks.
Carter's advisers insisted on the establishment of a Egyptian-Israeli
agreement which would eventually lead to an eventual solution to the
Begin and Brzezinski playing chess at Camp
Palestine issue. They believed in a short, loose, and overt linkage
David
between the two countries amplified by the establishment of a coherent
basis for a settlement. However, Carter felt they were not "aiming high
enough" and was interested in the establishment of a written and signed agreement. Numerous times both the
Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to scrap negotiations, only to be lured back into the process by personal appeals
from
Carter.
Considered
as
an
excellent
mediator
who
arbitrated
3
Camp David Accords
4
concessions with confidence, he played a tireless
commitment to find formulas, definitions, and solutions
to the many intricate variables, regardless of perceived
or real political limitations, and was capable of
soothing fears and anxieties, always with the goal of
keeping the negotiations going. He gradually
understood the importance historical events had upon
determining personal ideology, but he would not allow
it to constrain his political options, and he did not want
them to limit the options of those with whom he was
negotiating.
Begin and Sadat had such mutual antipathy toward one
A meeting at Camp David with (l-r) Aharon Barak, Menachem
Begin, Anwar Sadat, and Ezer Weizmann, 1978
another that they only seldom had direct contact; thus
Carter had to conduct his own microcosmic form of
shuttle diplomacy by holding one-on-one meetings with either Sadat or Begin in one cabin, then returning to the
cabin of the third party to relay the substance of his discussions. Begin and Sadat were "literally not on speaking
terms," and "claustrophobia was setting in."
President Carter, National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance at Camp David
A particularly difficult situation arose on the tenth stalemated day of
the talks. The issues of Israeli settlement withdrawal from the Sinai
and the status of the West Bank created what seemed to be an impasse.
In response, Carter had the choice of trying to salvage the agreement
by conceding the issue of the West Bank to Begin, while advocating
Sadat's less controversial position on the removal of all settlements
from the Sinai Peninsula. Or he could have refused to continue the
talks, reported the reasons for their failure, and allowed Begin to bear
the brunt of the blame.
Carter chose to continue and for three more days negotiated. During
this course, Carter even took the two leaders to the nearby Gettysburg
National Military Park in the hopes of using the American Civil War as
a simile to their own struggle.
Consequently, the 13 days marking the Camp David Accords were considered a success. Partly due to Carter's
admirable determination in obtaining an Israeli-Egyptian agreement, a full two-week pledge to a singular
international problem. Additionally, Carter was beneficiary to a fully pledged American foreign team. Likewise, the
Israeli delegation had a stable of excellent talent in Ministers Dayan and Weizman and legal experts Meir Rosenne
and Aharon Barak. Furthermore, the absence of the media contributed to the Accord's successes: there were no
possibilities provided to either leader to reassure his political body or be driven to conclusions by members of his
opposition. An eventual scrap of negotiations by either leader would have proven disastrous, resulting in taking the
blame for the summit's failure as well as a disassociation from the White House. Ultimately, neither Begin nor Sadat
was willing to risk those eventualities. Both of them had invested enormous amounts of political capital and time to
reach an agreement.[14]
Camp David Accords
Terms of the agreements
There were two 1978 Camp David agreements: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and A Framework for the
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the second leading towards the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty
signed in March 1979. The agreements and the peace treaty were both accompanied by "side-letters" of
understanding between Egypt and the U.S. and Israel and the U.S.[15]
The first agreement had three parts. The first part or preamble was a framework for negotiations to establish an
autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza strip and to fully implement SC 242. The
Accords recognized the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people", a process was to be implemented guaranteeing
the full autonomy of the people within a period of five years. Begin insisted on the adjective "full" to confirm that it
was the maximum political right attainable. This full autonomy was to be discussed with the participation of Israel,
Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza was agreed to
occur after an election of a self-governing authority to replace Israel's military government.[1] The Accords did not
mention the Golan Heights, Syria, or Lebanon. This was not the comprehensive peace that Kissinger, Ford, Carter, or
Sadat had in mind during the previous American presidential transition.[16] It was less clear than the agreements
concerning the Sinai, and was later interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The fate of
Jerusalem was deliberately excluded from this agreement.[17]
The second part dealt with Egyptian-Israeli relations, the real content being in the second agreement. The third part
"Associated Principles" declared principles that should apply to relations between Israel and all of its Arab
neighbors.
