_____________________________________________________________________________ WHEN LAND TITLES ARE NOT THE CONSTRAINT: COMPLEMENTARY FINANCIAL POLICIES TO ENHANCE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY ______________________________________________________________________________ Stephen Boucher University of California, Davis Bradford Barham University of Wisconsin, Madison Michael R. Carter University of Wisconsin, Madison March 2007 Abstract Despite several decades of land titling programs expected to increase supply and demand in agricultural credit markets, there is evidence that rural credit markets remain a weak spot in Latin America and that smallholder agricultural sectors are underperforming. This paper uses a theoretical model to argue that this curious result reflects the presence of uninsured agricultural risks that restricts both supply and demand for credit. If correct, this model would imply that land titling programs might partially relax quantity rationing constraints, but still may leave large numbers of ‘risk rationed’ borrowers. Uninsured (covariant) risk may also directly lower the willingness of micro lenders to invest heavily in an agricultural loan portfolio. Using panel data from Peru, this paper then explores then explores the impact of land titling on credit market outcomes. Preliminary results only partially support the theoretical hypothesis. The paper then closes with an empirical analysis of the likely effectiveness of implementable, moral hazardproof area based yield insurance. Such insurance could be expected to remove risk constraints and complement land titling programs so that their full economic benefits are realized. Results for this analysis are quite encouraging in the case of Peruvian coastal agriculture. 1 1. Introduction Provision of secure, mortgageable land titles to rural producers has been hypothesized to increase both the supply of, and the demand for credit. The former is imagined to occur because land titles should increase the collateral value of farm assets. The latter because newly secured producers should increase their demand investment. Combined, these two effects should ‘unleash’ informal assets (to use de Soto’s 2000 colorful language) and power increased economic performance. However, despite several decades of (donor-promoted) land titling programs, and the ‘microfinance revolution,’ there is evidence that rural credit markets remain a weak spot in Latin America.1 To illustrate this point, Figure 1 presents credit market indicators from in the three countries for which we have comparable survey data.2 Overall, about 40% of the rural households in our recent surveys in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru were credit constrained (using full quantity rationing, transaction cost rationing, and risk rationing categories). Those constraints are reflected in the key performance indicators depicted in Figure 1. For example, constrained producers on average use 50-75% of the purchased inputs of unconstrained producers and enjoy net incomes (returns to land and family labor) that range from 60-90% of the level of unconstrained farm households. The costs of these constraints in the form of agricultural underperformance can be substantial, as shown in the case of Peru by Boucher and Guirkinger (2006). Their econometric analysis of the Peruvian data suggests that the value of total agricultural output could be increased by 25% if all of the credit constraints could be eliminated. So what has gone wrong? A closer look at the data reveals that agricultural underperformance has its roots in both conventional quantity rationing (meaning …) as well as a less well known form of non-price rationing that recent studies have labeled risk rationing (meaning …) the combined effect of both is that … . This paper argues that an underlying reality of risk explains both these demand and supply side restrictions. Put differently, in risk constrained credit markets, land titling programs may be necessary but not sufficient for an efficient rural credit market and economy. Instead, innovative efforts to address risk may be required. To substantiate this argument, this paper proceeds in several stages. First, section 2 will employ a theoretical model to show that in the presence of uninsured risk, land titling will replace one form of non-price rationing with another, at least for a subset of the farm households that make up the rural economy. In addition, the covariant risks associated with agricultural loans are likely to lead locally based micro-lenders to severely restrict the fraction of their portfolio 1 A handful of studies have tried to directly evaluate the credit market effects of land titling. They tend to find relatively weak credit market access impacts from land titling programs, especially in rural areas (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2006; Field and Torero, 2003; Boucher, Barham, and Carter, 2006; Boucher and Guirkinger, 2006). In one of the most explicit studies of this sort, Carter and Olinto (2003) find that land tilting only boosts credit supply for producers located in the upper deciles of the wealth distribution. 2 The data are all based on random surveys of individual farms that elicited the credit market constraints faced by each (see Boucher and Guirkinger 2006 for a discussion of theis constraint elicitation strategy). 