Successful Intervention in Civil Wars:
Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Renée Edwards
Audrey Mattoon
Andrew Appleton
Washington State University
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Abstract
Colonial history is a variable missing from studies regarding civil war and third party
intervention. While literature often points out the negative effects and aspects of colonialism in a
myriad of other contexts, there may be a previously unexplored benefit to colonialism in respect
to successful interventions in civil war. This paper explores colonialism relative to cultural,
political and military ties and argues that former colonial status makes these ties stronger. When
the former colonial master is a third party intervener in conflict, strong ties bring about either
partial or full success for the intervention. This paper qualitatively compares seven cases with
one primary intervener, France, and the outcomes of each case. Its major theoretical contribution
is in pointing to the important role that historical colonial relationships play in the success of an
intervention.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
A series of conflicts since the 1980s have provided a rare opportunity to compare several
cases with a surprising amount of similarities and the same intervener, in this instance France.
This paper explores why the interventions of external parties— in particular the French—brought
about disparities in outcome: either some degree of success or complete failure. Its major
theoretical contribution is in pointing to the important role that historical colonial relationships
play in the success of an intervention. While these seven conflicts on the surface appear to be
incredibly disparate cases, we explore a number of variables in relation to a relatively unexplored
variable in the literature of civil war interventions: colonial history. Only in the case of a
colonial relationship resulting in strong cultural, political, and military ties with France as the
primary intervening state, do the conflicts significantly vary.
A moderate number of studies have looked at variables which contribute to duration of
conflict specifically, and since the mid-1990s research has begun to center on how third party
intervention may affect duration. There are primarily two schools of thought which inform
hypotheses on what affects civil war duration: (1) third party intervention makes a difference in
increasing or decreasing civil war duration, and (2) other factors outside of intervention are of
more importance in increasing or decreasing duration of conflict. While both camps have been
strengthened by empirical evidence, a valid concern arises when existing theories are applied at a
qualitative comparative level: neither can fully account for disparity between civil war outcomes
with similar political infrastructure, similar socio-economic, ethnic/cultural and geographical
factors, both of which involved third-party military intervention by the same foreign actor.
Since the end of the Cold War the increasing attention of the international community on
civil strife has resulted in the involvement of external actors in multiple forms. The three
primary sources of external involvement are military, economic/diplomatic, and a mixture of the
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
two. In addition, these forms of intervention can occur on the side of the government or the
insurgent organization (non-neutral), or irrespective of either (neutral). Regan (1996) finds that
intervention on the side of the government tends to be successful more often than intervention on
the side of the rebel group. As a whole, scholars implicate external intervention in extending the
duration (and some indicate an increase in severity) of conflict once it has begun (Balch-Lindsey
and Enterline 2000, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004, and Regan 2002, Lacina 2006).
In light of the above discussion, we developed a qualitative comparison of third party
intervention in Lebanon, Chad, Somalia, Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and two
conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire in order to contrast seven cases of conflict which, although they may
seem different on the surface, are actually quite similar. This case study highlights the flaws in
current analyses as well as shortcomings in the way civil wars are currently measured and
operationalized. Seven similar cases, with the same primary intervener (France), had divergent
outcomes in their civil wars. Three variables are used to examine the cases in a qualitative
analysis. The variables of cultural, political, and military ties to France are analyzed and
methods for examining each are discussed. A case study qualitatively comparing each case in
relation to each variable follows.
Colonialism
Colonial history has not been used as an explanatory variable in conflict literature,
especially in the realm of third-party military interventions. There is a certain lay belief that
interventions by colonial powers are more common, and probably more ethically questionable,
than interventions by non-colonial states, but no systematic work has been done to test whether
or not those interventions would be more common or more successful. In this study we are not
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
interested in whether or not colonialism causes intervention, rather our focus is on the dynamics
leading to successful intervention outcomes.
Colonialism has been used more extensively to look at variance in development
(Acemoglu et al 2001), economics (Bertocchi and Canova 2002; Firmin-Sellers 2000),
institutions both formal and informal (Maclean 2002; Ekeh 1975), and regime type (Barro 1999;
Varshney 1998; Lijphart 1999). Most scholars focus on the institutions and processes imparted
by colonial inheritance, which create path dependence in a variety of arenas. Colonization is
undoubtedly an important influence on countries that have experienced it; “Colonialism is to
Africa what feudalism is to Europe” (Ekeh 1975 [1972]).
Differences in colonial legacy can be the result of variations in the “styles” of
colonization adopted by colonizing countries; most of this work compares British and French
colonial patterns, especially in Africa (Grier 1999; Firmin-Sellers 2000; Maclean 2002). Britain
and France had distinct ways of ruling their colonies: Britain preferred a more indirect approach
that integrated existing political institutions, while France looked for complete assimilation and
centralization of their colonial infrastructure with their domestic political institutions.
The type of colony – settler vs. extractive – has also been considered of some importance
(Acemoglu, et al 2001). The differences in type of colony are based on how suitable the area was
for large scale settlement by people of European origin, largely based on the disease profile of
the area. Settler colonies and extractive colonies left different histories of institutions and
interactions between the colonizing country and its colony.
No matter the reason for the different types of institutions, our focus is largely on the way
these institutions were adapted with historical circumstances at the time of independence and
through later developments. This suggests that colonialism creates lasting impressions based on
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
the colonizer and the circumstances of that experience – impressions that may condition
responses to military interventions on the part of their former colonizer. In most cases, the
modern political elite, military apparatus and economic institutions are the result of colonial
legacies.
There are three possible avenues by which a former colonial relationship could contribute
to the literature on civil wars. It is the generally accepted wisdom that former colonial states have
interests embedded in their former colonies; these can be economic, strategic or cultural interests
and it is unlikely that a former colonizer has simply one unrelated to the others. For these
reasons, one would expect to see a greater probability of intervention in states by their former
colonial masters. We do not test this hypothesis here, since our focus is on the dynamics leading
to successful intervention outcomes.
