when land titles are not the constraint: complementary financial

_____________________________________________________________________________
WHEN LAND TITLES ARE NOT THE CONSTRAINT:
COMPLEMENTARY FINANCIAL POLICIES TO ENHANCE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
______________________________________________________________________________
Stephen Boucher
University of California,
Davis
Bradford Barham
University of Wisconsin,
Madison
Michael R. Carter
University of Wisconsin,
Madison
March 2007
Abstract
Despite several decades of land titling programs expected to increase supply and demand in
agricultural credit markets, there is evidence that rural credit markets remain a weak spot in Latin
America and that smallholder agricultural sectors are underperforming. This paper uses a
theoretical model to argue that this curious result reflects the presence of uninsured agricultural
risks that restricts both supply and demand for credit. If correct, this model would imply that
land titling programs might partially relax quantity rationing constraints, but still may leave large
numbers of ‘risk rationed’ borrowers. Uninsured (covariant) risk may also directly lower the
willingness of micro lenders to invest heavily in an agricultural loan portfolio. Using panel data
from Peru, this paper then explores then explores the impact of land titling on credit market
outcomes. Preliminary results only partially support the theoretical hypothesis. The paper then
closes with an empirical analysis of the likely effectiveness of implementable, moral hazardproof area based yield insurance. Such insurance could be expected to remove risk constraints
and complement land titling programs so that their full economic benefits are realized. Results
for this analysis are quite encouraging in the case of Peruvian coastal agriculture.
1
1. Introduction
Provision of secure, mortgageable land titles to rural producers has been hypothesized to increase
both the supply of, and the demand for credit. The former is imagined to occur because land
titles should increase the collateral value of farm assets. The latter because newly secured
producers should increase their demand investment. Combined, these two effects should
‘unleash’ informal assets (to use de Soto’s 2000 colorful language) and power increased
economic performance.
However, despite several decades of (donor-promoted) land titling programs, and the ‘microfinance revolution,’ there is evidence that rural credit markets remain a weak spot in Latin
America.1 To illustrate this point, Figure 1 presents credit market indicators from in the three
countries for which we have comparable survey data.2 Overall, about 40% of the rural
households in our recent surveys in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru were credit constrained
(using full quantity rationing, transaction cost rationing, and risk rationing categories). Those
constraints are reflected in the key performance indicators depicted in Figure 1. For example,
constrained producers on average use 50-75% of the purchased inputs of unconstrained
producers and enjoy net incomes (returns to land and family labor) that range from 60-90% of
the level of unconstrained farm households.
The costs of these constraints in the form of agricultural underperformance can be substantial, as
shown in the case of Peru by Boucher and Guirkinger (2006). Their econometric analysis of the
Peruvian data suggests that the value of total agricultural output could be increased by 25% if all
of the credit constraints could be eliminated.
So what has gone wrong? A closer look at the data reveals that agricultural underperformance
has its roots in both conventional quantity rationing (meaning …) as well as a less well known
form of non-price rationing that recent studies have labeled risk rationing (meaning …) the
combined effect of both is that … .
This paper argues that an underlying reality of risk explains both these demand and supply side
restrictions. Put differently, in risk constrained credit markets, land titling programs may be
necessary but not sufficient for an efficient rural credit market and economy. Instead, innovative
efforts to address risk may be required.
To substantiate this argument, this paper proceeds in several stages. First, section 2 will employ
a theoretical model to show that in the presence of uninsured risk, land titling will replace one
form of non-price rationing with another, at least for a subset of the farm households that make
up the rural economy. In addition, the covariant risks associated with agricultural loans are
likely to lead locally based micro-lenders to severely restrict the fraction of their portfolio
1
A handful of studies have tried to directly evaluate the credit market effects of land titling. They tend to find
relatively weak credit market access impacts from land titling programs, especially in rural areas (Galiani and
Schargrodsky, 2006; Field and Torero, 2003; Boucher, Barham, and Carter, 2006; Boucher and Guirkinger, 2006).
In one of the most explicit studies of this sort, Carter and Olinto (2003) find that land tilting only boosts credit
supply for producers located in the upper deciles of the wealth distribution.
2
The data are all based on random surveys of individual farms that elicited the credit market constraints faced by
each (see Boucher and Guirkinger 2006 for a discussion of theis constraint elicitation strategy).
2
Constrained Households as % of Unconstrained
Figure 1 Incidence & Cost of Credit Constraints
Inputs Used per Hectare
Net Family Income per Hectare
Total Productive Wealth
80
60
40
20
0
Nicaragua
Peru
Honduras
Source: Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger, 2006
allocated
to these kinds of loans. While these propositions are theoretically clear, do they have empirical
traction?
To address this question, sections 3 and 4 turn to panel data on a quasi-experiment in land titling
that took place in northern Peru. Section 3 introduces the quasi-experimental situation and the
data that are available for examining its effects. Transition matrices—that show the transition in
household credit constraint status over the course of the experiment—provide some first
evidence in support of the land titling/risk rationing proposition. Section 4 then more deeply
explores this proposition, using multinomial logit methods to characterize the changing nature
and incidence of non-price rationing following the provision of land titling.