2 Constrained Households as % of Unconstrained Figure 1 Incidence & Cost of Credit Constraints Inputs Used per Hectare Net Family Income per Hectare Total Productive Wealth 80 60 40 20 0 Nicaragua Peru Honduras Source: Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger, 2006 allocated to these kinds of loans. While these propositions are theoretically clear, do they have empirical traction? To address this question, sections 3 and 4 turn to panel data on a quasi-experiment in land titling that took place in northern Peru. Section 3 introduces the quasi-experimental situation and the data that are available for examining its effects. Transition matrices—that show the transition in household credit constraint status over the course of the experiment—provide some first evidence in support of the land titling/risk rationing proposition. Section 4 then more deeply explores this proposition, using multinomial logit methods to characterize the changing nature and incidence of non-price rationing following the provision of land titling. While additional work is needed to more fully substantiate the empirical veracity of the land titling/risk rationing hypothesis, Section 5 closes the paper by exploring possible policy resolutions. If uninsured risk is the problem, then financial or other instruments to deal with risk would seem to be the solution. While conventional agricultural insurance has foundered on problems of adverse selection and especially moral hazard, area-based yield insurance (ARBY, which is immune to these problems) provide a possible resolution. Econometrically based simulation analysis of the northern Peruvian coasts suggests that policy efforts to underwrite the creation of implementable ARBY schemes may crowd-in both agricultural credit supply and demand. 3 2. The Impact of Land Titling on Credit Markets in the Presence of Uninsured Risk: A Theoretical Model This section summarizes the theoretical model of Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2007), hereafter cited as BCG. After laying out the basic model structure and intuition, we will summarize its implications for the incidence and nature of non-price rationing in agricultural credit markets. Further analysis of the model shows that a generalized program of land titling would be expected to only partially resolve the problem of non-price rationing in rural credit markets. Insights from this model will be used to structure the empirical analysis in sections 3 and 4 below. Finally, this section will close with a few comments on the impact of uninsured risk on the portfolio behavior of rural micro-lenders. 2.1 A Model of Non-price Rationing in Agricultural Credit Markets In the BCG model, agents enjoy three endowments: financial wealth, W; land, T; and one unit of labor. Financial wealth is liquid and fully collateralizable. For simplicity, we assume agents earn a certain net rate of return equal to zero on financial wealth. If titled, land can be used as collateral and sold at price pT. If untitled, land cannot be used as collateral and has a lower price which, without loss of generality, we set at zero. Agents can potentially adopt a capital-using, high risk, high return entrepreneurial farming activity. For simplicity we assume that if an agent adopts this activity, she will do so on her entire land endowment. Entrepreneurial farming requires a fixed investment per unit-land, k. We restrict attention to agents with endowments such that W<Tk, i.e. to those who lack the capacity to self-finance production and must borrow in order to farm entrepreneurially. To capture uncertainty, we assume that gross farm revenues per unit land are xg if the state of nature is “good” and xb if the state of nature is “bad” with xg>k>xb. An agent’s well being in state j depends on her end of period consumable wealth, Cj, and the effort she exerts, e, according to the following additively separable utility function: U (C j , e) = U (C j ) − d (e) . Consumable wealth is the sum of initial financial wealth, the market value of land holdings (pTT), and net income from the chosen activity. Effort, in turn, can be either high (e=H) or low (e=L). The disutility of effort, d(e), is increasing in effort so that d(H)>d(L). We also assume that all agents have access to a minimum income level yielding finite utility which is exogenously guaranteed to the agent by social or other mechanisms. This assumption is required to establish quantity rationing but not risk rationing.3 The agent's primary decision is what to do with her land. Her reservation activity is to use her land in a safe or subsistence activity that requires no capital and yields a certain but low return of 3 The consumption minimum prevents the lender from offering contracts which drive the agent's utility under failure to negative infinity. If the lender could do so, then there would always exist incentive compatible contracts and quantity rationing would never occur. 4 τ per unit land plus a return of ω to her labor.4 We further assume that the reservation labor contract requires that the agent exert high effort. The agent's utility under the safe, reservation activity is thus: U R = u (ω + W + ( pT + τ )T ) − d ( H ). If the agent has access to a credit contract, she has the additional option of farming her land under a high return but risky entrepreneurial, activity.5 If she decides to pursue the risky activity, she also must decide how much effort to put into farming. In addition to lowering the agent's utility, high effort raises the probability of the "good" state of nature. Let φ e be the probability of the good state of nature under effort, e, so that φ H > φ L . Let xH and xL represent expected gross revenues per unit land in the risky activity under high and low effort and r≡1+r’, where r’ is the opportunity cost of lenders' funds. We make the following two assumptions about returns to effort and to the different activities: x H − rk > τ + ω / T > 0 x L − rk < 0 These assumptions imply that under high effort the risky activity yields a higher expected income than the safe reservation activity. Assumption A2 implies that low effort yields negative expected income under the entrepreneurial activity so that any loan contract that is offered will need to require, or induce, high effort. Given this setup, BCG go on to analyze the loan market under the assumptions of perfect competition and risk neutral lenders. Following the notation of Conning (1999), BCG express loan contracts in the form (sg, sb), where sg and sb are the borrower's payoff per unit area financed under each state. Asymmetric information is assumed to prevent lenders from specifying the borrower's effort level, and that lenders must choose payoffs that are incentive compatible and induce the borrower to choose high effort and the payoffs of the optimal contract must solve the following program: 4 The reservation activity, for example, could be to work off-farm and either rent out her land or plant it with a lowrisk crop such as yucca that requires little labor. 