~
Technology ln Society, Vol. 16, No. 2. pp. 173-197, 1994
Copyright ~ 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd
Printed in the USA. Ali rights reserved
0160-791X/94 $6.00 + .00
Pergamon
0160-791X(94)E0004-
V
The Global Interdependence of National
Innovation Systems:
Evidence,
Limits, and Implications
Jorge Niosi and Bertrand Bellon
ABSTRACT. The authors discuss the concept of a national system of innovation
(NSI) in the context of increased globalization in scientific and technological
activities. The international dimension of NSI is reviewed, and, for some of the
largest industrial countries, the importance of the internationalization of science
and technology, as opposed to their internal or domestic production and diffusion,
is estimated. A working definition of the concept of NSI and some of the theoretical
issues at stake are presented. Some major dimensions of the globalization of science
and technology are addressed. These dimensions are then measured using
American, Canadian, and Western European data. The importance of international
innovative processes in relation to NSIs is compared with that of the domestic ones.
The concept of a national system of innovation (NSI) was developed in
the mid 1980s by B.-A. Lundvall,l who was inspired by the 19th-century
German economist Friedrich List's notion of national production
systems. The idea of NSI was immediately adopted by authors in the
fields of economics and politics of technology, including C. Freeman2 and
R. Nelson.3 Several books and many articles are devoted either to a
Dr. Jorge Niosi is Full Professor of the Department of Administrative Science
at the University of Quebec, Canada, and Director of the Center for Research
on the Development of lndustry and Technology since 1986. He is the author
or editor of eight books, including Technology and National Competitiveness
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991). He has also published
nearly 30 articles in refereedjournals.
Dr. Bertrand Bellon is Prof essor of lndustrial Economics and Management at
the University of Paris. He has published 10 books and many articles on
French and American industrial policy, including Uinterventionnisme libéral
(Paris: Economica, 1989).
173
174
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
theoretical clarification of NSI or to a discussion of NSl's empirical
application in different countries and societies.4
The main idea behind the NSI concept is that countries structurally
differ in the way they conduct technical change, both at the level of their
socio-economic institutions, such as industrial firms, and at the level of
public policy for promoting innovation, which pertains to industrial and
technological policy, universities, and public laboratories. The United
States, for instance, like the United Kingdom and the former US SR,
have for a long time, through public policy for research and development
(R&D), given priority to the promotion of defense technologies. Many
corporations in each of these countries are at their best when developing
product and process technology for the manufacture of military goods
under cost-plus agreements with government agencies. On the other
hand, Japan and Germany have emphasized the development of civilian
technologies in the private sector. U.S. corporations have promoted
Henry Ford-style mass production techniques, whereas Japanese firms
have developed more flexible process methods. Canada's public policy
has supported the development of energy and telecommunications
technologies and energy-intensive mass-production industries.
Linked with evolutionary and institutional economics and anchored on
bounded rationality as the basic model for human action, the NSI
concept allows for the emergence of learning processes, both at the level
of the firm and the level of the individual, and leaves room for economic
and political institutions, their strategies, and their routines. It also
incorporates the thermodynamic theory of open systems and allows for
variation, selection, and imitation in the behavior of economic agents.
Currently, the concept of NSI needs to be clarified and applied
empirically. Its usefulness in explaining the technological performance of
countries is still uncertain, as is its precise definition. One major obstacle
that may hinder NSI's future development is the movement to
internationalize
or globalize science and technology. ln an era of
increasing delocalization of R&D laboratories, swelling international
technological alliances, intense cross-border technology transfers, and
overseas scientific cooperation, what is left of NSIs? Will NSIs disappear
because supra-national blocs, such as the European Community (EC) and
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),have formed? How
important are national differences compared to catching-up processes
and international convergence? Is the life cycle of the NSI concept so
short that it will have to be abandoned before it is universally accepted?
1. NBI: The Concept and the Theoretical Issues
As several authors have pointed out, the proponents of NSI do not share
the same semantic background when they define it. Lundvall concentrates
.
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
175
on the interaction
between private firms and the subsequent
networking that supports interactive learning followed by technical
change. Freeman emphasizes the importance of the social innovations
that accompany every new techno-economic paradigm; unlike Lundvall,
he also stresses the role of state and government policies in supporting
technical change. Nelson's concept of NSI is based on an evolutionary
economic framework and on his work regarding the role of public policy
in innovation. Nelson argues that the innovation system is larger than
the R&D system, and includes government as a guiding institution and
universities as purveyors of basic scientific knowledge.
A synthetic definition that brings together most of these different
components and stresses the possible linkages among the different
institutions was coined by J. Niosi, P. Saviotti, B. BeHon, and M. Crow:
"A national system of innovation is the system of interacting private and public
firms (either large or small), universities and government agencies, aiming at the
production of science and technology within national borders. Interaction among
those units may be technical, commercial, legal, social and financial, inasmuch as
the goal of the interaction is the development, protection, financing or regulation
ofnew science and technology."5
ln this assessment, the majority of the innovating units are private
corporations, but government is the dominant element of the system,
since it provides NSIs with R&D funds; scientific and technical
personnel; rules such as those on inteHectual property, standards, and
antitrust; basic scientific knowledge; and guidance, including military
and civil objectives. The quality and quantity of these government inputs
determine the characteristics of NSIs.
NSIs are parts of larger systems: national production systems, which
include social and political institutions. For example, in 1989, in
Canada, only 1,571 out of approximately 42,000 manufacturing firms
performed R&D, in the sense defined by the Frascati Manual. Some 20
out of 50 universities could be considered research universities. ln the
United States, more than 16,000 manufacturing firms, out of nearly
half a million, conducted formaI R&D. ln France, some 2,700 out of
34,000 industrial firms with more than 10 employees conducted R&D
programs; of those, 175 companies were responsible for 64% of the
country's indus trial R&D expenditures. Nevertheless, most firms
within the same economy, whether or not they conduct R&D projects,
share some characteristics, like the propensity to a more intensive use
of locally abundant factors, be they land, energy, capital, or skilled
labor; the implementation
of local regulations and socio-cultural
institutions; and specific national and regional dynamics of incremental
innovation. Several analyses have characterized
the behavior of
Japanese firms and their propensity to innovate using external sources
ofknowledge, comparing them with firms in North America or Western
176
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
Europe.6 Other analyses have shown the regional bases of many
innovation processes.7
Not aIl government agencies participate in NSI equaIly. ln each
country, the departments of industry, higher education, defense, and
communications are usually the most active in developing domestic
technologies, either in the pursuit of national goals or other, more
specifie objectives. ln Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MIT!) has historically been the government agency most active
in adopting foreign technologies and developing local ones. ln the D.S.,
the Department of Defense has been, for the last 50 years, the key public
supporter of technologieal change. The specifie government agencies that
actively participate in NSI vary from one country to another, and the
patterns of interaction between these agencies and the private sector
change through time.
