Review of Educational Research
Winter 1994, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 557-573
Integrating Social and Personal Theories of
Achievement Striving
Bernard Weiner
University of California, Los
Angeles
Empirical research clearly documents that attributions of failure to lack of
ability result in less punishment from others than do ascriptions to lack of
effort. In addition, personal attributions of failure to lack of ability result
in worse subsequent performance than do ascriptions to an absence of
effort. This paper provides a conceptual analysis of these empirical findings.
The interpretation is guided by a taxonomy of causal thinking and by
presuming that emotions mediate between causal thinking and action. In
addition, a distinction is drawn between a process versus a functional
understanding of achievement strivings.
A fuzzy yet useful and conceptually reasonable distinction can be drawn
between social and personal motivation. For example, how others react to the
shy or the handicapped in school—with help, flight, aggression, etc.—illustrates
what I mean by social motivation. On the other hand, how these stigmatized
individuals react to and cope with their plights exemplifies what I mean by
personal motivation.
Social motivation requires the psychological presence of another, and determines reactions to that person, dyad, or group. A fruitful psychological domain
for the study of social motivation is helping behavior. For example, in a typical
research investigation an individual is depicted in need of aid, such as a need to
borrow class notes, and some experimental manipulation, such as the reason for
the need or the characteristics of the needy, is introduced. How these antecedents
influence helping behavior is then examined. The mediating cognitions and affects
often are (but need not be) other-directed. As an example, sympathy or compassion
targeted toward the needy (e.g., students with a learning disability) may be probed
as a component of altruism.
Personal motivation, by contrast, can be studied in the absence of significant
others, as is usually the case in the analysis of achievement motivation. In many
investigations, a task is given along with some experimental manipulation, such
The current article is a modification of an address given at the American Psychological Association Convention, August, 1994, Los Angeles, CA. It was written while the
author was supported by Grant DBS-9211982 from the National Science Foundation.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bernard Weiner,
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024. The
author wishes to thank Jaana Juvonen for her comments on an earlier version of
this article.
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Weiner
as success versus failure. How these manipulations affect performance is then
determined. The mediating cognitions and emotions often are (but need not be)
self-directed or self-related. For example, subjective expectancy of success is
frequently analyzed in the study of achievement strivings.
Of course, contexts can be created in which the differentiation between social
and personal motivation is hard to maintain. Nonetheless, this contrast can be
heuristic and helpful in realizing the goal of the present article, which is to
integrate these aspects of motivation within a unifying theoretical framework.
What Is To Be Explained?
Theoretical understanding typically begins with an observation to be explained.
This empirical knowledge must be without question if progress is to be made.
It must be replicable and have the same certainty as the results when two chemical
elements, such as hydrogen and oxygen, are mixed in fixed amounts. What,
then, are the key findings pertaining to social and personal motivation in the
achievement domain?
Description: Social Motivation
There are many replicable observations, with what is thought to be essential
data intimately linked with one's theoretical stance. In the study of social motivation and its implications for achievement strivings, I think the central findings
pertain to the appraisal or evaluation of students as a function of the causal
attributions for their performance. Inasmuch as interpersonal evaluation can be
studied with judgment paradigms, which are relatively easy to craft, many investigations have yielded definitive evidence concerning the contrasting consequences
of ability versus effort attributions on performance evaluation.
Consider, for example, an early research study that I conducted with Kukla
(Weiner & Kukla, 1970). In that investigation, information regarding the performance of a pupil on an exam was given, along with his or her effort expenditure
and the level of ability of the pupil. Outcome was specified to be one of five
levels (excellent, fair, borderline, moderate failure, and clear failure), while there
were two levels each of effort and ability (high and low). Then all combinations
of these three sources of information were represented so that twenty different
types of student-situation patterns were depicted. For example, one student was
described as high in ability, low in effort, and successful, whereas another was
characterized as low in ability, high in effort, and unsuccessful, and so on.
The effects of these three variables, representing performance outcome (i.e.,
achievement level) and two possible causes of that outcome (effort and ability)
on achievement evaluation were then examined. The respondents, who were
asked to take the role of teachers, were instructed to provide feedback to students
in each of the conditions; feedback could range from maximum reward to maximum punishment.
