John Adams: Second President of the US running for Reelection* From Massachusetts, Born: 19 October 1735 Died: 4 July 1826 John Adams had started off his presidency in 1797 at a distinct disadvantage. "There never was perhaps a greater contrast between two characters than between those of the present President and of his predecessor," wrote James Madison of the transition from George Washington to John Adams in 1797. As Washington's two‐term vice president, Adams suffered much from the inevitable comparison between America's first president and its second. One problem observed historian Richard Brookhiser, was that Adams "had no executive experience."12 Second, Adams was not a particularly likable character. He had few friends in either his own party or the opposition. Historian Thomas Fleming called the John and Abigail Adams a "party of two."13 Adams' eight years as America's first vice president had not been easy, although neither had they had taxing on the restless elder statesman from Massachusetts. His two terms were frustrating for a man of his vigor, intellect, ambition, and vanity. He complained to his wife Abigail: "My country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived."14 Historian Richard Norton Smith observed that "the second office was torture for the proud, prickly New Englander cast as occasional confidant and frequent lightning rod to the vastly more popular chief executive, whom Adams, in moments of pique, called Old Muttonhead."15 What made the situation even more intolerable for Adams was the profound jealousy he harbored for the mythic reputations of George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. He was also envious of more charismatic colleagues like Alexander Hamilton and even his cousin Samuel Adams. Adams did not like to play second fiddle to anyone ‐ not even to an accomplished violinist like Jefferson. Adams was never comfortable in repose and the vice presidency offered little outlet for his talents or opinions. Historian Fawn M. Brodie wrote that "Adams frankly described his role as 'the first prince of the country, and the heir apparent to the sovereign authority.' But he never had Washington's intimate friendship, and Hamilton was eager to supersede him politically as well as personally."16 Adams' sole job was to preside over the Senate ‐ a responsibility which he found stultified his innate desire to declare his opinions, which unfortunately the elected senators did not seek or value. For a man who liked to talk, his duties were torture. Moreover, Adams took an almost perverse pleasure in being unpopular. It was his badge of political martyrdom. Historians Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen wrote that Adams "antagonized people, often needlessly, and lacked the political savvy and social skills necessary to retain the [presidential] office."17 The dignity that seemed to come easily to George Washington was elusive to Adams. He suffered from Irritable Founder Syndrome. He was cantankerous. He contemplated a heroic role and was chagrined that he seemed condemned to play a merely supporting role in history. He had a strong opinion of his own accumulated wisdom and a low opinion of unfettered democracy. So much of the world annoyed him. As a consequence, Adams's published writings were judged insufficiently democratic and probably monarchial by critics like Thomas Jefferson. Two decades later, Adams wrote Jefferson: "In truth, my 'Defence of the Constitutions' and 'Discourses on Davila,' were the cause of that immense unpopularity which fell like the tower of Siloam upon me. Your steady defence of democratical principles, and your invariable favorable opinion of the French revolution, laid the foundation of your unbounded popularity. Sic transit gloria mundi." He added: "Now, I will forfeit my life, if you can find one sentiment in my Defence of the Constitutions, or the Discourses on Davila, which, by a fair construction, can favor the introduction of hereditary monarchy or aristocracy into America. They were all written to support and strengthen the Constitution of the United States."18 In December 1796, Adams had edged out Jefferson in the Electoral College ‐ by just three votes. Historian Bruce Ackerman wrote that Jefferson's 1796 "campaign manager, James Madison, offered him a chance to quibble his way to the presidency by challenging the four Vermont votes that gave Adams his edge in the electoral college. Jefferson turned down Madison flat: 'I pray to declare it on every occasion foreseen or not foreseen by me, in favor of the choice of the people substantially expressed, and to prevent the phaenomenon of a Pseudo‐president at so early a day.'"19 Jefferson wrote of Adams: "I am his junior in life, was his junior in Congress, his junior in the diplomatic line, his junior lately in our civil government."20 Even as president, John Adams was a bundle of contradictions. He worried about everything. Nevertheless, there was none of Jefferson's false modesty or false self‐importance in Adams. In 1793, Adams wrote to his wife Abigail of the conflict within Washington's Administration: Supreme Court Chief Justice John "Jay's Friends have let Escape feelings of Jealousy as well as Jefferson's. And it is very natural. Poor me who have no Friends to be jealous, I am left out of the question and pray I ever may be."21 Of course, Adams desperately wanted to be part of governmental decision‐making and yearned to have the recognition he thought his talents should demand. Contemplating his elevation to the presidency in 1797, Adams wrote his wife on March 1, 1796: "I am quite at my Ease. I never felt less