5 The risky, entrepreneurial activity may be thought of, for example, as adopting a new capital intensive technology or non-traditional export crop. 5 Constraint 1 is the lender's participation constraint and requires that contracts, conditional on high agent effort, yield non-negative lender profits. Constraint 2 is the agent's incentive compatibility constraint (ICC). A contract is incentive compatible if the expected utility gain for the borrower outweighs the disutility cost of high effort. Finally, equation constraint 3gives the agent’s wealth or liability constraint. Note that the agent's payoff is not restricted to be nonnegative. A negative payoff requires the borrower to hand over some of her wealth and thus is equivalent to a collateral requirement. Much of the intuition behind the rationing results can be gleaned diagrammatically from Figure 2. The horizontal and vertical axes represent the borrower's payoff under good and bad states of nature respectively. Holding constant high effort, the borrower's indifference curves are convex to the origin because the rate at which she is willing to trade consumption across states depends on how `smoothed' consumption is. At points like A or C on the 45-degree line consumption is perfectly smooth across states of nature, and the borrower is willing to marginally trade consumption across states at the rate φH . In contrast, at a point such as B, consumption in 1−φ H the bad state is relatively scarce so the borrower is only willing to give up a little bit of it in order to increase consumption in the good state. The line labeled π(sj|H)=0, also with slope - φH , is 1−φ H the lender's zero expected profit contour (conditional on high effort). The lender’s participation constraint requires that contracts lie on or to the southwest of this contour. 6 sb τ+ω/T C ? A ? sg*(W,T) sg sˆb ( s g ;W , T ) sb* (W , T ) ? B π(sj|H) = 0 If effort were contractible (that is, if the lender could require and enforce high effort by the borrower), then the optimal loan contract would be the full insurance contract at point A where the borrower’s income would be the same in both states of the world. However, the contract at A will not be available because of moral hazard. With her consumption completely shielded from low outcomes at contract A, the agent would have no incentive to apply high effort. Inspection of the ICC reveals that incentive compatible contracts require sg>sb. The lender motivates the borrower to apply high effort by offering contracts that reward her in the good state and punish her in the bad state. The contraction of the feasible contract set due to moral hazard creates the potential for two sorts of non-price rationing. The first is conventional quantity rationing. Quantity Rationing occurs when (1) The agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric information world; but, (2) The agent lacks sufficient wealth to collateralize the contract at the LPC-ICB intersection (i.e., W+pTT<-Ts*b (W,T)). In this case, the feasible contract set will be empty and the lender will not make any contract available to the agent. The second sort of non-price rationing that can potentially exist is what we have labelled risk rationing. Risk Rationing occurs when (1) The agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric information world; (2) The agent is offered a financially feasible contract in the asymmetric information world (i.e., W+pTT≥-Ts*b (W,T)); but, (3) The agent chooses not to accept the offered contract, preferring the safe, reservation activity. As drawn in Figure 2, the agent would be risk rationed because the indifference curve through the contract at point B passes to the south west of the reservation-utility-equivalent contract at point C. While the concept of risk rationing can thus be easily illustrated, proof of its existence, and its incidence with respect to wealth, is less straightforward. After substantial suffering, BCG show 7 that when all land is untitled (i.e., pT=0), non-price rationing will occur as shown in the following figure. Endowment of Financial Wealth, W W*(T) 40 Risk Rationed Subsistence Producers Wˆ ( T ) 30 A 20 Quantity Rationed Subsistence Producers Price Rationed Entreprenuers 10 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 Endowment of Land, T In this figure, financial wealth is displayed on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis is productive wealth, land in the case of agriculture. Imagine that an agent located at point A in the wealth space is indifferent between the entrepreneurial activity financed with a credit contract and the non-entrepreneurial, reservation activity. A move straight north from A (an increase in financial wealth holding project size fixed), will generate risk rationing of the wealthy under empirically plausible assumptions about the nature of preferences. However, under these same preference assumptions, agents who are straight east from A (with greater productive wealth) will be not be risk rationed and will instead borrow and become the entrepreneurs. The information contained in Figure 1 above is consistent with this implication as the price rationed firms have substantially more productive wealth than risk rationed firms. 