Figure 1 depicts the results of this study. Examination of Figure 1 reveals that
achievement level is a very important determinant of reward and punishment—
overall, good performance tends to be rewarded whereas poor performance tends
to be punished. More germane to the issues addressed in this article, it is also
evident from Figure 1 that students described as putting forth effort are rewarded
more and punished less than students who do not try. This is true at each level
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Social and Personal Theories of Achievement
OUTCOME
FIGURE 1. Evaluation as a function of outcome, effort, and ability
Note. From "An Attributional Analysis of Achievement Motivation," by B. Weiner
and A. Kukla, 1970, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15, p. 3. Copyright
1970 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
of performance. Finally, and perhaps what initially is most surprising, those pupils
described as low in ability are evaluated more highly than students characterized
as high in ability. To understand the somewhat unexpected finding that low ability
is a "positive" characteristic in this experimental study, one has to take a closer
look at the rewards and punishments dispensed to the individual students. Figure
1 shows that pupils who are low in ability and try hard are very highly evaluated,
particularly when they succeed. Conversely, those high in ability who do not try
are appraised most negatively, especially when they fail. Hence, lack of ability
emerges as a "good" trait when accompanied by the other information.
Ignoring the influence of achievement level on evaluation, the most straightforward summary of the causal attribution results given failure is:
failure —> attribution to lack of ability (aptitude) —> no punishment
failure —> attribution to lack of effort —> high punishment
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These findings are without question, and I would venture to say that they are
pan-cultural and have been quite consistent over historical time periods (see
review in Weiner, 1986). Some have argued that the laws of social motivation
have little consistency over culture or time; I quite disagree with that position.
Description: Personal Motivation
Now I turn from social to personal motivation and present the central empirical
findings pertaining to intrapersonal behavior from an attributional perspective.
Given the conception to be championed here, what is of most significance is that
failure perceived by a student as caused by lack of ability or aptitude ("I cannot")
results in performance decrements, whereas failure ascribed to the absence of
effort ("I did not try hard enough") produces performance increments. A weaker
summary statement of these relations is that an attribution of failure to low ability
will result in poorer subsequent performance than an ascription to lack of effort.
These linkages are intuitively appealing and are supported by a wealth of evidence.
Consider, for example, another early investigation, this one by Meyer (1970).
Meyer manipulated task outcome (success vs. failure) and had students ascribe
their performance to ability, effort, task ease or difficulty, and luck, four salient
perceived causes of achievement performance (see Weiner, 1986). Given failure,
the findings regarding ability and effort, which are the only causes explored in
this article, are shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 reveals that the higher the attribution
of failure to low ability, the worse the future performance, whereas the higher
the effort ascription, the greater the enhancement of performance.
In addition to this class of investigations, studies contrasting helpless versus
mastery-oriented children, as well as experiments comparing ego- versus taskorientation, trace differences in performance between these types of children or
these achievement contexts to lack of ability as opposed to insufficient effort
attributions following failure (see, for example, Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Further,
the self-efficacy approach championed by Bandura (1986) has often documented
that the belief that "I cannot" has detrimental behavioral consequences across
virtually any learning setting.
I therefore feel some confidence in advancing the following sequences as
empirical facts:
failure —> attribution to lack of ability (aptitude) —> performance decrements
failure —> attribution to lack of effort —> performance increments
Summary of the Data
It is now possible to combine the effects of ability and effort attributions on
interpersonal evaluation and personal performance. The summary is as follows:
.,
..•!_.•
, , r ,-,.
íno punishment from others
failure —> attribution to lack of ability
\.
J -> i
[performance decrements
Γ
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Social and Personal Theories of Achievement
FIGURE 2. Change in speed ofperformance as a function of attributions (high versus
low) to ability and effort
Note. Data from Meyer, 1970.
failure
.t .
, , „ rn
fpunishment from others
attnbution
to lack of effort
->
f
[performance
increments
It must be remembered, however, that interpersonal evaluation and later performance as so-far discussed are independent, so that it should not be assumed
(at least, not yet) that punishment (or lack thereof) causes or influences later
achievement strivings.
