EXTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT MANAGERS:
DISCOVERING THEIR WORK MOTIVATION AND WORK HOURS
Abstract
Contemporary public and nonprofit management research has disproportionally
emphasized the importance of intrinsic motivation and internal rewards but failed to deliberately
examine managers’ extrinsic motivation to the extent that extrinsic motivation has been deemed
an antagonistic side in an intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy. However, this dichotomy oversimplifies
one’s motivational styles. Self-determination theory (SDT) hints that extrinsically motivated
people may vary with respect to various organizational behaviors due to the differences of their
locus of control. The authors tested this proposition by using variables from the National
Administrative Studies Project-III (NASP-III) data. The results of factor analysis support that
extrinsic motivation is multi-dimensional and it involves a unique type named “amotivation.”
Regression results show that work motivation is higher and work hours are longer among
extrinsically motivated managers whose locus of control is more internal. In addition, the
association of all types of extrinsic motivational styles with work motivation and work hours is
either less positive or more negative among nonprofit managers than among public managers.
Statistical analysis is followed by discussion and conclusion.
1
Introduction
Contemporary motivation studies in the field of public and nonprofit management have
strongly emphasized the importance of intrinsic motivation and internal rewards, perhaps due to
the mission-oriented nature of these two sectors. In public management, the upsurge of public
service motivation (PSM) research in recent decades has been widely embraced, in part because
it helps public administration scholars carve out a disciplinary identity. The PSM literature
includes not only works extending theory and empirical findings but studies focused on assessing
and building constructs, developing new methodological approaches and examining antecedents
and consequences of PSM (Brewer, Selden, and Facer II 2000; Coursey and Pandey 2007; Perry
1996; Perry and Hondeghem 2008; Perry and Wise 1990; Moynihan and Pandey 2007). On the
side of nonprofit management, although research efforts do not converge as seamlessly as public
management does on PSM, nonprofit management has been constantly associated with intrinsic
factors such as volunteering and philanthropy (Hager and Brudney 2004; Lohmann 1992; Hall
2002), altruism (Rose-Ackerman 1996, 1997), pro-social behaviors (Tidwell 2005; Mathews and
Kling 1988), ideological currency (Thompson and Hart 2006; Thompson and Bunderson 2003),
and many others.
In both public and nonprofit management, topics pertaining to extrinsic motivation have
of late received much less attention. Perhaps extrinsic motivation is somewhat less exciting
because there is less reason to expect departures in findings from private or generic studies
(Rainey and Bozeman, 2000). Moreover, intrinsic motivation especially PSM provide an
“aspirational theory,” focused on hopes for managers’ motivations and for the field in general.
When one finds evidence of PSM, it perhaps more uplifting than when that the strongest
motivation expressed by public managers is a need for security (Crewson 1997; Feeney 2008).
2
However, the allure of PSM and intrinsic motivation, while certainly understandable, does not
diminish the empirical reality of pervasive and behaviorally relevant extrinsic motivation
(Houston 2000). Many cross-sector comparison studies have repeatedly indicated that public
sector workers demonstrate strong desires for job security, high pay, promotion, and benefits
(Crewson 1997; Baldwin 1987; Karl and Sutton 1998; Houston 2000; Jurkiewicz, Massey, and
Brown 1998; Khojasteh 1993; Lyons, Duxbury, and Higgins 2006; Lewis and Frank 2002;
Posner and Schmidt 1996). Public managers’ desires for these externally-controlled motivational
objectives (especially job security) are quite often even stronger than their desires for intrinsic
rewards such as interesting work, usefulness to the society, serving the public interest. As
compared to private sector workers, public managers’ desires for extrinsic rewards (especially
job security, fringe benefits, and promotion) are not conspicuously weaker. Despite such
findings, discussion of extrinsic motivation has of late been less prominent in the public
management literature and empirical results have become increasingly scarce. Clearly both
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations are important to virtually all worker groups and this relative
neglect seems to us unwarranted.
Nonprofit sector employees’ work needs are seldom investigated in cross-sector
comparisons. Among limited evidence, nonprofit sector workers do have a stronger tendency
than public and private sector workers to care about pride in organizations and the chance to
“make a difference” (Light 2002), but their desires for a pleasant physical environment, job
security, benefits, pay, and promotion are not significantly lower (and are sometimes even higher)
than that of public sector workers (Vinokur-Kaplan, Jayaratne, and Chess 1994; Borzaga and
Tortia 2006). In cases where external attractions are generally sparse in nonprofit organizations
(Preston 1989; Mirvis and Hackett 1983; DeVaro and Brookshire 2006), will those driven by
3
extrinsic motivators encounter a person-environment mismatch in a nonprofit working context,
and because of this detrimental effect, exhibit compromised attitudes and behaviors?
Unfortunately, no systematic research is available on this question.
The current study attempts to fill in the gap in our knowledge about extrinsic motivation
in public and nonprofit management. We employ self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan
1985; Ryan and Deci 2000), widely used in psychology, but quite uncommon in public
management, to more deeply analyze multiple dimensions of extrinsic motivation and their
impacts on public and nonprofit managers’ overall level of work motivation. We select work
motivation as the main research focus in part because it requires a unique distinctive research
agenda to broaden the knowledge base of the motivational context in the public sector (Wright
2001, 2007). Given that the scope of work motivation is broad and sometimes hard to clearly
define, scholars tend to use work attitudes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment,
and job involvement as auxiliary variables to comprehend to what extent people are motivated to
work (Rainey 2009). The current study employs, in addition to work motivation, work hours as
another proxy for work motivation. Research has found considerable differences among those
who work many more hours than is typical (Feeney and Bozeman 2009).
