© F. Enke Verlag Stuttgart
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 3, Heft 3, Juni 1974, S. 3 1 2 -320
Max Weber and the Sociology of Science: A Case Reopened*
Friedrich H. Tenbruck
Universität Tübingen, Seminar für Soziologie
Max Weber und die Wissenschaftssoziologie: Zur Wiederaufnahme der Diskussion*
Inhalt: Für die Entwicklung der Soziologie der Wissenschaft sind die Arbeiten R.K. MERTONS grundlegend
gewesen. Das gilt auch für seine frühe Untersuchung über Science, Technology and Society in Seventeeth-Century
England, die er als die Ausführung eines Programms vorlegte, welches MAX WEBER am Ende der Protestanti­
schen Ethik entwickelt hatte. Obschon MERTONS Untersuchung eine bleibende Leistung darstellt, entspricht sie
nicht den Absichten MAX WEBERS. Dieser hat die Problematik der Entstehung der modernen Wissenschaft
duchaus anders gesehen und später auch wesentliche Ansätze für eine recht andere Soziologie der Wissenschaft
skizziert. Das ist bisher u.a. wegen der verbreiteten Annahme übersehen worden, WEBER habe sein ursprüngliches
Programm aufgegeben. Wie sich bei genauer Lektüre herausstellt, ist das Gegenteil richtig, womit das Werk MAX
WEBERS in ein anderes Licht rückt.
WEBERS Ansatz schließt der Soziologie der Wissenschaft eine ganze Dimension auf, die bisher übersehen worden
ist, für ein Verständnis der geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Wissenschaft und ihrer heutigen Problematik jedoch
unentbehrlich ist. Im Rahmen dieses Artikels war es nicht möglich, WEBERS Konzept und dessen Implikationen
auszubreiten, so daß ich vorläufig auf die summarische Darstellung in meinem Aufsatz “ ‘Science as a Vocation’
- Revisited” verweisen muß, der in Standorte im Zeitstrom. Festschrift für Arnold Gehlen, hersg. von E. FORST­
HOFF und R. HÖRSTEL, Athenäum Verlag, Frankfurt 1974, erschienen ist. Auch die Konsequenzen für die
WEBER-Forschung konnte ich hier nur andeuten. Ich werde auf beide zurückkommen.
A b stract: The works o f ROBERT K. MERTON have formed the basis for the development o f the sociology o f
science. This is also true for his early research on Science, Technology and Society in Seventeeth Century Eng­
land , which he presented as the completion o f a program, that MAX WEBER had developed at the end o f The
Protestant Ethic. Although MERTON’s research is an enduring accomplishment, it does not correspond to the
intentions o f MAX WEBER. WEBER saw the problematic o f the foundation o f modern science quite differently
and later sketched out the essential beginnings for a different sociology o f science. This fact has been overlooked
until now because, at least in part, o f the widespread assumption that WEBER had abandoned his original pro­
gram. However, with a closer examination o f the literuature this assumption proves to be the exact opposite o f
the truth, thus placing WEBER’s work in a different light.
WEBER’s beginning opened a new dimension in the sociology o f science which is essential for an understanding
o f the historical development o f science and its present problematic. Unfortunately, within the confines o f this
article it is not possible to expand upon WEBER’s concept and its implications; for a general elaboration o f these
points I must refer the reader to may article “ ‘Science as a Vocation’ -- Revisited” which appeared in Standorte
im Zeitstrom, Festschrift für ARNOLD GEHLEN, edited by E. FORSTHOFF and R. HÖRSTEL, Athenäum Ver­
lag, Frankfurt 1974. I will return to this topic and its consequences for WEBER research at a later date.
As anyone familiar with the field knows, the
sociology of science traces its ancestry back to
MAX WEBER, among other forerunners and
stimulators. MAX WEBER owes this customary
tribute almost exclusively to R.K. MERTON’s
now classic study on Science, Technology and
Society in 1 7th century England, which, as
BERNARD BARBER put it, “follows up WEBER’s
lead” 1. Of this we now have the vivid remi­
niscence of MERTON in the new preface to the
re-edition of 1970 where he writes: “In the
course of reading the letters, diaries, memoires
and papers of seventeenth century men of
* This article has been written in English by sugges­
tion o f the editors o f this journal.