This is tantamount to arguing that NSIs are historically rooted and,
like learning processes, institutions, firm routines, and technologies,
share cumulative traits, including path dependencies and trajectories.
NSIs are open systems that relate to domestic and international
environments. The degrees and types of their openness differ from one
country to another. Socialist NSIs, for instance, have shown a
remarkable degree of indifference to foreign influences, and have
suffered from scientific and technical isolation. On the other hand, the
American and Canadian NSIs have been extremely open to foreign
influences, which arrived in the forms of massive inward and outward
FDI and large numbers of immigrant scientific and technical personnel.
J apan and Korea have been open to foreign technological, organizational,
and scientific knowledge, but less so to foreign personnel and foreign
direct investment.
2. Systemic Openness and the Globalization of Science
and Technology
Interaction and openness indicate some degree of convergence among
NSIs. Through the adoption of foreign routines and foreign technology
and science, NSIs partially converge in an asymptotic way, as shown in
Figure 1. Social, technical, and scientific convergence are specifie
dimensions of the catching-up process, through which some nations,
namely the newly industrialized countries, join the small group of oIder
industrialized
nations. Openness, however, is accompanied by an
increase in international cooperation and competition among firms and
different national governments, which fosters accelerated technical
change and increased risk of exclusion from international flows of
science and technology for countries not participating in the processes,
and an increase in specialization, since international scientific and
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
~-(
~
--
Partial
convergence
of NSIs
in industrial
markets
economies
""...----
'-~.------------.--~.-.-1950
177
-- ---
'
1990
Figure 1. Asymptotic Convergence
Divergence
of socialist
economies
of NS
technological flows may tend to increase the national skill endowments
of some countries at the expense of those of other countries. Thus, we can
argue that the degree of openness of the economies determines the
scientific and technological imitation and convergence occurring in the
more open systems, and the parallel processes of divergence and
exclusion in the closed ones. Convergence does not mean uniformity; it
coexists with relative diversity and exclusion.
An increasing number of authors contend that scientific and
technological knowledge is becoming globa1.8This assertion implies that
through the foreign R&D laboratories developed by multinational
corporations, technology is easily diffused and easily produced,
regardless of national frontiers. NSIs would thus be less relevant thah
they are, since technology is created by web enterprises. However,
technology can be created and diffused through mechanisms other than
those included in the theory of globalization. The following are other
means through which science and technology cross borders.
International
technical alliances formed by both national and
multinational firms crea te new and improved technology through
research projects conceived and executed across national frontiers.9
International technology transfer among developed countries is on the
rise. This places technological convergence on the agenda, regardless of
national policies and frontiers. Since the 1970s, international trade in
high-technology goods and services has increased exponentially, diffusing
embodied technology through most developed and newly industrialized
countries. Concerning basic scientific knowledge, the flow of researchers
and graduate students from country to country has increased
dramatically in the last few decades. Also, scientific research is now not
only more widely produced, but is as diffuse as ever. It is accompanied by
178
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
rising international coauthoring of papers and cross-border publication
by national authors.
However, globalization theories assume some or aIl of the foIlowing
hypotheses: a trend towards homogeneous goods and services, a massive
delocalization of industry, complete deregulation of production, perfectly
fluid capital markets, and appropriation
of aIl technology by
multinational corporations.
If aIl of these arguments are true, NSIs are either disappearing or
their frontiers are increasingly blurred as international flows among
innovating units become as important as domestic ones. Let us examine
these contentions in more detail.
2.1. R&D by Multinational Firms
ln the economic literature, there exist opposing views concerning the
goals and trends of foreign R&D activities of multinational corporations
(MNCs). R. Ronstadt10 adopts the product life cycle model to explain the
international R&D activities of American firms. According to Ronstadt,
D.S. corporations, with few exceptions, have set up foreign research
facilities to adapt their basic technology to overseas markets in the
context of their foreign direct investments. When product or process
adaptation is not required, expatriate R&D facilities are not created.
And when they are created, says Ronstadt, "these R&D investments will
be small, low cost commitments for transfer of technology work."
Ronstadt maintains that global technology units that enjoy world
product mandates in foreign countries, like those of IBM, are exceptions
rather than the rule. He argues that MNCs introduce no major change to
the international production of science and technology. A similar view is
held by K. Pavitt,l1 according to whom innovative activities remain
concentrated in home countries of MNCs. Pavitt shows that the large
majority of original patents of large MNCs are requested in the home
countries of these firms. Expatriate R&D laboratories would only
marginally contribute to the creation of new technology.
The results of some specific analyses concerning individu al industries,
such as the automobile industry, are consistent with previous findings.
Out of 20 large multinational car assemblers, only two - GM and Ford
in Europe - have foreign R&D facilities large enough to conduct the
entire design, prototype development, and testing of new vehicles.12 The
overwhelming
majority of R&D expenditures
of the automobile
assemblers are limited to the home country of the corporations. ln the
automobile industry, foreign R&D laboratories are adaptive and
auxiliary facilities.
Many factors have been advanced to explain this type of strategy.
Economies of scale in R&D operate in favor of geographically
concentrated research. Protection of industrial property against foreign
competitors also tends to locate research in the home country. Transaction
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
179
costs, such as communication, transportation, management, and legal
costs, are minimized when the R&D facilities are close to headquarters.
ln other industries, including the nuclear and defense research
industries, the same tendency towards geographical concentration closeness to the parent company's central office and to government
headquarters - is exhibited.
Nevertheless, some industries show a tendency to locate important
departments and research personnel within expatriate R&D labs. The
pharmaceutical industry is one of them.13 Having far from normal
product life cycle strategies, pharmaceutical
corporations create
substantially autonomous multiple research facilities in countries that
have large markets for pharmaceutical drugs, efficient patent laws, high
stocks of scientists and engineers, strong competition, helpful
regulations for new drug development, and governments with empathy
towards industry. The pharmaceutical industry, like the biotechnology
industry, is one in which the only valuable asset of a research laboratory
is its personnel, and the role of economies of scale is not significant.