In the following sections, the authors begin by introducing the traditional intrinsicextrinsic dichotomy and comparing this conceptualization with self-determination theory (SDT)
(Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000). Next, the issues concerning public-nonprofit
sectoral comparison will be brought into the discussion so as to show how extrinsic motivation
may generate disparate effects in these two respective sectors due to different levels of personenvironment fit. The third theme of the study is linking multiple extrinsic motivational styles to
work motivation and work hours and exploring whether the relationships appear in different
4
scenarios between the public and nonprofit contexts. The authors will use variables extracted
from the National Administrative Studies Project-III (NASP-III) dataset to analyze their
associations. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications of the findings for both
future research and practice.
Extrinsic Motivation: Old and New Perspectives
Conventional wisdom suggests that motivation styles are either intrinsic or extrinsic, and
extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation are viewed as separate dimensions. Herzberg’s
(1966) two-factor theory and McGregor’s (1960) Theory X and Theory Y are typical examples
of intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy. Both Herzberg and McGregor laid more emphasis on Maslow’s
(1954) “higher-order needs” such as growth, development, and actualization.1 This tradition
leads later organizational behavior (OB) studies to disproportionately address intrinsic
motivation and intrinsically motivated people’s attitudes and behaviors (Lawler and Hall 1970;
Hackman and Lawler 1971; Brief and Aldag 1975; Hackman and Oldham 1975; Lambert 1991;
Venkatesh 2000). Extrinsic motivational factors appear in the literature as well, but the
discussion mainly centers on whether the influx of extrinsic incentives undermines individual
intrinsic motivation (Deci 1971; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett
1973), not on behavioral patterns of extrinsically motivated people. To the extent that extrinsic
motivation receives focus, it tends to be in the pay-for-performance literature, work especially
popular among labor economists and work usually giving short shrift to psychological aspects of
motivation (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Prendergast 1999).
The dearth of studies aiming at extrinsic motivation also stems from the belief that
extrinsic motivation pertains to behaviors performed in the absence of self-determination, such
that extrinsically motivated people can only be prompted by external contingencies (Vallerand
5
and Blssonnette 1992; Ryan and Deci 2000). This stereotype leads scholars to treat extrinsic
motivation as a unidimensional category but to neglect possible distinctions in extrinsic
motivational needs. Not until the late 1980s did Deci and Ryan (1985) examine multiple genres
of extrinsic motivation and carefully differentiate them. Their self-determination theory (SDT)
(Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000), unlike previous perspectives that viewed
extrinsically motivated behavior as invariantly non-autonomous, holds that various extrinsically
motivated people have different levels of autonomy. The following sections will provide a brief
introduction of autonomy, a typology of extrinsic motivation, and findings of some of the most
relevant empirical research grounded in SDT.
Autonomy and Locus of Control
SDT views motivational styles as a spectrum moving from intrinsic motivation, different
levels of extrinsic motivation, to “amotivation,” as displayed in Table 1. A fundamental element
that makes each motivational style distinctive is autonomy, a concept connoting “an inner
endorsement of one’s actions, the sense that they emanate from oneself and are one’s own” (Deci
and Ryan 1987). Taking intrinsic motivation as an example, the measurement of intrinsic
motivation in previous research has rested primarily on the “free choice” measures (Ryan and
Deci 2000), implying that intrinsically motivated people enjoy absolute autonomy: they consider
themselves as initiators of their own behavior, select desired outcomes, and choose their own
ways to achieve them (Deci and Ryan 1987). Therefore, SDT infers that intrinsically motivated
people are internally regulated and have a strong “internal locus of control” (Rotter 1954;
Spector 1982, 1988), a psychological term referring to whether individuals believe that they are
active causal agents. Those having a strong internal locus of control believe that they have full
control over consequences of their choices and behaviors.
6
[Insert Table 1 Here]
A Deliberate Typology of Extrinsic Motivation
Autonomy of extrinsically motivated activities is characterized by inflexibility and the
presence of pressure. For example, some students do homework because they fear parental
sanctions; workers take the current job because they have a basic security requirement.
Individual autonomy is low in both cases. However, autonomy of extrinsic motivation can vary.
Students may also do homework because it is valuable for their chosen career; workers may take
the current job because the position provides more opportunities for advancement and training
opportunities. Autonomy is relatively higher in latter two cases because terminating current
tasks will not trigger immediate pressure and negative sanctions. .