While additional work is needed to more fully substantiate the empirical veracity of the land
titling/risk rationing hypothesis, Section 5 closes the paper by exploring possible policy
resolutions. If uninsured risk is the problem, then financial or other instruments to deal with risk
would seem to be the solution. While conventional agricultural insurance has foundered on
problems of adverse selection and especially moral hazard, area-based yield insurance (ARBY,
which is immune to these problems) provide a possible resolution. Econometrically based
simulation analysis of the northern Peruvian coasts suggests that policy efforts to underwrite the
creation of implementable ARBY schemes may crowd-in both agricultural credit supply and
demand.
3
2. The Impact of Land Titling on Credit Markets in the Presence of Uninsured Risk: A
Theoretical Model
This section summarizes the theoretical model of Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2007),
hereafter cited as BCG. After laying out the basic model structure and intuition, we will
summarize its implications for the incidence and nature of non-price rationing in agricultural
credit markets. Further analysis of the model shows that a generalized program of land titling
would be expected to only partially resolve the problem of non-price rationing in rural credit
markets. Insights from this model will be used to structure the empirical analysis in sections 3
and 4 below. Finally, this section will close with a few comments on the impact of uninsured
risk on the portfolio behavior of rural micro-lenders.
2.1 A Model of Non-price Rationing in Agricultural Credit Markets
In the BCG model, agents enjoy three endowments: financial wealth, W; land, T; and one unit of
labor. Financial wealth is liquid and fully collateralizable. For simplicity, we assume agents
earn a certain net rate of return equal to zero on financial wealth. If titled, land can be used as
collateral and sold at price pT. If untitled, land cannot be used as collateral and has a lower price
which, without loss of generality, we set at zero. Agents can potentially adopt a capital-using,
high risk, high return entrepreneurial farming activity. For simplicity we assume that if an agent
adopts this activity, she will do so on her entire land endowment. Entrepreneurial farming
requires a fixed investment per unit-land, k. We restrict attention to agents with endowments
such that W<Tk, i.e. to those who lack the capacity to self-finance production and must borrow
in order to farm entrepreneurially. To capture uncertainty, we assume that gross farm revenues
per unit land are xg if the state of nature is “good” and xb if the state of nature is “bad” with
xg>k>xb.
An agent’s well being in state j depends on her end of period consumable wealth, Cj, and the
effort she exerts, e, according to the following additively separable utility function:
U (C j , e) = U (C j ) − d (e) .
Consumable wealth is the sum of initial financial wealth, the market value of land holdings
(pTT), and net income from the chosen activity. Effort, in turn, can be either high (e=H) or low
(e=L). The disutility of effort, d(e), is increasing in effort so that d(H)>d(L). We also assume
that all agents have access to a minimum income level yielding finite utility which is
exogenously guaranteed to the agent by social or other mechanisms. This assumption is required
to establish quantity rationing but not risk rationing.3
The agent's primary decision is what to do with her land. Her reservation activity is to use her
land in a safe or subsistence activity that requires no capital and yields a certain but low return of
3
The consumption minimum prevents the lender from offering contracts which drive the agent's utility under failure
to negative infinity. If the lender could do so, then there would always exist incentive compatible contracts and
quantity rationing would never occur.
4
τ per unit land plus a return of ω to her labor.4 We further assume that the reservation labor
contract requires that the agent exert high effort. The agent's utility under the safe, reservation
activity is thus: U R = u (ω + W + ( pT + τ )T ) − d ( H ).
If the agent has access to a credit contract, she has the additional option of farming her land
under a high return but risky entrepreneurial, activity.5 If she decides to pursue the risky activity,
she also must decide how much effort to put into farming. In addition to lowering the agent's
utility, high effort raises the probability of the "good" state of nature. Let φ e be the probability
of the good state of nature under effort, e, so that φ H > φ L . Let xH and xL represent expected
gross revenues per unit land in the risky activity under high and low effort and r≡1+r’, where r’
is the opportunity cost of lenders' funds. We make the following two assumptions about returns
to effort and to the different activities:
x H − rk > τ + ω / T > 0
x L − rk < 0
These assumptions imply that under high effort the risky activity yields a higher expected
income than the safe reservation activity. Assumption A2 implies that low effort yields negative
expected income under the entrepreneurial activity so that any loan contract that is offered will
need to require, or induce, high effort.
Given this setup, BCG go on to analyze the loan market under the assumptions of perfect
competition and risk neutral lenders. Following the notation of Conning (1999), BCG express
loan contracts in the form (sg, sb), where sg and sb are the borrower's payoff per unit area
financed under each state. Asymmetric information is assumed to prevent lenders from
specifying the borrower's effort level, and that lenders must choose payoffs that are incentive
compatible and induce the borrower to choose high effort and the payoffs of the optimal contract
must solve the following program:
4
The reservation activity, for example, could be to work off-farm and either rent out her land or plant it with a lowrisk crop such as yucca that requires little labor.
5
The risky, entrepreneurial activity may be thought of, for example, as adopting a new capital intensive technology
or non-traditional export crop.
