Policy Approaches to Religious Differences and AntiDiscrimination– the Call for Dialogue
Very much work in progress. Please do not cite without permission.
Stina Hansteen Solhøy, Research fellow, Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo,
Norway. [email protected]
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Abstract:
The paper discusses the call for dialogue as a means to govern religious differences and antidiscrimination. This is done by examining what a call for inter-religious dialogue might imply
in three recent contributions within multiculturalism, namely Bhikhu Parekh (2000), Tariq
Modood (2007) and Anne Phillips (2008). Furthermore, the White Paper on Intercultural
Dialogue by The Council of Europe (2008) is also discussed, as a practical attempt to specify
the dialogue approach. The paper concludes that more elaborations are needed as well as
clarifications regarding e.g. the underlying premises and purposes of the approach as well as
the question of who should participate. This also renders possible addressing the question of
intersectionality.
Introduction
How should religious pluralism and the possible disputes and dilemmas it raises be governed
in liberal democratic states? This question is at the centre of several academic debates within
the field of multiculturalism as well as being an intensely debated issue in actual politics
within Western European states. On the one hand the discussions raise the concept of
secularism, often framed as a question of whether or not modern secular states should
accommodate religion in the public sphere (see e.g. Loenen and Goldschmidt 2007). For
instance; should hijab be allowed to wear in schools, at universities – or even more
controversial; in public administration, the police force and in courts? Should secular states
accommodate different religious burial rituals and separate graveyards, time to pray during
working hours and religious appointed staff in e.g. hospitals, the army and in prisons? These
are a few examples challenging the classical liberal ideal of a strict separation between a
public and a private sphere, but they also confront the privileged position of the majority’s
religion, especially in countries like Norway with a state church system1.
On the other hand, religious pluralism and what is seen as an increase in claims and
allowances of religious accommodations and exemptions from certain laws can also be
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The last years however the state church system has undergone several changes, the most important being a
change in the status of the Church, from a state church to a “People’s Church”, indicating a more autonomous
position from the state.
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framed as a “minority within minorities”-problem. When this is the case the effects of this
policy, especially concerning women, children, homosexuals and dissenters, are at the centre
of attention (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005). This means that actions designed to protect
or strengthening the position of a religious minority within the larger society may result in
empowering religious leaders over dissidents within their group (Phillips 2005:113). Susan
Moller Okin (1999) is famous for her rhetorical question capturing this problem in the
following way: Is multiculturalism bad for women? The critical point is how each group treats
its own members (Okin 1999: 119). According to Okin ”[d]iscrimination against and control
of the freedom of females are practiced, to a greater or lesser extent, by virtually all cultures,
past and present, but especially by religious ones and those that look to the past – to ancient
texts or revered traditions – for guidelines or rules about how to live in the contemporary
world” (Okin 1999:21). Her argument is thus that group rights, especially the ones given to
religious communities, have a gendered bias in the sense that they allow the community to
continue privileging men over women, leaving women members of the group in a vulnerable
position. The tension between the individual rights of women and religious group rights may
be further aggravated if the state delegates self-governing power in certain legal arenas such
as family law, accompanied by a non-interventionist policy (Shachar 1999:91-92).
What is targeted both by Okin and Shachar then is not individual claims of religious freedom
and the right to exercise this freedom both in private and in public (as is the case when
discussing the hijab), but religious freedom as a right for religious communities to autonomy
and exemptions from specific laws – and the gendered consequences of such claims. This
problem is especially salient for liberal states as it is committed to treat all persons as each
other’s moral equals (Okin 1999:131). But – it may be quite uncertain what the best means to
this end are. For instance, when framing the problem as a minority within minority issue,
women tend to be seen as victims of their religious group, implicitly treating religious women
as less capable of individual autonomy than women outside these groups (Phillips 2008:3841). In a Norwegian context this is evident in public debates discussing particular Muslim
women’s lack of gender equality within the family as well as in the society at large (Grung
2006:272). The Muslim community is thus perceived as oppressive towards women – as in
contrast to Norwegian ideals of gender equality. According to Grung, the result of this
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framing is that Muslim women are experiencing a threefold kind of pressure; as Muslims, as
women, and as Muslim women (Grung 2006:272). This also exemplifies the concept of
intersectionality. While a minority-within-minorities approach usually focuses on either
women or homosexuals or some other group identity, intersectionality highlights how
different identities are intersecting in particular contexts, making individuals, in this case
Muslim women, vulnerable to discrimination that cannot be reduced to either gender or
ethnicity or religion.