1 BARBER (1970: 56).
science, the author slowly noted the frequent
religious commitments of scientists in this
time, and even more, what seemed to be their
Puritan orientation. Only then, and almost as
though he had not been put through his paces
during the course of gradulate study, was he
belatedly put in mind of that intellectual tra­
dition, established by MAX WEBER, TROELTSCH,
TAWNEY and others, which centered on the
interaction between the Protestant ethic and the
emergence of modern capitalism. Swiftly making
amends for this temporary amnesia, the author
turned to a line-by-line reading of WEBER’s
work to see whether he has anything at all to
say about the relation of Puritanism to science
and technology. Of course, he had. It turns out
Unauthenticated
that WEBER concluded
his classic essay by
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describing
the ‘next
as that of
F. H. Tenbruck: Max Weber and the Sociology of Science: A Case Reopened
searching out ‘the significance of ascetic ratio­
nalism, which has only been touched in the
foregoing sketch, for a variety of cultural and
social developments,’ among them ‘the develop­
ment of philosophical and scientific empiricism
. .. technical development and .. . spiritual
ideas’. Once identified, WEBER’s recommenda­
tion became a mandate”2.
Did MERTON carry out the mandate? Can his
dissertation serve us, as it were, as a substitute
for “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Science” which in 1905 MAX WEBER had been
contemplating to write as a sequel to The Pro­
testant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism?
The question has never been raised, and once
it is, it seems likely to remain a moot point
forever considering that WEBER abandoned the
task which he had set for himself in behalf of
the comparative study of world religions3.
Both certainly are agreed that the Protestant
ethic, again in BARBER’s words, “was an
especially favorable version of Christian attitu­
des toward the world for the development of
science”4. Yet such a wide fold leaves ample
room for marked differences, and I must readily
confess to serious doubts in this respect.
dissertation was, and will remain a
brilliant study into the configuration of spiritual
and material motivations which gave rise to
science in 17th century England. What regards
the spiritual theme, he had stated it quite strong­
ly. “In various ways, then, the general religious
ideas were translated into concrete policy. This
was no more intellectual exercise. Puritanism
transfused ascetic vigor into activities which, in
their own right, could not as yet achieve selfsufficiency”5. And he carried it out with great
insight and deft dexterity. There is nothing in
his book which could not have been written by
MERTON’s
313
himself. And yet there is something mis­
sing which one might expect WEBER to have
added.
WEBER
This difference is firstly a matter of dimension.
MERTON carried out a historical study. For him,
Puritanism had briefly played its role as a tem­
porary prop for a science which had rapidly
gained self-sufficiency, and so the books on Pu­
ritanism and science could be closed because
whatever the problems inherent in that relation
may have been, they did not extend into the
age of institutionalized science. Of course, a
mind of MERTON’s calibre could readly recognize
a general lesson for a systematic sociology of
science in a historical case: for its social legit­
imacy science remained dependent on favorable
cultural norms. This made him aware that
“changing social circumstances invited differing
strategy and tactics for maintaining legitimacy
and enlisting support”6 and so he sought
to identify these problems under changing
social circumstances: in the thirties the totali­
tarian threat to science, in the sixties “the
changing visible social consequences of science”
and “the pressing claims for the social utility
of science”7. However, he could not see how
these problems of modern institutionalized
science could bear a resemblance to the situa­
tion in the 17th century or could have their
roots in that fusion of spiritual and material
values which occurred under the reign of Puri­
tanism. MERTON’s dissertation is, then, a study
in the historical sociology of science. Its rele­
vance for our own situation could only be
mediate: from a historical case might be derived
general theorems for a systematic sociology of
science which could perhaps be reapplied to
advantage for an understanding of our quite
different situation.
WEBER’s entire
2
MERTON (1970: XVII).
3 WEBER (1958: 284 [n. 119]/1947: 205 [Anm. l].
- For references to The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit o f Capitalism I have used TALCOTT PAR­
SONS’ translation (WEBER 1958). All references
to this English edition are followed by entries in­
dicating the corresponding page o f the German text
in WEBER (1947).
oeuvre may also rightly be con­
sidered one extended historical study. Yet no
one will grasp it, or any part thereof, who has
not come to see the point in BENDIX’s able
remark: “ WEBER was preoccupied throughout
his career with the development of rationalism in
Western civilisation. His lifetime study of this
development revealed not only the complexity
4
BARBER (1970: 57).
6
MERTON (1970: XXII).
5
MERTON (1970: 86).
7
MERTON
(1970:Date
XXII).
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314
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 3, Heft 3, Juni 1974, S. 31 2 -3 2 0
of its antecedents, but the precariousness of its
achievements”8. Puritanism for WEBER was a
matter of the past, and without a doubt quite
dead. Yet it mattered terribly for our present
to see that it was so although it had once trans­
fused its lifeblood into the rise of capitalism by
imparting an inner meaning to a type of econo­
mic behavior, and generally to a specific kind of
disciplined conduct which could not have been
legitimated on strictly economic or purely
rational grounds.
To see the predicament of our age, one had to
realize that the spirit of ascetic Protestantism
had once shaped and animated the budding ra­
tional structures of our modern world, to flee
from them as they grew into the organized
machinery of modern life. WEBER showed us
the Puritan who “wanted to work in a calling”
in order to make us realize that now “we are
forced to do so”9. And to realize this mattered
very much since it saved us from facilely accept­
ing our rational institutions as a matter of course.