5
Constraint 1 is the lender's participation constraint and requires that contracts, conditional on
high agent effort, yield non-negative lender profits. Constraint 2 is the agent's incentive
compatibility constraint (ICC). A contract is incentive compatible if the expected utility gain for
the borrower outweighs the disutility cost of high effort. Finally, equation constraint 3gives the
agent’s wealth or liability constraint. Note that the agent's payoff is not restricted to be nonnegative. A negative payoff requires the borrower to hand over some of her wealth and thus is
equivalent to a collateral requirement.
Much of the intuition behind the rationing results can be gleaned diagrammatically from Figure
2. The horizontal and vertical axes represent the borrower's payoff under good and bad states of
nature respectively. Holding constant high effort, the borrower's indifference curves are convex
to the origin because the rate at which she is willing to trade consumption across states depends
on how `smoothed' consumption is. At points like A or C on the 45-degree line consumption is
perfectly smooth across states of nature, and the borrower is willing to marginally trade
consumption across states at the rate
φH
. In contrast, at a point such as B, consumption in
1−φ H
the bad state is relatively scarce so the borrower is only willing to give up a little bit of it in order
to increase consumption in the good state. The line labeled π(sj|H)=0, also with slope -
φH
, is
1−φ H
the lender's zero expected profit contour (conditional on high effort). The lender’s participation
constraint requires that contracts lie on or to the southwest of this contour.
6
sb
τ+ω/T
C
?
A
?
sg*(W,T)
sg
sˆb ( s g ;W , T )
sb* (W , T )
?
B
π(sj|H) = 0
If effort were contractible (that is, if the lender could require and enforce high effort by the
borrower), then the optimal loan contract would be the full insurance contract at point A where
the borrower’s income would be the same in both states of the world. However, the contract at A
will not be available because of moral hazard. With her consumption completely shielded from
low outcomes at contract A, the agent would have no incentive to apply high effort. Inspection
of the ICC reveals that incentive compatible contracts require sg>sb. The lender motivates the
borrower to apply high effort by offering contracts that reward her in the good state and punish
her in the bad state.
The contraction of the feasible contract set due to moral hazard creates the potential for two
sorts of non-price rationing. The first is conventional quantity rationing. Quantity Rationing
occurs when (1) The agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric
information world; but, (2) The agent lacks sufficient wealth to collateralize the contract at the
LPC-ICB intersection (i.e., W+pTT<-Ts*b (W,T)). In this case, the feasible contract set will be
empty and the lender will not make any contract available to the agent.
The second sort of non-price rationing that can potentially exist is what we have labelled risk
rationing. Risk Rationing occurs when (1) The agent would be offered and demand a credit
contract in the symmetric information world; (2) The agent is offered a financially feasible
contract in the asymmetric information world (i.e., W+pTT≥-Ts*b (W,T)); but, (3) The agent
chooses not to accept the offered contract, preferring the safe, reservation activity. As drawn in
Figure 2, the agent would be risk rationed because the indifference curve through the contract at
point B passes to the south west of the reservation-utility-equivalent contract at point C.
While the concept of risk rationing can thus be easily illustrated, proof of its existence, and its
incidence with respect to wealth, is less straightforward. After substantial suffering, BCG show
7
that when all land is untitled (i.e., pT=0), non-price rationing will occur as shown in the following
figure.
Endowment of Financial Wealth, W
W*(T)
40
Risk Rationed Subsistence Producers
Wˆ ( T )
30
A
20
Quantity Rationed
Subsistence Producers
Price Rationed Entreprenuers
10
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Endowment of Land, T
In this figure, financial wealth is displayed on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis is
productive wealth, land in the case of agriculture. Imagine that an agent located at point A in the
wealth space is indifferent between the entrepreneurial activity financed with a credit contract
and the non-entrepreneurial, reservation activity. A move straight north from A (an increase in
financial wealth holding project size fixed), will generate risk rationing of the wealthy under
empirically plausible assumptions about the nature of preferences. However, under these same
preference assumptions, agents who are straight east from A (with greater productive wealth)
will be not be risk rationed and will instead borrow and become the entrepreneurs. The
information contained in Figure 1 above is consistent with this implication as the price rationed
firms have substantially more productive wealth than risk rationed firms.
2.2 Land Titling and Non-price Rationing in Credit Markets: The Land Titling/Risk Rationing
Hypothesis
The impact of land titling on the operation of the rural credit market can be analyzed by using the
BCG model to analyze the impact of a titling program that effectively increases the value of land
(pT) and renders it collateralizable. While this approach does not permit us to analyze investment
demand effects of land titling, it does permit a richer analysis of the impact of titling on both
8
demand and supply in the credit market. The dashed lines in Figure 3 show the shift in the
boundaries for non-price rationing when land is titled and pT rises. Under this new specification,
titled land becomes capital in de Soto’s sense of the word and has collateral value. In addition,
because it is marketable, increments of titled land have the same risk-bearing and incentive
dilution effects as financial wealth. Finally, land titling reduces the incentive augmentation
effect as the key parameter ρ = (( x + pT − rk ) /(γ + pT )) > 1 is decreasing in the price of land.
