CHAPTER - Vll
SUMMARY
AND
CONCLUSION
Political scientists have classified governments into unitary and federal
on the basis of the nature of relations between the national government and
the regional governments. By definition, a unitary government is one in which
all the powers are vested in the national government and the regional
governments, if at all exist, derive their authority from the national
government. A federal government, on the other hand, is one in which powers
are divided between the national government and the regional governments
by the constitution itself and both operate in their respective jurisdiction
independently.
Therefore, federal government is distinguishable from a unitary system,
because, unlike a unitary system it has two sets of governments- the national
and the state governments. It is also distinguishable from a confederation.
Under confederation, it is only the state governments, which operate directly
upon the people, and the central government acts only through the state
governments. Under a federation, both national and regional governments
operate directly upon the people. Britain, France, Japan, China, Italy and
some other countries have the unitary model of government while the United
States of America, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and some other countries
have the federal model of government.
The United States is the first and the oldest federation in the world. It
was formed in 1787 following the American Revolution (1775-1783). It
comprises 50 states (originally 13 states) and is taken as the model of
federation. The Canadian federation, comprising 10 provinces (originally 4
provinces) is also quite old formed in 1867 and followed by many other
299
countries such as, Switzerland, and Australia. In the middle of twentieth
century, the federal governments were popular among the newly independent
third world countries.
The history of Indian federation dates back to the Mauryan Empire.
Some historians called the Mauryan empire as ‘feudal and ‘federal type’.
They said, the Mauryans recognised the local autonomy even at the expense
of the central government. The internal autonomy of various regions was
respected in the empire. This emphasis on local autonomy is very similar to
our present idea of a strong and full autonomy for the states, in the later Vedic
period, the Kurupanchaias formed a composite state under a common
monarch. The Kshudrakas and the Malavas formed a confederal union to
meet the invasion of Alexander the Great. Some historians discovered federal
administrative elements in India as far back the Moghuls, beginning with Sher
Shah’s land revenue system and taking shape with Akbar’s division of his
empire into Subhas or Provinces. Some British historians like Percival and
Wolseley argued that the Moghul rule fluctuated between strong central
control and local initiative, thus preventing an extremely centralized or
decentralised administrative structure.
However, the development of administrative institutions with a federal
character in India began with the expansion of British rule after 1857. Lord
May’s decentralisation policy of 1870 may be the first step towards the
establishment of federal system in the country. The Government Act of 1919
provided a federal character in India. The Government of India Act, 1935 laid
down the true foundation for the formation of federation in India and this
300
provided autonomy in the states and paved the way for the introduction of
federalism in India. This Act provided a provincial autonomy in the states and
paved the way for a complete responsible government. Though the
Government of India Act of 1935 contained a federal scheme, it was not
implemented. The federal scheme under the Act was to be operative after the
issue of a Notification from London, after the accession of Native States. The
notification was not issued and India did not become a federation under the
Government of India Act, 1935. Therefore, India became a federal state with
effect from January 26, 1950.
Although Indian Constitution is federal in structure, but there are
differing views about the nature of the constitution. While submitting the Draft
Constitution, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of Drafting Committee
clarified and assured that Indian Constitution is federal in structure.
Some
constitutional experts felt that Indian Constitution is unitary in nature. But the
fact is that there are no pure federal states in the world today. Every federal
state is designed to suit to the conditions of that society. Further, the concept
of ‘federalism’ is a word of multiple meanings and diverse hues and colours.
It also lacks a stable meaning. But it signifies a sense of devolution of power
and the sharing of decision making authority between at least two, if not more,
institutions of governance. But its penumbra is sufficiently open-ended to
accommodate significantly different concepts, structures and institutions. It
includes’ bottom up models, like the U.S.A., with virtually sovereign provincial
units ceding power to form a union. It includes top-down models like India,
with a strong unitary structure carving out federated units for better
management. In other words, federations can be formed in two ways. One is
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integration and the other is disintegration. In the first case, a number of weak
or economically backward states come together for form a big and a strong
union, as for example the United States. In the second case, a big unitary
state is converted into a federation by granting autonomy to the provinces to
promote regional interest, for example India and Canada.
