The League of Arab States
Chair: Kayla Scott
The Greater Washington Conference on International Affairs
The George Washington University
International Affairs Society
November 1 st , 201
Introduction from the Dais:
Ahlan! My name is Kayla Scott and I am excited to be chairing the Arab League for this year’s
19th GWCIA. I am a senior at the George Washington University and I will be graduating with a major in
International Affairs, a concentration in Middle East Studies, and a minor in economics. I grew up in
Huntington Beach, California, which is where I started my Model UN adventures. I have been competing
for 7 years and I have been to over 25 conferences. This is also my fifth time chairing a committee. If you
have any questions regarding Model UN in high school or college, or any questions regarding the
committee, please feel free to email me at [email protected]. I wish you all the best of luck in your
research and I will see you in November!
Marhaba delegates! My name is Fatima Jamal and I am a sophomore in the Columbian College of
Arts and Sciences, double-majoring in Political Science and International Affairs with a concentration in
Conflict Resolution. Though I call Victorville, California my home, I grew up in Kuwait City, Kuwait
and Muscat, Oman before coming to GWU last fall. I have been involved in MUN since high school,
participating as a delegate in around 10 conferences and chairing 3. I am so excited to meet you all and
debate our topics! In the meantime, please feel free to email me at [email protected] if you have any
questions or concerns!
History of the League of Arab States
Formed on March 22, 1945 in Cairo, Egypt, the League of Arab States is the foremost
regional organization for Arab states. Shortly after gaining independence from the Ottoman
Empire, the League was formed in commitment to "the strengthening of the relations between
the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between
them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs
and interests of the Arab countries" (Charter of the League of Arab States, Article II).
The LAS originally began as an organization dedicated to freeing other Arab countries
under colonial rule and preventing the creation of a Jewish state; it has since expanded its reach
beyond the political realm into coordinating scientific, economic, and educational policies and
preserving and promoting Arab culture and society. Egypt has often played a large role in the
League as the headquarters are in Cairo and all Secretary-Generals have been Egyptian except
from 1979 until 1991 when Egypt was suspended from the League after signing a peace-treaty
with Israel.
Due to significant diversity and differences between member states, the League has not
always been effective at resolving Arab conflicts and has found more success in fostering
economic and social cooperation between member states. The Leagues greatest successes include
increasing literacy across member states, economic integration, telecommunication, limiting the
1958 Lebanon crisis and the Gadaffi regime following Arab Spring protests, among others.
Members of the League
The current members of the Arab League are:
Algeria (1962)
Bahrain (1971)
Comoros (1993)
Djibouti (1977)
Egypt (1945)
Iraq (1945)
Jordan (1945)
Kuwait (1961)
Lebanon (1945)
Libya (1953)
Mauritania (1973)
Morocco (1958)
Oman (1971)
State of Palestine (1976)
Qatar (1971)
Saudi Arabia (1945)
Somalia (1974)
Sudan (1956)
Syria (1945; suspended in 2011, currently represented by the Syrian National Coalition)
Tunisia (1958)
United Arab Emirates (1971)
Yemen (1945)
The League of Arab States also has four observers: Eritrea, Brazil, Venezuela, and India.
Structure of the League of Arab States
The League Council is the supreme organ in the League; each member only has one vote
in the Council, regardless of the number of representatives, with majority decisions only binding
to states who voted for them. The duties of the council include coordinating the activities of the
League, voting on the budget and membership applications, appointing the Secretary General,
and overseeing the implementation of various agreements passed between member states. The
Council meets twice a year but may meet when an emergency session is called by at least two of
its members. Within the Council, two other councils exist. The first is the Joint Defense Council
formed from the Treaty for Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation; foreign and defense
ministers of member governments sit on the council and have the power to use armed forces and
to adopt whatever additional measures are deemed necessary to restore peace and security. The
Economic and Social Council is tasked with promoting the economic and social development of
member states as well as overseeing the specialized agencies of the League.