The next task is to provide a theoretical account of these data. To accomplish
this, I first make a distinction between two stages of scientific progress that follow
description, namely, taxonomy and explanation. Then I distinguish between two
types of explanation: process (mechanism) and function.
Taxonomy (Classification) of Causes
Classification in psychology takes many forms, from the grouping of external
stimuli to the categorization of internal mechanisms and behavioral reactions.
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The taxonomic system of importance here bears upon the difference between
ability and effort as the causes of achievement success and failure. If the imposed
classification system is useful, then light should be brought upon why these
ascriptions have disparate consequences on interpersonal evaluation and performance.
There are, of course, a multitude of determinants of achievement outcomes.
Failure, for example, may be due to lack of effort, the absence of ability, poor
strategy, bad luck, the bias of teachers, hindrance from peers, illness, and on and
on. In a similar manner, and now considering the affiliative domain, a social
rejection might be perceived as due to poor interpersonal skills, the desired
partner already having plans, parental obstacles, the other regarding you as
"sloppy," and so on.
These diverse and manifestly different causes have common characteristics or
properties, and therefore may be genotypically similar in spite of phenotypic
dissimilarities. For example, ability, effort, social skills, and sloppiness all
describe (are internal to) the person, whereas teacher bias, hindrance from peers,
and the desired date being busy all place causality external to the individual. It
has repeatedly been found that locus is a fundamental property of phenomenal
causality (see Heider, 1958; Rotter, 1966). It therefore may be stated that lack
of math ability and being sloppy are, in at least one feature, similar causes of
achievement failure and social rejection, respectively, in that they are both internal
causes. In a similar manner, teacher bias and the desired date having already
made plans are both external causes of failure to attain desired goals.
A second causal property that will prove to be of great centrality in this article
is controllability, or the degree to which a cause is volitionally alterable. Lack of
effort is perceived as controllable or personally changeable. In addition, personal
characteristics, including "sloppiness," are often judged by others as alterable—
the person can try to be better dressed, etc. Lack of effort as a cause of failure,
and being viewed as untidy as a cause of social rejection, are therefore in some
sense similar in regards to their causal properties, for both are perceived as
controllable. Furthermore, low aptitude as a cause of math failure, and the desired
partner having prior commitments as a cause of affiliative rejection, are also
alike in that they would be construed as not controllable by the unsuccessful
person. Like causal locus, controllability has again and again been identified as
a basic dimension of phenomenal causality (see review in Weiner, 1986).
There is most likely one, and perhaps two, additional underlying properties
of causality. These relate to the generality of causal explanations over time
(causal stability) and over situations (causal globality). For example, low general
intelligence as a cause of math failure tends to be considered stable over time
and general across situations, whereas affiliative rejection due to the desired
partner having a prior engagement is likely to be considered unstable over time
and an appropriate explanation only in this specific context (see Peterson et al.,
1982). There is a vast array of evidence supporting the position that locus,
controllability, and stability/globality (which, for reasons of simplicity, are combined here) are the only replicable properties of phenomenal causality (see
Weiner, 1986).
Ability and effort would both be classified as internal to the performing individual. On the other hand, ability tends to be considered uncontrollable and stable/
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Social and Personal Theories of Achievement
global, whereas effort is controllable and unstable/specific. These two causes
therefore are similar in one basic attribute, but differ in two other fundamental
characteristics (see Table 1).
Given this analysis, differences in reprimand and personal performance following a failure that are associated with ability versus effort ascriptions cannot
be traced to the locus dimension of causality (considering this a dichotomous
classification of internal versus external). On the other hand, inequalities in the
reactions elicited given failure can be ascribed to either of the remaining causal
properties. Given this conclusion, the prior findings as illustrated in the research
by Weiner and Kukla (1970) and by Meyer (1970) may be represented as:
(
failure
lack of ability
r
„ U1
..
no punishment from others
uncontrollable
causality
< ;
,
.
