"Peter I's Testament": A Reassessment
Author(s): Orest Subtelny
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 663-678
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OREST
SUBTELNY
"Peter I's Testament":A Reassessment
For over a centuryscholarslhavebeeinintriguedby one of hiistory's
most
famousapocryplhal
works,the "PoliticalTestamentof Peter the Great."' The
centraltheeme--a
warningof the dangerRussia representsto all lherneighbors
-las always been a relevanttopic for discussion.However, a satisfactory
explanationof the document'sgenesisis yet to be given. One thingis clear:
the "testament"is a forgery,
an attemptto "frame"Peter I. But who is the
culprit?The question has aroused the instinctsof the detectivein many
historiansand set themolnthemiscreant'strail.
evidencepointedto
Suspects were not lacking.Initially,circumstantial
Napoleonas the authoror inspirerof the fabrication,
since it was in 1812 in
France that the firstpublislhedversion of this documentappeared.2 Soon,
however,suspicionfell on C. L. Lesur, one of the emperor'spropagandists
and the authorof the work whichcontainedthe publishedtext. In 1912, on
thecentennialofthepublicationofthe document,
thlemattertooka sensational
turn.A descendanit
of a late eighteenltlh-century
Polish emigrerevealedthat
his ancestorGeneral MichatSokolnickipresentedto the French Directoryin
1797a memorandum
wlhichincludeda textalmostidenticalto theone published
by Lesur duringNapoleon's campaignagainst Russia. This was enough to
that the case was solved and the autihorof the
convincemaniyhiistorians
fabrication
was unmasked.3However,in the opinionof otlher,
notablySoviet,
scholarsan even bettercandidatewas the ChevalierCharles d'Ron,a colorful
and scandalouscourtierof Louis XV.4 The provocativememoirsof this con1. The most recent of the numerous articles on this subject are Erwin Oberlander,
"Zur WirkungsgeschichtehistorischerFalschungen: Das 'Testamenit'Peters des Grossen,"
Jahrbiichler
fiurGeschichte Oste?uropas, 21 (1973): 46-60; Simonl Blanc, "Histoire d'une
phiobie: Le Testaiiient de Pierre le Grand," Cahiers dnt.inonoderusse et sovie'tiqnte,9
(1968): 265-93; L. R. Lewitter, "TIhe Apocryphal Testament of Peter the Great," Polish
Review, 6 (1961): 27-44. The last article containsan English trainslationof the apocryphal
testament.
2. Harry Bresslau, "Das Testament Peter's des Grossen," Historische Zeitschrift,41
(1879): 385-409.
3. Michel Sokollnicki, "Le Testament de Pierre le Grand," Revue, des scientces
politiques,27 (1912): 88-98. The original is founldin Archives du Ministere des Affaires
IRtrangeres(henceforthAMAE), Memoires et documents,Russie, vol. 35, fols. 149-54.
4. Cf. Frederic Gaillardet, Menioires du clhevalierd'.IPon (Paris, 1836). The nmost
I am grateful to the Interinationial
Research anid Exchaniges Board anid to the Harvard
Ukrainian Research Institutefor their supportduring the writingof this article.
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Slavic Review
troversialfigurecontaineda document,dated 1757, which was remarkably
similarto the docunments
of Sokolnickiand Lesur. Some sclholarsfeltthatthis
representedthe firstappearance of the famiousPetrine apocrypha; others
pointedout thatsincetheversionof d'iRon'smemoirscontainiing
the docunmeint
appeared oily in 1836, the presenceof the apocryplhaldocumelnt
could be
explainedas a post-Sokolnicki
and Lesur interpolation
by the editorof d']on's
memoirs,
Gaillardet.Thus,at thispoiInt,
thequestioinofwho fabricated
Frecderic
the "testament"still remaiinsunresolved.
To begin with,therehas been some terminological
confusionin posing
the question.Althoughthe use of the term "testament"is widespread,it is
not justified.NeitlherLesur nor Sokolnickinor d'ion ever used the word
"testament."
They referred
insteadto "plans,""secretmemoirs,"or "projects"
whichwere formulated
duringPeter I's reignand were recommended
to his
successorsas a means of facilitating
Russian expansion.It was only in 1824
that a Germantranslationof Lesur's text introducedthe use of the word
"testament."5
This pointis significant,
because in analyzingthe originsof the
"testament,"several historianshave supposedthat the apocryphaldocument
appearedafterPeter's death (1725). Such an assuimption,
as we shall see, is
not valid. Anothermistakehas been to assumethata singlepersonfabricated
the document.Every time researchproduced a more likely candidate,the
other"suspects"were discarded.Thus researchersoftenmissedpossibleinterrelationships
amongall thoseimplicatedin the fabrication.
With these pitfalls
for
in mind,we will now commenceour search
the author of the notorious
"plans and schemesof Peter the Great" by turningto the tsar's own times.
The HungarianPrototype
In 1703 the Hungarians,led by Ferenc Rak6czi II, rebelledagainsttheir
king and Holy Roman Emperor,Leopold I. The rebels rose in the defense
of theirancientrights,whichwere threatenedby the absolutist,ceintralizing
ofthe Habsburgs,was quickto offer
policiesofVienna. France,thearchenemy
diplomaticand financialaid to the Hungarians. But in the course of the
protractedstruggleit becameevidentthatsizable militarysupportwas necessary as well. An obvioussourceof such aid was the OttomanPorte,another
bitterrival of the Habsburgs.Therefore,earlyin 1706, Rak6czi dispatcheda
missionto the Porte,led by Janos Papai, who was later joined in Constantieruditeof the many Soviet articles supportiingthe autlhorshipof d']Ron is E. N. Danilova,
instituta, 2 (1946): 203-70.