Federal polity may not be established in every country. The formation
of a federation requires the presence of certain conditions, which should exist
to pave the way for a federation to materialize. Firstly, people must have
strong desire to have a union. The will to have a union and to be under a
single independent government for some purposes is really the basis of a
federation. Secondly, the people also must possess a sentiment that strength
lies in union and this strength can be achieved by a political cohesion,
geographical contiguity, similarity of political and social institutions, absence
of marked inequality, political ability, centre-state co-ordination, reasonable
trend towards centralization are essential for the successful organization of
federal governments. Federal governments must also possess certain basic
features such as a written and a rigid constitution, division of powers, two sets
of governments, supremacy of constitution, independent judiciary and others.
In India, the situation in which the federal polity was created was
different from what it prevailed in America. At the time of independence, in
India, there were no independent sovereign political entities feeling any
compulsion or necessity to get together and create a new federal authority.
But it was an outside authority, British Parliament that decided to set up
Constituent Assembly. This Constituent Assembly had drafted and adopted
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the Indian constitution on November 26, 1949 and which came into effect from
January 26, 1950.
The Constitution of India laid down the foundations of unique federal
system. The purpose of it was to accommodate the multi-diversities of
pluralism in Indian culture. The essence of Indian federal set up lies in its unity
in diversity. At the same time, the Constitution of India was framed under the
dark shadow of events like the war in Kashmir, the communal riots at the time
of partition and adverse postures of recalcitrant princes, which had apparently
threatened the survival of our new Republic and had inevitably a catalytic
effect on framing process of the new constitution. Traumatized by the
unprecedented horrors and dislocation of partition, the Constituent Assembly
was obsessively focused on the need for ensuring the unity and integrity of
the new nation. The fear of excessive federalism was cogently articulated, the
risks of centrifugal and fissiparous forces overwhelming the young republic
were passionately evoked. Thus, the philosophy of the constitution was to
keep the country united and strong in hands of the powerful centre.
The framework finally adopted departed significantly from all existing
models of federalism. The Constituent Assembly devised a system, which
seemed most suited to the needs of the time and the requirements of a
federal society. Political processes generated by the logic of a federal
democracy completed this work in course of time. In the absence of any track
record or reliable radar to assess departures from the existing pattern of
norms and yardstick, which were derived from the then dominant models,
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jurists found it difficult to certify that the system was indeed federal, it was
therefore, declared ‘Quasi-federal’.
Whatever the comments may be, but the Indian Constitution has
introduced federal system as the basic structure of the government of the
country because it contains basic federal features such as a written
constitution, division of powers between the centre and the states and
independent judiciary. However, it has deviated from typical federations by
adopting some peculiar features, which may not be found in any typical
federal constitutions. Federations are, usually, the result of an agreement by
independent states. But, in India, the provinces were not independent entities
on the eve of their accession in the Indian federation. In U S A., each state
has a separate constitution and every citizen has dual citizenship. But in India
there is single citizenship and single constitution. Regarding the amendment
of the constitution, the union government has more powers than state
governments.
The
Constituent
Assembly
created
an
indestructible
union
of
destructible states. Secession was banned explicitly in the early years, but
constitutional flexibility enabled other forms of search for solutions. Overall,
the shift from reluctant to robust federalism was spurred on by the political
process, which made it difficult to ignore the true nature of the Indian
constitution. The Supreme Court framework has proved remarkably resilient,
even during the phase when clarion call was to roll back the state. Given the
nature and extent of social diversities and cleavages, the judicious
intervention of a strong central government is often considered indispensable
304
for maintaining social harmony. The constitution makers thought that the
central control was necessary for achieving rapid economic and industrial
progress.
The Indian constitution is also flexible and mobile as well as rigid and
unitary to adjust and accommodate any sort of political developments. It can
be definitely described as unitary, federal, quasi-federal, or co-operative
federal system, because it contained the features of all forms. It may also be
designated
as
convertible federalism.
Therefore,
Prof.
Alexandrowicz
observed that the Constitution of India is neither federal nor unitary but it is a
combination of both. It is a union or composite state of a novel type. It
enshrines the principle that in spite of federation the national interests are
ought to be paramount.