Company strategies include moves towards large talent pools in
countries with favorable legal, commercial, and political environments.
Similar considerations apply to other industries with expatriate R&D
facilities that enjoy high levels of independence from their parent
companies, such as the electronic hardware and software and advanced
materials industries. The largest electronics producers, including IBM,
Control Data, Siemens, Hitachi, and Toshiba, have developed large R&D
product laboratories abroad. Advanced materials producers situate their
laboratories close to users and sophisticated markets, wherever they
happen to be. Market considerations, factor endowments, and skilled
labor in the host country are conducive to the development of global
technology units or, at least, international product mandates in foreign
research labs. Thus, American companies in many different industries
will often give European mandates to their expatriate research
laboratories in order to capture local knowledge.
Whatever the specific strategy, it is clear that foreign R&D laboratories
are conducive to increased international flows of technology, and that
many of their objectives are international, not national. The more control
foreign entities have over the R&D in a country, the less applicable the
concept of NSI is, since a major share of the nation's research
laboratories would execute foreign-made strategies.
2.2. International Technical Alliances
Since the early 1980s, a massive movement towards technical
cooperation has been observed in aIl developed countries among firms of
aIl sizes, and among enterprises, universities, and public laboratories. A
part of this technological collaboration is international: It takes place
between units of different countries. This technical collaboration takes
180
J. Niosi and B. Bel/on
two major forms: specific R&D projects formalized by memoranda of
agreements (MOUs) and international
R&D and production joint
ventures. A 1992 one-billion-U.S.-dollar research agreement involving
IBM, Siemens, and Toshiba to create a new generation of powerful
memory chips is one major example of this type of collaborative project.
Sometimes, the technological collaboration includes production and
marketing clauses. Initiated in 1991 by Motorola (U.S.) and Northern
Telecom (Canada), an R&D project to develop compatible interfaces for
use between the cellular telephones of the former and the central
switching systems of the latter was successfully concluded one year later,
and was followed by the creation of a marketing joint venture.
Since the early 1980s, European intercommunity collaboration was
promoted by the creation of many public programs such as ESPRIT,
RACE, BRITE, JOULE, and EURAM. It was further nurtured by the
development of the EUREKA Program in 1985. These European
programs supported international
collaboration among the firms,
universities,
and public laboratories
of different EC countries.
Consequently, compared to unsupported international collaborations
such as those among American, Canadian, and Japanese firms, or even
those between European
and non-European
firms, inter-EC
international collaborations are more precompetitive. The others are
directed more towards the development of new or improved processes
and products.
Whether they are organized for precompetitive research or to develop
marketable products, international technical alliances create new
technology across borders and, thus, reduce the impact of domestic
factors such as government
policies and domestic resources.
International user-producer interaction now abounds, together with
vertical and horizontal collaborations.
2.3. International Technology Transfer
Most international flows of technology take place among developed
countries, reflecting the lesser technical gap that exists among them, as
compared to the wider gulf dividing industrial and underdeveloped
nations. The international transfer of technology may occur either within
the boundaries of multinational
corporations (MNCs) or between
independent firms. ln the first case, technology flows under the control of
the parent company, thus minimizing the risks of leakage and reducing
transaction costs. Technology transfer between independent corporations
takes place because some firms, especially small- and medium-sized
enterprises, are unable to internalize the transaction due to a lack of
resources or the influence of market forces.14 International technology
transfer further obliterates the frontiers between nations, as firms in one
country incorporate technology created in others. Like international
technical alliances, this type of flow is not easy to discover because, in
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
181
both cases, it consists of a myriad of private transactions, of which only
some aggregate dimensions are public knowledge. More specifically,
intrafirm technology transfers within multinational corporations usually
cross borders without any sort of financial counterflow or register.
Balance of technological payments capture only a part of the total flows
of technology transfers that occur across borders, but they are the only
existing proxy for these transfers.15 Patent figures also capture some of
the action, but they involve more the international protection than the
international flow of technology.16
2.4. International Trade of Capital Goods
Technology also crosses borders through the trade of capital, industrial
plants, and high-technology goods such as machinery and electronic
office and telecommunications equipment. Even though this is embodied
technology, it incorporates a dimension of knowledge. ln order to operate
these types of goods, the buyer (user) needs to learn about the capital
goods they require. This knowledge-creating process (learning by using)
may become the foundation upon which the user bases a learning process
that may be conducive to the adaptation, modernization, and eventual
independent production of the goods.17
2.5. International Flows of S&T Personnel
International
flows of technical and scientific personnel have, for
centuries, been the most important, even the sole, mechanism for
transfer of technology among nations. Skills moved from one nation to
the other, together with the persons bearing them. Today, this channel of
technology transfer is much less important in relative terms, since
knowledge crosses borders on many other types of carriers, such as
manuals, models, blueprints, schemes, designs, and instructions for the
use of machinery and equipment. Also, the technological revolution in
telecommunications
has rendered obsolete and uneconomical the
physical movement ofpersons across borders.
Nevertheless,
an international
flow of scientific and technical
personnel still takes place, since knowledge is partially uncodified, tacit,
and difficult to transmit without some kind of demonstration and
personal interaction. Thus, scientists and technicians still move from one
country to another for the purposes of teaching, researching, and
learning. International brain drain involves the movement of researchers
from the South to the North, and from Eastern Europe to Western
Europe and North America.18
ln the opposite direction, students obtaining advanced degrees in
developed countries are going back to their countries of origin, thereby
increasing the latters' scientific and technical capabilities and reinforcing
their NSIs.
182
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
Besides, scientific and technical personnel flow from one country to
another for economic, social, and political reasons. This flow modifies the
stock of skills that each nation possesses, regardless of national policies
concerning education and training. As such, the flows affect the
development and efficiency ofNSIs.
2.6. Joint International Science Projects
The internationalization
of the national systems of innovation also
includes scientific dimensions. Scientists working in universities, public
laboratories, or private corporations in different countries increasingly
collaborate on the production of scientific knowledge. The reasons for
these cooperative efforts are the international differences in the levels of
scientific capabilities and in the various national specializations (EC,
1991). Research programs requiring complementarities, accelerated
innovation,
scale economies, access to frontier research,
and
diversification often organize projects across borders. The rewards
system in the scientific community, the higher chances of success, and
the greater diffusion of knowledge contribute to the growth of
international scientific cooperation.19
The results of an increase in scientific cooperation are an increase in
the number of published articles coauthored by scientists in different
countries, the number of countries that participate in international
copublication, and the number of multiauthored articles.