The two factors most important for the success of interventions operate largely on the
elite level. Elites in former colonies frequently receive their education in the former colonizing
state, creating and cementing elite ties. The elite class in former colonies may have linguistic and
cultural ties to the former colonizing country. They may vacation there, send their own children
to school there, and continue to use the language as a mark of status. Interventions may be
triggered because of these ties, but they could also be successful as a result of these elite-level
cultural and political effects.
Former colonizing states also frequently maintain close relationships between their
military and that of their former colonies. They may provide training, aid and assistance to
officers, or engage in joint military operations. On a personal level, the military may share
cultural features as a result of colonial history. This could assist logistically in interventions on
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
the ground, or at the elite-level through bargaining. Therefore, the strength of military ties may
be an important factor in success.
France and Colonial Ties
Stepping back a level of abstraction, the relationship between intervening countries and
those that they intervene in can be categorized as having either weak or strong ties. Countries
with strong ties, we hypothesize, will have more successful interventions, while we expect
countries with weak ties to be less effective. For our cases, their ties with France are strong as the
result of long colonial histories. Where colonialism was a short process, for example Lebanon,
the strength of ties is commensurately weaker and more ambivalent.
These ties can be measured across three arenas or dimensions: cultural, political and
military. Cultural ties are measured empirically by looking for shared language and/or religion,
and remittance from diaspora populations. Cultural interaction does not have to occur only at the
elite level to possibly be effective, and therefore we look at cultural diffusion throughout the
population. The most direct method by which this would assist intervention is through a shared
language. American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have consistently run into difficulty
over the inability to communicate effectively at the lowest operational levels.
Political ties do operate exclusively on the elite level. Close associations between current
and former governmental officials of both countries is an indicator of a close ongoing political
relationship. With colonial relationships like the ones we examine, political elites may even have
been placed in power by the colonizing country or worked in the colonial institutions before
independence. This can ease the difficulties inherent in making agreements about intervention
goals and limits, as well as assisting in an understanding of actions by each country.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Military ties can be conceived of as occurring in two ways: through direct interaction
between military apparatuses, like through the provision of training or joint exercises, or through
financial means, like military assistance and the provision of materiel. We believe this will act in
the most direct way on strategic considerations; practice with integrating operations and
familiarity with the standard operating procedures of each organization facilitates interventions.
This effect can occur when the intervening country enters on the side of the government, or in
opposition to the government. Knowledge of weapons capabilities, troop training and strength,
and standard operating procedures is valuable intelligence in planning.
Cultural
Strong Ties
Weak Ties
Presence of shared
Lack of shared
language/religion,
language/religion, cultural
membership in shared colonial hostility (ex. Strong anti-
Political/economic
organizations
Western sentiment)
Close elite-level interaction,
Little or no elite-level
strong economic relationship
interaction, open hostility
between elites in each state
Military
Presence of defense
No non-hostile military
agreements, direct military
interaction
aid, sale of military
equipment, connections
between military elites
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
For each level, there is an obvious connection between a colonial relationship and the
presence of strong ties on at least a couple of the dimensions. The practice of French colonialism,
especially in Africa where most of our cases are located, was perfectly suited to the creation of
deep ties that would outlast the colonial experience itself. This set the stage for successful
French interventions in its former colonies.
The basic principle of French colonial administration was “assimilation,” though what
that meant in theory and in practice certainly changed over time (Lewis 1962). The purpose of
assimilation and its desired scope was never totally clear or without controversy, but it was a
French impulse intellectually in keeping with the universalizing impulses of the Revolution
France, unlike Great Britain, for the most part sought to tie its colonies closely both culturally
and politically to the metropole. Under different governments, for example, colonies were
represented in the national legislature. Some post-independence leaders, like Cote d’Ivoire’s
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, served in France’s parliament in Paris or as governmental ministers.
The over-seas colonies were intended to become like département, and in trying to style
them as such the French subordinated or removed traditional leaders. “Chiefs” were not advisors
of colonial political officers with positions that they held as a result of local traditions, but rather
they were “mere agent[s] of the central colonial government with clearly defined duties and
powers. [The chief] did not head a local government unit, nor did the area which he administered
on behalf of the government necessarily correspond to a pre-colonial political unit” (Crowder
1964).
The French divided their colonies into cantons ignoring, in some cases deliberately,
existing political boundaries, and created a colonial administration basically from scratch. “The
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
political institutions established by the French displaced pre-colonial institutions of chieftancy,
emphasizing a direct connection between the state and individuals, in particular the head of
the nuclear family household” (Maclean 2002). Echoing its centralizing tendency at home,
France tried to create a uniform colonial apparatus that was roughly similar in form and function
in each of its far-flung colonies. France was not up to the task of complete assimilation, and
eventually it abandoned assimilation as a policy for one of politique d'association. The name
may have changed but the intent remained the same—civilizing; the colonial administration
retained the desire to eventually create French citizens out of colonial subjects, education
remained in the French-style and colonial administration remained centralized (Crowder 1964).
Religious, ethnic and linguistic factors between the colonizer and colonized are indicators
of cultural ties that may exist between the two. Religion especially is inextricably intertwined
with colonialism. At the core of most colonial ventures, religion has been present either as a
primary goal in ‘civilizing’ a population or as a tool to further economic gain. In some cases
subjugation through religion was a side effect of “missions” sent from the colonizing country in
order to bridge communication gaps for the purpose of pursuing economic or political interests.
Missions were also used to “tighten the intellectual and emotional bonds” between religion and
empire—bonds exceedingly important in the 19th century (Carey 2011). Developing a common
religion between the colonizer and those being colonized was meant to create trust and common
ground. Whatever the ultimate goal, religion has been carried along with colonialism and
became a mechanism to spread language, ideologies and beliefs.