The logic of “hierarchical autonomy” induces Ryan and Deci (2000) to develop a more
sophisticated typology of extrinsic motivation. Just to the left of internal regulation (i.e. intrinsic
motivation) is integrated regulation, a category that represents the most autonomous forms of
extrinsic motivation. Integration occurs when individuals bring new regulations into congruence
with their values and needs, and integrated forms of motivation share some similarities with
intrinsic motivation such as an internal locus of control and high autonomy. For example, a firm
manager may join a variety of training programs in order to increase the opportunities of
promotion because a higher position is accompanied by higher prestige (Jason 2005). Next to
integrated regulation is identified regulation. This regulatory style slightly differs from
integrated regulation in that people accept the regulation because the activity is judged valuable,
not because the activity has been integrated into their value system. That is, the locus of control
is less internal. For example, a manager may join training programs because she sees new
abilities as necessary for her job.2
7
Introjected regulation is the third type of extrinsic motivation. People falling into this
category perform an action out of obligation in order to avoid anxiety, shame, and pressure
(Vallerand and Ratelle 2004). Therefore, introjected behaviors are not experienced as a part of
the self and thus have an external locus of control. For example, a manager may have a desire
for fewer conflicting demands so she can work more smoothly. Although she is obligated to
work itself, her main concern is to buffer herself from the vexation and pressure originating from
a conflicting environment. The last form of extrinsic motivation is external regulation, the type
that is generally portrayed in the literature (Vallerand and Ratelle 2004). When people are
externally regulated, their behaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand or obtain an
external reward contingency. Craving for bonus pay (as a positive end state) and avoiding
reprimands (as a negative end state) are typical examples. The locus of control is purely external
for externally regulated people.3
A unique classification of motivational style in SDT is amotivation, a regulatory style
implying “not valuing an activity” and consequently “not believing it will yield a desired
outcome” (Ryan and Deci 2000). Amotivation is at work when individuals display a relative
absence of motivation (Vallerand and Ratelle 2004), so it is deemed a continuum of extrinsic
motivation and should not go beyond the scope of the current study. Amotivated people
frequently feel helpless and question the usefulness of engaging in an activity, so they are likely
to quit the current task or activity (Vallerand and Ratelle 2004). For example, under the pressure
of economic recession, a manager can be forced to choose a “repugnant” job among extremely
limited alternatives. As a result, this manager will neither value this job nor expect any reward
from accomplishing a task. The locus of control for amotivated people is accordingly not only
external but impersonal.4
8
Empirical Research Grounded in SDT
By employing the SDT spectrum, educational psychologists have obtained fruitful
research findings regarding how different motivational styles are related to performance and
behavior. A study by Hayamizu (1997) indicates that students’ active coping behavior, interest
in a subject, and perceived self-efficacy were the weakest among those amotivated, stronger
among those externally regulated, and even stronger among those introjectedly, identically, and
intrinsically regulated. However, he failed to find an obvious difference of interest and efficacy
among the latter three motivational styles. In another study, Vallerand and Blssonnette (1992)
found that persistence in behavior was positively related to integrated and identified regulation,
not related to external and introjected regulation, and negatively related to amotivation (i.e.
impersonal regulation). That being said, not all extrinsic motivational styles lead to negative
effects. Pelletier et al. (1995) studied how university athletes’ motivational styles influence their
perceived competence, caring, effort, and future intentions to participate sport activities. The
findings showed a similar pattern: consequences are decreasingly positive from intrinsic
motivation to amotivation. A study of the quality of couples’ relationships (e.g. dyadic
adjustment, potential problem checklist, and marital happiness) also confirms this perspective
(Blais et al. 1990).
As yet, there is no published empirical research applying SDT theory to work motivation
in government and nonprofit organizations. Through the application of SDT to public and
nonprofit organizational contexts and discovering how different motivational styles are related to
managers’ overall work motivation and work hours, the present study attempts to fill in the
knowledge gap of extrinsic motivation (and amotivation) in public and nonprofit sector human
resources management.
9
Comparing Public and Nonprofit Organizational Contexts
Public and nonprofit organizations are similar in many respects. For example, those
working in these two sectors often have less interest in personal gain and, instead, seek to serve
and to engage in prosocial behaviors (Houston 2006). Similarly, both public and nonprofit
organizations provide limited financial rewards to their employees, and both of them lack
objective indicators for performance measurement (Berman 2006). Typically, both public and
nonprofit organizations operate under severe external constraint. Nonprofits must confront
conflicting interests among their funders whereas public agencies are subject to legislative
control, administrative supervision, and public scrutiny (Brooks 2002; Campbell 2002).
Despite the similarities, public and nonprofit organizations’ contexts are by no means
identical. The most distinctive difference is the existence of merit protection in the public sector.
Although intensive and formalized personnel rules emanating from merit systems limit public
managers’ flexibility in rewarding and punishing their subordinates (Feeney and Rainey 2010),
they are an important source of public sector employees’ high level of job security (Chen 2010).
Job security is not the only external attraction in public organizations. Some of the most
distinctive advantages of government employment in the United States include fringe benefits,
paid vacation days, routine employer pension contributions, earlier retirement, among others
(Cox and Brunelli 1994). Empirical studies have also concluded that fringe benefits and pension
plans in the nonprofit sector are inferior to those in the public sector (Mirvis and Hackett 1983;
Preston 1989).
Often, governmental agencies provide more opportunities for promotion than nonprofits.
Several reasons account for this difference. First, public organizations are usually larger in size,
and size implies job openings, a long vacancy chain, and opportunities for promotion (White
10
1970; Su and Bozeman 2009). Second, nonprofit organizations from time to time suffer from
constrained funding and a need to rely on flexible staffing such as the use of contract workers
and on-call, contingent workers. Finally, merit protection in the public sector reduces
discrimination and facilitates a balanced representation of women and minorities (Baron,
Mittman, and Newman 1991), thereby diminishing status distinctions, resource exploitation, and
opportunity hoarding for dominant groups (Jason 2005). In general public organizations,
compared to nonprofits, are larger, older, and have more resources routinely at their disposal
(Berman 1999).
Working conditions in these two respective sectors imply possibly different personenvironment fit (Blau 1987; Caplan 1987; Moynihan and Pandey 2008) for extrinsically
motivated people. For example, those motivated by opportunities for promotion and training
may perceive a better fit in public organizations than in nonprofit organizations. A typical
consequence of a “harmonious match” is more positive work attitudes such as higher levels of
job involvement and organizational commitment (Blau 1987). The concern of personenvironment fit leads the authors to more carefully compare how each extrinsic motivational
style affects public and nonprofit managers’ overall work motivation and work hours in the
following sections.