Though not included in the charter, summit conferences are an essential body of the Arab
League. They can be called at any time when the need arises and are attended by the heads of
state to pass resolutions from which other LAS bodies work.
The remaining bodies of the League fall within the office of the general secretariat.
Headed by the office of the Secretary-General, currently Nabil Elaraby, the general secretariat is
responsible for the administrative duties of the League as well as overseeing the committees and
special councils. Within the general secretariat, technical committees are established for
represented members to oversee technical matters relating to cooperation; these committees
include: the Administrative Court, the Investment Arbitration Board, and the Higher Auditing
Board. Specialized Ministerial Councils are established to coordinate policies on numerous
topics and the corresponding minister of the member's government sits on the ministry council.
The 12 councils established are on: housing and construction, information, interior, justice,
communication, electricity, environmental issues, health, social affairs, tourism, youth and sports
and transportation. Within these councils, numerous specialized agencies have been created,
which as mentioned earlier, are overseen by the Economic and Social Council of the League of
Arab States.
Topic 1: Sectarian Violence
Sources of Sectarian Violence:
Sectarian violence is a phenomenon that has been seen widely throughout the Arab
world. While some claim that sectarianism has been a constant in the last century, others claim
that while these divides have existed for a long time, their politicization has manifested in many
different depending on the context of the time (Zubaida). Some also blame the drawing of
current political borders as the reason for sectarian violence claiming that nations are not
indicative of true power alliances. Whether being of a different religion or ethnicity is the true
reason for violence or just an excuse to be violent in a power struggle, one must define the
groups that have long suffered disagreement.
The Arab world suffers from instances of religious, ethnic, and political sectarian
violence. Often, more than one of these labels can be given to any one conflict. In the Middle
East, there are three main religious strives. One is Sunni verses Shias which goes back to the
600s when the disagreement of who should lead the Muslims deepened as the party of Ali (the
Shias) split from those who wished to elect their leader (the Sunnis). There is also conflict
between Muslim and Christian groups. These two groups clash most often in the North African
region, especially Sudan and Egypt, as well as politically in Lebanon. Lastly, there is great
conflict between Muslims and Jews in the region. This conflict is greatly manifested in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an issue of great importance to all Arab nations. Ethnic sectarianism
is also present in the Middle East. In North African Arab nations, most ethnic sectarianism is
between blacks and Arabs. Another ethnic group that is marginalized in the Middle East, namely
Iraq, Turkey, and Iran is the Kurds. Political sectarian violence is also another issue experienced
throughout the Middle East. The political sectarianism experienced during the Arab spring was
largely between “political Islam” and secular-based regimes. However, there are also ethnic or
religious political violence, due to political parties coinciding with religious groups, such as the
violence in Iraq and Lebanon.
Complications from Sectarian Conflicts
Nearly every nation in the Arab league deals with some sort of violence based on
sectarian lines. Not only does this violence result in the deaths of many innocent people, but the
violence also leads to other problems such as political instability, the destruction of
infrastructure, and a decline in investment and the economy. The effects of sectarian violence
also resonate across country borders. Therefore, it is essential for the Arab League to discuss
sectarian violence and come up with a unified approach to containing and ending the violence.
While the Arab league has on many accounts denounced sectarian violence and taken an
especially active role in the Syrian conflict, it is clear that more needs to be done.
The actual violence due to sectarian conflict is a huge issue. For example, in the current
Iraqi insurgency, starting in 2011, around 16,000 have been killed in violence related to Sunni
and Shia conflict (AFP). The death toll in the Syrian civil war, also a conflict incited by
differences between Sunni and Alawite-Shia groups, has reached 160,000 (CNN). Deaths are not
the only direct result of violence. For example, extremist organizations have taken advantage of
the instability caused by this violence in order to cross country borders. For instance, sectarian
violence between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq led to the deterioration of the state, allowing for AlQaeda in Iraq (AQI) to flourish. When the Syrian conflict started, leaders of AQI took advantage
of the situation to enter Syria and gain followers for a new organization Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). ISIS then turned itself into the Islamic State (IS) and has now reentered Iraq and is
making its way south towards Jordan (Laub). While IS was born out of Wahhabist extremism,
the terrorist organization was able to take advantage of the violence and instability of Sectarian
Conflict.