Since France is the intervener in all seven cases and the primary unit of investigation
here, we will look closely at French colonization and religious ties. Under the Third Republic,
France began its major push for colonialism and expansion. The French Catholic church was a
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
substantial vehicle and integral part of the colonialism project (Daughton 2006). Aside from its
ability to create and share trust-bonds, religion offered the French a political advantage;
missionaries learned and shared the language(s), and became veritable information conduits to
France:
Many other agents of the state were active in the field, but the Catholic missionaries, as
unattached men committed to staying on location for their whole life, learning local
languages and customs, and reporting to the religious as well as civilian authorities on
anything that might have threatened the Pax Gallica on the colonial frontier, constituted
an unmatched source of dependable intelligence on the ground. (Michaud 2010)
France’s primary religion is Roman Catholic, with seventy-five percent of the population
belonging to the religion (Alesina et al); Catholicism was also the primary conduit of colonialism
for the state. Although all seven of our cases have Islam as a primary religion as well,
Catholicism ranks second in all cases with the exception of Somalia and Libya; neither colonized
by France. The DRC, Chad, and Cote d’Ivoire have the highest percentage of Roman Catholics
of the seven cases. In Cote d’Ivoire and parts of Chad this linkage is the strongest. Portions of
Chad have been highly westernized, including their education and religion, and in these areas the
religion is primarily Catholic. Type of religion, in this case Catholicism, is evidence of western
influence and linkages between the colonizer and the colonized.
In Cote d’Ivoire similar French influence can be seen in education, language, and
religion. Elites within the country tend to speak French and tend to be Roman Catholic. The
first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, following independence even served in the French
legislature and had converted to Christianity while young and attending a French colonial school.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Religious fractionalization is present in five of the seven cases with the exceptions being
Somalia and Libya; here the scores are both incredibly low and the people are predominantly
Muslim. In Cote d’Ivoire, Chad, and Lebanon, the two primary religions are Islam and
Catholicism, with Islam dominant but Catholicism ranking a close second. In Lebanon,
historical records of religious conflicts date back to the 1860s; the demographic balance between
Muslims and Christians has been delicate at best, and further divisions exist between Muslim
factions. In the 50s and 60s pan-Arabism swept Lebanon and radicalized a large percentage of
the Muslim population (Salabi 1993). This population, already unhappy sharing power with the
Christian portion of the populous, began to push to join with Syria in order to ensure dominance
over the Christian population. The Christian sector of the population began to strongly oppose
this move, for the same reasons. Some of the tensions are directly linked to French colonization,
though Christianity in Lebanon predates French colonization by at least a thousand years.
Political ties between France and Lebanon are tenuous, with religious fractionalization a
primary reason for this. Neither of the neither of the major religious factions have been happy
with French involvement, and both are extremely skeptical of the other’s intentions within the
state. During colonization, French was instituted as the language of instruction, which favored
the Christian population over Muslims. In this instance religious linkages with the colonizing
country have strengthened negative associations and factions.
Closely tied to religious fractionalization and colonialism are the elements of ethnicity
and language. While ethnicity is not something “brought” to a country as religion and language
can be, it has certainly been strengthened and manipulated by colonialism, thereby creating a
situation in which ethnicity becomes politically salient. A myriad of literature has revealed the
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
dark side of colonialism and the impact it has had on creating arbitrary borders, dividing tribes,
and playing games of ethnic favoritism. The cases we are highlighting are largely no exception.
Lebanon has relative ethnic homogeneity; divisions and tension tend to be religiousbased and not ethnic-based, as previously discussed. Linguistic fractionalization is also low, as
would be expected. French impact on ethnic fractionalization has been low, and ethnic identity
is not politically salient. Linguistically, France’s colonial ties are visible in that French is spoken
by a large amount of the population. In Chad, French colonialism had the greatest impact in the
South, which (not coincidentally) contains the vast majority of wealth in the country. The Sara is
the predominant ethnic group in the South controlling the civil service in the post-colonial
period, as more Southerners received Western education. Linguistic fractionalization in Chad is
also extremely high, although French is spoken by a large number of the population indicating
the continuing power of colonial history. States with high ethnic fractionalization tend to have
high linguistic fractionalization as well. Libya is the exception to this rule, where there are many
ethnicities and only two languages. This is largely due to the fact that ethnicities are tribally
based; there are more than twenty major tribes but they largely speak the same languages (CIA
Factbook).
Libya and France have had a tumultuous history. Libya was an Italian colony, not
French, but the two countries have had a varied history of ties, mostly revolving around arms
trading and various conflict-related issues. In 1967 France relaxed its arms embargo and allowed
Libya to purchase weapons and aircraft from the French. This resulted in close relations between
the two, and in the 1970s Libya signed a contract which guaranteed a supply of oil to France in
exchange for financial cooperation and technical assistance. The relationship became strained,
however, when Libya accused France of becoming an “arms merchant” and selling weapons to
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
both sides of conflicts; namely those Libya was involved in. Libya was also unhappy that France
was involved in several military interventions, notably those in Western Sahara, Zaire and Chad.
Gaddafi stated that while economic relations between the two states were good, political
relations were not (Library of Congress Country Studies 1987).
Relations between the two countries have vacillated between good and bad, however the
most recent interaction between them has been positive: France was the major instigator in the
multi-lateral intervention to oust Gaddafi, and was the first country to recognize the new
transitional council government in March of 2011 (ibid). Ties between the two states have been
primarily political and military in origin, and very little exists between the two as far as cultural
ties. We argue that political and military ties, while beneficial if strong, are not enough to create
a successful intervention, especially in the case of a non-colonial relationship between the two
states.
Unlike Lebanon, Cote d’Ivoire is ethnically fractionalized; however individual ethnic
identities are not highly politically salient. Rather, the primary political cleavage has been around
the construction of an “Ivorian” identity, based on more than just ethnicity, but also national
origin and religion (Mimiko 2006), creating a larger super-ethnic identity that nevertheless does
exclude certain groups more than others. The impetus behind the “Ivorian” identity movement
was primarily economic and political rather than the result of long-standing and unchanging
ethnic differences. Cocoa cultivation, as practiced in Cote d’Ivoire, puts a premium on land
ownership and requires a large labor force. Generations of immigrants to the cocoa producing
regions have created a population of laborers in a precarious position, unable to own land or
become fully “Ivorian”. Essentially, then, the identity cleavage is not along ethnic lines, but
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
along class lines where individuals of immigrant-descent are disenfranchised to prop-up up a
status-quo political coalition.
Linguistic fractionalization in Cote d’Ivoire is high, but the fractionalization index can be
deceptive: French is the second highest spoken language behind Akan, and is largely spoken as a
second language even by those whose primary language is Akan. This is evidence of the
strength of penetration of French culture in Cote d’Ivoire during the colonial era. Education,
elite-level and military ties have combined to make a shared language a necessary element
between the two states.