As can be seen in Figure 3, land titling, shifts down the quantity rationing frontier by a vertical
distance of pTT to W*t(T). This downward shift represents the hypothesized increase in credit
supply resulting in the increased collateralization of agents' assets. Depending on parameter
values, this downward shift may not be sufficient to completely eliminate quantity rationing for
the lowest wealth borrowers, a finding that is consistent with the empirical work of Carter and
Olinto (2003). In addition, land titling shifts the risk rationing frontier to the southeast to Wt(T).
The net effect of land titling on the topography of non-price rationing can thus be summarized as
follows. Agents in the portion of the endowment space labeled I are unaffected and are quantity
rationed both before and after land titling. Similarly, agents in zones III and V do not change
their status, respectively remaining as price rationed entrepreneurs and risk rationed subsistence
farmers.
More interesting are agents located in areas II, IV, and VI of the endowment space. Those in
area II receive positive benefits from titling, and move from being quantity rationed subsistence
farmers prior to titling, becoming price-rationed entrepreneurs after titling. Agents in area VI
shift from being quantity rationed to risk rationed. These agents have an improved access to
credit (post-titling, they have sufficient collateralizable wealth to qualify for a loan contract), but
they are unwilling to bear the risk of newly available contracts in the absence of insurance
markets and given the heavy collateral requirements that result from asymmetric information and
moral hazard. Finally, agents in area IV of the wealth space would shift from being price
rationed entrepreneurs pre-titling to risk rationed workers following land titling. This somewhat
surprising shift results from the fact that increased marketability of their land dilutes incentives
for the provision of high effort, leading the financial system to offer only more heavily
collateralized, and less favorable, loan contracts.
9
WˆNT (t )
Endowment of Financial Wealth, W
W*nt(T)
Risk Rationed Subsistence Producers
40
V
W *t (T )
30
Price Rationed Entreprenuers
VI
B
Quantity Rationed
Subsistence Producers
20
IV
Wˆt (T)
I
10
III
II
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Endowment of Land, T
These results are of course ultimately artifacts of the particular numerical specification used to
analyze the model. The real world effects of land titling would of course depend on the true
parameter values, as well as on the distribution of agents across the different zones of the
endowment space. Nonetheless, this theoretical perspective suggests how such empirical
analysis needs to be structured in order to fully comprehend the impact of land titling efforts.
2.3 Risk and Restricted Agricultural Credit Supply for Micro-lenders
The theoretical analysis here has shown how in the presence of moral hazard and uninsured risk,
land titling may simply replace one form of non-price rationing for another, leaving a subset of
rural producers to lower productivity income generation strategies. However, this modeling
exercise assumes conventional, arm’s length lenders for whom collateral is important. Given the
importance of microfinance, it is worth remarking on the implication of uninsured risk on the
supply of agricultural credit by MFIs.
Led by the pioneering efforts of the Grameen Bank, micro-finance institutions (MFIs) have
innovated new mechanisms to resolve these problems that distort the capital access of lowwealth, effectively opening up the menu of available contracts with new incentive and other
10
devices that substitute for collateral wealth. However, many of the principals of microfinance
that permits successful lending to low-wealth households are maladapted to agriculture.
For example, many MFIs lend to local groups whose members select each other and share
liability for loan contracts—that is, borrowers are bundled into groups who are responsible for
each other, and for paying each others’ loans when things go poorly. This shared liability creates
powerful incentives for selection and monitoring of borrowers, and it can work well when loans
are used for a diversity of (quick turnaround) activities. However, it works less well for
agricultural activities where all producers are subject to a common set of weather risks (when
one cannot pay, no one can pay) and where project gestation periods are long. Moreover, this
common weather risk undermines the financial stability of locally based MFIs. Traditionally
many microfinance organizations have strictly limited the extent of their lending to agricultural
activities, often after costly failures.6
These observations are documented by Trivelli (2006) for the case of the north coast of Peru,
where local ag lenders (the Cajas) are extremely reluctant to carry a large loan portfolio. At the
root of this reluctance is a two-sided fear of covariant risk. Directly, locally based lenders
clearly do not want to carry a large fraction of their portfolio in loans where the likelihood of
default is highly correlated (as would happen in a drought year). In addition, covariant risk of
this sort also generates a secondary political risk. When a large number of producers face
default, they have obvious political incentives to demand a bail-out or other form of debt
forgiveness. Precisely this scenario took place following the 1998 El Niño event. The resulting
governmentally mandated Rescate Financiero (debt forgiveness) further reduced lenders
willingness to lend to agriculture (see Trivelli, 2006). For these lenders, a land titling program
that increases the value of collateral would be expected to have little effect on credit supply.
3. Descriptive Evidence of Titling, Credit Market Outcomes, and Risk Rationing
The empirical analysis exploits a panel dataset (1997/2003) from Peru to examine the role of
title, risk, and other factors shaping credit market rationing outcomes. The full 1997 sample
included 547 farm households and was stratified geographically to ensure representation of the
five main valleys in the Piura region of Coastal Peru and by farm size to ensure inclusion of large
farms. In 2003, 499 of the original households were relocated and interviewed, of which 443
were still farming. The analysis that follows is based on the 443 households for whom we have
titling credit market outcome data for both years.