The union and the states derive their powers from the constitution and
both are autonomous within their sphere as allotted by the constitution. The
constitution enumerated possible subjects of legislation under three legislative
lists in the VII Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The Union list includes 100
subjects, the state list comprises 61 items and the concurrent list includes 52
subjects. A state legislature can make laws for the whole or any part of the
state to which it belongs, but it cannot enlarge its territorial jurisdiction under
any circumstances except when the boundaries of the state itself are widened
by an act of Parliament.
Parliament, on the other hand, has the power to
make laws for the whole or any part of country. It also possesses the power of
extra-territorial legislation. However, some limitations have been imposed
even on the power of Parliament regarding some union territories in view of
305
the backwardness of these regions. Residuary powers are vested in the union
government. Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to
any matter not enumerated in any one or the three lists.
In spite of a clear demarcation in the law-making power, Parliament
was assigned a predominant position in the legislative field. In the name of
national interests, the Rajya Sabha can make a law on any subject that falls
in the state list, if it is declared by 2/3rd majority in the house. During
emergency, the Parliament can make laws even from the state list and the
laws of the states remain inoperative. Moreover, the union government can
give directions to the state governments in various situations. The state
governments should abide by these directions and if the state governments
ignore them, then the union government is empowered to take action against
such erring states.
The Constitution framers have opted for a strong centre. The states are
not vested with exclusive jurisdiction even the subjects assigned to them by
the constitution and thus it makes the states to some extent, subordinate to
the centre, it is important to recall that the original design vested substantial
legislative powers and responsibilities in state governments for development
activities, like education, forests, wild animals, social and economic planning.
Latter they were transferred to concurrent list.
The centralizing tendency is
no doubt inconsistent with the federal principle. A literal reading of the Indian
constitution is also misleading. Multiple overlaps have occurred, not merely in
the concurrent spheres of jurisdiction but also in spheres explicitly assigned to
the states.
306
In respect of legislative, administrative and financial relations, the
constitution reflects a distinct spirit of unitarianism. The working of the federal
system during the past 60 years reflects an increasing tendency towards
centralism. The union government has at times behaved as a big brother over
states. The states have been demanding more autonomy, particularly in
respect of financial matters. On several issues, the union and states at times
adopt different, even opposed stands. A review of the history of union-state
relations since 1950 brings out major tension areas between the two levels of
the government.
A mix of the politics of identity and the politics of scarcity marked the
political process in the first two decades of independence. Tension areas of
this period were around identity, language and boundaries. But after the
emergence of several regional parties, the relations between the centre and
the states began to strain. The state parties started to criticize centre for its
partial attitude and dominant role. They began for more powers, more
autonomy.
The role of Governor is an area of tension between the union and state
governments. Governors as the eyes and ears of the Central government
were a legacy of colonial rule. It was considered necessary to retain this
institution, which became the most controversial instrument of central
intervention. Some constitutional experts questioned the necessity of this
institution. Some state parties demanded for its abolition. They demanded
particularly when efforts to curb abuse and reform the system met with little
success. Federal flexibility was ironically one major reason and defence of the
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institution. The fundamental issue is the abuse powers. It means illegitimate
exercise of legitimate powers. However, the judiciary has been a major force
in curbing this trend, laying down norms and guidelines for the exercise of
gubernatorial powers.
Article 356 has been the most controversial one with the Indian
constitution. It is a drastic power in the hands of the union government.
Actually, the use of this drastic power should be a matter of the last resort. In
several instances, some governors have behaved against the spirit of federal
system. Therefore, some state governments even went to demand for
abrogation of this article. By 2009, the union government has applied this
article for 116 times and in some cases; its use has been for narrow political
purposes. Therefore, the states look upon this article as a continuous threat
to autonomy because it can be used at any time for toppling any state
government. The states feel that as long as it continues to remain, the states
can never have real autonomy from the central government.
Another controversial area is emergency provisions in the constitution.
It is no doubt that emergency provisions exist in all democratic constitutions to
protect and preserve the state. These powers are essential to defend the
country from internal and external enemies. Suspension of federalism was a
major consequence of the utilization of emergency powers, quite apart from
its effects on fundamental rights and freedoms.