In order to make the picture more complex, it is also necessary to relate the discussion to
freedom of religion, established e.g. in The European Convention on Human Rights, Art.9, 1:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance”. Is not the result then, as the state tries to protect religious women from
discrimination, that they in fact not only devaluate the autonomy of religious women, but also
violate the principle of freedom of religion in a radical way (Torbjørnsrud 2007:150)? How
then should the liberal state approach this “puzzle”? Is it possible to support claims of
autonomy for religious groups while at the same time also protecting (religious) women’s
equality and rights (Borchgrevink 2002, Phillips 2008)?
According to Anne Phillips (2008:158) the following three strategies are most commonly
recommended by political theorists: a judicial approach, “exit”, and dialogue. In the paper my
main concern is on the latter, that is - the dialogue approach. The reason for this is that
dialogue is applauded both among multiculturalists and feminists (Elstub 2006:301) as well as
being an approach that politicians increasingly seems to turn to more generally to govern
cultural as well as religious diversity in the aftermath of “the crisis of multiculturalism”
(Modood 2008). The Council of Europe launched a White Paper on “intercultural dialogue” in
2008 expressing this view: “The responses to the questionnaires sent to member states, in
particular revealed a belief that what had until recently been a preferred policy approach,
conveyed in shorthand as “multiculturalism”, had been found inadequate. On the other hand,
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there did not seem to be a desire to return to an older emphasis on assimilation. Achieving
inclusive societies needed a new approach, and intercultural dialogue was the route to follow”
(The Council of Europe, p.5). According to The Council of Europe “intercultural dialogue”
includes dialogues in all spheres – the religious sphere included (ibid.:5, 12).
Norway is no exception from this “trend” as the country can be said to have taken on a
leading position concerning inter-religious dialogue, initiating as well as participating as
mediators of such dialogues both nationally as well as around the world. The Ministry of
Foreign affairs thus supports inter-religious dialogues in e.g. Africa’s Horn as well as in the
Middle East (St.prp.nr.1 2007-2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.149)2. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs also supports The Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights, led by the former
prime minister in Norway Kjell Magne Bondevik. The centre has inter-religious dialogue as
one of its main pillars (The Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights 2008).
In 1996 the Council of religious and life stance communities (STL) was established,
consisting of 13 religious communities. Its purpose is to promote mutual respect and
understanding between different religious and life stance communities while also initiate and
participate in dialogues between the religious communities, and between these communities
and other arenas in the Norwegian society. In this respect the council represent an
institutionalization of inter-religious dialogue (Grung and Larsen 2000:20). As a consequence,
STL is an important participant when the government initiate consultations and dialogues
concerning religion and religious policy (“religionspolitikk”). An example which also
highlights the state’s effort to address “minorities within minorities” through the means of
dialogue is the initiative by the The Minister of Children and Equality in 2008 to establish a
“contact forum for religious and life stance issues” (Kontaktforum for tros- og
livssynsspørsmål). Here STL was invited to discuss issues concerning gender equality and
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In relation to inter-religious dialogues in the Middle East, Rev. Canon Trond Bakkevig, a pastor in the Church
of Norway, has played a significant role as mediatior of dialoges between Christian, Jewish and Muslim
religious leaders in Palestine/Israel also involving extensive contacts with political and religious leaders in Iran
and other Middle East countries.
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anti-discrimination of homosexuals. This kind of dialogue is also mentioned in the recent
Norwegian action-plan to combat discrimination against homosexuals: “The Children- and
Equality Department shall establish an inter-religious council where representatives from STL
and the Minister can discuss values- and life stance questions and current anti-discrimination
themes, lhbt-questions included” [author’s translation] (The Government’s action-plan “Better
quality of life for lesbian, gays, bisexuals, and transsexual people 2009-2012”, measure 35).
Furthermore, dialogue with religious groups and religious leaders is also advocated as an
important approach in order to combat female genital mutilation (Knutsen 2009). It is fair to
say then, that inter-religious dialogue is seen as providing the best procedure to govern
religious pluralism and deep disagreements in modern societies. This sounds very good but
what does it mean (Hernes 2008)? What is inter-religious dialogue? And is dialogue between
the state and the religious communities on anti-discrimination policy really the best approach
to deal with these issues? If so; why? And what might be the challenges with the dialogue
approach in this respect?
The dialogue approach – what is it?