..
performance decrements
lack
of
effort
U1
„ U1
..
from others
stable/general
causality
^ r (punishment
controllable
causality
<r c
.r.
,.
increments
Lperformance
r
4 U1 ,
unstable/specific causality
Taxonomic Significance
A specific fact, in and of itself, is of less interest than what that evidence more
broadly represents. It is of great importance that lack of effort has more detrimental
effects on interpersonal evaluation and more positive effects on achievement
striving than does lack of ability as the perceived cause of failure. But it is of
greater significance to realize that causal controllability and instability, which
are substantiated or materialized by lack of effort, generate more reprimand
and better performance than do causal uncontrollability and stability, which are
embodied within low ability (aptitude). This importance becomes apparent when
it is recognized that social rejection arising, for example, because one is too short
should have the same effects as failure in math because one has low aptitude,
inasmuch as both are uncontrollable and stable. Similarly, rejection because one
is "sloppy" should have the same effects as failure due to lack of effort, since
both are controllable and unstable. That is, it might be anticipated that reprimand
from others will be greater because of "sloppiness" than "height" attributions,
and that subsequent affiliative attempts will be more dampened by the "too short"
as opposed to the "sloppy" explanation. Classification is thus in service of
explanatory generality, one of the primary goals of scientific theory.
For the remainder of this article, attention is focused on the controllability
dimension of causality and how this can be elaborated within a conceptual
TABLE 1
A taxonomic analysis of the causal properties of ability and effort
Causal dimensions
Ability
Effort
Locus of causality
Internal
Internal
Causal controllability
Uncontrollable
Controllable
Causal stability/globality
Stable/global
Unstable/specific
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framework. This is not because the stability dimension is not equally important,
but rather because space constraints do not allow me to tackle both issues at
once as I move toward the scientific goal of explanation.
A Process (Mechanism) Explanation of Achievement Evaluation and
Performance
What psychological processes intervene between the onset of an event, such
as achievement failure, and the reactions to that event, including the appraisal
of others and personal performance? Reaching a causal understanding of why
the outcome occurred has already been presumed to be an essential part of the
process. In addition, placing the cause within a dimensional space is a second
step that is necessary in determining the psychological reactions that are displayed.
But this is only the beginning in understanding the complex intervening mechanisms.
Further analysis of the property of controllability reveals that it is an antecedent
or component of a more encompassing inference, that of personal responsibility
(see Weiner, in press-a, in press-b). Inferences of responsibility require that the
person being judged have freedom of choice, or free will (see, for example,
Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Shaver, 1985). Hence, a person failing because of lack
of effort is deemed to be personally responsible for that outcome inasmuch as
he or she can choose to expend effort or not. On the other hand, one does not
make a "decision" about aptitude. For this reason, failure due to lack of aptitude
does not produce inferences of responsibility.
It is essential to distinguish the property of controllability from responsibility
for two reasons. First, responsibility is an inference about a person—one is or
is not responsible for an action or an inaction. This is not true for controllability,
which in this context refers to a property of a cause. Second, one can decide to
withhold effort yet not be punished if there is a justification for this conduct.
For example, if one did not study for an exam because of the need to care for
a sick mother (a justification), then punishment surely would be withheld—there
was causal controllability but no assignment of responsibility for the failure.
This analysis thus introduces an additional step into the process relating ability
and effort attributions for failure to interpersonal evaluation and personal motivation:
achievement failure
lack of ability
uncontrollable
not responsible
no punishment from others, performance decrements
achievement failure —> lack of effort —> controllable responsible —> punishment
from others, performance increments
Further Elaboration of Motivational Mechanisms: The Role of Emotion
Imagine your feelings when your child is doing poorly in school because of
a refusal to do homework, or when you do poorly at something important because
you failed to put forth sufficient effort. Not only are there thoughts about controllability and responsibility in these instances, but there are also intense affective
reactions. However, in contrast to the discussion thus far, a distinction must now
be made between the other-directed affects that determine interpersonal evaluation
and the self-directed affects that influence personal motivation. Thus, the theories
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Social and Personal Theories of Achievement
of social and personal motivation diverge. My next task is to identify this divergence, but then show the interplay between the two motivational systems and
find a common umbrella.