Role of central forces in areas, which fall primarily within the sphere of
states responsibilities, has been a contentious issue. In times of crises like
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communal riots or strikes, the states themselves make a request for the
deployment of central forces and often complaint of inadequate or delayed
deployment. However, at times, when the union government decides to
deploy the central forces in any state for maintaining public order or protecting
union property, but this has been opposed by parties other than on in power
at the centre. However, in subsequent years, states have tended increasingly
to lean on central forces to supplement their own often inadequate police
apparatus.
The use of All India Services by the union for carrying out its directions
in states is a tension area of Indian federalism. Another important problem
that keeps cropping up time and again is in respect of share in natural
resources like river waters, which has given rise to severe tensions and
prevented optimal utilization of such resources.
Financial relations between the union and the state governments have
been a major area of tensions. The states find themselves dependent upon
the union because of their meager resources and restricted field of taxation.
The treatment of the states by the union government while giving grants is
often a source of reaction from the states. They regard it as most serious
constraint upon their autonomy. The states often feel dissatisfied with the
system of central grants-in-aid and allocation of funds by the central agenciesthe Planning Commission and the Finance Commissions. The union
government is often charged of partisan attitude towards some states and
discrimination against other states, which are ruled by opposition regional
parties. The use of superior financial power of the centre for partisan ends by
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the party in power remains a perpetual complaint of the state governments.
The Finance Commission, with its independent constitutional status, was
expected to engineer the necessary balance between the needs of the centre
and the states. In addition to wide income disparities, the Indian union is
characterized by vast regional inequalities too. It may lead to regional
movements, the demand for separate statehoods. The union needs to resolve
such problems at the earliest.
All these have been the major areas of issues and tensions in the
union-state relations. These have tended to make Indian federalism develop a
confluctual and confrontational character. The objective of co-operative
federalism has suffered a set back in the face of these centre-states conflicts
and tensions. There is a need of evolving a national policy on this issue and
for putting in a place suitable mechanism for resolving such disputes.
Thus, the states find the balance of power heavily tilted in favour of
union in the federal scheme drawn by the constitution. The exploitation of
union government for securing partisan interests in the past has been an
added colour and weight to unitarianism. The states, as such, demand for
more autonomy. The R.S. Sarkaria Commission, while favouring the retention
of a strong centre, also accepted the need for the transfer of some additional
resources and powers to the states.
Therefore, the issue of relationship between the centre and the states
has become a subject of serious public concern in the country. Distinguished
jurists, constitutional experts, journalists and statesman suggested ways and
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means to establish that relationship on the basis of cordiality and co­
cooperativeness. They also suggested that the relationship should be
regularized on a more rational basis in view of the changed political situations.
As a result, the union government for recommending reforms in the Indian
administration appointed a number of committees and commissions. These
committees have specific areas of administration. The most important aspect
of these studies is the existing level of centre-state relations.
The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) and R.S. Sarkaria
Commission were most important commissions appointed by the union
government to review the centre-state relations. The DMK government in
Tamil Nadu also appointed P.V Rajamannar Committee to go into the entire
question of centre-state relations to suggest recommendations on these lines.
The terms and references of these commissions were to examine the entire
question regarding the relationship that should exist between the two
governments in a federal set up and to suggest amendments to the
constitution to secure utmost autonomy to the states.
The Administrative Reforms Commission considered that the unity of
India is of paramount importance. It suggested for avoiding over centralization
of authority at the administrative level. The committee viewed that amendment
of constitution is not necessary for ensuring proper and harmonious relations
between the centre and the states in as much the provisions of constitution
governing centre-state relations are adequate for the purpose of meeting any
situation or resolving any problem that may arise in this field. The commission
also made some recommendations regarding financial matters concerning
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centre-state
relations.
The
Finance
Commission
should
make
recommendations on the principles, which should govern the distribution of
Plan grants to the states.