3. Measuring Internationalization
This approach to NSIs suggests several parameters that may converge,
fostering trends towards a global uniformization in technology, or diverge
into national specificities. Some statistical evidence about the extension
of current NSIs' openness follows.
Some methodological caveats are necessary at this point. Science and
technology indicators are produced by national government agencies.
Some of the definitions and measurement techniques of these indicators
have been standardized, and permit us to produce comparable national
and international statistics. Most concepts and methodologies, however,
vary from one country to another, and are notoriously incomplete. Also,
some indicators are more useful and more reliable than others:
Expatriate R&D, international alliances and technology transfer figures
are more likely to reflect true technical flows than are patent or
embodied-technology trade statistics. Finally, some of these indicators
give some idea of the amounts of the flows and less of the direction of the
flows. With these caveats in mind, we have developed the following
statistics to measure international flows of science and technology.
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
183
3.1. R&D by Multinational Firms
Few countries publish figures on foreign-controlled R&D activities.
Among those that do are Canada, France, and the United States. The
scant figures show an increase in the share of internationalized R&D.
Some figures suggest that delocalized R&D tends to concentrate within
each block of the triad: U.S. with Canada; EC countries among
themselves; but Japanese R&D goes mainly to the U.S. (and not to its
NICs neighbors). At the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese enterprises
conducted some 2% of their R&D activities abroad, compared to 8.5% for
American firms and 25% for Swedish firms.20 The available comparative
figures show small increases in foreign R&D by firms in the largest
industrial countries.
Methodologically heterogeneous, and thus useless for intercountry
comparisons, the figures in Table 1 indicate that foreign-controlled R&D
is increasing in some countries (the U.S., the UK, and Sweden) and
decreasing in others (Australia, Canada, France, and Japan). The trend
towards delocalization of R&D probably exists, but it is far from linear,
universal, and continuous. More detailed figures exist for the U.S. and
Canada (see Tables 2 to 4).
U.S.-company-financed R&D abroad increased in the years 1979 to
1989, but decreased as a proportion of total company-financed R&D
(Table 2). The trend is not linear, and is observed in several industries.
On the other hand, foreign-controlled R&D in the U.S. has more than
doubled as a percentage (Table 3), with chemicals, electrical equipment,
and machinery representing more than 80% of the manufacturing total.
ln terms of countries, Canadian-controlled R&D represented more than
25% of the total foreign-controlled R&D expenditures in the U.S.
ln Canada, foreign-controlled
R&D has been decreasing as a
percentage of total R&D (See Table 4). The aircraft industry, in which an
increasing proportion of R&D is conducted by foreign firms, is an
exception to this general trend.
TABLE1. Shareof R&D Expenditures
Total R&D of Business
CountrylYear
Australia (Manuf.)
Canada (Total ind.)
France
Japan
Sweden
UK
USA (Manuf.)
Enterprises,
1981
Under Foreign Control in
1981 and 1989 (%)
1989
Difference
-6
-6
-5
-1
+7
+2
+6
51
45
44
38
17 (1977)
4 (1980)
7
15
5 (1980)
12
3
14
17
11 (1988)
Source: OECD, Politiques industrielles dans les pays de l'OCDE, Paris, p. 212.
N.B.: Data unavailable for Italy and Gennany.
184
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
TABLE 2. Company.Financed
R&D Performed Outside the U.S. by U.S.
Domestic Companies and Their Foreign Subsidiaries,
1979-1989 (%)
IndustriesIYear
1979
Chemicals
Drugs
Stone, clay, glass
Primary metals
Fabricat. metals
Machinery
Electrical equip.
Transport. equip.
Profess. instrum.
Non manufact.
AlI industries
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
11.9
12.1
C
C
2.0
C
17.2
4.2
1.3
5.2
9.7
11.1
9.2
10.3
11.6
13.1
10.1
13.5
C
C
C
2.5
5.9
C
3.0
C
10.6
9.1
6.8
6.0
9.0
C
7.2
0.6
9.7
6.9
10.3
7.2
0.8
8.7
5.6
8.9
C
0.5
6.8
6.0
7.8
3.5
1004
4.0
C
6.0
1.2
7.8
9.9
5.1
12.2
7.3
1.6
8.5
3.1
lA
3.5
2.6
004
6.0
C= Confidential.
National
Science Board, Science and Engineering
lndicators
1991, Washington
DC, 1991.
According to Statistics Canada, "ln 1989, there were 3,311 firms that
carried out R&D. Of these, 463 were un der foreign controI. Generally
speaking, foreign firms are larger than Canadian ones. The former
accounted for $1,788 million of total intramural expenditures in 1989,
compared to $2,880 million for Canadian-controlled companies."21 Thus,
foreign firms active in R&D were only 14%ofthe research-active firms, but
they accounted for 38.3% of the country's total intramural expenditures
(TIE). Nevertheless, the foreign-controlled share of TIE in R&D declined
from 48% to 38% between 1977 and 1989. More than 70% of foreigncontrolled R&D in Canada originates in the D.S. (Statistics Canada, 1991).
Conversely, the D.S. is the main destination of delocalized Canadian R&D.
3.2. International Technical Alliances
International technical alliances experienced rapid growth in the 1980s.
Nevertheless, their importance in total R&D expenditures is stilllow,
TABLE 3. Foreign
R&D Expenditures
1977-1989
in the U.S., By Selected
(%) and Millions
of Current
Industries,
US $
1977
1979
1981
1983
Manufacturing
851
1450
2898
3863
4866
5884
6747
Chemicals
483
98
69
773
229
129
1580
385
284
2037
613
350
2627
977
342
3220
1105
476
3656
1229
562
3110
8.8
777
4164
9.3
1212
5240
9.2
1550
6521
10.6
1666
7382
11.3
n.a.
Industry
Electrical
eq.
Machinery
AlI
industries
As % of allind.
Orig. Canada
933
4.8
74
1584
6.2
102
1985
1987
NationalScience Board, Science and Engineering lndicators 1991, Washington DC, 1991.
1988
185
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
TABLE4. Canada Intramural R&D Expenditures, Foreign-Controlled Firms 1975-89 (%)
Industry
Comm.eq.
Oil & prods
Aircraft
Machinery
Chemicals
AlI industry
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
33
96
51
61
68
48
26
91
38
68
63
43
25
72
37
68
62
41
25
76
53
65
67
44
10
71
56
n.a.
n.a.