Emotion and Social Motivation
This analysis begins with the basic assumption that how we think determines
what we feel. This is the underlying presumption of persons in the emotion field
who are known as appraisal theorists. In what manner, then, do thoughts about
responsibility and nonresponsibility for a poor performance of another direct
other-related emotions? The answer to this question is relatively straightforward
and supported by a great deal of empirical evidence. Assuming some personal
investment, when another is responsible for failure, anger is generated. You are
mad at the child who does not study and at a "loafing" athlete on a favorite
team. Anger is an accusation, or a value judgment, that follows from the belief
that another person "could and should have done otherwise" (Averill, 1982, 1983;
Frijda, 1986; Reisenzein & Hoffman, 1990; Roseman, 1991).
Both laboratory manipulation and self-report correlational research support this
view of anger, although responsibility judgments may not be the only precursor of
this feeling (see Berkowitz, 1993). In research conducted by Averill (1983), for
example, persons were asked to report about recent events that made them
angry. The study found that more than 50% of these incidents were considered
"voluntary"; that is, the harmdoer was fully aware of the consequences of the
action and the act was perceived by the victim as unjustified. These are antecedents
that promote judgments of responsibility. The next largest category of situations
that gave rise to anger (30%) was associated with an avoidable harm that was
not necessarily intended but was perceived as subject to personal control, such
as an injury resulting from negligence or carelessness. Hence, nearly 80% of the
contexts eliciting anger involved ascriptions to negative prior actions for which
the other person would be held responsible (see Weiner, Graham, & Chandler,
1982, for a replication of these findings).
In contrast to the linkage between responsibility and anger, the absence of
responsibility given the personal plight of another is associated with sympathy
and the related emotions of pity and compassion. Thus, athletic failure because
of a physical handicap and school failure because of the need to care for a sick
mother are typical predicaments that elicit sympathy, inasmuch as the person is
not held responsible for his or her negative plight.
There has been relatively little research on the antecedents of this emotion. In
one investigation, Weiner et al. (1982) asked college students to recall instances
in their lives when pity or sympathy was experienced. The most frequently
reported contexts involved observing others with handicaps and interacting with
the very aged. More broadly conceived, Wispé (1991) summarized that "one will
sympathize more with a brave sufferer, in a good cause, in which one's afflictions
are beyond one's control" (p. 134).
The Motivational Sequence
When emotional reactions to responsibility appraisals are included within the
motivational sequence, the conceptual systems for social motivation (behavior
towards others) following ability versus effort attributions for failure are:
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failure —> lack of ability —> uncontrollable —> not responsible —> sympathy —>
no punishment
failure —> lack of effort —> controllable —> responsible —> anger —> punishment
The addition of emotion suggests that feelings bridge thinking and doing; that
is, thoughts (about responsibility) tell us what emotion to experience, and that
feeling guides action. Concerning anger, a large body of evidence documents
that the experiencer of this emotion is directed to "eliminate" the wrongdoer—to
go toward that person and retaliate with some form of aggressive action, or to
go away from that individual and withhold some positive good or establish further
distance. Anger therefore is a "goad" that pushes the person to undertake selfprotective and/or retaliatory actions (see Averill, 1983). Sympathy, like anger,
also has motivational consequences. Sympathy tends to increase pro-social behaviors such as help-giving, and decrease anti-social conduct including punishment
(see, for example, Eisenberg, 1986). These motivational characteristics of the
emotions of anger and pity fit perfectly within the conceptions that have been
offered.
Emotions and Personal Motivation
How, then, do thoughts about responsibility and nonresponsibility for poor
performance direct self-related feelings? The answer to this question is not without
ambiguity, and what follows is the least definitive section in this paper in terms
of empirical certainty.
Many have suggested that self-responsibility for a negative outcome is an
antecedent for the experience of guilt. For example, Izard (1977) wrote:
The behavior that evokes guilt violates a moral, ethical, or religious code.
. .. Guilt occurs in situations in which one feels personally responsible.