The second agreement outlined a basis for the peace treaty six months later, in particular deciding the future of the
Sinai peninsula. Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the Sinai, evacuate its 4,500 civilian inhabitants, and
restore it to Egypt in return for normal diplomatic relations with Egypt, guarantees of freedom of passage through the
Suez Canal and other nearby waterways (such as the Straits of Tiran), and a restriction on the forces Egypt could
place on the Sinai peninsula, especially within 20–40 km from Israel. This process would take three years to
complete. Israel also agreed to limit its forces a smaller distance (3 km) from the Egyptian border, and to guarantee
free passage between Egypt and Jordan. With the withdrawal, Israel also returned Egypt's Abu-Rudeis oil fields in
western Sinai, which contained long term, commercially productive wells.
The agreement also resulted in the United States committing to several billion dollars worth of annual subsidies to
the governments of both Israel and Egypt, subsidies which continue to this day, and are given as a mixture of grants
and aid packages committed to purchasing U.S. materiel. From 1979 (the year of the peace agreement) to 1997,
Egypt received military aid of US$1.3 billion annually, which also helped modernize the Egyptian military.[18] (This
is beyond economic, humanitarian, and other aid, which has totaled more than US$25 billion.) Eastern-supplied until
1979, Egypt now received American weaponry such as the M1A1 Abrams Tank, AH-64 Apache gunship and the
F-16 fighter jet. In comparison, Israel has received $3 billion annually since 1985 in grants and military aid
packages.[19]
Consequences
According to The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East:
"The normalization of relations [between Israel and Egypt] went into effect in January 1980.
Ambassadors were exchanged in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt's National
Assembly the same month, and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In
March 1980 regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel with crude
oil".[20]
According to Kenneth Stein in " Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli
Peace":
5
Camp David Accords
6
"The Accords were another interim agreement or step, but negotiations that flowed from the Accords
slowed for several reasons. These included an inability to bring the Jordanians into the discussions; the
controversy over settlements; the inconclusive nature of the subsequent autonomy talks; domestic
opposition sustained by both Begin and Sadat and, in Sadat’s case, ostracism and anger from the Arab
world; the emergence of a what became a cold peace between Egypt and Israel; and changes in foreign
policy priorities including discontinuity in personnel committed to sustaining the negotiating
process".[16]
The time that has elapsed since the Camp David Accords has left no doubt as to their enormous ramifications on
Middle Eastern politics. Most notably, the perception of Egypt within the Arab world changed. With the most
powerful of the Arab militaries and a history of leadership in the Arab world under Nasser, Egypt had more leverage
than any of the other Arab states to advance Arab interests. Egypt was subsequently suspended from the Arab
League from 1979 until 1989.
When the Camp David accords were signed, Jordan's King Hussein saw it as a slap to the face. When Sadat
volunteered Jordan's participation in deciding how functional autonomy would work and, more specifically,
effectively said that Jordan would have a role in how the West Bank would be administered. Like the Rabat Summit
Resolution, the Camp David Accords circumscribed Jordan's objective to reassert its control over the West Bank.
Focusing as it did on Egypt, the Carter administration accepted Sadat’s claim that he could deliver Hussein.
However, with a number of Arab world opposition building against Sadat, Jordan could not risk accepting the
Accords, without the support from powerful Arab neighbours, like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.[16] Hussein
consequently felt diplomatically snubbed. One of Carter's regrets was allowing Sadat to claim that he could speak for
Hussein if Jordan refused to join the talks, but by then the damage was done to the Jordanians.[16]
The Camp David Accords also prompted the disintegration of a united
Arab front in opposition to Israel. Egypt's realignment created a power
vacuum that Saddam Hussein of Iraq, at one time only a secondary
power, hoped to fill. Because of the vague language concerning the
implementation of Resolution 242, the Palestinian problem became the
primary issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict immediately following the
Camp David Accords (and arguably, until today). Many of the Arab
nations blamed Egypt for not putting enough pressure on Israel to deal
with the Palestinian problem in a way that would be satisfactory to
them. Syria also informed Egypt that it would not reconcile with the
nation unless it abandoned the peace agreement with Israel.[6]
United States President Jimmy Carter greeting
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at the White
House shortly after the Camp David Accords
went into effect, 8 April 1980.
