12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
What were the internal and international impacts of King Alexander's assassination in
1934?
The assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseille in 1934 can be considered
a seminal moment in Yugoslav history, particularly when studying the chronology of
Yugoslavia from inception to break-up. There are two aspects of the question to be taken
into consideration: the impact of the assassination of Yugoslavia internally and how the
assassination affected the wider international arena. In looking at both internal and
international impacts of the assassination the wider context of Yugoslavia as history will
emerge, highlighting the long term ramifications it had, as well as the shorter term immediate
influence on the Yugoslav nation and international affairs. Considering Yugoslavian history,
and events subsequent to the assassination, it is possible to argue that the death of King
Alexander I in Marseille in 1934 ensured the country would follow a path away from the
dictatorship under the monarchy. Where it would end up was determined by the interjection
of the Second World War: communist dictatorship. The post-assassination era (up until the
outbreak of the Second World War) can be said to have represented the twilight years of the
“First Yugoslavia” (Ramet, 2006: 1).
When looking at the death of King Alexander as a pivotal moment in Yugoslav history, the
first enquiry should be into the exact provenance of the assassination and the plotters,
including what they represented and their modus operandi. Identifying this would highlight
the impacts of the assassination on state relations, especially if, as is to follow, the
perpetrators were from - and utilising the facilities of - bordering nations and constituent
countries within Yugoslavia itself. To this end, Singleton notes: “It was discovered that the
King’s assassination had been plotted by the Croat extremist Pavelić and by Mihajlov, the
Bulgarian head of the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation)” (163: 1985).
Understandably, anger was directed towards the Italians and Hungarians for harbouring the
Ustaša, but it was not to be a lasting anger, due to the actions of both the Italians and
Hungarians in the following months and years.
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
The expected reaction to the death of the unifying leader of Yugoslavia would, presumably,
have been one concomitant with social disorder and political unrest.
However, the initial reaction to the assassination in political and social terms was
unreservedly positive. Djokic notes: “Instead of breaking up after its leader’s death,
Yugoslavia appeared more united than ever since 1918, if only for a brief period.” (Djokic,
152: 2003) A report of Alexander’s alleged last words – “preserve Yugoslavia” – inspired
patriotic fervour that would ensure attempts to continue his political testament (Djokic, 152:
2003). This gives credence to the assessment that the assassination had the opposite effect
to the one intended by the perpetrators, the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organisation). “It was felt by his critics no less than his admirers that ‘an enemy hath done
this thing,’ and that it was aimed at the very existence of the Yugoslav state by instruments
of some insidious foreign design” (Seton-Watson, 1932:38). This emotive response was
expected. However, instead of Yugoslavia descending into chaos and the state losing its grip
on the people, Yugoslavia actually solidified. Using public fervour from King Alexander’s
death the state consolidated its position according to his political legacy (Seton-Watson,
1932:39). Lampe also noted: “his death gave the kingdom a second wind and dealt his killers
a serious setback.” (1996: 173). “Pavelić had hoped that the regicide would cause
Yugoslavia to unravel. But instead, Hungary and Italy took steps to restrict the Ustaša, which
thereupon went into decline” (Ramet, 2006: 92). This “brief period” (Djokic, 2003: 152) is
important in terms of giving an indication of the sequence of events following on from the
assassination: the posthumous adulation of King Alexander on the one hand and the
ensuing political discord that followed on the other. These reflect the short term (posthumous
adulation) and long term (political discord) impacts of the King’s assassination on Yugoslavia
internally.
The timing of the King’s death created a fraught political situation in Yugoslavia. Peter,
Alexander’s son and heir to the throne was only ten years old and therefore unable to take
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
office in place of his father. This led to discussion of how the country could be governed in
the intervening years, and, as is often procedurally pertinent in terms of monarchic protocol,
to the formation of a “regency council to exercise the royal prerogatives” (Singleton, 1976:
78). Peter’s uncle, Prince Paul, was to be the senior regent and as such would occupy the
most important position in post-Alexander Yugoslavia. His decision to become the leading
figure was one of necessity not choice. Singleton notes: “Paul reluctantly forced himself to
assume the leading role, although he hated politics and later described his seven years in
office as ‘a dog’s life’.” (1985: 162) His presiding over the governing of Yugoslavia as
essentially a reluctant leader is reflective of the impact the assassination had on the
character of the state: which begs the question of whether his heart was totally in it. Had
Alexander survived the possibility is that “he could have avoided both internal division and
war. At least until Hitler changed maps and rules in 1938, he might easily have done better
than his successors.” (Lampe, 2000: 176)
The decision was made to traverse a “new path” (Lampe, 2000: 176) and the Finance
Minister, Milan Stojadinović, was sought for a cabinet position amongst old regime ministers
that General Živković had “cobbled together” (Lampe, 2000: 177) in December 1934. The
scandal surrounding the election in May 1935 led to the premature end of the premiership of
Bogoljub Jevtić - and subsequent discord -having been Prime Minister for just six months.