An important fraction of households in this data set acquired a title between the two survey
years. Households in the Peru data set are split between those owning private land versus those
owning land in peasant communities. At the time of the baseline survey in 1997, land within
peasant communities was not individually titled and could not be mortgaged. This changed in
1998, however, as peasant communities in the study region agreed to move to private land
ownership. The titling process was partially completed at the time of the follow-up survey in
6
While a number of MFIs have increased their rural lending in Latin America, much of it seems dedicated to
livestock investment, which is subject to a rather distinctive set of stochastic forces than are crops.
11
2003, providing a source of exogenous variation in title status.* Table 1 provides a breakdown of
titling status and credit rationing outcomes.
Table 1. A Comparison of Credit Rationing Mechanisms by Tenure Type in Piura
Private Land (n=252)
Peasant Community (n=191)
1997
2003
1997
2003
% with title
85%
93%
2%
39%
Constrained
Quantity Rationed
Risk Rationed
44%
34%
10%
36%
13%
23%
70%
56%
14%
52%
31%
21%
Unconstrained
Borrowers
Non-borrowers
56%
41%
15%
64%
40%
23%
30%
12%
18%
48%
11%
37%
Note that in 1997, only 2% of the peasant community households held title. By 2003, 39% did.
By contrast, titling among private landholders also rose from 85% to 93%. Thus, while the
change in titling among the peasant communities was substantial, the change among the private
land holders was not.
Households were asked about their participation and perceptions of credit markets in a fashion
that allows a direct classification of households as constrained or unconstrained in the formal
credit market (Boucher, Guirkinger, Trivelli, 2006). Households are classified as either price
rationed (formal sector borrowers and non-borrowers who have no project requiring a loan), or
as non-price rationed. For this latter category, three non-price rationing mechanisms are
identified: quantity-rationed, transaction-cost rationed, and risk-rationed. For the empirical
analysis undertaken here, we collapse the first two non-price rationed categories into one, called
quantity-rationing and focus on three categories of credit market outcomes, price rationed,
quantity rationed, and risk rationed.
These data are also presented in Table 1 by credit market status to help explore the impacts of
land title on credit access. Note first that an increase in titling between 1997 and 2003 is clearly
associated with a reduction in the percent of households reporting themselves as quantity
rationed in credit markets. This change is most evident among peasant community households,
for whom quantity rationing drops from 56% of households to 31%. A large decline in quantity
rationing is also reported by private land holding households (34% to 13%), but this change is
not as clearly linked to the change in titling, since only 8% more private land holding households
added title during this time. Overall, the lower percentage of quantity rationing among this
predominantly land-titled p group in both time periods also provides supportive evidence that
titling may help to reduce quantity rationing among rural households.
The other major observation that Table 1 offers is that the impact of titling on reducing credit
constraint outcomes appears to be significantly muted by the rise in households of both types
12
reporting themselves to be risk rationed. Among private land holders, the percentage of risk
rationed households rises from 10% in 1997 to 23% in 2003, and among the peasant community,
it rises from 14% to 21%. Thus, there appears to be a switch in the credit rationing status away
from quantity rationing and toward risk rationing which limits the potential impact of titling and
other changes in local financial markets on the prevalence of credit constraints.
This outcome is further examined in Table 2, a transition matrix for households that details
transitions in credit rationing and titling outcomes for the 1997 to 2003 time period. Perhaps the
most interesting cells are in the middle row that track what happened to quantity rationed
households in 1997. Of the 207 households that reported being quantity rationed in 1997, about
half reported themselves as price rationed in 2003 and about 25% reported themselves as risk
rationed. The other 25% remained quantity rationed. The price and risk rationed groups (in this
middle row) were also the most likely of all the cells in the transition matrix to have acquired a
title during this time period (43% and 38%, respectively). Titling appears to have made a
significant difference in rationing outcomes for this group, but in an uneven fashion.
Another useful comparison in Table 2 is the title and wealth data across the bottom row. Not
surprisingly, the price rationed households are more likely to have title, larger farm size, and
more non-farmland wealth than the quantity rationed outcomes. However, the only significant
difference between the price and risk rationed households is in terms of wealth, of which the
price rationed have about 50% higher holdings. This result is consistent with the Figure set forth
in the theoretical section of the paper.
13
Transition Matrix for Formal Sector Rationing Mechanism: 1997 to 2003
Rationing Mechanism in 2003
Price
Quantity
Risk
Rationed
Rationed
Rationed
Rationing Mechanism in 1997
Price
Rationed
•
•
ƒ
Quantity
Rationed
Risk
Rationed
N = 129
N = 36
N = 33
% acquiring
title = 9%
% acquiring
title = 19%
% acquiring
title = 12%
N = 103
N=49
N=55
% acquiring
title = 43%
% acquiring
title = 26%
% acquiring
title =38%
N = 18
N=9
N=11
% acquiring
title = 17%
% acquiring
title = 22%
% acquiring
title = 0%
1997 Means
N = 198
Has Title = 67%
Farm Size = 5.4
N=207
Has Title = 31%
Farm Size = 3.5
Wealth = 3.71
N=38
Has Title = 60.5%
Farm Size = 4.29
Wealth = 4.68
2003
1997
N=443
N=94
N=99
N=443
N = 250
Has Title = 70%
Has Title = 51%
Has Title = 77%
Has Title =
Has Title = 74%
2003 Means
Farm Size = 4.2
Farm Size = 3.6
Farm Size = 4.5
49.4%
Farm Size = 4.3
Wealth = 3.95
Wealth = 3.1
Wealth = 3.0
Farm Size = 4.4
Wealth = 4.7
Wealth = 6.5
% acquiring title is the percentage of households in each cell that did not have a registered property title in 1997 and acquired
one by 2003.