Lastly, the biggest consequence of all may be in the psychology of the
participants of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The success of Begin, Sadat, and Carter at Camp David demonstrated to
other Arab states and entities that negotiations with Israel were possible—that progress results only from sustained
efforts at communication and cooperation. Despite the disappointing conclusion of the 1993 Oslo Accords between
the PLO and Israel, and even though the 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace has not fully normalized relations with
Israel, both of these significant developments had little chance of occurring without the precedent set by Camp
David.
Camp David Accords
Public support
Although most Israelis supported the Accords, the Israeli settler movement opposed them because Sadat would not
agree to a treaty in which Israel had any presence in the Sinai Peninsula at all, Israel had to withdraw from the entire
Sinai Peninsula.[21] Israeli settlers tried to prevent the government from dismantling their settlements.[22]
In Israel, there is lasting support of the Camp David Peace Accords, which have become a national consensus,
supported by 85% of Israelis according to a 2001 poll taken by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Israel
based).[23] Nevertheless, a minority of Israelis believe the price Israel paid for the peace agreement was too high for
its present gains, i.e. having relinquished the entire Sinai Peninsula, with its oil, tourism and land resources (Israel
has no other oil wells), and the trauma of evacuating thousands of its Israeli inhabitants (many resisted, as in the
town of Yamit and had to be forcefully evacuated, a phenomenon encountered also in the subsequent Israeli
withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, known as the disengagement).
For Israel, perhaps the most evident tangible benefit of the agreement with Egypt (other than the subsequent U.S.
aid, which Egypt also received) was a peaceful mutual border, enabling the Israel Defense Forces to reduce their
levels of alert on Israel's southwestern frontier.
Criticism of the Accords
Because the agreements were concluded without participation of UN and PLO and the UN General Assembly found
that they did not comply with the Palestinian right of return, of self-determination and to national independence and
sovereignty, and also condoned continued Israeli occupation, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East was
rejected. In Resolution 34/65 B of 12 December 1979, that agreement and all similar ones were declared invalid. [24]
Although both sides generally abided by the agreements since 1978, in the following years a common belief emerged
in Israel that the peace with Egypt is a "cold peace." Others feel that the Peace agreement was between the Israeli
people and Egypt's charismatic President Anwar El Sadat, rather than with the Egyptian people, who were not given
the opportunity to accept or reject the agreement with a free vote or a representative majority.
Like any delicate and highly charged agreement between bitter and seemingly implacable foes, there were
unintended consequences. Although Egypt was rewarded annually with over $1 billion in U.S. aid, the psychological
and financial health of the country suffered grievously. Not only was "Sadat's" peace almost universally despised in
Egypt and the Middle East (indeed, Sadat's own prime minister resigned in protest), the country was expelled from
the Arab League; every Arab country severed diplomatic ties with Egypt; commerce and trade between Egypt and its
neighbors became anemic; there were massive bread riots; Muslim fundamentalists became more vocal and more
popular than ever; and Sadat was forced to take the precaution of jailing nearly 1,300 opposition politicians. To
make matters worse, Israel rubbed salt in the wound, further inflaming the Middle East, by annexing East Jerusalem,
bombing Iraq's nuclear facilities, and building settlements in the West Bank. There were growing fears especially
among Western, Egyptian, and Israeli intelligence agencies—that Egypt was on the brink of a Muslim
fundamentalist revolution like the appalling one Iran had experienced two years earlier. (Iran's power elite was either
summarily executed or had to flee the country, and 52 American diplomats were held hostage for 444 days. The
ramifications of the Iran revolution continue to this day.) As a result of the Camp David Accords, Sadat—considered
a pariah and traitor—was assassinated three years later on October 6, 1981, during a military parade,
commemorating Egypt's "victory" over Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
To some, Sadat's assassination seemed too convenient. Because the peace was considered Sadat's personal
peace—not Egypt's—and because the traitor had now paid with his life, Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor, was able
to declare in a televised speech several hours after the assassination that "all treaties and charters" would be honored.