There is a strong relationship between one's sense of personal responsibility
and one's threshold for guilt. ( p p . 423-424)
There have been a number of empirical verifications of this description of
guilt. For example, two colleagues and I (Weiner et al., 1982) asked college
students to describe a time they felt guilty and to rate the cause of the outcome
on controllability. The most frequent guilt-related situations involved lying to
parents, cheating on an exam, and being disloyal to a dating partner. Ninety-four
percent of these occurrences were rated as personally controllable by the guilty
person. Responsibility, which in this case may be reasonably inferred from the
controllability ratings, is perhaps not a necessary antecedent of guilt (see
Baumeister, Still well, & Heatherton, 1994), but it surely is one important precursor.
While there is sufficient thought and data to support the belief that an appraisal
of personal responsibility for failure (or some other transgression) may generate
guilt, there is both less theoretical clarity and less empirical evidence regarding
the affects generated when failure is due to causes that are internal yet uncontrollable, such as lack of aptitude. Elsewhere (Weiner, 1986) I have proposed that
shame follows from an ascription of personal failure to uncontrollable internal
causes, such as low ability. A few empirical studies have found support for this
position. For example, Brown and Weiner (1984) had students rate the extent to
which a variety of emotions would be experienced as a result of failure due to low
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ability. The most dominant responses were shame-related emotions (humiliation,
disgrace, and embarrassment). In general, theorists have associated shame with
helplessness and powerlessness (see Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). However,
as I previously indicated, the data regarding the cognitive antecedents of guilt
and shame, and the differentiating thoughts that result in these feelings, have not
been definitively determined.
The Motivational Sequence
When these presumed self-directed emotional reactions to responsibility judgments are included within the motivational sequence, the conceptual systems for
personal motivation following ability versus effort attributions for failure are
suggested to be:
failure
lack of ability
uncontrollable
not responsible
shame and embarrassment
performance decrements
failure
lack of effort
controllable
responsible
guilt
performance increments
Concerning the emotions of shame and guilt, there is reasonable evidence that
they do have contrasting affects on personal motivation, although this database
is also not definitively established. It has been contended that:
with shame, one expects abandonment and attempts . . . to hide or run away.
. .. there is a general picture of greater helplessness in the shame situation.
(Wicker et al., 1983, p. 27).
On the other hand, commenting on guilt from a sociobiological perspective,
Trivers (1971) stated:
guilt has been selected in humans partly in order to motivate the cheater
to compensate for his misdeed and to behave reciprocally in the future. ( p . 50)
Thus, the motivational characteristics of shame and guilt fit quite well within
the conceptions that have been outlined, bridging between self-responsibility
beliefs and behavior.
Integrating Social (Evaluative) and Personal Motivation
It is now possible to examine the full theories of social and personal motivation
and investigate their interrelationships. First, consider the consequences of lack of
ability ascriptions for failure on interpersonal evaluation and personal motivation:
sympathy
failure
lack of ability
uncontrollable
no punishment
not responsible
shame
performance decrements
These sequences suggest that sympathy (the other-directed emotion) and shame
(the self-directed emotion) are complementary and congruent. Furthermore, if
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there is a naive understanding of the laws of motivation, then sympathy and lack
of punishment from others in certain contexts will lead an individual to believe
that the other ascribes his or her failure to uncontrollable causes (e.g., low
ability), which should then increase that individual's personal beliefs about lack
of controllability and nonresponsibility, thereby increasing shame and producing
performance decrements.
There are indeed research investigations in support of these hypotheses. For
example, Meyer et al. (1979) created scenarios in which a teacher was described
as providing feedback to two students who did not perform well on an exam. One
of the two students received negative feedback in the form of verbal punishment,
whereas the second student was the target of no negative communication. Subjects
were then asked to infer which student the teacher perceived as less intelligent.
The data clearly revealed that the student not receiving negative feedback following failure was viewed as relatively unintelligent. These findings have been
conceptually replicated by Graham and Barker (1990).