To understand our own time, one had to pierce
the given reality and its immediacy; one had to
probe beyond the manifest rationales of our
institutions; one had to grasp the “disenchant­
ment” of the world in which we live. And all
this could be best brought out against the back­
drop of the inner meaning which Puritanism had
lent to early capitalism. It is against this back­
drop that we can come to see the machinery in
which, and by which, we live for what it seems
to be, an “iron cage” as WEBER keeps remind­
ing us. And this reminder leaves (and is meant
to leave) us in doubt about the future of man
and the heritage of our civilisation.
This being the point to which every work of
conduces in the end, why should he
have deviated from it in an account of the role
of ascetic Protestantism for the rise of science?
Why should he not have surprised us with a si­
mile of an “iron cage of science”? Why should
“The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Science”,
as it were, not have amazed us by demonstrating
why and how Puritans were driven onto the
path of science from an inner compulsion and
were searching for knowledge with which to
WEBER
8
BENDIX (1960: 33).
9
WEBER (1958: 181/1947: 203).
answer those questions which arose from their
uncertainty and predicament? Why should he
not have shown us that science had had deeper
layers of motivation and meaning than we can
bring to it in a scientific civilization where
science becomes a matter of course and routine?
Why should he not have made us apprehensive
of a science which through its institutionalized
stability and triumph must grind on regardless
of what intrinsic meanings and values are invol­
ved in the search for knowledge? But MERTON’s
study is wholly devoid of any such considerations
and entertains no second thought about the in­
stitutionalization of science. Puritanism was for
him a fleeting prop which helped science gain
early self-sufficiency, and this self-sufficiency of
science presents no problems whereas for WEBER
the self-sufficiency which capitalism eventually
gained through its institutionalization presented
the very predicament of our modern situation,
and thus the secret object of his study.
The difference in dimension asserts itself in the
details. MERTON offers an exquisite exposition
of the general importance of Puritan religion,
but concerning science, his specific arguments
tend to cast Puritanism in a merely supportative and legitimizing role. Above all, his thesis
typifies the general lesson which he derived
from it: science depends for its social legitima­
tion on favorable cultural norms. For a brief
spell Puritanism provided positive sanctions for
science firstly by making utility a legitimate
purpose, and secondly by considering the study
of nature as a way for the glorification of God.
MERTON stresses utility throughout and even
where he speaks of the glorification of God, he
hardly seems to reach down into that depth
where WEBER had made us see the Puritan as
bking driven into ascetic rationalism and metho­
dical conduct.
At least he does not show us how science could
rise out of that depth. Being fully able, of course,
to look into that depth, he fails to recognize its
significance for the rise of science. When he sets
forth the problem of certitudo salutis, he talks
of the Puritan’s anxiety concerning his spiritual
grace and of the impossiblilty of continuing the
routine of daily life in the face of such uncertain­
ty 10, he speaks of ascetic compulsion for which
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F. H. Tenbruck: Max Weber and the Sociology of Science: A Case Reopened
315
compromise with the world had become into­
lerable11. But he treats of this as an isolated com­
plex, rather, and never truly links it up with the
rise of science. Where he succeeds in recreating
for us the WEBERian image of the Puritan who
finds in methodical and rational conduct relief
from the despair of his total isolation and inner
uncertainty vis-a-vis CALVlN’s God, he has lost
sight of science. When the Puritans began so
persistently to search for knowledge, they were
displaying another kind of that active interest
in the world which was so characteristic of their
religion, rather than seeking in scientific know­
ledge answers to questions arising from their
inner uncertainty. And the only specific rela­
tionship binding the quest for rational know­
ledge to the Puritan religion, viz the theme of
the glorification of God, neither refers to the
inner predicament of the Puritan, nor is it spe­
cific to science.
And here we come to the bottom of it. The
essential argument of WEBER was not that ca­
pitalism drew support from Puritanism nor that
the latter legitimated wordly behaviours which
had been frowned upon by medieval religion.
The rational discipline of life from which capi­
talism sprang was not just helped along by re­
ligious sanctions, it was rather created by them.