Which meant that the Camp David Accords would not be repudiated. Furthermore, Egypt somehow managed not to
fall into the hands of religious zealots. Eventually, Arab ambassadors returned to Cairo, and in 1989, Egypt was
welcomed back into the Arab League.
7
Camp David Accords
Subsequently, there have been reports that Sadat's assassination was actually a conspiracy in which Hosni Mubarak
was complicit. This allegation has been vigorously promoted by Sadat's daughter. Thirty years later, Mubarak was
ousted from power during the "Arab Spring" and is now serving a life sentence for his role in the deaths of hundreds
of Egyptian protesters. Egyptian prosecutors have also launched an investigation into his possible role into Sadat's
murder. "The Search for the Lost Army," a recently published historical novel by Gary S. Chafetz, presents
additional and somewhat compelling circumstantial evidence that Mubarak was indeed involved. For example,
Chafetz points out that on October 7, 1981, a photograph appeared on the front page of The New York Times,
reporting Sadat's assassination. The photo shows Hosni Mubarak to Sadat's immediate right and Defense Minister
Abu Ghazal to immediate Sadat's left (taken by Sadat's official photographer, who was also killed in the attack),
moments before Sadat was killed. Sadat, Mubark, and Abu Ghazala are sitting shoulder to shoulder. About 40 people
were killed and wounded in the attack, and yet neither Mubarak or Abu Ghazala was wounded. (Mubarak claimed to
have injured his thumb and Abu Ghazala proffered a military cap with a bullet hole through it.) Author Chafetz
alleges that Mubarak and Abu Ghazala must have had advance notice. In other words, the intelligence services knew
of the plot and allowed the attack to take place. When the attack did begin, the reasons that neither Mubarak or Abu
Ghazala were injured or killed was that they quickly through themselves to the base of the five-foot red granite wall
separating the front-row dignitaries from the parade of soldiers and military equipment. By an "amazing"
coincidence, several supersonic Mirage jets happened to be flying overhead, distracting everyone in the reviewing
stands and drowning out the machine gun fire, just as the four assassin soldier launched their attack. Finally, Sadat's
personal bodyguards did virtually nothing to stop the attack. This allowed one of the assassins to actually reach the
granite wall, stand on tiptoes, and fire down onto Sadat's body with his machine gun. As a result of Sadat's
convenient assassination, the Camp David Accords were saved, along with peace in the Middle East...for at least the
next 30 years.[25]
Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Paris Peace Conference, 1919
Faisal-Weizmann Agreement (1919)
1949 Armistice Agreements
Camp David Accords (1978)
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1979)
Madrid Conference of 1991
Oslo Accords (1993)
Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace (1994)
Camp David 2000 Summit
Peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs
List of Middle East peace proposals
International law and the Arab-Israeli conflict
Tabah-Rafah Sraights
Cairo-Maadi
End of the Yom Kippur War
8
Camp David Accords
Notes
[1] Camp David Accords – Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http:/ / www. mfa. gov. il/ MFA/ Peace Process/ Guide to the Peace Process/
Camp David Accords)
[2] Stein, Kenneth."Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace". Taylor & Francis, 1999, pp.
229-228
[3] "Stein, Kenneth 2000, pp. 229-228"
[4] http:/ / www. cartercenter. org/ news/ documents/ doc1482. html
[5] http:/ / countrystudies. us/ jordan/ 19. htm
[6] The Middle East: ten years after Camp David, William B. Quandt, pg. 9
[7] George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, Duke University Press, 1990 p.164. ISBN 0-8223-0972-6. From Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981, (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983), p.88.
[Carter] outlined to Begin his program, which consisted of five points: (1) achieve a comprehensive
peace affecting all of Israel's neighbors: (2) peace to be based on UN Resolution 242: (3) peace would
involve open borders and free trade; (4) peace would call for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories
to secure borders; (5) a Palestinian entity (but not an independent nation) should be created. Begin
responded that he could accept all of these points accept the Palestinian entity.