Data and Variables
The National Administrative Studies Project-III (NASP-III) dataset is employed in this
study. NASP-III includes data on public and nonprofit managers. The population of NASP-III
covers both the state of Georgia and Illinois. The population of public managers in Georgia was
drawn from the list provided by the Department of Audit (DoA), in which people who have been
on a state agency’s payroll during 2003/2004 fiscal year were included. The population of public
11
managers in Illinois was developed through a Freedom of Information Act request. The NASPIII research group purchased a list from Infocus Marketing, Inc. This list includes members of
the American Society of Association Executives (ASAE) with titles such as operation managers,
executive director, company president, development manager, education director, CEO, etc.
This list provides 280 nonprofit managers from Georgia and 1048 from Illinois. At the end of
this survey, the NASP-III research group obtained 790 responses out of 1849 reduced N with a
response rate of 43% (47% in Georgia and 38% in Illinois) for public sector respondents, 430 out
of 1307 reduced N with a response rate of 33% (39% in Georgia and 31% in Illinois) for
nonprofit sector respondents, and the overall response rate of 39% for their study (for full
discussion of the data, the sample, and procedures see Bozeman and Feeney, 2009).
Variables of extrinsic motivation in the current study are extracted from the NASP-III
dataset. Similar to educational psychologists engaged in SDT who generally ask students why
they go to school, do their homework, and study science (Hayamizu 1997; Vallerand and
Blssonnette 1992; Ryan and Connell 1989), these items were designed to solicit information
about reasons for respondents to accept their current jobs. The original question was stated as:
“We are interested in the factors that motivated you to accept a job at your current organization.
Please indicate the extent to which the factors below (some personal and family, some
professional) were important in making your decision to take a job at your current organization.”
Respondents were asked to score from very important (4), somewhat important (3), somewhat
unimportant (2), to very unimportant (1). The authors selected nine items that best represent
different dimensions of extrinsic motivation:5

Opportunity for advancement within the organization’s hierarchy

Opportunity for training and career development
12

Job security

The organization’s pension or retirement plan

Desire for less bureaucratic red tape

Desire for a low conflict work environment

Benefits (medical, insurance)

Few, if any, alternative job offers

Relatively low cost of living in the region
Given that construct development of extrinsic motivational styles in the field of public
and nonprofit management is in the burgeoning stage, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is an
appropriate tool that helps sorting out variables. The results of EFA are reported in Table 2. The
first factor includes two items: opportunity for advancement within the organization’s hierarchy
and opportunity for training and career development. According to the typology of SDT, this
factor should belong to either integrated regulation (i.e. act because it is congruent with personal
values) or identified regulation (i.e. act because it is judged valuable), as we analyzed earlier.
Managers falling into this category have an internal locus of control. The second factor
embraces two items: desire for less bureaucratic red tape and desire for a low conflict work
environment. This factor should reflect introjected regulation (i.e. act out of obligation to avoid
anxiety and pressure) as respondents treat work as their obligation but their paramount concerns
are less red tape and low conflict. This type carries a somewhat external locus of control.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The third factor is comprised of three items: job security, the organization’s pension or
retirement plan, and benefits. Our traditional understanding of extrinsic motivation, which is
associated with external regulation, covers these three items. According to SDT, externally
13
regulated managers have an even more external locus of control in comparison to introjected
regulated managers. The last factor is a combination of two items: few alternative job offers and
relatively low cost of living in the region. These two job selection reasons perfectly reflect
amotivation as being forced to choose a job among limited alternatives implies people’s lack of
ability, adaptability, and control over the current job. No incentive can be provided at the
workplace to motivate those who are concerned about cost of living in the region as well.
Regarding overall level of work motivation, one of the main dependent variables in the
current study, the authors employ four ordinal items with 4 referring to strongly agree and 1
referring to strongly disagree:

I put forth my best effort to get the job done regardless of the difficulties

Time seems to drag while I am on the job (inverse)

It has been hard for me to get very involved in my current job (inverse)

I do extra work for my job that isn't really expected of me
The four-item work motivation construct, which was first developed by Patchen and his
colleagues (Patchen, Pelz, and Allen 1965), asks respondents how involved they are in their
work (attitude) and how hard they work (behavior). This construct has been repeatedly used
(Wright 2004, 2007; Baldwin 1984, 1990) in the history. Although the Cronbach’s alpha value
(α = .61) is lower than the rule of thumb (α = .70),6 several fix indexes of confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) have reached or approached the cut-off level (please refer to Table 3 for results).
Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha has severe limits as a test of the utility of factor dimensions.
Cortina (1993) indicates that the level of alpha is a function of the size of the average
correlations among items and can be large despite a wide range of item intercorrelations. For
instance, for a 3-item scale with α = .80, the average correlation is .57; for a 10-item scale with
14
α = .80, the average correlation is only .28. In other words, internal consistency estimates are
relatively invariant when many items are pooled. Acknowledging the drawbacks of alpha, the
authors calculated the index score of factor analysis, labeled the calculated index as “work
motivation,” and used it as the first dependent variable.7 The other dependent variable is work
hours, measured by an item asking respondents: “During a typical week, about how many hours
do you work (including work done away from the office but as part of your job)?”
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Several control variables related to work motivation and work hours are included:
organizational size, a Georgia/Illinois dummy, a promotional position, age, gender, education,
number of children, and marital status. Larger organizational size (number of full time workers)
implies stronger inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Singh and Lumsden 1990) and more red
tape (Bozeman 2000; Bozeman and Feeney 2011), factors detrimental to work motivation. Civil
service reform in Georgia accompanied by the expansion of at-will workers is a decisive
predictor of work motivation and work hours (Feeney and Rainey 2010; Condrey and Battaglio
Jr 2007; Nigro and Kellough 2006). A promotional position, including internal promotion and
upward move from external organizations, denotes the success in one’s job career and can
enhance one’s work motivation. Women often report higher levels of job stress and other factors
related to job satisfaction (Feeney and Bozeman 2009), so the effect of gender needs to be
controlled for. Age represents differences of general values that influence work motivation and
work hours (Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown 1998). The days of absence because “you were not
sick but couldn’t face working” implies one’s unwillingness to work, a deleterious antecedent for
work motivation. Higher levels of education may be required to contribute longer time to
organizations. Marriage and children may drive one to work harder for their family.