Farm size is the area owned by the households and is measured in hectares.
Wealth is the non-farmland wealth of the household and is measured in thousands of dollars. It includes the value of house
and residential land, business assets, farm equipment, livestock and consumer durables.
14
4. Econometric Approach and Results
4.1 Introduction
The theoretical analysis of section 2 suggested that acquisition of a registered property title may
be necessary but not sufficient to eliminate non-price rationing in the formal credit market. Title
acquisition enhances farm households’ capacity to post collateral and thus may relax quantity
rationing. Two factors conspire against household participation in the formal credit market, even
after having acquired a title. First, fixed costs of loan processing may make lenders unwilling to
make loans below a minimum threshold. If so, then low wealth farmers may continue to face
quantity rationing even though they have a title. Second, if the farmer faces significant risk, then
she may not be willing to offer the titled land as collateral. In other words, a title may relax
quantity rationing but not risk rationing.
In this section we use panel data from northern Peru to explore the impact of title on farm
households’ rationing outcomes in the formal credit market. We estimate a single equation,
multinomial choice model to predict the probability that farmers of different characteristics
(including title status) are found in the different rationing categories.
Let Y be the observed rationing outcome in the formal credit market and which takes values 0, 1,
… J. Define Yij* as the continuous “score” for the i’th individual in the j’th rationing category.
Yij* can thus be considered the unobserved “propensity” of the individual to be in category j and is
modeled as a linear combination of an individual’s characteristics. The i’th individual’s score
for the j’th rationing category is:
(4.1)
Yij* = g ( β j , xi ) + ε ij = β 'j xi + ε ij ;
where xj is a (k x 1) vector of characteristics of the i’th individual; βj is a (k x 1) vector of
population parameters associated with the j’th category; and εij is the mean zero, unobserved
component of the i’th individual’s score from category j.
The observed category is the one which yields the highest score. The probability that the i’th
individual is in the j’th category is thus:
(4.2)
Pr(Yi = j ) = Pr(Yij* ≥ Yis* ) ∀s ≠ j.
We assume the J+1, εij terms are independent and identically distributed with Weibull
distribution so that the probability in equation (4.2) can be expressed as:
(4.3)
Pr(Yi = j ) =
e
J
β 'j xi
∑e
s =0
.
β s' xi
15
Multinomial logit models are typically motivated by a random utility framework in which the
latent variable represents an individual’s expected utility, and the individuals choose the category
maximizing their expected utility. The parameters, βj, would thus represent the impact of
individual characteristics on the expected utility of each choice. In the current context, the
random utility framework is not appropriate since farmers do not freely “choose” across the
different rationing categories. Instead, we use the multinomial logit framework to impost a
probability structure on the outcomes. The logistic form is especially convenient because it can
capture non-linear relationships between the independent variables and the regime probabilities
and it keeps the probability within the unit interval. As individual characteristics such as
education and wealth impact both supply and demand for formal credit, parameter estimates will
not have any structural interpretation.
4.2 Variable Definitions
We now turn to definition of the variables used in the estimation. Table 2 summarizes the
rationing categories in the sample. In our regression analysis, we pool the households across the
two years so that we have a total of 886 observations. Farmers that applied for and received a
positive formal loan amount are classified as priced rationed borrowers. Farmers that were
classified as either transaction cost or risk rationed in the survey are here classified into a single
category we call risk rationed. Farmers in both of these groups are similar in that they have
access to a loan an would have positive demand in a first-best world, however the presence of
asymmetric information causes their effective (or real world) demand to be zero. The category
of price rationed borrowers is taken as the base category.
Table 2. Description of Rationing Categories, Yj, Used in Multinomial Logit
Rationing
Sample Distribution
Description
j
Category
#
%
Price Rationed
0 Applied for and received some loan
248
28%
borrower
Price Rationed no
Did not apply because interest rate too
1
200
23%
non-borrower
high
Risk Rationed
2
Did not apply for fear of losing collateral
230
26%
Quantity Rationed
3
Applied and rejected or; Did not apply
because subjective probability of
rejection too high
208
23%
The non-random component of the j’th category score, g(βj,xij) is modeled as the following linear
function:
(4.3)
g ( β j , xij ) = β j1 + β j 2TITLEi + β j 3 LIQUIDITYi + β j 4 FARMSIZEi + γ ' X i
where TITLEi takes value 1 if the household owns at least one plot with a registered property title
and 0 otherwise; LIQUIDITYi is the value of the households financial savings, cash-on-hand,
jewelry and animals; FARMSIZEi is the total number of irrigated hectares owned by the
household; and Xi is a vector of additional controls.