38
20
50
61
n.a.
n.a.
35
11
66
75
n.a.
n.a.
35
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
38
Statistics Canada, Cat.88-202: Industrial R&D Statistics, Ottawa, various issues.
even in the more globalized industries. Thus, in the Canadian electronic
equipment manufacturing
industry, total alliance expenditure is
estimated to be 6% of TIE, with no more than one third of this figure
being spent on international alliances. Large private companies still
conduct more than 90% of their R&D in-house, whatever the industry.
And Canadian international alliances are equally divided between D.S.
and EC partners.22
ln the Netherlands, a survey conducted in 1989 of 7,500 companies
representing both manufacturing and service industries shows that
12.9% of the former and 8.5% of the latter were international. Foreign
collaboration rates were lower in other research institutions. Firms with
higher percentages of foreign cooperation were those that exported more
than 10% oftheir sales.23
ln 1990, the EC cooperative research programs supported only 10% of
the firms in France with a regular R&D effort, but these represented
55% of the industrial R&D effort in the country. ln comparison, national
programs mobilized 20% of the firms, representing 70% of the industrial
R&D effort.24 The authors conclude that EC programs that support
international collaborative research have been successful in promoting
intracommunity industrial cooperative R&D.
These isolated figures do not permit us to determine any major trend
in international collaboration. Scattered evidence, however, has led
many authors to hypothesize that international collaboration is on the
rise in aIl developed countries.25
3.3. International Technology Transfer
It is possible to measure the trend of international technology transfer
through payments and receipts from technological services as a
percentage of gross expenditure on research and development (GERD)
using the formula
Payments + receipts for technological services/2
GERD
186
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
The internationalization of the NSI in the G-7 countries is evidenced
by international technological transactions accounting for an increased
share of GERD. The same conclusion is also true for Canada.26 This
indicator can vary between 0%, indicating a situation in which the
country neither sells nor buys technology abroad, and 100%, indicating a
situation in which the country buys from abroad all the technology it
utilizes and sells overseas all the technology it produces. This
hypothetical situation would be a case of perfect internationalization.
This indicator shows a small increase in technology transfers between
1975 and 1990, and wide international divergences: Some countries
increased their participation in the global trade of technology (Germany,
Canada, and the United Kingdom), whereas others decreased their flows
as a percentage of national effort (Italy, Japan, and France). Some NSIs
are more internationalized (Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom)
than others (the US, Italy, France, and Japan).
Available information shows that the U.S. remains the largest
purveyor of technology in other developed and developing countries,
whereas intra-European
flows are very intense, as are CanadianAmerican ones.
These balance of payment flows (see Table 5) support not the hypothesis
of across-the-board globalization, but that of nonlinear, heterogeneous
trends and a weak.trend towards increasing international technology flows.
Another indicator of the globalization of technology is the decreased
share of domestic patents in the largest industrial countries. ln most G-7
countries, except for Canada and Japan, autosufficiency ratios
(exports/imports) have decreased.
Foreign patent applications indicate more than technology transfers.
Foreign patents are demanded to better protect a technology against
potential foreign free riders, especially in the cases of product exports or
direct foreign investment in the country of application. Nevertheless, an
increase in foreign patent applications indicates an increased potential
for technology transfer. Table 6 shows that foreign patents have rapidly
increased as a proportion of national patent applications in the G-7
TABLE 5. Technological
Balance of Payments
CountryNear
1975
1981
1985
1990
1990-1975
Difference
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
U. Kingdom
United States
6.6%
8.2%
6.2%
12.8%
4.0%
9.6%
6.5%
8.1%
8.2%
7.3%
10.8%
3.6%
6.9%
5.4%
9.6%
8.3%
5.4%
7.2%
3.0%
8.5%
3.0%
10.3%
7.6%
14.3%
6.8%
2.7%
10.6%
6.6%
+3.7%
-0.6%
+8.1%
-6.0%
-1.3%
+1.0%
+0.1%
Source: OCDE, Main S&T Indicators (Paris, 1992), and special tables.
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
187
TABLE 6. Autosufficiency Ratio:
DomesticlNational Patent Ratio
Country
1975
1980
1985
1989
Canada
0.07
0.30
0.07
0.25
0.08
France
0.09
0.18
Gennany
0.50
0.25
0.46
0.29
Japan
U. Kingdom
0.85
0.86
0.39
U. States
0.64
Italy
0.22
0.42
0.36
n.a.
n.a.
0.33
0.90
0.29
0.89
0.24
0.58
0.55
0.51
Source: OCDE, Main S&T lndicators,
several years, and
OECD, Basic Science and Thchnology Statistics (Paris, 1991).
countries except for Canada, in which the internationalization process
was already very advanced, and Japan.
Canada has always received more patent applications from the U.S.
than from other countries, but the EC now dominates foreign patent
applications in the United States, followed by Japan and Canada.
3.4. International Trade of Capital and High-Technology Goods
International trade in embodied technology is also a good indicator of
flows. We have selected three industries in which the technological
component is high: nonelectrical machinery (ISIC 382 excluding 3825),
computers and office machinery (lSIC 3825), and electrical machinery
(lSIC 383 excluding 3832). Autosufficiency ratios were calculated to
show whether trade increased over time.
The figures in Table 7 show an across-the-board decline in autosufficiency
ratios in both nonelectrical and office machinery, with Japan winning
competitiveness at the expense of other large industrial countries. The
largest declines in machinery autosufficiency are those in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Canada and Italy managed
to increase their autosufficiency in two out of three sectors. If anything,
these figures show an increase in interpenetration of high-technology
industries among the G-7 countries.
Besides, Canadian-American trade in embodied technology is now
superseded by Japanese-American and European-American trade.
3.5. International Flows of S&T Personnel
International flows, like other indicators, can be measured by the participation offoreign students in the graduate programs of developed countries.
The share of Ph.D. degrees granted to foreign students in the
developed countries is increasing, as are the total number of Ph.D.
degrees. ln the United States, the percentage of Ph.D. degrees awarded
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
188
TABLE 7. Trade in High-Technology
Industries:
Exports + Imports (Billions of Constant US $)
Non electrical machinery
Country
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
U. Kingdom
U. States
1971
49.1
97.7
379.3
200.6
241.8
260.7
306.0
1976
38.8
120.0
477.9
257.7
536.5
175.1
361.8
1981
46.7
114.9
362.7
240.9
818.7
194.1
247.4
1986
45.9
97.1
338.0
216.2
825.2
123.8
89.6
1990
37.0
82.2
268.9
226.1
494.9
115.9
120.8
1986
41.9
69.8
94.6
83.9
668.3
79.1
110.5
1990
46.5
58.9
66.4
81.6
396.5
83.7
94.9
Computers, office machinery
Country
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
U. Kingdom
U. States
1971
45.7
73.2
117.6
155.1
112.7
84.2
270.1
1976
50.6
77.7
131.6
108.2
204.6
77.4
217.8
1981
42.4
73.7
96.6
79.1
262.7
68.7
322.6
Electrical machinery (excl. radio, TV...)