[8] Stein, Kenneth."Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace". Taylor & Francis, 1999, p.7.
[9] Feron, James. "Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker." (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/ fullpage.
html?res=9E0CE3DC1E30F93AA35750C0A964958260& sec=& spon=& pagewanted=2) The New York Times. 9 March 1992. 15 February
2009.
[10] Forward.com (http:/ / www. forward. com/ articles/ 13212/ )
[11] Bitterlemons.org (http:/ / www. bitterlemons. org/ previous/ bl150402ed13. html)
[12] Foreignpolicyblogs.com (http:/ / israel. foreignpolicyblogs. com/ category/ peace-process/ page/ 2/ )
[13] Peacenow.org (http:/ / peacenow. org/ entries/ archive3705)
[14] Stein, Kenneth."Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace". Taylor & Francis, 1999, p.252.
[15] "The Camp David Accords." (http:/ / www. jimmycarterlibrary. org/ documents/ campdavid/ letters. phtml) Jimmy Carter Library and
Museum. 21 July 2001. 28 April 2008.
[16] Stein, Kenneth."Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace". Taylor & Francis, 1999, p.254.
[17] Gold, 175
[18] "Egypt" (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ei/ bgn/ 5309. htm#relations) U.S. Department of State. March 2008. 28 April 2008.
[19] Benhorin, Yitzhak. "Israel still top recipient of US foreign aid." (http:/ / www. ynetnews. com/ articles/ 0,7340,L-3362402,00. html)
Ynetnews. 2 August 2007. 28 April 2008.
[20] Sela, "Arab-Israel Conflict," 100
[21] Sela, "Sinai Peninsula," 774
[22] Armstrong, 414
[23] Ronen, Joshua. "Poll: 58% of Israelis back Oslo process." (http:/ / www. tau. ac. il/ jcss/ Hjerus1. html) Tel Aviv University. 7 June 2001. 28
April 2008.
[24] UNGA, 12 December 1979, Resolution 34/65 B. Question of Palestine (http:/ / unispal. un. org/ unispal. nsf/ 0/
1CFBE54A74E1AB8B852560DA006DE34D). [doc.nr. A/RES/34/65 (A-D)]
[25] http:/ / www. amazon. com/ The-Lost-Army-ebook/ dp/ B0092PABYO/ ref=sr_1_1_title_1_kin?s=books& ie=UTF8& qid=1346782296&
sr=1-1& keywords=the+ lost+ army+ %2B+ chafetz
References and further reading
• Medad, Yisrael, ed., Hurwitz, Zvi Harry, ed. Peace in the Making The Menachem Begin - Anwar Sadat Personal
Correspondence, Gefen Publishing House, 2011. ISBN 978-965-229-456-2
• Avner, Yehuda, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership, The Toby Press, 2010. ISBN
978-1-59264-278-6
• Armstrong, Karen. Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.
• Bregman, Ahron Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America.
• Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." Sela.
• Gold, Dore. The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City. Washington, DC:
Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2007.
• Hinton, Clete A. Camp David Accords (2004)
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Camp David Accords
•
•
•
•
•
Meital, Yoram. Egypt's Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977.
Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (1986), by leading political scientist
"Arab-Israel Conflict." Sela.
Sela, Avraham, ed. The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. New York: Continuum, 2002.
Adam Curtis' 2004 documentary The Power of Nightmares, in its second and third part, studies the Camp David
Accords from the point of view of fundamentalist Muslims.