Using the Alesina et al measure of ethnic fractionalization, Somalia gets a 0.8117 which
is quite high. There are six distinct ethnic groups that Alesina et al measured, all of which have
significantly sized populations. They are quite important to the continuation of the conflict,
providing natural constituencies for warlords and complicating efforts for national reconciliation.
The DRC should be briefly mentioned, although it is somewhat different than the other
cases. It has a high fractionalization score and is primarily Roman Catholic, however the
“fractionalized” religions are all within the realm of Christianity (Protestant and African
Christian), with the exception of a small percentage of Congo traditional and Muslim.
Economic and political ties, often conjoined, are resultant of colonialism as well.
Political ties can create economic benefit and can also give a colonizing country reason to
intervene in the future, either on the side of the government or on the side of the rebels. We
propose that strong political ties between the colonizing country and the colonized are evident by
political and economic agreements between the two states, by political elites from one country
participating in governments and political activities with the other, and by the positive interaction
of the two country’s government officials.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
France imports
from (in US
millions)
Lebanon
1983
3.3
France
Libya
2011 (2009)
3174.62
France
Somalia
1992
0.9
France
Cote d’Ivoire (1) 2002
760.3
France
Cote d’Ivoire (2) 2011 (2009)
France
754.08
DRC
1978
148.9
France
Chad
1983
6
France
Table 1 – French trade relations (from Barbieri and Keshk 2012)
France exports
to
(in US
millions)
403.26
1123.13
13.48
556.78
993.86
41.2
25.85
Libya’s trade relationship with France fluctuates to extensive degree from year to
year. France imports Libyan oil for the most part, resulting both in the volatility of their trade
relationship and in the trade deficit that Table 1 illustrates (France Diplomatie 2011). In any
given year for the last decade leading up to their intervention in 2011 especially, France imported
three times as much from Libya as it exported to Libya. Of all of our cases, France’s trade with
Libya is the most substantial, however it did not consistently surpass trade with Cote d’Ivoire
until the new millennium.
Cote d’Ivoire since independence in 1960 has had a close political relationship with
France; in fact, one of the closest of all of France’s former African colonies. In 1981, “the
Director of the Cabinet, the Secretary General of the Government and the Private Secretary of
President Houphouet Boigny [were] all French citizens, although the first two [were] Black
Frenchmen from the French West Indies” (Golan 1981). Twenty years after independence France
remained an important source of political actors.
Further political and economic ties can be seen in shared currency, however Cote
d’Ivoire and France have a relationship closer than other former colonies of France have had:
“Under President Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire established itself as the main partner of the
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
former colonial power in Africa, adopted the regional common currency linked to the French
Franc with a fixed rate (franc CFA) and developed a liberal export-oriented economy based on
cocoa culture” (Bossuroy and Cogneau 2008).
At the time of both of France’s interventions, Cote d’Ivoire was France’s fourth leading
trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is a substantial economic partnership and a
particularly important economic site in West Africa for French interests. The relationship was
mutually important; France was only recently overtaken by Nigeria as Cote d’Ivoire’s largest
trading partner (France Diplomatie 2010). French companies and their subsidiaries account for as
much as 30% of Cote d’Ivoire’s GDP, but the economic relationship is not wholly about private
corporations. France recently restricted Cote d’Ivoire’s debt, cancelling $455 million and
deferring another $2.2 billion (Ibid).
France has had a history of political ties with Chad, including use of the state as a
diplomatic liaison and of shared diplomatic relations for Chadian officials in France. The
Minister of Foreign and European Affairs visited Chad in 2007 before continuing to Darfur; the
Chadian President traveled to France for diplomatic reason in 2007 as well, and also paid a
private visit to Paris the same year (diplomatie.gouv.fr). There is a rich history of connections
such as these between the two states. Chad does not have a lot to offer in the realm of economic
benefit; however the two countries have maintained political ties. These are primarily at the elite
level, and most French impact has been in one region of Chad; the South. Because of the urbanrural divide within the country, political ties are not universally distributed within the state. Like
many other states, geographically rural areas are less likely to have close associations with their
own governments, let along those of their former colonizer. A struggling economy, lack of
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
resources, and a urban-rural divide have resulted in weak political ties between Chad and its
colonizer.
Political ties between Lebanon and France have been loose. France has maintained a
certain amount of control within the state over time, primarily as a cautionary investment. Since
Lebanon has little to offer economically, resources have not strengthened political ties between
the two countries. Largely, the colonizer has been more of an “impatient parent” figure to the
state and political ties have been for the purpose of maintaining a balance of power between the
highly religiously fractionalized populations than for any give-and-take between the two
countries.
Somalia was not one of France’s colonies nor was it a point of particular interest for
France’s regional concerns, except through its proximity to Djibouti. Somalia was originally
created out of Italian and British Somaliland. Following Somali independence in 1960 France
had strained relations with Somalia; Somalia objected to France’s colonial maneuvering in
neighboring countries, specifically Djibouti, which is where France launched its troops for its
part in the intervention (Metz 1992).
Economically Somalia is and has been a pastoralist society, where livestock makes up a
significant amount of the GDP. Even before the total collapse of the state there was little in the
way of industry in Somalia, which accounts for the very small amount of French imports from
the state (ibid). For the most part, Somalia was of marginal interest to France politically and
economically until the crisis that precipitated the French participation in the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF) and the second United Nations’ mission in Somalia.
Military ties can be measured by examining whether or not a military presence remains in
the colonized country after independence, how closely the two militaries interact (such as
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
training, structure, and institutions), and whether or not the colonizing country readily assists the
former colony. France has had a rather unique military situation with its colonies. France has
maintained a military force which was essentially made up of members of colonies to be used in
colonies (Possio 2007). This force has been – since 1967 – known as the Troupes de marine
(formerly Troupes coloniales). This force was primarily – although not completely – based in
Gabon, Senegal, Djibouti, and Port-Bouet (Côte d'Ivoire). It is possible, however, to look even
more closely at France’s military ties with each of the six cases we analyze here.