"Zaveshchanie Petra Velikogo," Tnidy Istoriko-ar-khivnogo
5. Oberlander, "Wirkungsgeschichte,"p. 48, n. 9.
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"Peter l'.s Testanment"
665
noplebya veteranHungariainemigreand specialistin Ottomanaffairs,Ferenc
Horvath.6
In his instrtuctions
Rako6cziorderedihis agents to establishcontactwith
Baron Clharlesde Ferriol,the Frenclhambassadorto the Porte. The preclominaintFrenclhinfluencein Constantinoplecould be counted on to lhelpthe
Hungarianspresenttheircase effectively
and gain a favorablereception.Not
all of the Hungariains'argumieints
were directedagainstVienna; a good part
of themwere aimedagainstAltiscovy,
whichwas an old and triedally of tlle
Habsburgs.Papai aindHorvathwereorderedto miakeeveryattenmpt
to embroil
the Ottomains
in a war withthe tsar.7RaIk6czi'sreasoningprobablywas that
if a war betweenMoscow and the Porte should break out (and this seemed
likelyat thetime), it wotildinevitablyinvolvethe Habsburgsand thtusaccrue
to theadvantageof the Hungarians.
Upon theirarrival in Constantinople,
the Hungariainsfound Ferriol to
be mostlhelpftul.
He not only arrangedseveral audiences for theemwith the
granclvizir, but even provided his own services,as well as those of the
experienlced Veinetian ambassador, in formiiulatingthe Hungarianls' case.
ear to what Paipai
However,althoughthe Porte lenta williig and synmpathetic
and Horvathhad to say, it did not give themthe aid theyrequested.Nevertheless,bothP. A. Tolstoyand Leopold von Talmania,the respectiveenvoys
ofthetsarand theemperorat thePorte,weredeeplytroubledbytlleHungariail
mission.They were especiallyirritatedby two memorialswhich Papai and
Horvathpresentedto the grandvizir,Ali Pasha. Talmann obtainedcopies of
thesedocumentsand sent themto his government
in Vienna. Unfortunlately,
onlysummariesof thesememorialsare availableto us, but even theymake it
evidentthatthe documeints
containedsomieof the germinalideas whiclhwere
to appearin thelaterPetrineapocrypha.A
The major themesof the memorials
are (1) the coordination,
by means of a secretor "intimate"alliance,of the
tsar's and the emperor'soffensivestrategyboth in Europe and against tlhe
Ottomani
ofestablislhing
herselfin the Orient
Emlpire,(2) Muscovy'sintenition
anclfouindinig
there,oI1 theruiis oftheOttomanEnmpire,
an "oriental-muscovite
monarchy,"and (3) the Muscoviteintentionof using the Porte's Orthodox
subjectsagainst the Ottomlains.
These are somieof the poiIts which would
appearin all the laterversionsof Peter I's "plan."
6. For biographicalinformationconcerningJanos Papai (d. 1740) and Ferenc Horvath
(d. 1723) see Rdday P6l iratai, 1703-1706, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1955), 1:444, 447.
7. Ibid., p. 446.
8. The summaryof Leopold von-Talmanmi'sreport mlaybe found in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, Fragnie;nteznr Geschiclict der-Rwnidneni,5 vols. (Buclharest, 1878-86), 3-5:23-24.
The reportwas entitled"Due Memoriale presentatiIi 23 di Marzo et li 23 d'Aprile 1706
dagli Agenti del Conte Ragozzi, Papay ed Horvath, al Supremo Viziro; progiettatipero
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Slavic Review
A few years later, anotlherHtungal-iani
elaborated on the tlhemles
wlhiclhhiis
colleagues lhad expounlded in Constalntilnople.In 1708 Rak6czi founldit in hlis
interest to develop better relations witlhPeter I. Tlherefore,in tlhe spring of
that year he sent oineof hiisdiplomlats,a certain \Iat6 Talaba, to serve as hiis
residentat the tsar's court." However, durilnghiistwo years' stay at the Russian
court, Talaba was not especially successful in lis dealings witlhthe Russialns.
It seems that the Russialns were suspicious of the contacts lhemaintained witl
the Frenclh, and specifically witlh the Comte Pierre des Alleurs, a former
adviser to Rak6czi and Louis XIV's represelntativeto ClharlesXII of Sweden.
In the early maolntlhs
of 1710 the nature of Talaba's relationslilpwitlh(les Alleurs
becalm-eevident. At this timie,the Russialns acctused Talaba of spyillg for the
Frenclh,especially in matters dealing witlhthe tsar's plans against tlle Porte.10
Because of these diffictilties,
Talaba was forced to leave Moscow oIn April
16, 1710.
thereafter,the Hunlgarian secretly niiade lis way to Bender,
Iiimmediately
an Ottoman border fortressin Moldavia, wllere ClharlesXII and the remnalnts
of his forces were recuperatingafter their disastrous defeat at Poltava. It just
so lhappened that Talaba lhad brotuglht
with himl a documielnt,comlpletewith
maps, wliclh, he mlaiintailled,outlilned Peter I's projected coturse of action
against the Ottoman Porte. The Swedlish king, who lhad been trying-for some
time to lhavethe Ottomlalnsdeclare war on Russia, sent copies of tlhis(locument
to the Tatar klhainand to the stultanas proof of the tsar's aggressive intelntionls.
This action apparently lhad some effect,because several weeks after Talaba's
arrival in Bender (November 1710), the Porte (leclared war oni Russia. In
the meaintime,Talaba lhadboarded a Frenclhslip and sailed to Constalntinople,
and from there to France.
of Talaba's docutlmelnt
lhas survived.11 But
Unfortullatelyolnlya fragnmelnt
dall' Amnbassadordi Francia col Cavagliere Ruzzinii." See also S. M. Solov'ev, Isto-ijia
Rossii s drez'ncishklih
vrcmcn, 15 vols. (Moscow, 1959-66), 8:167.
9. There is very little biographical iniformationi
available about this Tranisylvallian
nioblemani.
For a briefsketchof his activities during the Ben-derperiod see Aladar Ballagi,
XII Kcirolycs a svcdekvatvonulasa Magyarorszigo'n, 1709-1715 (Budapest, 1922), p. 115.
The text of Rak6czi's inistructionis
to Talaba may be founidin R(da P(l iratai, 2:51.
10. Des Alleurs to Louis XIV, Jain.24, 1711, AMAE, Correspondance politique, vol.
49. In the springof 1711, Sutton,the Br-itishamlbassadorto the Porte, wrote: "the formler
[des Alleurs] mnadeuse of onie Thalaba, a Hunigariain,who had beeni Prince Ragoczy's
Agenitat the Court of Moscow, to carry on the work in Polanid anid Muscovy." Akdes
Nimet Kurat, The Dcspatcl[es of Sir Robcrt Sittton,in Royal Historical Society, Camudeni
Third Series, vol. 78 (Lonidoni,1953), p. 47. Also see E. S. Tenigberg,FrThtPoltava till
Beitder: Ein Studie i Karl XII:s turkiskzaPolitikz, 1709-1713 (Lund, 1953), p. 114.