2.2 Land Titling and Non-price Rationing in Credit Markets: The Land Titling/Risk Rationing Hypothesis The impact of land titling on the operation of the rural credit market can be analyzed by using the BCG model to analyze the impact of a titling program that effectively increases the value of land (pT) and renders it collateralizable. While this approach does not permit us to analyze investment demand effects of land titling, it does permit a richer analysis of the impact of titling on both 8 demand and supply in the credit market. The dashed lines in Figure 3 show the shift in the boundaries for non-price rationing when land is titled and pT rises. Under this new specification, titled land becomes capital in de Soto’s sense of the word and has collateral value. In addition, because it is marketable, increments of titled land have the same risk-bearing and incentive dilution effects as financial wealth. Finally, land titling reduces the incentive augmentation effect as the key parameter ρ = (( x + pT − rk ) /(γ + pT )) > 1 is decreasing in the price of land. As can be seen in Figure 3, land titling, shifts down the quantity rationing frontier by a vertical distance of pTT to W*t(T). This downward shift represents the hypothesized increase in credit supply resulting in the increased collateralization of agents' assets. Depending on parameter values, this downward shift may not be sufficient to completely eliminate quantity rationing for the lowest wealth borrowers, a finding that is consistent with the empirical work of Carter and Olinto (2003). In addition, land titling shifts the risk rationing frontier to the southeast to Wt(T). The net effect of land titling on the topography of non-price rationing can thus be summarized as follows. Agents in the portion of the endowment space labeled I are unaffected and are quantity rationed both before and after land titling. Similarly, agents in zones III and V do not change their status, respectively remaining as price rationed entrepreneurs and risk rationed subsistence farmers. More interesting are agents located in areas II, IV, and VI of the endowment space. Those in area II receive positive benefits from titling, and move from being quantity rationed subsistence farmers prior to titling, becoming price-rationed entrepreneurs after titling. Agents in area VI shift from being quantity rationed to risk rationed. These agents have an improved access to credit (post-titling, they have sufficient collateralizable wealth to qualify for a loan contract), but they are unwilling to bear the risk of newly available contracts in the absence of insurance markets and given the heavy collateral requirements that result from asymmetric information and moral hazard. Finally, agents in area IV of the wealth space would shift from being price rationed entrepreneurs pre-titling to risk rationed workers following land titling. This somewhat surprising shift results from the fact that increased marketability of their land dilutes incentives for the provision of high effort, leading the financial system to offer only more heavily collateralized, and less favorable, loan contracts. 9 WˆNT (t ) Endowment of Financial Wealth, W W*nt(T) Risk Rationed Subsistence Producers 40 V W *t (T ) 30 Price Rationed Entreprenuers VI B Quantity Rationed Subsistence Producers 20 IV Wˆt (T) I 10 III II 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 Endowment of Land, T These results are of course ultimately artifacts of the particular numerical specification used to analyze the model. The real world effects of land titling would of course depend on the true parameter values, as well as on the distribution of agents across the different zones of the endowment space. Nonetheless, this theoretical perspective suggests how such empirical analysis needs to be structured in order to fully comprehend the impact of land titling efforts. 2.3 Risk and Restricted Agricultural Credit Supply for Micro-lenders The theoretical analysis here has shown how in the presence of moral hazard and uninsured risk, land titling may simply replace one form of non-price rationing for another, leaving a subset of rural producers to lower productivity income generation strategies. However, this modeling exercise assumes conventional, arm’s length lenders for whom collateral is important. Given the importance of microfinance, it is worth remarking on the implication of uninsured risk on the supply of agricultural credit by MFIs. Led by the pioneering efforts of the Grameen Bank, micro-finance institutions (MFIs) have innovated new mechanisms to resolve these problems that distort the capital access of lowwealth, effectively opening up the menu of available contracts with new incentive and other 10 devices that substitute for collateral wealth. However, many of the principals of microfinance that permits successful lending to low-wealth households are maladapted to agriculture. For example, many MFIs lend to local groups whose members select each other and share liability for loan contracts—that is, borrowers are bundled into groups who are responsible for each other, and for paying each others’ loans when things go poorly. This shared liability creates powerful incentives for selection and monitoring of borrowers, and it can work well when loans are used for a diversity of (quick turnaround) activities. However, it works less well for agricultural activities where all producers are subject to a common set of weather risks (when one cannot pay, no one can pay) and where project gestation periods are long. Moreover, this common weather risk undermines the financial stability of locally based MFIs. Traditionally many microfinance organizations have strictly limited the extent of their lending to agricultural activities, often after costly failures.6 These observations are documented by Trivelli (2006) for the case of the north coast of Peru, where local ag lenders (the Cajas) are extremely reluctant to carry a large loan portfolio. At the root of this reluctance is a two-sided fear of covariant risk. Directly, locally based lenders clearly do not want to carry a large fraction of their portfolio in loans where the likelihood of default is highly correlated (as would happen in a drought year). In addition, covariant risk of this sort also generates a secondary political risk. When a large number of producers face default, they have obvious political incentives to demand a bail-out or other form of debt forgiveness. Precisely this scenario took place following the 1998 El Niño event. The resulting governmentally mandated Rescate Financiero (debt forgiveness) further reduced lenders willingness to lend to agriculture (see Trivelli, 2006). For these lenders, a land titling program that increases the value of collateral would be expected to have little effect on credit supply. 