If we start looking at the concepts used to describe the dialogue approach they vary between
intercultural dialogue, inter-religious dialogue, multilogue, deliberative democracy,
corporatism, negotiations, discussions and consultations. The problem is not the concepts per
se, but that there seems to be a lack of clarity as to what they might mean when used in
relation to dialogue. This is also noted by the Council of Europe, commenting on the
reluctance from member states to give a definition of “intercultural dialogue” (White Paper
2008: 5). In The White paper this is interpreted as “a genuine uncertainty as to what
intercultural dialogue might mean in practice” (ibid.). This uncertainty also seems to
characterise some of the central theoretical contributions within multiculturalism in recent
years, like Bhikhu Parekh (2000, 2009) and Tariq Modood (2007) as well as Anne Phillips’
(2008). Few efforts are for instance done to clarify the relationship between e.g.
“discussions”, “negotiations” and “dialogue”.
In the paper the purpose is to shed light on the challenges facing first and foremost interreligious dialogue between the state and the religious communities. Note however that some
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might not be willing to define negotiations or “talks” between the state and religious groups as
“dialogue” at all, mainly because of the uneven distribution of power. I will return to this
question later, but for analytical purposes and because much literature as well as actual
negotiations or consultations between the state and religious groups are called “dialogue”, I
have decided to stick with the concept. Inter-religious dialogue is however more frequently
being used to describe dialogues between religious communities (see e.g.Grung and Larsen
2000). These dialogues can involve organizations within the same religion, for instance the
“Conference of European Churches” (SEC) which is a Christian fellowship of 126 Orthodox,
Protestant, Anglican and Old Catholic Churches (CEC 2009). Or they can involve different
religions as for instance dialogue between Christians and Muslims, as is the case with The
Christian-Muslim Contact Group of the Churches and the Islamic Council in Norway
(Kontaktgruppa for Mellomkirkelig Råd og Islamsk Råd ). Inter-religious dialogue is in these
cases perceived as a particular method towards greater understanding between different
religions (see e.g. Leirvik 2003, Grung and Larsen 2000). This is achieved through a dialogue
that treat all participants with equal respect, all should have the same influence according to
the issues at hand as well as how the issues should be dealt with. These are important
hallmarks of what have been called “a qualified dialogical process” (Grung 2006:274). A
connection is furthermore drawn between inter-religious dialogue and dialogues within
religious communities, opening up for possible changes in how religious texts and norms as
well as practices are interpreted (Grung 2006:275). Sometimes also “intercultural dialogue”
is used, e.g. by The Council of Europe (2008) who includes both religious and cultural
groups, and dialogues between religious communities as well as between the state and
religious communities. Inter-cultural dialogue is thus being a broader concept than interreligious dialogue.
Within the multicultural literature dialogue is sometimes also taken to imply dialogues in the
wider society. The theoretical foundations are often derived from deliberative democracy. The
ideal is the active citizen. We should all engage in different public discussions, debates and
dialogues not only within the traditional political institutions, but in as many arenas as
possible: “(…) no sphere should be exempt from engaging in intercultural dialogue – be it the
neighbourhood, the workplace, the education system and associated institutions, civil society
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and particularly the youth sector, the media, the arts world or the political arena” (The
Council of Europe 2008: 5).
The distinction made so far is done on a basis of who participates in the dialogue. However,
focusing on dialogues between the state and religious communities a further categorization is
possible – on the basis of institutionalization. Are we talking about a corporate
multiculturalism (Modood 2008) or a multiculturalism “without groups” (Phillips 2008)? An
underlying question is then whether type of institution matter for addressing minorities within
minorities-problems. Framing the question in such a manner also includes exploring how
different dialogues are justified, both within multicultural theory as well as in practice; Why
should religious communities engage in dialogue with the state – and vice versa?
Three main contributions within recent multicultural theory will be studied more closely in
this respect, namely Parekh (2000, 2009), Modood (2007) and Phillips (2008)3. Modood and
Parekh have been positioned as “critical or political multiculturalists” as they oppose liberal
multiculturalism and its emphasis on legal accommodations (Strasser 2008). Phillips, trying to
combine a multicultural perspective with a liberal feminist one, is modifying the dialogue
approach. She argues in favour of greater inclusion of individual voices, including a particular
concern for women’s voices. Although there are substantial differences between Parekh and
Modood on the one side and Phillips on the other, they all share a more or less strong belief in
the dialogue approach. The empirical examples will mainly be drawn from The Council of
Europe’s “The White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue” (2008).
Inter-religious dialogue as “corporative multiculturalism” or
as “multiculturalism without groups”?