Its rationalism was not merely supported by
irrational elements, it was irrational in itself
because incessant work, discipline, and dedica­
tion with no regard to tangible gratifications
cannot be logically derived from any ends which
naturally come to men. The continuing allure of
The Protestant Ethic lies in this very discovery
which comes to every new generation as an eyeopener. The spirit of a “rational” conduct of
life, and thus of capitalism, was born from an
“irrational” dedication to one’s calling reflecting
an inner uncertainty and anxiety of man.
takes the religious ideas and proclama­
tions of his actors serious, indeed, and he is
fully capable of pointing out the inner anxiety
of the Puritan, but as men of science they all
remain rather serene and contented persons who
could well have accepted the rationale of science
on its own grounds. For MERTON, the bridge
leading from the inner despair of the Puritan
to science is supported by the pillars of utili­
tarian motives and the compulsion to conquer
the world. Thus, the peculiar flavor of WEBER’s
thesis with its continuous emphasis on asceticism
and calling is missing once MERTON goes beyond
the exposition of Puritanism and probes into
its significance for the rise of science. What
there remains is but the stress on hard labor,
worldly success, and the glorification of God,
the latter very soon to be superseded by utili­
tarian considerations, too. Although MERTON
has given an excellent exposition of the predi­
cament of the Puritan as WEBER had developed
it, it remains of little consequence for the ex­
planation of the rise of science inasmuch as
WEBER’s perspective has become subordinate to
the general idea of “support by favorable cultur­
al norms”. Man’s anxiety is part of the Puritan
syndrome, but it does not directly and specific­
ally enter into the rise of science.
Although knowing all this, MERTON hardly drew
inspiration from it for his account of the role
which Puritanism played for the rise of science.
Aware of the substantive role which Puritanism
played in forging that methodical discipline from
which capitalism eventually grew, he did not
duplicate it in his study of the rise of science. In
this regard, Puritanism has shrunk to a merely
supportive and external element, a “sanctioning
power” 12.
MERTON
11 MERTON (1970: 99).
In sum: in MERTON’s study the relation between
Protestantism and science is rather distant when
compared with what WEBER described as the
transfiguration of Puritanism into capitalism,
and where WEBER focussed on the “irrational”
core of capitalim, MERTON seems content to
accept the self-legitimation of science as fully
convincing. Given requisite preconditions, the
rise of science does not strike him as something
extraordinary, it is most natural thing to expect,
rather. And so throughout the study he stressed
that religion played a very brief and merely
supportive role for science. No wonder then
that in his new preface he complains of the
lively attention which his exposition of religious
support had gained when he had actually wanted
to stress the material-technological motivations
whic& latingly gave rise to science.
Unauthenticated
12 MERTON (1970: 104).
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Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 3, Heft 3, Juni 1974, S. 31 2 -3 2 0
When MERTON occasionally comes close to that
account of the relation between Puritanism and
science which, as we suspect, WEBER would have
offered us after the fashion, pattern, and sub­
stance of The Protestant Ethic, he can almost
be observed to dismiss such possibility hastily.
There is a ready aversion running through his
entire thesis of admitting or recognizing any
dimension of science but the cognitive and uti­
litarian. What regards the intrinsic value of
knowledge, science is purely a cognitive venture,
and what is involved in the quest for knowledge
can best be rendered by the reiterative statement
“knowledge is knowledge is knowledge”. He
therefore anxiously rejects SPRANGER’s idea that
“values from other zones . . . become religious
when they are related to the final meaning of
life, and consequently they embody a religious
emphasis over and above their original accent” .
Gravely he points out a warning: “This statement,
however, should not be generalized for it applies
only when religion is clearly a preeminent social
value” 13.
It seems, then, that MERTON studied the relation
between Puritanism and science with a certain
idea of science in his mind. Apart from conside­
rations of utility, science appears as a purely cog­
nitive venture. Pointing out a requisite norm of
science, MERTON correctly states: “Once science
was established with a degree of functional auto­
nomy, the doctrine of basic scientific knowledge
as a value in its own right became an integral part
of the creed of scientists”16. However, he does
not go on to point out that the belief in the in­
trinsic value of knowledge as knowledge may be
predicated on further assumptions about mean­
ings which knowledge has beyond its purely cog­
nitive and objective content. Although noting
that religion had enabled Puritans to invest
scientific pursuits “with all manner of values”17,
MERTON narrowed them down to the praise of
God, the virtue of methodical work, practical
interest in the world, and the like. True, the
search for knowledge had temporarily benefited
from such implications as religion had bestowed
upon it. It had never been a quest for meaning,
though. The cognitive and objective content of
It is in the same vein that MERTON suddenly veers knowledge was for MERTON the ultimate and
off when approaching points from which he could specific aim and objective in the pursuit of know­
have looked into the land of The Protestant Ethic ledge. He could hardly have made sense of the
and the Spirit o f Science. There is a beautiful and idea that science had once been a search for God,
deep section in the fifth chapter of MERTON’s or still could be a quest for meaning.