Sectarian conflict in the region has also resulted in a massive increase in refugees. Not
only are there internally displaced persons living in refugee camps, but there are also externally
displaced persons (EDPs) in countries neighboring conflict. This is an issue because sectarian
conflict is truly a regional issue with regional consequences. For example, Jordan currently hosts
around 1.4 million refugees. While Jordan itself has been fairly stable throughout the Iraq War
and the Arab Spring uprising, the nation has not been able to escape the consequences of
conflict. Most refugees in Jordan have fled sectarian violence in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine
(UNHCR). To put this number of refugees in a better perspective, the total population of
Jordanian citizens totals only 6.3 million (World Bank). This means almost one in every five
persons in Jordan is a refugee. Jordan is not the only country in the Arab League who hosts
EDPs. Housing refugees puts a strain on national governments to support the refugee population
while still trying to provide basic services to their own citizens.
Lastly, sectarian violence can hurt either a country’s own economy or even the
economies of neighboring. Violence can hurt a nearby country’s economy by blocking shipments
or discouraging investment. Sectarian violence can hurt a countries own economy by making it
unsafe for businesses to be run or for employees to go to work. This brings a halt to businesses
and a decline in investment. For example, post-Arab Spring, Egypt has been dealing with
political sectarian violence between the Muslim Brotherhood and other supporters of political
Islam and those in support of a more secular or military government, as well as sectarian
violence between Muslims and Coptic Christians. This violence nearly crippled the Egyptian
economy and has led to a lack of foreign investment and foreign reserves, which has caused
massive inflation and unemployment in Egypt (Cook).
Sectarian violence has a wide range of effects and complications and therefore needs to
be dealt with, especially in the Arab League. Previously, the Arab League has acted against the
sectarian violence in Syria by suspending the Asad regime from the Arab League, and the league
has also formally denounced the sectarian violence in Iraq, but little else has been done in the
league to deal with such issues.
Questions to Consider:
•
What role will terrorist organizations play in the peace-building process? Should said
organizations play a role?
•
What measures should member states take to insure peace and security in the region?
•
Given the general weakness of state governments where sectarian issues are widespread,
what role should the Arab League play in assisting the governments?
•
How will the League foster cooperation between Arab citizens despite religious and
linguistic barriers?
•
Should the League attempt negotiations with Israel in order to quell sectarian violence?
•
How can the League better coordinate anti-terrorism policies and information on
sectarian violence in member states and surrounding states?
Topic 2: Expatriate Workers
Background of Expatriate Workers in the Arab League
Expatriate Workers are defined as foreigners who work in a country other than their own
under a limited duration contract (Naithani). The Middle East is both a destination and origin
country when it comes to foreign workers. The first major influx of foreign workers into the
Arab region occurred in 1973, following a boom in oil prices. With wealth flowing into many of
the nations that now make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), many migrant workers
looking for higher wages immigrated into the region. Initially, most of the migrant workers in the
GCC were other Arabs coming from nations such as Egypt, Yemen, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Sudan. However, this trend started to change by the early 1980s as more workers from Asia,
including Southeast Asia, were recruited. (Jureidini). Currently, a majority of expatriate workers
in the Middle East are from South and Southeast Asia.
The United Nations and several other international organizations, including the
International Labor Organization (ILO), have passed conventions and agreements pertaining to
migrant workers. The backbone of the United Nations’ policy on migrant workers can be found
in the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1990
(A/RES/45/58). The ILO has also passed a number of documents that give rights to laborers as
well as encourage the abolition of forced labor which is extended to migrant workers in addition
to domestic workers. However, no Middle Eastern nation has ratified any of the major ILO
conventions that pertain to expatriate workers (Jureidini).