The Troupes de marine essentially trained the Chadian army, under the agreement known
as the Assistance Militaire Technique (AMT), starting in 1968. France had been concerned
about Libyan incursion into Northern Chad since 1970. However, the French were asked to
leave in 1980 by the OAU and President Oueddei (ibid). During the Habre Revolt, the French
intervened for motivations discussed later; presently France maintains 950 troops in Chad.
France has had a military alliance with CDI since 1961, and the French 43rd infantry
battalion is based in Port-Bouet, Cote d’Ivoire. Prior to the 2011 intervention, France had other
operations in CDI, including Operation Licorne, which began in 2002, parallel to the UN
operation but never under UN auspices. France claimed the operation was rooted in the defense
treaty between the two countries. In 2004/5 there were several incidents between government
forces and the French; the French neutralized the CDI air force in retaliation for attacks on
French troops. This is an indication of France’s military strength in the country, and also
perhaps a foreshadowing of things to come.
Lebanon was part of the French mandate in the Middle East after 1924. Today, France
has about 850 soldiers attached to the UN force in Lebanon. Prior to the declaration of Lebanon's
independence on November 22nd 1943, the various military units were combined into the fifth
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Brigade under the command of Colonel Fouad Chehab. Upon independence, the Lebanese Third
Sharp Shooters Regiment was placed at the disposal of the Lebanese government to maintain
security but the greater part of the LAF remained within the French Army in Lebanon until the
total evacuation of French troops on August 1st 1945 (lebarmy.gov). Lebanon wanted France to
turn over full control of the armed units to the Lebanese government; therefore the Lebanese
government formed an official delegation to negotiate with the French concerning the handing
over of the LAF. After several weeks of talks, the joint French-British Command decreed that
responsibility for armed units under French control were to be handed over to the Independent
Government of Lebanon (ibid). France has maintained weak military ties with Lebanon since.
Unlike Lebanon, France did not have a defense agreement with the DRC, nor did it have
troops permanently stationed there. France did not have much presence there until the mid1970s, when they began to replace Belgium as the predominant partner – both military and
political. In 1974 France signed a military assistance agreement (the Assistance Militaire
Technique, or AMT). Charbonneau (2008) says: “AMT agreements authorized the transfer of
French military technology and the propagation of French military culture through African
armies…” (p.62).
France has had the following military agreements with the DRC: (1) an
AMT (no date, classified) relative to supply of aircraft and parts, (2) an AMT relative to
cooperation with the CDI air force, signed July 1975, renewed March of 1976, and renewed
again in May of 1977, (3) an AMT for air force personnel training in France (no date, classified),
and (4) an AMT relative to training ground troops and officers, signed in June of 1976 and
renewed February of 1978. These are more agreements than France had with Chad or CDI –
however, they were somewhat less entangling and deep, especially in comparison to the
agreement France signed with CDI in 1961.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
As previously discussed, Libya and France have had a fractious past. This was set aside,
however, during the recent conflict in Libya, as France was the major instigator in the
intervention there. Previously, France did not maintain a military presence in the country,
although it did supply weapons to Libya through arms agreements. Considering all facets of
military involvement, it is clear that France maintains strong military ties with CDI and Chad,
and to a lesser degree Lebanon, Libya and the DRC, and no military ties with Somalia.
Out of the five countries representing the six cases here, four of them are represented in
The Organisation Internationale de la francophonie (OIF). The OIF was created in 2005, out of
the old Agence de cooperation culturelle et technique (ACCT), which was created in 1970. Its
mission is to:
embody the active solidarity between its 75 member states and governments (56
members and 19 observers), which together represent over one-third of the United
Nations’ member states and account for a population of over 890 million people,
including 220 million French speakers. IOF organises political activities and actions of
multilateral cooperation that benefit French-speaking populations. Its actions respect
cultural and linguistic diversity and serve to promote the French language, peace and
sustainable development. (http://www.francophonie.org/English.html).
Chad and CDI were original signatories to the IOF. Lebanon joined in 1973, Zaire in 1977. The
IOF is a good indicator for a combination of cultural, political and military ties and France’s
subsequent ties to those countries that are members of it. The four countries represented in the
IOF are Lebanon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, and the DRC. Somalia is not represented.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
French Interventions
Case
Cultural
Ties
Political/Economic Military
Ties
Ties
Overall
Success/Failure
Lebanon
Ambivalent Ambivalent
Weak
Variable
(weakening)
Partial Failure
Libya
Weak
Ambivalent
Weak
Weak Ties
Partial Success
Somalia
None
None/Weak
None
Weak/Nonexistent Total Failure
Ties
Cote
d’Ivoire
(1)
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong Ties
Full Success
Cote
d’Ivoire
(2)
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong Ties
Full Success
DRC
Weak
Growing
Growing Variable
(growing)
Partial Success
Chad
Strong
Strong
Strong
Full Success
Strong Ties
The dependent variable, intervention outcome, is constructed based on the motivations of
the intervening state, France. Taking into account the major intentions for each intervention, we
can measure to what extent those were realized. It is important to keep in mind that ending the
conflict may not be the primary purpose of an intervention and consequently, continuation of
violence does not necessarily mean that the intervention failed.
To measure success in a meaningful way we take into account the motivations of the
intervener (France) in each case. Too often an understanding of success in interventions in civil
wars hinges on whether or not hostilities cease, but this is not often the primary purpose one state
chooses to intervene in another. It would be problematic to hold states to a standard they were
not aspiring to at the time of their intervention.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
To ensure that success or failure for each case is appropriate, we explore the primary
motivations of France in the case of each intervention. These are gathered from primary and
secondary sources, and for the most part, take into considerations beyond the publically stated
intentions of France. The motivations included for the cases can be broadly grouped into three
types: humanitarian, geopolitical (Cold War), and power maintenance in client states. Somalia is
the purest example of a humanitarian motive, while the DRC is much more geopolitical in intent.
Retaining power in a client state was the primary purpose of the first Cote d’Ivoire intervention,
and an important motivation in the second. The other cases fall somewhere in between each.