3. Descriptive Evidence of Titling, Credit Market Outcomes, and Risk Rationing The empirical analysis exploits a panel dataset (1997/2003) from Peru to examine the role of title, risk, and other factors shaping credit market rationing outcomes. The full 1997 sample included 547 farm households and was stratified geographically to ensure representation of the five main valleys in the Piura region of Coastal Peru and by farm size to ensure inclusion of large farms. In 2003, 499 of the original households were relocated and interviewed, of which 443 were still farming. The analysis that follows is based on the 443 households for whom we have titling credit market outcome data for both years. An important fraction of households in this data set acquired a title between the two survey years. Households in the Peru data set are split between those owning private land versus those owning land in peasant communities. At the time of the baseline survey in 1997, land within peasant communities was not individually titled and could not be mortgaged. This changed in 1998, however, as peasant communities in the study region agreed to move to private land ownership. The titling process was partially completed at the time of the follow-up survey in 6 While a number of MFIs have increased their rural lending in Latin America, much of it seems dedicated to livestock investment, which is subject to a rather distinctive set of stochastic forces than are crops. 11 2003, providing a source of exogenous variation in title status.* Table 1 provides a breakdown of titling status and credit rationing outcomes. Table 1. A Comparison of Credit Rationing Mechanisms by Tenure Type in Piura Private Land (n=252) Peasant Community (n=191) 1997 2003 1997 2003 % with title 85% 93% 2% 39% Constrained Quantity Rationed Risk Rationed 44% 34% 10% 36% 13% 23% 70% 56% 14% 52% 31% 21% Unconstrained Borrowers Non-borrowers 56% 41% 15% 64% 40% 23% 30% 12% 18% 48% 11% 37% Note that in 1997, only 2% of the peasant community households held title. By 2003, 39% did. By contrast, titling among private landholders also rose from 85% to 93%. Thus, while the change in titling among the peasant communities was substantial, the change among the private land holders was not. Households were asked about their participation and perceptions of credit markets in a fashion that allows a direct classification of households as constrained or unconstrained in the formal credit market (Boucher, Guirkinger, Trivelli, 2006). Households are classified as either price rationed (formal sector borrowers and non-borrowers who have no project requiring a loan), or as non-price rationed. For this latter category, three non-price rationing mechanisms are identified: quantity-rationed, transaction-cost rationed, and risk-rationed. For the empirical analysis undertaken here, we collapse the first two non-price rationed categories into one, called quantity-rationing and focus on three categories of credit market outcomes, price rationed, quantity rationed, and risk rationed. These data are also presented in Table 1 by credit market status to help explore the impacts of land title on credit access. Note first that an increase in titling between 1997 and 2003 is clearly associated with a reduction in the percent of households reporting themselves as quantity rationed in credit markets. This change is most evident among peasant community households, for whom quantity rationing drops from 56% of households to 31%. A large decline in quantity rationing is also reported by private land holding households (34% to 13%), but this change is not as clearly linked to the change in titling, since only 8% more private land holding households added title during this time. Overall, the lower percentage of quantity rationing among this predominantly land-titled p group in both time periods also provides supportive evidence that titling may help to reduce quantity rationing among rural households. The other major observation that Table 1 offers is that the impact of titling on reducing credit constraint outcomes appears to be significantly muted by the rise in households of both types 12 reporting themselves to be risk rationed. Among private land holders, the percentage of risk rationed households rises from 10% in 1997 to 23% in 2003, and among the peasant community, it rises from 14% to 21%. Thus, there appears to be a switch in the credit rationing status away from quantity rationing and toward risk rationing which limits the potential impact of titling and other changes in local financial markets on the prevalence of credit constraints. This outcome is further examined in Table 2, a transition matrix for households that details transitions in credit rationing and titling outcomes for the 1997 to 2003 time period. Perhaps the most interesting cells are in the middle row that track what happened to quantity rationed households in 1997. Of the 207 households that reported being quantity rationed in 1997, about half reported themselves as price rationed in 2003 and about 25% reported themselves as risk rationed. The other 25% remained quantity rationed. The price and risk rationed groups (in this middle row) were also the most likely of all the cells in the transition matrix to have acquired a title during this time period (43% and 38%, respectively). Titling appears to have made a significant difference in rationing outcomes for this group, but in an uneven fashion. Another useful comparison in Table 2 is the title and wealth data across the bottom row. Not surprisingly, the price rationed households are more likely to have title, larger farm size, and more non-farmland wealth than the quantity rationed outcomes. However, the only significant difference between the price and risk rationed households is in terms of wealth, of which the price rationed have about 50% higher holdings. This result is consistent with the Figure set forth in the theoretical section of the paper. 