There have been Arab regional agreements pertaining to migrant workers. One of these
conventions in the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, adopted at a meeting of the
Islamic Cooperation Organization. This convention extended human rights to migrant workers.
Another important declaration is the Arab Declaration on the Movements of Manpower which
called for interregional cooperation and preference. However, the principles of this declaration
were relaxed as it was evident that Asian labor would be significantly cheaper starting in the
1990s. Nonetheless, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia
(ESCWA) continued to pressure Arab governments to replace Asian workers with Arab workers
to promote the regional economy and help to alleviate social and political tensions in the region
(Jureidini).
With growing international attention on the situation of expatriate workers in the Middle
East, the Arab league has taken several actions in order to improve any flaws with the influx of
foreign workers in the region. Since 2012, the Arab league has conducted field visits to both
Syria and Libya, as well as sponsor three research projects. The Arab League has also hosted
several meetings and conferences that included expatriate workers as a point for discussion
(League of Arab States).
While every nation in the Arab League hosts foreign workers, the Gulf Cooperation
Council by far hosts the most outsiders. Expatriate workers make up 61.7% of the total
workforce in the GCC, with some countries having up to 90% of their workforce expatriates
(Forstenlechner). In Qatar for example, foreigners make up 90% of the workforce and 99% of
the labor in the private sector (“Qatar Labor Report”). The GCC region has the largest number of
expatriate workers for two major reasons: energy wealth and a small national population. After
the boom and continued demand of energy sources such as oil and natural gas, the GCC nations,
rich in these commodities, experienced an immense growth in wealth. The money gained by the
governments was used to not only take care of their own population, but also to begin large
development projects. Since these nations were small in terms of workers to begin with, foreign
labor was needed to staff large development projects. This system of foreign labor holding
industrial-type jobs for the uneducated and nationals holding public sector jobs still is seen
today. Many other nations in the Arab League suffer from an issue such as a slow-growth
economies, unemployment, or security problems that has made the country less hospitable to
foreign workers. For example, Libya may have large oil reserves, but there is political conflict,
violence, and therefore not a foreign worker population comparable to the GCCs.
In the Arab world there are two main classes of expatriates; there are the upper class
workers who fill skilled and management jobs, and there are the lower class workers that
perform manual labor or household jobs. Upper class workers tend to come from the Western
World. There are some Indian expatriate workers who hold similar jobs, but according to a 2009
survey, the Indian workers earn less than half of a westerner with the same job in GCC countries.
The lower class workers typically come from South Asia. This has created a two-tiered category
of expatriate workers with the preferred category, from a social standpoint, being the Western
workers who are treated well by both their employers and the community (Naithani).
Problems Associated with the Use of Expatriate Workers
There are many potential issues that Arab nations may encounter when using expatriate
workers especially those outside of the Arab World. These issues encompass very pressing
economic, social, and humanitarian problems.
Two major economic problems that stem from the use of expatriate workers are loss of
wealth due to remittances and long term unemployment of the domestic population. Remittances
are money earned by a foreigner and sent to his or her home country (World Bank). While the
Middle East as a whole benefits from receiving remittances abroad, the region as a whole loses
quite a bit of money with GCC countries alone supplying about 82.96 billion USD in 2012 to the
rest of the world. 45% of India’s remittances originate from money their citizens earned in GCC
nations. Due to the current political instability and violence in Egypt, Egyptians citizens working
abroad have passed up the nations of Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia and the highest
remittance earner in the Arab League. The Middle East and North African (MENA) region,
collected about 49.2 billion USD in 2012 (Gulf Times). So while the promotion of international
economic integration is helping many nations in the Arab League, there are concerns that more
wealth is being lost from the region due to expatriate workers originating from South Asia.