A dichotomous conceptualization of success or failure is not sufficient to capture the
nuances of each case. A case study approach like ours allows for greater gradation of our
dependent variable. On a spectrum of success and failure, the French interventions in Cote
d’Ivoire would be the furthest to the left (full success).
France’s goal in Cote d’Ivoire, during both interventions, was two-fold: preservation of
its role as a powerbroker in the country, and returning stability. France’s long political and
military relationship with Cote d’Ivoire created an expectation both within the country and its
neighbors, that France had a responsibility to assist. Western Africa and Cote d’Ivoire in
particular had a close relationship to France, pre and post-independence. They naturally saw
France as having a greater responsibility to assist them with internal issue. The likelihood of
intervention was increased not just because France as a former colonial power felt a particular
kind of imperial interest in Cote d’Ivoire, but because Cote d’Ivoire and its neighbors saw France
as having certain being a benevolent sort of protector in line with defense agreements between
the two countries since independence.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
During the first intervention France originally had troops in the country to evacuate
French nationals; there were roughly 20,000 in the country at the time. Cote d’Ivoire’s
government and the governments of neighboring countries called for “France to take a more
active role in ending the rebellion” (Global Security). The second intervention involved troops
that had been left stationed in the region following the first intervention and ongoing instability.
The 2011 intervention was cast explicitly as protection of French civilians. France also wanted
to prop up the legitimacy of Cote d’Ivoire’s institutions by insuring the transfer of power to the
elected President Outtarra. International observers had verified the fairness and legality of the
2010 election. Ultimately, this was about stability; maintaining the legitimacy of government
structures and putting into place a president that the international community could support.
France’s intention in each intervention was to restore relative stability in Cote d’Ivoire. In
the second intervention, there was the added motivation of facilitating the power transfer to
Outtarra following the 2010 election. After a civil war, it is unreasonable to expect that all
violence will immediately cease. States do not dissolve into conflict without serious underlying
cleavages in society that do not immediately disappear after a successful intervention. France
maintained a cease fire in Cote d’Ivoire following the first civil war in 2002 and stability was
restored sufficiently to have a free and fair election in 2010. The second intervention ended with
the arrest of outgoing President Gbagbo and the inauguration of President Outtarra. The
reconciliation process began almost immediately, including the creation of a Truth,
Reconciliation and Dialogue Commission.
Chad, our second case of intervention in a former French colony, is also located on the
left hand side of the spectrum. France’s main motivation in Chad was pressure from the
international community. The US forced France’s hand to intervene by publicizing information
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
regarding military operations that France wanted kept secret. In addition, France wanted to
maintain credibility with their more important African allies (cofr.org). Chad was less important
to France than Libya was. Libya was a major source of oil and a purchaser of French arms.
Because of strained relations between the two states, French troops were staying within a certain
region of Chad, so while France could exert political pressure (indirectly) on Libya, there was
little worry about direct military engagement with them. France’s primary motivation in the
intervention was twofold: international political pressure and motivation over Libyan
involvement.
France wanted to halt the rebels advance, backed as it was by regional power Libya, and
to maintain the government in power. While France never managed to force Libya’s withdrawal,
it did stop the rebels from seizing power and maintained President Habré at the head of the
country until he was deposed with tacit French approval in 1990. Libyan influence was thus
contained by the French presence.
The cases of Libya and the DRC are both classified in the table as “partial successes”.
They are closer to the left hand side of the spectrum, success, than they are to failure. Many of
France’s primary motivations were achieved by their intervention in Libya and the DRC but not
all
France saw the opportunity in Libya to gain international respect by “flexing its muscles”
and spearheading a multi-national intervention. France and the UK have stepped up to take on
the “peacekeeping and democracy-building” role that the US has begun to move away from as
the American economy has stalled (Time.com). France and Libya had ties prior to the conflict
and although much of their relationship has endured friction, France has hosted thousands of
refugees under Gadaffi, the countries maintain robust trade, and France depends on oil exports
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
from Libya. Oil was a main motivator for France’s involvement; the conflict halted production,
therefore ending the conflict would prove to be instrumental in restoring the oil production and
export to Europe.
France also needed to repair its reputation in the Middle East (a political motivation); its
reaction to the events in Egypt and Tunisia were negative and did not impress the international
community. When the Arab Spring movement began to gain ground, France realized it had a
reputation for being on the wrong side of history in the Middle East. Taking a pro-humanitarian
response to the conflict would vastly improve France’s reputation.
France’s intervention in Libya was largely based on reputational concerns. France wanted
to present itself as a country willing and able to project power abroad for humanitarian
purposes.. France saw the opportunity in Libya to gain international respect by “flexing its
muscles” and spearheading a multi-national intervention. France and the UK have stepped up to
take on the “peacekeeping and democracy-building” role that the US has begun to move away
from as the American economy has stalled (Time.com).
It did not hurt that France imported a great deal of Libyan oil, and a new government that
they assisted into power might be more inclined toward France economically. France and Libya
had economic ties prior to the conflict and although much of their relationship has endured
friction, France has hosted thousands of refugees under Gadaffi, the countries maintain robust
trade, and France depends on oil exports from Libya. Oil was a main motivator for France’s
involvement; the conflict halted production, therefore ending the conflict would prove to be
instrumental in restoring the oil production and export to Europe.
France also hoped to repair its standing in the Middle East (a political motivation); its
reaction to the events in Egypt and Tunisia were negative and did not impress the international
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
community. When the Arab Spring movement began to gain ground, France realized it needed to
correct its reputation for being on the wrong side of history in the Middle East. Taking a prohumanitarian response to the conflict would vastly improve France’s reputation.
We classify France’s intervention in Libya as a partial success. On the humanitarian side,
significant violence is still on going and Libya has not transitioned to stable new regime.
However, without the multinational intervention which France spearheaded, Gaddafi would not
have been deposed and his forces would have continued to utilize superior military forces to
perpetuate massacres and massive human rights violations. On a strictly reputational level, the
intervention has similarly mixed results.