13 Transition Matrix for Formal Sector Rationing Mechanism: 1997 to 2003 Rationing Mechanism in 2003 Price Quantity Risk Rationed Rationed Rationed Rationing Mechanism in 1997 Price Rationed • • Quantity Rationed Risk Rationed N = 129 N = 36 N = 33 % acquiring title = 9% % acquiring title = 19% % acquiring title = 12% N = 103 N=49 N=55 % acquiring title = 43% % acquiring title = 26% % acquiring title =38% N = 18 N=9 N=11 % acquiring title = 17% % acquiring title = 22% % acquiring title = 0% 1997 Means N = 198 Has Title = 67% Farm Size = 5.4 N=207 Has Title = 31% Farm Size = 3.5 Wealth = 3.71 N=38 Has Title = 60.5% Farm Size = 4.29 Wealth = 4.68 2003 1997 N=443 N=94 N=99 N=443 N = 250 Has Title = 70% Has Title = 51% Has Title = 77% Has Title = Has Title = 74% 2003 Means Farm Size = 4.2 Farm Size = 3.6 Farm Size = 4.5 49.4% Farm Size = 4.3 Wealth = 3.95 Wealth = 3.1 Wealth = 3.0 Farm Size = 4.4 Wealth = 4.7 Wealth = 6.5 % acquiring title is the percentage of households in each cell that did not have a registered property title in 1997 and acquired one by 2003. Farm size is the area owned by the households and is measured in hectares. Wealth is the non-farmland wealth of the household and is measured in thousands of dollars. It includes the value of house and residential land, business assets, farm equipment, livestock and consumer durables. 14 4. Econometric Approach and Results 4.1 Introduction The theoretical analysis of section 2 suggested that acquisition of a registered property title may be necessary but not sufficient to eliminate non-price rationing in the formal credit market. Title acquisition enhances farm households’ capacity to post collateral and thus may relax quantity rationing. Two factors conspire against household participation in the formal credit market, even after having acquired a title. First, fixed costs of loan processing may make lenders unwilling to make loans below a minimum threshold. If so, then low wealth farmers may continue to face quantity rationing even though they have a title. Second, if the farmer faces significant risk, then she may not be willing to offer the titled land as collateral. In other words, a title may relax quantity rationing but not risk rationing. In this section we use panel data from northern Peru to explore the impact of title on farm households’ rationing outcomes in the formal credit market. We estimate a single equation, multinomial choice model to predict the probability that farmers of different characteristics (including title status) are found in the different rationing categories. Let Y be the observed rationing outcome in the formal credit market and which takes values 0, 1, … J. Define Yij* as the continuous “score” for the i’th individual in the j’th rationing category. Yij* can thus be considered the unobserved “propensity” of the individual to be in category j and is modeled as a linear combination of an individual’s characteristics. The i’th individual’s score for the j’th rationing category is: (4.1) Yij* = g ( β j , xi ) + ε ij = β 'j xi + ε ij ; where xj is a (k x 1) vector of characteristics of the i’th individual; βj is a (k x 1) vector of population parameters associated with the j’th category; and εij is the mean zero, unobserved component of the i’th individual’s score from category j. The observed category is the one which yields the highest score. The probability that the i’th individual is in the j’th category is thus: (4.2) Pr(Yi = j ) = Pr(Yij* ≥ Yis* ) ∀s ≠ j. We assume the J+1, εij terms are independent and identically distributed with Weibull distribution so that the probability in equation (4.2) can be expressed as: (4.3) Pr(Yi = j ) = e J β 'j xi ∑e s =0 . β s' xi 15 Multinomial logit models are typically motivated by a random utility framework in which the latent variable represents an individual’s expected utility, and the individuals choose the category maximizing their expected utility. The parameters, βj, would thus represent the impact of individual characteristics on the expected utility of each choice. In the current context, the random utility framework is not appropriate since farmers do not freely “choose” across the different rationing categories. Instead, we use the multinomial logit framework to impost a probability structure on the outcomes. The logistic form is especially convenient because it can capture non-linear relationships between the independent variables and the regime probabilities and it keeps the probability within the unit interval. As individual characteristics such as education and wealth impact both supply and demand for formal credit, parameter estimates will not have any structural interpretation. 4.2 Variable Definitions We now turn to definition of the variables used in the estimation. Table 2 summarizes the rationing categories in the sample. In our regression analysis, we pool the households across the two years so that we have a total of 886 observations. Farmers that applied for and received a positive formal loan amount are classified as priced rationed borrowers. Farmers that were classified as either transaction cost or risk rationed in the survey are here classified into a single category we call risk rationed. Farmers in both of these groups are similar in that they have access to a loan an would have positive demand in a first-best world, however the presence of asymmetric information causes their effective (or real world) demand to be zero. The category of price rationed borrowers is taken as the base category. Table 2. Description of Rationing Categories, Yj, Used in Multinomial Logit Rationing Sample Distribution Description j Category # % Price Rationed 0 Applied for and received some loan 248 28% borrower Price Rationed no Did not apply because interest rate too 1 200 23% non-borrower high Risk Rationed 2 Did not apply for fear of losing collateral 230 26% Quantity Rationed 3 Applied and rejected or; Did not apply because subjective probability of rejection too high 208 23% The non-random component of the j’th category score, g(βj,xij) is modeled as the following linear function: (4.3) g ( β j , xij ) = β j1 + β j 2TITLEi + β j 3 LIQUIDITYi + β j 4 FARMSIZEi + γ ' X i where TITLEi takes value 1 if the household owns at least one plot with a registered property title and 0 otherwise; LIQUIDITYi is the value of the households financial savings, cash-on-hand, jewelry and animals; FARMSIZEi is the total number of irrigated hectares owned by the household; and Xi is a vector of additional controls. 