For a detailed treatmenit
of des Alleurs's colntactswith the Hunigarialnssee Bela Kopeczi,
La Frantce ct la Honggrieait debitt dnitXVIIIe siecle: Rtude d'Ilistoire des relations
diploniatiqiteset d'hlistoiredes idrcs (Budapest, 1971).
11. This documeint(dated 1710) bears the title "Summa capita sua molmienita
quae
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"Peter I's Testament"
667
two other sources-one Ukrainian and the other Swedish-have preserved
summariesof the originalversion.12The former,the diary of Pylyp Orlyk,
in wlhichthe documentappeared. According
also recotunts
the circumnstances
to this diary,Talaba had obtainedthe plan fromthe tsar's arclhive"in some
secretmanner"and,uponarrivingin Bender,sold it to CharlesXII for 10,000
talers.Orlyk'ssummaryofthe originalversionreads as follows:
the project,formulated
at the Viennese court,acceptedand approvedby
thedeceasedTsar [Peter I], was initiatedthen [1710] and is now [1732]
beginninig
to take effect.It stated,amongothermatters,some of whichI
have already forgotten,
tthat,beforethe Tsar completedthe war with
he
be
toward
Sweden, slhould gentlewiththeTurks,expresshis friendship
them,and spare no expense to keep themfromgoing to war with him.
He should occupy the fortson the Polish-Moldavianborder with his
troopsunderthe pretextof protectingthemagainst the Swedes. Stores
of provisionsshould be gatheredthere. Taganrog and Azov should be
strelngthened
witlha large garrison,and a fleet,as strongas possible,
shoould
be broughtintothe Black Sea. The Ukraine shouldbe filledwith
as manytroopsas it will lhold,alndthe Cossacks shouldbe consoledwith
hopes of liberty.The Poles slhouldbe accommodatedin everymatterin
orderto keep [Russian] troops in Poland under the pretextof aiding
in the war against Sweden. Afterthis war, he [Peter I] should take a
firmgrip of the Cossacks, destroytheir liberties,establishfortsalong
the Dnieperin theUkraine.If tlhey,
theCossacks,tryto resist,hleshould
expel themfromtheirlhabitations
and dispatchthembeyondthe Volga.
Meanwhile,theUkraineshouldbe settledbytheMuscovites.At thispoint,
havingIlis troopson all sides, in the Ukraine and in Poland, he should
advanceby land and by sea againstthe Crimea.Afterits conquest,it will
be easy to take Georgia and thus open the way to Constantinopleand
mountan attackon the OttomanEmpirefromEurope and Asia.13
This summary
clearlyrepresents
theprototype
oftheallegedprojectsof Peter I
whichwereto appear laterin the eighteenth
century.Moreover,it introduces
a device whichwas to becomethe hallmarkof tlhelater versions-the claim
N.N. aulae moscoviticae,per modumnconsilii de rebus ad portam hac tempestateagendis
insinuaverat." It was published by A. 0. Bodiansky in the Chteniia v Imperatorskomn
obshchestvcistorii i drevizosteirossiiskikh,no. 1 (Moscow, 1847), p. 56.
12. This sumimlary
appears in a letter which Orlyk wrote to his son, Hryhor, in 1732
and in which he describedevents which had occurred in 1710. A copy of this letter may be
found in Orlyk's diary "Diariusz podr6ony . . . ," located in AMAE, Memoires et
documents,Pologne, vols. 7-11. For a discussion of this interestingand valuable source
see Orest Subteiny,"From the Diary of Pylyp Orlyk," Ukrains'kyi istoryk,8 (1971):
95-104. The much briefer Swedish summary appears in Johann von Kochen, Kanslidagbok fran Tutrkicttill storsta delcenfJrd,1709-1714 (Lund, 1908), p. 45. This source
is vol. 4 of the KaroliinskaKrigarcs Dagbakcr, edited by A. Quennerstedt.
13. AMAE, "Diariusz podr6zny," vol. 11, fol. 351.
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Slavic Review
that Peter I had a concreteand systematicplan for expansionand that the
purporteddocumenthad been obtained"in some secret manner" fromhis
archives.This elementof sensationalism
helpedto make the apocryphalwork
effectiveas an anti-Russianpropaganda tool and notorious in historical
literature.
The question now arises whetherthe Papai-Horvath memorialscould
have had a directbearingon theappearanceand contentof Talaba's document.
Perhaps the Hungarian residentin Moscow was acquaintedwith what his
colleaguesin Constantinoplehad writtenabout the tsar four years earlier.
Such an assumptionappearswarranted.Talaba mustcertainlyhave been aware
of the intricaciesof Russo-Hungarianaffairsbeforeleaving for Moscow in
1708. Moreover,in the personof des Alleursthereexisteda "French connection"forthe Hungarians.This energeticFrenchdiplomatwas in contactwith
Talaba in Moscow, Horvath and Papai in Constantinople,
and Charles XII
in Bender.14It must have been a simplematterfor des Alleurs to remind
Talaba of the precedenthis colleagueshad set in 1706; the Frenchmanhad a
notoriousreputation
forspreadinganti-Russianrumorsand intrigues.15
Under
his influenceTalaba could easily have come upon the idea of "discovering"
thetsar'saggressiveplans in no less thanPeter I's own archives.
But why,in 1710,shouldthe Hungariansand Talaba have cooperatedso
willinglywiththe French?On thewhole,theyhad littleto lose and something
to gain. By thefallof 1710 Riakoczi'spositionwas deteriorating.