It is possible to differentiate between a strong and weak notion of institutionalization. An
example of a weak notion of institutionalization is lobbyism. It is an inclusive form of
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Also theories within deliberative democracy as well as “associational democracy” advocates dialogue – or
rather democratic deliberation at all levels of society. Thus these theories can contribute to theories of
multiculturalism and the dialogue approach. Further discussions of this will be included in a revision of the
paper. As a first step however, I have limited the scope scrutinize some of the main contributions within recent
theories of multiculturalism and their call for dialogue.
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participation (at least in theory) and usually perceived as the least binding form of
participation where the government (or some other political body) is free to turn down advice
or critique if this is in the state’s interest (Rommetvedt 2002). Corporatism on the other hand,
is known as “strong” institutionalized participation between the state and interest groups.
Particular groups in society are granted exclusive and formal participation rights by
incorporating them into the process of public policy-making (Cawson 1986).
Modood seems to favour some kind of “religious corporatism” arguing that integrating
Muslims into the political structure might require “(…) some degree of corporatism in the
way the Anglican Church as an organization is guaranteed representation in the House of
Lords; or the catholic church is a partner in the state educational system; or the trades unions
have substantial representation in the Labour party and formal and semi-formal representation
on a panoply of public bodies and advisory government committees” (Modood 2007:145).
Dialogues between the state and the religious communities will then take on a strong form of
institutionalization. The question is – could such institutions address “minorities within
minorities”-problems? Modood is silent as far as this is concerned as his main purpose is to
make an argument for religious corporatism that includes Muslim on a broad basis, but he
does see the dangers of elitism inherent in corporate solutions as group leaders are invited
exclusively to political participation. However, he argues that this critique is invalid according
to his version of multicultural corporatism as it consists of a plurality of participation forms.
Some organizations are represented by their religious leaders, while others are represented by
spokespersons the community find most appropriate to the type of representation at hand
(Modood 2007: 82-83). One of his examples is the Muslim Council of Britain, whose officeholders and spokespersons are likely to be chartered accountants and solicitors rather than
imams (ibid.83). He does not however argue convincingly why choosing “accountants and
solicitors” would resolve the problem of elite representation. Furthermore; is it not likely that
e.g. women would still be excluded in his multicultural model?
Phillips’ approach in contrast is“multiculturalism without groups”, explicitly ruling out
corporatist solutions as they tend to invoke essentialized notions of the group, the religion or
the community as well as of individual members. She also sees the dangers of religious
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leaders coming together, presenting their views as being representative of the whole group
(Phillips 2008:164). Her preferred approach is rather “looser measures that seek to increase
the representation of people sharing the markers and experiences of these groups (ibid.:168).
But as Phillips dismiss corporate arrangements as such; she fails to discuss how they could be
organized in order to include both feminist concerns and the concerns of religious minorities.
The problem thus seems to be that Phillips too readily dismiss corporate institutions as means
of addressing minorities within minorities, while Modood fails to see that including
“solicitors and accountants” in addition to imams may not be inclusive enough, especially not
from a feminist perspective.
The relationship between dialogue and negotiations
Dialogue and negotiations are often seen as two sides of the same coin within multicultural
theory. This can be exemplified by Anne Phillips the following way: “Solutions to
multicultural dilemmas are best arrived at through discussion and dialogue, where people
from different cultural backgrounds explain to one another why they favour particular laws or
practices, and develop the skills of negotiation and compromise that enable us to live
together” (Phillips 2008: 180). However, when using the term “negotiations”, the focus is
shifting from reaching mutual understanding to consensual compromises. When this is the
case negotiations tend to accommodate dominating structures of power, reflecting majority
norms and exclusions (Lægaard 2008: 166, Skjeie and Teigen 2003: 31-54). This difference
between a more open-ended dialogue and the expectation that negotiations should result in
decisions, is not discussed. Within a Norwegian context, negotiations about religious
exemptions from the Gender Equality Act resulted in a compromise that made gender equality
yield when confronted with freedom of religion (Skjeie 2007, Solberg 2007). Negotiations
and compromises might then not result in a particular “woman friendly” policy.