The election results were disputed and marred by undemocratic practices. Ramet notes:
“Jevtić, following the tradition established in Belgrade, ran a dirty campaign, using the
organs of power to harass the opposition and used the press and radio to attack and run
down the leadership of the United Opposition.” (Ramet, 2006: 93) That being said the
opposition - led by Maček - used methods equally as illegal such as physical harassment of
opposition voters. The results made for a telling picture as well: out of the 370 seats in the
assembly 303 were awarded to the governing party led by Jevtić, who gained 60.6 per cent
of the vote; while Maček’s opposition party were awarded only 67 seats, despite gaining 37.4
per cent of the vote. (Ramet, 2006: 93).
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
Jevtić’s position became untenable when the opposition parties boycotted the skupština in
protest at the election. Prince Paul realised that Jevtić could no longer remain Prime Minister
and asked for his resignation. He gave this upon the concurrent resignation from the cabinet
of its members – most notably General Živković. Prince Paul, who had the choice of Živković
or Stojadinović to appoint to the position of Prime Minister, eventually chose Stojadinović
(Ramet, 2006: 93). He would lead the country for nearly four years and would “bring a period
of relative calm in Yugoslav internal affairs,” (Jelavich, 1983: 202) during that period. He
enacted policies that would liberalise the country, such as relaxing censorship and the
releasing of political prisoners. The lingering question over Croatia that had remained
unanswered since the royal dictatorship was installed in 1929 was to remain unanswered
throughout his premiership, and would eventually contribute to Stojadinović’s demise along
with his lack of political direction with regard to Croatia after his narrow election victory in
1938. Prince Paul took advantage of the situation, replacing Stojadinović with Dragiša
Cvetković. This disjointed approach to the Yugoslav political system further points to the
deviation from Alexander I that occurred as a result of his assassination in Marseille. With
the exception of the relative calm during Stojadinović’s term in office, the Yugoslavian
political situation was one of disorder and factionalism. The question of Croatia is where the
next line of inquiry lies, culminating in the Sporazum of 1939.
Alexander had alluded to the fact that he was planning to settle the question of Croatia when
he returned from his fateful visit to Paris in 1934. As is now known he never made it to Paris
and so it leaves a potential ‘what if’ question that - even with the benefit of hindsight – is
difficult to answer. What would Alexander have done to settle the Croatian problem five
years earlier that was unlike the post-assassination circumstances? The scale of the issue is
brought to light by Mangham as follows: “Broadly defined, the Croatian question comprised
the totality of Serb-Croat relations by 1939, as the struggle between Yugoslavia’s two
dominant nations manifested itself in almost every aspect of cultural, economic and political
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
life” (1992: 15). The newly appointed Cvetković was brought in with the specific task of
settling the Croatian question. His appointment was based upon his long standing positive
relations with Vladko Maček, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party. (Hoptner, 1962: 129130) In terms of the Croatian question, King Alexander’s attempts to answer it were largely
directed towards the imposition of unity through his dictatorial governing of the state, as
Mangham puts it, “King Alexander’s attempt to impose unity had failed. It was time to see if a
negotiated solution could succeed.” (Mangham, 1992: 60)
Because of the increasingly worrying international system the Yugoslavian leadership were
prepared to make concessions to Croatia, and give Croatia a certain amount of
independence. Mangham states: “The emerging pattern of military confrontation and
territorial revision forced all states to look to their defences, and Yugoslavia’s grievous
internal divisions obviously weakened her politically and militarily” (1992:57). The
international situation made it difficult for Yugoslavian officials - in particular Cvetković – to
manage the outcome of the Sporazum. The Croats were able to hold the Yugoslavian
government to ransom in order to ensure some degree of autonomy for Croatia.