Anxiety when any considerable Change lay before me. Aut transit aut finit. I transmigrate or come to an End. The Question is between living at Phila[delphia] or at Quincy, between great Cares and Small Cares. I have looked into myself and see no meanness [illegible] nor dishonesty there. I see weakness enough. But no timidity."22 Once Adams occupied the presidency, noted historian Joseph J. Ellis, he "regarded himself as the American version of 'the patriot king,' the virtuous chief magistrate who would oppose all factions on behalf of the public interest, even if it meant repudiating his own Federalist colleagues, as it eventually did."23 Adams had a strong concept of his presidential responsibilities, but a weak concept of how to exercise them politically. He had taken office without a strong popular or political base. Historian Jay Winik wrote that "within weeks, he was declaring that the presidency was tantamount to a sentence of 'hard labor.' His pique was predictable. For all his brilliance and years in public service ‐ he was arguably the nation's most seasoned diplomat ‐ he had numerous handicaps to overcome." Among them was his executive inexperience and a lack of political instincts.24 He was not the man to construct a broad governing coalition: Adams was unable to rally either Federalists or Republicans. To his credit, however, noted historian Jack Shepherd wrote: "John Adams...was a national president, with all his faults, who felt no obligation either to party or politicians, but to his country. He had constantly sought peace and accommodation throughout his career; he had always been a man of law over mob rule."25 Adams lacked Washington's political dexterity ‐ refusing even to participate in celebrating Washington's long leadership record. When as president he was invited to a ball in Washington's honor, he wrote "DECLINED" on the invitation ‐ causing a minor political scandal which contributed to his image as being out of political touch with the opinions of most Americans.26 In replacing Washington, Adams made a fatal mistake in not replacing his cabinet, who owed their loyalty to Alexander Hamilton rather than Adams. During his presidential term, Adams would attract many strong critics ‐ even among those who should have been his friends. Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott Jr. wrote in 1800 of Adams: "We know the temper of his mind to be revolutionary, violent, and vindictive; he would be sensible that another official term would bring him to the close of life. His passions and selfishness would continually gain strength; his pride and interest would concur in rendering his administration favorable to the views of the democrats and jacobins; public offices would be frequently bestowed on men capable of servile compliances; the example of a selfish attention to personal and family interests would spread like a leprosy in our political system, and by corrupting the fountains of virtue and honor would destroy the principles by which alone a mild government under any form can be sustained."27 Adams's decision as president to retain Washington's cabinet was well‐intentioned but ill‐advised. It contributed mightily to the political and personal paranoia from which Adams already suffered. Washington biographer Richard Brookhiser wrote that Adams was ill‐prepared for the country's top office. He had never been a general or a governor. He had been a thinker. Brookhiser wrote that Adams "was a hands‐off administrator, spending inordinate amounts of time at his home in Braintree, doing business by mail. When he acted, he acted impulsively and without consultation. Years later, he complained that 'I was as president a mere cipher,' meaning that Hamilton pulled the strings in his cabinet. Hamilton's role was not quite what Adams thought, and to the degree that he was a cipher, it was because he made himself one."28 Adams biographer James Grant concluded that Adams was ill‐
suited for the American presidency: "His first deficiency was that he was not George Washington. Try as he might, the constitutional theorist, peacemaker, and junk‐bond financier could never replace the heroic general. Certainly Adams had all too little of the Virginian's stoic self‐control...A third deficiency was that Adams was a political entrepreneur, a creator and builder more than a manager."29 And lingering in Adams' political shadows was the consummate Federalist manager, Alexander Hamilton, never afraid to try to exercise power and influence. Adams, moreover, was not a trusting soul. He didn't trust the business elite, he didn't trust the political elite, and he didn't much trust the people. In particular, he didn't trust Hamilton. Most important, he increasingly did not trust his own cabinet. Adams' Secretary of War James McHenry wrote: "Whether he is spiteful, playful, witty, kind, cold, drunk, sober, angry, easy, still, jealous, cautious, confident, close, open, it is almost always in the wrong place or to the wrong persons."30 As a cabinet member, McHenry had been unnerved by the president's mercurial moods and capricious judgment. When Adams effectively fired McHenry in the spring of 1799, the president ranted about the power and influence of former Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton who he claimed, was "the greatest intrigruant in the World ‐ a man devoid of every moral principle ‐ a Bastard, and as much a foreigner as Gallatin."31 Historians Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick wrote of the cabinet confrontation: "Whether Adams intended this in advance, or simply lost control of himself, or whether he did indeed intend