Even more compelling evidence was gathered by Graham (1984) in a laboratory
investigation. Graham varied affective feedback to school-aged children following
induced failure at an achievement task. In one of the conditions the "teacher"
conveyed sympathy through both verbal and nonverbal cues (soft voice, leaning
forward, looking into the eyes of the other). The recipients of this feedback
were then asked to ascribe their failures to ability and effort. It was found that
sympathetic feedback increased personal attributions to lack of ability. Furthermore, lack of ability attributions were related to low expectancy of success, as
well as to lack of persistence at the task.
Although research studies to date have explored the influence of evaluation
on personal motivation, it also is quite possible that expressions of shame and
performance decrements will give rise to sympathy and less harsh evaluations.
That is, the relation between social and personal motivation may be bidirectional.
Now consider the consequences of lack of effort ascriptions for failure on
interpersonal evaluation and personal motivation. The two sequences that have
been proposed may be depicted as follows:
anger
failure
lack of effort
controllable
punishment
responsible
guilt
performance increments
These sequences suggest that anger (the other-directed affect) and guilt (the
self-directed affect) are complementary or congruent. Hence, if anger from others
is "accepted," then there should be increased inferences of self-responsibility,
which raises guilt and improves performance. The research just reviewed by
Meyer et al. (1979) and by Graham (1984) also examined these hypotheses. In
one condition in the investigation by Meyer et al. (1979; see also Graham &
Barker, 1990), teacher feedback to a student following failure was anger. Research
participants viewed the failure of this hypothetical student as due to lack of effort,
and the student was perceived as high in ability. And when Graham (1984)
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Social and Personal Theories of Achievement
communicated anger to children following their failure, using cues such as a
loud voice, those individuals tended to ascribe their poor performance to lack of
effort. This was related to high subsequent expectancy of success and
increased persistence.
If social and personal motivation are completely bidirectional, and if anger
and punishment from others increase guilt and personal performance, then expressions of guilt and performance increments should increase anger. However, this
is not the case. There is an abundance of evidence that communication of guilt,
which is one component of confession, reduces anger (see Weiner, in press-b).
And it intuitively follows that performance increments should have the same
result. Thus, the effects of each system on the other are not necessarily symmetrical.
Achievement Change Programs
Inasmuch as effort attributions are presumed to increase performance, whereas
lack of ability attributions decrease performance, it is reasonable to anticipate
that achievement change programs attempt to alter attributions of failure from
lack of ability to lack of effort (see review in Forsterling, 1985). In so doing,
all the components in the systems should also be altered—attributions from
uncontrollable to controllable, responsibility inferences from nonresponsible to
responsible, affects from shame to guilt, and performance from bad to good.
Research has not been undertaken to determine if such patterns of alterations
indeed occur, although the evidence is quite convincing that attributional change
programs can be effective. Our discussion does suggest that communications of
anger and punishment will prove more effective than sympathetic feedback and
the absence of reprimand. However, it is obvious that this needs further study,
and this principle should not be accepted without considering qualifying conditions and mitigating circumstances.
Furthermore, what one considers effective also depends on the goals one has.
It some instances, persistence in the face of failure is not instrumental to longterm success, and it would be beneficial for the learner to alter the direction of
his or her energies (see Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982). In that case, conveying
a great deal of sympathy and withholding punishment might paradoxically be
the best method of inducing achievement change.
A Functional Explanation of Appraisal and Personal Motivation
I have now considered the motivational process at both the social and intrapersonal levels. Previously it was suggested that there may be two types of explanation of motivational phenomena: process (or mechanism) and function. Attention
therefore is now directed to the function of the affects and actions that have been
implicated in the motivational process.
First, however, let me elaborate on the distinction between a process (or
mechanism) explanation and a functional interpretation of behavior. Consider
the analyses of the behavior of a stickleback fish, a topic included in many
introductory psychology textbooks but unfortunately omitted from a discussion
of achievement motivation. It is now known that the color red, which is on the
belly of the fish, acts as a sign-stimulus that releases an innate attacking response.
These mechanisms are involved in the action sequence and in part "explain"
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Weiner
the aggressive behavior. But a functional interpretation, which often includes
evolutionary considerations, examines the significance, or meaning, or the ulti­
mate consequences of the act. In this case, the attack response chases the attacked
fish into another territory. As a result, the attacker is more likely to pass on
personal genes through reproduction. In addition, there is spreading of the species;
this enables all the fish to have better access to food, thereby abetting their sur­
vival.