Unsurprisingly, Croatia was granted a degree of autonomy, but “…Belgrade continued to
control defense, internal security, foreign affairs, trade, and transport; but an elected Sabor
and a crown-appointed ban would decide internal matters in Croatia” (Curtis, 1990). In return
for granting partial Croatian autonomy, the promise was made not to secede from the Union.
Whilst the Croat question was loosely answered by the Sporazum of 1939, it only served to
raise a new question in respect of Serbian status within Yugoslavia. Serbians began to
question the outcome of the Sporazum, heavily criticising the one sided nature of the
agreement. In Serbians eyes, they had been given no autonomy whereas Croatia had been
set on the path of independence. Indeed, the Serbians were not alone in levelling this claim:
“Muslims demanded an autonomous Bosnia; and Slovenes and Montenegrins espoused
federalism” (Curtis, 1990).
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
Considering the broad portrait of events surrounding the Sporazum, it is evident that its
hurried conclusion was both necessitated and fatally undermined by the Second World War:
“The Second World War left the Yugoslavs no time to digest the implications of the
Sporazum, and the fragility of the compromise was tragically demonstrated when Yugoslavia
herself was drawn into the war in 1941” (Singleton, 1976: 80). Eventually domestic resolution
became impossible when France fell, “Foreign political developments after the fall of France
eventually forced Yugoslavia’s leaders to neglect their pursuit of domestic reconciliation”
(Mangham, 1992: 149). The fall of the guarantor of the Little Entente, France, was the
culmination of the end - for Prince Paul – of the alliance system Yugoslavia had come to
know under King Alexander. The changing shape of international politics from the
perspective of Yugoslavia was a notable legacy of the assassination, which deserves
significant and subsequent reflection.
The change in foreign policy by Prince Paul and Stojadinović that deviated from King
Alexander I’s position, had implications for both the internal stability of Yugoslavia and the
international situation. “Yugoslavia’s attempt to persuade the League of Nations to condemn
both Italy and Hungary for their complicity in the assassination was watered down, under
pressure from Eden and Laval” (Singleton, 1985: 163). Laval had replaced the French
Foreign Minister Barthou, who met his end at the hands of the assassins in Marseille along
with King Alexander. This led to a weakening of Franco-Yugoslav relations which can be
examined in the context of the Second World War as a precondition for German dominance
in the Balkans that subsequently enabled Germany and Italy to dominate the region and
create a power block in juxtaposition to the UK and France.
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
Prince Paul concluded that the “Little Entente became less and less credible as Nazi
Germany grew in power and influence and France did nothing” (Singleton, 1976: 82). With
the security of the Yugoslav state at stake Prince Paul had to act to protect its interests; and
with inaction on France’s part, he seemed to have little option. Between 1937 and 1941
various agreements were made with the defence of the Yugoslavian realm in mind. Firstly,
the Pact of Eternal Friendship was signed with Bulgaria in January 1937, and then in March
Italy and Yugoslavia came to an agreement “despite the protests of the Little Entente.”
(Singleton, 1976: 82) Relations with Hungary were improved in 1940 with the “Pact of
Lasting Peace and Eternal friendship” (Singleton, 1976:82).The tripartite pact with Germany
ultimately summed up the transition from Alexander I on foreign policy, as Singleton notes:
“It only remained to come to an accord with the arch-revisionists, Germany, to complete
Yugoslavia’s total reversal of her system of alliances” (1976: 82). It should, however, be
stressed that after France’s fall in June 1940 Yugoslavia found itself - through the diplomacy
of Prince Paul – “desperately seeking allies” (Curtis, 1990). Yugoslavia had found itself
lacking in friendly neighbours and was left in a position where accepting Germany’s offer and
consequently agreeing to the terms of the Tripartite Pact was the only option.
Yugoslavian reaction to the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany was so profoundly
negative that it led to a coup d’état during the night on 27th March 1941. The Yugoslav
government’s overthrow was led by the military, and in particular General Dušan Simović,
commander of the Yugoslavian air force. The coup was conducted in the name of King Peter,
who was sworn in the very next day. Mass demonstrations occurred against the Tripartite
Pact with Germany and in exaltation at the coup d’état’s success (Singleton, 1976: 82-3).