The P.V. Rajamannar Committee felt that though the constitution is
federal in form, but there are several provisions, which are inconsistent with
the principles of federalism, and there have been unitary trends. The
commission made some drastic recommendations. It advised that a person
appointed as a Governor should have long experience in public life and
administration and can be trusted to rise above party prejudices and
predilections. Guidelines also must be formulated regarding the exercise of
the discretionary powers by Governors duly approved by the Inter-State
Council and the central government. The Inter-State Council should be
constituted under article 263 of the Indian constitution. The Inter-State or
centre-state differences should be settled by mutual discussions to the extent
possible. The union government may deploy the armed forces in the states at
the request of the states or by its discretion of maintaining the interests and
the property of the centre in the allocation of powers with a strong bias in
favour of the centre.
The committee suggested that the President of India should appoint
the Governor in consultation with the cabinet or in consultation with the high
power body specially constituted for this purpose. The Governor, before
issuing a proclamation of emergency under the Article 356, should refer his
report to the state legislative assembly. It advised to replace it because it
empowers the centre to dismiss the state government. It sought for sufficient
312
safeguards to be provided in the constitution to secure the interests of the
state governments from arbitrary and unilateral action of the party in power at
the centre. It also suggested that equal representation to be given to all the
states in the Rajya Sabha. It also advised to set up a statutory body consisting
of scientific, technical, agricultural and economic experts in the place of
Planning Commission and the states to have their own Planning Boards. It
strongly recommended that the articles 356 and 357 relating to the
emergency provisions in the constitution should be totally repealed. The
commission recommended delegation of more financial and administrative
functions to the states. Thus, according to the commission, would introduce
more efficiency and economy in the administration and smoothen relations
between the two governments. But the central government did not accept the
recommendations made by P.V.Rajamannar committee because it was
appointed by a state government.
However, the R.S. Sarkaria Commission rejected the demand for
curtailing the power of the centre saying that a strong centre is necessary to
preserve the unity and integrity of the country. The commission’s view is that
there is no need for drastic changes in the existing provisions of the
constitution. In its view, the fundamental provisions of the constitution have
done reasonably well and withstood the stress and strains of heterogeneous
society in throes of change. In financial sphere also, the commission has not
suggested for major changes in the basic scheme of the constitution. It has,
however favoured amendments to provide for sharing of corporation tax and
levy of consignment tax
on
advertisements
and
broadcasting.
The
313
commission has, however, suggested that there should be consultation by the
centre on all concurrent subjects before passing any law.
The R.S. Sarkaria Commission also made out a strong case for InterState Council under article 263. The recommendations of the Sarkaria
commission are well balanced and in accordance with the spirit underlying the
various provisions of the constitution for ensuring unity and integrity of the
country. A weak nation either becomes a target of foreign invasion or invites
chaos in the country. This is evident from its history as well as from present
disruptive tendencies. The framers rightly tried their best to bring about a
compromise between the demands of strong centre and the aspirations of the
states for more powers.
It is clear that the Administrative Reforms Commission and the R.S.
Sarkaria Commission stood for a strong centre. These commissions also
stressed for co-operation and co-ordination between the union and the states
and among the states themselves. In a vast country like ours, the spirit of co­
operative federalism should guide the relations between the centre and the
states.
The essence of co-operative federalism is that the centre and the state
governments should be guided by the broader national concerns of using the
available resources for the benefit of the people. The centre and the states
should take advantages of a large national market, diverse and rich national
resources and the potential of human capabilities in all parts of the country
and from all sections for building
a
prosperous nation.
Co-operative
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federalism makes it possible to raise all the available resources by the
government at different levels in a co-ordinated way and channel them for
their use for the common good of the people. This requires a harmonious
relationship and co-operative spirit between the centre and the states and
among the states themselves. Co-operative federalism is intended to ensure a
minimum bundle of basic services among the states for evolving efficient and
socially desirable policies and programmes. Any competition, which nullifies
each other’s advantages in development and erodes the resources base of
states, should be avoided. The co-operation must ensure the changes
envisaged in policy matters are brought about smoothly. Further, the national
and regional interests do not clash, thus strengthening in the process a
responsive democratic set up.
Indian constitution provides for several institutional agencies for the
adjudication of disputes that may arise between the two governments. These
inter-governmental institutions or agencies encourage co-operation among
the state governments in the economic and industrial sphere. Planning
Commission, Finance Commission, Inter-State Council, Zonal Councils,
National Development Council are some important Inter-Governmental
agencies in India. These Inter-Governmental agencies strive for strengthening
relations between the central government and the state governments.