Country
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
U. Kingdom
U. States
1971
25.7
116.7
217.1
125.1
441.6
199.7
160.9
1976
18.7
138.8
231.1
141.0
443.3
160.3
199.0
1981
29.9
146.7
213.8
200.6
834.5
121.3
142.9
1986
27.6
118.9
197.9
158.8
789.1
82.5
54.0
1990
31.1
110.9
165.9
145.2
435.4
85.1
76.7
Source: OECD, Special compilation.
to foreign students in relation to the total number awarded increased
from 20% to 29% between 1978 and 1988 for all disciplines.27 ln France,
foreign students represented 32% of all Ph.D. degree recipients in 1981
and 38% in 1989. The foreign students in France are mainly, but not
exclusively, citizens of other European countries.28 ln Canada, the
number of foreign Ph.D. students in engineering and applied science
departments increased, and the percentage soared from 33% to 44%
between 1976 and 1986. The figures declined in the social, agricultural,
and biological sciences.29
3.6. Joint International Publication
"ln 1986, nearly 8% of the world's scientific research took place within
the framework of international collaboration. Since then the percentage
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
189
has gradually increased."30 Between 1976 and 1986, joint international
publication of scientific articles soared. Articles coauthored by two or
more scientists working in different countries has nearly doubled since
1976. (See Table 8.)
Some indicators show regional clusters. The U.S. is the main location of
scientific collaboration involving Canadian scientific researchers, but the
EC is rapidly increasing its share of Canadian collaboration. Most
international scientific cooperation in the EC has taken place among EC
countries.31 M. Leclerc et al. conclude that "The intensification of
international scientific exchange does not result in modifications of
national systems, although it may significantly
affect internaI
functioning." 32
3.7. Major Conclusions on Flows
Several major conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the figures
presented. The first is that there are wide differences among countries in
the rate and types of globalization efforts when it comes to NSIs. Smaller
countries, including Canada, are at one end of the spectrum with higher
levels of flows of scientific and technological knowledge and embodied
technology crossing their borders. The larger non-European countries,
including the U.S. and Japan, are at the other end, being much more
self-sufficient and less affected by international technological and
scientific flows.
Secondly, aIl these types of flows are substantial, since most figures are
presently in the 10%-30% range when compared to national stocks. AlI
types of international flows are growing, and the rate of growth of some
of them has been accelerating for the last 10 years, indicating a speedup
of globalization trends. NSIs may appear less national today than they
were 20 years ago.
ln addition, the different types offlows differ in their intensity. Patents
have the highest degree of globalization, but are less indicative of actual
flows. Researchers, one of the best indicators of flows, have what is
TABLE 8. Internationally Coauthored
Articles for Major Countries
Country
1976
1986
Canada
France
Germany
Japan
U. Kingdom
U. States
12.4%
10.3%
9.7%
3.5%
10.0%
5.6%
19.4%
21.3%
20.9%
7.5%
16.6%
10.2%
Source: National Science Board, Science and Engineering
Indicators 1989 (Washington, DC, 1989).
190
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
probably the lowest degree of globalization. International scientific
cooperation and flows are more intense than technological ones, and
reflect the disembodied nature of pure knowledge, government support of
internationalization,
and scientific creation within mostly public or
quasi-public institutions.
Another major conclusion is that the EC appears to be the only
emerging major supranational scientific and technological block. Japan
is much less internationalized, and its internationalization is mainly
geared towards the V.S. Canada-V.S. interaction, in spite of NAFTA, is
less evident than interaction in the EC.
Finally, national policies play key roles, with some countries filtering
the flows (J apan), and others being more open to entry and exit of
science and technology resources and products (the VSA and Canada).
4. Open National Systems of Innovation
The postwar period is characterized by the appearance of a new technoeconomic paradigm that centers on the electronics and new materials
technologies, and on the more recent emergence of biotechnology.33
These generic technologies are characterized by, among other things, a
stronger reliance on science, accelerated technical change, the need for
standardization and coordination of independent innovating agents,
rising costs of R&D, and, above aH, a qualitative leap in complexity and
new organizational forms. These changes have been accelerated by a
rapid increase in international trade, the emergence of a multipolar
world, and, at least in the Western countries, increasingly open economic
and social systems. The internationalization of science and technology
that has been measured in the preceding section is only one dimension of
this process that modifies NSIs. ln this section, we argue that all NSIs
are open to a different degree, and that the links between national
systems and the dynamics of their interdependence
are keys to
understanding their national characteristics.
4.1. Innovation in Open Systems: Convergence vs Specialization
For centuries, economists have debated the roles of foreign trade and,
more generally, flows of factors through borders in economic
development and welfare. Two major, but opposing conclusions have
been put forth. The first is that under open frontiers, countries
specialize in the production of the goods and services for which they are
best endowed. The second is that the opening of markets brings
increasing convergence among nations. Several variants of these
hypotheses can be found.
The most generalized opinion is the classic and neoclassic contention
that free international trade will increase national welfare through
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
191
specialization. Countries would specialize in the production of the goods
and services that make the most use of the resources they possess. Both
classical and neoclassical economics refer to "natural" and "static"
factors, such as land and mineraIs, or slowly changing factors such as
population. Capital is considered to be immobile through frontiers, and
technology is considered to be free and readily available. Under these
restrictive assumptions, national technical systems tend to diverge
because each country specializes in using technology that is effective in
extracting
and transforming
its resources. And, under these
assumptions, the question of NSIs does not even arise, since innovation
occurs outside of the economic system.