Within France, opinion on the intervention has changed significantly over time. Before
the operation began, approval was at a significant low (36%), before reaching a high of 66% at
the end of March, 2011. By the end of June, two months before Gaddafi’s capture and death,
approval had fallen to 49% (IFOP 2011). More recent polling on France’s international image,
not aimed specifically at the Libyan intervention, points to a strong belief by citizens of many
developing countries, including African ones that France is a country that strongly believes in
human rights. Moroccans agreed the most at 92%, and Mali, another African country, agreed at
56% (TNS 2012). Countries like Morocco and Egypt both believed strongly that consequences
for France of their intervention in Libya were positive, and similarly sized majorities in both
countries believe that France’s intervention has had a positive impact on the situation in Libya
(TNS 2012).
France intervened in the DRC for the purpose of protecting European expatriates and to
attempt to restore stability. France’s relationship with DRC was growing; it had begun to take
over for former colonizer Belgium, as DRC’s main European ally. Cold War dynamics were also
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
central to the intervention, as the Angolan-Cuban influence in the conflict and region was of
particular concern. “Under the guidance of President Giscard d'Estaing, France pursued a policy
intended to reinforce its continued interest in Africa….designed to bolster the African countries
against Soviet-Cuban or other forms of communism, [and]…intended to expand France's
commercial status on the continent” (Odom 1993).
Beginning in May 1978, France and Belgium both entered the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. The initial purpose was to rescue European expatriates that had been taken hostage in
the mining the mining center of Kolwezi, Zaire. However, France and Belgium quickly diverged
on how that should be accomplished.
In keeping with President d'Estaing's activist approach toward the continent of Africa,
France was as much concerned with the reestablishment of Zaire's internal security as in
safeguarding the Europeans. The French did not approach the problem as an evacuation
operation. The 2d R.E.P., acting under Gras' orders, was going to Zaire to kill rebels in order to
save the Europeans. Brussels focused on the expatriates' safety. (Odom 1993)
France was more interested in Zaire’s security internally and externally. The
geopolitical concerns of the Cold War were important to France’s calculations; they were
seeking also to block the Angolan and Cuban advances in Africa. “In short, France, and
President d'Estaing in particular, took a strong interest in African affairs”, particularly in light of
the Cold War calculus playing out in Central Africa at the time (ibid). Stability in the DRC was
important to France to help protect a developing relationship which was viewed as a bulwark
against Communist inroads elsewhere in Central Africa.
France did manage to rescue the majority of the Europeans it set out to save, but not
before triggering the massacre of eighty of them. The rebels were successfully pushed back into
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Angola and France continued to gain ground against Belgium in relations with the DRC.
However, the DRC’s economy was seriously hurt by the conflict, and the mining sector took
time to rebound.
Lebanon was a French colony only briefly in comparison to Chad and Cote d’Ivoire.
French penetration of Lebanese society was less complete and as a result, relations between the
two states have been markedly more ambivalent. French authorities were concerned over
maintaining control within the county in addition to rebuilding the Lebanese economy and social
systems. In addition, France has always maintained somewhat of a “parental” relationship with
Lebanon. Whenever factions threatened to disrupt the political balance France has historically
stepped in and exerted control in order to keep the government from dissolving or fracturing
completely. France was also motivated to keep the Lebanese dissatisfaction with the French
from reaching beyond Lebanon.
During intervention, France failed to counter the Syrians, who continued to occupy the
country for another decade and a half. Even with this failure, however, the intervention was a
partial success; the multinational force was successful in its mission to force a cease-fire and
withdrawal of rebel forces. The Lebanese war allowed France to re-energize its own political
profile and on a more individual level allowed the French president (Jacques Chirac) to reenergize his presidency. France re-appeared as a major international player and has garnered
respect in international affairs since the Lebanese civil war. Underlying tensions continued to
plague the state, however, and Lebanon remained an essential “satellite” of Syria (lgic.org).
The only complete failure that we include is Somalia. This intervention was the most
purely humanitarian of those that we analyze. France’s primary purpose in Somalia was to
provide security for humanitarian aid shipments and mitigating the suffering of Somalis. France
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
entered Somalia with the United Task Force (UNITAF), and participated in the United Nations
Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).
But the French decision to enter Somalia was not without political
controversy….French newspapers also said the decision to send 2,100 French
troops to Somalia had divided the French Cabinet, with the Defense Minister,
Pierre Joxe, opposing the move and President Francois Mitterrand finally coming
down on the side of Bernard Kouchner, the Health and Humanitarian Affairs
Minister (Riding, 1992)
At least for Kouchner’s part, his motivations appear to be genuinely humanitarian. He
made a trip to Somalia where he was photographed carrying sacks of rice paid for by French
school children, and described conditions in Somalia as “worse than hell” (Riding, 1992). There
was major international coverage of and concern about the situation in Somalia, and France was
not immune.
They were eventually forced to withdraw after no significant improvement in the security
situation of Somalia. Today, two decades later, Somalia remains without a functional
government – the world’s only truly collapsed state. The humanitarian situation in Somalia never
significantly improved by any metric.
Conclusion
Of the cases that we classified as having strong or growing ties, France’s interventions
were successful either in full or in part. In two of those three cases, those strong ties were the
result of long colonial histories. In the case of the DRC, France was actively engaged in
strengthening ties to replace former colonial master Belgium.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
France’s military agreements with Francophone Africa were explicitly about
“propagation of French military culture through African armies” (Charbonneau 2008, 62).
Culturally, Cote d’Ivoire and Chad were both members of Organisation internationale de la
Francophonie. French was a primary secondary language. The prevalence of French and the
propagation of French military culture are key to the success of French interventions in these
former colonies. Just the ability to communicate effectively through a shared language can
increase the likelihood of success at a tactical level. Strategic friction between two different
military organizations is also minimized by the presence of a shared military culture.
Political ties provide their own impetus for successful interventions; they increase the
costs that a country is willing to accept in an intervention. When a state is seen as central to
France’s concerns in a region, than the money, time and manpower that France is willing to sink
into an intervention will increase. The difference between Somalia and Chad or Cote d’Ivoire is
illustrative. Somalia was not of particular interest to France, so causalities and costs were more
sensitive than they were in the interventions in their former colonies.