It is essential for process to be in service of function, so that the two types of
explanation are compatible. For example, in Hullian psychology the motivational
process is represented by the mathematical equation that behavior is a function
of Drive X Habit. The values given to these concepts "explain" why the organism
does what it does. But drive is an activator of behavior, so that the organism is
more likely to find food when hungry and survive. Thus, behavior is explained
by the mathematical representation, as well as by the principle that activity is
instrumental to personal preservation, and these two explanations are in harmony
with one another. Imagine, for example, an equation stating that drive detracts
from motivation. Then hungry organisms would most likely remain inert, which
would result in nonattainment of food, and death. The process would then be
inconsistent with a functional interpretation.
A Functional Interpretation of Evaluative Responses
Why should a pupil be punished for not trying? The answer is perhaps best
articulated in arguments advocating the sentencing of those who have engaged
in criminal activities. The functions and purposes of criminal punishment include:
1. Reform, so that the individual "learns a lesson" and therefore is less likely
to engage in the same action (or inaction) again. This is consistent with
rehabilitative and utilitarian principles of punishment.
2. General deterrence, so that others are informed that they will be punished
if they engage in such behavior.
3. Retributive justice, so that we give others their "just deserts." A moral
balance is thought to be established by an "eye for an eye" or a "tit for
tat" philosophy. This forms the basis for many prominent theories of justice.
Perhaps the basis for adhering to this principle is that, when considering
the general welfare of society, it is presumed that all must "carry their
weight" and, although lack of effort most harms the "lazy" individual, it
also is the case that the entire society is adversely affected. The student
who does not try in school asks others to sacrifice their "personal fitness"
for his or her well-being, in that it is likely to be assumed that lack of effort
at school will subsequently cause the individual to be a burden on society.
Hence, the emotion of anger that is elicited by inferences of personal responsi­
bility for failure, and the punishment that this affect generates, are functional for
the preservation of self and society. It is evident, therefore, that the process and
the function of behavioral reactions to lack of effort are in accord.
Λ Functional Interpretation of Personal Motivation
The motivational function for personal motivation can be best understood if
the assumption articulated by Heider (1958), that both "can" and "try" are neces570
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Social and Personal Theories of Achievement
sary for goal attainment, is accepted. If failure is caused by lack of aptitude,
which is not controllable, then success cannot be achieved (assuming a necessary
threshold of capacity has not been reached). It therefore would be dysfunctional
(in most instances) to continue to expend effort. Hence, it could be argued that
the emotion of shame has evolved to prevent the person from persisting in the
face of an unattainable goal (see Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982).
On the other hand, effort is controllable. Hence, failure due to lack of effort
gives rise to affective reactions (guilt) that promote increased "trying." This should
result in goal attainment. Again, then, process and function are interdependent.
On Integrating the Functional Goals of Evaluation and Personal
Motivation
It is evident from the above discussion that the evolution of social and personal
processes go hand in hand in serving ultimate survival goals of the organism.
Both sympathy and shame, manifested behaviorally as the absence of punishment
and withdrawal, are functional given situations in which goal attainment is
unlikely. On the other hand, both anger and guilt, manifested behaviorally as
punishment and increased goal striving, are functional in contexts where goal
attainment is possible. These emotional and behavioral responses follow from
lack of ability and lack of effort attributions for failure, respectively.
A Final Note
I began this paper with the statement that a distinction can be drawn between
social and personal motivation. At the same time, I indicated that these motivational systems do interact. In addition, a second differentiation, yet coupling,
was suggested between process and and functional interpretations of motivation.
These differentiations yield both process and functional interpretations of social
and personal motivation, and interdependencies between them. A general theory
of motivation must attend to and incorporate all these possibilities and complexities.
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Author
BERNARD WEINER is Professor, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90024. He specializes in
motivation and social psychology.
Received June 3, 1994
Revision received July 5, 1994
Accepted July 11, 1994
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