dissertation entitled “Community o f Tacit As­
sumptions in Science and Puritanism” where MER­ The point of all this, of course, is not to raise
doubts about MERTON’s findings. Puritanism
TON, drawing on WHITEHEAD and others, shows
most certainly contributed to the rapid rise of
us that Puritanism and science shared an implicit
modern science by virtue of its emphasis on utili­
fundamental assumption that the world was an
intelligible order. But when it comes to the ques­ ty, practical interest in the world, vigour of metho­
dical effort, and glorification of God. The ques­
tions of why the Puritans wanted to ask scienti­
tion is wether WEBER would have been content
fic questions and sought for scientific answers,
with such an account. Arguing from the central
MERTON readily steers back into the utilitarian
idea and logic of The Protestant Ethic — and on
explanation14. Again, on rare occasions MERTON
suspicion, as it were — I have suggested that
recognizes in the scientific study of nature an
WEBER had been contemplating a very different
attempt to understand God’s works, yet he fails
account of the rise of science where religion
to notice the potential significance of this fact.
would have played a truly essential, rather than
On the contrary, when talking about this search
a merely supportive role. MERTON’s book sent
for a non-manifest order which God had hidden
the sociology of science off in the direction of
in the cosmos, MERTON hastens to point out
structural studies; WEBER’s account would have
that this search was nothing but a glorification
of God15.
given it a different impetus and approach.
There are tangible proofs to bear out these con13 MERTON (1970: 75).
14 MERTON (1970: 108f. et passim).
16 MERTON (1970: XXIII).
15 MERTON (1970: 88).
17 MERTON (1970: 91).
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F. H. Tenbruck: Max Weber and the Sociology o f Science: A Case Reopened
tentions. To begin with, there is a more substan­
tive lead than MERTON got hold of to be found
in The Protestant Ethic where WEBER expressly
refutes the idea that science could have grown
solely from material-technological considerations
and interests, and where he continues thus: “On
the development of the sciences in the direction
of mathematically rationalized exact investiga­
tion . . . Windelband rightly denies that mo­
dern science can be understood as the product
of material and technical interests” 18*.This rich
remark could have directed MERTON’s efforts in­
to an entirely different approach. It suggests at
once the gulf which separates the search for ra­
tionally certified and uncontroversial knowledge
from all considerations of practical utility. Pier­
cing through the routine of our modern assump­
tions about science, it makes at once clear what
an extraordinary and amazing, what an unnatu­
ral venture the quest for basic knowledge had
originally been. As much as capitalism could
only develop from a methodical discipline of
conduct far in excess of what economic consi­
derations might suggest, as much science could
only grow from an intellectual determination
far in excess of anything that considerations
of practical utility could suggest. Centuries of
assiduous efforts and individual determination
had gone into the search for such basic know­
ledge before it could begin to pay off. No practi­
cal considerations could have engendered or sus­
tained this singular intellectual effort. We have
learnt to expect practical rewards from basic re­
search. This was a lesson of the 19th century, how­
ever, which we must not project back into the
past. We usually believe that science is a natural,
though late fruit of man’s concern with prac­
tical matters or — worse still - a late outcome
of his natural will to know. By refuting the
utilitarian explanation of the rise of modern
science, WEBER implies that science is a unique
and almost unnatural phenomenon. He makes
us realize all of a sudden that practical interest
and natural curiosity could not lead men onto
the path of basic science where generalized, ab­
stract and mathematical knowledge takes them
away from practical considerations and tangible
realities.
18 WEBER (1958: 249 [n. 145] / 1947: 141f. [Anm.
5]).
317
That MERTON overlooked this lead in The Pro­
testant Ethic was not merely an accident. His
faith in the intrinsic value of knowledge as
knowledge being firm, he accepted the ideology
which science had fashioned for itself: know­
ledge is an end in itself, somehow mistaking a
norm of science for reality. It is for the same
reason that all the other sociologists of science
also overlooked the significant lead of WEBER
while extolling his Protestant Ethic as a germane
concept for a sociology of science. The profes­
sion struggled to discover all the extrinsic forces
which could exert an influence on science, i.e.
the mundane interests, the cultural norms, the
powers of decision, the technological and struc­
tural conditions. It explored to the fullest, and
beyond to the minutest, the institution of scien­
ce as a structural-functional system. But it accep­
ted the doctrine of the intrinsic value of scien­
tific knowledge at face value and classified it
as a functional requisite of science which posed
in itself no further problems. Unable to realize
how truly extraordinary and quite problemati­
cal this doctrine is, the sociology of science
remained unresponsive to the historical and
systematic questions which this doctrine ought
to have provoked. It therefore could never con­
ceive of an approach to the sociology of science
which pierced through the transparency of this
doctrine and began looking for ulterior meanings
involved in, and urging on the quest for know­
ledge. Confined by the ideology of science, the
sociology of science could not follow, nor even
notice WEBER’s lead. It simply could not recog­
nize it. Thus, I believe, it did not merely over­
look a problem, it rather missed the essential
and substantive dimension of a sociology of
science which .MAX WEBER had opened up for
us more than fifty years ago.