While we are interested in the relationship between colonial ties and interventions more
broadly, this study can only explain the success of French interventions. A possibility exists that
there is something about French colonialism, its international relations, or its military that makes
these effects unique. The next step would be to expand the universe of cases to include other
instances of former colonial countries intervening, in addition to intervening countries with no
colonial relationships but strong ties. This second part is important, since the majority of
interventions in civil wars are not by great powers, but by regional powers and neighbors that
share borders with the country in conflict.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
References
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative
development: An
empirical investigation. The American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-1401.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003).
Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth. (8), 155-194.
Angstrom, J. (2001). Towards a typology of internal armed conflict: synthesizing a decade of
conceptual turmoil. Civil Wars. 4(3), 93-116.
Barbieri, K. & Keshk, O. (2012) Correlates of war project trade data set codebook version 3.0.
Retrieved from : http://correlatesofwar.org.
Barro, R. (1999). Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 107 (S6), S158S183.
Bertocchi, G., & Canova, F. (2002). Did colonization matter for growth?: An empirical
exploration into the historical causes of Africa's underdevelopment. European Economic
Review, 46 (10), 1851-1871.
Bossuroy, T. & Cogneau, D. (2009). Social mobility and colonial legacy in five African
countries. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/dia/wpaper/dt200810.html.
Carey, H. M. (2011). God’s empire: Religion and colonialism in the british world, c. 1801-1908.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Conteh-Morgan, E. (2004). Collective political violence. New York: Routledge.
Cofr.org. The French military in africa. The council on foreign relations. Retrieved from
http://www.cfr.org/france/french-military-africa/p12578.
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Cunningham, D. E., & Lemke, D. (2011). Beyond civil war: a quantitative analysis of sub-state
violence. Paper presented at American political science association 2011 annual meeting,
Seattle, WA.
Crowder, M. (1964). Indirect rule: French and British style. Africa: Journal of the International
African Institute, 34(3), 197-205.
Daughton, J. P. (2006). An empire divided: Religion, republicanism, and the making of French
colonialism, 1880-1914. New York: Oxford University Press.
Deming Lewis, M. (1962). One hundred million Frenchmen: The "assimilation" theory in French
colonial policy. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 4(2), 129-153.
Diplomatie.gouv.fr. Chad country files. Retrieved from
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/chad-190/.
Diplomatie.gouv.fr. France and Cote d’Ivoire economic relations. Retrieved from
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/cote-d-ivoire/france-and-cote-d-ivoire/economicrelations-6123/
Ekeh, P. (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement.
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17 (1), 91-112.
European Union Electoral Observation Mission in Cote d'Ivoire, (2011). Extract of the final
report Retrieved from http://eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/executive-summary25012010_en.pdf
Firmin-Seller, K. (2000). Institutions, context, and outcomes: Explaining French and British rule
in west Africa. Comparative Politics, 32 (3), 253-272.
Global Security. Ivory Coast conflict. Retrieved from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast-2002.htm
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Golan, T. (1981). A certain mystery: How can France do everything that it does in Africa -- and
get away with it?. African Affairs, 80 (318), 3-11.
Grier, R. (1999). Colonial legacies and economic growth. Public Choice, 98, 317-335.
Handloff, R. E. (1988). Ivory coast: a country study. Washington DC: Library of Congress.
Retrieved from http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/
IFOP. (2011, June). Approval of the military intervention in Libya: Crossed perspective between
the UK and France detailed results. Retrieved from http://www.ifop.fr/media/poll/15582-study_file.pdf
Ivory coast profile: a chronology of key events. (2011, September 28).BBC. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13287585
Lacina, B. (2006). Explaining the severity of civil war. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 50.2
276-289.
Lebarmy.gov. English-- history, lebanon. Retrieved from http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/
english/history.asp.
Lgic.org. History of Lebanon. Retrieved from http://www.lgic.org/en/history_lebanon1516.php
Library of Congress Country Studies. (1987). Libya: France. Retrieved from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lytoc.html.
Maclean, L. (2011). State retrenchment and the exercise of citizenship in Africa. Comparative
Political Studies, 44 (9), 1238-1266.
Metz, H. (1987). Libya: a country study. Washington DC: Library of Congress. Retrieved from
http://countrystudies.us/libya/
Metz, H. (1992). Somalia: A country study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.
http://countrystudies.us/somalia/
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Michaud, J. (2010). Review: An empire divided: Religion, republicanism, and the making of
French colonialism, 1880-1914. Catholic Historical Review. 96:3, 505-506.
Mimiko, F. N. O. (2006). Regional ethnic diffusion, state authoritarianism and the crisis of postcolonial reconstruction in cote d'ivoire. Journal of Third World Studies, 23(2), 189-202.
Odom, T. (1993). Shaba II; The French and Belgian intervention in Zaire in 1978. Retrieved
from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/odom2/odom2.asp
Oved, M. C. (2010). Two candidates claim victory in ivory coast election. who's right? Christian
Science Monitor. December.
Possio, T. S. (2007). Les evolutions recentes de la cooperation militaire fancaise en afrique.
Publibook/Societe ecrivains.
Regan, P. M. (2002). Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46.1, 55-73.
Riding, A. (1992, December 10). Mission to Somalia; French fault 'circus' coverage of the arrival
of U.S. troops. New York Times.
Salabi, K. (1993). A house of many mansions: The history of Lebanon reconsidered. I.B. Tauris
and Co Ltd.
Sambanis, N. (2004). What is civil war? conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational
definition. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), 814-858.
Sarkees, M. & Schafer, P. (2001). "The Correlates of War Data on War: an Update to 1997".
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18 (1), 123-144.
Smith, S. (2010). “How France maintains its grip on Africa”. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/focusonafricamagazine/news/story/2010/04/100429_france_africa.
shtm
Successful Intervention in Civil Wars: Former Colonial Status as a Missing Variable
Time.com. Why did france intervene in Libya? Retrieved from http://www.time.
com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053363,00.html.
TNS. (2012). The image of France in the world. Retrieved from http://www.tnssofres.com/_assets/files/2012.02.21-imageFrance.pdf
U.N. mandate libya. (2011). http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm
U.N. mandate cote d’ivoire. (2011.) http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/
mandate.shtml
Varshney, A. (1998). Why democracy survives. Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 36-50.