16 The independent variables and their means are summarized in Table 3 below. Table 3. Description of Independent Variables Used in Multinomial Logit Variable Description Name TITLE 1 if household owns a parcel with registered title, 0 if not. LIQUIDITY Household’s pre-planting liquidity in thousands of dollars FAMRSIZE Household farm size in hectares Comunidad Household resides in a peasant community EDUC Years of formal education of household head AGE Age of household head ALTO 1 if household’s primary plot is in Alto Piura valley, 0 if not. CHIRA 1 if household’s primary plot is in Chira valley, 0 if not. SANLOR 1 if household’s primary plot is in San Loranzo valley, 0 if not. CIEN 1 if household’s primary plot is in Cieneguillo valley, 0 if not. Year 1 if observation is from 2003, 0 if from 1997. Sample Mean 0.60 0.36 4.3 0.43 3.7 54.2 0.14 0.43 0.07 0.08 0.5 4.3 Estimation Results The results of the multinomial regression are reported in Table 4. The parameters of the vector βj describe the impact of individual characteristics on the probability of an individual being observed in the j’th category relative to the base category (price rationed borrowers). Table 4. Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors Associated with Rationing Category: Regressor Price rationed nonRisk Quantity borrowers Rationed Rationed (β1) (β2) (β3) Coefficient Std Errror Coefficient Std Errror Coefficient Std Errror Constant 1.5** .78 1.96** .77 2.7** .80 TITLE -.80** .32 -1.12** .31 -1.5** .35 LIQUIDITY .09 .08 -.008 .11 -.27* .15 FARMSIZE -.03 .03 -.041 .03 -.058* .03 Comunidad -.80* .35 .46 .34 .79** .37 EDUC -.056 .03 -.06** .03 -.008 .03 AGE .002 .01 .001 .01 -.0033 .01 ALTO -1.02** .51 -.24 .48 .27 .512 CHIRA -2.2** .39 -2.3** .40 -2.44** .40 SANLOR -.55 .68 -.78 .70 .361 .719 CIEN -.86 .53 -.56 .52 -1.06* .60 Year .62** .23 .70** .22 -1.11** .25 **Denotes significance at 5% level; *Denotes significance at 10% level. 17 4.4 A Mapping of Rationing Regimes in Endowment Space We now use the parameter estimates from the multinomial logit to explore the relationship between farmer endowments and rationing mechanisms. We do so in a manner consistent with the theoretical framework presented in Section 1. Figure 3 plots, for each point in farmsizeliquidity space, the rationing category with the highest predicted probability when the farmer does not have a title. All other conditioning variables are held at the sample means. Figure 4 does the same thing conditional on having a title. A comparison of the two figures thus allows us to examine the impact of title on the predicted distribution of the different rationing categories in this two-dimensional wealth space. Figure 3: Price rationed non-borrowers Risk rationed Quantity rationed Price rationed borrowers Figure 4: Price Rationed NonBorrowers Price Rationed Borrowers Risk Rationed From these two initial pictures (more refined pictures will be generated soon!), we see that the main impact of titling is to eliminate quantity rationing while also slightly reducing the area of risk rationing. It is important to point out that, while it appears that risk rationing in these two 18 figures is fairly unimportant, there is a relatively high density of farmers quite close to the origin. For example, over 40% of sample farmers own less than 4 hectares. It is also worth noting that the specification upon which these figures are based is a “bare-bones” specification. As a next step we will explore more theoretically consistent specifications including allowing for quadratic wealth terms as well as interactions between title and the farm size variable. 5. Area-based Yield Insurance to Crowd-in Agricultural Credit Demand and Supply If the intuition presented in this paper is correct, then one obvious solution to the problem would be to complement land titling with efforts to remove risk from the rural credit system via insurance mechanisms. However, given the miserable record of agricultural insurance, this suggestion may seem rather useless. Indeed, conventional (all hazard) crop insurance has in almost every instance been rendered financially unsustainable by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. However, index-based insurance (e.g., area-based yield insurance or insurance based on rainfall or other weather indices) has the virtue of being moral hazard proof in the sense that it preserves effort incentives for producers as no individual farmer can influence the probability of an insurance pay-off. It is also immune to problems of adverse selection. However, despite these advantages index-based insurance by construction only covers a fraction of the risks faced by farming households, leaving households exposed to residual uninsured or basis risk. A key empirical question then is whether the provision of this partial index based insurance will suffice to relax demand constraints to borrowing and empower small holders to pursue more entrepreneurial strategies. Similarly, we might ask whether index insurance suffices to relax the reluctance of rural microfinance lenders to carry a larger agricultural portfolio as discussed by Trivelli (2006). In an effort to answer these questions, Carter, Galarza and Boucher (2007) estimate the parameters for an actuarially fair area-based yield (ARBY) insurance scheme using data from the Lambeyeque valley in Peru. Both yields and area planted in Lambeyeque depend on the flow of irrigation water, ωt. Following Zegarra and de los Rios, they model the distribution of irrigation water as: f (ω ) = (ω − a ) p −1 (b − ω ) q −1 for a ≤ ω ≤ b; p, q > 0 Β( p, q )(b − a ) p + q −1 . 