The rebellion
was failing;relationswithPeter I had cooled; and thetsar and the Habsburg
emperorseemedto be morecloselyallied than ever.16The Hungarianleader
was already thinkingof a place to seek asylum. In such an event,French
mediationwould have been necessaryand cooperationwiththe Frenchadvisable. This is notto say thatRakoczi had specifically
sanctionedTalaba's actions;
but then,neitherdid he have any reasonto disapproveof them.On the other
hand, Talaba had his own interests,besides those of his masters and the
French,to consider.As an adherentofa losingcause,he faceda mostuncertain
future.If he wereable to ingratiatehimselfwithdes Alleursand enterFrench
service,his dilemmacould be solved.For "servicesrendered"Talaba not only
receiveda lump sum fromCharles XII but was also aided by the French in
leavingBenderforConstantinople
and finallyforFrance,wherehe did in fact
attemptto enterthe serviceof Louis XIV.17
14. Comte des Alleurs (d. 1748) was appointed French ambassador to the Porte in
1711. He remained at this post until his death.
15. Cf. Kurat, Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, p. 34; Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, 8:84;
and A. V. Florovsky, Ot Poltavy do Pruta (Prague, 1971), p. 94.
16. Florovsky, Ot Poltavy do Pruta, pp. 55-56.
17. Things did not go well for Talaba in France. Shortly after his arrival and
interrogationby French officialshe became involved in some misdemeanoras a result of
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"Peter I's Testament"
669
It would be hazardousto assume that Talaba's documentis a complete
fabrication.
It was generallyknownamongboth the friendsand the enemies
of thetsar thathlewantedRussia to expand at the expense of the Ottomans.
There were even projects of cooperationor alliance between Moscow and
Vienna.18But even if Talaba had managed to obtain notes about these, or
similar,"designs,"theycould not have been writtenin the self-incriminating
tonewhichcharacterizes
his versionand laterones. The pointoftheapocryphal
creationswas primarilyto stressthe deviousnessand the unbridledambition
of thetsar. This was the themethatlater imitatorsof Talaba's device would
playupon.
The UkrainianElaboration
A strikingaspect of Talaba's documentis the emphasisplaced on the
Ukrainianissue.19Althoughthe Ukraine was certainlyan importantinternationalproblemlin the years imilmediately
before and after Poltava, it is
curiousthatOrlyk'ssummarydwells on the Ukraine to the point of making
it themainissue,thoughin the Swedish summaryit is hardlymentioned.Let
us look morecloselyat the reasonsforthis discrepancy.
Firstof all, who was PylypOrlyk? A scionof an old Czech familywhich
had emigratedto Poland duringthe Hussite wars, Orlyk (whose motherwas
Orthodox)cameto Kiev in thefinalyearsof the seventeenth
centuryto study
at the MohylaAcademy.20His quick wit and facilepen attractedthe attention
of Hetman Mazepa. Soon afterwards,Orlyk married into the Cossack
starshyna-aristocracy
and quicklyrose to the rank of chancellor(heneral'nyi
pysar) of the Zaporozhian Host. After Poltava he followed Mazepa and
which he was rejected from French service and, in September 1712, asked to leave the
country.Cf. FonitesReruan Autstriacarumti,
17: Actenstiickezur GeschichteFranz RakocDy,
ed. Joseph Fiedler (Vienna, 1858), p. 617. According to Ballagi (XII Kdroly, p. 115),
Talaba then ret-urned
to the Ottoman Empire and requested Charles XII's chancellor to
obtain a pardon for him from the Viennese court. This proved difficultbecause the
Viennese court bore Talaba a special grudge. At this point we lose sight of this interesting
Hungarian emigre.
18. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, 9:84. In 1707 Peter I informed Mazepa of his plans
to conquer Tatar and Ottoman territoriesas soon as the war with the Swedes was over.
See Ukrains'kyiarkheografichntyi
3 (Kiev, 1930): 29. Similar referencesappear
sbirn-yk,
in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, ed., Documente privitorela istoria Rorndnilor,suppl. 1 (Bucharest,
1886), p. 365, and in Kurat, Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, p. 48.
19. For a discussion of this question see Jozef Feldman, Polska a sprazwca
wschodnia,
1709-1714 (Cracow, 1928), passim, and the Harvard University dissertation by Orest
Subtelny, "The Relations of Pylyp Orlyk with the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman
Porte, 1710-1742" (1973).
20. A thorough study of Orlyk's political career is Borys Krupnyts'ky's Hetmilan
Pylyp Orlyk, 1672-1742, vol. 42 of Pratsi Ukraiits'koho naukovoho instituta (Warsaw,
1934).
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670
CharlesXII intoexile,and whentheold and dispiritedhetmandied in September 1709, Orlyk,supportedby Charles XII, was electedhis successorin the
joined the Swedish king in the attemptto
springof 1710. He immediately
recoupthe losses of Poltava.
In the fall of 1710, wllile Charles XII workedto induce the Porte to
declarewar on Russia, Orlyk,in conjunctionwith the Polish supportersof
StanislawLeszczyn'skiand withtheCrimeanTatars,was planningan invasion
of the Ukraine.In preparationforthis offensive(launched fromBender one
conductedan intensive
monthafter Talaba's arrival), the hetman-in-exile
propagandacampaignagainstthe Russians in the Ukraine. Numerousmanifestoeswere issued to the populaceurgingthemto throwoffthe "Muscovite
yoke." In this context,Talaba's materialswere a windfallfor Orlyk. With
the approvalof Charles XII, he secretlysent copies of these texts and maps
who had remainedloyal to Peter I.21 But, in orderto
to the Cossack officers
Orlyk
makeTalaba's materialsmorerelevantto his Ukrainiancorrespondents,
edited them,makingthe Ukraine appear to be the imminentand principal
victimof the tsar's voraciousdesigns.