Nor is this all. Although expressing regret that
WEBER had abandoned the task which MERTON
then accepted as a mandate, the sociologists
of science overlooked not just the more substan­
tive lead, they even failed to notice that WEBER
had after all returned to his task and did, after
all, carry out what he obviously considered to
be the most important part of the mandate. To­
ward the end of his life he sketched out a so­
ciology of science, or what he at least conside­
red to be an essential dimension of it, which
in breadth and depth far
surpasses the scope of
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which
has
come
to pass
us for a
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Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 3, Heft 3, Juni 1974, S. 3 1 2 -320
sociology of science. It may well have gone be­
yond what he had had in mind originally when he
had promised, and then abandoned, a study of the
role which Protestantism had played for the rise
of science. Yet any attentive reader of the
sketch will immediately sense its continuity with
The Protestant Ethic. In fact, the continuity is
heralded by the very title of the essay in which
this sketch is to be found: Science as a Vocation
(or better perhaps: Science as a Calling)19. I do
not want to go into the substance of the matter
here and for proof must refer the reader to MAX
WEBER’s essay, and for further arguments to my
publications on this question20. Suffice it to
state here that whoever focusses his mind on
the relevant passages of the essay will feel closer
to the spirit of WEBER’s thesis than he could
anywhere in MERTON’s study. There cannot be
the slightest doubt that Science as a Vocation
is the authentic offspring of The Protestant Ethic
inasmuch as that essay shows us the genuine
Puritan of The Protestant Ethic who found in
his religion not only cultural norms favorable to
some wordly occupations but also motive forces
which drove him to seek God in and through
rational knowledge. The Protestant Ethic had
shown us what an extraordinary venture capita­
lism had been in the beginning, and what an
“irrational” element had given, among others,
rise to an economic conduct of life which could
not have sprung from strictly economic rationa­
les, Science as a Vocation shows us what an
extraordinary venture the pursuit of rational
knowledge, and mathematical knowledge at that,
had originally been.
The substantive logic of his oeuvre, then, declar­
es Science as a Vocation to be the legitimate
continuation of The Protestant Ethic, and thus
it turns out that MAX WEBER made true his ori­
ginal promise, after all, or at least in part. Now,
a scrupulous mind may conceivably feel qualms
in accepting the verdict of interpretative logic
when it runs against WEBER’s explicit renuncia-
19 As T. PARSONS and R. BENDIX have emphasized
correctly, there is no satisfactory translation for
the German term ‘Beruf. (F. BENDIX (1960: 73
[n-D
tion of his earlier program. Referring to this al­
leged renunciation to be found in the last foot­
note which WEBER added when re-editing The
Protestant Ethic late in life, many scholars
have therefore repeated: “But WEBER did not
pursue this line of inquiry further. Instead . . .” 21.
May we then dismiss WEBER’s explicit statement
and accept it for a fact, on the strength of sub­
stantive understanding, that WEBER first openly
renounced his original program, yet afterwards
quietly returned to it? I, for one, feel that the
strength of the argument and the imperatives
of substantive understanding leave us no choice
in the matter.
There is consolation, however, for the most
scrupulous scholar. For it turns out, most si­
gnificantly again, that over the generations the
commentators and experts clearly misread WE­
BER’s remark. May the footnote now speak for
itself: “Instead of following up with an immedia­
te continuation in terms of the above program,
I have, partly for fortuitous reasons, especially
the appearance of TROELTSCH’s Die Soziallehren
der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, which
disposed of many things I should have had to
investigate in a way in which I, not being a
theologian, could not have done it; but partly
also in order to correct the isolation of this study
and to place it in relation to the whole of cul­
tural development, determined at that time,
first, to write down some comparative studies
of the general historical relationship of religion
and society”22. In this English version of the
footnote I have reinstated the temporal clause
“at that time” {seinerzeit) which T. PARSONS
had omitted from his translation, thereby ob­
scuring the chronological order in the statement,
and its exact meaning.
To sum it up for the sake of WEBERian studies:
When late in life MAX WEBER prepared for print
the first volume of his Collected Essays in the
Sociology o f Religion he wrote a preface {Vor­
bemerkung, which in the English edition is known
as ‘Author’s Introduction’) to bind together his
earlier essays o n The Protestant Ethic and his
subsequent studies on World Religions, all pre­
viously published in the Archiv für Sozialmssen-
20 I refer the reader to my 1974 article. For a general
21 MERTON (1970).
background see also TENBRUCK (1972a) and further,
Unauthenticated
TENBRUCK (1972b).
22 Download
See above, Date
note | 3.
6/15/17 8:48 PM
F. H. Tenbruck: Max Weber and the Sociology of Science: A Case Reopened
schaft und Sozialpolitik. For this purpose he
corrected, or otherwise slightly changed the
essays, sometimes adding new sections to them.