it but needed to work himself up before he could do it, cannot of course be known."32 Adams' fellow Federalists were not averse to reporting on his defects. Historian David Hackett Fischer wrote that with a few exceptions, "Federalists were in a state of extreme disorganization at the end of 1790s. Evidence of many kinds suggest that they were not merely split, as a modern party might be, but atomized." Fischer noted that the party could even nominate candidates efficiently for office. But perhaps the greatest difficulty was that there was no real chief of the party. Adams was alienated from other party leaders, but so was Alexander Hamilton." There developed a serious communication gap between Adams and fellow Republicans. Fischer wrote: "By 1800, after three years of his administration, many federal leaders so thoroughly misunderstood him that they believed he had taken leave of his senses." He added: "The violent quarrels between Adams and other Federalists in 1799‐1800 were not merely a matter of appointments, the army, and foreign affairs, but a clash of conflicting political conceptions."33 As president Adams, therefore, grew increasingly isolated ‐ from his own fellow Federalists who were angered by his decision to seek a second peace mission to France in 1799 and from Republicans angered by Adams's support of the Alien and Sedition acts. Anger and depression stalked Adams at a time he needed to be developing a political strategy to save his presidency. Even his friends could not reach him. Historian Thomas Fleming wrote: "One hot July day [in 1799], three old friends, led by General Henry Knox, rode out from Boston to see him. John sat in the parlor reading a newspaper while they tried to converse with him. He did not offer them so much as a sip of cold water before they stalked out, wondering if the president was more than a little crazy."34 Foreign Affairs Key to Adams's presidency and to his political future was his handling of relationships with the tumultuous French government. President Adams took office at a time of conflict between Britain and France ‐ and conflict between their partisans in the United States ‐ Federalists for Britain and Jeffersonians for France. The Jay Treaty of 1795 had deepened that rift. The French Revolution of 1789 had set in motion the political currents that would converge in the election of 1800. "As liberty got ugly in France, people grew less patient with its partisans here at home," noted religious scholar Forrest Church.37 American attitudes toward the French Revolution became a surrogate for attitudes toward American politics. "To a large extent the record of the Adams Administration was written in response to the pressures of foreign affairs growing out of the crisis in French relations which greeted him when he took office and which, before it was settled, led to decisions in domestic policy more controversial than those in foreign affairs," observed historian Noble E. Cunningham, Jr.38 The Jay Treaty had quieted relations with Britain, but the crisis of American‐French relations occupied most of Adams's presidency and colored all of the politics during his administration. During his two terms, President Washington had been able to balance the competing strands of American politics while balancing America's responses to Britain and France. President Adams could hardly balance the competing strands among his fellow Federalists as he tried to quiet relations across the Atlantic. Historian Jean Edward Smith wrote that Adams "attempted to follow Washington's moderate policies but came under increasing fire from both the left and right. Jefferson and the Republicans pressed the president for an alliance with France against England, while Hamilton's supporters urged an alliance with England and war against France."39 Soon after he took office, President Adams dispatched three official commissioners to Paris ‐ to the dismay of Federalists. Adams' own secretary of state was suggesting his replacement in letters he wrote at the end of October 1797. Timothy Pickering wrote to Pennsylvania Senator William Bingham: "This fatal error will subvert the present administration & with them the government itself. Mr. Adams has not by this mission gained one friend among the democrats; to their former hatred will now be added another sensation: while among the federalists he has forfeited the support of his best friends and our most estimable citizens."40 Pickering would be proved wrong. The commissioners attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate with the French government. Instead, French officials insisted on bribes. When the American emissaries arrived in Paris in the fall of 1797, they met with three representatives of French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand. They were informed that before any negotiations could proceed, they needed a $250,000 bribe from the Americans and a governmental loan to France of $12 million. Commissioner John Marshall wrote from Paris: "All power is now in the undivided possession of those who have directed against us those hostile measures...Only the Atlantic can save us."41 The commissioners presented their correspondence with "X, Y and Z" in the French government to Adams, who in turn gave it to Congress. The publication of the XYZ correspondence backfired on Jeffersonians as Americans rallied to prepare for war with France. The President's opponents insisted on publication of the delegation's papers, but publication of these so‐called XYZ letters backfired by mobilizing public opinion against France and behind the Federalists. The Federalists then overreacted by