16
The independent variables and their means are summarized in Table 3 below.
Table 3. Description of Independent Variables Used in Multinomial Logit
Variable
Description
Name
TITLE
1 if household owns a parcel with registered title, 0 if not.
LIQUIDITY
Household’s pre-planting liquidity in thousands of dollars
FAMRSIZE
Household farm size in hectares
Comunidad
Household resides in a peasant community
EDUC
Years of formal education of household head
AGE
Age of household head
ALTO
1 if household’s primary plot is in Alto Piura valley, 0 if not.
CHIRA
1 if household’s primary plot is in Chira valley, 0 if not.
SANLOR
1 if household’s primary plot is in San Loranzo valley, 0 if not.
CIEN
1 if household’s primary plot is in Cieneguillo valley, 0 if not.
Year
1 if observation is from 2003, 0 if from 1997.
Sample
Mean
0.60
0.36
4.3
0.43
3.7
54.2
0.14
0.43
0.07
0.08
0.5
4.3 Estimation Results
The results of the multinomial regression are reported in Table 4. The parameters of the vector
βj describe the impact of individual characteristics on the probability of an individual being
observed in the j’th category relative to the base category (price rationed borrowers).
Table 4. Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates
Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors Associated with Rationing Category:
Regressor
Price rationed nonRisk
Quantity
borrowers
Rationed
Rationed
(β1)
(β2)
(β3)
Coefficient Std Errror Coefficient Std Errror Coefficient Std Errror
Constant
1.5**
.78
1.96**
.77
2.7**
.80
TITLE
-.80**
.32
-1.12**
.31
-1.5**
.35
LIQUIDITY
.09
.08
-.008
.11
-.27*
.15
FARMSIZE
-.03
.03
-.041
.03
-.058*
.03
Comunidad
-.80*
.35
.46
.34
.79**
.37
EDUC
-.056
.03
-.06**
.03
-.008
.03
AGE
.002
.01
.001
.01
-.0033
.01
ALTO
-1.02**
.51
-.24
.48
.27
.512
CHIRA
-2.2**
.39
-2.3**
.40
-2.44**
.40
SANLOR
-.55
.68
-.78
.70
.361
.719
CIEN
-.86
.53
-.56
.52
-1.06*
.60
Year
.62**
.23
.70**
.22
-1.11**
.25
**Denotes significance at 5% level; *Denotes significance at 10% level.
17
4.4 A Mapping of Rationing Regimes in Endowment Space
We now use the parameter estimates from the multinomial logit to explore the relationship
between farmer endowments and rationing mechanisms. We do so in a manner consistent with
the theoretical framework presented in Section 1. Figure 3 plots, for each point in farmsizeliquidity space, the rationing category with the highest predicted probability when the farmer
does not have a title. All other conditioning variables are held at the sample means. Figure 4
does the same thing conditional on having a title. A comparison of the two figures thus allows
us to examine the impact of title on the predicted distribution of the different rationing categories
in this two-dimensional wealth space.
Figure 3:
Price rationed
non-borrowers
Risk
rationed
Quantity
rationed
Price
rationed
borrowers
Figure 4:
Price
Rationed
NonBorrowers
Price
Rationed
Borrowers
Risk
Rationed
From these two initial pictures (more refined pictures will be generated soon!), we see that the
main impact of titling is to eliminate quantity rationing while also slightly reducing the area of
risk rationing. It is important to point out that, while it appears that risk rationing in these two
18
figures is fairly unimportant, there is a relatively high density of farmers quite close to the origin.
For example, over 40% of sample farmers own less than 4 hectares.
It is also worth noting that the specification upon which these figures are based is a “bare-bones”
specification. As a next step we will explore more theoretically consistent specifications
including allowing for quadratic wealth terms as well as interactions between title and the farm
size variable.
5. Area-based Yield Insurance to Crowd-in Agricultural Credit Demand and Supply
If the intuition presented in this paper is correct, then one obvious solution to the problem would
be to complement land titling with efforts to remove risk from the rural credit system via
insurance mechanisms. However, given the miserable record of agricultural insurance, this
suggestion may seem rather useless. Indeed, conventional (all hazard) crop insurance has in
almost every instance been rendered financially unsustainable by moral hazard and adverse
selection problems. However, index-based insurance (e.g., area-based yield insurance or
insurance based on rainfall or other weather indices) has the virtue of being moral hazard proof
in the sense that it preserves effort incentives for producers as no individual farmer can influence
the probability of an insurance pay-off. It is also immune to problems of adverse selection.
However, despite these advantages index-based insurance by construction only covers a fraction
of the risks faced by farming households, leaving households exposed to residual uninsured or
basis risk. A key empirical question then is whether the provision of this partial index based
insurance will suffice to relax demand constraints to borrowing and empower small holders to
pursue more entrepreneurial strategies. Similarly, we might ask whether index insurance suffices
to relax the reluctance of rural microfinance lenders to carry a larger agricultural portfolio as
discussed by Trivelli (2006).