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Statistical Findings
We first employ OLS regression with the use of Beta values (standardized coefficients)
to examine whether, in both the public sector sample and the nonprofit sample, the relationships
between extrinsic motivational styles and the dependent variables (i.e. work motivation and work
hours) follow the SDT pattern—decreasingly positive and increasingly negative from integratedidentified regulation (IIR), introjected regulation (IR), external regulation (ER), to nonregulation or amotivation (AM). We also examine whether coefficients of these motivational
styles significantly differ after controls are added into the model. We present models without
controls in Table 4 and models with controls in Table 5.
[Insert Table 4 and Table 5 Here]
Results in Table 4 show that the “decreasingly positive and increasingly negative” pattern
exists in both samples in general. However, exceptions exist. Regarding the association with
work motivation, the order of IR (a desire for less red tape and conflict) and ER (a desire for job
security, pension plans, and benefits) deviates from the pattern in both the public (Beta = -0.06
and -0.03 respectively) and nonprofit (Beta = -0.10 and -0.06 respectively) samples.8 Regarding
the association with work hours, the order of ER and AM (limited job alternatives and low cost
in the region) is not consistent with the pattern in the nonprofit sample (Beta = -0.18 and -0.12
respectively).9 After we control for several confounding variables, the aforementioned SDT
order and exceptions do not change significantly.
We notice two additional findings that deviate from the theory. Technically speaking,
IIR (a desire for advancement and job training) people have a rather internal locus of control, so
IIR should be positively associated with work motivation and work hours. However, in the
nonprofit sector sample, IIR is negatively related to work hours. Its association with work
16
motivation is also negative, although not statistically significant. ER (a desire for job security,
pension plans, and benefits) in the theory should be a negative predictor for the dependent
variables in that ER people have a strong external locus of control. However, in predicting work
motivation, ER is not statistically significant in both the public and nonprofit samples. We will
more deliberately discuss reasons leading to these deviations in the next section.
Next, we introduce OLS regression and dummy variable moderation to examine whether
each motivational style generates different impacts on the DVs between public and nonprofit
samples. Regression models with dummy interactive terms can be expressed as following
(“NPO dummy” denotes nonprofit = 1 and public = 0):
( )
is the impact of IR in the public sector sample. Statistically significant
implies that
the impact of IR on work motivation is significantly different between public and nonprofit
samples. The real impact of IR in the nonprofit sample is
tests with a null
, and post-regression Wald-
can help us obtain the p value of IR coefficient in the nonprofit
sample. We report regression results without control variables in Table 6 and results with
control variables in Table 7.
[Insert Table 6 and Table 7 Here]
In Table 6, all interaction terms are negative, an indication that the impacts of extrinsic
motivational styles on work motivation and work hours are more negative among nonprofit
managers than among public managers. Among them, three out of eight interaction terms are
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In addition, one interaction term (ER in the
17
model of work hours) is approaching the 90% confidence level (p < .11). In order to look more
deeply into the difference between two types of managers, we compare coefficients in the public
and nonprofit samples by using eight Wald-tests with a null
.
The most salient differences appear in IIR (a desire for advancement and job training),
the first row of the table. Its effect on work motivation is both significant and positive for public
managers (B = 1.92; p < 0.00) but negative for nonprofit managers (B = -0.19; p < 0.67); its
effect on work hours is positive for public managers (B = 0.40; p < 0.16) but both negative and
significant for nonprofit managers (B = -0.88; p < 0.00). Differences appear in IR (a desire for
less red tape and conflict) and ER (a desire for job security, pension plans, and benefits) as well.
The impact of IR on work hours is significant for nonprofit managers (B = -1.06; p < 0.00), but
not for public managers (B = -0.13; p < 0.63). Regarding ER, the negative effect on work hours
seems to be larger in the nonprofit sector sample (B = -1.48; p < 0.00) than in the public sector
sample (B = -0.76; p < 0.01). Coefficients in the last row (AM) are both negative and
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, although they appear to be (slightly) more
negative in the nonprofit sample. Finally, the most obvious difference between Table 6 and
Table 7 is the coefficient of ER in the public sector sample: it is negative in Table 6 but positive
in Table 7. However, both coefficients are not statistically significant.
Concerning control variables, size, education, and the state of Georgia are more
influential in the model of work hours whereas marriage and the number of children are more
influential in the model of work motivation. A move-up position and age are statistically
significant in both models. An interesting finding is that female managers are likely than male to
report that they work hard, but meanwhile they also report that their working time is shorter.
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Discussion
There are two discussion foci in the present study. The first discussion focus is findings
that deviate from the self-determination theory. The second focus is public-nonprofit difference.
Deviations from SDT
SDT hints that the negative impact of ER (job security, pension plans, and benefits) on
work motivation and work hours should be stronger than IR (less red tape and low conflict).
While the findings in the models of work hours follow this pattern, the findings in the models of
work motivation show the opposite in both the public and nonprofit samples (see both Table 4
and Table 5). In addition, the findings also demonstrate that ER significantly and negatively
predicts work hours in both the public and nonprofit samples, but its significance diminishes, if
not disappears, in the models of work motivation. A possible reason leading to both deviations is
that ER people overestimate their work motivation.