passing the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. Jefferson was as inflamed in his opposition to the Federalists' acts as the Federalists were inflamed in their support for the Alien and Sedition Acts. The vice president wrote that "to preserve the freedom of the human mind & freedom of the press, every spirit should be ready to devote itself to martyrdom, for as long as we may think as we will & speak as we think, the condition of man will proceed in improvement."42 The anti‐Federalists led by Jefferson and James Madison overreacted to the Alien and Sedition Acts by pushing the Virginia and Kentucky Legislatures to pass the so‐called Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions which asserted state authority to overrule federal government. Adams's great‐grandson Henry wrote: "These Virginia Resolutions, which were drawn by Madison, seemed strong enough to meet any possible aggression from the national government; but Jefferson, as though not quite satisfied with these, recommended the Kentucky legislature to adopt still stronger. The draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, whether originally composed or only approved by him, representing certainly his own convictions, declared that 'where powers are assumed which have not been delegated a nullification of the Act is the rightful remedy,' and 'that every State has a natural right, in cases not within the compact, to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits.' Jefferson did not doubt 'that the co‐States, recurring to their natural right in cases not made federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each take measures of its own for providing that neither these acts, nor any others of the federal government not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be exercised within their respective territories.'"43 Historian Joseph Charles wrote: "Whatever the causes for Adams's decision, the sending of the second mission to France put an end to British efforts at collaboration with this country. Their captures of our ships and impressment of our seamen became again as numerous as at any time during the decade. The heavy captures of the British in 18oo were an important factor in bringing about the Republican victory in the election, particularly since one of these captures influenced the vote of New York City, upon which depended that of the state and less directly that of the whole country."44 In the 1800 election, Jefferson asserted his foreign policy simply: "I am for free commerce with all nations, political connection with none and little or no diplomatic establishment."45 By then, President Adams was distrusted by his own party, many of whom were angered by his renewed peace initiative to France. Republican aversion to the Alien and Sedition Acts was celebrated in a campaign ditty: Rejoice, Columbia's son rejoice To tyrants never bend the knee But join with heart and soul and voice For Jefferson and liberty From Georgia up to Lake Champlain From seas to Mississippi's shore Ye sons of freedom loud proclaim THE REIGN OF TERROR IS NO MORE Years later, Adams contended to Jefferson that Jefferson did not understand the Federalists' fears of civic
disorder and revolution. Adams wrote his former opponent in 1813: "You never felt the terrorism of
Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts. I believe you never felt the terrorism of Gallatin's Insurrection in
Pennsylvania. … You certainly never felt the terrorism excited by Genet in 1793, when ten thousand
people in the streets of Philadelphia, day after day, threatened to drag Washington out of his house and
effect a revolution in the government, or compel it to declare war in favor of the French Revolution and
against England. The coolest and the firmest minds, even among the Quakers in Philadelphia, have given
their opinions to me that nothing but the yellow fever … could have saved the United States from a total
revolution of government. I have no doubt you was fast asleep in philosophical tranquility when ten
thousand people, and perhaps many more, were parading the streets of Philadelphia on the evening of
my Fast Day [25 April 1799]; when Governor [Thomas] Mifflin himself thought it his duty to order a patrol
of horse and foot to preserve the peace; when Market Street was as full as men could stand by one
another, and even before my door; when some of my domestics, in frenzy, determined to sacrifice their
lives in my defense; when all were ready to make a desperate sally among the multitude and others were
with difficulty and danger dragged back by the others; when I myself judged it prudent and necessary to
order chests of arms from the War Office to be brought through bylanes and back doors, determined to
defend my house at the expense of my life and the lives of the few, very few, domestics and friends within
it. What think you of terrorism, Mr. Jefferson?"47
Under pressure from fellow Federalists in the aftermath of the XYZ Affair, Adams had mobilized an
American army - under General George Washington. The president, however, did not cease to seek an
accommodation with France - to the chagrin of fellow Federalists. Adams' foreign policy toward France
might have contained an element of jealousy. The president had been forced against his will by
Washington and Alexander Hamilton to appoint Hamilton to the number two command position in a
reconstituted American army preparing to fight France. Peace with France would deprive Hamilton of any
chance at military glory. Predictably, Adams' peace initiative infuriated Hamilton whose respect for Adams
was hardly higher than his for France.
The Treaty of Mortefontaine was a personal triumph for Adams - but not a political one. Historian Gordon
W. Wood noted: "After months of negotiations, France...agreed to terms and in 1800 signed the Treaty of
Mortefontaine with the United States that brought the Quasi-War to a close and suspended the FrancoAmerican treaty of 1778, thus freeing America from its first of what Jefferson would refer to as 'entangling
alliances.' Unfortunately for Adams, word of the ending of the conflict did not reach America until the
Republicans had won the presidency."48 The treaty 'did not give the Americans all they desired, but it did
resolve the crisis, and as the principal scholars of the Federalist era have argued, it was probably the best
accommodation that could have been reached."49 It was finally ratified by the Senate on February 3,
1801. "Adams would go to his grave believing that he had sacrificed himself for peace," wrote historian
Richard Brookhister. "A more realistic view is that he did the right thing in the worst possible way."50
Objectively, Adams was right. Historians Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick wrote: "With the likelihood of
an actual French invasion having long since faded, and with popular exasperation at high taxes, the Alien
and Sedition Laws, and an expensive army becoming every day more manifest, there was little to be
gained from a continuing sole preoccupation with the specter of jacobinism."51 Politically, Adams was
already isolated from both Jeffersonians and Federalists. After leaving the presidency, Adams wrote of
his fellow Federalists: "Let me repeat to you once more, Sir, the faction was dizzy. Their brains turned
round. They knew not, they saw not the precipice on which they stood."52 Without a foreign war to fight,
the Federalists and Jeffersonians seemed to focus their paranoia on each other - fears and suspicions
that had been growing since the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, exacerbated by the Jay Treaty, the Alien and
Sedition Acts, and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.
The same fears that had motivated the Alien and Sedition Acts were revived by Federalists in the 1800
campaign. Historian Fawn M. Brodie wrote: "The New York Commercial Advertiser ran a series of articles
by one who signed himself Burleigh, which topped every previous diatribe in vituperation and hysteria.
Burleigh predicted that a Jefferson victory would mean civil war, that thousands of Frenchmen and
Irishmen, 'the refuse of Europe who have fled from the pillory and the gallows, and are here stirring up
revolution, watching for plunder, and rioting in the thoughts of dividing up the property of the honest,'
would 'rush from their lurking places, whet their daggers, and plunge them into the hearts of all who love
order, peace, virtue, and religion.'"53 Emotions were running high and the rhetoric was hot. One
Jeffersonian ditty proclaimed: Let foes to Freedom dread the name,
But should they touch this sacred Tree,
Twice fifty thousands swords shall flame,
For Jefferson and Liberty.54
President Adams had grown increasingly isolated - from his own fellow Federalists who were angered by
his decision to seek a second peace mission to France in 1799 and from Jeffersonians angered by his
support of the Alien and Sedition acts. His position was perilous and his personality was fragmenting.
*Source: Taken from the Lehrman Institute @ http://www.lehrmaninstitute.org/history/1800.html#affairs