ProofofOrlyk'seditorialtampering
lies in theargumentsand terminology
he interpolatedin the Talaba version.The threatthat Peter I intendedto
removethe Cossacks fromthe Ukraine and settlethe land with Muscovites
Justbeforehe abandoned
was an old Mazepist rumor.22
and otherforeigners
the tsar, Mazepa spread this rumoramong his officersto justifyhis future
actions.The stationingof more Muscovitetroops in the Ukraine (a point
Orlyk'sversionstresses) was sure to irritateUkrainianseven if theywere
loyal to the tsar.23Finally, the survivingfragmentof one of these copies
containsthephrase,"Ukraineand the Ruthenian[Ukrainian]people together
withthe ZaporozhianHost on bothsides of the Dnieper."24This terminology
was used exclusivelyby the chancelleryof the hetmanate;foreignersnever
referred
to theUkraineand to Ukrainiansin theseterms.These pointsdemon21. Rumors that Ivan Skoropadsky, the man Peter I appointed to succeed Mazepa,
was secretly correspondingwith Orlyk were quite widespread in the Ukraine and in
Moscow. The Russian authorities,however, did not make an issue of this matter for fear
that it might cause the remainderof the Ukrainian Cossack starshncta to join Orlyk on
the eve of the war with the Ottomans. Cf. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, 8: 588-89, and
Pis'nmai btutiagiiinperatora Petra Velikago (Moscow, 1962), 11 (1711): 346. Twenty
years later (December 21, 1731) Orlyk's son, Hryhor, informedthe French government
engage les Cosaques de l'Ucraine
that in 1711, "Mon Pere par une secrete correspondanice,
de se declarer pour luy . . . ," AMAE, Pologne, vol. 180, fol. 391.
22. Orlyk recountedthis incident,and many others which took place in the dramatic
monthsbefore Mazepa's final decision, in a long letter to his formerpatron and mentor,
Stefan Iavorsky, which was written from exile in Poland on June 5, 1721. Cf. Osnova
(St. Petersburg), 10 (1862): 1-15.
23. Ibid. See also Bohdan Kentrschynskyj,"Propagandakriget i Ukraina, 1708-1709,"
KarolinskcaFarbundets Arsbok (Stockholm), 48 (1958): 81-125, passimn.
24. Chteniia, p. 56.
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"Peter I's Testament"
671
stratehow Talaba's originalversionwas changed to suit the needs of the
Mazepist emigres.
ofCharlesXII and Orlyk,and theirOttoman,Crimean,
Despitetheefforts
and French supporters,the effectsof Poltava were not reversed.In 1714,
the Swedishkingfinallyreturnedto Sweden,followed
aftermanyvicissitudes,
by Orlyk,his family,and a smallgroupof Ukrainiane'migres.It is likelythat
the entireTalaba episode would have been forgottenif it had not been for
theseUkrainianemigres.For almostthirtyyears Orlykcontinuedto shower
Europeanstatesmenwithdirewarningsof the Russian menaceto Europe and
how Peter intended
Asia. In 1720 he elaboratedon this themeby specifying
to conquer Persia and the areas around the Caspian Sea.25 This, according
to Orlyk,would give the tsar completecontrolof the major East-West trade
routes and allow Russia to play a dominaintcommercialrole in Europe.
afterbeing houndedby the tsar's agenitseverywherehe turned,
Evenitually,
returnedin 1721 to the OttomanEmpire,wherehe was
the lhetman-in-exile
forcibly
detainedforover twelveyears.
Orlyk'sviews,however,continuedto be heard in the courtsof Europe,
forhis role as the harbingerof the Russian menacewas assumedby his son,
Hryhor.26In 1730, when France was preparinganother attemptto put
Leszczyn'skion the Polish throne,theyoungHryhorOrlykwas recruitedinto
of the Swedishambassadorto Warsaw,
Frenchserviceon therecommendation
Count GustavZiilich.The Swedish diplomatnotedthatthe Orlyksmightbe
usefulin mobilizingthe ZaporozhianCossacks and the CrimeanTatars in a
diversionagainst the Russians, who would surely oppose the election of
In thefall of 1730, Hryhorwas sentto France to explain how
Leszczyn'ski.27
his father'santi-Russianplans could be put into effect.Hryhor'scredentials
forthisrole were impressive:as the son of an emigreUkrainianhetman,the
godsonof Mazepa, and a protegeof Charles XII, he was a dedicatedRussophobe.Duringthe nexttwo years,by specialorderof Louis XV, he was sent
on severalsecretmissiolns
to the Porte and to the Crimeankhan.28It was in
po istorii Iugo-2apadnoi Rossii izdavacmvi Kievskoi
25. Sborntikstatei i miiaterialov
komnnissicidlia ro.)bora drcvnikhaktov, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1916), p. 60. In this letter Orlyk
also argued that Russia could be weakened by exploitingthe discontentamonigher Muslim
subjects just as the tsar was doing with the Christiainsubjects of the Porte.
26. A somlewhatromaniticizedbiography of Hryhor Orlyk (1702-59) is available in
an English translationfroimi
Ukrainiani: Rlie Borschak, Hrylior Orlyk: Franice's Cossack
Genteral (Toronto, 1956). The Ukrainian version appeared under the title Velykyi
Mactcpynets'Hryhor Orlyk (Lviv, 1932).
was a short summaryof
27. Included withiGustav Ziilich's letterof recommen-datioin
Mazepa's and Orlyk's reasons for strugglingagainistthe tsar. See AMAE, Pologne, vol.
184, fols. 261-63.
28. For this mission Hryhor was given Louis XV's personal letterof recolllmlelndatioll.
AMAE, Turquie, vol. 83, fol. 285.
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Slavic Review
preparationforthesemissionsthathis fatherinformedHryhorabout Talaba's
docunient.29
The second attemptof Leszczynskito maintainhimselfon the Polisl
thronefailed in 1734-35 because of Russian opposition.With it, the last
realisticchancesof the Orlyksto make good theirclaims to the hetmancyin
the Ukraine faded. However,for the next twenty-five
years Hryhor Orlyk
remainedin French service,where he was employedin a series of schemes
designedto thwartRussian expansion.Very oftenit was Hryhorhimllself
who
suggestedsuchprojectsto the FrenchForeignMinistry,and nearlyeveryone
of his proposalsechoed the ideas foundin the Talaba document.30
He constantlywroteabout the dangerouscooperationof Vienna and St. Petersburg
and about the Russian use of the Ukraineas a stagingarea for the conquest
of Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire. Almost every one of the
memorialswhich Hryhorpresentedto the French foreignministersduring
the 1730s and 1740s repeatedthe idea that Russia was followinga preconceivedplan of expansion.For example,in 1742, when the Russians had just
completeda war withthe Ottomansand again turnedtheirattentionto the
Baltic,Hryhorwrote: "The Tsarina [Anna Ivanovna] did notwantto destroy
her father's[Peter I's] work and returnto Sweden those provinceswhich
her fatherhad acquired,becausepossessionof themallows Russia to maintain
a footholdin Europe,to have supremacyin the North,and to be the terrorof
the neighboringstates. Moreover,the historyof Russia proves that even in
timeswhen barbarismwas at its heightin Muscovy,many tsars, especially
Ivan Vasilievich,always aimed to broaden their gains in the areas of the
Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas. Thus, Peter I was only carryingout what
his ancestorsprojected."31 In this case, the originsof Peter's "plans" were
tracedas farback as the timeof Ivan IV.