If WEBER, therefore, truly had abandoned his
earlier program he could easily have omitted it
from the text and the very fact that he did not
do so is an indication that he still stood by his
program. Leaving it in, however, created a start­
ling situation for readers who now found The
Protestant Ethic winding up with a program for
the further study of Protestantism and occiden­
tal rationalization processes while actually con­
tinuing with studies on world religions. To re­
pair this seeming incongruity, then, MAX WE­
BER, looking back at this point in his life (1919/
20) on his work in the sociology of religion,
tells us, in a last note which he appends to The
Protestant Ethic, that upon completion of his
Protestant Ethic he had not, “at that time”
(1905) “immediately” followed up on his origi­
nal program and had seen fit, for a number of
reasons, “first” to test out his ideas in the lar­
ger context of comparative studies on the other
world religions. He tells us plainly in so many
words that the meanwhile completed and pu­
blished comparative essays on The Economic
Ethic o f World Religions were an intermezzo
from which he had every intention to return to
the original program, i.e. follow through with
his intention of a comprehensive study of the
development of rationalism in Western civiliza­
tion to which he could now bring the insights
gained through the study of world religions. He
did, in fact, indicate that he had abandoned that
part of his early program which TROELTSCH
had tackled in the meantime, and being wise
to his original program by many years he must
also have had in mind certain shifts in emphasis.
But in toto his note is a plain and uncontroversial declaration of his lasting intention to carry
out his original program which never was aban­
doned, only temporarily postponed. Far from
contradicting the substantive logic, the note
corroborates it.
319
Yet are there not more substantial and compact
passages from his very late work, in which MAX
WEBER at least sketched out one or another part
of his contemplated authoritative work? More
specifically, did not MAX WEBER leave us with
an outline for a sociology of science which can
be readily recognized as an authentic continua­
tion of The Protestant Ethic? And how did mo­
dern science originate if, as WEBER tells us, it
cannot be understood as the product of material
and technical interests? And what verdict about
the present situation of science would WEBER
have derived from his account of the origins of
modern science? These questions do not merely
concern the exegesis of MAX WEBER; they are, I
think, of the utmost importance for a sociology
of science. And therefore we have to turn to
Science as a Vocation as the one authentic con­
tinuation of his “program”. When we begin to
read this essay seriously we discover that MAX
WEBER had opened up a new, essential and fasci­
nating dimension for a sociology of science.
Considering our ideas about the nature and
growth of science, we cannot easily make sense
of WEBER’s essay which goes beyond the con­
fines of our universe of discourse, ordinary or
professional. Thus, the essay has been read by
some as a weak restatement of the axiom of
value-neutrality, or has been regarded by others
as his political testament.
The essay is an intricate piece of work which
calls for an interpretation. I cannot now attempt
to reconstruct and interpret it, though, let alone
develop its far reaching implications for a history
and sociology of science. Suffice it then to indi­
cate what is characteristic in WEBER’s essay, which,
as must be borne in mind, uses the term science
in its inclusive meaning to comprise the humani­
ties and the social sciences as well as the natural
sciences.
He concentrates on a point which is protected,
as it were, by a constitutive norm of science.
From all this can but result the question: where is The pursuit of science presupposes a norm which
the continuation to be found in WEBER’s oeuvre? declares knowledge to be something worthwile
Surely, there must be indicative traces and poin­ in its own right, i.e. to have an intrinsic value
ters immersed in his writings, which can serve us apart from utilitarian or instrumental considera­
as clues and conjectures in an attempt to size up tions. A scientist must be so imbued with this
norm that he is individually motivated (and other­
the contours and directions of the definitive
wise socially encouraged)
to search for knowledge
work which WEBER, with just one or two years
Unauthenticated
left before his sudden death, never came to write with noDownload
other justification
than
being know­
Date | 6/15/17
8:48itsPM
320
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 3, Heft 3, Juni 1974, S. 3 1 2 -3 2 0
ledge. He may, if he is familiar with the philoso­
phy of science, realize that the norm cannot be
established by scientific proof. Methodologically
speaking, it is a non-rational belief in the value
of knowledge. In fact, most scientists are usu­
ally content to take the norm for granted. If
questioned about it, they refer to the utility of
science or have recourse to more or less equi­
valent values such as “intellectual curiosity”,
“rationality” and the like, which are woven
into our cultural tradition.
moral world. “In the last analysis” the rise of
modern science was a quest for Truth writ
large, a search for a meaningful cosmos and for
the certainty of uncontroversial rules to tell us
how we ought to act and to live. “In the last
analysis” and originally, science was not a purely
cognitive venture, and the belief in the intrinsic
value of rational knowledge was predicated on
assumptions and expectations about its ulterior
meanings.