Furthermore, in corporatist literature it is argued that a multicultural society leads to
increasing conflicts about absolute norms and values – and hence are unsuitable as subjects to
negotiations (Rommetvedt 2002:66). The argument is that when absolute norms and values
are involved it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to reach compromises (ibid.: 63). This is not
discussed by Parekh, Modood or Phillips. They all seem to take for granted that negotiation is
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a suitable approach to deep disagreements. It can be argued against the corporatist literature
that what is at stake here is not really “absolute norms and values”. As Phillips (2008:180)
puts it: “Cultural difference is not as great as it is often said to be. It does not map neatly on to
communities”. Her claim is thus a multiculturalism “without culture”, opening up for
compromises and pragmatism (Phillips 2008). However, this appears as too easy an answer as
religion is perceived by many as “a fundamental capability that may lie in the heart of their
lives” (Nussbaum 2000: 189). This could imply that compromises reducing the autonomy of
religious communities are unthinkable – and thus explaining the result of the negotiations
mentioned above, granting religious communities a right to discriminate women “within
internal relations” (The Norwegian Gender Equality Act §2) . The problem so far then has
been that the “compromises” in cases involving “minorities within” seems to favour religious
freedom over gender equality, illustrating that power relations is often part of negotiations and
compromises. It also illustrates that freedom of religion traditionally has been seen as a
fundamental right arranged hierarchical above gender equality. Thus there have been limits
as to what can be the result of compromises between gender equality and freedom of religion.
One should not, however, underscore the dynamic aspect of interpretations of religious texts
and practices, which implies that religion also can be viewed as consistent with gender
equality claims. When Rommetvedt argues that “absolute norms and values” are not
negotiable he does not include such a dynamic view on these “absolutes”. However, what
Rommetvedt points out, leads to a question of what the aim of dialogue actually is, as well as
its limits when the state invites religious communities to dialogue.
One way to answer this is simply highlighting dialogue as process, as The Council of Europe
does: “Intercultural dialogue is understood as an open and respectful exchange of views
between individuals, groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic
backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect” (Council of
Europe 2008:5). If inter-religious dialogue is understood primarily in terms of “exchange of
views”, obvious objections are; What happens next, what can dialogue accomplish – and
when is it actually successful (Bohman 1996:25)? If the purpose by the state is to address
anti-discrimination policy in these dialogues – what count as a successful outcome?
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Lægaard (2008: 166) approach the issue of limits by asking Modood whether any result is
acceptable as dialogue outcome (Lægaard 2008: 166). When arguing in favour of
“multicultural equality” this seems in fact to impose an external constraint on any bargaining
process (Lægaard 2008:166). As I read this critique from Lægaard, the implication is that
dialogue in Modood’s sense, must result in some kind of multicultural accommodations in
order to comply with his notion of multicultural equality. These possible constraints on
democratic deliberation are, according to Lægaard, not made explicit by Modood (ibid.:167).
If this is the case, then restricting the right to religiously based discrimination as the result of
dialogue would not be legitimate. The blind spot here is thus that Modood does not discuss
the possible normative limits to both the issues as well as the outcomes of dialogue. As
Phillips does not advocate a similar strong version of multicultural equality as Modood, she
seems to escape this critique, but even in her theory this problematization is lacking.
Parekh on the other hand explicitly states that accommodations to religious (and cultural)
minorities need to be evaluated against “the society’s operative public values” (Parekh 2000:
292). He then suggests how different minority claims would turn out when faced with these
operative public values of the majority society. One of these operative public values is gender
equality. What is not discussed however, is the relationship between the “evaluation” he
proposes - and dialogue. If what is to happen is that religious communities explain their point
of view, followed by a decision by the state whether or not to allow a specific practice – could
this still be called a dialogue? Moreover, if one could reach a conclusion, as Parekh does,
sitting at one’s desk evaluating or weighing principles and values against each other – why
bother with dialogue at all? This question might also be asked in respect to the dialogue
approach advocated by the Council of Europe. The White Paper states on the one hand that
“universal principles” meaning the European Convention on Human Rights, is to offer “a
moral compass” when conducting intercultural dialogues (The Council of Europe 2008:5).
How this might affect the process of dialogue as well as the possible outcomes is not
addressed. The relationship between what we may call a judicial approach and a dialogue
approach is thus ambiguous, both in the work of Parekh as well as in the White Paper by The
Council of Europe.
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Thus we seem to return to the following question; Why include religious communities in
dialogues with the state? And to what extent could such dialogues contribute to gender
equality and anti-discrimination of homosexuals within religious communities while
simultaneously protecting a certain degree of autonomy for religious communities?
Why include religious groups in politics (through interreligious dialogue)?
Why should religious groups be included in politics? This is a broad question linking up to
issues of both the relationship between secularism and dialogue4, as well as the role of
religious political parties and the legitimacy of religious arguments in public discourse5. My
purpose is however much more limited focusing on the concrete arguments claimed by
multicultural literature and The Council of Europe when legitimizing dialogue between the
state and the religious communities.