The present study employs the most typical approach to measure work motivation: asking
respondents how hard they work, how often they do extra work, and how involved they feel in
their work (Patchen 1965; Rainey 1993; Wright 2007). Although researchers have reported
successful use of this approach, Rainey (1983) indicates that respondents tend to give high rating
to their won work effort, which to some degree reflects the cultural emphasis on hard work in the
United States (Rainey 2009). Compared to the measurement of work hours, the measurement of
work motivation is more likely to suffer from subjective bias. If ER people’s work motivation is
not as high as what they report, the negative relationship between ER and work motivation
would be more significant, which is more in line with the relationship between ER and work
hours. This possibly explains why the order of ER and IR does not follow the SDT pattern as
well. A remedy to the measurement of work motivation is to use some alternative measures such
19
as job involvement, organizational confidence (Feeney and Boardman 2010), and different
dimensions of public service motivation (Vandenabeele 2007) as DVs and correlate them with
motivational styles.
Another deviation occurs in the nonprofit sample: the order of ER (job security, pension
plans, and benefits) and AM (selecting the current job because of limited choices and low cost in
the region) does not follow the SDT pattern in the model of work hours, although the same order
perfectly follows the SDT pattern in the model of work motivation. In the public sector sample,
this order is also consistent with the SDT pattern in the models of both work motivation and
work hours (see both Table 4 and Table 5). This implies that AM nonprofit managers should
have worked even less (in comparison to their self-reported work hours) due to a low level of
work motivation. A possible explanation is the nonprofit sector’s work nature. Different from
most public agencies, nonprofits usually lack strict job descriptions and classification, indirectly
freeing workers to work beyond their job descriptions (Rainey 2009). Many nonprofit
organizations are relatively small in size, and this requires workers to take on more than their
share of work (Feeney and Bozeman 2009). In addition, pervasive use of voluntary workforce
also creates additional duties for paid nonprofit managers to work extra hours (Netting et al.
2004; Hager and Brudney 2004), despite their willingness. Indeed, nonprofit managers having a
higher level of AM do work less than those having a lower level of AM, but their work hours
should have been even shorter if the aforementioned features did not exist in nonprofits.
Public-Nonprofit Comparison
In the public sector sample, the impact of IIR (a desire for advancement and job training)
on both DVs are positive whereas the rest of the extrinsic motivation and amotivation factors
have negative impacts, reflecting different levels of internal and external locus of control in SDT.
20
However, in the nonprofit sample, IIR has either a zero or negative impact on the DVs. In
addition, the negative impacts of the rest of extrinsic motivation factors on the DVs are generally
stronger than those in the public sample, and three out of six extrinsic motivation interaction
terms are even statistically significant (see Table 6 and Table 7). We thus question: why is IIR
an ineffective or negative predictor for work hours and work motivation, and moreover, why do
most extrinsic motivation factors appear to be more negative in the nonprofit sample?
The theory of person-environment fit may help answer these two questions. First,
compared to governmental agencies, nonprofits provide limited opportunities for promotion due
to their small size, resulting in fewer job openings and a short vacancy chain (White 1970).
Their scarcity of resource also implies obvious disadvantage in offering professional training and
the opportunity for career development (Berman 1999). Although IIR managers have a rather
strong internal locus of control, the person-environment mismatch in nonprofits compromises a
positive impact of IIR on work motivation and work hours. Second, although red tape is less
prevalent in nonprofits than in governmental units, nonprofits are indeed notorious for their job
ambiguity and work conflict originating from the shortage of manpower (Feeney and Bozeman
2009; Mirvis and Hackett 1983). This feature furthers the negative impact of IR on work
motivation and work hours in nonprofits. Finally, job security grounded in merit protection,
abundant benefits, and pension plans are the privilege for public sector managers only (Cox and
Brunelli 1994). That is, ER managers may experience a better person-environment fit in public
sector organizations than in nonprofit sector organizations.
Conclusion
The discussion of extrinsic motivation has long been underemphasized in public
administration research, this despite indications that public managers are strongly motivated by
21
extrinsic motivations, especially guarantees of security (Lewis and Frank 2002). The current
study proposes that the theory of self-determination provides a lens through which scholars may
obtain a more deliberate understanding of extrinsic motivation. This more sophisticated
typology of motivational styles in SDT helps us more precisely capture behavioral consequences
of different EM and AM styles. However, the application of SDT requires our caution in taking
sectoral contexts into consideration to the extent that person-environment value fit can moderate
the relationships between motivational styles and behavioral consequences. As a preliminary
study of SDT in public and nonprofit administration, our findings basically support the
“decreasingly positive and increasingly negative” SDT pattern with respect to work motivation
and work hours. Although some exceptions can be attributed to different levels of personenvironment fit in public and nonprofit organizations, we need more empirical evidence to
espouse our arguments. By treating the present study as a cornerstone, efforts to be made in the
future can be oriented to multiple dimensions of behavioral outcomes such as organizational
citizenship behaviors, confidence in organizational performance, and many others.
Another approach that helps improve the quality of SDT-based research is to identify
more job selection factors that represent different regulatory styles. For example, we fail to
successfully separate integrated regulation and identified regulation in the current study due to
the limitation of the dataset itself. It will also be valuable if each motivational construct has
more than three items. In sum, SDT is a useful tool that helps both practitioners and researchers
more deeply analyze human motivation. We encourage scholars engaged in public sector
motivation studies to brainstorm and contemplate a way that broadens the scope of SDT-based
empirical research.