Othermemorialsdwelton themeswhichwould appear laterin the Sokolnickiand Lesur versions.For instance,HryhorconstantlydiscussedRussia's
need to cooperatewiththe maritimepowers,England and Holland, but only
insofaras it suitedher interests.Also, Russia's desire to be involvedin the
affairsof the Germanstateswas oftenstressed.Like his father,the younger
Orlykpaid much attentionto Russian ambitionsin the East, particularlyin
29. See note 12.
30. For example, see the series of memorials delivered by Hryhor to the French
Foreign Ministry in the 1730s. AMAE, Pologne, vol. 180, fol. 292. Borschak firstnoted
the similarities between the writings of Hryhor Orlyk and the later versions of the
apocryphal "testament"; however, he did not delve into this matter more deeply. See his
Velykyi Masepynets' Hryhor Orlyk, and "Zapovit Petra Velykoho," Ukraina (Paris),
no. 3 (1950), p. 179.
31. "Memoire presenteau Ministrepar le Comnted'Orlick . . . ," Apr. 5, 1742, AMAE,
Memoires et documents,Pologne, vol. 2, fol. 204.
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"Peter I's Testament"
673
Persia, and in 1746 he urged France to mediatebetweenthe Ottomansand
Persians: "With commoneffort,they mightforce Russia back to her old
boundaries,makingit impossiblefor her to gain supremacyin the North
and dominatein the East. If the Porte squalndersthis opportunity,
then one
day it maysuiffer
fromthe evil consequenices
of Peter I's and Tsarina Anna's
systemwhichaims to expand both in Persia and in the OttomanEmpire."32
Is thisnot a linkbetweenthe warningsof Papai and Horvathregarding
Peter's plans fora "muscovite-oriental
monarchy"and similarthemesin the
laterversionsof Sokolnickiand Lesur? However, since the situationin the
Ukraine was hopeless, Hryhor felt that the most effectiveand the most
threatenedbastionagainst Russian expansionwas Poland. Althoughduring
his career Hryhorworkedagainst Russia in almost all the major capitals
betweenStockholmand Constantinople,
he constantly
emphasizedto his French
superiorsthathe couldbe mosteffective
in Poland. It was here,he argued,that
France should concentrateher effortsto block Russian expansion. In his
requestto ForeignMVinister
Puysieulx,in 1749,foraii assignmenlt
in Poland,
Hryhorincludedthischaracteristic
comment:"May I notboast in Poland that
the wise ministerwlhoseforesightencompassesall possibilitieshas deigned
to take my warningsinto account.. . . May I not expect that there is [iin
France] a desire to preparethe simplestand most directmeans for a goal
whichis worthyof such a great king as His Majesty [Louis XV], worthy
ofthegloriousFrenchnation,and worthyofherministers'unparalleledwisdom
-to end the arroganceof a statewhichwishesto dominiate
others. [France]
would thus forestallthe disastrousfatewhichshe [Russia], as absoluteruler
and arbiter,is preparingfor her n-orthernneighborsand maybe for all of
Europe."S33
IHryhorOrlyk died in 1759 on the battlefield,
fightingas a lieutenantgeneralin the Frencharmyagainstthe forcesof Frederickof Prussia. Soon
afterhis death the French Foreign-Milnistry
impoundeda major part of his
and his father'ssurvivingpapers and kept them in its archives.34If this
materialwere summarized,it would, in essence,be an expositionof almost
everythemewhichappearsin the laterversionsof Peter's "plans," "projects,"
or "testaments."
Moreover,theOrlykpaperspreservedthemenioryofTalaba's
device-the discoveryof such "plans," "in some secretmanner"in the tsar's
own archives.Thus thematerialsforthe finalversionof thisapocryphalwork
were certainlyavailable and even elaboratedby the middleof the eighteenth
century.Now thequestionsarise: whatproofis therethatit becamethe basis
32. "Memoire pour M. le de Puysieulx, Ministre et secretaire d'etat des affaires
etrangeres," ibid., fol. 221.
33. "Memoire presente par le Comte d'Orlick," ibid., fol. 258.
34. AMAE, Restitutionsde correspondance,1661-1806, fol. 222.
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Slavic Review
674
for the later versions,and who could have added the finishingtouches to
this famousfabrication?
The Final Franco-Polish
Product
We have reached,both in geographicaland chronologicalterms,the
pointwherethe searchforthe apocryphalPetrineplan usuallycommencescentury.To be moreexact,
thatis, France in the latterpart of the eighteenth
the focusof attentionfallson the secretdu roi, Louis XV's personalagency
for the concduct
of foreignaffairs.This, in the words of a recentarticle,is
"the contextand epoch in whichthe contentof Peter's 'testament'began to
unravel."35The membersof the secret du roi, among whom Hryhor Orlyk
was one of the oldest and most experiencedin East European affairs,were
knownfortheiranti-Russiantendencies.It is no wonderthatChevalierd'Ron,
who was one of the youngermembersof thisbodyof diplomatsand agents,is
implicatedin the finalformulation
of the forgery.
There is, as we have noted,some debateconcerningd'Ron's "authorship."
Circumstantial
evidencecertainlyindicatesthat the Chevalierwas implicated
in the formulation
of some sort of anti-Russiantracts.He mighthave easily
takenthe work of his older colleague,HryhorOrlyk,as an example of this
typeof activity.Furthermore,
the Chevalieris knownto have writtenabout
Peter I, and his privatelibrarycontainedbooks whichcould have served as
modelsforpoliticalprojectsand testaments.Finally,in one of his memorials
to the French Foreign Ministry,d'iRonhimselfdiscusseda "favoriteplan of
Peter I."36 Thus it seems that d'iRoncontributedin disseminatingthe tales
aboutPeter's"plans." But sincethereis no originalversionof his anti-Russian
we mustreservejudgmentabout d'ion's authorshipof the finalversion
-tracts,
of the Petrine"plan."