According to Parekh, dialogue between the state and religious communities bring religion into
the public realm, making them publicly accountable as well as subject to democratic
discipline (Parekh 2000: 331). What’s more, the public debate will be enriched as
perspectives otherwise likely to be ignored would be introduced (ibid.). Consequently, both
the public debate as well as the internal debate within religious communities will be
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Secularism could for instance mean rejecting religiously based claims in politics (Lægaard 2008: 162). A
different position is taken by Modood as he claims that different kinds of corporate solutions should be extended
and modified to cover Muslims in addition to e.g. Jews and various Christian churches. Since it would be an
extension of already existing institutions and practices, it would be compatible with what he defines as
“moderate secularism” (Lægaard 2008: 162).
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An example of this is the discussion by e.g. Rawls (2002) about the notion of public reason. Rawls excludes
religious arguments as they are seen as incapable of being understood and accepted by non-religious citizens.
Hence, religious arguments should not be given in the political public, unless they also provide public reasons as
well to support the principles of a comprehensive doctrine (Schuster 2008). Habermas (2006) on the other hand
is critical towards Rawls for being too restrictive towards religion and that he fails to see the significance of
religion for the believer. However, he does not propose an alternative approach to Rawls regarding religious
arguments in public discourse, arguing in favor of an institutional separation of religion and politics, or between
a formal and an informal sphere (Schuster 2008: 8). Religious arguments then have to, in order to be valid, be
translated into secular terms when passing the institutional threshold (ibid.). Following the logic of Rawls and
Habermas then would set up limits as to what kind of arguments could legitimate be used in dialogues.
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transformed as dialogue encourages us to take a critical view of our beliefs (Parekh 2000:
307).
The dialogue approach is furthermore seen as a possibility of “mutual education and learning”
(Modood 2007: 79, Phillips 2008: 162). If considering an ideal version of dialogue, like
Phillips does, this might be true. However, Parekh and Modood both seems to apply their
arguments without making such a distinction, that is, between an ideal dialogue and dialogue
as they tend to be held in practice. Parekh (2000: 271) argues for instance that “the dialogue
need not be and is generally not polarized”. Why this is so is not based on any empirical
evidence. Without any examples he furthermore states that disputed practices “tends to trigger
off a debate within the minority community itself” (ibid), creating an opportunity for internal
inquiries of whether a disputed practice really is central and if it is worth continuing (ibid.).
Likewise, Modood argues that the dialogues will have transformative effects on all involved
by triggering off debates “(…) within the minority community, within the wider society, and
between the two” (Modood 2000: 271). Although the starting point of the debate is a certain
practice soon it will “(…) broadens out to cover both the majority and minority ways of life
and sometimes opens up large and unexpected sets of issues. It also forces each party to
become conscious of its values and reasons for holding them, and contributes to their critical
self-knowledge” (ibid). It is no wonder then why The Council of Europe (2008: 5-6) states
that dialogue is “a key to Europe’s Future” and as “a major tool to achieve pluralism,
tolerance and broadmindedness”. Without dialogue “it will be difficult to safeguard the
freedom and well-being of everyone living on our continent (ibid.).
Furthermore, “recognition” seems to be an equally important reason, in order to justify the
dialogue approach. According to Fraser and Honneth (2003:1), “recognition” has become a
keyword of our time. Fraser (ibid: 7) links it to a “politics of recognition”, where the aim is “a
different-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no
longer the price of equal respect”. Dialogue between the state and religious communities can
thus bee seen as an additional form of recognition, apart from mainstream democratic
participation, that may be necessary to empower these groups and to meet their distinctive
needs (Modood 2007: 132-133). Dialogue between the state and religious communities is thus
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a very explicit expression of recognition as religious communities are included exclusively as
participants in political processes.
Acknowledging that dialogue is about recognition leads to a question of what there is to be
recognized? A frequent answer is identities (Modood 2007, Parekh 2000, Phillips 2008).
When the identities that people find important and defining for them in their daily lives are
included in politics it means they are recognized (Modood 2007: 35). One such identity (that
is not actually one, but many) is a Muslim identity. When this happens, we are closer to
fulfilling the ideals of multicultural citizenship – a notion of citizenship and of democratic
participation that includes religious groups. It is thus a short step to claim that inclusion of
religious minorities in dialogues with the state should be favoured because justice requires it
(Deveaux 2005: 342). This is also stated explicitly by Modood: Dialogue enables consensual
resolutions consistent with equality and justice (Modood 2007:79).