Prince Paul had lost the confidence of the Yugoslavian people: “…there is evidence of
widespread opposition to Paul’s foreign policy, from all parts of the country and from all
political groups” (Singleton, 1976: 83).
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
The occurrence of the military coup in 1941 does pose an interesting question. Would it have
been necessary if King Alexander had never been assassinated? With the benefit of
hindsight it is easier to make the assumption that without the political vacuum caused by his
death the Yugoslav state would have maintained its structure and strength sufficiently to
resist a coup. In fact, it would in any event hardly have been considered necessary or
beneficial for the people of Yugoslavia. Ultimately, the decisions that led to the coup by the
military were rooted in the agreements that Paul had made with countries that were contrary
to the original foreign policy objectives pursued by Alexander when he was alive. In essence
Prince Paul had pursued a foreign policy that made him the architect of his own demise,
epitomised by his flight from Yugoslavia and exile in Greece.
Ramet highlights three causal factors that led to the demise of the ‘First Yugoslavia’ (Ramet,
2006: 109): “…widespread discontent among all peoples of the country, the worsening
international situation, in which Yugoslavia found itself torn between two warring blocs, and
the failure among the country’s leading politicians to reach a consensus on a formula for the
creation of a legitimate state” (Ramet, 2006: 109). Looking at these three causal factors, only
the international situation was of an external source, rendering it challenging to include the
actions of the King – whose actions - had he avoided his untimely death - could not easily be
anticipated with regard to the international situation which he was not privy to. The two
internal factors are attributable to the assassination in Marseille and domestic events that
occurred subsequently. Both the widespread discontent among the people and the failure to
achieve a political consensus on the structural formulation of the state were consequence of
the post-Alexander political situation. In essence, Ramet argues that the regicide occupies a
position in Yugoslav history at a turning point that – once played out – emerged as a
contributory factor in the break-up of the “First Yugoslavia” (Ramet, 2006: 1).
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
After considering the literature on the subject and evaluating the arguments presented
surrounding the impact of the assassination it is possible to deduce the central
consequences of the act of regicide in Marseille in 1934, both in the immediate short term
context of the resulting political disarray and the wider context of the Second World War. It is
clear that the death of King Alexander as a result of the assassination there were far
reaching implications for Yugoslavia and in its relations with bordering nations, including the
wider international system as a whole. From analysis of the immediate post-assassination
domestic situation in 1934; ensuing political vacuum throughout the late 1930s; the
Sporazum of 1939; coup d’état of 1941 and eventual invasion and collapse the same year,
the legacy of the assassination remains consistently multidimensional and far-reaching.
However, in the wider context of Yugoslavia, the assassination is best understood as a
manifestation of a nation intertwined with ideology, since it is an integral part of a rich
tapestry of events that have shaped the Yugoslav story from its birth to its eventual demise
as a unified nation towards the latter stages of the twentieth century.
Considering the period of Yugoslav history it is therefore possible to make the claim that the
death of King Alexander I in 1934 precipitated Yugoslavia’s gradual transition as a state
away from its monarchic dictatorship. His death was symbolic of the demise of the crown as
a centralising head of state that kept Yugoslavia united, even if that was not immediate.
However, the assassination helped to gradually erode Yugoslav unity, thereby leaving the
nation in a poor position to deal with the consequences of the Second World War. The
Second World War and its post war outcome, however, decided what the nation’s political
system would be replaced with: Josip Broz Tito led communism. The success of the “First
Yugoslavia” (Ramet, 2006: 1) was ultimately tied to strong unifying political leadership,
without which the state was unable to deal with its increasingly frail position in world politics.
It wasn’t until the emergence of Tito that Yugoslavia would experience the strong political
leadership in domestic and foreign aspects that the post-assassination era of Yugoslavia
necessitated.
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Peter Lawton
12EUC631 - Yugoslavia: Its 20th Century
Bibliography
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Cavendish, R. ‘Alexander I of Yugoslavia Assassinated’, 2010, URL:
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[20/10/2012]
Curtis, G. ‘Yugoslavia: A Country Study’, 1990,
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