The "plan of Peter I" was a topicwhichalso interestedothermembersof
the secretdu roi. Its leadingfigure,the Comtede Broglie,wroteseveraltimes
Anotherindividual
aboutthe deceasedtsar's plans to conquerhis neighbors.37
associated with this milieu was Claude-Carlomande Rulhiere,author of a
of Poland. Like his colleagues,Rullhierenoted Peter's
famousFrenclhIhistory
plan,but in his versionit grewto encompassthe conquestof India.38Perhaps
35. See Blanc, "Histoire d'une phobie," p. 277.
36. According to Lewitter, d'Rton'slibrary contained an Histoire de Pierre le Grand
in which there was a referenceto a "favorite plan of Peter the Great." There were also
books which could have served as models for spurious "political testaments," such as
those referringto the "testaments"of Richelieu and Colbert. Lewitter, "The Apocryphal
Testament," p. 38. This author, however, rejects d'Rtonas a possible formulatorof the
"plan."
37. Blanc, "Histoire d'une phobie," p. 276.
38. Cf. Claude Rulhiere, Histoire de l'amarchie de Polognte, 4 vols. (Paris, 1807),
1:106, 162.
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"Peter l's Testament"
675
it was HryhorOrlyk'sinfluencethatmade these Frenclhmen
so consciousof
the Russian "menace," althouglhsuch sophisticateddiplomatsdid not need
Hryhor'said to realize the implicationsof Russian expansion.Nevertheless,
thereare concreteindicationsthat the Orlyksfounda receptiveaudience in
the French Foreign Ministryon this subject.
We mentionedabove that immediately
afterHryhor'sdeath (1759) the
Ministrytransporteda large part of the Orlyk papers to its own archives.
These papers,as various marginalnotationsindicate,were oftenthoroughly
perused.Those passages in the papers dealing with Russia and her foreign
relationsseemto have been especiallyinteresting
to the readers.For instance,
the plans of his
the passage in Hryhor'smemorialabout Peter I's fulfilling
ancestorswas underlinedseveral timesby an eighteenth-century
reader,and
is
a note was made about the "ambitionsof Russia."39Even more significant
the attentionthata readerin the 1770s paid to the part of the elder Orlyk's
diary which describesthe Talaba episode. Judgingfromthe glosses, this
reader foundthe "anecdote sur Talaban" (apparentlyhe had some trouble
readingthePolishtext) to be veryinteresting.40
Many otherindicationsreveal
in
final
of
that the
decades
the eighteentlh
centurythe Orlyk papers were
assiduouslystudiedby those wlhohad access to the archivesof the French
Foreign Ministry.In fact,everyFrenclhimian
associatedwiththe finalformulationofPeter's"plan,"d'I?onand Lesur included,had access to thesearchives.
How, then,does one deal withthefactthatit was not a Frenchmanbut a
Pole-General MiclhatSokolnicki-wlhosename appears on the earliestundisputedtextof the Petrineplan?41 This finalversionwas submittedin 1797
to the Directorywhen Sokolnicki,a veteranof the Kosciuszko uprising(and
subsequently
prisonerof the Russians), came to Paris to seek Frenchsupport
forthe formation
of a Polish legion.Like Horvathand Papai, Charles XII,
and the Orlyks,Sokolnickialso prefacedhis requestfor aid with a warning
againstthe Russians. He warned of a "plan, or rather,an entirecodex of
ambitiousprojects,a wlholebook of arrogantinstructions,
born in the fiery
imaginationof Peter I."42 And he too nmentioned
that his informatioll
was
based on the insiglhts
of perusingthe
gained froman "unusual opportunity"
tsarist arclhives,as well as on facts garnered while conversingwith his
comrades,notably Ignacy Potocki.43Most Western scholars believe that
39. AMAE, Memoires et documents,Pologne, vol. 2, fol. 205.
40. Ibid., fol. 351. It is difficultto establish who the readers of these documentswere.
Notations in the mlargiins
of the "Diariusz podro6ny" indicate that they correspondedwith
such French specialists in East European affairs as Breteuil and Le Clerc.
41. Michal Sokolnicki, GenteralMichlal Sokolnticki,1760-1815 (Cracow and Warsaw,
1912).
42. Ibid., p. 221.
43. Ibid., pp. 64, 221.
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Slavic Review
Sokolnicki'sreal sourcewas his own fertileimagination.44
But it was certainly
not necessaryfor Sokolnickito resort to his imaginationwlhenso many
precedentsfor his "discovery"alreadyexisted. In addition,othersources of
inspirationwere available to this Polish e'migre.They again lead us to the
Orlyks.
Back in 1734 thePortehad finallyreleasedtheelderOrlykfromdetention
and sent him to the Polish-Moldavian-Russian
borderto agitate against the
Russians.In thatsame year,Russian officials
complainedto tlleirsuperiorsin
St. Petersburgthat Orlyk "continuesto spread his intriguesand malicious
allegationsagainst our empire."45The old hetman-in-exile
not only directed
his "maliciousallegations"into Russian territories,
but he also shared them
withan old colleague,thecrownhetmanof Poland,J6zefPotocki.Orlykurged
this old veteranof the Bender days to beware of Russian designs,forthese,
accordingto theplansof PeterI, calledforan occupationof a partof Poland.46
The agingOrlykwas notthesole agitatorin Poland againsttheRussians;
he was aided by his son-in-law,
Andrzej Dzier2anowski.This Polish nobleman
was an inveterateanti-Russianand an activistin the struggleto preserve
Poland fromforeign,mainlyRussian, intervention.47
It is very likelythat in
Poland he disseminatedthe same views and allegationsas his in-lawsdid in
otherparts of Europe. There are, moreover,indicationsthat at the end of
the eighteenth
centurynotonlywas Orlykthe objectof generalPolish interest
but his views were probablyknownto Sokolnickiin particular.Sometimein
the finalyears of the century,the Frenchallowed a Polish scribeto make a
copy of Orlyk'svoluminousdiaryand send it back to Poland, where it was
storedin the famouslibraryof Adam Czartoryskiin Putawy.48Sokolnicki
himselfwas one of the mostenthusiasticsupportersof this library,forhe not
onlyvisitedit butwas also veryactivein collectingmaterialsforit in Western
Europe.49Surely he must have read as fascinatingan item as the Cossack
hetman'sdiary,withits numerouscopies of bothof the Orlyks'memorialsto
44. For example, see Lewitter, "The Apocryphal Testament," p. 48.
45. Sbornik Rtsskago istorichleskagoobsllchestva,108 (1900): 134, 348. At this same
time, calendars caricaturing the Russian Empire and its minlisterswere smuggled into
the Ukraine. Kochubinsky assumed, correctlyin our opinlioin,that Orlyk was imnplicated
in their formulation.See Alexander Kochubinsky,Graf A. I. Osterilan i razdel Tulrtsii:
Iz istorii vostochnago voprosa, 1735-1739 (Odessa, 1899), p. xxxvii.