According to Parekh inter-religious dialogue it is about institutionalizing respect for different
faith communities (Parekh 2000: 331). This might be true if the purpose is to accommodate
religious groups in some specific ways. But how do you recognize religious identities and
respect for faith communities if the purpose of dialogue is to “discuss” discriminating
practices within religious communities as seems to be the case in the Norwegian examples
(see introduction)? Remembering the hallmarks given when religious communities are
involved with dialogue with each other, equal respect and influence on the issues as well as
the way these should be discussed is important. Neither of these prerequisites seems to be met
here. And what if we consider the unequal distribution of power between the state and
religious communities? How would this affect the “mutual learning” and “critical
examination” of their own practices? Could it not be that dialogues between the state and
religious communities in particular cases could be characterised by suspicion and distrust?
Would these kinds of dialogues be ruled out then? They certainly would be facing important
challenges, especially in creating an atmosphere of mutual trust. Grung (2006:273) argues
that it is important that the participants must not feel their integrity being at stake (ibid.).
Thus, a lack of trust could make the religious communities hesitant to be involved in these
kinds of dialogues. Even though Parekh agrees that minorities sometimes will close ranks and
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feel their way of life attacked by the majority, this does not destroy his confidence in the
dialogue approach: “(…) the stronger compulsions of the shared life often tend to prevail and
persuade them to explore common interests and values” (Parekh 2000: 271). However, in
Norway a wide range of religious communities have been invited to comment on a new
proposition from the Norwegian Government suggesting to restrict religious exemption rights
from The Gender Equality Act and The Work Environment Act (NOU 2008:1). Some of the
organizations responded with arguments of possible withdrawal and civil obedience if the
proposition where to pass in Parliament. A few even argued that this proposition had made
them even more certain on their own values in these matters (e.g. about the wrongness in
hiring homosexual priests living in partnership). What might then be the solution if concerned
with issues of gender justice and anti-discrimination?
Can inter-religious dialogue contribute to gender equality?
Intra-religious dialogue is often presented by feminist contributions as a necessary
precondition to the exit-argument, leaning on Albert Hirschman’s distinction between exit and
voice (Phillips 2008:139). Voice, in Hirschman’s sense, meant trying to alter rather than
escape an objectionable state of affairs (Ibid.). (Liberal) feminists have thus argued that
discriminatory practices should be contested from within. Martha Nussbaum (2000:179)
seems to favour such an approach arguing that feminists find ideas of justice in their religion
important sources of empowerment. Included in this view is an argument about differences
within religious communities.
However, in Phillips’ (2008) as well as Okin’s (1999) contributions this leads to an argument
of inclusion of different voices, particular women, in dialogues with the state. Hence
“dialogue within” can (or rather ought to) have effects on who gets to speak in the name of
the community in dialogues between the state and the religious communities. According to
Okin (1999:24), it is especially important that in “negotiations with the state” young women
are being present “since older women often are co-opted into reinforcing gender inequality”.
If this is not the case, then their interest may be harmed rather than promoted (ibid.). The
premise is thus that (young) women should be included if dialogues between the state and the
religious communities should be able to contribute to gender equality. Less clearly however,
17
is what kind of justification is given for this. To include women will not necessarily lead to
the inclusion of a gender perspective (Grung 2006:276). On the other hand, extending who are
viewed as legitimate participants with the state in inter-religious dialogues would mean that
other voices than what have traditionally been the case are being heard. Thus, as the state
increases the possibility of including all relevant perspectives, interest and information they
simultaneously diminishes the likelihood of excluding legitimate interests, relevant
knowledge, or appropriate dissenting opinions (Bohman 1996:27). Would this however, also
render possible addressing intersectionality?
Intersectionality is called the new “buzzword” (Davies 2008). The concept “refers to the
interaction between gender, race, and other categories of differences in individual lives, social
practices, institutional arrangements and cultural ideology and the outcomes of these
interactions in terms of power” (ibid.:68).
According to Modood religious identities should be viewed in comparison with other types of
identities, such as race, gender and sexuality – and should receive the same space as to
organize on these grounds in the same way as other identities. Only then can civil peace and
other civic purposes be attained, that is when organized religions become “governmental
interlocutors and partners in a routinized, institutionalized way” (Modood 2007:30). This does
not imply however, that Modood grounds his arguments on the concept of intersectionality
(Squires 2008). Only the Muslim identity seems relevant, and the other categories are seen as
separate identities and as such neither intertwined with each other or the Muslim identity.
Arguments of inclusion and representation according to one strand, e.g. religion will, if we are
following the logic of intersectionality, makes it difficult to respond to the needs of
individuals facing intersectional discrimination due to e.g. religion as well as gender and
sexual orientation. What Crenshaw (2000:17) defines as “political intersectionality” may be
of special interest, as this is linked to the problems of “minorities within”: Women within
minority groups meet particular obstacles, one being “their obligation to their social or
national group, an obligation that is at times deployed to suppress any critique of such
practices or problems that might in some way draw negative attention to the group. Women
who insists on pursuing their rights against certain abuses that occur within their communities
18
risk ostracism or other forms of disapproval for allegedly betraying or embarrassing their
communities” (Crenshaw 2000: 17).