22
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Tables and Figures
Table 1 Self-Determination Theory
Behavior
Nonself-Determined
Self-Determined
Motivation
Amotivation
Regulation
Non-regulation
External
regulation
Introjected
regulation
Identified
regulation
Integrated
regulation
Intrinsic
regulation
Impersonal
External
Somewhat
external
Somewhat
internal
Internal
Internal
Locus of control
Regulatory
processes
Extrinsic motivation
Intrinsic
motivation
Nonintentional, Compliance, Self-control,
Personal
Congruence,
nonvaluing,
external
internal
importance, awareness,
incompetence, rewards and rewards and conscious
synthesis
lack of control punishments punishments
valuing
with self
Interest,
enjoyment,
inherent
satisfaction
Source: Ryan & Deci (2000)
Table 2 Exploratory Factor Analysis for Extrinsic Motivational Styles
Factor 1
Opportunity for advancement within the organization’s hierarchy
Opportunity for training and career development
Desire for less bureaucratic red tape
Desire for a low conflict work environment
Job security
The organization’s pension or retirement plan
Benefits (medical, insurance)
Few, if any, alternative job offers
Relatively low cost of living in the region
Factor 1: Integrated-identified regulation (IIR)
Factor 2: Introjected regulation (IR)
Factor 3: External regulation (ER)
Factor 4: No regulation or amotivation (AM)
29
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
0.85
0.86
0.88
0.82
0.71
0.86
0.86
0.88
0.70
Table 3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Work Motivation
Chi square
Suggested cut-off
Values of the model
29.61
df
RFI
NFI
GFI
CFI
RMSR
RMSEA
2
>.90
.87
>.90
.96
>.90
.98
>.90
.93
<.08
.01
<.08
.09
Items
I put forth my best effort to get the job done regardless of the difficulties
Time seems to drag while I am on the job (inverse)
It has been hard for me to get very involved in my current job (inverse)
I do extra work for my job that isn't really expected of me
Factor loadings
0.63
0.78
0.79
0.55
Table 4 OLS Regression in the Public and Nonprofit Samples (without Controls)
Dependent variables
Work Motivation
Public
Nonprofit
Beta
Coef
IIR
0.17
1.92 0.00**
IR
-0.06
ER
AM
N
Adjusted R-square
Work Hours
p
Public
Nonprofit
Beta
Coef
p
Beta
Coef
Beta
Coef
-0.02
-0.19 0.63
0.06
0.40 0.10†
-0.11
-0.46 0.03*
-0.64 0.10†
-0.10
-0.85 0.04*
-0.02
-0.13 0.59
-0.13
-1.06 0.00**
-0.03
-0.40 0.34
-0.06
-0.45 0.27
-0.11
-0.76 0.00**
-0.18
-1.06 0.00**
-0.16
-1.60 0.00**
-0.19
-1.88 0.00**
-0.17
-1.07 0.00**
-0.12
-0.96 0.02*
758
394
751
0.06
0.04
0.04
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10; deviations from the SDT pattern are highlighted
30
p
399
0.06
p
Table 5 OLS Regression in the Public and Nonprofit Samples (with Controls)
Dependent variables
Work Motivation
Public
Work Hours
Nonprofit
Beta
Coef
(p)
Beta
Coef
0.18
-0.07
-0.06
-0.13
2.06
-0.75
-0.73
-1.32
0.00**
0.06†
0.09†
0.00**
0.02
-0.11
-0.01
-0.14
0.20
-0.94
-0.05
-1.40
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.16
0.13
-0.03
0.04
0.04
0.21
0.72
2.17
0.19
2.75
-0.28
1.10
0.33
0.41
0.34
0.01*
0.00**
0.00**
0.37
0.24
0.34
-0.09
0.03
0.06
0.18
0.07
0.12
0.11
0.08
-0.36
0.59
1.16
0.17
1.22
1.01
2.35
0.66
39.60 0.00**
--
Public
p
Nonprofit
Beta
Coef
p
Beta
Coef
p
0.64
0.03*
0.91
0.01*
0.06
-0.02
-0.11
-0.13
0.39
-0.11
-0.82
-0.81
0.12
0.67
0.00**
0.00**
-0.06
-0.13
-0.13
-0.10
-0.46
-1.06
-1.06
-0.96
0.27
0.01*
0.01*
0.05*
0.08†
0.58
0.24
0.00**
0.22
0.02*
0.04*
0.12
0.09
0.21
0.04
0.13
0.00
0.03
-0.02
-0.03
0.39
2.69
0.57
0.10
0.05
0.17
-0.33
-0.16
0.01*
0.00**
0.26
0.00**
0.91
0.38
0.57
0.47
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.09
-0.21
0.10
-0.01
-0.02
0.15
1.25
1.16
0.08
-3.67
0.82
-0.18
-0.16
0.47
0.23
0.23
0.11
0.00**
0.05*
0.87
0.69
40.13 0.00**
--
35.20 0.00**
--
Extrinsic motivation
IIR
IR
ER
AM
Controls
Size (log)
State of GA
Move-up position
Age
Female
Education
Married
Number of children
Constant
N
Adjusted R-square
--
739
0.09
377
0.09
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10
31
732
0.11
43.22 0.00**
382
0.12
Table 6 OLS Regression and Sector Moderation in the Full Sample (without Controls)
Dependent variables
Work Motivation
Coef
IIR
IR
ER
AM
1.92
-0.64
-0.40
-1.60
NPO dummy
p
Work Hours
Coef
0.00**
0.09†
0.31
0.00**
0.40
-0.13
-0.76
-1.07
p
0.16
0.63
0.01*
0.00**
2.58 0.00**
4.49 0.00**
IIR*NPO
-2.11 0.00**
-1.28 0.00**
IR*NPO
-0.21 0.72
-0.93 0.03*
ER*NPO
-0.05 0.93
-0.72 0.11
AM*NPO
-0.28 0.66
-0.06 0.90
Constant
53.42 0.00**
45.29 0.00**
N
Adjusted R-square
1152
0.07
1150
0.16
(
Post-regression Wald-tests under
)
(
Work Motivation
Public
Coef
IIR
IR
ER
AM
1.92
-0.64
-0.40
-1.60
Work Hours
Nonprofit
p
)
Coef
p
Public
Coef
0.00** -0.19 0.67
0.40
0.09†
-0.85 0.06†
-0.13
0.31
-0.45 0.32
-0.76
0.00** -1.88 0.00**