Conclusion
After 60 years, Indian federalism is still work in progress. Witness is the
appointment of the Second Commission on centre-state Relations. The
following dimensions can be highlighted in conclusion.
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1. Issues to be Resolved
(i)
Identity related issues are still alive: There are demands from
different parts of the country for separate statehoods (Telangana,
Vidarbha and the restructuring of Uttar Pradesh). Under pressure, the
central government appointed Sri Krishna Committee to look into
Telangana issue. If the committee recommend for the formation of
separate Telangana state, such demands may arise from other parts of
the country and it may become another serious issue in the country.
(ii)
Resource and border related issues: Issues related to natural
resources still exist in India. For example, water resources, long
standing inter-state river water disputes (like Cauvery, Narmada,
Godavari and Krishna) inter-state border disputes (over Belgaum
between Karnataka and Maharashtra). Sometimes they may reach
serious proportions. Water may be the state subject but the centre
should explore early and enduring solution for such issues. It must
initiate dialogue and discussion between the states concerned and
pursue them to resolve these long pending issues. The states also
need to develop responsible behaviour on their part and understand
that they are a part of a system and should co-operate with the centre
and other states.
(iii)
Reforms related issues: There is need to bring reforms in the
institutions of Governor, President’s rule, role of Finance Commission
and the future of Inter-state Council.
(iv)
Issues relating to specific sectors: There are also certain sectoral
issues related to health, education and social security combined with
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jurisdictional roadblocks in the development of infrastructure and basic
minimum needs like water, power, transport and connectivity.
2. Coalition Politics and Federalism
❖
The growth in power and influence of state-based parties now shape
the course of centre-state relations primarily through the mechanism of
coalition governments at the centre. More importantly, some parties
have
engineered,
through
the
political
process,
an
enhanced
participation in national policy-making that they could not achieve
through formal institutions of co-operative federalism. In effect, federal
coalitions have given them participatory opportunities that were earlier
denied to the states in institutions such as the Planning Commission,
the National Development Council or the Inter-State Council.
3. Economic Reforms and Globalisation
❖
Structural changes conducive to an increased role for the market have
obviously had an impact on intergovernmental relations. This has
prompted fears that the gap between the more developed and the less
developed states could widen, with the latter being left behind in the
competition
for
economic
growth.
Some
states
like
Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu have taken advantage of economic
reforms and could attract huge foreign direct investments and
investments from Non-Resident Indians. But some states like NorthEastern States are lagging behind in the race for investments. This
may lead to regional imbalances. This inequitable development of
regions would not do well to the unity and integrity of the country.
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Hence, compensation through equalization formula for unequally
endowed states is the need of hour.
4. Reinforcing Governance-Capabilities of the States
❖
The challenge is simultaneously to invent new ways of facilitating the
participation of states in the formulation of national policies and
motivating them for effective implementation in key infrastructural areas
such as power, roads, and basic civic amenities. In the context of a
multi-party system and the need to forge federal coalitions for national
governance, this becomes even more necessary. The political process
is able to achieve this to some extent, but is no substitute for effective
institutionalised arrangements.
5. Issues related to internal and external security
❖
Terrorism, militancy, naxalism, organised crimes, problem of internally
displaced persons- all these require that the country as a whole comes
together and the institutional bodies under state governments help the
centre by collectively making available the necessary information and
resources.
6. New Challenges for Federalism
❖
The new challenges facing 21st Century federalism have further
necessitated the preexisting need for cooperative federalism, thereby
making its practice as a form of governance all the more indispensable.
Technological advances have led to tremendous improvement in
connectivity and accessibility, both, physical as well as electronic.
318
❖
Environmental challenges of global nature like climate change do not
recognise state frontiers. Pollution and conservation issues reflect the
uncomfortable tension between the decision making process of the
governments at the centre-state-local levels. Public Trust Doctrine is a
new doctrine of federalism evolved by the Supreme Court in M.C
Mehta vs. Kamal Nath. It has established a direct link between the
state and the public to quote Justice Kuldip Singh, “The state is the
trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public
use and enjoyment and is under a legal duty to protect the natural
resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted
into private ownership: Disaster Management transcends inter-state
boundaries.