External links
• Text of the Accords, Israeli government (http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+
Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htm)
• Text of Accords and additional material, Carter Library (http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/
campdavid/index.phtml)
• Interview with King Hussein (http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552609) from the Dean
Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives (http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/
552494/browse?type=title)
• 2006 Egyptian public poll on attitudes to Israel (http://www.nysun.com/article/43906) and other countries,
NY Sun Article. Alternate link to poll results from a BBC News Article (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/6107160.stm)
• The Menachem Begin Heritage Foundation (http://www.begincenter.org.il/)
• Jaffe Center Poll on Israeli public Attitudes to the Peace Process (http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/Hjerus1.html)
• NY Times: Anti-Semitic 'Elders of Zion' Gets New Life on Egypt TV (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=9F00E1DE1F3CF935A15753C1A9649C8B63)
• "Camp David 25th Anniversary Forum" (led by President Carter) (http://www.ismi.emory.edu/
PrimarySource/Camp_David__25th_Anniversary_Forum.pdf)
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Article Sources and Contributors
Article Sources and Contributors
Camp David Accords Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=518314746 Contributors: 2002:186A:18B7:1234:226:BBFF:FE01:3C9A, 5 albert square, AJ24, AKGhetto, Abnn,
Ace of Raves, Afelton, Alansohn, Altmany, Amazones, Ams80, Ardfern, Art LaPella, Askhal, Atmathm, Bender235, Biker Biker, BlackCatNeko, Bobblewik, Bobo192, Bolt Vanderhuge,
Booksprwork, Burntsauce, Caeonosphere, Calabe1992, CanisRufus, Capedia, Capricorn42, Captain panda, CasualObserver'48, Celarnor, Charlesdrakew, Chodorkovskiy, Chris the speller,
Chrisloveswow, Cielomobile, Clarificationgiven, Cometstyles, Corax, Counterboint, CylonCAG, Dailycare, DanMS, Dance21c, Danwillemjohnson, Darrenleu, DavidYork71, Dbchip, Defender
of torch, Delldot, Denisarona, Der Eberswalder, Durova, Dutchdavey, Eiram762, Eman, Encyo, Enviroboy, Epeefleche, Equilibrial, Eric1985, Ericsherby, Evil Monkey, Favonian, FayssalF,
Federalist51, Flyfly12, Freakofnurture, Fsotrain09, Fvw, GHcool, Gibbs516, Good Olfactory, Grenavitar, Hertz1888, Hetar, Hmbr, Howcheng, Hqb, Husond, IZAK, Inductiveload, Irfankichloo,
J04n, Jaakobou, Jambobambo, Jason Quinn, Jengod, Jkane11110, Jmw0000, John Z, John254, Johnhagen, Jonadab, Jonathan.s.kt, Justinsomnia, Kaaveh Ahangar, Kaltenmeyer, Kazubon,
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pharaoh, Overthinkingly, PFHLai, PIrish, PMCwiki, Pearle, Perceval, Pevarnj, Peyre, Phenz, Philip Trueman, Philwelch, Piano non troppo, Pie Man 360, Pikalax, Piledhigheranddeeper, Pilotguy,
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Tesseran, Tewfik, The Thing That Should Not Be, The freddinator, TheKillerAngel, Thehegemon42, ThinkAndQuestion, Thuresson, TonyTheTiger, Troglo, Trying2help, Uriber, VeryVerily,
Vipinhari, Vishalsingh30, WhisperToMe, Wickey-nl, Wikiliki, Willhsmit, William Avery, Wine Guy, Wirthi, Woland37, Woohookitty, Xiahou, YousefJb, Yuber, Zerida, 574 anonymous edits
Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
Image:Begin, Carter and Sadat at Camp David 1978.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Begin,_Carter_and_Sadat_at_Camp_David_1978.jpg License: Public Domain
Contributors: Fitz-Patrick, Bill, photographer
Image:Camp David, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, 1978.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Camp_David,_Menachem_Begin,_Anwar_Sadat,_1978.jpg License:
Public Domain Contributors: Auntof6, Infrogmation, Lipothymia, Makthorpe, Martin H., Shalom, TCY
Image:Begin Brzezinski Camp David Chess.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Begin_Brzezinski_Camp_David_Chess.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors:
Original uploader was Perceval at en.wikipedia
File:Barak-Begin-Sadat-Weizmann1978.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Barak-Begin-Sadat-Weizmann1978.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Golf Bravo,
Martin H., Oyoyoy, ‫יעקב‬
Image:Carter, Brzezinski and Vance at Camp David, 1977.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Carter,_Brzezinski_and_Vance_at_Camp_David,_1977.jpg License:
Public Domain Contributors: Perceval
File:Carter and Sadat White House2.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Carter_and_Sadat_White_House2.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Leffler, Warren
K., photographer or Trikosko, Marion S., photographer. Work for hire made for U.S. News and World Report.
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