-1.07
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10
32
Nonprofit
p
Coef
p
0.16
0.63
0.01*
0.00**
-0.88
-1.06
-1.48
-1.13
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
Table 7 OLS Regression and Sector Moderation in the Full Sample (with Controls)
Dependent variables
Work Motivation
Work Hours
Coef
p
Coef
p
Extrinsic motivation
IIR
IR
ER
AM
2.07
-0.63
-0.57
-1.30
NPO dummy
0.00**
0.10†
0.15
0.00**
0.41
0.05
-0.76
-0.85
2.32 0.01*
IIR*NPO
IR*NPO
ER*NPO
AM*NPO
0.15
0.86
0.01*
0.00**
6.30 0.00**
-2.12
-0.38
0.22
-0.19
0.00**
0.52
0.72
0.77
-1.01
-1.22
-0.45
-0.15
0.02*
0.01*
0.32
0.76
Size (log)
State of GA
Move-up position
Age
Female
Education
Married
Number of children
-0.07
0.70
2.02
0.19
2.18
0.13
1.52
0.46
0.65
0.26
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.61
0.04*
0.09†
0.28
2.34
0.89
0.10
-1.21
0.45
-0.22
-0.14
0.02*
0.00**
0.06†
0.00**
0.01*
0.02*
0.69
0.49
Constant
39.60 0.00**
35.13 0.00**
N
Adjusted R-square
1116
0.11
1114
0.20
Controls
(
Post-regression Wald-tests under
)
(
Work Motivation
Public
Coef
IIR
IR
ER
AM
2.07
-0.63
-0.57
-1.30
Work Hours
Nonprofit
p
Coef
)
p
Public
Coef
0.00** -0.05 0.91
0.41
0.12
-1.11 0.01*
0.05
0.22
-0.35 0.36
-0.76
0.00** -1.49 0.01**
-0.85
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10
33
Nonprofit
p
Coef
p
0.11
0.84
0.01*
0.00**
-0.60
-1.17
-1.21
-1.00
0.14
0.00**
0.00**
0.05*
Endnotes
1
The use of intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy exists ubiquitously in the classic literature of motivation
research, both incentives and human needs. In addition to Maslow (1954), Herzberg (1966), and
McGregor (1960), Lawler (1971) developed his extrinsic-intrinsic rewards dichotomy, indicating that
rewards extrinsic to individuals reflect lower-order physiological, safety, and social needs whereas
intrinsic rewards can satisfy higher-order self-esteem and self-actualization needs. Wilson’s (1973)
material/tangible incentives and solidary/intangible incentives were designed to satisfy extrinsic needs
and intrinsic needs respectively.
2
In providing examples, Vallerand and Ratelle (2004) used some cases of educational psychology. The
example of integrated regulation is: “A ballet dancer might choose not to go to a party with friends in
order to be in shape for dance class early on the next morning.” The example of identified regulation is:
“A boy in high school who decides to get up an hour earlier to review his chemistry notes because he
feels it is personally important to do so.”
3
Vallerand and Ratelle (2004) provided examples for introjected regulation and external regulation as
well. The example of introjected regulation is: “A woman may vote municipal elections because she feels
she has to, because it is her duty as a citizen.” The examples of external regulation are “getting money”
and “avoiding a parent’s reprimands.”
The example of amotivation in Vallerand and Ratelle’s (2004) article is: “Students who cannot see what
staying in school will bring to their future decide to drop out of high school.”
4
In this study, both “opportunity for advancement” and “opportunity for training and career development”
are deemed extrinsic motivation as they are not internally-embedded desires and are controlled by
external parties. Our view is grounded in the taxonomy by Lawler (1971), who argues that extrinsic
rewards are those external to individuals and given by others, whereas intrinsic rewards stem directly
from job performance itself (e.g. using one’s own abilities and serving the public interest). Besides,
treating advancement as extrinsic motivation is not unprecedented (please see Word and Park, 2009 for an
example).
5
In fact, the value of Cronbach’s alpha in most of the previous research, such as Wright’s (2004, 2007)
empirical studies, was below .70.
6
7
The saved index ranged between -5.44 and 0.87. In order to avoid confusion, the authors added 5.44 to
every saved score so the range became 0 ~ 6.31. However, this rage is too small in comparison to the
other dependent variable: work hours (ranging between 20 and 70). We then multiplied the index by 10
and obtained the index used in this study. The range of this new index is between 0 and 63.1.
( )
We conducted post-regression Wald-test under
( )
in the nonprofit sample and
found that p < 0.13. That being said, this gap in terms of statistical significance is approaching the 90%
confidence level. The result of the same test in the public sample showed that p < 0.97, implying that the
difference is little and ignorable.
8
( )
We conducted post-regression Wald-test under
( )
in the nonprofit sample and
found that p < 0.56. Although the result is not statistically significant, substantive difference between
these two coefficients requires some discussion.
9
34