Authors who are not as neoclassic also believe in specialization, but for
very different reasons. Porter argues that no country can pro duce
everything, and that even the largest industrialized economies are net
exporters of some goods and net importers of others. Specialization is, for
him, an observed fact and not the result of liberalized trade. National
specialization occurs not only on the basis of a country's natural
resources, but also on its skilled labor, economic infrastructure, and
organization and technology on the levels of the firm, the industry, and
the country. Cumulative learning effects, either through R&D,
cumulative investment in physical facilities, or distribution channels;
proprietary technology; brand reputation; and customer-supplier
relationships
are only some sources of long-term advantages and
specialization. Government, through effective technology and regulation
policies, may also enhance the competitive advantage of a nation in
regard to specific industries and technologies. ln other words, "firms gain
competitive advantage where their home base allows and supports the
most rapid accumulation of specialized assets and skills."34
This idea that assets, skills, and technology are firm-, industry-, and
nation-specific can also be found in the evolutionist theories of economics
and technology.35 Evolutionists criticize neoclassical assumptions of
similar endowments of technological capabilities, free scientific and
technological knowledge, and trade equilibrium mechanisms. Their
international trade figures show that stable specialization over time is
the norm, and that large firms represent a large share of each country's
international trade.
The concept of open NSIs is compatible with national specialization,
since it appears in evolutionist approaches, but is not confined to
them. ln other words, some of the proponents of the concept of NSI are
not evolutionists.36
The second conclusion, that openness brings convergence among
economic and technological systems, also admits many different
arguments. The general argument is that the productivity levels of
countries will converge because of the aging of technology embodied in
the capital stock of older industrial countries. The less advanced
countries can incorporate a more recent vintage of capital stock, thus
192
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
catching up with or overtaking formerly advanced countries. The
literature espousing convergence and catching-up theories is varied. The
more radical literature states that all countries do eventually catch up,
and that imitation and diffusion is inevitable.37 The life-cycle approach
theories suggest that aIl products will move towards developing
countries when they mature through foreign direct investment.38 Some
convergence theorists find convergence only among the few advanced
industrial countries39 or within groups of nations.40 For these latter
authors, the national stock of knowledge is the most important variable
in explaining the less-than-perfect diffusion of technology across borders.
Nevertheless, these approaches identify technology with capital stock
and measure its development through productivity growth.
Finally, a few authors have developed models that are compatible both
with convergence and specialization. J. Fagerberg41 argues that
technology gaps among nations decline not automatically, but, at least
partiaIly, on the basis of innovative activity and concerted efforts to
narrow the gap through public and private investments in knowledge
and technology. Similarly, C. Perez and L. Soete42 argue that catching-up
and convergence processes are easier to implement when new
technological paradigms appear and when basic science is still an
important factor in the innovation process.
Our approach is compatible both with specialization in the evolutionist
perspective and with partial convergence. Through imitation, technology
diffusion, and transfer, national systems may converge up to a certain
point. The limits of convergence are determined by different natural
factors, cumulative effects of industrial organization and specialization,
different national stocks of knowledge, and different national economic
and political institutions. The national degree of specialization and
convergence in production, innovation, and trade structures is a variable
and empirical question subject to measurement; it is not our goal to
produce any data in this area.
4.2. Globalization us Openness
Globalization implies a huge mobility of aIl productive factors, such as
labor, capital, organization, technology, and new materials. Globalization
theories, nevertheless, understate the fact that most technology is
industry-specific and resource-specific.43 Technology with commercial
value is usually appropriated either through patents or through secrecy.
ABsuch, general science migrates much more easily than technology, and
is somewhat closer to the neoclassical concept of free knowledge, an
important caveat of which is that only scientifically literate countries,
industries, and firms are able to use it.
Present trends are tending more towards internationalization
with
specialization than towards globalization. The new complexity of the
process of innovation is one of the most important factors that determine
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
193
the internationalization
of innovation. The internationally immobile
factors of innovation - highly skilled labor, niche markets, research
institutions, and regulation - must be incorporated wherever they exist.
Thus, the creation of international links between agents located in
different countries is necessary. ln several recent works,44 the concept of
globalization has been framed in a productive and commercial sense, and
linked to the activities of MNCs. Conversely, in a new techno-economic
paradigm developed by Freeman and Perez, innovating activities
themselves are delocalized.45 Also, an increasing number of the phases
of innovating activity, such as basic research, applied research, and
development, are being conducted by agencies that collaborate across
borders to produce the best possible technology. The internationalization
of innovation is therefore defined as a multidimensional process through
which some key stages of the innovative activity are conducted by agents
located in different national systems. Among these phases, the most
important are: fundamental or basic research conducted increasingly
through international scientific collaboration, and applied research and
development conducted either by interfirm alliances or through the
international network of R&D laboratories of MNCs, sometimes with the
help of universities and government laboratories.
The international creation of technology also induces an increasing
flow of technology across borders; the transfer of technology increases as
a result.
4.3. Previous Flows Do Not Disappear
International networks of innovators develop and modify existing local
and national networks. These international networks are created both by
multinational enterprises and by national firms. ln several cases,
government programs support these networks (CERN, Concorde, Airbus,
ESPRIT, EURE KA, BRITE, RACE, and ITER). Other international
networks, such as the recent mega-alliance between IBM, Siemens, and
Toshiba, are entirely private and receive no government support.
The territorial basis of previous flows remains. Local networks (large
urban technical centers, technopoles) still exist, develop, renew
themselves, and compete with each other. NSIs also exist and grow: Most
firms remain active only at the national level, and the most important
innovation policies are still national.
Our approach differs from those that emphasize exclusively, or even
mainly, regional networks of innovators,46 as well as those that argue
that innovation is essentially international.47 Our approach qualifies the
concept of national system of innovation. These three types of innovation
systems coexist, interact, and are mutually linked, as illustrated in
Figure 2.
The creative destruction discussed by Schumpeter goes on, and
encompasses not only firms and industries, as he argues, but also
194
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
National innovation
systems
1890-1960
Open national
innovation
systems (1960-»
=Districts D =Nations -
=Flows
Regional networks
(Marshallian districts)
circa 1890
x =Firms
0
Figure 2. Evolution
of Local and National Innovation
Systems
regions, national systems of innovation, and international networks.
Local, national, and international systems of innovation compete with
each other, and are more or less open and competitive, compared to other
systems at the same level.
4.4. Internationalization and the Changing Functioning of NSls
Internationalization has several effects on NSls. Public sector policies
toward the support of innovation become less relevant in the national
context. Companies are able to obtain public financing, highly skilled
personnel, and university and government laboratory collaboration
outside the national bord ers through technical alliances and the
expatriation of plants and R&D laboratories.