46. Wladyslaw Konopczyfiski,Polska a Szzcecja (Warsaw, 1924), p. 141.
47. See Polski SloziowikBiograficz;sy,vol. 6 (Cracow, 1948), pp. 155-56. Hryhor
also informned
the French of his cooperation with his brotlier-in-lawagainst the Russians
in Poland. For example, see AMAE, Memoires et documents,Pologne, vol. 2, fol. 206.
48. This copy is at present in Cracow in the Biblioteka Czartoryskich,no. 1977. In
1830, Adam Czartoryski wished to have this copy published and had already obtained
permission of the censor when the project was interruptedby the events of 1830-31.
Cf. Subtelny,"From the Diary," p. 95.
49. Sokolnicki, Sokolnicki, pp. 202-3.
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c"PeterI's Testament"
677
European statesmen.This would explain why, in the memorandawhiclh
Sokolnickisubmittedto Napoleon in 1811, he stressedthe possibilityof an
uprisingby the Cossacks in the Ukraine whiclhwould be "une diversion
importante."50
Severalscholarshave notedthatthefinalversionofthe Petrineapocrypha
was probablytheresultofa jointeffort
by Polish emigresand Frenchpolitical
cognoscenti.Since this legendwas deeplyrootedin botlhFrance and Poland,
such a conclusionappears to be valid. One mightalso expect that the first
publishedversionwould surfaceat a time when Poland had just suffered
at the handsof Russia, and France was about to confrontthe colossus in the
East. Whetherit was, as Szynioi Aszkenazystates,a French expatriatein
Warsaw by thenameof N. de Tombeurwho in 1794 draftedthe finalversion
of the "plan"51 or, as nmany
believe,Sokolnickiwho formulatedthe version
laterpublishedby Lesur, Frenchmneni
and Poles had everyreasonto cooperate
in warningEurope of the Russian "menace." It would certainlybe satisfying
to establishdefinitely
theidentity
ofthepersonwho added thefinishiing
touclhes
to the "plan." This, however,we cannotdo. But such an identification
is not
for
the
solution
of
it
essential
to the mystery tlhe"plan," since would merely
add one morename to the long list of those wlho,since Peter I's victoryat
Poltava,usedtheapocryphaltale as a vehiclefortheirforeboding
aboutRussia.
In summary,we list here the fourpoiIntswhiclhare the basis for a reevaluationof theprevailingviews aboutthe originsand evolutionof Peter I's
"plan": (1) the rootsof the documenlt
reach intothe beginning,ratlherthan
the end, of the eighteenthcentury (2) insteadof viewingthe "plan" as a
productof individualcreativeness,we shoul(dacknowledgean evolutionary
explanationforits appearance; (3) not olnlywas this apocryplhal
device used
to sway publicopilnionl durilngthe nineteelnth
and twentiethcenturies,it was
also employedto influience
courtpoliticsdurinigthe eighteentlh
century;and
(4) the recurrentwarningsagainstRussian expansionduringthe eighteenth
centuryreveala pattern:wheneverEast Europeanipoliticalemigres(wllether
Hungarian, Ukrainian, or Polish) and membersof the French Foreign
Ministrymet,the specterof the apocryphal"plan of Peter I" raised its liead.
50. Ibid., pp. 399, 407. The originals of these memorials are in AMAE,
et documents,Russie, 1811-12.
51. Ibid., p. x.
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Memoires
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678
APPENDIX
The followinglist is a summaryof the points included in the final (SokolnickiLestir) version of Peter I's apocryphal"plan," with indicationsof the points that
also appeared in the PApai-HorvAtlh
(P-H) and Talaba-Orlyk (T-O) texts:
1. The Russian nation must be kept on a war footing.Aggrandizementis
Russia's primarygoal. (P-H, T-O)
2. European specialists slhouldbe invitedto Russia, but Russian ones should
renmain
at home.
3. No opportunityshould be lost to take part in the affairs of Europe,
especiallythose of Germany.
4. Poland mustbe keptas weak as possible. Russia should maintaina presence
in thatcountry.(T-O)
5. Sweden should be provokedinto a war whiclhwill allow Russia to take her
Denmarkand Sweden shouldbe keptat odds. (P-H, T-O)
territory.
in order
6. Consortsof Russianiprincesshould alwavs be chosen in Germzanvy
to consolidateRussianiinfluenice
there.
7. A comrmercial
alliance with England shouldbe maintained,siniceit is useful
for Russia's development.
8. Russia must continiueto expand her borders-nortlhwar-d
along the Baltic
Sea and southwardalong the Black Sea. (P-H, T-O)
9. Russia shouldpush ahead toward Constantinople,India, and Persia. Control
of themajor traderouteswill miiake
of Englislhgold. (P-H, T-O)
Russia independent
10. An intimateunion should be establishedwith Austria, but simultaneously
her power should be undermined.(P-H, T-O)
11. Austria shouldbe made to desire the expulsionof the Turks fromEurope.
Russia, however,should conquer Constantinople.(P-H, T-O)
12. Russia should become the ecclesiastical leader of the Orthodox. Their
supportwill pave the way to universalsovereignty.(P-H, T-O)
13. Afterachieving the subjugation of Sweden, Persia, Poland, and Turkey
and the consolidationiof control over the Black and Baltic Seas, Russia should
begin to play off France and Austria against each other by siding with one and
then the other.
14. Should this tactic fail,at the propermomentRussia should attack Europe
by launchingnaval offensivesfromthe Baltic and Black Seas.
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