1 and Β( p, q ) = ∫ t p −1 (1 − t ) q −1dt 0 Average valley yields ( yt ) and area sown ( st ) ware in turn specified as: yt = y (ωt ) + ε ty st = s (ωt ) + ε ts Finally, individual yields, yit , and individual sown areas, sit , using the following specifications: 19 yit = μiy + β iy ( yt − μ y ) + ε ity sit = μis + β is ( st − μ s ) + ε its , (3) where the terms μ iy and μ is are household-level fixed effects, μi y = E ( yit ), μ y = E ( yt ), μi s = E ( sit ), μ s = E ( st ). , and we assume that the error terms are distributed normally with mean zero. Finally, as a basis for an area-based yield product, define ⎛ st ⎞ adjusted valley yields ( y%t ) as y%t = yt ⎜ max ⎟ and the corresponding estimated adjusted valley ⎝s ⎠ ⎛ sˆt ⎞ 7 ⎟. yˆ t = yˆ t ⎜⎜ max yields as ~ ⎟ s ⎝ ⎠ We are now in a position to define an ARBY insurance contract will be written as a function of ~ ŷ t . In particular define the contractually predetermined “strike point” that determines when the insurance pays off as y% c . If normalized valley yields fall below this amount, the insurance pays out a per-hectare indemnity, ρt , equivalent to the shortfall: ρt = max[0, y% c − y%t ] (4) We will consider the case of an actuarially fair insurance, which requires that per-hectare annual insurance premium, π , be equal to the average indemnity across time—i.e., π = E[ ρt ] . In other words, ignoring the fixed and other administrative costs of designing and delivering the insurance, actuarially fairness implies that the insurer will break-even in the long run: average premiums will equal average payouts. Combining long-term time series data on water flows and average valley yields and harvested area, as well as a three farm-level panel on individual producers, Carter, Galarza and Boucher estimate the various parameters and distributions for above functions. They then simulate the impact of an ARBY insurance written on actual yields, as well as a second best form of ARBY insurance written on estimated yields (i.e., a weather index). From the perspective of an average producer, the impact of ARBY insurance on yields will appear as shown in the figure below. In addition, assumptions on the nature of the utility function permit us to calculate the certainty equivalent of the different stochastic consumption streams made available to the farmer under 7 Using this same idea of an adjusted yield, we can define a farmers’ output per cultivable hectare, Qit , as: ⎛ s it ⎞ Qit = y it ⎜ max ⎟ ⎝ s ⎠ and is expressed in kilos. In the simulation analysis of the value of insurance to farmers, we assume that the typical farmer has access to five hectares (i.e., smax=5). The value of an ARBY contract written on ~ ŷ t will depend on how closely the farmer’s adjust yields track ~ ŷ t (as shaped by βy and βs and also on the individual ε y and ε its );. (farmer specific) realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks ( it 20 the different contracts. These are shown in the table below. Also shown in the table is the disappearance of default for lenders whose borrowers are insured with ARBY insurance. Area-based Yield Insurance Simulation (% probability of outcome less than indicated amount) Typical Farmer, Strike Value = 100% mean 80 Cumulative Density 60 40 No Insurance Insurance with Measured Avg Yields Insurance with Est Yields (Weather Index) 20 0 0 1000 2000 3000 Income Available for Consumption ($US) 4000 21 Net income Insurance payment (5has) Expected Indemnity Consumption Loan Repayment Lending return (%) With Insurance No Insurance (Strike Point 100% of Expected Yields) Estimated ARBY Measured ARBY (Weather Index) Mean Mean Mean 2,601 2,601 2,601 547 547 1,932 [797] 669 [0] 21.7 514 514 1,945 [990] 656 [77] 19.4 0 0 1,971 [1276] 631 [118] 14.7 Certainty Equivalent under Different Risk Aversion Assumptions Low Risk Aversion Mid-Low Risk Aversion Middle Risk Aversion Mid-High Risk Aversion 1904 1885 1862 1846 High Risk Aversion 1825 Notes: Standard errors in square brackets. Average loan: $ 550; Interest rate: 21.7%. 1889 1849 1798 1742 1878 1813 1726 1643 1695 1565 As these figures indicate, producers would in principal be willing to offer significant payments above and beyond the actuarially fair premium. In addition, the elimination of default risk removes the risk of collateral loss that drives risk rationing. While more work remains to be done to explore these ideas, at first glance at least, this form of insurance would seem to hold substantial promise in terms of crowding in credit demand and supply. 22 References Boucher, S., B. Barham and Carter, M. (2005). The Impact of “Market-Friendly” Reforms on Credit and Land Markets in Honduras and Nicaragua. World Development, 33(1), 107-128. Boucher, S., M. Carter and Guirkinger, C. (2006). Risk Rationing and Wealth Effects in Credit Markets. Working Paper 05-010, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Univesity of California – Davis. Boucher, S. and C. Guirkinger. Risk, Wealth and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, forthcoming. Boucher, S., Guirkinger, C., and Trivelli, C. (2006). Direct Elicitation of Credit Constraints: Conceptual and Practical Issues with an Application to Peruvian Agriculture. Working Paper, University of California – Davis. Carter, M. (1988). Equilibrium Credit Rationing of Small Farm Agriculture. Journal of Development Economics, 28: 83-103. Carter, M. and B. Barham (1996). Level Playing Fields and Laissez Faire: Post-Liberal Development Strategy in Inegalitarian Agrarian Economies World Development, 24, 7: 11331149. Carter. M. and P. Olinto. (2003). Getting Institutions Right for Whom? Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(1), 173-186. De Soto, H. (2000). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. Basic Books, New York. Field, E. and Torero, M. (2006). Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program. Harvard University, mimeo. Galiani, S. and E. Schargrodsky (2006). Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling. mimeo, UTDT. Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss. (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review, 3(71), 393-410.
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz