,
Decembe r 9, 1976
I.
TO:
JIMMY CARTE R
FROM:
WALTER F . MaNDAl£
RR:
mE ROLE OF TilE VICE PRESIDENT 111 TilE CARTER ADMIN I STRATION
Background
s ty
r
e
e
i
p
c
a
years, generally speaking . the Vice president
P Shaso performed a role
e alan d even antagonism .
characterized by ambiguit y, dlsappointment,
l
a ic
d
r
n
o and, I believe , incurable
t
Vice Presidency to be a job ofo spectacular
s
i
M
frusnation."
.
H
F ta
r
o of the office . Competition wi th
tl e problems
foc used on partlcular
s
a newith the White House staff, lack of meanthe
conflict
W
n
i
ingful
lsck of
and inadequate acceS5
M
vital information are most frcquently "",ntioned,
Defining an appropriate and meaningfu l role for the Vic e
President has been a problem throughout the history of this country.
While custom and statute have changed the office
gt~_ d\lally
over 200
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. concludes "history has shown the American
Other
co~ntators
as well as former Vice Presidents have
Presiden~,
assignmen~s,
au~ho~ity ,
~o
I have spoken st length with Vice President Rockereller,
former Vice President Humphrey, and thei r staffs to try to understand maxe (ully the m3ny dimensions of the position,
Further,
through othe r conversations an d reading what literatur e is
available, I have tried to supplement my understanding.
-
-2-
Finally, my scaff prepared a Con s t itutiona l history of the office
and .. comparloon of the duties lin d staffing of the Humphrey an d
Rockefeller Vice Presidencies.
It is my hope in this memorandum that 1 can outline a set o f
relationships , functions and assignments that wil l be workable an d
productt"" fo r the administr .. tion.
I am cornrnHterl to do everything
possible to lDa ke this administration
Ii
success .
I full y r"al ize
s ty
r
e ie
Our Basic Relationship -- General Adviser p
c
a
o
I believe the most importan t contP
ribution
I can make is to
S
e al
general adviser
l
a me icin giving you advice on
d
government and politics would assist
r
n
o. isto
the major
facing you
M t heHonl y other public official elected
The position of being
.
F by tspecific
a
nationwide , not affected
obligations or institutional
r
o
tl etheeCongressional
inter ests of either
or Executive branch, an d
s
a n
able to look at the governmen
t as a
docs put me in a unique
W
n
i
posiCion to advise . Further, my political role around the country
M
as well as my est"blished relationships in ;,'ashington shoul d allow
that my persona l an d policical success is totally tied to yours
an d the achievements of your administration.
11.
serve 8a a
to you.
I would hope my experience in
questi~ns
~hole,
me to keep in clos e touch with man y different groups and viewpoints.
The biggest single problem of our recent administrations
has bee!"! the failure of the President to be exposed to independent
analysi s not conditioned by what it is thought he "'·ants to hear or
.J.
often wha t other. want ht~ to heat.
I hope to offer Imp~ rt l& l
advice and he lp a •• ure that you are not shie l ded from point. of
vb" chat you shou ld hear.
advice.
1 .,111 no t be the onl y sou"'c" o f suc h
Yet , [ think lIlY podtion enables
11M!
to he lp maintain the
(rpc flow o f 1de.8 ~nd Infor.atlon which I, indispensab l e to a
healthy and productive adDint. eratlon.
In order to fulfill the. ro l e o f a gene ral advi sor sath-
s ty
r
e
e
i
p
the CI A and othe r inte ll igence agenei ..c, of ,i.l1a r
a
o
P warning
depth to tho... OU receive. Advance
of .ajar
S
e al
l
a ic
d
r
n
o
t
o
request additional briefing' san d res ponses On areas of
i
M
sp ecisl concern. .
H
F
a
r
Senator Humphr e y t e'"ph" a b;ed the importance of this
o
e
t
s
poin t to me l re peate dly . He was not given
e
a
n
br lofinga
W andinwas , therefo re, unable to pa rt icipate
e ffec tive ly
Mon the NSC or in t hi s general arena of foreign
("etorlly. I chin k the following arc ncce •• ,uy,
1.
Frequent a nd cOIIpr ehen dva lnte l11genc e bri"finga
rr~
h.uel t o be ,lhcU8.o d a t lIICot inga of the NSC and other
I ' gnifieant g r oup. 11 "ece'8"r y as well as the abUit y to
adeq~te
and dotense polic y .
2,
A spec ial r e l a~ i on.hi p with other membe r . of the
Exocut{IIe branc h .
1 would hope tha t 1 could e xpect the
8abe or nea rly the ..... level of
administration official. in
r~.pon8 1 vonoss
.o~kt na
from key
Information that you
,
•
-."""td r e ceive.
Providing soun d "dv lce to you r e quire.
from them complete candor an d coop e rat ion in providing
info..."...tlon .
I do no t belt"" .. 1 coul d evaluat e a nd!o r
asseu key probll!1Ds ... ithoue thh r ... h Uonah tp .
1 think
it woul d be Importan t to .... k" th1. point to th.. Cabinet
and otbe .. key officials at the very b"Sinn ing of the
"","1I1ia t .. a t 10n •
s ty
r
e
e l
i
p
Congtes.tonal
Meting. of
"10,,cNationa
a
Security Counc il, no.e't ic Council
P anSd othe econosic
l ) wou ld be ext r eme ly
policy group (whalever fO rD le t akea
a
aa dvhory
c
i
d
r
n
o . taff representative on
t
4 . A .e'loned, o
experienced
s
i
M
the NSC and Dome.tic
Council
who I can clIll on to mee t
.
H
F
my
think ta
terribly i mportant that I have
r
o
te ility
s
l
a st arf capab
on these t wo Council. whose prior ity
e
a
ls to a .s l . t n
W in .e In pc r (or.ing cy f unc tions. Hu.phrey was
no t givcn s tarf support which coabi ned with the lack o f
M
3.
PDrttclpation tn Meeting, of Key Group',
Participation in Cabinet meetings. discussions with the
lead"nh1p ,
it
valuable in ("tUlling the
n~<:llL
I
role.
i t is
br icfings made his rol e on the N$C aluo.t insignificant.
~.
RchU onsh ip with White Houu Staff.
is cr itical tha t my off icc be well
"of the \Jllite House .
jnfor~d
I thin k it
on the act iv ities
I belicve i t would be hel pful i f
rcprcsentatives o f my office could participate in
-5-
appropriate White House staff meetings.
main tain the
e~cellent
I hope we can
relationship our two staffs
developed during the campaign and have maintained during
the transition.
Also, my su.if is available to you or
the White House scaff for any assign<nents or tasks for
~hich
they may be needed .
6.
Access to you.*
I suggest that we plan to meet
s ty
r
e
e
i
p
c
a
o
P advice
me to report on my activities , offer
and set
S
e al, could cancel the
assignments from you. We , ofl course
a ic
d
if
r
n
o
t
o
regular meeting. I would hope
s I could depend on having
i
M
.
H
access whenever necessary
. Of course, I would be availF
a want to me et.
t
able whencverr you might
o
e
t
s
General Functionsl
e
a
n
A. Troub
As problems arise, I woul d like to
W lc-Shooting.
n
i
be available toM
respon d to your direction and hclp solve them as
onc e per week at a
minl~
of 30 minutes to an hour.
Roc kefelle r currently has thiS arr angement with President
Ford and rc<:ormlends i t highly.
"",ering
111.
quickly
a.
This would be
we did not need the time.
possible.
It
time for
I n addition to our
Within this genera l category , two ar ca s emerge :
• His torically, there has been substantl.al variaCion in acceSS and
proximity. It was not until President Kennedy that the Vice
President had an office in proximity to the OIhlte House ( Ic:OS).
On one occaaion (A!new) the office of the Vice President was
actuall y in the Wh te !louse. t prefe r to think of aCcess in
the t erms expressed here and would prefer to maintain the spac e
with adequa te scaf f offices in the Executive Office Building.
-
1.
Investigation .
valuable function in
I believe I coul d perform a ve-cy
at t ~p tlng
to provide backg-cound and
analysis fo-c you in specia l a-ceas of concer n.
This f unction
could -cange from ga theri ng lnfo -cmation on an issue o-c area
of gove-cnment about which you are -cest l ess o-c uncomfortable
to conducting a full -sca le, forma l investigation such a.
Roc kefel l er did in the case of the CIA .
An examp le of one
s ty
r
e
e
i
p
ca'"l'aign .
c
a
o
2. Ar bitration . Th e sometimes
and sOmeP conflicting
S
l functions to
tfmes parallel assignments o f le
governmental
a
a
c produces inefficiency
i
d
different departments and agencics
r
n
o isto as you well know. With
interdepartmental disputes,
Mk 1 could
your support, I thin
play an Important role
.
H
F ta This ,",ould probably be don e in
resolving suchr problems.
o
e
t
s
l t- by-eassignment basis.*
an assignmen
a
B. Foreign Representatio
n. Nearly everyone, most notably
W inn
t he fo rmer Vi ce M
Pr esirlent s I have spo ken
agree s that the
area we ll suite d for this approach is that of t8sk forc e
on hard cr ime and official lawlessness suegested in the
.~nd
in
~ith,
* Humphre y
fel t he coul d be very effective in this area. lie noted
that the President did no t have sufficient time to conside r man y
of the'problems tha t aros e between departments an d agenci es .
-,Vies Pres ident can pIa,
trave l .
&
very s i gnificant r ole through Corelgn
The f ore i gn travel t do can be used to exprca& your Interos t
I n se l ecte d foreign policy arC8., giva Ua
~n
additiona l presence
abroad, an d prov Ide you with a fir a t -han d
n"CS5~nt
of forolgn
leadera an d airu.tlon •.
I would tentatively ,u&8ca t (subjec t to conver.atlona with
lhe Secretary of State) that i n the early weeks of the admlnlatrarion
we con.ider the ad vantages of short t rip'
~o
the indust r ia l ize d
s ty
r
e
e
enabl e me to rea •• ure Our allies , di,eua. the
objec
t ives of a
i
p
c
a
o
po •• lble economic sum-i t , and a.SO'. the
coana-te prospects
P internal
Sd trave l In tha
l
of Ou r leading econo ... l.: pa rtner. . Ileam advise
a
a
c
i
ea rly days ean be very product i ve
in pArt
beeause it
too loon
d
r
n
o fle re.ponse. to their
(or t he host countries to expect
t
o i5pecl
s
M
problems .
.
H
F ta both publ ic ly . nd privately, th.t
It woul d b.
r
tl e eso gathertng . t ' l lon. not a negottatins
.uch a trip was .n
a a ry would be worked out with your senior
.l •• lon. The Iti ne r n
W
n
i
offic t a l ' and adviaor.. It
be conducted with minimum publicity
M
(r om the s t andpoint o f the United Statea but with appropriate
n~tlon.
(Canada , Weat ern Europe and J apan ).
Such trips woul d
tha t
i.
,
,
~do
c l ~s (,
tn(o~tion
~blnet
\KY~ld
"ttentton to
dra""'tl~ln8
the Vice Pre. ident's visi t .s a gesture
of you r interest In the coun tr ies concerned.
I V.
Syec1ctc Func tion
The Cons ti tution mandat .. s tha t I .ervo a.
Senate.
Pre~ldent
of the
The dutles are ter...ania l with the exceptiOn o f clltlns
-8-
tia-breaking votu .
t assume this responsibility 101111 take a
.. 111t_ amoun t of time ,
V.
Possible Additional Functions
Based on my analysis of the history of the office, the
following are functions which arc the moat promising or in this
siluation scem to merit serious exploration .
A.
Congressional Relations .
I thin k I can b e helpful to
s ty
r
e
e
i
p
c
a
and what approaches willPbe mostoproductive.
S
l
e
Twelve years in th e Senate gives
me a substantial backl
a
a
c
i
d
ground for analysis and inte
r pretation
.
r
n
o isto
M H
.
F ta
r
tl e eso
a n
W in
M
you in your relations with the Congress in two Import ant respects:
1.
I think I can advise you on what to "xpect from
the Congress on significant isstles , how to interpret. their
~ctions .
2.
office.
,I can advise an d assist your Congcession"l liaison
This should be don e on an inro~ .. al basia 80 tha t
my ~ole is not thoutht of as a lobbyist.
Yet, on ..... jo~
initia tives , 1 could conduct key conversations and become
more oper at iona l.
S.
poUtical Aceion.
Every Vice President in recent history
hu played a significant political role for the President .
I would do the sawe.
I assume
I can be helpful through keeping our adml.n-
tstration on the offensive politically and representing uS aroun d
th" countty . ",ith the Party , and ",ith sp"cial conscitu"nci"s such
as labor .
I ",ould assume t his would be a continuing role, meshed
-,with the off-year election campaien" and the r,,-election campaign
of 1980 .
On an al l ied point, an i mmediate assessment of election laws,
together with recommendations
fo~ Con8rcs8ion~1
much nced"d before the next electlon .
action, is very
CampaIgn finance , prima ry
laws, voter registration , and other critical areas are much in
need of review.
I would be interested in conducting such a review
s ty
r
e e
served in the pas t as a special liaison to p
elected i officials
c
a
P So
l was disbanded .
of Intergovernmenta l relations for ale
time which
a
a andic advocate for the
d
Humphrey ser:vcd 3" a point of contact
r
n
o isto
elected officials.
M to this function is that the
The key danger in .regardH
Fis dcvoted
a to doing agency for local
Vice President ' s office
t
r
ocould be handled bet t er through direct
tl e which
and 8tatc government
s
e official and the agency concerned .
ath e elected
n
contact
W
n
i
I sugges t maint a ining the Vice President 's of fice as a
M
key cOntact point for Mayou and Govcrnors with adequate u.re&uards
and rcco....,nding " legislative package if you would find i t valuable.
C.
Liaison with Special Group',
(particu\a.;ly t11oyors nn d Governors ).
The Vice President has
Ag""'" established an ofHce
~ork
bet~een
against the danger noted above .
The proper execut!.on of this
possible function will require sdditlonal discuss!.on .
D.
Specia l Role
~iCh
Domestic Gouncl l.
Depending on the
functions of the Domestic Council, " leadership rolc
~ith
the
Counc ll
gcaup
.l8h~
b8
conce~ned
conalde ~ed.
cu~~en~ ly
The Counci l ia
the only
with . l ong- r ange po l lc y plannin g f unction an d
with the integration o f doaICI.tic policy r"CO'
,"da~ion..
These
func~tona would be conaiaten t with the d~stic ove<view required
•• an advIser to lhe President and with the pos.ib l e role a. an
..cbltrato r in tnterdepart_nta l conflicta .
You r deceno!na t !on
of the functions o f the Counc il wi l l bca r direc t ly on what col e
s The
coord i nation
y
r
t
e e
of domestic and interna t iona l econo-ic po l icp
y wi ll ibe e xtr eme ly
c
a
o
importen t . A spech l role
th e £con01lli
Boa ... d could be
P c Policy
S
e al
l
consider"d .
a
c
i
d
Addittonal
r
n
o
A. Minneaot a . 1 wouldo U ke tvery !"Ouc h to be a bl e t o cons
i
M
t inue to devote some t llllt!. an d .. "tcn
tion t o my s pec i al ... e l .. tionsh l. p
H
F ll . taSpecial projec t s , some lia ison wor k ,
to the people of Minnelot
r
tl e eso nnd regular con t act s i n Minneso t a an d
concern about
a n
\Jashingt on would be included.
That time wou ld no t be substan tial,
W
n
i
but thia pr ivate com- i tmen t to be ab l e to con t inue to serv e the
M
would be
a~propriate
r. .
~ci.l
for . . to play .
Ro l e wi th £conaaic Pol icy Board .
wi~h
VI .
Comm i t~nt.
appolnt~nt.,
people of my .tata would ba ve r y .caning!ul to " e.
B.
Arta and
A Ro t a foe Joa n with
nUlUnltJ.~
~he
Nation.l Founda tion on t he
t ...,.,ld 11ke to asah t Joan in ,t r uctur tnl
a useful" ami r"",ardin& role with the ttationa l Foundation .s the
pri~ry vchicle for her continued inyolve~nt i n t he a rt..
•
-
She is
•
-11-
e x tr~ely
effective in this arCA.
In the earl y stages , this might
involve my showing a special interest in Chis agency.
VIII.
Conclusion
I am optimistic that we Can develop a relationship and ,a
s et of functions which will allow me to contribute to the adminlartation in a substantial wa y.
That optimism has becn maintaine d
s nd nourished from our first conversation in Plains through the
s ty
r
e
e
i
sn d a close friendshi p throughout the administration
and beyon d.
p
c
a o clearly
The role outlined above would , inPmy judsment.
S
l
e
fulfil l the most important constitutional
obligation of the off ice
l
a
a theicPresidency should tha t be
d
that
being prepared to take over
r
n
o suggested no t
t
o assignments
require d. The relationship and
s
i
M
focused on that obligation
, but H
1 think the y do me e t the tea t .
.
F ta
r
tl e eso
a n
W in
M
campaign and further reinforced in the past monch of working
together .
I loo k forward to a productive work ing relationship
i B,
~ere