❖
Globalisation has reinforced the need for concurrence between the
geographical, climatic, environmental and technological diversities inter
as well as intra states so that they may link with global processes for
viable and sustainable development and growth. What is being
experienced at the global level is also being felt at the local level. India
is making strides in the global sphere and the local governments that
promote shared partnership in development have come to be noticed
today. Hence, whenever development programmes or any other
interests of states in matters relating to IT or investment by way of
export, trade, exchange of projects etc, are touched by international
agreements, the well conceived demands of states should be met in
order to promote truly cooperative, coordinative and multi dimensional
centre-state relations. This requires mutual trust and confidence.
319
❖
Since the world has become a global village, the country’s internal
security and political problems are open to external influence verging
on intervention. For instance, the U. S Ambassador to India, Mulford, in
2006, overstepped his diplomatic role by writing directly to the Chief
Minster of Assam offering assistance from the FBI to investigate a
bomb attack in the state. Hence, in the name of protecting human
rights and on the plea that minorities are being tortured, big powers can
intervene militarily which is against India’s interest.
❖
The states today have acquired sufficient politcal weight of their own
through a pluralised party system enabling individual states to embark
on bilateral negations with the union bypassing the institutionalised
bodies of collective policy framing that have proved to be ineffective,
thus lending a negotiatory character to our federalism.
❖
However, the same must be taken with a pinch of salt because power
sharing by states at the central level has not contributed towards
reducing localism, parochialism and chauvinism of regionalists and
sub-regional parties. Increase in bargaining capacity will serve to
strengthen cooperative federalism only if the supposed drawbacks of
centralism are mitigated through it.
❖
The increasing voices of autonomy and separatism have vitiated the
political and social fabric of the federal structure. States are
increasingly harbouring feelings of deprivation and alienation and have
begun viewing all problems from a narrow parochial outlook. Moreover,
their approach is becoming violent and confrontationist. This not only
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weakens the nation politically and economically but also makes the
land fertile for the growth of terrorism and insurgency.
❖
The Indian Union has united its rich diversity of its enormous
population serving as an example to the rest of the world. This is an
asset to be built upon for the future. To override the fissiparous
tendencies, only the legitimate grievances of the regions or states
should be addressed as far as possible within the framework of the
federal constitution. More importantly, a strong sense of nationhood is
necessary to maintain our territorial integrity and internal security, and
this cannot be accomplished without cooperative federalism.
❖
The need to come together today is not only the consequence of the
new challenges facing the nation but that the same will serve as an
antidote
to
prevent such
challenges from
recurring
in future.
Cooperative federalism strengthens the nation from within by enabling
it to withstand adversities and challenges because of its inherent
resilience and flexibility.
❖
Socio-economic development is the collective responsibility of the two
governments. The centre should allow the state governments enough
to grow and expand and there would be nothing to prevent any state
government from reaching its ultimate goal consistent with the common
obligation.
In spite of the issues in the centre-state relations, a periodic
reaffirmation of the spirit of accommodation and reconciliation in the polity has
ensured that the federal arrangement remains efficacious, just and vibrant.
Nothing symbolized this better than the emergence of H.D. Deve Gowda as
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the Prime Minister and his effort to address the nation in Hindi from the
ramparts of the Red Fort on August 15, 1996. The accession to the “Delhi
throne” of the regional parties-dominated United Front is a far cry from fear
expressed by Sardar K. M. Panikkar, in his dissent to the Report of the States
Reorganisation Commission, of “the dominance of Uttar Pradesh in all-India
matters.”
It is to be noted that the
& /.India as “Union of States”
constitutes a fascinating essay in the art of political reconciliation and
accommodation. It also seems a miracle that the federal polity survives the
vicissitudes of the language. ioftti|)versy and the linguistic reorganization of
the states. The polity stands chastened by the mistakes and excesses on both
sides of the federal divide in the last 60 years. Six decades of a fitful
experiment in sharing power inspire the confidence that the federal spirit will
continue to find vigorous expressions within the parameters of a strong- if not
necessarily an omnipotent centre.
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