In an effort to answer these questions, Carter, Galarza and Boucher (2007) estimate the
parameters for an actuarially fair area-based yield (ARBY) insurance scheme using data from the
Lambeyeque valley in Peru. Both yields and area planted in Lambeyeque depend on the flow of
irrigation water, ωt. Following Zegarra and de los Rios, they model the distribution of irrigation
water as:
f (ω ) =
(ω − a ) p −1 (b − ω ) q −1
for a ≤ ω ≤ b; p, q > 0
Β( p, q )(b − a ) p + q −1
.
1
and Β( p, q ) = ∫ t p −1 (1 − t ) q −1dt
0
Average valley yields ( yt ) and area sown ( st ) ware in turn specified as:
yt = y (ωt ) + ε ty
st = s (ωt ) + ε ts
Finally, individual yields, yit , and individual sown areas, sit , using the following specifications:
19
yit = μiy + β iy ( yt − μ y ) + ε ity
sit = μis + β is ( st − μ s ) + ε its
,
(3)
where the terms μ iy and μ is are household-level fixed effects,
μi y = E ( yit ), μ y = E ( yt ), μi s = E ( sit ), μ s = E ( st ). , and we assume that the error terms are
distributed normally with mean zero. Finally, as a basis for an area-based yield product, define
⎛ st ⎞
adjusted valley yields ( y%t ) as y%t = yt ⎜ max
⎟ and the corresponding estimated adjusted valley
⎝s ⎠
⎛ sˆt ⎞ 7
⎟.
yˆ t = yˆ t ⎜⎜ max
yields as ~
⎟
s
⎝
⎠
We are now in a position to define an ARBY insurance contract will be written as a function of
~
ŷ t . In particular define the contractually predetermined “strike point” that determines when the
insurance pays off as y% c . If normalized valley yields fall below this amount, the insurance pays
out a per-hectare indemnity, ρt , equivalent to the shortfall:
ρt = max[0, y% c − y%t ]
(4)
We will consider the case of an actuarially fair insurance, which requires that per-hectare annual
insurance premium, π , be equal to the average indemnity across time—i.e., π = E[ ρt ] . In other
words, ignoring the fixed and other administrative costs of designing and delivering the
insurance, actuarially fairness implies that the insurer will break-even in the long run: average
premiums will equal average payouts.
Combining long-term time series data on water flows and average valley yields and harvested
area, as well as a three farm-level panel on individual producers, Carter, Galarza and Boucher
estimate the various parameters and distributions for above functions. They then simulate the
impact of an ARBY insurance written on actual yields, as well as a second best form of ARBY
insurance written on estimated yields (i.e., a weather index). From the perspective of an average
producer, the impact of ARBY insurance on yields will appear as shown in the figure below. In
addition, assumptions on the nature of the utility function permit us to calculate the certainty
equivalent of the different stochastic consumption streams made available to the farmer under
7
Using this same idea of an adjusted yield, we can define a farmers’ output per cultivable hectare,
Qit , as:
⎛ s it ⎞
Qit = y it ⎜ max
⎟
⎝ s ⎠ and is expressed in kilos. In the simulation analysis of the value of insurance to farmers, we
assume that the typical farmer has access to five hectares (i.e., smax=5). The value of an ARBY contract written on
~
ŷ t will depend on how closely the farmer’s adjust yields track ~
ŷ t (as shaped by βy and βs and also on the individual
ε y and ε its );.
(farmer specific) realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks ( it
20
the different contracts. These are shown in the table below. Also shown in the table is the
disappearance of default for lenders whose borrowers are insured with ARBY insurance.
Area-based Yield Insurance Simulation
(% probability of outcome less than indicated amount)
Typical Farmer, Strike Value = 100% mean
80
Cumulative Density
60
40
No Insurance
Insurance with Measured Avg Yields
Insurance with Est Yields (Weather Index)
20
0
0
1000
2000
3000
Income Available for Consumption ($US)
4000
21
Net income
Insurance payment (5has)
Expected Indemnity
Consumption
Loan Repayment
Lending return (%)
With Insurance
No Insurance
(Strike Point 100% of Expected Yields)
Estimated ARBY
Measured ARBY
(Weather Index)
Mean
Mean
Mean
2,601
2,601
2,601
547
547
1,932
[797]
669
[0]
21.7
514
514
1,945
[990]
656
[77]
19.4
0
0
1,971
[1276]
631
[118]
14.7
Certainty Equivalent under Different Risk Aversion Assumptions
Low Risk Aversion
Mid-Low Risk Aversion
Middle Risk Aversion
Mid-High Risk Aversion
1904
1885
1862
1846
High Risk Aversion
1825
Notes: Standard errors in square brackets.
Average loan: $ 550; Interest rate: 21.7%.
1889
1849
1798
1742
1878
1813
1726
1643
1695
1565
As these figures indicate, producers would in principal be willing to offer significant payments
above and beyond the actuarially fair premium. In addition, the elimination of default risk
removes the risk of collateral loss that drives risk rationing. While more work remains to be
done to explore these ideas, at first glance at least, this form of insurance would seem to hold
substantial promise in terms of crowding in credit demand and supply.
22
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