The significance of WEBER’s amazing analysis
does not lie in his account of the origins of
science, modern or ancient, though. It is the
implications that matter. One is spelt out
succinctly by MAX WEBER who uses the histo­
rical account for the purpose of throwing into
relief a fundamental predicament of modern
science, and of a scientific civilization, at that.
Far from establishing science securely, the insti­
tutionalization of science has led into another
sort of ‘iron cage’. The very success of science
has led to disenchantment of the world. The
original expectations have been buried, the
original enthusiasm has been spent. It has be­
come quite obvious that science cannot
provide meaning or guidance. The attraction of
MAX WEBER approaches the problem differently.
science has come to rest on expectations of
Believing that the norm itself bears closer inspec­ material progress which cannot last. At any
tion, he is not concerned with conditions or for­ rate, they cannot serve as an adequate substi­
ces which could favor or threaten this norm.
tute for the belief in the intrinsic value of know­
When he points out the meta-scientific character ledge. In a way, the legitimacy of science is
of the norm, he is not merely offering a metho­ threatened from within because it is becoming
dological statement. Never content with genera­
increasingly difficult to believe in the intrinsic
lities, he asks what the norm historically meant
value of knowledge and to mobilize that requi­
to different epochs. He argues that intellectual
site enthusiasm which has sustained the pro­
curiosity, utilitarian considerations or social
gress of knowledge over the centuries. When it
conditions cannot explain why some men in
becomes obvious that science cannot satisfy
antiquity, in the Renaissance, in the 17th cen­
man’s need for meaning, it is likely that men
tury began to search for rational knowledge. No will turn away from, or even against science.
combination of such motivations could have en­
gendered the requisite determination. To per­
When we use WEBER’s analysis as a guide for
severe in so strange a venture; to seek for strict­ the history of modern science, another impli­
ly logical, rational, mathematical knowledge; to
cation of great importance comes to the light
abide by its consequences; to consider rational
which WEBER did not develop in his essay. The
explanation a fit key to reality ; all this pre­
history of the sciences, to include the humanities
supposes a belief that the world is an intelli­
and the social sciences, all of a sudden reveals
gible and, what is more, a meaningful order.
a logic and unity of its own once we approach
Men like PLATO, LIONARDO, or SWAMMERDAM
it with WEBER’s ideas in mind. In my article on
were not searching for what we nowadays call
Science as a Vocation I have tried to show
knowledge. Their quest was sustained by the
what a new picture of three centuries of modern
conviction that they would ultimately discover
sciences emerges Unauthenticated
once we have become alert to
Date | WEBER
6/15/17 8:48
the order and meaning of the physical and
theDownload
clues which
has PM
provided. If we
What is a norm for the practicing scientist be­
comes a problem for a sociology of science,
though. How does this norm operate? How
effective is it in the face of potentially deviant
personal interests of scientists and social pressu­
res? In what manner and to what extent can
the norm be maintained? These are crucial
questions with which the sociology of science
has been concerned. THOMAS KUHN has recent­
ly added a new angle to these problems by sug­
gesting that normal science does follow para­
digms, rather than pursue knowledge directly,
thus disturbing the normative self-image of
scientists.
F. H. Tenbruck: Max Weber and the Sociology of Science: A Case Reopened
want to understand the situation of contempo­
rary science, I believe, we have to study it in
this larger historical perspective.
Bibliography
321
TENBRUCK, F.H., 1972b: Wissenschaft und Religion.
In: Religion im Umbruch, hersg. von J. Wössner.
Stuttgart: Enke.
TENBRUCK, F.H., 1974: ‘Science as a Vocation Revisited. In: F o rsth o ff/R. Hörstel (eds.): Stand­
orte im Zeitstrom. Festschrift für Arnold Gehlen.
Frankfurt: Athenäum Verlag.
WEBER, M., 1947: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions­
soziologie, Bd. I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Sie­
beck).
WEBER, M., 1958: The Protestant Ethic and the Spir­
it o f Capitalism, trsltd. by Talcott Parsons. New
York, N.Y.: Charles Scrbner’s Sons.
BARBER, B., 1970: Science and the Social Order.
2. Aufl. Glencoe: The Free Press.
BENDIX, R., 1960: Max Weber. An Intellectual Por­
trait. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
MERTON, R.K., 1970: Science, Technology and Society
in 17th Century England. New York, N.Y.: Harper
(Torchbooks).
TENBRUCK, F.H., 1972a: Tensione fra cultura e scienza nei paesi sviluppati. In: Scienza a Tecnica 72.
Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori. (A French version o f
this article can be found in: La science et la diversi- Anschrift des Verfassers: Prof. Dr. F.H. TENBRUCK
74 Tübingen 9, Maienfeldstraße 29
te des cultures, UNESCO, Paris, 1973.).
Unauthenticated
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