User-producer and other types of private sector interactions develop
across borders. ln North America, for instance, international alliances
tend to concentrate less on fundamental research than on development of
large projects. Such alliances are costly, organized on longer time frames,
and based on joint ventures more than MOUs. Examples of these
alliances are those involved in new aircraft turbine development, new
generation of memory chips, and vaccines against cancer and AIDS.
These flows induce convergence to the extent that organizational forms,
technology, and science move from the innovating countries to followers.
This movement brings convergence among NSIs. Conversely, these flows
may also bring specialization when factors of production move towards the
countries that present the best endowment profiles for specifie activities.
The Global Interdependence of National Innovation Systems
195
5. Conclusion
Our figures show an increased intertwining of NSIs. They also show
various levels of openness, with smaller industrial countries, including
Canada, N etherlands,
and Sweden, showing a higher degree of
internalization in their R&D activities. The figures also suggest that only
one major supra-national system of innovation is presently emerging: the
European Economic Community. Canada and the D.S. show a similar,
but less intense, interpenetration of their R&D activities. There seems to
be no similar supra-national system emerging that involves Japan.
From these empirical conclusions, three further implications may be
drawn. The first is theoretical: International networks develop on the
basis of NSIs. Systems of innovation are increasingly complex and
intertwined,
with regional, national, and international
levels of
innovative activities being integrated. Internationalization grows, but
does not suppress local and national networks; it modifies their
functioning, however, since some previously regional or national
activities are transferred to international networks.
Open systems of innovation correspond to flexible production systems.
These are characterized by the interaction of many different innovating
units under flexible and complex forms of coordination that include
technological alliances, delocalized R&D, international
scientific
cooperation, and technology transfer.
The second implication is political. Today, NSIs are held together by
the domestic policies of national states. However, if these international
systems keep developing, national states, which are presently the
gravit y centers of NSIs, will be increasingly unable to exercise their role.
National science and technology policies will foster international
coordination in the area of science and technology or disappear
altogether, leaving market forces alone to coordinate the production of
innovations. Only supranational states, such as the EC, will be able to
insure stability to international systems of science and technology.
International
policies will be required to regulate and support
international innovative activities.
The final conclusion is methodological. Statistical indicators need to be
developed for both stocks and flows, from technological trade balances to
market shares, and from national to international
and regional
comparisons. Presently, most statistics are national and are unable to seize
the complexity of the innovation process as it is currently structured: with
different layers of agents and flows. The present balances of technological
payments statistics are also incomplete and difficult to compare, because
they are collected using different definitions
and methods.
Internationalized R&D is almost impossible to capture with present-day
definitions and statistical methods. The need to add new indicators of
internationalization to the present ones in order to respond to the questions
raised by the increasing openness of NSIs is therefore an urgent one.
196
J. Niosi and B. Bellon
Notes
1. B.-A. Lundvall, Product Innovation and User-ProducerInteraction (Aalborg: Aalborg University
Press, 1985).
2. C. Freeman, TechnologyPolicy and Economic Performance. Lessons {rom Japan (London: Pinter,
1987); C. Freeman, "Japan, A New National System of Innovation," in G. Dosi et al. (eds.),
Technical Change and Economic Theory (London: Pinter, 1988).
3. R. Nelson, "Institutions Supporting Technical Change in the United States," in G. Dosi et al.
(eds), op. cit.
4. Among others, see M. McKelvey, "How do National Systems of Innovation Differ?," in
G. Hodgson and E. Screpanti (eds.), Rethinking Economics (Alshot: Elgar, 1991) J. Niosi,
"Canada's National System of Innovation," Science and Public Policy, Vol. 18, no. 11 (1991), pp.
83-2; B.-A. Lundvall (ed.), National Systems of Innovation (London: Pinter, 1992); J. Niosi,
P. Saviotti, B. Bellon, and M. Crow, "National Systems of Innovation: ln Search of a Workable
Concept," Technology in Society, Vol. 15, no. 2 (1993), pp. 207-227; R. Nelson (ed.), National
Innovation Systems (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
5. J. Niosi et al., op. cit.
6. K Oshima, "Technological Innovation and Industrial Research in Japan," Research Policy, Vol.
13, pp. 285-301; K Sakakibara and D. E. Westney, "Japan's Management of Technological
Innovation: TechnologyManagement Crosing Borders," in N. Rosenberg et al. (eds.), Technology
and the Wealth of Nations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
7. A. Saxenian, "The Origins and Dynamics of Production Networks in Silicon Valley,"Research
Policy, Vol.20, no. 5 (1991), pp. 423-438.
8. European Commission, The Nascent Globalization ofUniversities and Public and Quasi-Public
Research Organizations (Brussels: FAST, 1991); K Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York:.
Harper, 1991); R. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Random House, 1991); Organization
for Economie Cooperation and Development, Technologyand Economics: The Key Relationship
(Paris: OECD, 1992).
9. D. Mowery,"Collaborative Ventures Between U.S. and Foreign Manufacturing Firms," Research
Policy, Vol. 18 (1989); L. Mytelka (ed.), Strategic Partnerships and the World Economy
(Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1991).
10. R. Ronstadt, "R&D Abroad by US Multinationals," in R. Stobaugh (ed.), Technology Crossing
Borders (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 1984).
11. K Pavitt, "Internationalization ofTechnological Innovation," Science and Public Policy, Vol. 19,
no. 2(1992),pp. 119-123.
12. G. Maxcy, Les multinationales de l'automobile (Paris: PUF, 1982); R. Miller, Competitive
Dynamics and the Location of R&D Facilities: The Case of the World Automobile Industry.
Working paper #91-05-A(Montreal: CREDIT and Hydro-Quebec Chair, 1991).
13. J. H. Taggart, "Determinants of the Foreign R&D Locational Decision in the Pharmaceutical
Industry," R&D Management, Vol.21, no. 3 (1991), pp. 229-240.
14. J. Niosi and J. Rivard, "Canadian TechnologyTransfer to Developing Countries through Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises," World Development, Vol. 18, no. 11 (1990), pp. 1529-1542.
15. B. Madeuf, "International Technology Transfers and International Technology Payments:
Definitions, Measurements and Firms' Behaviours," Research Policy, Vol. 13 (1984),
pp. 125-140.
16. D. L. Bosworth, "Foreign Patent Flows to and From the United Kingdom,"Research Policy, Vol.
13 (1984), pp. 115-124.
17. M. Teubal, Innovation Performance, Learning and Government Policy (Madison: University of
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18. European Commission, op. cit.
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Technology ln Society
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