Judith Squires (2008:541) criticizes both Phillips and Modood for neglecting such problems
and how they can be addressed within a multicultural policy. The same could be said about
the European Council, although stating a need not to stereotype men and women within
religious and cultural minorities as if gender inequality is just happening outside of the
majority (p.11). However, this does not relate specifically to intersectionality and the concept
is not used in the White Paper. Squires (2008:541) argues that “where states have previously
operated with equality legislation that addresses particular forms of inequality only, they are
now under pressure to address not only multiple forms of discrimination, but also to consider
the interaction between the strands”. The argument put forward by Squires (2008: 541) is that
multicultural theory needs to be more attentive to diversity within groups. Phillips as
previously shown, argues in favour of including different voices e.g. through the dialogue
approach. Although this is not put forward as a way to address intersectionality, I would argue
that it is a possible approach as Phillips question the alleged equation between equality and
group representation. The challenge raised by intersectionality is exactly to problematize the
relationship between definition of group identities and conceptualisations of the goals and
meanings of equality (Fredman 2009: 313). Furthermore, and in line with the arguments of
Phillips, specific attention needs to be paid to ensure that the people most likely to experience
intersectional discrimination have a voice (Fredman 2009: 85). According to Fredman this
means, among other things, to ensure that they have an appropriate set of spokespeople
(ibid.). This is also underlined by Skjeie and Siim (2008) the following way – as an explicit
demand upon the state: “(…) to work hard to facilitate participation; to put much more
institutional energy into the inventive development of participatory schemes, so that all who
are affected by political decisions are equally included in their making”.
In line with Skjeie and Siim I would argue that the state is in a unique position when inviting
different voices to dialogue whether this is defined as corporatist arrangements or more
loosely forms of participation. However, this also demand of the state a much more conscious
attitude as to why dialogue between the authorities and religious communities should be the
19
preferred approach in particular cases. What are the intentions, the motivations and preferred
outcome (if any)? And who should be invited to participate and speak on behalf of groups?
6. Concluding remarks
The aim of the paper has not been to criticize dialogue efforts per se. Rather, the purpose has
been to explore some important shortcomings to the ways both multicultural theory as well as
policy documents (mainly exemplified by the White Paper from The Council of Europe on
Intercultural Dialogue) have advocated the dialogue approach. The overall impression is that
too much is expected from the dialogue approach. To sum up: The state and religious
communities should engage in dialogue with each other as it provides recognition of
(excluded) identities (Moodod) as well as contributing to civil peace “and other civic
purposes” (Modood). The dialogue approach is also capable of enriching the perspectives of
other participants as well as making religious communities publicly accountable, as well as
encourages both the minority groups as well as the majority to take a critical review of their
own beliefs, enhancing mutual education and learning (Parekh and Modood).
What about the prospects of addressing anti-discrimination policy through inter-religious
dialogue? According to Phillips dialogue (at least in its ideal version) is the only approach
capable of combining respect for religion and at the same time accommodates differences
within the group. The premise is however that differences within religious communities are
included in the dialogues, and not only differences between religions and between secular
views and religious views. However, I do not agree with Phillips that corporate solutions
would be unsuitable in this respect. One of the main advantages would be that the state is in
charge of who should be included in these kinds of institutionalized dialogues. That corporate
solutions traditionally have been exclusionary and favoured participation of group leaders
does not mean that this type of institution cannot be made more inclusionary in the future to
come. Expecting however, as Okin does, that inclusion of women necessarily leads to their
interests being protected, is a difficult assumption. One such difficulty is to decide what
“women’s interest” amount to. In Okin’s essay an underlying assumption seems to be that all
women share some common interests, e.g. in abolishing traditional gender roles. One can
avoid such essentialist notions by highlighting that inclusion of different voices is important
20
in order to avoid that one or a few (usually male) individuals serve as the authorised
representatives of their group, regarded as its authentic voice (Phillips 2008:168). Drawing on
deliberative democracy, participation in dialogues could also facilitate that participants in the
dialogue recognize that they have contributed to and influenced on the outcome, even when
they disagree with it (Bohman 1996:33). Finally, what Phillips (2008: 162) has called “the
poverty of alternatives” should not keep us from scrutinizing the dialogue approach further,
both theoretically and empirically.
21
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