The other major concern regarding the influx of expatriate workers in the Middle East is
long term unemployment. Currently, most jobs in the GCC nations are filled by expatriate
workers. However, 60% of the GCC population is between the ages of 14 and 27, meaning there
are a lot of workers coming out of high school or higher education that will be searching for
employment. Currently, most of the local population work for the public sector because there is
greater job security, less hours, less content in the work, and generous holidays (Naithani). This
has widely created a privileged local workforce that would refuse to occupy the lower paid or
more strenuous private sector jobs. Thus far the GCC governments have had enough money to
add jobs to the public sector, even if they are not needed for any purpose other than providing
employment. However, this is not a sustainable system due to the eventual depletion of the oil
industry and further growth of the national population. Eventually the distribution of oil wealth
will deteriorate and unemployment or unsufficient employment for gulf citizens will be realized
(Forstenlechner).
The social problems that the Middle East may face are anger at a lack of jobs for
domestic citizens, anger by foreigners at their mistreatment compared to natives, as well as
further ethnic and cultural tension between natives and foreigners. The Middle East has a young
population that is entering their working years. In many nations in the Middle East, there are not
sufficient jobs available to the local population. However, South Asians are still able to find
work all over the Middle East, from the GCCs to Lebanon to Morocco. While the jobs of these
South Asians are mainly household workers or construction jobs, which most Middle Eastern
workers would not want to occupy, especially with a college education, a phenomenon similar to
what is seen in the U.S. may occur where unemployment is blamed on foreigners, even if
foreigners don’t dominate the industry people are looking for work in. In a region that is already
wrought by political and social unrest, the potential conflict could be disastrous.
There is also the issue of race-based treatment in the Middle East. Especially in the GCC
countries, there is a social hierarchy with local Arabs on the top, followed by skilled westerners,
Arabs from other countries, and lastly Asian migrant workers. This clear racial divide leads to
poor social treatment of Asians and often social alienation (Naithani). Even in countries outside
of the GCC, such as Lebanon, Asian female live-in workers are excluded from society and have
been documented working under conditions akin to slavery (Jureidini). This issue of ethnic
division in society (not just in law) plays a huge role in furthering many of the human rights
abuses experienced by low-class migrant workers in the Middle East.
Asian domestic workers are widely mistreated in the region and there has been many
claims to human rights abuse towards companies, employers, and countries’ legal systems. The
two occupations most at risk for abuse are female live-in domestic workers and manual laborers.
Both of these jobs are mainly occupied by South and Southeast Asians. Asian domestic workers
are typically female and don’t have much outside the home which leaves them very vulnerable to
abuses by members of the family employing them. In Lebanon, these workers have been
documented in conditions akin to slavery (Jureidini), and there have been countless instances of
maids and nannies in GCC countries being sentenced to the death penalty for a variety of reasons
(Chamberlain). Manual laborers often experience poor safety conditions in the workplace, poor
housing, delay in payment, forced overtime without overtime compensation, and in some cases,
forced surrender of their passports (Naithani). In some GCC countries, the Kafala system is still
used as a means to control the flow of migrant workers. This system itself has been argued to be
an abuse to human rights. While some GCC countries have altered or abolished this system, Qatar
still uses it. The system requires sponsorship of migrant workers by an employer and that sponsor then
becomes the only means for a worker to enter or exit the country legally (Murray). This has led to
instances of human trafficking where an employer threatens an employee with inability to leave the
country in order to gain more work out of said employee. Overall, the issue with migrant workers and
their human rights throughout the Middle East stems from the reality that these workers are supposed to
be temporary and without a pathway to citizenship. Without citizenship, these workers lack many rights
they may have otherwise.
Questions to Consider:
•
Should the members of the Arab League return to the principles of preferring Arab labor over
Asian labor?
•
Would member states see this as furthering prejudices or strengthening the regional economy?
•
Should governments risk private sector profitability off of migrant workers or increase
quotas/place new measures to increase domestic workers?
•
How can governments promote social integration between nationals and foreigners? Should these
two groups mix?
•
How will governments address the accusations of human rights abuses against migrant workers?
•
Is there a legal platform nations should adopt to protect migrants?
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